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Chan Chun Yee v Public Prosecutor
[1998] SGHC 277
Cr M 17/1998, Cr Rev 22/1998
Yong Pung How CJ
17 August 1998
1 Judgment:
2 YONG PUNG HOW JC
3 The petitioner pleaded guilty and was convicted of remaining in Singapore after the expiry of his social visit pass for three months and seven days without reasonable cause, an offence under s 15(1) Immigration Act (Cap 133, 1997 Ed). He sought revision of his conviction and also applied in Criminal Motion 17/98 to admit his affidavit filed on 6 August 1998 and oral evidence at the hearing of the criminal revision. I dismissed the motion and the petition and now give my reasons.
4 2. Facts
5 On 22 July 1998, the petitioner was charged in the district court as follows:
You, Chan Chun Yee (M/29.2.68) 30 years old Malaysian Passport No: H101507 are charged that you, from 15 April 1998 to 21 July 1998 did contravene the provisions of s 15(1) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133), to wit, that without reasonable cause, you did remain in Singapore after the expiry of the visit pass issued to you on 31 March 1998 permitting you to remain in Singapore till 14 April 1998 and you have thereby committed an offence under s 15(3), punishable under s 15(3)(b) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) as amended by the Immigration (Amendment) Act 1995.
6 3.The petitioner appeared in person and pleaded guilty after the charge was read and explained to him in Mandarin and he was told the nature and consequences of his plea. He admitted the statement of facts in support of the charge without qualification. The statement stated:
The accused, a Malaysian national, 30 years of age, was arrested by Immigration officers on 21 July 1998 for having overstayed in Singapore.
2 Investigation revealed that the accused arrived in Singapore on 31 March 1998 and was granted a visit pass valid till 14 April 1998. Upon expiry of the visit pass on 14 April 1998, the accused did not leave Singapore or apply for extension of stay. He then remained there unlawfully.
3 Investigation also revealed that the accused`s purpose here was to seek employment.
4 The accused had up to the time of his arrest on 21 July 1998, remained unlawfully in Singapore for a period of three months and seven days and has therefore committed an offence punishable under s 15(3)(b) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133).
7 4.The petitioner was convicted of this charge. A second charge of having in his possession a forged Singapore Immigration social visit pass endorsement was taken into consideration for sentencing. In mitigation, the petitioner asked for leniency. The district judge sentenced him to two months` imprisonment and four strokes of the cane.
8 5.Notwithstanding his plea of guilty in the district court, the petitioner filed a petition for criminal revision asking the High Court to exercise its revisionary powers under s 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68) (CPC) to quash the conviction on the ground that the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory. In order to show that the conviction was unsatisfactory, he applied for leave to adduce fresh evidence to show that he had a valid defence to the charge, namely, that he held the belief that he was entitled to remain in Singapore by virtue of the special pass endorsed on his passport.
9 6. The criminal motion
10 Before me, the petitioner applied for leave to adduce his affidavit in support of his application to adduce fresh evidence, which essentially said that he held the belief that the endorsements on his passport were genuine and that he was entitled to remain in Singapore.
11 7.Section 268(1) CPC makes it clear that the revisionary powers of the High Court include the power to order the taking of additional evidence in accordance with s 257(1). The principles to be followed in deciding if additional evidence should be taken are set out in Juma`at bin Samad v PP [1993] 3 SLR 338 , Carl Elias v PP [1995] 2 SLR 501 , applying the principles in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745. Briefly, first, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; secondly, the evidence must be such that, if given at the trial, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, although it need not be decisive; and thirdly, the evidence must be apparently credible although it need not be incontrovertible.
12 8.Applying the principles above to the present case, it was clear that the first condition was not satisfied. The evidence of the petitioner of his own belief that he was entitled to remain in Singapore was clearly available at the time of the trial and the petitioner could well have claimed trial and explained to the district court his belief that the endorsements on the passport were genuine.
13 9.In Juma`at bin Samad , the court held that:
It is true that there are situations where the court would allow additional evidence to be called even though it could not be strictly said that the evidence was not available at the time of trial, if it can be shown that a miscarriage of justice has resulted. The core principle of s 257 CPC after all, is that additional evidence may be taken if it is necessary in the interests of justice. That said, it must be emphasised in no uncertain terms that such a situation will arise only in the most extraordinary circumstances.
14 10.There were no grounds here for invoking the exception in the interests of justice and counsel did not provide any. This is a narrow exception and is warranted only by the most extenuating circumstances, which may include the fact that the offence is a serious one attracting grave consequences and the fact that the additional evidence sought to be adduced is highly cogent and pertinent and the strength of which renders the conviction unsafe. Counsel argued that there were exceptional circumstances, being that the petitioner failed to understand the nature and consequences of the plea and that he was confused or intimidated by the proceedings which led him to plead guilty. These are circumstances which are clearly relevant only to the criminal revision in seeking to retract the plea of guilt and not to the criminal motion in seeking to adduce fresh evidence on the circumstances relating to the commission of the offence. I will consider these arguments in the petition for criminal revision below.
15 11.The relevance and credibility of additional evidence are related aspects. If the appellant held the belief that the endorsements on his passport were genuine, that would constitute `reasonable cause` within s 15(3) of the Act to remain in Singapore despite the fact that his social visit pass had expired. The petitioner has to satisfy the court that the additional evidence is apparently credible and, if believed, establishes on a balance of probabilities that he had a valid defence. I was of the view that the additional evidence did not achieve this. The DPP adduced the affidavit of the investigating officer, Senior Inspector of Immigration Tay Liang Kim, which exhibited a statement by the petitioner on 21 July 1998, that was made after his arrest. In that statement, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the endorsements on his passport could not have been genuine because he did not apply for a work permit and did not undergo any medical check-up; he knew that these two were prerequisites before such a permit could be granted. Given his admission, I came to the conclusion that the additional evidence was not apparently credible.
16 12.Therefore his application to allow the fresh evidence should not be allowed.
17 13. The criminal revision
18 The grounds for criminal revision, as set out in the petition, were that the petitioner`s plea of guilt was equivocal. He was not aware that the endorsements on his passport were forged. He pleaded guilty involuntarily on the inducement of the immigration officer who told him that he had a hopeless case and that the judge would not believe his defence that he did not know that the endorsements were false. He did not know that he had a defence of reasonable cause to remain in Singapore on the basis of the special pass which he thought was genuine at the material time.
19 14.The petition stated that he entered Singapore on 31 March 1998 and was given the usual two week social visit pass which expired on 14 April 1998. He approached his friend, one `Ah Meng`, who ran a restaurant business in Bedok North Avenue 2 known as `Tong Seng Restaurant` to work as a cook. Ah Meng agreed and the petitioner handed his passport to him. Ah Meng offered to apply for him the `special pass` which, according to him, would enable the petitioner to remain and work in Singapore for three months. Ah Meng returned the passport with the special pass endorsed with the words `03: 10 April 1998 - 16 July 1998: Visa`) and the petitioner believed that the special pass was genuine and that he could remain in Singapore until 16 July 1998. On 5 July 1998 the petitioner expressed his desire to return to Malaysia and requested Ah Meng to apply to cancel his special pass. He handed the passport to Ah Meng and it was duly endorsed with the exit pass and the social visit pass.
20 15.Since the petitioner had pleaded guilty to the charge, I considered whether his plea of guilt was valid and unequivocal. The safeguards for ensuring the validity of such pleas were set out in Ganesun s/o Kannan v PP [1996] 3 SLR 560 , applied in Virgie Rizza V Leong v PP (Unreported) : first, the court must ensure the accused himself wishes to plead guilty; secondly, the court must ascertain if the accused understands the nature and consequences of his plea; and thirdly, the court must establish that the accused intends to admit without qualification the offence alleged against him. Ganesun s/o Kannan concerned an accused who wished to retract his plea of guilt before sentencing. However, the same test for determining the validity of a plea of guilt applies as well where criminal revision is sought following conviction and sentencing: Rajeevan Edakalavan v PP [1998] 1 SLR 815 , Virgie Rizza V Leong v PP .
21 16.The petitioner`s plea of guilt certainly appeared to be prima facie valid. From the notes of evidence, the charge and statement of facts were read to him and he seemed to understand fully. He admitted without qualification to the facts. The petitioner had no complaints about linguistic competence of the court interpreter. There is nothing in the petitioner`s plea or mitigation which can be taken as a qualification or equivocation of his intention to plead guilty. However he claimed that: (1) he was unaware of the possible defence which was that he believed that the endorsements on his passport were genuine; and (2) he was induced by the immigration officer to plead guilty.
22 17.I first considered the alleged representations by the immigration officers. Even if the representations were in fact made, they were not positive misrepresentations as to the rights of the appellant. The alleged representations by the immigration officer to the appellant were merely that the endorsements in his passport were forged and that he was not likely to be believed in court if he said that he did not know of the forgery. There was no deception imputed to the prosecution. It was not the duty of the prosecution to inform the accused of defences or other options open to him. The fact that the immigration officer did not inform the appellant as to any defences which might be open to him did not make his representations an inducement to plead guilty. More importantly, in court, the district judge explained to him the charge, the nature and consequences of the plea to him. Counsel`s argument that he was induced to plead guilty by the representations of the immigration officer was without any merit.
23 18.As for the claim that he was ignorant of a possible defence because he was unrepresented, this argument had no merit. In Packir Malim v PP [1997] 3 SLR 429 , it was held that pleas of guilt by unrepresented persons were not more easily vitiated than those by represented persons. Rajeevan Edakalavan v PP suggested that an unrepresented accused`s plea of guilt will not be vitiated by his ignorance of possible defences. The essential test of criminal revision is whether there has been some serious injustice or whether the decision of the lower court is perverse: Ang Poh Chuan v PP [1996] 1 SLR 326 . As held in Virgie Rizza V Leong v PP , an accused who unnecessarily pleads guilty has added to his own problems, but there is no reason for a court to uphold a conviction if it can be clearly demonstrated to be wrong in law or in fact.
24 19.I thus considered if the petitioner held the belief that the endorsements on his passport were genuine, such that it consisted reasonable cause to remain in Singapore. However, I was not persuaded this was the case. The prosecution adduced an affidavit from the investigating officer in charge of the case together with the statement made by petitioner shortly after his arrest, which has been referred to earlier. In the statement, he admitted that he knew that the endorsements on the passport could not be genuine because he had not applied for a work permit to work in Singapore nor had he gone for any medical checkup which he knew was necessary before a work permit could be granted. His claim that he was ignorant that the endorsements in the passport were forged could not be believed.
25 20.For these reasons, I rejected the petitioner`s contention that he held the belief that the endorsements on his passport were genuine and he was entitled to remain in Singapore.
26 21.This was sufficient to dispose of the petition for revision. However, further comments may be made as to the petitioner`s claim that he believed that the endorsements on his passport were genuine and that this constituted `reasonable cause` to remain in Singapore within s 15(3) Immigration Act. The relevant provision is set out below:
15 (1) A person shall not remain in Singapore after the cancellation of any permit or certificate, or after the making of a declaration under section 14(4) or after the expiration or notification to him, in such manner as may be prescribed, of the cancellation of any pass relating to or issued to him unless he is otherwise entitled or authorised to remain in Singapore under the provisions of this Act or the regulations.
(3) Any person who contravenes, without reasonable cause , this section shall be guilty of an offence and -
(b) in the case where he remains unlawfully for a period exceeding 90 days, shall on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months and shall also, subject to section 231 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68), be punished with caning with not less than 3 strokes, or where by virtue of that section he is not punishable with caning, he shall, in lieu of caning, be punished with a fine not exceeding $6,000.
27 22.`Reasonable cause` is not defined but in Virgie Rizza V Leong v PP , the High Court held that what suffices as reasonable cause must depend on the circumstances of each case. Where the accused is relying on the defence that he believes that he is entitled to remain in Singapore lawfully, the phrase `reasonable cause` indicates that the accused must not only genuinely hold the belief that the endorsements are valid, but there must objectively be evidence showing that the belief is reasonable in the circumstances. In that case, the accused was charged under s 15 Immigration Act and her defence was that she was deceived by one Leong who fooled her into thinking she could legally remain in Singapore because of the forged endorsement of the visit pass in her passport and her forged Singaporean identity card which Leong told her was issued to her as his wife. The High Court held that, even if the accused`s version was true, it would not amount to `reasonable cause`. The accused did not claim to have taken any steps to check her own status and the appellant had not married Leong and had no proper grounds for believing that she had been issued a Singapore identity card.
28 23.The High Court made the important observation that blind reliance on others for compliance with the Immigration Act could not possibly afford a defence on the facts. The burden has to be on those claiming that they believe that they have a right to enter or remain in Singapore based on visit passes or any other passes issued to them, that they have taken reasonable steps to ensure that their passes are genuine and have made reasonable inquiries to verify their own immigration status. Otherwise the provisions are unworkable. A strict approach is necessary. There are serious social implications of unrestricted immigration which the Act attempts to curb. The petitioner alleged that he relied on Ah Meng to get proper approval for him. He did not claim to have taken any steps to check his own status. On 8 July 1998 he was handed his passport by Ah Meng which had an exit pass and social visit pass endorsed on it. His suspicions arose since he did not leave Singapore and the exit pass should not be endorsed. Ah Meng allegedly told him that he was unsure about the endorsements. Yet the petitioner was content to leave the matter as it stood.
29 24.For the above reasons, I dismissed the petition for criminal revision.
Morris Yow Choon Seng (David Chong & Co) for the applicant in Criminal Motion 17/98 and petitioner in Criminal Revision 22/98
Foo Cheow Ming (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent in Criminal Motion 17/98 and Criminal Revision 22/98