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Lim Gim Chong and Another v Public Prosecutor
[1994] SGHC 26
MA 361/1993
Yong Pung How CJ
01 February 1994
1 Cur Adv Vult
2 The two appellants were charged with having, between 28 September 1991 and 31 January 1992, at the factory premises of Sun Tech Engineering Pte Ltd at 18 Penjuru Road, Singapore, in the furtherance of the common intention of them both, harboured three Indian nationals who had unlawfully overstayed in Singapore following the expiry of their social visit passes; and having thereby committed offences under s 57(1)(d) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) (`the Act`), punishable under s 57(1)(ii) of the Act read with s 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224). They were convicted of the charges against them and each was sentenced to 14 months` imprisonment. They now appeal against their convictions.
3 The facts
4 The facts of the case are essentially as follows. The three Indian nationals whom the appellants were convicted of having harboured illegally were: Thuraimanickam Ayyappan, Mariyappathevar Subramaniam and Veerasamy Thavasimuthu. At the material time, the first appellant was employed as production supervisor in the production department of Sun Tech Engineering Pte Ltd (`Sun Tech`) at 18 Penjuru Road, while the second appellant was employed as project and administration manager by Sun Tech. The second appellant admitted in a statement made to immigration officials on 17 February 1992 that his responsibilities included the employment of workers for Sun Tech, but stated that he also authorized the first appellant to interview workers when he himself was not available.
5 On 24 September 1991, the first appellant was approached by one `Rajah`, later ascertained to be Thuraimanickam Ayyappan, as well as another Indian man, both of whom were looking for jobs with Sun Tech. Ayyappan informed the first appellant that he was a Malaysian and that he had a work permit; although when asked to show this to the first appellant, he claimed that he had not brought it with him. The first appellant told the two men to return the following day with their work permits. He also proceeded to seek and obtain approval from the second appellant to employ the two men. In giving approval the second appellant added that this was on the condition that both men held work permits.
6 On 25 September 1991, Ayyappan returned to Sun Tech with Mariyappathevar Subramaniam. They were both told by the first appellant that they had been accepted for employment. Upon being asked by the first appellant for their work permits, passports and identity cards, they answered that they had forgotten to bring these documents. The first appellant then wrote down their names and identity card numbers on a piece of paper which he handed to the accounts clerk for record purposes. He did ask Ayyappan again a few days later for the work permits and passports of both men but once more Ayyappan replied that they had forgotten to bring them.
7 At about the same time, Ayyappan approached the first appellant with a request for accommodation for both himself and Subramaniam. The first appellant relayed this request to the second appellant and, upon receiving his approval, allowed both men to take up accommodation at the factory premises of Sun Tech in Penjuru Road. Another request was made by Ayyappan two days later, this time for the provision of mattresses. Again, the first appellant sought the second appellant`s permission before granting the request. In the meantime, he asked the two men again for their work permits and passports, only to be told again by them that they had forgotten to bring them.
8 Sometime in early October 1991, Ayyappan brought Veerasamy Thavasimuthu to see the first appellant after the first appellant had asked him to recommend another Malaysian worker with a work permit. Ayyappan informed the first appellant that Thavasimuthu had forgotten to bring the work permit with him and that he himself had not brought his own permit either. The first appellant took down Thavasimuthu`s particulars on a piece of paper which was passed on to the accounts clerk for record purposes. At the same time, the first appellant told the second appellant about Thavasimuthu and requested approval of his employment, which the second appellant duly gave. It appears that thereafter Thavasimuthu too stayed at the factory premises of Sun Tech where Ayyappan and Subramaniam were being accommodated.
9 Needless to say, none of the three Indian men actually possessed valid work permits. They held only social visit passes. It is important to note the dates on which their respective passes expired. Ayyappan`s social visit pass expired on 27 September 1991; Subramaniam`s pass expired on 14 October 1991; and Thavasimuthu`s pass expired on 6 October 1991. It is also important to note that throughout the period of their stay at the Sun Tech factory premises, none of them produced valid work permits to show the first and second appellants. The first appellant testified that he made some 10 to 15 requests for the work permits of these three men but that he was told time and again that they had forgotten to bring the permits with them.
10 On 12 November 1991, the first appellant was sent by Sun Tech to Batu Pahat, Malaysia, to assist in the assembling of a conveyor system there. He did not return to Singapore until 29 January 1992. There is no dispute however that throughout that entire period the three Indian men were staying at the Sun Tech factory premises in Penjuru Road. In fact, this was where they were arrested by immigration officials on 31 January 1992.
11 In the court below the learned district judge held that s 57(7) of the Act was capable of being invoked. Section 57(7) reads:
Where in any proceedings for an offence under subsection (1)(d) it is proved that the defendant has given shelter to any person who has remained in Singapore unlawfully for a period exceeding 90 days after the expiration of any pass issued to him or who has entered Singapore in contravention of section 5(1) or 6(1), it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the defendant has harboured him knowing him to be a person who has acted in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the regulations.
12 The district judge went on to hold that in the case of the first and second appellants, the evidence they had adduced was insufficient to rebut the presumption provided by the above subsection and accordingly he found them both guilty under s 57(1)(d) of the Act.
13 The first appellant
14 I will consider first the case against the first appellant. Having reviewed with care the facts of the case, it is my considered opinion that the first appellant can, with justification, be regarded as having, together with the second appellant, given shelter to the Indian workers in furtherance of the common intention of them both. It is true that the first appellant sought and obtained the approval of the second appellant before employing the three Indian men. The second appellant`s authorization was also sought before Ayyappan and Subramaniam were given accommodation in the Sun Tech factory premises. However, it cannot be denied that it was the first appellant who was responsible for turning the managerial decisions of the second appellant into practical results. The second appellant relied on the first appellant for the relevant information in order to come to those decisions in the first place. As the second appellant himself said in evidence, he relied on the recommendations of his production heads in matters relating to the workers employed. It was also the first appellant who actually installed the Indians in sleeping quarters in the Sun Tech factory premises. I was satisfied, therefore, that there existed sufficient evidence from which to infer beyond reasonable doubt that the first appellant shared with the second appellant a common intention to harbour the Indian workers and that he acted in furtherance of this common intention.
15 I am of the opinion, however, that the above is clear only with regard to Ayyappan and Subramaniam. The first appellant did not deny being involved in the decision to give Ayyappan and Subramaniam accommodation but asserted that he was unaware that Thavasimuthu too was staying in the same quarters. Indeed, with regard to the charge concerning the harbouring of Thavasimuthu, I have grave doubts, particularly after a detailed perusal of the notes of evidence. The first appellant testified that he had not been aware of Thavasimuthu staying in the factory. The second appellant also testified as to his own ignorance of this fact. It was Ayyappan who claimed that he had spoken to the first appellant about Thavasimuthu staying in the factory and that the first appellant had agreed. However, Thavasimuthu himself did not speak to the first appellant and his basis for believing that the first appellant knew of his presence was that he had once seen the first appellant inside their room. Thavasimuthu also admitted that he had not been shown to the room by the first appellant, unlike in the case of Ayyappan and Subramaniam. I am of the view, therefore, that the charge against the first appellant of harbouring Thavasimuthu was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
16 It follows therefore that in relation to Ayyappan and Subramaniam, there was sufficient evidence to justify invoking against the first appellant the presumption that he knew these two to be persons who had acted in contravention of the Act. I find, further, that the first appellant failed to rebut the presumption. He insisted in his defence that he did ask the two men for their work permits some 10 to 15 times. However they answered every time that they had forgotten to bring the permits. It must have become patently clear to the first appellant at that point that something was not quite right. Yet he did nothing about it. This is surely a wilful shutting of the eyes or, at the very least, negligence; and, as I have held in Naranjan Singh s/o Ujagar Singh v PP , neither will suffice to rebut the presumption of knowledge contained in s 57(7).
17 I note, at this juncture, counsel`s argument that, in order for s 57(7) to be invoked, the giving of shelter has to be done at a point in time when the illegal overstayer in question has already remained in Singapore for a period exceeding 90 days after the expiration of any pass issued to him. Counsel submitted that both Ayyappan and Subramaniam were still within this 90-day period when they were first granted permission to stay on the Sun Tech factory premises, because, at that point (27 September 1991), Ayyappan had only remained unlawfully in Singapore for 24 days while Subramaniam`s presence in Singapore was still lawful.
18 Having considered counsel`s argument, I find no merit in it. The whole basis for the interpretation of s 57(7) put forward by counsel appears to be his reliance on the phrase `any person who has remained in Singapore`, which is used in the subsection to describe illegal overstayers. The argument appears to be that, if the subsection were intended to catch those who give shelter to anyone who overstays for less than 90 days, then the phrase should read `any person who remains in Singapore`. I am of the opinion that this grammatical hair-splitting is not merely arbitrary but also achieves very little. It is equally possible to argue that had the subsection been intended to catch only those who give shelter to anyone who has already overstayed for more than 90 days, then the phrase `the defendant has given shelter` should instead read `the defendant gives shelter`. In fact, the latter argument would seem to make more grammatical sense!
19 To my mind, the correct interpretation of s 57(7) is that it catches out those defendants who give shelter to persons who subsequently overstay unlawfully for more than 90 days. In other words, the overstayer need not have already remained unlawfully in Singapore for more than 90 days at that point in time when he is first given accommodation by the defendant; but it must be the case that he was still being given this accommodation at that point in time when his overstaying exceeds 90 days. Such an interpretation would be more consonant with the proper enforcement of the Act. The legislative aim is surely to oblige employers to ensure that their workers have acted in accordance with the Act, not just at the commencement of their employment but throughout the continuation of that employment.
20 I should state also that it is irrelevant that the first appellant was away from the Sun Tech factory premises between 12 November 1991 and 30 January 1992. As noted earlier, Ayyappan`s and Subramaniam`s social visit passes expired on 27 September 1991 and 14 October 1991 respectively. There was ample time between those dates and 12 November 1991 in which the first appellant could have ascertained the validity of the work permits, if any, held by these two Indians. Yet, as narrated, it appears that he made no effort in this respect, apart from going through the motions of asking them if they had brought their work permits and accepting at face value the handy answer that they had forgotten to do so. Indeed it is difficult to see how the first appellant could have been content to accept such an answer as being a truthful one. By early October, both Ayyappan and Subramaniam were ensconced within the living quarters of the Sun Tech factory premises and, for all intents and purposes, did not stay anywhere else. It is not easy to imagine where else they could have kept their work permits, assuming they had any, other than in the Sun Tech factory premises. Certainly, no plausible explanation was proffered to the first appellant for the Indians` persistent forgetfulness and he made no effort to ask for one. He could also have urged the second appellant to follow up on the matter prior to his own departure for Batu Pahat, but he did not. Such conduct can scarcely entitle him to escape the presumption of s 57(7).
21 The second appellant
22 I turn now to consider the case against the second appellant. He was, among other things, responsible for the management of personnel at Sun Tech; and it is quite clear that he was the one who took the final decisions as to whether the Indians could be employed and whether they could stay within the factory premises. Although he said in cross-examination that he left it to the first appellant to check on the status of workers recruited by Sun Tech, he never seriously denied ultimate responsibility, as is demonstrated in the following exchange:
Q: If there is any breach, as a company co-ordinator, you are responsible?
A: Yes.
23 I am satisfied, in short, that in the case of the second appellant, there was also enough evidence to justify the conclusion that he shared with the first appellant a common intention to harbour the first appellant and that he acted in furtherance of that common intention. Again this is only with regard to the charges concerning the harbouring of Ayyappan and Subramaniam, because as I stated earlier, I have serious doubts as to the charge concerning the harbouring of Thavasimuthu. It may be noted that, in his statement to immigration officials on 17 February 1992, the second appellant admitted that the first appellant had told him about a request from Ayyappan for accommodation, for Ayyappan himself and two other Indians. The second appellant stated that he had told the first appellant that they could stay in the Sun Tech factory premises, even though on his own admission he had not seen the work permits or passports of these men. At trial the district judge seems to have made the assumption that Thavasimuthu was one of the three Indians referred to in the said statement: see p 12 of his grounds of decision at paras E-F. I am of the view, however, that such an assumption was unjustified on the evidence. At the point in time when Ayyappan first asked the first appellant for accommodation for his friend and himself, Thavasimuthu had not yet been introduced to the first appellant as a potential employee. It is not possible therefore that he can have been included within Ayyappan`s request for accommodation. Indeed it is clear from Ayyappan`s testimony that when he first told the first appellant that they stayed too far from the factory and made the request for accommodation, he was referring only to Subramaniam and himself.
24 Findings
25 I find, therefore, that, as far as Ayyappan and Subramaniam were concerned, the second appellant did give shelter to them, but that, as far as Thavasimuthu was concerned, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the second appellant also gave him shelter.
26 I find, further, that in the case of the second appellant, s 57(7) was capable of being invoked in relation to Ayyappan and Subramaniam. It was up to the second appellant to rebut the presumption that he knew that these two men had acted in contravention of the Act. I am of the opinion that the district judge was justified in finding that he failed to rebut the presumption.
27 The defence of the second appellant was, essentially, that he had left it to the first appellant to check on the work permits of the workers. At the same time, howeve,r he admitted that, as far as the employment and management of the workers were concerned, the ultimate responsibility fell to him. He admitted that he had approved the employment and subsequent accommodation of Ayyappan and Subramaniam with the stipulation that they must possess work permits. Obviously, therefore, he was aware of the requirements of the Act. Although at trial he denied having personally asked any of the Indians for their work permits, he admitted in examination-in-chief that he had checked with the first appellant `on a few occasions`. He must have realized then that neither Ayyappan nor Subramaniam had produced any work permits. Yet he did nothing to clarify matters and elected to hide behind the excuse that he had asked the first appellant to take care of the work permit issue.
28 Again, as in the case of the first appellant, this really amounted to a wilful shutting of the eyes or, at the very least, negligence, neither of which suffices to rebut the presumption of knowledge. Conduct which Parliament has resolved to categorize as being criminal cannot be so readily absolved by blithe declarations of ignorance, unless distinct evidence is also adduced to that effect. In the present case it is especially pertinent to note that Parliament has stipulated custodial sentences of at least six months for those who violate the provisions of s 57(1)(d). This is a clear indication that the offence is not to be regarded lightly, particularly as the need to maintain careful regulation and supervision of immigrant labour in Singapore increases with the continued influx of such labour.
29 In conclusion, therefore, I find that the first and second appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having harboured Thuraimanickam Ayyappan and Mariyappathevar Subramaniam when they had acted in contravention of the Act; but that in relation to Veerasamy Thavasimuthu, the same was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. I, accordingly, uphold their conviction on the first two charges and acquit them on the charge relating to Thavasimuthu. Their sentences are to be reduced to six months` imprisonment on each charge, to run concurrently.
30 Order accordingly.
Robert Yu (Low & Robert Yu) for the appellants
Kamala Ponnampalam (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent