1 Cur Adv Vult

2 This is an appeal by the public prosecutor against the sentence imposed by the district court on 30 July 1990, following the respondent`s plea of guilty to a charge under s 67(1) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276) (the Act) of driving a motor vehicle whilst under the influence of drink and sentenced to a fine of $1,000 in default three months` imprisonment and disqualified from driving all classes of vehicles for four years.

3 The public prosecutor submits that the sentence is manifestly inadequate.

4 The respondent also pleaded guilty to two other charges:

5 On 5 March 1990, the respondent was convicted under s 67(1) of the Act for drunken driving and was fined $1,000 in default three months` imprisonment and disqualified from driving all classes of vehicles for three years.

6 When the respondent was convicted on 5 March 1990, it was under the then existing s 67(1) which provided:

7 Section 67(1) was repealed by the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1990 (No 7 of 1990) (which came into force on 2 April 1990) and re-enacted and provides:

8 The public prosecutor submits that as this is the respondent`s second conviction under s 67(1) the resshould have been sentenced by the district court, in addition to a minimum fine of $3,000, to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.

9 Although the elements of the offence created by the re-enacted s 67(1) are substantially the same as the elements of the offence under the repealed s 67(1), the punishment for the offence is not the same: the re-enacted section provides for a heavier punishment.

10 For a first offender, the punishment under the repealed section was `a fine not exceeding $1,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months`. Whereas under the re-enacted section the punishment is a mandatory sentence of `a fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months`.

11 For a second offender, the punishment under the repealed section was `a fine not exceeding $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both`. Whereas under the re-enacted section the punishment is a mandatory `fine of not less than $3,000 and not more than $10,000 and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months`.

12 Now is this a second conviction of the respondent under s 67(1)? Under the repealed section, the court had a discretion as to the punishment. Under the re-enacted section, the court has no discretion as to the punishment.

13 A distinction should be made between an amendment by deletion or insertion of words from or into an existing legislation, and an amendment by the repeal of the whole section and substituting therefor a new section. The re-enacted s 67(1) is in fact a new section.

14 Article 11(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore protects a person against retrospective criminal laws.

15 In my view the respondent was charged and convicted under the re-enacted s 67(1) for the first time, notwithstanding that he had been dealt with under the repealed s 67(1) once before on 5 March 1990.

16 To treat the respondent as a second offender under the re-enacted section is to apply the re-enacted section to him retrospectively. The words preceding the provision for punishment of a second or subsequent offender under the re-enacted s 67(1) are `in the case of a second or subsequent conviction`. These words can only mean a second or subsequent conviction under the re-enacted s 67(1).

17 Appeal dismissed .