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LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura
[1998] SGCA 55
CA 246/1997
Chao Hick Tin J; L P Thean JA; Yong Pung How CJ
08 September 1998
Judgment:
CHAO HICK TIN J
Cur Adv Vult
(delivering the judgment of the court): This appeal raises the question whether a certain leasehold property, which income thereof is dedicated to certain specified objects, constituted a valid wakaf under Muslim law and whether the property was validly sold and assigned by the trustees to the appellant under a contract dated 9 July 1993. The respondent, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, (Majlis) claims that the property is the subject of a wakaf, that the legal title to it vested in the Majlis by virtue of ss 58 and 59 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3)(AMLA) and that the purported sale by the trustees passed no title to the appellant. The Majlis is a body corporate established under AMLA to administer all wakafs and Muslim charitable trusts.
2. Background
We will first set out the facts giving rise to this action. On 21 November 1911 one Sharifah Shaikah bte Syed Omar bin Ali Aljunied (the testatrix) made a will, the relevant part of which reads as follows (translation in English is not in dispute):
She [ie the testatrix] directs to distribute her estate according to Islamic law and after settling her debts, if she is indebted, to purchase with the balance of the one third of her estate a house or a shop and apply the net income of same for payments for holding celebration of the memorials of her, her father the late Syed Omar bin Ali Aljunied, her mother the late Sharifah Alaweyyah bte Abdullah Alkaff and her daughter Sharifah Baheyyah bte Ali Aljunied, free supply of ten vessels of zamzam water in the holy mosque of Mecca, furnishing a mat for Kor`an reciters every night for the period between the third and the fourth prayers and engaging annually somebody to perform the pilgrimage and al-omrah (homage) on her behalf.
She directs that dollars three hundred only $300 out of the nett income of her trusted property in Singapore be added to the nett income of the property purchased for the balance of the one third mentioned above if the latter income is not sufficient to carry all her said directions and the balance after the fulfillment of such directions is to be applied for charity and benevolence in general.
3.It will be noted that the will referred to her trusted property. That was in reference to a settlement made by the testatrix on 4 June 1903 where a number of her properties were placed on trust. Nothing in the present action concerns that.
4.The testatrix died on 11 September 1912. In compliance with her testamentary directions, her executors in 1913 purchased two leasehold properties to be held on trust for the purposes directed in her will. One of them was acquired by the State in May 1978 and the other, which is located at No 49 Temple Street (hereinafter called `the property` or `the Temple Street property` as the context may require) formed the subject of the present dispute.
5.In 1990 the trustees of the property were two brothers, Syed Salim bin Junid Aljunied (Salim) and Syed Hamid bin Junied (Hamid) and they are distant relatives of the testatrix. On 16 January 1991 the solicitors for Majlis wrote to the two trustees to ask, inter alia, for a copy of the will to ascertain whether the property was wakaf property. Apparently at the time Salim was away in Saudi Arabia. There was some doubt if that communication reached Hamid. The request was repeated to Hamid on 4 June 1992 and 28 July 1992, followed by further reminders. On 20 November 1992 Hamid`s solicitors, M/s Bernard Rada & Lee (BRL) replied stating that Hamid did not have a copy of the will and was making inquiries about the will. On 18 December 1992, BRL informed the Majlis` solicitors that their client could not find the original Will or obtain a copy. BRL also stated that they had searched the records of the High Court for the years 1912 to 1916 without success and had also written to the previous solicitors for a copy of the Will and were waiting for a reply. In spite of further reminders, BRL never reverted thereafter.
6.Then on 16 June 1993, unknown to the Majlis, Hamid by deed appointed Syed Hashim bin Abdulkader Alhadad (Hashim) as the new trustee in place of Salim on the ground that Salim had `since 1982 left the Republic of Singapore to reside permanently abroad`.
7.On 9 July 1993 Hamid and Hashim, as trustees, entered into a sale and purchase agreement (the agreement) to sell the property to the appellant with vacant possession for a sum of $800,000. A deposit of 5% of the purchase price was required to be paid upon execution of the agreement. The agreement referred to the will of the testator and the fact that the executors/trustees were to utilize a third of her residual estate to purchase a house or shophouse for the purposes set out in the will. The sale to the appellant was expressly stated to be subject to the sanction of the court.
8.On 2 September 1993, by way of an ex-parte application, Hamid and Hashim applied to the High Court under s 59 of the Trustees Act (Cap 337) that they be empowered to sell the property and to purchase another property with the proceeds thereof. A copy of the translation of the will of the testatrix was exhibited in the affidavit filed in support of the application. An order in terms was granted by the High Court on 11 October 1993. The sale to the appellant was completed on 29 November 1993. The deed of assignment was lodged with the Registry of Deeds on 1 December 1993.
9.On 2 December 1993, the Majlis lodged a caveat against the property claiming as lawful owner of the property under s 59 of AMLA.
10.On or about 4 December 1993 the Majlis came to know of the sale of the property effected by Hamid and Hashim to the appellant. Subsequently correspondence ensued, with the Majlis seeking to obtain further information regarding the will and the accounts of the trust.
11.On 23 March 1995 the appellant instituted OS 285/95 (the present proceedings) seeking an order to expunge the caveat lodged by the Majlis and an injunction to prohibit the Majlis from lodging any further similar caveats against the property. The appellant said that it was only in or about February 1995, when the appellant was seeking to re-sell the property, that it learned of the caveat lodged by the Majlis. Majlis never, after December 1993, wrote to the appellant about its interest in the property. The appellant admitted that it knew the property was subject to a trust created by the testatrix in her will and that the trustees were not empowered to dispose of the property under the will.
12.After having purchased the property the appellant, in ignorance of the existence of the caveat lodged by the Majlis, proceeded with re-development works. The appellant said it had incurred a re-development cost of $543,740.63 including a sum of $100,000 as tenant compensation.
13. Decision below
In the court below Judith Prakash J ruled, following this court`s decision in Abdul Rahman bin Mohamed Yunoos v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura [1995] 2 SLR 705 , that although the trust was created in 1912, as the dispute arose in 1995 it had to be construed in the light of s 63(1) of AMLA which provides that where any question arises as to the meaning of any instrument creating or affecting any Muslim charitable trust such question shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Muslim law. She held that there was in this case a valid Muslim charitable trust or wakaf and that in view of ss 58 and 59 of AMLA the property automatically vested in the Majlis `without any conveyance, assignment or transfer whatever.` As the trustees no longer had any right or title to deal with the property, other than to carry out the trusts as directed by the testatrix in her will, the purported sale to the appellant was void. The fact that the trustees obtained an order of court under s 59(1) of the Trustees Act empowering them to sell the property did not confer title in the trustees if they did not have any. Section 59(1) of the Trustees Act only applied `where in the management or administration of any property vested in trustees `. She said that the plaintiff (the appellant) could probably have a claim against the other property which the trustees had bought with the proceeds of sale, but she was not expressing a firm view on that.
14.The learned judge also held that the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value had no application in the circumstances of this case as it only `protects a purchaser of a legal interest in a property from claimants to a beneficial interest in the same property when such purchaser can show that he bought the legal estate in good faith for value and without knowledge of the beneficial interest.` In any case she also found on the evidence that the appellant was not a bona fide purchaser. If the appellant`s solicitors had done a proper tracing of title the appellant would have noticed that the property was purchased for the purposes of trusts declared in the will of the testatrix. Furthermore, in a April/May 1993 issue of the Law Society`s circular, attention of members of the Society was drawn to the provision of AMLA regarding the Majlis` interest in properties subject to any Muslim charitable trust or wakaf. Thus she held there was constructive knowledge on the part of the appellant`s solicitors and accordingly of the appellant. Enquiries should have been made by the appellant with the Majlis.
15.For these reasons the learned judge refused to grant any relief to the appellant and instead declared that the leasehold interest in the property vested in the Majlis and ordered that the registration of the deed of assignment lodged by the appellant on 1 December 1993 be expunged.
16. Issues before us
Two main questions are canvassed before us. First, what is the nature of the trust created by the will of the testatrix. If it is a wakaf then following s 59 of the AMLA, legal title in the estate vests automatically in the Majlis and the trustees would have had no title whatsoever to pass to the appellant. Second, is the appellant entitled to relief as against the Majlis on the ground of estoppel. We shall now examine each of these in turn.
17.Although AMLA only became law in Singapore in 1968, it applies to all wakafs which existed as of that date. This is not disputed by the appellant`s counsel and cannot really be disputed: see ss 58(2) and 63(1) of AMLA and Abdul Rahman bin Mohamed Yunoos v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura [1995] 2 SLR 705 which decided this very point. But he raised the following arguments to submit that in this instance there was no valid wakaf - (a). The testatrix`s directions were primarily for private and not charitable purposes.
(b). Only the income, and not the capital, was directed to be applied for the purposes set out in the will.
(c). Its constitution was dependent on contingencies.
(d). The property was not vested in the testatrix at the time of her death.
18. Private and non-charitable purposes
We will at this juncture set out the provisions of s 58(2) of AMLA:
Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any written law or in any instrument or declaration creating, governing or affecting the same, the Majlis shall administer all wakaf, whether wakaf `am or wakaf khas, all nazar am, and all trusts of every description creating any charitable trust for the support and promotion of the Muslim religion or for the benefit of Muslims in accordance with the Muslim law to the extent of any property affected thereby and situate in Singapore.
19.It will be noted that s 58(2) refers to `all wakaf whether wakaf `am or wakaf khas` and AMLA has defined `wakaf `am` and `wakaf khas` as follows:
`wakaf `am` means a dedication in perpetuity of the capital and income of property for religious or charitable purposes recognised by the Muslim law and the property so dedicated;
`wakaf khas` means a dedication in perpetuity of the capital of property for religious or charitable purposes recognised by the Muslim law, the income of the property being paid to persons or for purposes specified in the wakaf, and the property so dedicated;
It differentiates between `religious` and `charitable` purposes and more importantly in relation to `wakaf khas` the income of the property need not be given to charitable purposes as it could be paid to `persons or for purposes specified in the wakaf.`
20.Counsel for the appellant argued that the words `creating any charitable trust etc` in s 58(2) qualified not only the expression `all trusts of every description`, which is not disputed, but also the words before that expression, namely, `all wakaf, whether wakaf `am or wakaf Khas, all nazar am`. We should add that `nazar am` is also separately defined in AMLA. In our opinion, this construction of s 58(2) is wholly untenable as a matter of plain language. To construe it in the way contended by counsel would be inconsistent with the separate and distinct definitions of `wakaf `am`, `wakaf khas`, and `nazar am` provided in the Act and would render those definitions redundant.
21.It is clear that the concept of wakaf is quite different from that of the English law of trust as the following statements in Outlines of Muhammadan Law by AA Fyzee (4th Ed) at pp 280-281 will show. Under ss 63(3) and 114 of AMLA, this book is one of seven authorities on Muslim law on which the court can rely upon.
The essentials of wakfmay now be summarized. The motive in wakf is always religious; in trust, it is generally temporal; this is the first characteristic.
Secondly, wakf is a foundation endowed in perpetuity. In the eye of the law the property belongs to God, and as such, the dedication is both permanent and irrevocable. The property itself is `detained` or, to use the expressive language of French lawyers, it is `immobilized` and no further transfers can be effected. In a trust, permanency is not an essential condition; a trust of property for the benefit of A and thereafter absolutely to B is a valid trust terminable on the death of A. In Islamic law, a wakf is not terminable; it is God`s property and should be as permanent as human ingenuity can make it. Permanency is ensured by the legal fiction that the property is transferred to the ownership of Almighty God.
Thirdly, in a trust, the settlor himself can lawfully take an interest; but in a wakf, except in the case of the Hanafis, a wakf is not entitled to take any benefit in the wakf property.
Fourthly, it is now established beyond any possibility of doubt that any property capable of being endowed in perpetuity can be the subject-matter of wakf. There is in this respect no distinction between a wakfand a trust.
And fifthly, as to the administration, a trustee differs widely from a mutawalli. A mutawalli is merely a `procurator`, manager or superintendent, `the property is not vested in him and he is not a "trustee" in the technical sense`.
22.A wakaf is a religious or pious endowment and although it often provides for charities, it should not be confused with a charity or a charitable trust as understood in English law. Wakafs may be divided into three classes, (i). in favour of the rich and the poor alike;
(ii). in favour of the rich and then the poor;
(iii). in favour of the poor alone.
And this is how Fyzee explained (at p 282) in relation to each class:
The first class of wakafs would comprise what might be termed in modern law public trusts of a charitable or beneficial character; for example, schools or hospitals open to all persons. The second class would include family wakafs in favour of a settlor`s family, the ultimate of which goes to the poor. The third class would comprise endowments for giving food, clothing or medical relief to the needy alone.
23.It does not follow that for there to be a valid wakaf, the objects must be charitable and cannot be private. Again to quote from Fyzee (at p 294):
the real purpose of making a wakaf is to acquire merit in the eyes of the Lord; all other purposes are subsidiary. Therefore, every purpose considered by the Mohammadan law as religious, pious or charitable would be considered valid.
24.In our present case, the purposes for which the testatrix had directed that the income of the property be utilized for, are the following: (a). holding celebration of the memorials of her, her parents and her daughter;
(b). free supply of ten vessels of zamzam water in the holy mosque of Mecca;
(c). furnishing a mat for Koran reciters every night for the period between the third and fourth prayers;
(d). engaging annually somebody to perform the pilgrimage and al-omrah (homage); and
(e). the balance, after the fulfillment of such directions (which if insufficient is to be supplemented by a sum of $300 from her `trust property in Singapore`), `for charity and benevolence in general`.
Objects (b) and (c) are clearly religious and generally charitable. Objects (a) and (d) are religious though private. Object (e) would of course be charitable as it says. We do not see how it could be contended that any of these objects are bad under Muslim law and would endorse the decision of the Legal Committee of the Majlis that the wakaf created by the testatrix is good.
25. Income and not capital
We move to the next argument that only income, and not capital, has been dedicated to the wakaf. Admittedly, there is no express statement that the property was dedicated to constitute the wakaf. In both the definitions of `wakaf `am` and `wakaf khas` the reference is to `a dedication in perpetuity of the capital`. There must be a tying down of the capital or corpus itself. Reliance was placed on the Malaysian case of Haji Embong bin Ibrahim v Tengku Nik Maimunah Hajjah bte Almarhum Sultan Zainal Abidin [1980] 1 MLJ 286 where the court held that `for a wakaf to be valid, the endowment must be the dedication of capital as well as income.`
26.However, it must be borne in mind that the dedication of the income of the property for the objects set out in the testatrix`s will is perpetual. We think there is much force in the submission of counsel for the Majlis that if there is no termination of the dedication of the income, the logical and necessary inference must be that the testatrix intended to consecrate and dedicate the capital as well. This view is supported by the following passages from Ameer Ali`s Mohammedan Law (5th Ed) at pp 220-21, another recognised work under ss 63(3) and 114:
In case of ambiguity, therefore, if the wakif be alive, he would be the person to explain his meaning, but if he be dead, his intention is to be gathered from the surrounding circumstances, and the evidence of the manner in which the proceeds of the property have been applied. (1) If a man were to say simply, `Buy out of the produce of this my mansion every month ten dirhems worth of bread, and distribute it among the poor,` according to the Fatawai Alamgiri this is sufficient to constitute a dedication of the house for that purpose.
But no express word is necessary to constitute a wakf so long as it is clear that the intention of the donor is to devote the use of the property permanently to a good object; eg, if a man were to say, `give so much out of the income of this my house to buy bread with for the poor,` that is sufficient to create a wakf.
In the thirteenth section of the Jam`aa-ul-Fusulain, it is stated that if a person were to say, `this room or this house is for lighting such a mosque,` and add nothing further, it would constitute a valid wakf, for such a purpose is sufficient.
27.A similar view was adopted in Abdul Rahman where income from a half share in a house was directed to be utilized for certain purposes as set out in a will. There the court stated (at p 711):
obviously the undivided half share in 34 Arab Street was also dedicated to the wakaf declared by the testator for without such dedication there would be no income to perform the wakafs.
28.We would reiterate the views expressed in Abdul Rahman and declare that in relation to the present case as the income from the property is dedicated in perpetuity it must follow that the testatrix intended a similar dedication of the property which is to produce the income.
Contingencies
29.The argument of the appellant under this sub-head is that a wakaf cannot validly be constituted if its constitution is dependent upon a contingency. The appellant says that here there were three contingencies upon which the constitution of the wakaf depended: (i). the testatrix must have property at the time of her death;
(ii). there must be moneys remaining after payment of her debts; and
(iii). the moneys remaining must be sufficient to purchase a shop or a house.
30.While it is not disputed that a wakaf cannot be validly constituted if it depends on a contingency which may or may not occur, the real question is, are the three alleged contingencies truly contingencies. The appellant does not dispute that a wakaf can be created by a will so long as the wakaf does not encompass more than one-third of the testator`s assets. The authorities are clear on that. But we do not see the three alleged contingencies being truly contingencies as if they were events which could or could not have happened. Upon the death of the testatrix what assets were hers and what debts were hers were objective matters which could be ascertained. They did not depend upon events which had yet to happen. In Ameer Ali`s Mohammedan Law (5th Ed) the learned author states the following as an example of a contingency (at p 545): `Nor can a wakaf be made dependent upon a contingency which may never occur, as for example, "I make a wakaf on condition that Zaid should come."` In our present case what would be the sum available to carry out the objects of the testatrix was capable of being ascertained and with that sum the executors/trustees were to purchase a house/shop to produce income. There was nothing contingent about that. Accordingly, we hold that there is no merit in this contention of the appellant.
31. Property not vested in testatrix
The appellant contends that for there to be a valid wakaf, the property dedicated must belong to the settlor/testatrix. In the present case, the property was purchased by the trustees after the death of the testatrix and it did not belong to the testatrix at the time of her death. Reliance was placed upon Baillie on Digest of Moohummadan Law (another recognised work) where the learned author stated at p 562:
It is also a condition that the thing appropriated be the appropriator`s property at the time of the appropriation; so that if one were to usurp a piece of land, appropriate, and then purchase it from the owner it would not be a wakf.
There are also similar statements in other authoritative works such as Ameer Ali on Mohammedan Law .
32.It seems to us clear that what the learned authors are saying is that a person cannot create a wakaf out of a property which does not belong to him but to others. This is obvious. You cannot create wakaf out of other people`s things. But that is not the position in our case here. The wakaf created by the testatrix was in respect of the balance one-third of her estate and the property was acquired by the trustees with that sum pursuant to the testatrix`s explicit direction in the will. The testatrix did not seek to create a wakaf out of property which did not belong to her. In our opinion, this argument is without merit. The comparison is wholly inappropriate.
33. Trustees have power of sale
A related argument of the appellant is that even assuming that the legal title to the property vests in the Majlis, the trustees of the property still had a power of sale. Counsel submitted that as s 58(4) of AMLA allows the trustees to manage the wakaf, this should include the power to apply to court to approve the sale of a wakaf property and the purchase of another property in substitution thereof. The appellant said that under general Muslim law a trustee may apply to court for substitution and cited AA Fyzee on Outlines of Muhammadan Law (4th Ed) in support thereof, where the learned author stated (at p 289):
As a wakaf is a permanent endowment, perpetuity is ensured by the doctrine that wakf property belongs to God and cannot be alienated by human beings for their own purposes. Hence the rule of law that wakf property is not alienable.
Although wakf property cannot be sold, transferred or encumbered, in a fit case the mutawalli (the trustee) may apply to the court, and for the protection or the better management of the wakf, he may sell or grant leases with the court`s express permission. The prohibition to sell must not be confused with a mere variation of investment, and the courts have often consented readily to allow an alteration in the form of investment.
34.The appellant contended that the right of the trustees to apply to court for approval is not altered by s 59 of AMLA. Since under s 58(4) the trustees are given the power to manage the wakaf, this power to manage must include the power to apply to court.
35.It seems to us that the position as set out by Fyzee above is the position under general Muslim law. That would have been the position in Singapore prior to the coming into operation of AMLA. The authority given under s 58(4) to the trustees of a wakaf to manage the wakaf is expressly subject to the provisions of AMLA. It will be recalled that under s 58(2), the Majlis is to administer all wakafs. AMLA clearly draws a distinction between `administer` and `manage`. In our opinion what is encompassed in the function `to administer` must be viewed in the light of the following provisions in that Act:
59 All property subject to section 58 shall if situate in Singapore vest in the Majlis, without any conveyance, assignment or transfer whatever, for the purpose of the Baitulmal, wakaf or nazar am affecting the same.
62(2) If from lapse of time or change of circumstances it is no longer possible beneficially to carry out the exact provisions of any wakaf or nazar am, the Majlis shall prepare a scheme for the application of the property and assets affected thereby in a manner as closely as may be analogous to that required by the terms of such wakaf or nazar am and shall apply the same accordingly:
Provided that the Majlis may, with the approval in writing of the Minister, direct that such property and assets shall be added to and form part of the Fund.
62(4) All instruments creating, evidencing or affecting any wakaf or nazar am, together with any documents of title or other securities relating thereto, shall be held and retained by the Majlis.
63(2) If in the opinion of the Majlis the meaning or effect of any instrument or declaration creating or affecting any wakaf or nazar is obscure or uncertain, the Majlis may refer the same to the court for construction of the instrument or declaration, and shall act in accordance with the construction so given by the court.
36.The net effect of these provisions is that legal title to wakaf properties vests in the Majlis; that the Majlis shall hold the documents of title relating to wakaf properties; that it is for the Majlis to prepare any cy-pres scheme; and that it is for the Majlis to refer to court for an opinion if the meaning or effect of any instrument creating a wakaf is obscure or uncertain. In our opinion, in the light of the scheme of things laid down in AMLA, we do not think that it falls within the province of the trustees, as managers, to apply to court to approve the sale under s 59 of the Trustees Act. The trustees did not hold the title to the wakaf property. They were no longer trustees in the English law sense, viz, someone who holds the legal title for the benefit of another or for certain specified objects. As managers, the trustees` (in Muslim law they are called `mutawallis`) functions are only to manage the wakaf property and to apply the income as directed in the trust instrument. Under AMLA, control of all wakafs vests with the Majlis. It must be borne in mind that under s 58(4) the Majlis is empowered to remove the trustees of a wakaf when it appears to the Majlis that the wakaf has been mismanaged or it would be to the advantage of the wakaf to appoint a mutawalli.
37.While it is true that in this case the trustees, pursuant to s 59(1) of the Trustees Act, did apply and obtain an order of court empowering them to sell the property, that was an ex parte order and the court`s attention was not drawn to s 59 of AMLA. Such a court order empowering sale cannot confer title upon the party where that party does not possess title to the property in the first place. Section 59(1) of Trustees Act only applies `where in the management or administration of any property vested in trustees ` Here the property did not vest in the trustees but in the Majlis.
38. Muslim law is local law
At this juncture we should mention that counsel for the appellant made a preliminary point that the learned judge below erred when she appeared to treat Muslim law as a fact to be proved by evidence like foreign law. He said this could be seen from the statement of the learned judge where she stated that `the plaintiff (the appellant) did not produce any evidence on Muslim law.` We accept the submission that Muslim law need not be proved like foreign law. Muslim law is part of the law of the land which the court would take cognizance of. But the learned judge did, notwithstanding that statement, take into consideration the submission on Muslim law. In any case in this appeal, it being a rehearing, we have heard and considered fully the submissions of both counsel on Muslim law and our views on the various points are as herein set out.
39. Estoppel
We now turn to the second main argument based on estoppel. The appellant relies upon the following: (i). The Majlis knew of the sale of the property by the trustees to the appellant before completion and yet did not intervene to stop the sale.
(ii). The Majlis was probably aware of the application made to the High Court in OS 849/93 to obtain the sanction of the court for the sale.
(iii). The Majlis lodged a caveat against the property on 2 December 1993, one day after the appellant had registered the purchase.
(iv). The Majlis had failed to fulfil its statutory duty under s 66 of AMLA by not listing or gazetting the property as a wakaf. The appellant could not have known that the property was affected by a wakaf . While the appellant knew the existence of the will, a will is not a part of the title. There was no reason for the appellant to look behind the grant of probate and the order for sale. The Majlis had taken no steps to make their claim known to the appellant.
(v). The appellant had spent a considerable sum in the redevelopment of the property. The Majlis must have known that the appellant was carrying out the work and yet permitted the appellant to continue.
The appellant submitted that proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation, and/or estoppel per rem judicatum, apply in the circumstances of this case.
40.The appellant`s counsel`s submission on each of the above three heads of estoppel is based essentially on acquiescence and thus the question of the knowledge of the Majlis, as to the sale to the appellant and the application to court under s 59 of the Trustees Act, is critical. You cannot acquiesce to something you do not know. So the question is, is there any evidence of such knowledge. The Majlis clearly deposed that it did not know of the proposed sale by the trustees to the appellant and of the application in OS 849/93 to obtain the sanction of court for the sale. It also did not know of the works being carried out to the property. The evidence shows that the Majlis was pursuing the trustees for a copy of the will of the testatrix without success. Yet when the trustees found a translated copy of the will and made the application in OS 849/93, they did not forward a copy to the Majlis even though they knew very well that the latter had been pressing for a copy in order to determine if the testatrix had created a wakaf. There was no dealing whatsoever between the appellant and the Majlis.
41.The only allegation made that the Majlis knew of the matters as aforesaid was contained in an affidavit of Hamid filed on behalf of the appellant on 27 July 1995. This was what Hamid deposed:
I also wish to state that most of the members of `Aljunied` family were aware of my intended sale of the subject property and to purchase a property with the proceeds of sale thereof.
42.The secretary of the Majlis, one Syed Haroon bin Mohamed Aljunied, is a cousin of Hamid. It is of significance to note that Hamid did not state explicitly that Haroon knew or was informed of the intended sale. Instead Hamid used a vague expression `most of the members of the Aljunied family`. Who are the people who come within the term `most`? As Hamid was replying to an affidavit filed by Haroon wherein the latter explicitly stated that he did not know, why was Hamid afraid to point the finger directly at Haroon, if the latter did in fact know of the position?
43.In the face of this indirect accusation by Hamid that Haroon did know or would have known, Haroon filed an affidavit in reply on 23 August 1995 stating that he did not have any knowledge of the contents of the will of the testatrix nor did he know of the proposed sale to the appellant. Haroon also said that he did not know that Hamid had bought another property after having sold the Temple Street property.
44.What is in issue here is really a question of credibility. We have earlier referred to the efforts made by the Majlis to obtain a copy of the testatrix`s will. As they are germane to the issue in hand, we will briefly restate them. In 1991, or latest by 4 June 1992, Hamid was informed by the solicitors for the Majlis that the property `forms part of a wakaf and as such vests in our clients pursuant to the (AMLA).` The solicitors went on to state that to enable the Majlis to ascertain whether indeed the property formed part of the wakaf the solicitors asked for a copy of the grant of probate and a copy of the will of the testatrix. On 17 August 1992, Hamid replied saying that the documents were with his brother (the then co-trustee) who was resident in Saudi Arabia and he had forwarded the request to the brother. Nothing was heard from either Hamid or his brother though reminders were sent. Then on 20 November 1992 Hamid`s solicitors, BRL, replied for Hamid stating that Hamid did not have the will and he was making enquiries with members of his family to ascertain the whereabouts of the will. On 18 December 1992, BRL wrote to say that their clients still did not have a copy of the will. Nothing more was heard from Hamid or his solicitors. The next thing was this sale to the appellant. Hamid knew very well the reason why the Majlis asked for a copy of the will. He entered into the agreement with the appellant without informing the Majlis. Yet, later he had the audacity to assert that the Majlis knew of the proposed sale because Haroon, the Secretary of the Majlis, must have known. Hamid`s reliability as a witness is suspect.
45.We, therefore, hold that the Majlis did not know of the proposed sale of the property by the trustees to the appellant, nor of the application to court for sanction, until after the completion thereof, for these reasons: (i). The appellant had not tendered any evidence that the Secretary of the Majlis in fact knew; whatever evidence was based on supposition.
(ii). The reliability of the assertion of Hamid that Haroon must have known of the sale is suspect since it was clear that he did not want the Majlis to interfere in the property. It is of interest to note that the solicitors who acted for the trustees in the sale and purchase were not BRL but another firm, M/s S Nabham.
(iii). The Majlis only knew of the sale after the completion thereof and this is evidenced by the letter of 4 December 1993 from the Majlis` solicitors to M/s S Nabham complaining about the conduct of the trustees. Hamid`s letter of 13 January 1994 where he stated that `we are of the view that your clients have no jurisdiction over the said property` speaks volumes. Hamid wanted to keep the sale away from the Majlis.
46.Estoppel is an equitable remedy. The rationale for the intervention of equity was put by Denning MR in Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 at p 187 as follows:
The basis of this proprietary estoppel is the interposition of equity. Equity comes in, true to form, to mitigate the rigours of strict law. The early cases did not speak of it as `estoppel`. They spoke of it as `raising an equity`. If I may expand what Lord Cairns LC said in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co [1877] 2 App Cas 439, p 448: `it is the first principle upon which all courts of equity proceed,` that it will prevent a person from insisting on his strict legal rights - whether arising under a contract, or on his title deeds, or by statute - when it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties.
Short of an actual promise, if he, by his words or conduct, so behaves as to lead another to believe that he will not insist on his strict legal rights - knowing or intending that the other will act on that belief - and he does so act, that again will raise equity in favour of the other; and it is for a court of equity to say in what way the equity may be satisfied.
47.In the light of our finding that the Majlis had no knowledge of the sale or the application for sanction, the appellant`s claim based on proprietary estoppel and estoppel by representation must necessarily fail. As mentioned above, the application by the trustees for sanction of the sale to the appellant was made ex parte. Similarly we do not see how estoppel per rem judicatum could ever apply.
48. Section 66 of AMLA
We now turn to the argument based on s 66 of AMLA. This section requires the Majlis to publish yearly a list of all wakaf properties vested in the Majlis. Two points may be made here. Firstly, from 1992 up to early 1993 the Majlis was trying to ascertain the exact status of the property although the Majlis felt that the property was a wakaf property. Until they see the will and the directions therein, there was no way the Majlis could know the true position. The Majlis obtained no assistance at all from the trustees. Even as late as 2 December when the Majlis lodged its caveat it did not obtain a copy of the will. This was explained by Haroon as follows:
8 After much exhausted fruitless attempts on the part of the defendants to obtain a copy of the last will of the testatrix which Syed Hamid failed to furnish, it was then decided that the defendants should nevertheless lodge a caveat against the property. This was done on 2 December, 1993, and the said caveat was registered at the Registry of Deeds in Vol 2641 No 198.
49.Thus, even on the basis of this caveat lodged by the Majlis, the earliest conceivable time at which the Majlis could have included the property in the list to be published in the gazette would be in 1994, by which time the sale and purchase had already been completed. Secondly, there is no assertion by the appellant that it had relied upon any list gazetted by the Majlis under s 66 before entering into the contract of purchase or before completing that transaction. Quite apart from the question as to the object behind s 66 in requiring an annual gazetting of wakaf properties, the simple truth is that the appellant did not rely upon any list published by the Majlis in deciding to purchase the property. In our opinion, the omission of this wakaf in any list published by the Majlis was wholly irrelevant.
50. Redevelopment works
The appellant stated that upon completion of the purchase, it proceeded with the redevelopment works on the property. At the time of commencement of this originating summons in April 1995, the redevelopment works were `almost completed`. The appellant contended that as the Majlis permitted the works to continue, estoppel applies.
51.As mentioned above, the Majlis lodged its caveat on 2 December 1993, a day after the appellant lodged its deed of assignment for registration. More importantly, on or about 4 December 1993 the Majlis came to know of the sale of the property by the trustees to the appellant. Yet, thereafter, the Majlis never wrote to inform the appellant about its interest in the property. The appellant only learned of the caveat lodged by the Majlis in or about February 1995 when it sought to re-sell the property. The appellant then commenced the present proceedings to remove the caveat of the Majlis. In our opinion, upon being aware that the appellant had bought the property from the trustees, the Majlis should have given immediate notice of its interest in the property to the appellant. The Majlis would have known that the appellant, having bought the property which is an old shophouse, would undertake renovation or other works to modernize it, either for its own use or for resale. Yet the Majlis stood idly by and let the appellant carry on with the works. In the circumstances, estoppel would apply: see Ramsden v Dyson [1866] LR 1 HL 129 at pp 140-141 and Willmot v Barber [1880] 15 Ch 96 at p 105.
52.The estoppel here gives rise to an equity in favour of the appellant in so far as the redevelopment works are concerned. The next question is, how is that equity to be satisfied. Here we would like to quote what was stated by Mason CJ in Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen [1990] 170 CLR 394 at p 413:
There must be a proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is its purpose to avoid. It would be wholly inequitable and unjust to insist upon a disproportionate making good of the relevant assumption.
The same principle was alluded to earlier by Scarman LJ in Crabb v Arun District Council under what he termed as the `minimum equity` concept.
53.It is presumably in recognition of such an equity that the Majlis at the hearing below agreed to bear all reasonable costs incurred for the redevelopment works. However, in our view, equity would only be satisfied in the circumstances of this case if the appellant is reimbursed in full for all expenditures actually incurred by them on account of the redevelopment works. To this extent, we would vary the order of the court below.
54. Retrial
Finally, there is the submission of the appellant that there should be an order for a retrial. The appellant says the case should have proceeded as if begun by writ as questions of fact were involved and there should be cross-examination of witnessess.
55.We would observe that this originating summons was first heard before Warren LH Khoo J over two days. He then made certain directions. At no time was an application made to him to convert the originating summons into a writ action or to cross-examine witnesses. For reasons which were not apparent, the continued hearing of the originating summons was fixed before Judith Prakash J instead of being restored before Warren LH Khoo J. Counsel for the appellant did not apply to Judith Prakash J that there should be cross-examination of witnesses. It was clear to us that at all times the parties were prepared to let the matter be decided on the basis of the affidavit evidence.
56.By s 39 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322), the court has the power to order a new trial but that should only be done if there is `some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.` On the basis of the events we have set out hereinbefore and in the light of our views on the various issues raised, we do not think there is any cause for a retrial.
57. Judgment
In the result this appeal is allowed only to the limited extent that the respondent shall reimburse the appellant for all expenditures actually incurred in the redevelopment works. As the appellant has substantially failed in this appeal it shall bear the costs. We would award costs to the respondent at 90%. The security for costs shall be paid out to the respondent`s solicitors to account of the respondent`s costs. It seems to us that the remedy of the appellant lies elsewhere. The Majlis has clearly set out in its affidavit that it is not claiming any interest in the flat which the trustees subsequently bought with the proceeds of sale of the Temple Street property.
Chao Hick Tin J L P Thean JA Yong Pung How CJ |
K Shanmugam SC and Ronald Choo (Allen & Gledhill) for the appellant
Mizra Namazie and Tan Teng Muan (Mallal & Namazie) for the respondent