1 (delivering the grounds of judgment of the court): Suresh Kumar Suppiah, (the `respondent`), who was admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore on 18 February 1987, was found guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty by the Disciplinary Committee appointed to hear and investigate a complaint against him by his client, Madam Ng Siew Ker (the `complainant`). We ordered that the respondent be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors and now give our reasons for doing so.

2 The complainant, a renovation contractor, was sued by one of her clients, who was dissatisfied with renovation work undertaken by her. The respondent agreed to act for the complainant in the suit. However, he took no steps to properly defend the complainant, who claimed that she had a valid defence and a counter-claim, and failed to keep her informed of the proceedings in the suit.

3 On 7 January 1997, interlocutory judgment was entered against the complainant, with damages to be assessed at a later date. More than half a year later, on 11 August 1997, the damages were assessed and the complainant was ordered to pay the sum of $41,995.60 as well as costs to the plaintiffs in the suit in question. The complainant only became aware that judgment had been entered against her and that damages had been assessed when she received a letter from M/s Khattar Wong & Partners, the solicitors for the plaintiffs in the suit in question. On 19 August 1997, the complainant wrote to the respondent as follows:

4 On 21 August 1997, the respondent replied to the complainant as follows:

5 The respondent arranged with M/s Khattar Wong & Partners, the solicitors for the plaintiffs in the action against the complainant, to have the judgment sum, together with interest and costs, paid by way of six monthly instalments. When queried by the complainant about the proposed instalment plan and the respondent`s insurers` position, the respondent wrote the following letter of undertaking to the complainant on 27 August 1997:

6 On 12 September 1997, M/s Naidu, Ng & Partners informed M/s Khattar Wong & Partners that they had taken over the conduct of the matter from the respondent and that payments under the agreed instalment plan will be made by way of the firm`s clients` account cheques. The first instalment of $8,709.05 was paid to M/s Khattar Wong & Partners on 19 September 1997.

7 Although no further payments were made by M/s Naidu, Ng & Partners, the complainant was led to believe that a second instalment had been paid. On 20 October 1997, a letter from M/s Naidu, Ng & Partners, which was purportedly sent to M/s Khattar Wong & Partners, stated as follows:

8 M/s Naidu, Ng & Partners denied any knowledge of this letter, a copy of which was forwarded to the complainant. In a letter to the Law Society, the law firm made it clear that none of their lawyers drafted the said letter of 17 October 1997 and that none of their support staff assisted in the typing of the said letter. M/s Khattar Wong & Partners confirmed that they did not receive the said letter.

9 Having been assured that the second instalment had been paid, the complainant was understandably shocked and distressed when she received from M/s Khattar Wong & Partners a statutory demand to pay the sum of $44,392.40, failing which bankruptcy proceedings would be instituted against her.

10 On 17 November 1997, the complainant wrote to the respondent as follows:

11 As the respondent did not pay the amount demanded in the statutory demand and did not stop the bankruptcy proceedings, the complainant was made a bankrupt on 20 March 1998.

12 In the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee, two charges were preferred against the respondent. The first charge was as follows:

13 The second charge was in the following terms:

14 On 29 January 1999, the respondent informed the Disciplinary Committee that he would be contesting the first charge but not the second. The first charge was not considered by the Disciplinary Committee because counsel for the Law Society withdrew it after it was discovered that the respondent had ceased practice on 6 September 1997 and was not a practising lawyer when the wrongful act referred to in the first charge was allegedly committed by him.

15 With only the second charge to be considered, the Disciplinary Committee proceeded to determine whether the evidence revealed that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under s 83 of the Legal Profession Act. The Disciplinary Committee noted the respondent`s mitigation plea. His counsel had submitted as follows:

16 The respondent`s mitigation plea, the Disciplinary Committee rightly pointed out, `was somewhat lacking in terms of efforts by the respondent in helping the complainant`. The Disciplinary Committee added that a continuing intention to help without pointing out how the respondent`s undertaking to the complainant could be carried out was cold comfort to the complainant, who had been made a bankrupt as a result of his actions.

17 After considering the evidence, the Disciplinary Committee took the view that the second charge had been proved and that there was a cause of sufficient gravity in respect of the second charge for disciplinary action to be taken against the respondent under s 83 of the Legal Profession Act, which provides as follows:

18 Following the report of the Disciplinary Committee, the Law Society applied under s 98(1) of the Legal Profession Act for the respondent to show cause as to why he should not be dealt with under s 83 of the said Act. The application was granted and the show cause proceedings came before this court.

19 As the respondent admitted that he failed to honour an undertaking given to the complainant to pay a judgment debt on her behalf, and that such failure resulted in the complainant being served with a bankruptcy petition and being adjudged a bankrupt, the task of this court was only to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed on the respondent.

20 We noted that the respondent had readily admitted his guilt and that he had not misappropriated any funds. The fact that a person who has not been found guilty of dishonest conduct may still be dealt with severely was made clear in Law Society of Singapore v Ravindra Samuel [1999] 1 SLR 696 at [para ] 15 in the following terms:

21 When considering the appropriate penalty in this case, the question of a mere reprimand did not arise. As for whether the respondent ought to be suspended from practising for a specified period of time, we had no doubt that suspension of the respondent would not be the proper penalty to be meted out. After all, in an Australian case, Re A Practitioner [1984] 36 SASR 591, 593, King CJ rightly pointed out that the proper use of suspension is `for those cases in which a legal practitioner has fallen below the high standards to be expected of such a practitioner, but not in such a way as to indicate that he lacks the qualities of character and trustworthiness which are the necessary attributes of a person entrusted with the responsibilities of a legal practitioner`. In similar vein, in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 2 All ER 486, 491, Sir Thomas Bingham MR, who accepted that where a solicitor has not been shown to have acted dishonestly but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, the lapse is less serious, added that the lapse remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust. His Lordship thus accepted that while a striking-off order will not necessarily follow in such a case, it may be the right sanction in appropriate circumstances.

22 In this case, the respondent let down his client very badly and not merely on one occasion. His failure to act in a professional manner by arranging for the suit against the complainant to be defended cannot be countenanced. Realising that the complainant`s predicament was caused by the total neglect of his duty to her, the respondent accepted liability to the complainant and undertook to pay the judgment sum, which he arranged to pay in instalments. The respondent must have realised the seriousness of his undertaking to the complainant and the suffering he would cause her if he did not pay the judgment sum. When he failed to pay the second instalment, he did not have the courtesy to inform his client. After the complainant informed him that she had received a statutory demand, the respondent failed to take steps to ensure that the complainant was not made a bankrupt.

23 We must ensure that the public is entitled to the standards expected of legal practitioners in the discharge of their duties to their clients. Taking all the circumstances into account, we decided that the proper course of action to take in this case was to order the respondent to be struck off from the roll of advocates and solicitors. We also ordered him to pay the costs of the application before us and the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee.

24 Outcome:

25 Order accordingly.