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In the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
[1996] SGHC 62
MA 333/91/01
Between
Public Prosecutor
… Appellant
And
Koo Pui Fong
… Respondent
grounds of decision
Immigration — Employment — Illegal immigrant

This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.
Public Prosecutor v Koo Pui Fong
[1996] SGHC 62
MA 333/91/01
Yong Pung How CJ
04 April 1996
1 The facts
2 On 17 January 1990, a party of immigration officers conducted a check at a construction site canteen off Hougang Ave 8 run by the respondent. The officersfound a Thai female, Sangiam Phuengsanthiah @ Namee Hathaichot (PW1), washing dishes. PW1 was subsequently charged for illegal entry under s 6(1) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133). She pleaded guilty to the offence and, by the time of the trial below, she had already finished serving her three months` imprisonment.
3 The respondent was a licensed canteen operator selling pre-cooked food at the Hougang construction site. Her business was a modest one, earning a net profit of about $80-$90 per day. There were Thai females at the worksite who sometimes bought food from the canteen but the respondent never asked them to help her in the business. On 1 October 1989, the respondent met PW1 for the first time outside the canteen when a woman, Plar, brought her along. On that occasion, no introduction was made although a Thai worker told the respondent that PW1 wanted to work for her. The respondent replied that she could not offer PW1 a job. After that meeting and until 17 January 1990, PW1 would turn up at the canteen occasionally. At times she would come on for a stretch of a few days and at other times, she would not appear at all for about ten days. When PW1 appeared at the canteen and saw that the respondent was busy, she would sometimes collect the dishes and wash them at the washing stand. The respondent would then give her leftover food or pay her a small sum of money. On the day of PW1`s arrest on 17 January 1990, she had volunteered to wash the dishes for the respondent.
4 The original charge
5 The respondent was originally charged with the following:
You, Koo Pui Fong @ Koo Mei Mei (F/6.1.42) SNRIC NO 0451459-I, are charged that you, between 1 October 1989 and 17 January 1990 at a canteen situated at the Housing and Development Board worksite at Hougang Ave 8, Singapore, did employ a Thai national, known as Namee Hathaichot (F/1948), as a canteen helper, being a person who had entered Singapore without a valid pass in contravention of the provisions of s 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133), and you have thereby committed an offence under s 57(1)(e) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133), punishable under s 57(ii) of the said Act.
6 The relevant sections of the Immigration Act which pertain to this charge are as follows:
7 Section 6(1)(c) reads:
No person, other than a citizen of Singapore, shall enter Singapore unless he is in possession of a valid pass lawfully issued to him to enter Singapore.
8 Section 57(1), so far as relevant, states:
Any person who -
...
(e) employs any person who has acted in contravention of sections 6(1),15 or 36 or the regulations;
...
shall be guilty of an offence and -
...
(ii) subject to subsection (1A), in the case of an offence under paragraph (b), (d) or (e), shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less than 6 months and not more than 2 years and shall also be liable to a fine not exceeding $6000 ... .
9 Section 2 of the Act states:
`employ` means to engage or use the service of any person and to pay such person for services rendered or work done or to remunerate such person on a piece rate or on a commission basis ...;
`occupier`, in relation to any premises or place, includes -
(a) the person having the charge, management or control of either the whole or part of the premises or place, either on his own account or as an agent; and
(b) ...
10 Section 57(8) which provides for a knowledge presumption reads:
Where a person who has acted in contravention of section 6, 15 or 36 or the regulations is found at any premises or place, other than premises used solely for residential purposes, and is in possession of any tools or implements or engaged in any activity which may give rise to the inference that he is doing any work, the occupier of the premises or place shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to have employed him knowing that he is a person who has acted in contravention of section 6, 15 or 36 or the regulations.
11 The decision below
12 At the trial below, the trial judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent had indeed employed PW1 during the period in question. The only issue was whether the presumption under s 57(8) of the Immigration Act triggered against her was successfully rebutted on a balance of probabilities.
13 The trial judge, after considering all the evidence and submissions, was satisfied that, in view of the wholly unsatisfactory evidence of PW1 as well as the rest of the evidence, there was a real likelihood that the respondent had reasonable grounds to believe that PW1 was extending her stay in Singapore legally. He accepted the respondent`s explanation that, as PW1 was only at the worksite intermittently, she had thought that the latter was making frequent trips every two weeks to Johore or Thailand so as to have her passport stamped for a further two-week stay. Hence she had no cause to suspect that PW1 was an illegal immigrant at the material time and the presumption was rebutted. Accordingly, he acquitted the respondent of the original charge. In its place, the trial judge preferred a different charge under s 8(1) of the Regulation of Employment Act (Cap 272) (now repealed) for employing a worker who had not been issued with a work permit. The respondent pleaded guilty to this charge, and was convicted and fined $2,500.
14 The appellant appealed against the acquittal on the original charge.
15 The present appeal
16 The only issue in this appeal was whether the respondent had indeed rebutted the s 57(8) presumption on a balance of probabilities. The thrust of the appellant`s case was that, on the evidence, the respondent had only made a bare allegation in her defence at the trial below that she did not know that PW1 was an illegal immigrant when she employed her. She did not take any steps to verify that PW1 entered Singapore legally even when she knew that PW1 was a foreign national and had the intention, as contended by the appellant, to employ PW1. Thereforeher mere denial of knowledge was insufficient to rebut the presumption as she had been wilfully blind to the obvious. That being the case, the appellant submitted that the respondent was guilty under the original charge and the acquittal by the trial judge should be reversed.
17 On the evidence before me, there was no question that the presumption had been triggered. PW1 had already been convicted for illegal entry. The respondent had intended to engage and use the services of PW1 who was remunerated with cash and sometimes food on a piece rate basis. At the time of arrest, she was washing the dishes which obviously gave rise to the inference that she was doing work for the respondent. The only question was whether the respondent had rebutted the knowledge presumption in s 57(8) of the Immigration Act. In other words, was it more likely than not that she did not know that PW1 was an illegal immigrant?
18 In the case of Naranjan Singh s/o Ujagar Singh v PP [1993] 1 CLAS News 237, I explained that the knowledge presumption under s 57(8) Immigration Act merely obviates the need for proof of mens rea and does not turn an offence under s 57(1)(e) to a strict liability offence. Therefore, mens rea remains an essential component in every offence under s 57(1), but need not be proved in the specific instances set out in ss 57(6) to (8), in which the offender is presumed to have the necessary mens rea.
19 What then must an accused do before he can rebut the presumption of knowledge? This ultimately depends on the facts of the individual case, but in my view where a person has wilfully shut his eyes to the obvious, then that would be insufficient to rebut the presumption. A duty of due diligence is expected of the employer. However, since the offence was committed before the 1993 amendments to the Act, namely, subsections 57(9) and (10), came into force, the old standard of due diligence was applicable (see Kuek Ah Lek v PP [1995] 3 SLR 252 ). I recall the following passage in Naranjan Singh :
The social implications of unrestricted immigration which the Immigration Act attempts to curb, are obvious. It was toward the controlling of such immigration, and toward the proper enforcement of the Act, that in practice the courts have treated s 57(1) as if it did impose a strict liability, and have placed a high obligation on the part of an employer of foreign workers to establish that they were not illegal immigrants or overstayers before employing them. To my mind this strict approach, certainly as regards s 57(1)(e), must be taken. To allow an employer to evade the section by doing what would, in effect, amount to wilfully shutting his eyes to the immigration or employment status of his foreign employee, would make proper control and enforcement impossible. It cannot be placing too onerous a duty upon employers in Singapore to require them to screen their foreign workers before employing them to ensure compliance with immigration policy and the law.
20 This presumption clause places the onus on the employer to ensure that only legitimate workers are allowed entry to workplaces. Once the clause is triggered, the employer is presumed to have knowingly employed an illegal immigrant. However, it remains open for the accused to show that it was more likely than not that he did not know that his employee was an illegal immigrant. Therefore it is clear that guilty knowledge (and no less) is the state of mind that is still required. The presumption, once triggered, merely dispenses with the prosecution`s need to prove the necessary mens rea.
21 I think that it would be reasonable to say that a person `knows` a certain fact if he is aware that it exists or is almost certain that it exists or will exist or occur. Thus knowledge entails a high degree of certainty. All the respondent had to show was that it was more likely than not that she did not have guilty knowledge. Of course, we would never have the benefit of going into the mind of another person to ascertain his knowledge and in every case, knowledge is a fact that has to be inferred from the circumstances. This concept of wilful blindness does not introduce a new state of mind to that of knowing (see R v Griffiths (1974) 60 Cr App R 14). It is simply a reformulation of actual knowledge. It seems to me that it is wholly in keeping with common sense and the law to say that an accused knew of certain facts if he deliberately closed his eyes to the circumstances, his wilful blindness being evidence from which knowledge may be inferred. Thus I fully agree with the following passage of Lord Bridge in Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd (1986) 83 Cr App R 155 at p 164:
... it is always open to the tribunal of fact, when knowledge on the part of a defendant is required to be proved, to base a finding of knowledge on evidence that the defendant had deliberately shut his eyes to the obvious or refrained from inquiry because he suspected the truth but did not want to have his suspicion confirmed.
22 But this is different from saying that wilful blindness should be automatically equated with knowledge. Hence, if the respondent suspected that PW1 was an illegal immigrant but deliberately shut her eyes to the circumstances, that in itself is strictly speaking not an alternative to knowing that PW1 had entered the country illegally, although it would be fair and almost irresistible to infer that the respondent had the relevant knowledge. Despite the distinction, the practical effect it seems, would usually be the same but the difference should be borne in mind so as not to confuse the concept of wilful blindness as being a separate state of mind which is sufficient to form an alternative to the requirement of knowledge.
23 Knowledge as a fact is a state of mind that is of a different character from a fact which is a state of things. Where the law presumes a fact to arise from certain facts, proof may be adduced to rebut the fact which the law presumes. But the same cannot be said of knowledge which is imputed to a person because a person who did not have the relevant knowledge can only maintain his ignorance. A person can either have knowledge of a fact or not at all. There is no intermediate stage. Since the respondent could not show that she did not acquire or had not acquired that knowledge, a relevant inquiry into her absence of knowledge was to consider whether she had been wilfully blind to the obvious. If she was, then the fair inference would be that there was no absence of knowledge and she would have failed to rebut the presumption. To this end, it must be established whether it was even obvious to her that PW1 was an illegal immigrant to begin with.
24 Turning to the facts of this case, the respondent knew that PW1 was a Thai national but claimed that she had never given thought to whether or not she was an illegal immigrant. This was because she never intended to employ her because she could not afford it and felt she had no right to ask her about it. Throughout the trial, the respondent maintained that she never intended to employ PW1. To her, this was an informal arrangement whereby PW1 would turn up intermittently and, during those occasions when PW1 volunteered to help wash the dishes, the respondent would either give her some food or money. But, in so far as the lawwas concerned, this informal arrangement was caught within the ambit of s 2 of the Immigration Act which gives a wide definition to the word `employ`. `Employ` in the Act would connote the creation of a contract of some sort but not necessarily a normal contract of employment as understood by lay persons.
25 Of course, ignorance of the law even in the case of gullible and uneducated persons is no defence. But I have also stated previously in the case of Kuek Ah Lek v PP (at p 260-261) the following:
... this maxim does not elevate facts which would have put an accused on notice if he had knowledge of the law to one which would have put him on notice regardless of whether he had the requisite knowledge of the law. If the [respondent] was truly unaware that something was in contravention of the law, then the fact remained that it did not put him on notice because he was unaware that the relevant circumstances should have put him on notice ... It is open to the court to draw the proper inference when a person claims that he is unaware of legal provisions that are relevant to his trade.
26 The respondent was not in the business of employing foreign workers. Her misconceived notion of employment as opposed to the one defined under the Act clearly operated on her mind and affected her subsequent action. It was precisely because the respondent thought that she was not employing PW1 that she felt she never had any reason to ask PW1 regarding her immigration status.
27 In my view, the absence of any intention to employ, this being a question of fact, was a matter that went towards rebutting the presumption. Since the respondent never intended to employ PW1, it could be inferred that it was less obvious to her that PW1 was an illegal immigrant. This was because she would not have directed her mind to PW1`s immigration status as she might have done had she intended employment. Moreover, the arrangement was on an ad hoc basis and, even on the occasions when PW1 appeared at the canteen, she only washed the dishes when she volunteered to. The mere fact that PW1 was a Thai national and a prostitute did not automatically lead to the conclusion that she must have entered the country illegally. The belief that PW1 had entered Singapore legally was reinforced by the fact that PW1 appeared only intermittently. As a result, this led the respondent to think that PW1 was extending her stay legally in Singapore by making frequent trips every two weeks to Johore or Thailand to have her passport stamped and extended. The cumulative effect of the respondent`s mistaken belief that she never employed anyone and the intermittent appearances of PW1 brought about her failure to make further inquiries. Thus the circumstances were such that one could reasonably conclude that she did not deliberately refrain from making inquiries. The respondent was not wilfully blind to the obvious as she never suspected PW1 to be an illegal immigrant. With hindsight, it could be said that the respondent was negligent, in the sense that she ought to have known that PW1 was an illegal immigrant because she had in effect the means of knowledge. She could have simply asked to see the passport of PW1. However, there is a vast difference between a state of mind which consists of deliberately shutting the eyes to the obvious, the result of which a person does not care to have, and a state of mind which is merely neglecting to make inquiries as a reasonable and prudent man would make. The latter, also known as constructive knowledge, is not knowledge at all: see Roper v Taylor`s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 284 at p 289. Therefore, I agreed with the inference drawn by the trial judge that the respondent lacked the relevant knowledge to secure her conviction.
28 The trial judge had the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses and inferred that the respondent did not know that PW1 was an illegal immigrant. I can only add that an appellate court generally would not interfere with a trial judge`s findings of fact, including a finding of inferential fact of knowledge, based on the credibility and veracity of the witnesses whom he had seen and observed when giving evidence, unless such findings were clearly against the weight of the evidence and unsupportable. Having said that, I found that the trial judge`s inference as to the respondent`s lack of knowledge of PW1`s immigration status was supportable on the facts.
29 I cannot stress more emphatically that, whether the knowledge presumption would be rebutted, must depend on the facts of the case. It was my view that, on the peculiar facts of this case, the respondent had successfully rebutted the presumption on a balance of probabilities and that she did not know that PW1 was an illegal immigrant.
30 Conclusion
31 For the reasons that I have stated above, I dismissed the appeal.
Yong Pung How CJ
Lim Yew Jin (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the appellant
Loh Lin Kok (Loh Lin Kok) and Mohan Singh (B Mohan Singh & Co) for the respondent
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This judgment text has undergone conversion so that it is mobile and web-friendly. This may have created formatting or alignment issues. Please refer to the PDF copy for a print-friendly version.

Version No 1: 29 Oct 2026 (23:45 hrs)