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In the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
[1996] SGHC 296
Suit 549/1995
Between
Awang bin Dollah
… Plaintiff
And
Shun Shing Construction & Engineering Co Ltd
Housing & Development Board
Kwan Kok Pheng t/a Quick Start Construction
… Defendant
And
Cosmic Insurance Corporation Ltd
… Third Party
grounds of decision

This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.
Awang bin Dollah v Shun Shing Construction & Engineering Co Ltd and Others (Cosmic Insurance Corporation Ltd, Third Party)
[1996] SGHC 296
Suit 549/1995
Lim Teong Qwee JC
31 December 1996
1 Judgment:
2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 1. On 3 July 1994 at about 9.50am an uncompleted wooden structure at a construction site collapsed. The structure was to have been the site office. The plaintiff was employed at the construction site as a general worker and from about 8.00am that day he had been working inside the structure. He was engaged in its construction. He was seriously injured when the structure collapsed and in this action he claims damages for loss and expense as a result of the injuries he sustained.
3 2. The second defendant ( HDB ) was the owner of the site which was in Tampines at the junction of Ave 6 and Ave 9. HDB had awarded a contract for the construction of 656 dwelling units there to the first defendant and by a contract evidenced by the first defendant's letter to Sources Construction Pte Ltd ( Sources ) dated 2 July 1994 the first defendant had sub- contracted the whole of the works to Sources. Sources had in turn sub-contracted the carpentry works to Hood Seng Construction Engineering ( Hood Seng ) and Hood Seng had in turn sub- contracted part of those works to Quick Start Construction ( Quick Start ). The works sub-contracted to Quick Start included the construction of the site office.
4 3. Before the trial began there were two procedural developments. On 11 September 1995 interlocutory judgment in default of appearance was entered against the third defendant for damages to be assessed. As appears from the title of this action the third defendant is Kwan Kok Pheng trading as Quick Start Construction. On 4 March 1996 the action against HDB was discontinued but the pleadings were not amended. The trial is in respect of the action against the first defendant only and of the third party proceedings.
5 4. Lim Png Sor ( Lim ) testified that in July 1994 he and Lee Kuan Yong ( Lee ) were partners in the firm of Quick Start Construction. This is borne out by the returns lodged with the Registry of Companies & Businesses which also showed that the third defendant Kwan Kok Pheng ( Kwan ) only entered the business on 19 September 1994 when Lee withdrew. This is not in dispute and I find that Lim was a partner of Quick Start to whom the construction of the site office had been sub-contracted by Hood Seng.
6 5. The plaintiff alleged in his statement of claim that he was employed by the first defendant or HDB and also by the third defendant or by all of them at the time of the accident. In his affidavit he said he was employed by one or two or all three of the original defendants but under examination-in-chief in court he said he was working for the first defendant and that he was not working for the third defendant.
7 6. The plaintiff is a Malaysian from the state of Kelantan where he worked as a rice padi planter. He said he came to Singapore to find work because he would be paid much more. He said a fellow Malaysian brought him to the construction site. He did not know his name. He was not working at the same construction site.
8 7. The plaintiff said that he discussed his salary with a Mr Ban Ching. He was informed by the fellow Malaysian that this person was the supervisor. He admitted that this person himself did not tell him he was the first defendant's supervisor and there was no evidence that anyone else did. Although he did not have a work permit he said he was told to start work first and Mr Ban Ching would take care of that later on. None of this evidence was mentioned in his affidavit.
9 8. The plaintiff said that he started work the same day after the interview and Mr Ban Ching told him to work on the site office. He said he was to knock in some nails so < the > site office would not shake . He never saw Mr Ban Ching again. He did not know the third defendant (Kwan) or Lim or Lee. He worked with four others. He did not know them and he did not even know if any one of them worked with him on any of the other days he worked there. On his third day at work the site office he was working on collapsed.
10 9. Shum Hau Tak ( Shum ) testified that he was the deputy general manager of the first defendant. He said in his affidavit that investigations carried out by his company and the third party revealed that the plaintiff was not employed by the first defendant. He did not know Mr Ban Ching.
11 10. Lim said that the plaintiff was his employee at the Tampines construction site. He knew the plaintiff did not have a work permit and told him he would apply for one after a trial period of one week. He did not know Mr Ban Ching.
12 11. Tan Saw Wei a senior officer in the Ministry of Labour said that she carried out investigations into the illegal employment of foreign workers and in the course of her investigations she recorded a statement from Lim. In his statement Lim admitted that he interviewed the plaintiff for employment as a construction worker. By letter dated 6 January 1995 she offered to compound the offence of employing the plaintiff in July 1994 to 3 July 1994 without a work permit on payment of $1,000. On 9 February 1995 the offer was accepted and Lim paid $1,000. Lim confirmed that he paid and that the offence was compounded.
13 12. I find that at the time of the accident on 3 July 1994 the plaintiff was employed by Quick Start as a construction worker. He was employed two days previously and was instructed to work on the construction of the site office together with about four others. He was not employed by the first defendant or HDB.
14 13. The plaintiff alleged in para 7 of the statement of claim that the accident was caused by the negligence of the first defendant and/or by the breach of the first defendant's duty as his employer to take reasonable care for his safety. All the particulars given had to do with the allegation that the first defendant was his employer. I have found that the first defendant was not his employer and accordingly the claim under para 7 fails.
15 14. The plaintiff said that he started work at 8.00am on the day of the accident. He worked inside the uncompleted site office. He said there was still a lot more to be done . When he was asked if it was a two-storey site office he said he would not know as there was only one level when he was working there. The roof was not in place yet. He said there was only a plywood ceiling over the structure.
16 15. In his affidavit the plaintiff said that it was raining heavily that morning but the servants or agents of the defendants insisted that < they > continue to work as the site office was required urgently . The affidavit was affirmed before the action against HDB was discontinued and defendants would have meant the first defendant, HDB and the third defendant.
17 16. The plaintiff was asked who told him to continue working and he said it was Mr Ban Ching but when he was reminded that he had said he did not see Mr Ban Ching again after the interview on his first day of work he corrected himself and said that on the day of the accident Mr Ban Ching did not tell him anything. When he was asked who insisted he continued working he said On first day Ban Ching already told me to carry on working and not to stop until job completed. He was asked again if on that day anyone told him he had to continue and he said No one.
18 17. The plaintiff was asked why he continued to work even though it was raining heavily. His answer was brief. It was sheltered inside . This is part of his evidence under cross- examination:
19 Q: Remember weather condition 3/7/94 from about 9.30 am?
20 A: Can't remember. But it was dark.
21 Q: Affidavit para 10. Raining heavily. At time of accident? Remember?
22 A: Yes. Remember.
23 Q: Rain came into site office?
24 A: No.
25 Q: Heard thunder?
26 A: No. I was inside. Working indoors.
27 Q: Which part of site office you were in just before collapse?
28 A: In the middle.
29 Q: Collapse of site office. Straight down or to side?
30 A: Don't know. I was unconscious.
31 18. The Straits Times newspaper in its issue of 4 July 1994 carried an article about heavy rain and strong winds having swept across Singapore the day before. The meteorological service was asked for its report on the weather in the Tampines area and in his letter of 10 April 1996 Tan Suan Foon ( Tan ) the deputy director (services) said:
32 Our assessment of the weather condition is as follows:-
33 Location : Tampines area
34 Date : 3 July 1994
35 Time : Between 0830 hrs and 1030 hrs
36 Wind : South/Southwest 10-20 km/h. Occasionally between 0930 hrs and 1030 hrs Southwest/West 30-40 km/h with strong wind gust to 60-90 km/h due to a 'Sumatra' squall/thunderstorms.
37 Weather : Intermittent to continuous rain occasionally heavy. Also occasional lightning/thunder.
38 Remarks : Similar wind and weather condition affected many other parts of Singapore.
39 19. Tan explained that there were five weather stations in Singapore recording the weather each day. There was no weather station in Tampines. Two weather stations nearby were at Changi Airport and Paya Lebar. The statement as to the weather in Tampines was his assessment based on records at the two weather stations nearby.
40 20. At Changi Airport wind speed started to rise at about 10.00am and most of the time it was above 40 km/h. Tan said that at Tampines strong winds could have started earlier but he was quick to point out that although the wind was from the west it did not mean that strong winds would hit the west first. At Changi Airport the strongest wind gust was recorded at 87 km/h at about 10.15am and at Paya Lebar at 63 km/h at about 9.45am. He said a Sumatra squall was usually accompanied by heavy rain and strong gusty west to east wind. When asked if the wind conditions on 3 July 1994 were totally out of the ordinary his answer was that he would say they were uncommon.
41 21. There was no direct evidence as to the wind conditions at the construction site in Tampines at any time on 3 July 1994 or as to what caused the uncompleted wooden structure to collapse at about 9.50 that morning. It was raining heavily while the plaintiff was working inside the structure. He did not hear any thunder. He did not give any evidence about the wind conditions. He did not know if the structure came straight down or fell to one side.
42 22. I think there were strong winds blowing over the construction site at Tampines on 3 July 1994. I accept Tan's assessment of the weather in the period between 9.30am and 10.30am. At Changi Airport wind speed started to rise at about 10.00am. Tan did not say when strong winds started in Paya Lebar. He was not asked. There was a strong gust at 9.45am and so strong winds would have started at that time or before that. Since the construction site is roughly west of Changi Airport and northeast of Paya Lebar the likelihood (and I put it no higher than that) is that strong winds started at the construction site at some time between 9.45am and 10.00am. I must bear in mind that usually wind fluctuated in speed and direction quite quickly.
43 23. It was raining heavily at the time the structure collapsed and I think for some time before that although it was unlikely to have been heavy before 8.30am. The winds could have started to build up from about 9.45am but as the plaintiff gave no evidence of the wind conditions the likelihood is that he did not notice anything unusual. There was no evidence of any defect in the design of the site office or the method of construction or materials used or anything to do with the structure that caused it to collapse. The structure collapsed at about 9.50am and on the evidence before me I find that it collapsed under the combined force of the heavy rain and strong gusty wind.
44 24. The plaintiff alleged in para 8 of the statement of claim that the accident was caused by the breach of the first defendant of its duty as an occupier of the work site. He alleged that he was an invitee or a licensee. All the allegations were denied by the first defendant.
45 25. In Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd < 1966 > AC 552 Lord Denning said at p 578:
46 ... wherever a person has a sufficient degree of control over premises that he ought to realise that any failure on his part to use care may result in injury to a person coming lawfully there, then he is an 'occupier' and the person coming lawfully there is his 'visitor': and the 'occupier' is under a duty to his 'visitor' to use reasonable care. In order to be an 'occupier' it is not necessary for a person to have entire control over the premises. He need not have exclusive occupation. Suffice it that he has some degree of control. He may share the control with others. Two or more may be 'occupiers'.
47 I think this is a good working definition and I will respectfully adopt it. See also China Insurance Co Ltd v Woh Hup (Pte) Ltd < 1977 > 2 MLJ 57 where this passage was cited with approval.
48 26. The first defendant sub-contracted the whole of the works to Sources. In its letter to Sources dated 2 July 1994 it said:
49 < Sources > shall observe, perform and comply with all the provisions of the contract between the < first defendant > and < HDB > for the execution of the captioned Building Contract (hereinafter called 'the Contract') on the part of the < first defendant > to be observed, performed and complied with in so far as they relate and apply to the Sub-contract Works and are not inconsisent with the express provision of the Sub-contract as if all the same were severally set out herein and indemnify and save harmless the < first defendant > against and from:
50 i) any breach, non-performance by < Sources > , his employees or agents of the said provisions of the Contract; and
51 ii) any act or omission of < Sources > , his employees or agents which involves the < first defendant > in any liability to HDB under the Contract; and
52 iii) any claim, damages, loss or expense due to or resulting from any negligence or breach of duty on the part of < Sources > , his employees or agents.
53 27. On 21 June 1994 before the works had been sub-contracted to Sources the first defendant submitted to HDB the design calculations endorsed by its professional engineer Koh Bok Cheng ( Koh ) for the site office. On 4 July 1994 which was the day after the acident HDB wrote to the first defendant:
54 PE'S SUBMISSION FOR SITE OFFICE, WORKER'S QUARTERS AND PERIMETER HOARDINGS CONTRACT NO. A/247/94 SITE: TAMPINES N7 C8
55 We have no objection to your PE's submission for the above- mentioned works.
56 2 However, it is subject to the following conditions:
57 a) Your Professional Engineer is fully responsible for his design and calculations.
58 b) Your PE is to supervise the construction of the works and to submit a Certificate of Supervision upon completion of the works.
59 28. The first defendant's letter to HDB said that its professional engineer Koh had endorsed the design calculations and I can infer that it employed Koh for that purpose. Koh was required to supervise the construction of the site office and to submit a certificate of supervision upon completion. There was no evidence as to whether Koh continued to be retained for this purpose but there was also no evidence that there was any change in HDB's conditions. There was also no evidence that the responsibility for providing supervision by a professional engineer had been included in the sub-contract to Sources.
60 29. Shum said under cross-examination that the first defendant had its supervisors at the site. This is part of his evidence:
61 Q: Steven Lee one of < the supervisors > ?
62 A: Yes.
63 Q: Would he have been at premises every day?
64 A: Should be. I was not on site. I did not know.
65 Q: Steven Lee project manager?
66 A: Yes.
67 Q: From commencement of works. Who supervised?
68 A: Steven Lee.
69 30. The first defendant was awarded the contract for the construction of 656 dwelling units. The contract is not before me but the first defendant must have been given possession of the site. The contract works included the construction of the site office. The whole of the works were sub-contracted to Sources and Sources was to observe, perform and comply with all the provisions of the contract between the first defendant and HDB and to indemnify the first defendant. The contract with HDB was not assigned. The first defendant remained primarily answerable to HDB by which it would be paid for the works. It had its supervisors on site. No doubt they were there to provide supervision.
70 31. I think the first defendant had a sufficient degree of control over the whole of the site including that part where the site office was under construction. This is so notwithstanding that Sources, Hood Seng and Quick Start might also have had some degree of control over that part of the site. In my judgment the first defendant was an occupier of the site including that part of it where the site office was on the day of the accident under construction.
71 32. The first defendant had an interest in the construction of the site office. It was part of the main contract works. It would be paid for it and its professional engineer was required to supervise the construction. Quick Start also had an interest in it. They were employed to construct the site office under their sub-contract with Hood Seng.
72 33. If the partners of Quick Start had gone onto the site to construct the site office themselves they would have gone upon business which concerned the first defendant and at its tacit invitation by reason of the chain of sub-contracts. They would have been entitled to consideration as invitees. They had instead sent their employees (including the plaintiff) as the first defendant would most certainly have expected them to do having regard to the nature of the business. These employees would be entitled to the same consideration as their employers. In my judgment the plaintiff was an invitee and he was an invitee notwithstanding that he did not have a work permit.
73 34. In Industrial Commercial Bank v Tan Swa Eng & Ors < 1995 > 2 SLR 716 Lai Kew Chai J (delivering the grounds of judgment of the Court of Appeal) said at p 719:
74 In short, the duty of an occupier to an invitee would be to prevent damage or injury from any unusual dangers on the premises he knows or ought to know and which the invitee does not know about.
75 Thus, the appellants would only be liable to the estates of the two deceased and their dependants for their claims for lost years and loss of dependency respectively if:
76 (a) the appellants actually knew or ought to have known of the danger that caused the injury;
77 (b) the danger was unusual to the two deceased, having regard to the nature of the place and their knowledge;
78 (c) the danger was unknown to the two deceased and the significance not appreciated by them; and
79 (d) the appellants had failed to use reasonable care to prevent damage from occurring, whether by notice, lighting, guarding or otherwise.
80 He referred to Indermaur v Dames (1866) LR 1 CP 274 where Willes J said at p 288:
81 And, with respect to such a visitor at least, we consider it settled law, that he, using reasonable care on his part for his own safety, is entitled to expect that the occupier shall on his part use reasonable care to prevent damage from unusual danger, which he knows or ought to know ....
82 35. In Industrial Commercial Bank v Tan Swa Eng & Ors a high- rise building collapsed and two customers of a bank which occupied part of the ground floor of the building died from injuries they received. One of the questions before both the High Court and the Court of Appeal was whether the bank's officers knew or ought to have known of the danger of the building collapsing. It was the collapse of the building that caused the injuries but the occupier's liability depended on the knowledge its officers had or ought to have had of the danger of its collapsing.
83 36. I return now to the facts in the case before me. Between 8.30am and 10.30am there was intermittent to continuous rain which was occasionally heavy according to the weather assessment. At 9.50am the structure collapsed. I have found that it collapsed because of the heavy rain and the strong gusty wind. It was likely that these wind conditions started between 9.45am and 10.00am.
84 37. The uncompleted site office would have been able to withstand heavy rain. It did. It would also have been able to withstand some amount of wind. The first question then is what conditions of rain and wind would present a danger of this structure collapsing. Unfortunately there was no evidence of what these conditions would be.
85 38. The structure collapsed under conditions which were uncommon. Usually wind fluctuated in speed and direction quite quickly and a sudden strong gust of wind could have caused the structure to collapse without any build up. If there was a build up starting from about 9.45am the structure would have collapsed within about five minutes. There was no evidence as to the wind conditions at any time at all before the structure collapsed or at any time at all that day although the plaintiff and four other workers were there and many other workers must have been at the construction site.
86 39. Mr Shah said that the professional engineer Koh was not called. That was so but the evidence is that his design calculations were submitted and a copy of his submission is in the agreed bundle of documents. There was no evidence that there was anything wanting in regard to the design.
87 40. Mr Shah also said that Steven Lee who was the first defendant's project manager did not give any evidence. I agree that if he had been at the site at the material time his evidence would have been helpful.
88 41. The question is whether there was a danger of the structure collapsing. Was there a real risk that it would collapse before it actually did collapse? In a sense there was always a risk of the structure collapsing under the combined force of heavy rain and strong gusty wind but that is not enough. There must be present some signs to indicate that the risk was real.
89 42. In Industrial Commercial Bank v Tan Swa Eng & Ors it was a matter of time before the building would collapse. Lai Kew Chai J said at p 721:
90 Whilst we accepted that the distant rumbling, tremor and vibration felt and cracks on the pillar were signs of unusual danger, it was difficult in all the circumstances for the appellants to ascertain the extent of the unusual danger at that point in time. It must be pointed out that no debris was ever seen to be falling off the ceiling at the appellants' premises and none of the walls in the appellants' premises were cracked prior to the collapse.
91 There was a real risk of the building collapsing although having regard to the circumstances and to the state of knowledge then prevailing the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge and concluded that the appellants' officers could not be imputed with knowledge of the danger.
92 43. On the evidence I have found that it was likely that strong winds started between 9.45am and 10.00am. The first defendant did not call Steven Lee or for that matter anyone else to give any evidence as to the weather at the construction site that morning but in the circumstances I do not consider that any adverse presumption under s 116(g) of the Evidence Act is justified.
93 44. Tan's evidence was that usually wind fluctuated in speed and direction quite quickly. Strong gusty wind which in combination with heavy rain caused the structure to collapse could have come on quite quickly without any build up and I do not consider that the onus has in any sense at all shifted to the first defendant.
94 45. Having regard to all the evidence before me I find that it has not been proved that there was any danger of the structure collapsing before it actually collapsed. It has not been proved that any of the first defendant's supervisors or officers knew or ought to have known of the danger if there was any. If there was any such danger and if they did know of it there was really nothing they could have done to prevent injury to the plaintiff. There would have been very little time to do anything. The plaintiff's claim against the first defendant as occupier of the site under para 8 of the statement of claim accordingly fails.
95 46. Finally in para 9 of the statement of claim the plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred within a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act of which the first defendant was an occupier and the accident was caused by breach of statutory duties under the Act.
96 47. Factory means any premises in which ... persons are employed in manual labour in any process for or incidental to ... (a) the making of any article or of part of any article; (b) the altering ... of any article; or (c) the adapting for sale of any article .... Article is not defined except that it includes solid or liquid or gas or any combination of these but clearly it does not include any building such as a site office which is affixed to and forms part of the land. There can be no doubt that the accident did not occur within a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act and the claim under para 9 accordingly fails.
97 48. In the premises I dismissed the plaintiff's claim with costs.
98 49. I go on now to the third party proceedings. In the event that the first defendant is liable to the plaintiff the first defendant claims that it is entitled to be indemnified by the third party under a policy of insurance issued by the third party. Since I have dismissed the plaintiff's claim the first defendant's claim to an indemnity fails and I dismissed it. The only question that I have to decide is the proper order as regards costs.
99 50. The third party alleged in para 7 of the defence that the first defendant had failed to disclose the fact that the plaintiff was an illegal worker. By way of particulars it alleged that:
100 the wrongful concealment and/or failure of the First Defendants to disclose the fact that the Plaintiff did not have a work permit is a material fact which if known to the Third Party at the time of inception of cover would have led the said Third Party to decline insuring such a risk on the ground of illegality.
101 51. It is not disputed that the plaintiff was a foreign worker under the Employment of Foreign Workers Act. Section 5(1) prohibits a person from employing a foreign worker unless he has obtained a valid work permit. Section 5(2) prohibits a foreign worker from being in the employment of an employer without a valid work permit. It is also not disputed that there was no valid work permit in respect of the plaintiff which allowed him to work for Quick Start.
102 52. It seems to me that the third party's case is that the first defendant had failed to disclose the fact that there was no valid work permit in respect of the plaintiff and that this was a material fact. In my judgment this defence fails in limine. The policy was issued on 30 August 1993 and the relevant endorsement extending the categories of employees (to include the plaintiff as the first defendant alleged) was dated 13 January 1994. When Quick Start employed the plaintiff in the few days to 3 July 1994 the policy with the relevant endorsement had been in force for more than five months. Non-disclosure of a material fact as a defence has to be non-disclosure of a fact in existence before the policy is issued or as in this case before the categories of employees are extended.
103 53. It is unnecessary to consider whether the test of materiality is as pleaded. I have not had the benefit of counsel's submissions on this point but in the language of s 18(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he will take the risk. As a statement of the common law it applies to non-marine insurance.
104 54. There was no evidence as to whether a prudent insurer's judgment would be influenced. Chua Keok Wah ( Chua ) said no more than since the plaintiff was not a holder of a valid work permit at the material time of the accident, the said policy will not respond to any claims of an indemnity .... Chua was the senior claims executive of the third party. He was not even an underwriter. Whether one accepts the decisive influence test or rejects it as did the majority in the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd & Anor v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd < 1994 > 3 All ER 581 I would have thought that the fact that there was no work permit would not influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he will take the risk.
105 55. The third party's defence under para 7A is that the policy extended to employees of the first defendant's sub-contractors and that the plaintiff was not such an employee. He was an employee of Quick Start who were sub-contractors of Hood Seng which was in turn a sub-contractor of Sources and Sources was a sub-contractor of the first defendant.
106 56. Under the policy the third party agreed:
107 ... that if any workman in the < first defendant's > employment shall sustain personal injury by accident ... arising out of and in the course of his employment by the < first defendant > in the Business, the < third party > will ... indemnify the against all sums for which the shall be liable to pay compensation either under the Legislation or at Common Law ....
108 Business was defined as construction and engineering works and Legislation meant the Workmen's Compensation Act.
109 57. In the schedule to the policy under the heading Categories of employees in < the first defendant's > employment there is only one person named and that is Shum himself. By the endorsement dated 13 January 1994 the schedule was amended by an addition to the Categories of employees in < the first defendant's > employment . The category added was described as 3 General Labourers (Sub-Contractors' Workers) .
110 58. The question is whether Sub-Contractors' Workers included the plaintiff or whether the expression meant only employees of the first defendant's immediate sub-contractor Sources. It is not disputed that in appropriate cases sub-contractor for this purpose can include sub-sub-contractor and further down the line.
111 59. Shum said that the extension in the endorsement was meant to cover three general labourers employed by any sub-contractor whether or not a sub-contractor with a contractual relationship with the first defendant. He said he could not remember if this was made known to the third party. He also said:
112 In the case of a building project (such as the Tampines Project where the Plaintiff was injured), where numerous different contractors and sub-contractors may be engaged, it is usual and convenient that the main contractor (such as the First Defendants) take out a single policy covering all contractors and sub-contractors in respect of loss of or damage to the entire contract works or from personal injury claims arising therefrom. This makes sense as is evident from the instant case where the Plaintiff was not insured by his employer, the Third Defendants.
113 60. Section 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that where personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to a workman his employer shall be liable to pay compensation. The liability is that of the immediate employer only. Where a person contracts with another for the execution of work undertaken by him he would not be liable to pay compensation for personal injury caused to a workman not employed by him immediately even though the workman is employed in the execution of the work.
114 61. Section 17(1) addresses this question. It provides:
115 Where any person (referred to in this section as the principal) in the course of or for the purpose of his trade or business contracts with any other person (referred to in this section as the contractor) for the execution by the contractor of the whole or any part of any work ... undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the execution of the work any compensation which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him ....
116 The principal's liability attaches by reason that the workman is employed in the execution of the work undertaken by the principal and for which the principal receives the benefit. The workman may be employed by the contractor or by any other person to whom the contractor may have sub-contracted the work.
117 62. I think what the parties intended was that the endorsement should extend the policy to employees of persons who have contracted to execute any part of the work undertaken by the first defendant. It was intended to provide insurance in cases where the first defendant would be liable to pay compensation under the Act notwithstanding that it may also be entitled to be indemnified by the workman's immediate employer and also at common law. The third party's defence under para 7A accordingly fails.
118 63. Finally in para 8 of the defence the third party alleged that the agreement referred to in the statement of claim to insure three (3) sub-contractor's workers was void for illegality and its enforcement would be contrary to public policy. The case is that the plaintiff did not have a work permit.
119 64. Section 2(2) of the Act provides that:
120 If in any proceedings for the recovery of compensation under this Act it appears to the Commissioner or the court that the contract of service ... under which the injured person was working at the time when the accident causing the injury happened was illegal, the Commissioner, or the court may, if having regard to all the circumstances of the case he thinks proper to do so, deal with the matter as if the injured person had at such time been a person working under a valid contract of service ....
121 If the plaintiff's contract of employment with Quick Start was illegal because he did not have a work permit he was not altogether deprived of any right to compensation under the Act. He may have a claim against the first defendant. He certainly has a right of action against the wrong doer at common law. I cannot see that a contract of insurance to provide the first defendant with indemnity from his liability in the circumstances of this case can ever be void or its enforcement contrary to public policy. This defence also fails.
122 65. There is one other matter I have to take into consideration. It is alleged in the first defendant's statement of claim that under the policy the third party agreed to take over and conduct in the first defendant's name the defence or settlement of the plaintiff's claim. This is not expressly denied in the third party's defence but para 7 of the conditions of the policy provides:
123 The < third party > shall be entitled if it so desires to take over and conduct in the < first defendant's > name the defence or settlement of any claim ....
124 Counsel was unable to point to any provision making it obligatory for the third party to conduct the defence.
125 66. In summary the first defendant's claim against the third party for an indemnity would have succeeded if the plaintiff had succeeded in his claim against the first defendant. On the other hand the third party was not obliged to take over the defence as alleged but was only entitled to do so if it so desired. In the circumstances I order that in the main action the plaintiff pay the first defendant the costs of the action and in the third party proceedings the third party pay the first defendant the costs of the third party proceedings.
126 LIM TEONG QWEE
127 JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER SUPREME COURT
Lim Teong Qwee JC
Mukesh Shah for the plaintiff
Lim Chong Boon and Valerie Ang for the first defendant
B Rao, Fazal Md bin A Karim and Philip Chua for the third party
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Version No 1: 29 Oct 2026 (23:45 hrs)