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Public Prosecutor v Chen Chih Sheng and another appeal
[1999] SGHC 14
MA 80/1998
Yong Pung How CJ
18 January 1999
1 Judgment:
2 YONG PUNG HOW CJ
3 The accused was convicted on the following charge:
You, Chen Chih Sheng, are charged that you from, on or about 14 November 1992 to 14 November 1996 were a director at Victoria City Restaurant Pte Ltd of 2, Havelock Road, Apollo Centre [num ]02-01 which had from, on or about early October 1996 to 30 October 1996 committed an offence of employing a foreign worker, namely, one Chin Sai Piew, without having obtained a valid work permit allowing him to work for the said company under s 5(1) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap 91A), the commission of which offence was attributable to your default, and you have thereby, by virtue of s 16D, committed an offence under s 5(1) punishable under s 5(4) of the same Act.
4 2.The prosecution submitted that, as the accused had a previous conviction under s 5(6) read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap 91A, 1991 Ed) (`the 1991 Act`), his current conviction under s 16D read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap 91A, 1991 Ed), as amended by the Employment of Foreign Workers (Amendment) Act (Act 37 of 1995), (`the 1995 Act`) was a second conviction under the 1995 Act and accordingly should be punished with mandatory imprisonment as required by s 5(4)(b)(i) of the 1995 Act. The trial judge found however that the accused`s conviction under the 1991 Act should not be considered a previous conviction under the 1995 Act and his current conviction should therefore not be considered a second conviction under the 1995 Act which would attract the punishment of mandatory imprisonment. In the result, the trial judge sentenced the accused to pay a fine of 48 months` levy, amounting to $15,840.
5 3.The Public Prosecutor appealed against the sentence imposed by the trial judge. The accused responded by appealing against his conviction, but not his sentence.
6 Facts
7
8 4.A Malaysian, one Chin Sai Piew (`Chin`) approached one Chan Tonny Chun Fatt (`Ah Fatt`), for work at Victoria City Restaurant (`the restaurant`) some time in October 1996. Ah Fatt interviewed him and employed him at the restaurant. Chin started working at the restaurant and only applied for a work permit on 1 November 1996. At the same time, he applied for a temporary work permit which was granted. By a letter dated 4 November 1996, the Ministry of Labour notified the restaurant that Chin`s application for a work permit had been rejected and that his temporary work permit would be cancelled with effect from 9 November 1996.
9 5.On 14 November 1996, Yeo Sze Kwang, an employment inspector from the Ministry of Labour, together with several other inspectors, conducted an inspection at the restaurant. Chin and two other Malaysian workers were arrested for working without valid work permits.
10 6.The Ministry of Labour prosecuted the restaurant under s 5(1) of the 1995 Act for employing Chin and the other two Malaysian workers without valid work permits. The restaurant pleaded guilty to all three charges and was fined a total of $33,660.
11 P4
12
13 7.The accused was subsequently interviewed by the investigating officer, PW1. The following statement, P4, was recorded:
(1) I am a Singaporean citizen and I am the managing director of Victoria City Restaurant Pte Ltd. I have been managing director of the restaurant since 14 November [1990].
(2) I am here at the Ministry today to give a statement regarding three Malaysians who were found working at the restaurant by a group of employment inspectors during a surprise check conducted on 14 November 1996 at about 11.10am.
(3) I am married with two children and my highest educational level is Form 2. I am able to speak and understand Mandarin. Hence I am giving my statement voluntarily in Mandarin.
(4) I am the person in charge of the restaurant. My duties are to oversee the business of the restaurant and also to handling issues on the marketing aspects.
(5) There are about 30 workers working at the restaurant. There are a manager, a supervisor supervising waitresses and waiters, and two supervisors supervising workers in the kitchen.
(6) The two supervisors supervising workers working in the kitchen are Ah Fatt and Ah Min. As I am always not around at the restaurant, I have authorised my supervisors to recruit workers to work at the inspected restaurant. For example, if Ah Fatt finds there is a shortage of workers in the kitchen, he would recruit workers himself. He does not have to inform me regarding the recruitment. Hence, it would be the same for other supervisors. They are also given the authority to recruit workers to work in their areas of supervision. They will make the final decision.
(7) As for payment of salary to the workers recruited by the supervisors, they will have to inform the accountant that a certain amount of money has to be paid to these workers.
(8) However, when the supervisors apply work permits or employment passes for these workers, they will have to submit forms for me to sign.
(9) The restaurant operates daily from 11am to 11pm. I would be there about two to three times per week to oversee the business. At times, I would stay there for the whole day or only for one to two hours.
(10) During the time of the inspection, I was not present at the restaurant.
(11) When I am not around at the restaurant, the supervisors and manager will oversee the operations of the restaurant.
(12) I am now shown the polaroid photographs of the following persons:
(a) Chin Sai Piew;
(b) Ang Dek Pau; and
(c) Lim Tow Hong.
I do not recognise the above subjects as I have never seen them before. I am not sure whether the subjects are employed by Ah Fatt as he is the person who is in charge of workers working at the restaurant. So far, Ah Fatt did not mention anything about the subjects.
(13) However, I remember not long ago, Ah Fatt gave me two application forms to sign. He said that he had employed a few workers and they need to have work permits. Hence I signed the forms. But I do not know who are the workers that he has applied work permits for.
(14) For every worker employed by Ah Fatt, he would distribute salaries to them. I believe these workers do not have to sign for any payment vouchers.
(15) I wish to say that it is due to my negligence that I had allowed my workers to employ on my behalf. I should exercise more stringent control over the recruitment of these workers.
(16) That is all.
(17) The above statement has been read and explained to me in Mandarin, a language which I understand. I confirm it to be correct and true.
14 The above will henceforth be referred to as paras 1 to 17 of P4.
15 8.PW1 testified that the accused had chosen to make his statement in Mandarin. PW1 recorded his statement in English through an interpreter, one Hang Teck Yi (`Hang`), who conversed with the accused in Mandarin. The statement was read over and explained to the accused in Mandarin. The accused confirmed that the statement was correct and declined to make any amendments. The accused signed both pages of the statement. Under cross-examination, PW1 testified that the accused had not said that his Mandarin was not very good. PW1 questioned the accused in English, and the questions were interpreted through Hang to the accused in Mandarin. The accused replied in Mandarin and his answers were interpreted through Hang to PW1 in English. Hang was present throughout the recording of the statement.
16 The prosecution`s case
17
18 9.The mainstay of the prosecution`s case was the admissions made by the accused in P4. The accused had admitted that (a) he was in charge of the restaurant, (b) as he was only around two or three times a week, he had delegated the task of recruiting workers to his supervisors, (c) he had been negligent in allowing his supervisors to recruit on his behalf, and (d) he should have exercised more stringent control over the employment of the workers. The employment of Chin was therefore attributable to the accused`s default.
19 10.The trial judge found that a prima facie case had been made out against the accused and called for his defence.
20 The defence
21
22 11.The accused gave evidence in his own defence. He testified that, right from the very start, Ah Fatt had been allowed to take full charge of the running of the kitchen. Ah Fatt was called the supervisor of the kitchen, and one Wong Min, who worked directly under Ah Fatt, was the second supervisor. All those who worked in the kitchen were answerable to Ah Fatt. The accused was not responsible for the recruitment of employees in the kitchen. The kitchen staff was employed by Ah Fatt. Ah Fatt was also responsible for the supervision of the kitchen staff, applying for work permits and paying their salaries. The accused admitted however that he signed the applications for the work permits. However, apart from this, he did not have any role in the employment of the staff.
23 12.The accused testified that he had met Chin on either 2 or 3 November 1996, two or three days after he had signed the application form for Chin`s work permit. Ah Fatt told him that Chin had obtained a work permit.
24 13.The accused claimed that he knew that the law pertaining to employing illegal workers in Singapore was very strict and so he took precautions against contravening the law. The accused gathered the staff for a discussion everyday and always cautioned them not to engage illegal workers. When the restaurant advertised for staff in the newspapers, it was always emphasised that only Singaporeans or Permanent Residents would be considered. Notices were put up at the restaurant stating that unauthorised workers were not allowed on the premises. The supervisors were given handbooks which clearly stated that no illegal workers were allowed.
25 14.The accused then gave evidence as to the recording of P4. PW1 told him that she would be recording a statement from him and that she would speak to him in either English or Mandarin. He told PW1 that he might not be able to understand her. She then started questioning him and recording his statement. At this time, the interpreter, Hang, was not in the room. He told PW1 to speak slowly as he was not able to understand her. PW1 said that she would get an interpreter to read back his statement back to him. Hang then came in and asked him whether he understood the statement PW1 had recorded. The accused asked him what he meant by `understood`. Hang read back the statement to him. PW1 then recorded a statement from him afresh, this time through Hang. He was not able to fully understand the Mandarin spoken by Hang. Hang even used English words intermittently. Whenever he asked for an explanation of English words used, Hang was unable to give a satisfactory explanation. When asked by the court whether he had made the statements contained in paras 3, 6 and 15 of P4, the accused denied making those statements.
26 15.Under cross-examination, the accused was asked why he had to sign the application forms for work permits when all other matters relating to recruitment were handled by Ah Fatt. He replied that he had to sign because the forms required the signature of a representative of the company. He later conceded however that Ah Fatt too was able to sign the forms as a representative of the company. The accused then said that the board of directors had decided from the outset that he should sign these forms. He was then asked whether he conducted regular spot checks to ensure that there were no illegal workers employed by the restaurant. He replied that he had ordered notices to be put up stating that no illegal workers were allowed on the premises and that the handbooks given to the supervisors stated that daily inspections were to be carried out. The accused first said that the supervisors did carry out daily inspections, but later admitted that he did not actually know if they had carried out daily inspections, and that he had reposed a great deal of trust in his supervisors to ensure that the precautionary measures adopted by him against the employment of illegal workers were carried out. He also admitted that no one was deployed at the staff entrance of the restaurant to ensure that all the workers going in had work permits.
27 16.The cross-examination then turned to the recording of P4. The accused said that he had not understood what PW1 had said at all, which was why she had sent for an interpreter. He said first that he was not sure how long he had spoken to PW1 before she sent for an interpreter, but later said that they had been conversing for about 15 minutes before the interpreter, Hang, came in. The accused was then asked whether PW1 had asked him whether he was married and how many children he had. The accused replied that PW1 had asked him these questions. The accused was then asked how he could have known that PW1 had asked him these questions when he had earlier testified that he had been unable to understand PW1 at all. The accused replied that he had only understood the question because PW1 had used the word `babies`. He also said that Hang had spoken to him in Mandarin and he had not understood what he was saying. The whole of P4 was then read out and translated to him and he was asked which parts of P4 were correct and which parts were wrong. He said that (a) para 2 was correct, (b) the last three lines in para 3 were incorrect; as he only understood a little Mandarin, (c) para 4 was correct, (d) para 6 was correct, (e) the second sentence in para 6 was not correct; Ah Fatt was in charge of all matters in the kitchen, (f) para 7 was correct, (g) para 8 was correct, (h) para 9 was incorrect; the restaurant opened from 11am to 3pm and then again from 6pm to 11pm; the second sentence of para 9 should be `I would be having meetings or discussions with friends or business associates two to three times a week`, (i) para 11 was correct, (j) para 12 was correct, (k) para 13 was correct, (l) the second sentence in para 14 was incorrect; Ah Fatt signed the workers` payment vouchers, and (m) the first sentence in para 15 was incorrect; the accused had not authorised Ah Fatt to recruit workers. The accused was then asked if para 17 was correct. The accused said that the statement had been read back to him in Mandarin, but he had been unable to understand what Hang was saying. The accused had signed the statement because Hang told him that the statement was for record purposes and that the accused was merely giving a statement on behalf of the restaurant.
28 The evidence of Ah Fatt
29
30 17.Before I turn to the evidence of Ah Fatt, it is essential that I set out the series of events leading up to the calling of Ah Fatt as a witness. Under s 22 of the 1995 Act, if the accused could prove that he had acted with due diligence and that Ah Fatt had committed the offence with which the accused was charged, without the consent, connivance or wilful default of the accused, the accused would not be guilty of the offence and Ah Fatt would be convicted of the offence instead. On 19 November 1997, the following summons (PSS 827/97) was issued against Ah Fatt as the accused intended to try to exempt himself from liability under s 22 of the Act:
You, Chan Tonny Chun Fatt are charged that you, being the chief supervisor at Victoria City Restaurant Pte Ltd of 2, Havelock Road, Apollo Centre, [num ]02-01 Singapore 059763, which had from, on or about 9 November 1996 to 14 November 1996 committed the offence of employing a foreign worker, namely, one Chin Sai Piew, without having obtained a valid work permit allowing him to work for the said company under s 5(1) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap 91A), and which offence was attributable to your act and you have thereby by virtue of s 16D of the Act, committed an offence under s 5(1) read with s 22(1) of the said Act, punishable under s 5(4) of the same Act.
31 18.The Ministry of Labour responded to this by issuing a summons containing the following charge (LAB 2535/97):
You, Chan Tonny Chun Fatt, are charged that you, from on or about early October to 30 October 1996 at Victoria City Restaurant Pte Ltd of 2, Havelock Road, Apollo Centre, [num ]02-01 Singapore 059763, did abet Victoria City Restaurant in the commission of the offence of employing a foreign worker, namely, one Chin Sai Piew, in that you intentionally aided the said Victoria City Restaurant to employ the said Chin Sai Piew contrary to s 5(1) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap 91A), when the said Victoria City Restaurant had not obtained in respect of the said foreign worker a valid work permit allowing the foreign worker to work for the said company, which offence was committed in consequence of the abetment and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under s 5(4) read with s 19(1) of the Act.
32 19.Before the commencement of the accused`s trial, Ah Fatt pleaded guilty to and was convicted on LAB 2535/97. In the middle of the accused`s trial, counsel for the accused announced the accused`s intention to exempt himself from liability under s 22 of the 1995 Act. This required the accused to prove that Ah Fatt was guilty of the charge contained in PSS 827/97. However, as Ah Fatt had already been convicted on LAB 2535/97, by virtue of s 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68) (`the CPC`), and art 11(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1992 Ed) (`the Constitution`), the doctrine of autrefois convict applied and Ah Fatt could not be tried and convicted on the charge contained in PSS 827/97. The trial judge therefore doubted that the accused could exempt himself from liability under s 22. Nonetheless, as the trial judge felt that Ah Fatt`s evidence was essential to the just decision of the case, he exercised his power under s 399 of the CPC and called Ah Fatt as a witness. The trial judge also allowed both the prosecution and the defence to cross-examine him.
33 20.Under cross-examination by the defence, Ah Fatt testified that the accused was not involved in the recruitment of kitchen staff. It was Ah Fatt`s responsibility to ensure that no illegal workers were employed in the kitchen. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, Ah Fatt said that the accused was totally uninvolved in the employment of kitchen workers. However, he later admitted that the accused signed the application forms for work permits for the kitchen workers. When asked whether the accused conducted spot checks to see if there were any illegal workers employed in the kitchen, Ah Fatt replied that the accused occasionally did so. When asked whether he complied with the requirement in the supervisors` handbook that daily inspections be carried out, Ah Fatt replied that he did. Finally, Ah Fatt said that he had been authorised by the accused to employ kitchen workers.
34 Decision below
35
36 21.The trial judge found that the accused had understood the questions posed to him by PW1 through the interpreter, Hang, while his statement, P4, was being recorded, and that he understood the contents of the statement when Hang read the statement back to him. The accused was obviously trying to undermine the reliability of P4, which contained numerous admissions which were adverse to his defence, by claiming that he had not understood what PW1 and Hang were saying. The trial judge accordingly found that everything in P4 was correct, including the parts which the accused claimed were incorrect, and that the contents of P4 should be preferred over any statements to the contrary in the accused`s testimony.
37 22.The trial judge then went on to consider whether the employment of Chin by the restaurant without a valid work permit was attributable to the accused`s default. The trial judge found that the primary responsibility for recruiting kitchen staff rested with the accused. He had however delegated this responsibility to Ah Fatt, and actually admitted that he was negligent in so doing. The trial judge accepted that the accused had put up notices stating that no illegal workers were allowed on the premises, that he had repeatedly reminded his supervisors not to employ illegal workers, and that the supervisors` handbook specifically stated that no illegal workers were to be employed. However, the trial judge found that the accused had not taken any practical steps to enforce these precautionary measures against the employing of foreign workers. The trial judge rejected Ah Fatt`s evidence that the accused conducted occasional spot checks in person, noting that that the accused himself had evaded the question as to spot checks during cross-examination. He found that the accused had not carried out spot checks, nor had he stationed personnel outside the staff entrance to ensure that only workers with a valid work permit entered the restaurant premises. In the result, the trial judge found that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the employment of Chin by the restaurant without a valid work permit was attributable to the accused`s default.
38 23.The trial judge then went on to consider if the accused was able to exempt himself from liability under s 22 of the Act. He noted that, in order for the accused to rely on s 22, the accused had to show that he had exercised due diligence to enforce the provisions of the Act. The trial judge was of the view that the standard of diligence required was very high. In the instant case, the measures or steps taken by the accused fell short of personally checking the identity of the kitchen workers to ensure that there were no illegal workers employed in the kitchen, and the accused had therefore failed to show that he had exercised due diligence to enforce the provisions of the Act.
39 24.Finally, the trial judge dealt with the sentence which should be imposed. The prosecution submitted that as the accused had a previous conviction under s 5(6) read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the 1991 Act, his current conviction under s 16D read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the 1995 Act was a second conviction under the 1995 Act and accordingly should be punished with mandatory imprisonment as required by s 5(4)(b)(i) of the 1995 Act. The trial judge found however that the accused`s conviction under the 1991 Act should not be considered a previous conviction under the 1995 Act and his current conviction should therefore not be considered a second conviction under the 1995 Act which would attract the punishment of mandatory imprisonment. In the result, the trial judge sentenced the accused to pay a fine of $15,840.
40 The appeals
41
42 25.Counsel for the defence contended that the trial judge had erred in:
43 (a). relying on P4;
44 (b). finding that the employment of Chin by the restaurant without a valid work permit was attributable to the default of the accused; and
45 (c). finding that the accused was not entitled to exempt himself from liability under s 22 of the 1995 Act.
46 26.The DPP on the other hand contended that the trial judge had erred in finding that the accused`s conviction under the 1991 Act should not be considered a previous conviction under the 1995 Act and his current conviction should therefore not be considered a second conviction under the 1995 Act which would attract the punishment of mandatory imprisonment.
47 Whether the trial judge had erred in relying on P4
48
49 27.Counsel for the accused contended that the trial judge should not have relied on P4 in light of the circumstances in which it had been recorded. The accused had hardly understood what PW1 and the interpreter, Hang were saying, both when the accused was being questioned and when the statement was read back to him. The contents of the statement were therefore likely to be inaccurate and therefore unreliable. I found this contention to be without merit. Firstly, I found that the accused`s evidence contained marked inconsistencies as to the level of understanding he had of what PW1 and Hang were saying. For example, the accused claimed that his understanding of what PW1 and Hang were saying was so limited that, when PW1 asked him whether he was married and if so, if he had any children, he had been unable to understand the question until PW1 mentioned the word `babies`. Yet when asked under cross-examination why he had signed the statement when, as he claimed, he had not understood what Hang had read back to him, the accused immediately said that he had done so because Hang had told him that the statement was for record purposes only and the accused was required to sign it as the representative of the restaurant. It seemed to me incredible that the accused, whose understanding of Mandarin was supposedly so limited that he could not understand a simple question about his family, could understand and recount in court what Hang had told him.
50 28.Secondly, when the accused was asked to point out which parts of P4 were correct and which parts were incorrect, the accused was forced to admit that most of P4 was correct. As to those parts which were incorrect, some of them were minor errors relating to dates and the restaurant`s opening hours, while the remaining parts were, coincidentally, those parts of the statement which contained admissions adverse to the accused`s interest. It seemed to me far too much of a coincidence to be believable that, despite the accused`s inability to understand PW1 and Hang, most of what was recorded in P4 was correct and the only parts which were recorded incorrectly were those which were adverse to the accused`s defence.
51 29.Thirdly, PW1 testified that, during the recording of P4, the accused had chosen to speak in Mandarin. The accused had not said that he was not conversant in Mandarin. The interpreter, Hang, had been present throughout the recording of P4. This evidence was unchallenged during cross-examination. PW1 made no mention of any difficulties the accused had in understanding either PW1 or Hang, nor was she cross-examined on this point.
52 30.In my opinion, the trial judge was fully justified in finding that the accused was trying to undermine the reliability of P4, which contained numerous admissions which were adverse to his defence, by claiming that he had not understood what PW1 and Hang were saying, when he had in fact understood their questions. I also agreed with the trial judge that everything in P4 was correct, including the parts which the accused claimed were incorrect, and that the contents of P4 should be preferred over any statements to the contrary in the accused`s testimony.
53 Whether the employment of Chin by the restaurant without a valid work permit was attributable to the default of the accused
54
55 31.I turned first of all to consider whether a prima facie case had been made out against the accused at the end of the prosecution`s case. The trial judge`s analysis of the prosecution`s case was as follows: the accused had admitted in P4 that (a) he was in charge of the restaurant, (b) as he was only around two or three times a week, he had delegated the task of recruiting workers to his supervisors, (c) he had been negligent in allowing his supervisors to recruit on his behalf, and (d) he should have exercised more stringent control over the employment of the workers. A prima facie case had therefore been made out that the employment of Chin was attributable to the accused`s default. I was unable to agree with the trial judge`s analysis. The accused was the managing director of the restaurant. It was not unreasonable for him to delegate the task of recruiting workers to his supervisors. The mere fact that he had done so did not make the employment of Chin by the restaurant without a valid work permit attributable to the default of the accused. In my opinion, therefore, a prima facie case was not made out on the facts relied upon by the trial judge.
56 32.I was nonetheless of the view that a prima facie case had been made out at the end of the prosecution`s case. The agreed statement of facts showed that Chin had applied for a work permit on 1 November 1996. The application for a work permit included an application for a temporary work permit. In P4, the accused admitted that all applications for work permits were submitted to him to sign. He had therefore signed Chin`s application form and should have known that Chin was applying for a permanent as well as a temporary work permit. He should have monitored the status of Chin`s application. Had he done so, he would have known that Chin had been granted a temporary work permit and was working in the restaurant. He would also have known that, by a letter dated 4 November 1996, Chin`s application for a permanent work permit had been rejected and his temporary work permit would be cancelled as from 9 November 1996. Under s 9(1) of the 1995 Act, when an employer is notified of the Controller of Work Permit`s decision to cancel a foreign worker`s work permit, the employer is given a period of seven days from the date of receiving the notification to terminate the service of the foreign worker. The accused should therefore have checked to make sure that Chin stopped working at the restaurant from 11 November 1996. The accused, however, failed to do so. As such, the employment of Chin from 11 November 1996 to 14 November 1996, the date Chin was caught by the employment inspectors, by the restaurant without a valid work permit, was attributable to the accused`s default.
57 33.I then turned to consider whether there was anything in the defence to displace the prima facie case against the accused. A close scrutiny of the defence only served to strengthen the case against the accused. The accused admitted that even though he had delegated every other aspect of the recruitment of workers to Ah Fatt, he had retained the authority to sign the application forms for work permits. The accused also admitted that he had signed Chin`s application form for a work permit. The accused had met Chin two or three days after he signed Chin`s application form for a work permit. Ah Fatt had told him that Chin had obtained a work permit. The accused must therefore have known that Chin had obtained a temporary work permit and was working in the restaurant. This made it all the more imperative that the accused monitor the status of Chin`s application, so as to make sure that Chin stopped working at the restaurant if his application for a permanent work permit was rejected and his temporary work permit was cancelled.
58 34.Counsel for the accused laid great emphasis on the fact that the accused was the managing director of the restaurant and that a man of his position could not be expected to direct his mind to such mundane matters as the monitoring of a foreign worker`s application for a work permit. The short answer to this was that the relevant touchstone in these cases is not the position which the accused occupies or the title that he holds, but the degree and nature of his participation in the employment process. In the instant case, the accused was responsible for the signing of the foreign workers` application forms for work permits. It was accordingly incumbent upon him to assume the attendant responsibilities of monitoring the status of these applications and ensuring that any foreign worker whose application was rejected or whose work permit was cancelled ceased to work at the restaurant. The standard of care and diligence required in the discharge of these responsibilities was a high one and one which the accused had manifestly failed to meet.
59 35.In the result, therefore, I was of the view that the accused`s failure to monitor the status of Chin`s application for a work permit and his consequent failure to check to make sure that Chin stopped working at the restaurant from 11 November 1996 meant that the employment of Chin from 11 November 1996 to 14 November 1996 by the restaurant without a valid work permit, was attributable to the accused`s default. I accordingly directed that the charge be amended to read as follows, pursuant to an appellate court`s power to amend the charge under s 256 of the CPC:
You, Chen Chih Sheng, are charged that you from, on or about 14 November 1992 to 14 November 1996 were a director at Victoria City Restaurant Pte Ltd of 2, Havelock Road, Apollo Centre [num ]02-01 which had from, on or about 11 November 1996 to 14 November 1996 committed an offence of employing a foreign worker, namely, one Chin Sai Piew, without having obtained a valid work permit allowing him to work for the said company under s 5(1) of the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Cap 91A), the commission of which offence was attributable to your default, and you have thereby, by virtue of s 16D, committed an offence under s 5(1) punishable under s 5(4) of the same Act.
60 I noted that no prejudice would be occasioned to the accused by the amendment as neither the evidence nor the result would have been different had the accused been tried on the amended charge. The only defence the accused could have raised was that he had monitored Chin`s application and checked to make sure that Chin stopped working for the restaurant once his temporary work permit had expired. The accused clearly failed to do this, otherwise Chin would not have been caught working at the restaurant on 14 November 1996 by the employment inspectors.
61 Whether the accused could exempt himself from liability under s 22 of the 1995 Act
62
63 36.It is convenient at this point to set out s 22 of the 1995 Act:
(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under this Act, he shall be entitled, upon a charge duly made by him and on giving to the prosecution not less than 3 days` notice in writing of his intention, to have any other person whom he charges as the actual offender (whether or not that person is his agent or employee) brought before the court at the time appointed for hearing the charge; and if, after the commission of the offence has been proved, the first-mentioned person proves to the satisfaction of the court -
(a) that he has used all due diligence to enforce the execution of this Act and any relevant regulations or orders made thereunder; and
(b) that the second-mentioned person had committed the offence in question without his consent, connivance or wilful default,
the first-mentioned person shall not be guilty of the offence and the second-mentioned person shall be convicted of the offence and shall, in the discretion of the court, be also liable to pay any costs incidental to the proceedings.
(2) The prosecution shall have the right in any such case to cross-examine the first-mentioned person if he gives evidence and any witnesses called by him in support of his charge, and to call rebutting evidence.
(3) Where the second-mentioned person brought before the court under subsection (1) by the first-mentioned person is found by the court to have committed the offence with the consent, connivance or wilful default of the first-mentioned person, the court may, after convicting the second-mentioned person, convict the first-mentioned person on a substituted charge of abetment of the offence.
(4) When it is made to appear to the satisfaction of an employment inspector at the time of discovering an offence -
(a) that the person who would be proceeded against apart from this subsection has used all due diligence to enforce the execution of this Act and any relevant regulations or orders made thereunder;
(b) by which person the offence has been committed; and
(c) that it has been committed without the consent, connivance or wilful default of the first-mentioned person and in contravention of his orders,
the employment inspector shall proceed against the person whom he believes to be the actual offender without first proceeding against the first-mentioned person.
64 37.Under s 22 of the 1995 Act, therefore, the accused was entitled to prefer a charge against Ah Fatt, and if the accused could prove that he had acted with due diligence and that Ah Fatt had committed the offence in question, without the consent, connivance or wilful default of the accused, the accused would not be guilty of the offence and Ah Fatt would be convicted of the offence instead. The accused accordingly preferred the charge contained in PSS 827/97 against Ah Fatt. However, before the commencement of the accused`s trial, Ah Fatt had pleaded guilty to and been convicted on LAB 2535/97. As such, by virtue of s 239 of the CPC, and art 11(2) of the Constitution, the doctrine of autrefois convict applied and Ah Fatt could not be tried or convicted on the charge contained in PSS 827/97. The trial judge was therefore of the view that the accused could not exempt himself from liability under s 22. Despite his reservations, the trial judge went on to consider if the accused could exempt himself from liability under s 22, and he concluded that the accused was unable to do so as he was unable to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he had exercised all due diligence to enforce the execution of the Act.
65 38.Counsel for the accused contended that the fact that Ah Fatt had been convicted on LAB 2535/97 and could not be convicted on the charge contained in PSS 827/97 did not by itself prevent the accused from exempting himself from liability under s 22 of the 1995 Act. After examining the purpose and the wording of s 22 of the 1995 Act, I agreed with counsel for the accused. The purpose of s 22 is to give an accused a chance to exempt himself from liability by showing that a second person committed the offence with which the accused is charged. There is no reason why an accused should be precluded from invoking s 22 simply because the second person cannot be convicted of that offence.
66 39.I noted that s 22(1) clearly states in terms that, where the accused has proved to the satisfaction of the court that a second person has committed the offence in question, the court shall convict that second person of that offence. I was of the view, however, that this mandatory direction must be read subject to the doctrine of autrefois convict embodied in s 239 of the CPC and Article 11(2) of the Constitution. Section 22(1) should therefore be construed as requiring the court to convict the second person of the offence in question, if it is proven to the satisfaction of the court that he committed the offence, unless the doctrine of autrefois convict applies to protect the second person from conviction.
67 40.What then is the procedure to be adopted when an accused tries to exempt himself from liability under s 22 and the second person cannot be convicted of the offence with which the accused is charged because of the doctrine of autrefois convict? In such a situation, the second person does not stand in the position of an accused, as he cannot be tried and convicted of the offence in question. The question of his guilt is only relevant insofar as to determine whether the accused is able to exempt himself from liability under s 22. The second person should not therefore enjoy the privileges of an accused person, and he should not be tried for the offence in the strict sense of the word. The second person may thus be called as a witness by the accused. He may be cross-examined by the prosecution: see s 22(2) of the 1995 Act. The second person may also be called by the prosecution, and be subject to cross-examination by the defence. In the event that neither the prosecution nor the defence calls the second person as a witness, the court may exercise its power under s 399 of the CPC, as the court below did in the instant case, and call the second person as a witness if the court is of the view that his evidence is essential to the just decision of the case. The court may then allow both the prosecution and the defence to cross-examine him. If the accused proves to the satisfaction of the court that he has exercised due diligence and that the second person committed the offence without the accused`s consent, connivance or wilful default, the accused will be acquitted of the offence with which he is charged. As for the second person, he will not be convicted of the offence in question because of the application of the doctrine of autrefois convict.
68 41.I must emphasise, however, that the above situation should be avoided. Firstly, it smacks of duplicity of proceedings. Secondly, there is a danger that the second person, secure in the knowledge that he cannot be convicted on the charge preferred against him, may be readily persuaded to shoulder the blame for the benefit of the accused. An accused who intends to try and exempt himself from liability under s 22 should therefore prefer a charge against the second person and inform the prosecution of this as soon as possible. The prosecution should then refrain from preferring a charge against the second person arising out of the same facts until the accused has been tried. If such a charge has already been preferred, the prosecution should proceed to have the second person tried on that charge only after the accused has been tried. If the accused proves to the satisfaction of the court during the course of his trial that the second person committed the offence with which the accused is charged, the second person can then be convicted of that offence and the prosecution must discontinue any proceedings pending against him.
69 42.I next turned to consider whether, on the facts of the instant case, the accused could exempt himself from liability under s 22 of the 1995 Act. In order to exempt himself from liability, the accused had to show that (a) he had exercised all due diligence to enforce the execution of the Act and (b) Ah Fatt had committed the offence in question without his consent, connivance or wilful default. After reviewing the evidence, I was of the view that the accused had failed to satisfy limb (a). My reasons for this were broadly similar to those set out in [para ] 32 to 35. In the circumstances, the accused should have monitored the status of Chin`s application for a work permit and checked to make sure that Chin stopped working in the restaurant once his application for a permanent work permit had been rejected and his temporary work permit had expired. The accused`s failure to do so meant that he had failed to exercise all due diligence to enforce the execution of the Act and accordingly his attempt to exempt himself from liability under s 22 of the Act failed at the first hurdle.
70 43.In the result therefore the accused`s appeal against his conviction failed.
71 Whether the accused`s conviction under the 1991 Act should be considered a previous conviction under the 1995 Act
72
73 44.The accused had a previous conviction under s 5(6) read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the 1991 Act. His current conviction was under s 16D read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the 1995 Act. The trial judge found that the accused`s conviction under the 1991 Act should not be considered a previous conviction under the 1995 Act and his current conviction should therefore not be considered a second conviction under the 1995 Act which would attract the punishment of mandatory imprisonment under s 5(4)(b)(i) of the 1995 Act. The DPP contended that the trial judge had erred in so finding.
74 45.It is convenient at this point to set out the relevant statutory provisions. Section 5(6) of the 1991 Act reads:
Where any offence under subsection (1) is committed by a body corporate, and it is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate, or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
75 Section 5(1) of the 1991 Act reads:
No person shall employ a foreign worker unless he has obtained in respect of the foreign worker a valid work permit which allows the foreign worker to work for him.
76 Section 5(4) of the 1991 Act reads:
Any person who fails to comply with or contravenes subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall -
(a) be liable on conviction to a fine of an amount of not less than 24 months` levy and not more than 48 months` levy or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both; and
(b) on a second or subsequent conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than one year and shall also be liable to a fine of an amount of not less than 24 months` levy and not more than 48 months` levy.
77 Section 16D of the 1995 Act reads:
Where an offence under this Act or any regulations made thereunder is committed by a body corporate, and it is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any act or default on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate, or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
78 Section 5(1) of the 1995 Act reads:
No person shall employ a foreign worker unless he has obtained in respect of the foreign worker a valid work permit which allows the foreign worker to work for him.
79 Section 5(4) of the 1995 Act reads:
Any person who fails to comply with or contravenes subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall -
(a) be liable on conviction to a fine of an amount of not less than 24 months` levy and not more than 48 months` levy or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both; and
(b) on a second or subsequent conviction, be punished -
(i) in the case of an individual, with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than one year and shall also be liable to a fine of an amount of not less than 24 months` levy and not more than 48 months` levy; and
(ii) in the case of a body corporate, with a fine of an amount of not less than 48 months` levy and not more than 96 months` levy.
80 Section 5(9) of the 1995 Act reads:
For the purpose of this section, `employ` means to engage or use the service of any person, whether under a contract of service or otherwise, with or without salary.
81 46.Having perused the relevant sections of the 1991 as well as the 1995 Act, I agreed with the submissions of the DPP. The only difference between the 1991 and the 1995 Acts is that the 1995 Act has incorporated into it the amendments made to the 1991 Act by the Employment of Foreign Workers (Amendment) Act (Act 37 of 1995). So far as the offence in the instant case is concerned, its definition has remained the same save for the following changes:
82 (a). In the 1991 Act, the offence of employing a worker without a valid work permit by the body corporate must be attributable to the neglect of the accused. In the 1995 Act, the offence by the body corporate must be attributable to the act or default of the accused. I do not propose to go into an exhaustive or indepth examination of the term `default` in the context of the 1995 Act. Suffice it to say that in interpreting the term, it is useful to keep in mind the natural and ordinary meaning of the word `default` as a working guide, albeit with the qualification that this is not exhaustive. For present purposes, it suffices to note that one of the meanings of default as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary is:
83 Failure to act; neglect [emphasis added].
84 It is clear therefore that the phrase `act or default` is wider than and includes the term `neglect`
85 (b). In the 1991 Act, the term . `employ` was not defined. However, the courts, in interpreting the term, would look to the definition of `employ` in s 2 of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) for guidance: see PP v Tham Kwai Lian [1995] 1 SLR 293 , PP v Tan Kim Seng Construction Pte Ltd [1997] 3 SLR 158 . Section 2 states that `employ` means to engage or use the service of any person and to pay such person for services rendered or work done or to remunerate such person on a piece rate or on a commission basis. In the 1995 Act, the term `employ` is defined at s 5(9) to mean to engage or use the service of any person, whether under a contract of service or otherwise, with or without salary. This definition was adopted so that it would no longer be possible for errant employers to claim that they did not employ the illegal foreign workers because they did not pay the workers any salary or that they were merely trying out the workers: see the Second Reading of the Employment of Foreign Workers (Amendment) Bill by the Minister for Labour, Mr Lee Boon Yang on 1 November 1995. The definition of the term `employ` in the 1995 Act is therefore wider than in the 1991 Act.
86 (c). Under the 1991 Act, an officer of a body corporate would be liable for the offence in question only when the body corporate committed an offence under s 5(1) of the 1991 Act. Under the 1995 Act, an officer of a body corporate would be liable for the offence in question when the body corporate committed an offence under the 1995 Act or any regulations made thereunder.
87 (d). Under the 1991 Act, on a second or subsequent conviction, an individual and a body corporate would be liable to be punished in the same way. Both would be liable for a term of imprisonment of not less than one month and not more than one year and would also be liable to pay a fine of an amount of not less than 24 months` levy and not more than 48 months` levy. It was eventually realised that the punishment of imprisonment was not apt in the case of a body corporate. Under the 1995 Act, therefore, an individual and a body corporate would be dealt with differently. An individual would be liable for a term of imprisonment of not less than one month and not more than one year and would also be liable to pay a fine of an amount of not less than 24 months` levy and not more than 48 months` levy, whereas a body corporate would be liable to pay a fine of an amount of not less than 48 months` levy and not more than 96 months` levy.
88 47.It was clear from the above comparison that the sole effect of the amendments to the offence in question between 1991 and 1995 was to broaden the ambit of the offence. In other words, the same facts which would support a conviction under s 5(6) read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the 1991 Act would also sustain a conviction under s 16D read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the 1995 Act. As such, I did not see why the accused`s conviction under s 5(6) read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the 1991 Act should not count as a previous conviction under the 1995 Act, so as to make the accused`s current conviction under s 16D read with s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(4) of the 1995 Act a second conviction which would attract the sentence of mandatory imprisonment under s 5(4)(b)(i) of the 1995 Act. Clearly, the intention of Parliament in re-enacting s 5(4)(b)(i) of the 1995 Act was to ensure stricter punishment for individuals who repeatedly committed the offence in question, and it would be an absurd denial of Parliament`s intention if in considering whether the accused`s current conviction was a second conviction, the courts were to ignore his past conviction on the mere basis that that he had been convicted under an earlier edition of the Act which defined the offence in question more narrowly than the 1995 Act. I therefore allowed the prosecution`s appeal against sentence.
89 The sentence
90
91 48.Under s 5(4)(b)(i) of the 1995 Act, the accused was liable for a term of imprisonment of not less than one month and not more than one year, and a fine of not less than 24 months` levy and not more than 48 months` levy.
92 49.I noted that there are four limbs to the offence under s 16D of the 1995 Act (employment of a foreign worker without a work permit by a body corporate with the consent or connivance of, or attributable to the act or default of an officer of the body corporate). I took into consideration the fact that the accused was charged under the `default` limb of the offence under s 16D, which is the least culpable of the four limbs. I also took into consideration the fact that the period for which Chin was employed without a work permit and which was attributable to the accused`s default was extremely short. I also took into account, however, the fact that the period of employment would probably have been longer had it not been curtailed by the raid carried out by the employment inspectors on 14 November 1996. In the result, I sentenced the accused to one month`s imprisonment, in addition to the fine of 48 months` levy amounting to $15,840 imposed by the court below, which the accused had already paid.
Malcolm Tan and Sunari bin Kateni (Deputy Public Prosecutors) for the appellant in MA No 80/98/01 and for the respondent in MA No 80/98/02
B Mohan Singh and Bernard Chao (Chung, Tan & Partners) for the respondent in MA 80/98/01 and for the appellant in MA No 80/98/02