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In the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
[1994] SGCA 132
MA 423/1992
Between
Public Prosecutor
… Appellant
And
Tham Kwai Lian
… Respondent
grounds of decision
Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Trials; Immigration — Employment — Foreign worker

This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.
Public Prosecutor v Tham Kwai Lian
[1994] SGCA 132
MA 423/1992
Yong Pung How CJ
23 November 1994
1 The respondent was prosecuted in the subordinate courts under s 5(1) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap 91A), on two charges of employing foreign workers during the period 7 March 1992 to 12 March 1992, without having first obtained valid work permits for them. The foreign workers in question were two Malaysian women, Tong Shwu Hong (PW1) and Sim Kim Hong (PW2). Both were discovered on the premises of the respondent`s hairdressing salon (Sweeney Le Saloon) on 12 March 1992 during a raid by officials from the Ministry of Labour. In the course of their testimony in the court below, both PW1 and PW2 confirmed that they had worked at the respondent`s hair salon for the period of time alleged in the charges, the work in question being the provision of hairdressing cum cleaning services between the hours of 9.30am and 7.30pm daily. Whilst working at the said salon, they had received free accommodation and meals from the respondent, but neither of them had yet been paid any money up to the time of the MOL raid on 12 March 1992. Furthermore both women had been told by the respondent that there existed only one vacancy for the permanent position of hairdresser at her salon and that they would have to work for a trial period of some one to two weeks before the respondent made up her mind as to the more suitable `candidate`.
2 It should be noted at this juncture that throughout the relevant period (ie 7 March 1992 to 12 March 1992) the respondent was aware of the nationality of the two women, having been duly informed from the outset. Indeed she had told them that she would apply for a work permit in respect of the `candidate` she eventually chose.
3 At the close of the prosecution case, it was submitted by counsel for the respondent below that since both PW1 and PW2 had only been ` trying out ` for the same vacancy and since neither of them had received any remuneration during their period of work at Sweeney Le Saloon, the respondent could not be said to have `employed` them in the sense given to that term under s 2 of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) (there being no definition of the term in the Employment of Foreign Workers Act itself). That provision reads:
`employ` means to engage or use the services of any person and to pay such person for services rendered or work done or to remunerate such person on a piece rate or on a commission basis ... .
4 The above submission was accepted by the district judge who acquitted the respondent without calling for her defence. The prosecution appealed against that order of acquittal.
5 The present appeal
6 In his written grounds of decision the district judge held that under s 6 of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap 91A) the respondent could, on the basis of the evidence adduced, be presumed to have employed both PW1 and PW2. Counsel for the respondent argued on appeal that in fact the presumption should not have been invoked so far as PW1 was concerned because there was no evidence to show that she had been found working on the premises of the respondent`s salon. I found no merit in this argument. PW3, one of the employment inspectors from the ministry who had conducted the raid, testified that when the MOL inspectors arrived at the respondent`s salon, PW1 had opened the door for the inspectors when they came to the salon, an act she would scarcely have done had she been a mere casual bystander instead of a worker at the salon. Indeed, as the district judge pointed out, on PW1`s own admission she had been providing hairdressing and cleaning services at the salon from 7 March 1992 up to the day of the raid itself, ie 12 March 1992. Plainly, therefore, the inference to be drawn from the evidence was that PW1 had been found working on the premises. PW2 for her part had also clearly been found working there, for as PW3 testified, she had been in the act of assisting another hairdresser in the perming of a customer`s hair when the MOL inspectors made their appearance. PW2 too stated in evidence that during the period of 7 March 1992 to 12 March 1992, she had gone to the salon everyday with PW1 to do work ranging from the cleaning of the furniture to the washing and blow-drying of customers` hair. According to the testimony of both women, the work instructions had been given by the respondent, who had supervised their work at the salon everyday.
7 Having held that the presumption of employment provided for in s 6 applied, however, the district judge then went on to conclude that by the close it its case, the prosecution had ` not proved conclusively ` the actual employment of PW1 and PW2 by the respondent. In the district judge`s view, the evidence showed that both women had not yet been paid any money at the time of the raid, nor had there even been any explicit discussion of wages or salaries between the parties. He therefore acquitted the respondent without calling upon her defence.
8 I must, with respect, express some surprise at this decision. From a reading of his written grounds it appears to me that the learned judge misdirected himself as to the burden of proof laid upon the prosecution at the close of the prosecution`s case. Under s 189(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68), at the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, the trial court may record an order of acquittal only if it finds that `no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction.` As Lord Diplock pointed out in at p 51:
The crucial words in [s 189(1)] are the words `if unrebutted`, which makes the question that the court has to ask itself a purely hypothetical one. The prosecution makes out a case against the accused by adducing evidence of primary facts. It is to such evidence that the words `if unrebutted` refer. What they mean is that for the purpose of reaching the decision called for by [s 189(1)] the court must act on the presumption (a) that all such evidence of primary fact is true, unless it is so inherently incredible that no reasonable person would accept it as being true; and (b) that there will be nothing to displace those inference as to further facts or as to the state of mind of the accused which would reasonably be drawn from the primary facts in the absence of further explanation.
9 In short, all that is required of the prosecution at the stage it concludes its case is the adduction of some evidence (not inherently incredible) which, if the trial judge were to accept as accurate, would establish each essential element in the alleged offence. In the context of the present case, this required the prosecution to produce some credible evidence at the close of its case of the respondent`s having employed PW1 and PW2. In this task, however, as the district judge himself observed early on in his grounds, the prosecution was aided by the provision made in s 6 of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act for a presumption of employment vis-a-vis persons found working on the premises; and as I have related above, there was reliable evidence from PW3 as well as admissions from PW1 and PW2 themselves to show that PW1 and PW2 had been found working on the premises of the respondent`s salon. The presumption of employment in s 6 therefore sprang into operation against the respondent and the burden shifted onto her at that juncture to rebut the presumption by adducing evidence to the contrary. The evidence as to non-payment could then perhaps have been adduced by her in her defence, or indeed any other evidence her counsel deemed fit to call. In any event, the fact remained, in my opinion, that the prosecution had at the close of its case made out against the respondent a prima facie case satisfying the case and her defence should at once have been called.
10 For the reasons set out above I allowed the prosecution`s appeal and ordered the case to be remitted back to the subordinate courts for the respondent`s defence to be called in respect of the charges under s 5(1) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act.
11 Order accordingly.
Yong Pung How CJ
Mathavan Devadas (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the appellant
Robert Yoong Weng Ho (Yoong & Co) for the respondent
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This judgment text has undergone conversion so that it is mobile and web-friendly. This may have created formatting or alignment issues. Please refer to the PDF copy for a print-friendly version.

Version No 1: 29 Oct 2026 (23:45 hrs)