1 This is a joint application by six persons, who are being detained under the Internal Security Act 1960 for a writ of habeas corpus. They allege that their detention is illegal or improper.

2 The affidavits filed in these proceedings disclose the following undisputed facts. The first applicant, Lim Hock Siew, a medical practitioner, was arrested on 2 February 1963. At the time of his arrest he was a Central Executive Committee member of the Barisan Sosialis, a political party. On 16 February 1963 he was detained in custody under a detention order made under s 3(1) of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance 1955 the detention order being for a period of one year from 16 February 1963. The period of his detention was extended for a further period of 12 months by an order made on 1 February 1964 under s 3(1)(b) of the same Ordinance. On 1 February 1965 the Minister of Interior of Malaysia made an order under s 8(1)(a) of the Internal Security Act 1960 directing that he be detained for a period of two years. On 1 February 1967 the Minister of the Interior and Defence of the Republic of Singapore made an order under s 8(1A) of the Internal Security Act 1960 directing that he be detained for a further period of two years and this order was signed by the Permanent Secretary of that Ministry. He is presently being detained under the order of 1 February 1967.

3 The second applicant, A Mahadeva, was also arrested on 2 February 1963. At the time of his arrest he was a journalist and was the general secretary of the Singapore Journalists Union. On 16 February 1963 he was detained in custody under a detention order made under s 3(1) of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance 1955 the detention order being for a period of one year from 16 February 1963. He remained in continuous detention under orders made similar to those made in the case of the first applicant and is presently being detained under an order dated 18 February 1967 made by the Minister of the Interior and Defence under s 8(1A) of the Internal Security Act 1960, and signed by the Permanent Secretary of that Ministry.

4 The third applicant, Ho Piao, a trade unionist, was also arrested on 2 February 1963. At the time of his arrest he was the General Secretary of the now banned Singapore National Seamen`s Union. On 16 February 1963 he was detained in custody under a detention order made under s 3(1) of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance 1955 the detention order being for a period of one year. He remained in continuous detention under orders made similar to those made in the case of the first applicant and is presently being detained under an order dated 1 February 1967 made by the Minister of the Interior and Defence under s 8(1A) of the Internal Security Act 1960.

5 The fourth applicant, Yan Chiang Ding, was at the time of his arrest on 2 February 1963 a third year student at the Nanyang University of Singapore. On 16 February 1963 he was detained in custody under a detention order made under s 3(1) of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance 1955 the detention order being for a period of two years. He remained in continuous detention under orders similar to those made in the case of the first applicant and is presently being detained under an order dated 1 February 1967 made by the Minister of the Interior and Defence under s 8(1A) of the Internal Security Act 1960 and signed by the permanent secretary of that ministry.

6 The fifth applicant, Lee Tze Tong, a trade unionist and an elected member of Parliament under the 1963 elections was arrested on 8 October 1963. On 23 October 1963 he was detained in custody under a detention order made under s 3(1) of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance 1955 the detention order being for a period of two years. On 23 October 1965 the Minister of the Interior and Defence made an order under s 8(1A) of the Internal Security Act 1960 directing that he be detained for a further period of two years.

7 The sixth applicant, Chia Thye Poh, a member of the Barisan Sosialis and a former member of Parliament who resigned his seat in 1966, was arrested on 29 October 1966 and on 28 November 1966 the Minister of the Interior and Defence made an order under s 8(1) (a) of the Internal Security Act 1960, directing that he be detained for a period of two years.

8 The applicants allege that they are being illegally or improperly detained by the Minister of the Interior and Defence and by the Government of Singapore. They put forward two main contentions.

9 The first contention is put forward on behalf of all except the sixth applicant, Chia Thye Poh. It is submitted that the orders of detention made by the Minister of the Interior and Defence under s 8(1A) of the Internal Security Act 1960, and under which they are presently detained are bad on their face and technically defective because the minister had no power to make any order under s 8(1A) of that Act.

10 It is necessary therefore to examine the material provisions of s 8 and they are as follows:

11 `Minister` is defined in s 2 as the minister charged with responsibility for internal security.

12 The order made by the minister under s 8(1A) in respect of the first applicant Lim Hock Siew is as follows:

13 Name of Detainee

14 NRIC No

15 Four other orders in identical terms, except the dates, were made in respect of the second, third, fourth and fifth applicants. In my opinion it is clear from the language of s 8 of the Act that the legislature has entrusted the absolute power or the complete discretion to detain a person under the Internal Security Act, 1960 to the President and not to the minister charged with the responsibility for internal security. Under the Act, a person can only be detained initially for a period not exceeding two years, if the President is satisfied with respect to that person, that with a view to preventing that person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore or any part thereof or of the maintenance of public order or essential services therein, it is necessary to direct that that person be detained. Once the President is so satisfied then s 8(1) (a) requires the minister charged with the responsibility for internal security to make an order directing that such person be detained accordingly. The making of an order of detention in respect of a person by the minister under s 8(1)(a) is in my opinion merely the performance of an administrative function in compliance with an executive decision of the President that it is necessary to direct that the person be detained.

16 Next s 8(1A) gives power to continue the detention of a person detained under an order of detention after the expiration of the period of detention specified in the initial detention order, by giving the President the power to direct that the period of any order made under s 8(1)(a) be extended for a further period or periods not exceeding two years at a time. In clear and simple language the legislature has thus entrusted the power to continue the detention of a detainee to the President and not to the minister and this is clearly in conformity with the power vested in the President alone by the legislature by s 8(1)(a) to detain a person in the first place.

17 In what manner then must the President make known to a detainee that he, the President, is directing that the period of his detention is extended for a further period of time? In my opinion, either by the President making the direction under his own hand or in accordance with the provisions of s 34 of the Interpretation Act 1965 which is in the following terms:

18 The five orders or directions complained of in this application were ex facie not made under the hand of the President nor were they in compliance with s 34 of the Interpretation Act. They were not even signed by a minister. On the face of the five orders the minister specifically purports to exercise the powers conferred by s 8(1A) and as I have stated above no powers are conferred on the minister by s 8(1A). These orders are therefore ex facie defective orders and are unlawful as they are not within the competence of the minister to make. They can therefore give no legal justification for the present detention of the first five applicants and on this purely technical ground I must hold that they have shown that they are being unlawfully detained.

19 If authority is needed that a writ of habeas corpuswill issue where an order, which is relied upon as justification for the detention of a person, is bad on its face, I need only refer to the judgment of Lord Wright in Greene v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1941] 3 All ER 388 at p 403 where he states:

20 As the sixth applicant, Chia Thye Poh does not contest the validity of the order of detention made against him under s 8(1) (a) it is necessary to consider the other contention put forward on behalf of all the applicants.

21 It is submitted that their detention is illegal or improper because the detention orders were made in bad faith. The joint affidavit of the applicants allege bad faith on the part of the government in that the applicants belong to a party in opposition to the party now forming the majority in parliament and in that the purpose of their detention was (i) to coerce and to subdue them into signing statements favourable to the ruling party and adverse to the people`s interest, (ii) to coerce them into renouncing their political beliefs and convictions, (iii) to wreck their morale, and (iv) to force them to appear on the television to praise the ruling party and to condemn their own political comrades. They also allege they have been kept under detention in such conditions as to amount to punitive detention and that the conditions under which they are being detained support their allegation of bad faith.

22 In my view the fatal objection to this submission, assuming the orders of detention are ex facie good and valid orders, is that the good faith of the President has not been challenged. As the power to detain under the Internal Security Act 1960 is, as I have already indicated, entrusted by the legislature to the President alone and not to any minister or to the government or to the party in power, for any applicant to succeed on the ground of bad faith, he must not only show that the courts are entitled to enquire into the good faith or otherwise of the President of the Republic of Singapore, but, assuming the courts are so entitled, he must also allege and prove that the President and not some one else had acted mala fide in directing that he be detained under the Act.

23 On the ground that the five orders made relating to the first five applicants by the Minister of the Interior and Defence under s 8(1A) are ex facie defective orders and do not therefore provide legal justification for the present detention of the first five applicants I direct that an order be drawn up for their discharge from custody.

24 As regards the sixth applicant the rule nisi is discharged. As all the applicants have chosen to make a joint application and having regard to the grounds put forward by them in support of their joint application I order that the costs of this application are to be taxed as a whole and that the respondent do pay half the costs as so taxed.

25 Applications allowed