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Public Prosecutor v Mayban Finance (Singapore) Ltd
[1997] SGHC 257
MA 147/1997
Yong Pung How CJ
16 October 1997
1 Judgment:
2 YONG PUNG HOW CJ
3 This appeal was brought by the Public Prosecutor against the decision of the district judge in refusing to grant an application for forfeiture of a vehicle bearing registration no YG 6377 R (the lorry) under s 49 of the Immigration Act (Cap 133, 1995 Ed) (the Act). After listening to arguments by the DPP and counsel for the respondents, I allowed the appeal and ordered forfeiture of the lorry.
4 2. The background facts
5 The events that led to the application for the forfeiture of the vehicle were as set out below.
6 3.In the district court, one Tan Poh Siang (Tan) had claimed trial to eight charges under the Act. He was charged that he had committed an offence under s 57(1)(d) of the Act in that between September 1996 and 17 October 1996, at No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang, Singapore, he did harbour four Thai nationals, namely, Wandee Bunthong (Wandee), Wat, Suti Teh and Thongsuwan, all of whom had contravened s 6(1)(c) of the Act by entering Singapore without a valid pass. The other four charges against Tan were that he had committed an offence under s 57(1)(e) of the Act in that he had employed the same four Thai nationals who had contravened s 6(1)(c) of the Act. In respect of Wandee, Wat and Suti Teh, Tan was charged with employing them between 4 July 1996 and 17 October 1996 and in respect of Thongsuwan, the period of employment was between June 1996 and 17 October 1996.
7 4.In the court below, after admitting the statements and photographs of the police photographer Quek Kim Nguan, who gave a statement that in October 1996, he had taken three photographs of the construction site of Exclusiv Centre at Ubi Avenue and ten photographs of No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang, prosecution called police corporal Tan Kok Ann (PC Tan) to give evidence.
8 5.PC Tan had given a statement that on 17 October 1996, he and a party of police officers arrived at Lorong 6 Geylang. He noticed the lorry outside No 14. The engine of the vehicle was running and the driver was seated in the driver`s seat. PC Tan noticed a few male persons loading some objects on to the lorry, after which they boarded the lorry. The party of police officers went to the lorry and detained all the persons in it, including the lorry driver. There were a total of nine male Thai nationals seated in the lorry and the lorry driver was a male Singaporean. As the nine male Thai nationals could not produce any travel documents or identification papers, they were arrested for overstaying in Singapore. The lorry driver, whose name was Lee Teck Yin, was detained and referred to the Central Police Station, together with the Thai nationals.
9 6.The next prosecution witness was Wandee, one of the male Thai nationals. Wandee testified that he had been approached in Thailand by a male Thai named Ah Sorn who had asked him if he was interested in working in Singapore. An Sorn had offered to arrange for him to work in Singapore if he paid Ah Sorn 20,000 baht. Ah Sorn had also approached some other Thai nationals, including Wat and Suti Teh. Wandee agreed. He left his village on 25 June 1996 to travel to Singapore with 11 other male Thais, including Wat and Suti Teh.
10 7.He first took a train to Haadyai, South Thailand and, from there, he continued on a train through Malaysia to Singapore. Upon arrival at a place in Johore Bahru, Malaysia he was told to disembark from the train and to board a car. He, along with Wat and Suti Teh sat in the car and they were driven to an unknown place along the shore in Johore Bahru, where they boarded a boat to Singapore. After a very short boat journey, he arrived in Singapore. It was 26 June 1996. There were two cars waiting for their arrival, whereupon they were driven to an unknown lodging house.
11 8.At about 7 or 8am that same day, a male Chinese came and sent them to a construction site in Woodlands where they worked for three days. At that Woodlands construction site, Wandee said that he met a Thai worker, whom he told that he did not have a job. This Thai worker then brought all of them to No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang, which was a lodging house, for them to stay in and wait for a new employer. They stayed there for two days before one Ah Tan turned up. Wandee later identified Ah Tan as Tan.
12 9.Wandee, Wat and Suti Teh approached Tan and informed him that they were illegal workers and jobless. Tan had told them that he would find a cleaning job for them. He gave them each a photostat work permit with photographs on them which were not theirs. According to Wandee, Tan had said that if Wandee was arrested by a police officer, he was to produce the work permit and assume the name on the work permit. They were then brought to work at the Ubi Avenue construction site. Tan was the person who paid them their salaries.
13 10.Wandee said that he stayed at the Ubi construction site for two months before he was transferred back to No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang. He said that he went to the construction site from No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang sometimes in a green lorry and sometimes in a yellow lorry. He identified the yellow lorry as being the lorry registration no YG 6337 R. He worked at the Ubi Avenue construction site until he was arrested.
14 11.Wandee was cross-examined but in the midst of the cross-examination, counsel for Tan informed the court that a certain development had taken place. The prosecution had offered to proceed with two charges and the rest of the charges were to be taken into consideration for the purpose of the sentence. Tan decided to accept the offer.
15 12.Thereafter Tan pleaded guilty to two charges. One charge (DAC 24506/96) related to the offence under s 57(1)(d) of the Act for harbouring Wandee and the other charge (DAC 25005/96) related to the offence under s 57(1)(e) of the Act for employing the same person. Tan admitted to the following statement of facts presented by the prosecution:
On 17 October 1996 at about 7.15am, [PC Tan Kok Ann] together with a party of police officers led by DSP Zuraidah, Head Operations `A` Division, kept an observation at the premises at no 14 Lorong 6 Geylang. They spotted a motor lorry bearing registration no YG 6377 R Nissan Cabstar/yellow parked outside the unit no 14 Lorong 6 Geylang. Shortly, a group of male Thais were seen loading some construction equipment onto the lorry while the rest boarded the said lorry. The police moved in and arrested a total of nine male Thais (including a male Thai, Wandee Bunthong) on board the lorry as they failed to produce any valid document or identification papers.
Investigation revealed that between 4 July 1996 to 17 September 1996, [Tan Poh Siang] did employ a Thai, Wandee Bunthong as a construction worker. This male Thai had entered Singapore illegally on 26 June 1996, in contravention of the provisions of s 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133, 1995 Ed). Tan deployed the male Thai to work at the Sumitomo construction site to build 4-storey warehouse located at Ubi Avenue 3. His working hours were from 7am to 6.30pm. Tan fixed his salary at $20 daily with $3 an hour for overtime. The salary was paid to the male Thai by Tan on the 5th and 20th of every month.
Tan housed the male Thai at unit No 14 Lorong 6 Geylang from the period around September 1996 to 17 October 1996. Tan provided shelter to the male Thai. The male Thai did not pay any rent nor was his salary deducted for his stay at unit No 14 Lorong 6 Geylang.
16 13.Tan admitted to the remaining six charges and consented to these charges being taken into consideration for the purpose of sentence. Tan was sentenced to a total of seven months` imprisonment, being seven months` imprisonment on each charge, the sentences for both charges to run concurrently.
17 14.As a result of the above, after sentence was imposed, the DPP applied for forfeiture of the lorry to the State under s 49 of the Act. Two parties, Waterfall Engineering Pte Ltd (Waterfall) and Mayban Finance Singapore Ltd (the respondents) opposed the application and claimed for the return of the lorry to them. Waterfall was the registered owner of the lorry and the lorry was purchased through a hire-purchase agreement with the respondents. Waterfall subsequently decided not to pursue the claim. At the end of the trial, the district judge refused the DPP`s application for forfeiture of the lorry.
18 15. Decision below
19 The district judge considered at length whether under s 49(5) of the Act, once it was proved to the satisfaction of the court that an offence under the Act or regulations had been committed and that the vehicle or vessel had been used in the commission of the offence, it was mandatory upon the court to order the forfeiture of the vehicle or vessel. After a review of the authorities on other similar provisions in other statutes and the case of Public Finance Berhad v PP [1997] 3 SLR 354 the district judge found that s 49 was mandatory in nature.
20 16.Counsel for the respondent, the claimant in the court below, informed the court that his client did not wish to make an issue of whether s 49(5) was mandatory or directory. The claimant also did not wish to make an issue of whether an offence under the Act had been committed. The only issue raised in opposing the application for forfeiture was that it had not been shown that the lorry was used in the commission of the offence.
21 17.The district judge found that there was evidence that the lorry was used to transport the Thai nationals. Wandee had said that the lorry was used to transport him from No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang to the construction site where he worked. The district judge said, however, that he had difficulty in finding that the lorry was used in the commission of the offence of harbouring the illegal immigrants since they were harboured at No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang and not in the lorry.
22 18.As for the issue of whether the lorry was used in the commission of the offence of employing the illegal workers, the district judge found that there was nothing to show that Tan had used the lorry to commit this offence. All Tan had done to commit the offence was to deploy Wandee to work at the construction site and to pay Wandee a salary for his services. It was not essential to the commission of this offence that a lorry would have to be used.
23 19.The district judge drew a fine distinction between facilitating the commission of the offence and being used in the commission of the offence. Whilst he was prepared to hold that the use of the lorry facilitated the commission of the offence of employing the illegal immigrants, he did not think that it would be tantamount to the lorry being used in the commission of the offence. He also relied on the cases of PP v Sai & Or s [1980] 2 MLJ 153 where the court agreed and supported the view of the court in PP v Ismail bin Yusof [1979] 2 MLJ 119 , that the usage of the vehicle must be an essential ingredient of the offence for it to be used in the commission of the offence. As, in the present case, the lorry was not an essential ingredient of either of the two offences under the Act, the district judge refused the application by the DPP that the lorry be forfeited to the State.
24 20. Appeal
25 In his petition of appeal, the DPP raised three grounds of appeal. They were that: (1). The district judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the motor lorry YG 6377 R was not used in the commission of the offence under the Immigration Act;
26 (2). The district judge erred in law in adopting too restrictive an interpretation of the meaning of the term `used in the commission of the offence` as stated in s 49(5) of the Immigration Act; and
27 (3). The district judge erred in law in adopting too narrow a construction of `employment` as envisaged in the Immigration Act, and failing thereby to consider that employment is not merely restricted to the actual work that is to be done by the employee.
28 21.Section 49 of the Act states:
(1) Any vehicle or vessel below 76 tonnes which is used or in respect of which there is reasonable cause to suspect that it has been or that it is about to be used in the commission of any offence under this Act or the regulations may be seized and detained by the Controller or any immigration officer, authorised in that behalf by the Controller in writing under his hand, at any place either on land or in the territorial waters of Singapore.
(2) The seizing officer shall forthwith give notice in writing of the seizure and the grounds thereof to the owner, charterer or agent of the vehicle or vessel so seized or detained, either by delivering the notice to him in person or by post at his place of office or abode, if known except that the notice shall not be required to be given where the seizure or detention is made in the presence of or with the knowledge of the offender or the owner or his agent, as the case may be.
(3) Any vehicle or vessel liable to seizure or detention under subsection (1) shall be liable to forfeiture.
(4) An order for the forfeiture or for the release of any vehicle or vessel liable to forfeiture under this section shall be made by the court before which the prosecution with regard thereto has been held.
(5) An order for the forfeiture of a vehicle or vessel shall be made if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that an offence under this Act or the regulations has been committed and that the vehicle or vessel was used in the commission of the offence, notwithstanding that no person may have been convicted of the offence.
(6) The Controller may sell any vehicle or vessel forfeited under this section. The proceeds of the sale shall, after payment of the expenses of the sale, be applied in payment of any fine, costs or charges incurred under this Act and any balance remaining shall be paid into the Consolidated Fund.
29 22.In the present appeal, it was not in issue as to whether, once it was proved to the satisfaction of the court that an offence under the Act or regulations had been committed and that the vehicle or vessel had been used in the commission of the offence, it was mandatory upon the court to order the forfeiture of the vehicle or vessel. I did not therefore consider in depth the authorities on this point except to reinforce everything which I have said in those previous authorities.
30 23.Briefly, in Toh Teong Seng v PP [1995] 2 SLR 273 I held that the word `shall` in s 20(4) of the Environmental Public Health Act (Cap 95, 1988 Ed), was used in the directory sense and the court retained the discretion whether or not to make a forfeiture order. This was because s 20(5) is irreconcilable with s 20(4) if the word `shall` in s 20(4) is used in the mandatory sense. In PP v M/s Serve You Motor Services [1996] 1 SLR 669 , I found that no ambiguity arose in respect of the forfeiture provision in s 124 of the Customs Act (Cap 70, 1995 Ed) and held that forfeiture was mandatory.
31 24.There had been no ruling on the question of whether forfeiture under s 49 of the Act was mandatory until my recent ruling in Public Finance Berhad v PP [1997] 3 SLR 354 , where I held that it was mandatory. I was of this opinion as the forfeiture provisions in s 20 of the Environmental Public Health Act, which I held to be directory in Toh Teong Seng `s case were worded differently from that in s 49. There was no ambiguity and no conflicting subsections in s 49 which would require the interpretation of `shall` in s 49 to be directory. In addition, the forfeiture provisions in s 49 of the Act were worded in a manner virtually identical with the forfeiture provisions in the Customs Act which had been interpreted in R v Ng Hee Weng & Ors [1956] MLJ 85 and PP v M/s Serve You Motor Services to be mandatory.
32 25. Was the lorry used in the commission of the offences?
33 The main issue in this appeal was whether the district judge was right in holding that the lorry had not been used in the commission of both the offences of harbouring and employing Wandee. Section 49(5) of the Act stated two pre-conditions before forfeiture of the lorry could be ordered. They were that an offence under the Act had been committed and that the lorry was used in the commission of the offence. The first pre-condition was not in issue as Tan had pleaded guilty to both the charges of harbouring as well as employing Wandee. Therefore the determination of the second pre-condition was important, as once it was established that the lorry was used in the commission of the offence, forfeiture of the lorry was mandatory.
34 26.To be able to determine whether the lorry had been used in the commission of the offence, the court had first to decide the interpretation that was to be placed on `used in the commission of the offence`. The district judge had noted the case of PP v Sai & Ors , where the court agreed and supported the view of the court in PP v Ismail bin Yusof that the usage of the vehicle must be an essential ingredient of the offence for it to be used in the commission of the offence. I was doubtful as to the correctness of these decisions. I was of the opinion that, as long as the vehicle was `directly related` to the offence, it did not matter that the usage of the vehicle may not be an essential ingredient of the offence. I did not think that one could distinguish between a vehicle used in `facilitating the commission of the offence` and one `used in the commission of the offence` as the district judge had done. This distinction was an unnecessarily strict one. A more appropriate test would be to see if the vehicle was `directly related and substantially connected` to the offence.
35 27. Was the lorry used in the commission of the offence of harbouring Wandee?
36 Under the first offence of harbouring Wandee under s 57(1)(d) of the Act, the main element would be to `harbour` Wandee. Section 2 of the Act states:
`harbour` means to give food or shelter, and includes the act of assisting a person in any way to evade apprehension.
37 I had difficulty seeing how the lorry could have been used in the commission of the offence of harbouring Wandee. From Wandee`s evidence, when he arrived in Singapore he first stayed at Woodlands but at that time he did not know Tan. Later he was brought to No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang where he met Tan. He stayed there for a short period. He was later brought to the construction site at Ubi Avenue where he stayed for two months before he was transferred back to No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang, where he stayed until he was arrested. The charge against Tan was that he had harboured Wandee at No 14, Lorong 6 Geylang. At no point of time was it suggested that the lorry had been used to provide shelter to Wandee. If it had been used as Wandee`s sleeping place, there may have been room for holding that the lorry was used in the commission of the offence of harbouring Wandee. In PP v Heng Siak Kwang [1996] 2 SLR 274 , the illegal workers were staying in a container and, although there was insufficient evidence to prove the charge of harbouring against the accused in that case, it was not disputed that a container could be used to harbour the illegal workers. Therefore, it is possible for a vehicle to be used to harbour illegal workers. However, there was no evidence in the present case that the lorry had been used to harbour Wandee.
38 28.Similarly, if there was evidence that the lorry had been used to assist Wandee to evade apprehension, then it could be said that it had been used in the commission of the offence. In a district court case, PP v Siang Hock Corp [1990] 3 CLAS News 13 an order of forfeiture was ordered as it was clear that the vehicle had been used to convey and hide the three illegal immigrants. In that case, it was clear that the vehicle was being used to evade apprehension of the illegal immigrants and therefore the vehicle was used in the commission of the offence of harbouring them. This was not so, however, in the present case. It was clear to me that the lorry had not been used in the commission of the offence of harbouring.
39 29. Was the lorry used in the commission of the offence of employing Wandee?
40 Even though I was of the opinion that the lorry had not been used to harbour Wandee, I found that the lorry had been used in employing Wandee. Section 2 of the Act defines `employ` as follows:
`employ` means to engage or use the services of any person, whether under a contract of service or otherwise, with or without remuneration.
41 Counsel for the respondent argued that as the lorry was not used in engaging the services of the illegal workers, it could not be said that the lorry was used in the commission of the offence of employing Wandee.
42 30.I rejected counsel`s argument as it failed to consider that providing `transport` to the workers was `part and parcel` of the process of employing the workers. In most instances, the employment of these illegal workers involves providing them with remuneration, food and sometimes accommodation as well as transport. Transport is therefore an incident of employment, a feature that is so directly related to the employment of these workers that it would be artificial to ignore it. The use of the lorry was substantially connected with the employment of the illegal workers. There was clear evidence that it was used to transport the workers from the lodging house in Geylang to the construction site in Ubi Avenue. The lorry was also used to transport construction equipment which the workers needed for their work.
43 31.Counsel for the respondents submitted before me that it could not be said that the lorry was used in the commission of employing the workers as this would mean that, if the workers had been instructed to take a public bus to work, the public bus could be forfeited. I could not see the relevance of this. It was not the same thing if the workers were instructed to take public transport to work. This was because, in those circumstances, the public transport used would not be directly related to their employment, it would not be part of the employment `package` provided by the employer.
44 32.Counsel for the respondents further submitted before me that the phrase `used in the commission of the offence` should be interpreted narrowly, as otherwise it would have a harsh effect on innocent finance companies which were usually the owners of the vehicles which were under hire-purchase agreements.
45 33.I was aware that this case could have tremendous repercussions on the finance or car rental companies. It is unfortunate that they should be the unwitting victims. In most cases, the finance companies would have no knowledge of the background of the applicant under the hire-purchase agreement. However, the finance and car rental companies could take certain precautions, eg requiring a guarantee from the purchasers of vehicles under hire-purchase agreements. This would increase the cost of persons using such vehicles for their business. However, I am confident that the slight increase in cost should not deter them from doing business.
46 34.It is clear that Parliament`s intention is to deter the employment of illegal workers. The courts need to send a clear message to the employers that such activities will not be condoned. At the same time, the courts have to warn finance and car rental companies to take more precautions when entering into hire-purchase or rental agreements for their vehicles.
47 35. Conclusion
48 In conclusion, I was of the view that the lorry was `used in the commission` of the offence of employing the illegal workers, as it was used to provide transport for the workers from their place of lodging to the work site. Transport is directly related to their employment and is an incident of their employment. It was unfortunate that the innocent respondents were the real victims in the present case but it was inevitable in light of the circumstances. For these reasons, I allowed the appeal and ordered forfeiture of the lorry.
Jaswant Singh (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the appellant
Benjamin Sim (Shook Lin & Bok) for the respondent