This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports. |
Kuek Ah Lek v Public Prosecutor
[1995] SGHC 184
MA 286/94/01
Yong Pung How CJ
31 July 1995
1 The appellant was convicted by the district court on two charges. The amended first charge was as follows:
You, Kuek Ah Lek @ Kuek Yong Lek ... are charged that you, between November 1993 and 22 June 1994 at the proposed erection of a pair of two-storey semidetached houses located at the junction of Toh Avenue and Upper Changi Road, Singapore, did employ one Rengasamy Kannadasan ..., an Indian national, as a general worker, being a person who had overstayed on his visit pass in contravention of s 15(1) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) and you have thereby committed an offence under s 57(1)(e), punishable under s 57(1)(ii) of the said Act.
2 The second charge read as follows:
You, Kuek Ah Lek @ Kuek Yong Lek ... are charged that you, between February 1994 [sic] at the proposed erection of a pair of two-storey semidetached house located at the junction of Toh Avenue and Upper Changi Road Singapore, did harbour one Indian national, namely Rengasamy Kannadasan ... being a holder of a social visit pass and who has acted in contravention of s 15(1) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133), by remaining in Singapore after the expiry of the visit pass, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 57(1)(d), punishable under s 57(1)(ii) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133).
3 The prosecution case
4 The prosecution`s case was that on 22 June 1994, at about 9.45 to 9.55am, a party of officers from the Immigration Department conducted a check for overstayers at the worksite of a pair of semidetached houses at Toh Avenue (the worksite). Five workers were detained. The workers identified the appellant as their employer. One of the officers paged for the appellant, who returned the call. The appellant was told to go to the worksite. He arrived there at about 10.30am. Three of the workers were subsequently ascertained to be valid work permit holders and a fourth was a Singapore citizen. The fifth identified himself as Selvanathan Thirunavukkarasu. The identity of this fifth worker was later ascertained from his passport to be Rengasamy Kannadasan (Kannadasan).
5 The appellant was arrested and escorted to his office at Tan Quee Lan Street. Payment vouchers and work cards relating to Kannadasan were seized. Senior Immigration Officer Png Eng Hock`s (SIO Png) conditioned statement was admitted in court. His evidence was that he approached Kannadasan, who was standing near a heap of sand and cement. Kannadasan gave his name as Selvanathan Thirunavukkarasu. However, he produced a green work permit (P11) under the name of Sethu Sangilimuthu. Kannadasan admitted that he was overstaying. He was arrested.
6 This was corroborated by Sub-Inspector Savinder Singh (SI Savinder). SI Savinder also gave evidence that on that afternoon, he and Senior Immigration Officer Wong Kong Wa escorted Kannadasan back to the worksite. Kannadasan`s passport was retrieved from the second floor of the uncompleted building. It was kept in a bag. The name on the passport was Rengasamy Kannadasan. Kannadasan said that the passport was his. According to the passport, Kannadasan entered Singapore on 10 November 1992. He was granted a 14-day social visit pass. He had been overstaying in Singapore since 25 November 1992.
7 Joseph Yeo, a records officer at the Ministry of Labour, gave evidence that a work permit was issued to Sethu Sangilimuthu. The photograph on P11 was not the same as that on the application form for the work permit. The work permit was not issued to Kannadasan. According to the records at the Ministry, no work permit was issued to Kannadasan. As far as he knew, the actual work permit was still with the real holder.
8 The main prosecution witness was Kannadasan. He gave evidence that after arriving at Changi Airport on 10 November 1992, he went to Tekka Market. He was told that was where all the Indians would be and that he would be able to get employment. Ten days after arriving in Singapore, he managed to get employment. He worked at different places under different employers, often for only two to three days. Kannadasan was approached by the appellant when he was at a site in Geylang. The appellant asked Kannadasan if he would work. Kannadasan said he would and the appellant took him to the worksite at Toh Avenue. Kannadasan was paid $35 per day at the worksite. His job was to mix cement and to do other general work. Kannadasan said that he was paid by the appellant. Whenever the appellant paid him, he had to sign a receipt. These are the payment vouchers produced in court. The appellant called him Muthu. This was because he told the appellant that his name was Muthu. He had never shown anyone his passport before.
9 Kannadasan told the court that throughout the period from the end of 1993 till 22 June 1994 he stayed at the worksite. The appellant permitted and told him to stay there. Originally he stayed in a container at the worksite. Subsequently the appellant told them to destroy the container. They then slept in the building. The appellant told him in English `You sleep there.` This was either in February or March.
10 Kannadasan said that the name on P11 was not his, but the photograph was. He had previously bought P11 for $10 from an Indian national at Tekka. He obtained it before working at Toh Avenue. He had never shown anyone P11 except the appellant. The appellant saw P11 on an occasion when he was keeping his wages in his purse. He had taken the card out. The appellant saw P11 and asked for it. After viewing both sides of P11, the appellant returned it to him. The appellant did not say anything.
11 Kannadasan explained that he had first given his name as Selvanathan Thirunavukkarasu because he had been told by an Indian national named Rajah, that if he did that, he would get a lighter sentence. When the officers from the Immigration Department asked where his passport was, he led them to the place where he kept it.
12 Under cross-examination, Kannadasan told the court that before he went to the worksite at Toh Avenue, when he was working at various diverse places, his employers would pay him different wages. Sometimes he was paid $30 a day, and sometimes $20. He had previously worked for some 30 employers. He was always paid in cash and those employers did not ask him to sign any payment vouchers. These employers never asked for his work permit and he never showed them. If the employers asked him to work for four to five days, they would ask him to stay at the site.
13 Some of the employers knew that Kannadasan was an overstayer and an illegal worker. They would tell him that he had no work permit. They would say that there are many people from India at Tekka. Therefore, they would only pay him $20. If he asked for more, they said that they would get someone else. Nobody paid him more than $30 except the appellant. He denied that he asked to be paid $35 per day. He also denied that the appellant told him that out of the $35, $20 was for his wages, $14 was for the foreign worker levy and $1 was for his income tax. He denied that the appellant saw P11 on the day he was taken to Toh Avenue. He maintained that the appellant only saw P11 on that one occasion when he took it out. That was about two weeks after he started work.
14 Kannadasan told the court that the appellant did not ask to see his passport. He would have shown the appellant his passport if he had asked for it. If the appellant had then asked him to leave, he would do so. He told the appellant his name was S Muthu because the name on P11 was Sethu Sangilimuthu. He did not tell the appellant that his passport was with his agent and that his agent was in India. The appellant used to bring Kannadasan and the other workers food. Kannadasan agreed that it was a bonus or a gesture of the appellant`s appreciation for their work. The appellant would also buy them drinks every day. Kannadasan agreed that, when he was arrested, he was once placed in the same room as the appellant. The appellant had confronted him and said `Muthu, you have cheated me.` He did not say anything in reply. He did not know why the appellant had confronted him in that manner.
15 The investigating officer, Lim Peng Siah (Lim) testified that the contractor at the Toh Avenue worksite was Guan Seng Construction Pte Ltd (Guan Seng). The appellant was a director of Guan Seng. The appellant had told him that he was in charge of the operation of Guan Seng. The other director, his wife, only dealt with administrative matters.
16 Lim told the court that the appellant had told him that he did not know that Kannadasan had overstayed in Singapore. The appellant also told him that Kannadasan had showed him a green work permit and told the appellant that it was a valid work permit. The appellant said he believed Kannadasan. The appellant said that he had asked Kannadasan for his passport and Kannadasan had told him that it was with his agent. The appellant mentioned that he had asked Kannadasan on several occasions. Lim also gave evidence that Kannadasan had told him that he was paid $35 a day. Kannadasan had told him that he had shown the appellant his green card. However, Kannadasan had said then that he showed it to the appellant on the second day that he was employed.
17 The defence case
18 The appellant gave evidence that he had never previously engaged illegal workers. He paid his Thai workers $16 per day, increasing to $17 per day in the second year they were employed. These were workers with valid work permits. His company kept proper documents and accounts.
19 On the day he went to Geylang, he had gone to see a friend. It was about 7am. It was his friend`s site. The appellant had some miscellaneous work to do in Geylang, so he dropped by the site and visited his friend. There, he met Kannadasan, who had just woken up. The appellant asked Kannadasan if he was interested in working for him. He also asked Kannadasan if he had a work permit. Kannadasan said `yes` and followed the appellant to his pick-up. The appellant asked for Kannadasan`s work permit and was shown P11. Kannadasan told him that his name was Muthu. The appellant saw that the particulars in P11 were printed by a computer. The validity was stated to be until 1995. He believed it was a valid work permit and did not suspect anything. The appellant asked for Kannadasan`s passport but was told that it was with Kannadasan`s agent and that he had gone to India.
20 The appellant asked Kannadasan how much he wanted for the day. Kannadasan replied that he wanted $35. The appellant asked why it was so expensive, and was told that Kannadasan needed to pay the levy. He had needed a worker for that day, so he offered Kannadasan the job.
21 The appellant testified that he paid his skilled Thai worker $19 a day. This was not inclusive of the foreign worker levy. The appellant had to pay this. The total wage cost for this worker was around $35 a day. The appellant said that he paid Kannadasan fortnightly. He would ask to see his passport on these occasions. Kannadasan would tell him that it was with his agent, who had gone to India. He believed Kannadasan because he kept his Thai workers` passports.
22 The appellant denied that he had a container at the worksite. He did not tell Kannadasan to stay at the construction site or give him shelter. Kannadasan did ask if he could stay at the construction site. The appellant told him there was no place for him.
23 On 22 June 1994, the appellant cooperated fully with the immigration department officers. He volunteered all the payment vouchers and documents relating to Kannadasan. Lim even remarked that the appellant was an honest employer as all the documents were proper and complete. When he was left in the room with Kannadasan, the appellant had confronted him. The appellant told Kannadasan that he had given him trouble. The appellant said `Muthu, you have cheated me.` Kannadasan bowed his head and kept repeating that he was sorry.
24 Under cross-examination, the appellant said that he had seen other work permits before. They were green. These belonged to his friends. He had not really seen the ones belonging to his workers as they were kept in a safe in the office. He merely glanced at those. P11 looked like the ones his friends had. The appellant believed Kannadasan because whenever the appellant asked him questions, he would answer without hesitation. He did not ask for the agent`s name. He asked to see the passport because he merely wanted to have a further look.
25 When asked if the appellant provided Kannadasan with shelter, he replied that it was a construction site. The workers slept everywhere. He did not buy them beds. The workers merely took a plank each and slept on it.
26 The finding below
27 The district judge held that the appellant`s defence was contradictory. If the appellant was convinced that the work permit was genuine, there was no reason to insist on the passport. It was highly incredible that the appellant, an experienced businessman, would actually accept the reasons given by Kannadasan for not being able to produce the passport. The appellant himself said that Kannadasan was giving excuses. If the appellant recognized that these were in fact excuses, he should have been put on alert and realized that Kannadasan was trying to conceal the fact that he was an overstayer. The appellant made no effort to ascertain the particulars of the agent, his address or even his name during the approximately seven months Kannadasan was employed. The appellant must have realized that the agent could not have been in India for seven months.
28 The district judge held that even if he were to accept the appellant`s evidence, he could only conclude that the appellant did not really bother to have sight of Kannadasan`s passport or that he was indifferent as he knew that Kannadasan was in Singapore illegally. The appellant`s conduct was insufficient to rebut the presumption in s 57(8) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) (the Act) and did not amount to screening of foreign workers. The appellant`s failure to enquire into the status of Kannadasan for seven months amounted to wilfully shutting his eyes to the immigration status of Kannadasan.
29 By virtue of s 57(9) of the Act, the appellant`s defence would not hold unless he could prove that he had exercised due diligence to ascertain that the work permit was valid. Section 57(10) states that an accused is deemed to have exercised due diligence only if he had personally checked the passport or travel documents of the employee. The appellant had not personally checked Kannadasan`s passport. He would therefore be deemed not to have exercised due diligence.
30 The district judge dismissed the defence`s argument that s 57(9) and s 57(10) only came into effect on 22 April 1994 on the ground that the offence was a continuing one as the appellant carried on the act of employment until 22 June 1994. In any event, even without s 57(9) and (10), the appellant had not discharged his obligation.
31 On the charge of harbouring, it was held in Thyagarajan v PP , that giving permission to sleep in a particular place can constitute providing shelter. It was not strenuously resisted by the appellant that Kannadasan had slept at the worksite from February until his arrest upon being told to do so by the appellant. All the appellant said was that this was a construction site and the workers slept everywhere. The presumption under s 57(7) was therefore raised that the appellant knew that Kannadasan was a person who had contravened the Immigration Act. Based on the appellant`s testimony and s 57(9) and (10), he had not rebutted the presumption. The appellant was therefore found guilty.
32 The appeal
33 The relevant legislation
34 Until 22 April 1994, the relevant parts of the Act are as indicated below. Section 2 of the Act states:
`employ` means to engage or use the service of any person and to pay such person for services rendered or work done or to remunerate such person on a piece rate or on a commission basis ...
`harbour` means to give food or shelter, and includes the act of assisting a person in any way to evade apprehension ...
`occupier`, in relation to any premises or place, includes -
(a) the person having the charge, management or control of either the whole or part of the premises or place, either on his own account or as an agent; and
(b) a contractor who is carrying out building operations or construction works at the premises or place on behalf of some other person ...
35 Section 57, so far as relevant, states:
(1) Any person who -
...
(d) harbours any person who has acted in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the regulations;
(e) employs any person who has acted in contravention of section 6(1), 15 or 36 or the regulations ...
shall be guilty of an offence and -
...
(ii) subject to subsection (1A), in the case of an offence under paragraph (b), (d) or (e), shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less that 6 months and not more than 2 years and shall also be liable to a fine not exceeding $6000 ...
(2) Where a body corporate is guilty of an offence under subsection (1)(e) and that offence is proved to have been committed with the authority, consent or connivance of any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
...
(7) Where, in any proceedings for an offence under subsection (1)(d), it is proved that the defendant has given shelter to any person who has remained in Singapore unlawfully for a period exceeding 90 days after the expiration of any pass issued to him or who has entered Singapore in contravention of section 5(1) or 6(1), it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the defendant has harboured him knowing him to be a person who has acted in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the regulations.
(8) Where a person who has acted in contravention of section 6, 15 or 36 or the regulations is found at any premises or place, other than premises used solely for residential purposes, and is in possession of any tools or implements or engaged in any activity which may give rise to the inference that he is doing any work, the occupier of the premises or place shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to have employed him knowing that he is a person who has acted in contravention of section 6, 15 or 36 or the regulations.
36 By an amendment in 1993, which came into effect on 22 April 1994, sub-ss (9) and (10) were inserted into s 57. These state:
(9) In any proceedings for an offence under subsection (1)(d) or (e), it shall not be a defence for the defendant to prove that the person harboured or employed by him was in possession of a pass or permit issued to the person under this Act or the regulations unless the defendant further proves that he had exercised due diligence to ascertain that the pass or permit was at the material time valid under this Act or the regulations.
(10) For the purposes of subsection (9), a defendant shall not be deemed to have exercised due diligence unless he had personally checked the passport or other travel document of the person who, he had harboured or employed and had reasonable ground to believe that -
(a) the person harboured or employed by him had, at the material time, in force a pass or permit issued under this Act or the regulations; and
(b) where such person is the holder of a visit pass, that person had, at the material time, in force a work permit issued under the Employment of Foreign Workers Act or had obtained the written consent of the Controller to work in Singapore.
37 The first charge
38 Applying the relevant statutory provisions to this case, the first question for the court was whether the appellant had shut his eyes to the obvious. If he had, then the appeal must fail regardless of when the 1993 amendments to the Act came into force.
39 In my view, the evidence could not show that the appellant had shut his eyes to the obvious. The relevant evidence included the fact that the appellant had paid Kannadasan $35 a day. It was not really in dispute that this was what a worker with a valid work permit would be paid. An illegal worker would have been paid about $20 a day. Furthermore, it was not disputed that each payment of wages made to Kannadasan was documented by Guan Seng. Every time he was paid, Kannadasan was made to sign a payment voucher. This was inconsistent with the appellant having shut his eyes to the obvious. If the appellant had done so, he would not have paid Kannadasan $35 a day and would not have made him sign the payment vouchers. It was inconceivable that the appellant would take the risk of engaging an illegal worker and pay him the market rate for a legal one.
40 As for the fact that Kannadasan had persisted in giving the appellant excuses when he asked for his passport, at the highest, this can only show that the appellant had not exercised due diligence. First, there is no evidence that the appellant had in fact recognized at the material time that what Kannadasan had said were excuses. The suggestion that these were excuses was made by the prosecution. The appellant did not admit that he knew that they were excuses at the relevant time. At most, the appellant`s answers could only be taken to mean that, with the benefit of hindsight, he had since realized that they were excuses.
41 Also, the fact that the appellant asked for Kannadasan`s passport does not show that he suspected the work permit to be invalid or a forgery. If he had done so, it would have been more logical for him to have offered a much lower wage to Kannadasan. There was absolutely no evidence that Guan Seng could not secure any more work permits. It was just as consistent with the appellant`s evidence that he asked for Kannadasan`s passport as a matter of routine. That being so, it would not be surprising that he did not pursue the matter vigorously. The allegation that he asked to see Kannadasan`s passport every time Kannadasan was paid his wages was, of course, an exaggeration. This was consistent with a belief that the work permit was valid. With the greatest respect to the district judge, there was nothing inherently contradictory about the appellant`s defence.
42 The prosecution also sought to rely on the fact that it would be an offence to employ a foreigner who had a work permit issued to another employer. The prosecution`s argument was that this should have put the appellant on notice. Ignorance of the law is no defence, or so it is said. That may be so, but this maxim does not elevate facts which would have put an accused on notice if he had knowledge of the law to one which would have put him on notice regardless of whether he had the requisite knowledge of the law. If the appellant was truly unaware that something was in contravention of the law, then the fact remained that it did not put him on notice because he was unaware that the relevant circumstances should have put him on notice. Nevertheless, the fact that the appellant was in the business of a building contractor and had previously employed foreigners was a relevant fact. It is open to the court to draw the proper inference when a person claims that he is unaware of legal provisions that are relevant to his trade. On the other hand, it would be unreal to expect a layman to know every legal provision that is relevant to his trade. In this regard, other evidence before the court cannot be ignored. In this case, even though the appellant had employed foreign workers before, the appellant`s evidence that it was his wife who took care of the administrative matters was not disputed. That being the case, it was not improbable that he could be ignorant of the relevant laws.
43 Hence, I was of the view that there was insufficient evidence to justify the finding that the appellant had shut his eyes to the obvious. At the highest, the prosecution`s evidence could only show that the appellant had not exercised due diligence. This, of course, left the question of what standard of due diligence the appellant must discharge before he could establish this defence.
44 As s 57 sub-ss (9) and (10) only came into effect on 22 April 1994, art 11(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1992 Ed) was relevant. This states:
(1) No person shall be punished for an act or omission which was not punishable by law when it was done or made, and no person shall suffer greater punishment for an offence than was prescribed by law at the time it was committed.
45 It is not controversial that a provision taking away a defence, which s 57(9) undoubtedly is, is a substantive provision. Hence, any attempt to apply it retrospectively would be unconstitutional. It was observed in Plewa v Chief Adjudication Officer by Lord Woolf in the House of Lords at p 329:
... I would have been inclined to attach more importance to the possible retrospective unfair effect of s 53 than the Court of Appeal did in Tunnicliffe [ Secretary of State for Social Security v Tunnicliffe]. This is because it removed the defence of due care and diligence. If recipients would not have been under a liability in fact to make a repayment under the former machinery then from the practical point of view they were being placed under a liability which did not previously exist by the change in law.
46 This observation was applicable here. If the appellant could have relied on certain defences before the 1993 amendments, he would not have been under a liability under the law at that time. The 1993 amendments, in effect, took away parts of these defences and limited their scope. The effect would be to put the appellant under a more onerous duty. That being the case, the 1993 amendments could only apply to acts of employing or harbouring Kannadasan on or after 22 April 1994. For this reason, it was insufficient to just say that the offences were continuing ones. If the amendments were intended to apply to that part of the course of conduct occurring after the amendments came into effect, then at least the charges must be amended to reflect this.
47 It must then be answered what defences were available to an accused before 22 April 1994. The case of Naranjan Singh s/o Ujagar Singh v PP is highly relevant. There, I approved of a statement from the grounds of judgment from the magistrate`s court:
`An example of rebutting the presumption of the mens rea could possibly be that the employee had represented to the employer that he had valid permits or had shown the employer permits which were subsequently discovered to be forged ... Furthermore, the accused was a person in the business of employing labourers which were foreigners ... Defence counsel`s submission that ... (as) the accused had not asked (Murugan) about his employment status nor checked (his) passport ..., it merely amounted to negligence ... which could not be mens rea ... could not (be accepted) ... I recall again the passage by Justice Chua at p 31 last paragraph of PP v Vadivelu:
"[The social policy of the Immigration Act offences] would not be achieved if mere negligence and recklessness on the part of the accused to enquire about the status of the illegal immigrant or overstayer, if he knows or has reasons to believe that the person is a foreigner, would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of knowledge."`
I must agree with this articulation of both the magistrate and the learned judge. The social implications of unrestricted immigration, which the Immigration Act attempts to curb, are obvious. It was toward the controlling of such immigration, and toward the proper enforcement of the Act, that in practice the courts have treated s 57(1) as if it did impose a strict liability, and have placed a high obligation on the part of an employer of foreign workers to establish that they were not illegal immigrants or overstayers before employing them. To my mind this strict approach, certainly as regards s 57(1)(e), must be taken. To allow an employer to evade the section by doing what would, in effect, amount to wilfully shutting his eyes to [the] immigration or employment status of his foreign employee, would make proper control and enforcement impossible. It cannot be placing too onerous a duty upon employers in Singapore to require them to screen their foreign workers before employing them to ensure compliance with immigration policy and the law.
48 Thus, an accused under the provisions in force before 22 April 1994 would not be able to rebut the presumption by merely saying that he did not know of the employee`s employment and immigration status. Mere negligence or recklessness was not a sufficient defence. However, an employer was not negligent if he had inquired from his employee what his employment status was or had checked his employees` permits. He would be absolved even if the permits turned out later to have been forged.
49 In Naranjan Singh , the defendant had neither inquired from his employee his employment status nor checked his passport. It was a case where the defendant did absolutely nothing to screen his employees. That being so, he was clearly negligent or reckless. It was in this context that I said that there was a duty on the part of employers to screen their foreign workers. If he had not done anything to screen the workers, then it would be no defence to say that he was ignorant of his workers` employment and immigration status.
50 Parliament, on the other hand, has decided to go one step further. It introduced s 57 sub-ss (9) and (10). The fact that Parliament inserted ss 57(9) and 57(10) shortly after Naranjan Singh was decided supported the proposition that it would have been sufficient to check the work permit of the employee before the amendment. Had it not been the case, then the 1993 amendments would appear to be superfluous. For these reasons, I was unable to accept the learned DPP`s submission that the standard of due diligence required of an employer before 22 April 1994 was the same as the standard required after that date.
51 Hence, prior to 22 April 1994, it would have been sufficient for a defendant to show that he had screened his workers by examining the work permits of the workers. There was then no requirement to examine the passport as well, unless he had reasons to suspect that the work permit was not genuine. It was probably the case that either method sufficed.
52 Applying the principles to the facts of this case, until 22 April 1994, the appellant had no duty to check Kannadasan`s passport. It was sufficient for him to have checked P11. Did he do so? The appellant`s evidence was that he checked P11 before agreeing to employ Kannadasan. Kannadasan`s evidence was that the appellant did so only about two weeks after he was employed. According to his testimony in court, this was purely due to chance. He had just happened to have taken P11 out of his purse and the appellant had just happened to see it. However, it was apparent from the evidence of the investigating officer that Kannadasan had told him that the appellant checked P11 the second day he was employed. This, in my view, was a material contradiction. This, together with the fact that the appellant was paying Kannadasan the wages for a legal worker meant that Kannadasan`s evidence on this was, at least, of doubtful credibility.
53 No doubt, Kannadasan had already been dealt with for overstaying. If one were only to look at the Immigration Act, then one could say that Kannadasan would have no motive for lying. However, if what the appellant said was true, then Kannadasan could be charged for cheating as well. There was thus manifest reason for Kannadasan to lie. Hence, PP v Vadivelu could easily be distinguished on this point.
54 I was therefore of the view that it would have been against the weight of the evidence to hold that the appellant did not ask to see P11. Looking at the whole of the evidence, including the fact that Kannadasan was paid the wages of a legal foreign worker as well as the fact that payments of his wages were carefully documented by the appellant`s company, the almost inescapable conclusion was that the appellant did check Kannadasan`s work permit and believed it to be genuine. In my view, that was a sufficient exercise of due diligence before the amendments came into effect on 22 April 1994.
55 From 22 April 1994 onwards, the question that remained was whether the amendments that were effected were intended to apply to employers who had employed foreign workers before 22 April 1994 and had continued to employ them on or after 22 April 1994. If the amendments were not meant to apply to employers in relation to these workers, then the appellant was entitled to be acquitted. This is because the old standard of due diligence was applicable to him, and he could discharge this by examining P11. If, however, the amendments were meant to apply to such a situation, then it would be apparent that the appellant had no defence to the charge, even if his evidence was accepted. This is because in relation to the employment of Kannadasan from 22 April 1994 to 22 June 1994, the appellant had not exercised due diligence. It was his own evidence that he did not check Kannadasan`s passport.
56 I was of the view that the legislature, in amending s 57 in the manner it did, intended that employers continuing to employ foreign workers from 22 April 1994 onwards should exercise a greater degree of diligence. It is the act of employing an illegal worker that Parliament intended to proscribe. Whether he was employed for the first time on 22 April 1994 or had continued in his employment on that day could not be relevant. The obligation was a continuing one. Parliament could not have intended that once an employer had checked his worker`s work permit and passport, the employer had no more duty to ensure compliance with the Act. The mischief the Act was directed at would not be addressed.
57 For this reason, the amendments were intended to apply to an employer who employs foreign workers on or after 22 April 1994, even if the worker was first employed before the amendments came into effect. This is not giving retrospective effect to the amendments, for, prior to 22 April 1994, the old standard of due diligence applied. The new standard only applied for the period of employment after 22 April 1994. Counsel`s argument in the district court, that Parliament cannot have intended that on 22 April 1994, all employers have to check their workers` passports was, in my view, ill-conceived. Clearly, Parliament did not intend this. What Parliament intended was that if the employer knew that his worker`s employment was to continue after the amendment came into effect, he would take steps to discharge the enhanced standard of due diligence. There was nothing to prevent the employer from discharging this enhanced duty by doing the necessary checks once he learnt that the amendments had been passed or when the commencement of the amending legislation was announced. Nobody asked him to wait until the very last day.
58 Based on the appellant`s own evidence, he had no defence to the first charge. This was because he did not check Kannadasan`s passport. I was unable to accept counsel`s submission that there could somehow be a defence even if the appellant did not check Kannadasan`s passport because he believed that the passport was not available. The short answer was that, in such a case, the employer should not employ that foreign worker until the passport is made available.
59 Nevertheless, for the reasons I have stated, the charge should be amended to state that the relevant period of employment was `between 22 April 1994 and 22 June 1994`. This would not cause any prejudice to the appellant. Hence, subject to the charge being thus amended, I dismissed the appellant`s appeal against conviction in respect of the first charge.
60 The second charge
61 It was quite apparent that the prosecution was not seriously relying on the fact that the appellant had bought Kannadasan food and drinks as a basis for the second charge. In my view, this was quite correct. The prosecution was relying on s 57(7) of the Act. This only applies to one who `has given shelter` and not merely food. In any event, the food was provided by the appellant to all his workers as a bonus for working hard, and not as an act in the nature of harbouring.
62 The question then was whether there was sufficient evidence to show that the appellant had given shelter to Kannadasan. It was not disputed that Kannadasan slept in the uncompleted building. However, this was insufficient to constitute an act of harbouring. In Darch v Weight , it was held that harbouring involves a positive act of providing shelter. In Thyagarajan v PP , the prosecution`s evidence, on the basis of the overstayer`s testimony alone, was that the overstayer had slept in the defendant`s barber shop. The only other evidence was that this occurred on nights when the defendant had given him the keys to the shop. Chua J held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant there permitted the overstayer to stay overnight in his shop. The act of entrusting the keys to the overstayer on certain nights could be equally consistent with requiring him to lock up the shop. Therefore it could not be inferred that the defendant knew that the overstayer was sleeping in the shop on those nights. The defendant`s conviction was accordingly quashed.
63 In the present case, the only evidence the prosecution could adduce to show that the appellant had permitted Kannadasan to sleep in the uncompleted building was Kannadasan`s testimony. The same thing was true of the allegation that the appellant permitted Kannadasan to sleep in a container which was subsequently broken up (though I had difficulty imagining how a container can be broken up). The district judge`s finding on this charge was as follows:
PW3 [Kannadasan] had testified that he slept at the site in question from February till the date of his arrest upon being told to do so by the accused. This fact was not strenuously resisted by the accused. All the accused said was that this was a construction site and the workers slept everywhere. He only added that he did not provide them with beds.
64 With the greatest respect, this was not a sufficient treatment of the evidence. The appellant, in his evidence-in-chief, had denied that he had told Kannadasan to sleep at the site. His evidence was that he told Kannadasan that there was no place for him. Furthermore, he denied that he had a container at the worksite for the purpose of accommodating his workers. No doubt, the appellant did not seriously challenge Kannadasan`s allegation during cross-examination , but that was only because the prosecution did not adequately pursue this issue. The entire cross-examination on this element of the second charge could be found in the following extract of the notes of evidence:
Q: I put it to you that you harboured Muthu at this worksite in Toh Avenue between February and June 1994 knowing that he is an overstayer?
A: Just now I have expressed my position. I did not know that he was an overstayer. It was because of this work permit. I believed this work permit. I was convinced by this work permit.
Q: So you are saying that you did harbour him or provide him with shelter?
A: The issue arises, this piece P11 affected me very much. Since this is so and I believed P11 is a real one. If I believed this is legal, proper I would not know that he has overstayed. If I knew, I would chase him away and would not have employed him.
Q: So what you are saying is that you did provide shelter but you did not know he was an overstayer?
A: That is the construction site. They all sleep everywhere. I did not buy them beds. They just took a plank and sleep.
Q: You have heard Muthu`s evidence. He said that you told him to sleep at Toh Avenue and you told him to guard the things there. Is there any reason why he should say this?
A: I have Thai workers there. My things are not looked after by anybody. I have not asked Muthu to do so. If he wants to distort this, what can I do ...
65 With the greatest respect, the prosecution might just as well have said to the appellant `I put it to you that you are guilty of the offence.` The question was so loaded with nuances that it alleged all the requisite elements of the offence! Just because the appellant knew that some of his workers were sleeping at the site, it did not follow that he knew that Kannadasan was sleeping at the site. Similarly, even if he had given consent to some of his workers sleeping at the site, it did not follow that he had permitted Kannadasan to sleep at the site. The prosecution should have proceeded to ask whether the appellant was aware that Kannadasan was sleeping at the site. If that had been done, then the appellant`s evidence would have been tested. There would then at least be some basis, apart from Kannadasan`s evidence, for the court to infer that the appellant consented to Kannadasan sleeping at the site. However, he did not do so.
66 That being the case, since the only evidence against the appellant on this charge was Kannadasan`s testimony, it was imperative for the district judge to make a finding that his testimony was compelling to the extent that a conviction might be based solely on it. The district judge did not make such a finding of fact. In fact, given the numerous contradictions, inconsistencies and improbabilities in Kannadasan`s testimony, it is doubtful if such a finding could properly be made.
67 As the burden of proof was on the prosecution to show beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had given Kannadasan shelter, there was insufficient evidence to justify the appellant being convicted on this charge. This is because there was insufficient evidence that the appellant knew that Kannadasan was sleeping in the uncompleted building. There was thus insufficient evidence to show that the appellant permitted Kannadasan to sleep there. That being so, there was insufficient evidence to show the positive act of providing shelter. Therefore, the presumption in s 57(7) did not arise.
68 Accordingly, I set aside the appellant`s conviction on the second charge.
69 I should say that had the act of providing shelter been proved, it would not be unconstitutional to invoke the presumption in s 57(7) in respect of the amendments, even though part of the period of 90 days fell before 22 April 1994. In R v St Mary (Whitechapel) , a statute was passed prohibiting the removal of a widow from a parish within 12 months after the death of her husband. A pauper`s husband passed away and the parish obtained an order for her removal. Before she was actually removed, the statute came into effect. It was held that the pauper could not be removed till the 12-month period had passed. Lord Denman CJ held at p 127:
It was said that the operation of the statute was confined to persons who had become widows after the Act was passed, and that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended supported this construction: but we have before shewn that the statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing.
70 This is directly applicable to the 90-day period in s 57(7).
71 The sentence
72 The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for eight months and seven months on the first and second charges respectively. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The district judge held that as the appellant had claimed trial, he did not deserve the statutory minimum term as there was no indication of remorse or regret. However, it was not a serious aggravating factor as he did not prolong his trial unnecessarily.
73 With respect, it appears to me that the district judge`s reasoning was not exactly on all fours with sentencing principles. An accused is entitled to claim trial. Although an accused who pleads guilty may usually expect a discount, it does not follow that the court can impose a heavier sentence merely because he had elected to contest the charges instead. The mere fact of claiming trial is not an aggravating circumstance. As the appellant had not unnecessarily prolonged his trial, there was no aggravating circumstance at all.
74 In respect of the first charge, Parliament had seen fit to impose a minimum sentence of six months` imprisonment. This is so even if an accused was a victim of deception, so long as he did not exercise the requisite amount of due diligence. In view of the fact that the period over which the appellant could be said to have employed Kannadasan illegally was from 22 April to 22 June 1994, as well as the fact the appellant was a first time offender and that there was no aggravating circumstance in this case, I was of the view the minimum sentence prescribed by the Act was appropriate.
75 As I have set aside the appellant`s conviction on the second charge of harbouring, the sentence on this must, for what it is worth, be set aside as well. In the event, I allowed the appellant`s appeal against sentence on the first charge and reduced the sentence to six months` imprisonment.
76 Appeal allowed in part.
Jason Peter Dendroff (Yap Chee Leong & Pnrs) for the appellant
Low Cheong Yeow (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent