1 25 May 1983

2 Before we give our decisions on the amended charges on which the three accused stand trial, we want to express our deep appreciation to all who have assisted us in this long trial which has taken 41 hearing days. First, we thank you Mr Glenn Knight, and Mr Roy Neighbour who has assisted you for the very careful presentation of the prosecution case. Next, there is Mr Cashin (whom we released last Friday) assisted by Mr Choo Han Teck who represents the first accused, Mr J B Jeyaretnam the second accused, and Mr Nathan Isaac the third accused. We are grateful to them for having accepted the assignments to defend the three accused. They can take satisfaction that they have discharged their public duty courageously and, in the highest traditions of the Bar, they have given their best for their respective clients. Next, we are indebted to the expert witnesses, the scientific officers, the pathologist and the doctors in psychiatric medicine, the last of whom have played a significant role in this trial. Finally, we pay tribute to the team of police officers who had the conduct of the investigations in the Special Investigation Section of the Criminal Investigation Department, in particular we commend Inspector Pereira for the early detection of the offenders in respect of the murder of Ghazali bin Marzuki and Inspector Suppiah who led the team for the diligence and thoroughness shown in the investigations of the crimes committed by the three accused.

3 Now, on the two amended charges, the three accused have from the very outset admitted the facts relating to the killings of the two children, Agnes Ng and Ghazali bin Marzuki. Throughout the trial, the participation of each of them in furtherance of the common intention to kill the two children has never been in doubt. All these are found in the lengthy statements voluntarily given by the three of them to the police soon after their arrest. These statements were put in evidence by their respective counsel in the course of the case for the prosecution. So it was that at the close of the prosecution case we held that a prima facie case had been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant the conviction of the three accused on the two amended charges.

4 The only defence of the three accused is that at the time of the commission of the offence each of them was suffering from diminished responsibility as defined in Exception 7 to section 300 of the Penal Code. Accordingly, it is submitted that the three of them are guilty not of murder but of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. There is, however, one exception. On behalf of the third accused, it is also submitted that we should consider the defence of insanity under section 84 of the Penal Code. We have done so and we reject this latter submission as without foundation.

5 Exception 7 to section 300 reads as follows:

6 “Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in causing the death or being a party to causing the death.”

7 The burden of proof that an accused charged with murder comes within this Exception is on the defence. It is settled law that this burden is on the balance of probabilities.

8 The law of diminished responsibility is clearly explained in Rex v Byrne (1960) 3 All ER 1 and this has been accepted in Singapore in Cheng Swee Hin v Public Prosecutor (1981) 1 MLJ 1, a decision of our Court of Criminal Appeal. In the context of the evidence given in this trial, to come within the Exception each of the three accused must show that (a) he or she was suffering from an abnormality of mind induced by disease and, (b) that the abnormality of mind was such as substantially impaired his or her mental responsibility for the killing of the two children.

9 We have carefully considered, not just the medical evidence of each of the three accused and the evidence in rebuttal of them for the prosecution, but, as we must as Judges of facts, all the evidence before us. Now we have reviewed the whole of the evidence in the light of the submissions made to us by counsel for the Defence and Prosecution. The decisions we have come to are these.

10 As regards the first accused l we accept the opinions of Dr Chee KuanTsee and Dr N Nagulendran that at the time of the commission of the two murders, the first accused was not suffering from an abnormality of mind induced by the disease of the mind – manic depressive illness of the manic type. We are satisfied that at the material time the first accused was not suffering from any psychiatric illness. From the evidence we find, as Dr Chee said, the first accused was “purposeful in his pursuits, patient in his planning and persuasive in his performance for personal power and pleasure”. We are revulsed by his abominable and depraved conduct.

11 Next, as regards the second accused, we find that there is evidence that when she lived with the first accused, there were occasions when she suffered from depression. But, on a balance of probabilities, we find that at the time when the second accused took part in the two murders, she was not suffering from reactive depressive psychosis. That which weighs heavily in our minds is that we had the benefit of hearing and seeing her give evidence in the witness box. The opinion we have of her is that she is an artful and wicked person. In conspiracy with the first accused, she was at all times a willing party to his loathsome and nefarious acts. We have also considered her case on the footing that she was suffering from the mental disease postulated by Dr Nagulendran. Even if she was suffering from abnormality of mind, we find that the abnormality was not such as substantially impaired her mental responsibility for her acts in the two killings.

12 Finally, in contrast to the second accused, the third accused is a simple person who can be easily influenced. It is claimed that the third accused is suffering from schizophrenia. Admittedly: there is a history of schizophrenia in her family. There is also evidence that she was in Woodbridge Hospital from about the end of May to the first week of July 1980. In the Hospital she was treated for schizophrenia. That diagnosis however is in issue between the psychiatrists. On the evidence before us, it appears that there are grounds for the disagreement. However, what comes out clearly in the evidence is that since her discharge from the Hospital, some six months before the commission of the offences, she was thereafter at all times in a state of remission. We accordingly have no difficulty in finding that even if the third accused had suffered from schizophrenia, at the time of the commission of the offences she was not suffering from an abnormality of mind as substantially impaired her mental responsibility for the two killings.

13 We accordingly find all the three accused guilty on the two charges of murder before us and they are convicted.