This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports. |
Mohamed Lukman bin Amoo v Public Prosecutor
[1999] SGHC 238
MA 55/1999
Yong Pung How CJ
07 September 1999
1 : Introduction
2 The appellant was charged with two counts of employing immigration offenders under s 57(1)(e) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) (`the Act`), punishable under s 57(1)(ii) of the Act. The district judge convicted him on both charges and sentenced him to six months` imprisonment on each charge, both sentences to run concurrently. I dismissed the appellant`s appeal against his conviction and sentence on both charges. I now give my reasons.
3 Background facts
4
5 At all material times, the appellant was the sole proprietor of A & A Muslim Restaurant (`A & A`) at 431 Sembawang Road.
6 On 26 June 1998, two Bangladeshi nationals, Shamin Ahmed (PW2) and Md Humayun Kabir (PW3) were arrested in a room above the restaurant. Subsequently, both PW2 and PW3 pleaded guilty to charges of entering Singapore without being in possession of a valid pass issued by the Controller of Immigration, in contravention of s 6(1) of the Act. They were each sentenced to one month`s imprisonment and four strokes of the cane.
7 The following charges were then brought against the appellant:
that you, from early June 1998 to 26 June 1998, at Singapore, did employ as a cleaner, one Shamin Ahmed @ Monir Hossain ... Bangladeshi National, a person who had acted in contravention of s 6(1) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) by entering Singapore without being in possession of a valid pass issued by the Controller of Immigration, and whom you had reasonable grounds for believing to be a person who had contravened s 6(1) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133), and you have therefore committed an offence under s 57(1)(e), punishable under s 57(1)(ii) of the Immigration Act 1995
8 and
that you, from December 1997 to 26 June 1998, at Singapore, did employ as a cleaner, one Md Humayun Kabir ... Bangladeshi National, a person who had acted in contravention of s 6(1) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133) by entering Singapore without being in possession of a valid pass issued by the Controller of Immigration and whom you had reasonable grounds for believing to be a person who had contravened s 6(1) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133), and you have thereby committed an offence under s 57(1)(e), punishable under s 57(1)(ii) of the Immigration Act 1995.
9 The prosecution`s case
10
11 The prosecution`s case was that the appellant had employed PW2 and PW3 as cleaners at A & A during the periods of time stated in the respective charges, and that he had done so despite having reasonable grounds for believing that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders. In addition, the prosecution alleged that the appellant had allowed the workers to reside in the room above A & A in which they were arrested.
12 PW2 and PW3`s evidence
13 At the trial, the prosecution called PW2 and PW3 as their key witnesses. PW2 and PW3 had entered Singapore on different dates, but their testimonies in the district court were essentially similar: upon entering Singapore, the worker`s agent, one `Kumar`, took away his air ticket and passport and arranged to give him a laminated, black-and-white photocopied work permit. While the worker`s photograph appeared on his work permit, the name stated on the work permit was not his real name. PW2`s work permit stated `Monir Hossain` while PW3`s work permit stated `Shamim`. The worker was then brought to A & A. The appellant was introduced to him as the `boss` and he was told to start work immediately at the restaurant. PW2 and PW3 also testified that their work at A & A comprised general cleaning chores, including cleaning the tables, mopping the floor, and cleaning the toilet and cutlery. The appellant was present at the restaurant every day and he instructed them on the work that had to be done.
14 PW2 started work at the restaurant from early June 1998 and lived in the room above the restaurant. He testified that he never told the appellant his real name and the appellant simply called him `Monir`. As far as PW2 was concerned, the appellant never asked PW2 for his work permit, and did not query whether PW2 was an immigration offender. On the day of his arrest, PW2 had only just received his first month`s salary payment of $600 from the restaurant manager `Rahman`.
15 PW3 started work at the restaurant sometime in December 1997, and lived in the room above the restaurant. He did not know who arranged for him to stay there. Neither did he know whom the room belonged to. However, he testified that both Kumar and the appellant told him on the day when he was first brought to A & A that he could stay in that room.
16 PW3 also testified that he worked a 12-hour shift from 7am to 7pm daily. His agent, Kumar, had told him at the outset that his monthly salary was $600 but would be increased if his performance was good. PW3 testified that he was paid $600 from January 1998 to March 1998 , and $700 from April 1998 onwards. He said that he had asked the appellant for the increase in salary. The appellant told him to talk to Kumar instead, and it was Kumar who raised his salary to $700. He was always paid by Kumar, and he knew that he would only get paid if the appellant paid Kumar a certain amount of money every month. He also recounted one occasion when he proposed to the appellant that the appellant should pay him directly and that this sum could then be deducted from whatever sum that the appellant paid to Kumar each month. However, the appellant refused to do so.
17 PW3 testified that after he had worked 2[half ] months at A & A, the appellant asked him for his original work permit and passport. He told the appellant that these were all kept by Kumar. About one week later, Kumar came to A & A with a file which he showed to the appellant. Kumar later told PW3 that the file contained PW3`s passport and work permit. As far as PW3 was aware, the appellant did not ask to see the documents again.
18 The expiry dates of the work permits given to PW2 and PW3 were 25 July 1999 and 18 August 1999 respectively. On the reverse of PW2`s permit, it was stated that he was permitted to work as a `construction worker` for `Hock Lee Sin Building Contrn, 100 Jln Sultan [num ]03-33 Sultan Plaza`. On the reverse of PW3`s permit, it was stated that PW was permited to work as a `general worker` for `Tangee Construction, 22 A Lor 11 Geylang`.
19 PW1`s evidence
20 The agent, Kumar, could not be found. However, Kumar`s principal, one Manickam Elangovan (PW1), was present to testify for the prosecution in the district court. PW1 had previously been convicted of illegally overstaying in Singapore. After serving his sentence, he was put on a Work Release Scheme during which he absconded. At the time of the trial, PW1 was serving a sentence of 4[half ] years` imprisonment and six strokes of the cane for various offences arising out of operating an illegal business of labour supply. One of these offences was abetting A & A in employing immigration offenders.
21 In the district court, PW1 testified that he had purchased a fake identity card at Serangoon Road. He had then used the identity card to set up `Esvar Engineering and Cleaning Services` (`Esvar`) under the assumed identity of Baboo Thevan s/o Nagarasaen. PW1 explained that he had a team of about 10 Bangladeshi agents, including Kumar, who would scout for workers, and for companies to supply the workers to. The companies would make payments in the form of cheques made out to Esvar for the services provided. Out of the sums paid to Esvar, PW1 and his agents would deduct a percentage of their respective commissions, and then pay the remainder to the workers.
22 PW1 testified that his role was to sign blank invoices for his agents to use. He himself had no links or contact with the workers and had no idea how much PW2 and PW3 were paid. It was always the agents who `distributed the salaries` to the workers. He also testified that he had never dealt directly with the appellant. He had received about two or three cheque payments of slightly more than $1,000 each from A & A but he had never seen the contract between Esvar and A & A.
23 `Employed`
24 The prosecution submitted that the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 clearly supported the prosecution`s allegation that the appellant had `employed` PW2 and PW3. The prosecution pointed out that, since the Act was amended in 1996, the definition of `employ` in s 2 of the Act had been widened to mean `to engage or use the service of any person, whether under a contract of service or otherwise, with or without remuneration`. The prosecution submitted that the appellant fell squarely within the statutory definition because he had `used or engaged the services` of PW2 and PW3.
25 Due diligence and reasonable grounds to believe
26 The prosecution also submitted that s 57(9) and s 57(10) of the Act placed a specific duty of due diligence on the appellant. In effect, these sections shifted the burden of proof on to the appellant to show, on a balance of probabilities, that he had reasonable grounds to believe that PW2 and PW3 were legitimate immigrants. It was not reasonable for the appellant to have left the legal arrangements to his `contractors`, and to have accepted the documents at face value as originals. Moreover, even though he did not understand English, the appellant had not bothered to ask someone else who understood English to check the documents for him. If the appellant had taken reasonable steps to ensure that the documents shown and supplied to him were in order and were authentic, he would have been put on notice as to the workers` illegal immigrant status.
27 The defence`s case
28
29 The appellant did not dispute that PW2 and PW3 had worked as cleaners at A & A, and that they had lived in the room above A & A in which they were arrested. However, the appellant maintained that he had neither employed PW2 and PW3, nor had he reasonable grounds to believe that they were immigration offenders. He alleged that he had been cheated by Kumar, and that he had never met PW1 before.
30 `Employed`
31 Counsel for the defence denied that the appellant had `employed` PW2 and PW3, and relied on the `sub-contractor` defence. He submitted that Esvar, and not the appellant, was the true employer of PW2 and PW3. The appellant had been approached by Kumar and one `Ahmat Kurudus`. Kumar and Ahmat Kurudus showed him their name cards and represented that they were managers of the company, Esvar Engineering and Cleaning Services. They offered to supply him with workers to clean his restaurant. Kumar and Ahmat Kurudus also showed him some sample contracts between Esvar and other shops. Accordingly, the appellant entered into a written `sub-contract` with Esvar. Pursuant to the `sub-contract` procured by Kumar, Esvar was supposed to supply workers to A&A at $1,200 per worker per month. PW2 and PW3 were supplied as Esvar`s workers to the appellant. Esvar was supposed to ensure that all the necessary arrangements were in order. The appellant paid $1,200 every month to Esvar for each worker supplied to him. Based on this sub-contract, counsel for the defence submitted that there was no actual employment of PW2 and PW3 by the appellant.
32 Counsel for the defence also submitted that all the relevant indicia of employment indicated that Esvar, and not the appellant, was the true employer of PW2 and PW3. Under the terms of the sub-contract, Esvar was responsible for the welfare of the workers. While the appellant conceded that he had provided food and shelter to the workers, he also explained that he had only agreed to do so because Kumar had informed him that the workers lived very far away from the restaurant premises. Counsel for the defence also pointed out that Esvar had always determined the level of the workers` salaries and distributed these salaries to them each month. The only exception was PW2`s salary for the month of June 1998, which had been paid directly to PW2 by A & A`s manager, Rahman. This had only been done as a result of `extreme exigencies` - Kumar had telephoned the appellant to say that he was in Bangladesh, and had asked the appellant to pay PW2 $600 first, because PW2`s father was very ill in Bangladesh and needed the money to go to hospital.
33 Due diligence and reasonable grounds to believe
34 It was argued that in any event, the appellant did not have the requisite mens rea necessary for an offence under s 57(1)(e) of the Act.
35 First, counsel for the defence submitted that the appellant had no actual knowledge of the fact that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders. The appellant had never known that PW2 and PW3 were working under assumed names or fraudulent work permits. Nobody had ever told him about PW2 and PW3`s ostensibly assumed identities.
36 Secondly, counsel for the defence submitted that the appellant could rely on the defence that he had seen the workers` work permits, since he had discharged his duty to exercise due diligence under s 57(9) and s 57(10) of the Act. The appellant always checked the originals of a new worker`s passport and work permit when the worker was first brought to his restaurant. When he was shown the documents, he would check the photographs in the documents and the names in the documents. The appellant did not understand English, but he understood the words `passport` and `work permit`. He had found nothing amiss with the workers` documents, and he had not seen the need to get someone who understood English to check the documents for him. He had also been given copies of these documents for his retention. He had given these documents to the arresting officer, together with the written contract he had with Esvar and the invoices for his payments to Esvar every month. There was nothing to alert him to the possibility that the documents produced by Esvar for his reference and retention were forged. Therefore he had no reasonable grounds to believe that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders.
37 The decision below
38
39 The district judge held that the passports and work permits containing the photographs of PW2 and PW3 were forgeries - the defence had intimated in chambers that it would concede this point, and PW2 and PW3 had already pleaded guilty to immigration offences and had been convicted and sentenced accordingly. He then went on to consider the question of whether the appellant had `employed` PW2 and PW3.
40 `Employed`
41 The district judge held that the appellant was PW2 and PW3`s employer, as his conduct in relation to the workers fell squarely within the meaning of `employ` as stipulated in s 2 of the Act. Furthermore, the district judge held that the presumption of employment in s 57(8) of the Act was operative against the appellant in this case. This presumption had not been rebutted by the defence on a balance of probabilities.
42 The district judge referred to the previous cases of Gay Yun Lin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 547 and Tamilkodi s/o Pompayam v PP [1999] 1 SLR 702 , and noted that the `sub-contractor` defence was now difficult to run. He was of the opinion that, despite the existence of a written sub-contract between the appellant and Esvar, there was, in substance, an employment relationship between the appellant and the immigration offenders, as all the relevant indicia of employment pointed to the accused as the employer. In the district judge`s opinion, Esvar`s role had always been only as a middleman. Esvar acted as the appellant`s agent in securing the workers` services. It also acted as the workers` agent insofar as it had helped them obtain employment.
43 The district judge pointed out that the appellant exercised a high degree of control over the workers. It was he who gave daily instructions to the workers and supervised them. Esvar did not supervise or manage the workers on a daily basis at all. Since the appellant provided food and accommodation to the workers, the district judge could not see how Esvar had been responsible in any way for the workers` conduct or welfare despite the sub-contract stipulating otherwise.
44 The district judge did not see the payment arrangements between the parties as being contradictory to his analysis, since he felt that the appellant`s payments to Esvar were ultimately `channelled to the workers` - all that Esvar was doing was to pass on the payments made by the accused to PW2 and PW3 after appropriate deductions. The district judge also reasoned that the money deducted by Esvar each month could be explained as `regular commission fees` for Esvar`s `service` as a middleman.
45 The district judge also pointed out that, in any event, the appellant`s act of providing food and accommodation to the workers meant that he could have been charged for `harbouring` PW2 and PW3 under s 57(1)(d) of the Act, as is clear from Lee Boon Leong Joseph v PP [1997] 1 SLR 445 . The evidence disclosed could also have raised the presumption in s 57(7) that the appellant had harboured PW2 and PW3 knowing that they were immigration offenders. Hence, to the district judge`s mind, the only real submission available to the defence was that there was no requisite mens rea for the offence.
46 Due diligence and reasonable grounds to believe
47 In relation to the mens rea for the offence, the district judge invoked the presumption of knowledge in s 57(8) of the Act. He accepted that the appellant did not have actual knowledge of PW2 and PW3`s illegal immigration status. Neither did he wilfully contravene the law. However, the district judge found that he had failed to discharge his duty of due diligence under s 57(9) and s 57(10) of the Act and had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge on a balance of probabilities.
48 The district judge likened the present case to that of Ramli bin Daud v PP [1996] 3 SLR 225 . The accused in Ramli bin Daud `s case had delegated the task of checking his workers` particulars to his agents. That was not considered to be a sufficient exercise of due diligence. In the present case, the district judge found that the appellant had also delegated his task of checking his workers` particulars as he had relied entirely on Esvar to provide `legal` workers. The district judge found the appellant`s reliance on Esvar was unacceptable as he could not be allowed to say that he was merely relying bona fide on Esvar`s representations. In the district judge`s opinion, the appellant had manifestly shut his eyes to the obvious fact that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders.
49 The district judge also found that the appellant`s efforts while checking the workers` documents were merely cursory and not enough to discharge his duty of due diligence. The district judge made three observations in relation to this point. First, the appellant had not even looked at how long the workers were permitted to remain in Singapore, let alone whether they had valid travel endorsements indicating when and how they had entered Singapore. On this point alone, the district judge felt that the appellant had failed to check the documents to any reasonable degree. Secondly, he observed that a brief examination of the photocopies of the passports disclosed endorsements purportedly reflecting the Controller of Immigration`s permission for the workers to enter and remain in Singapore until 25 July 1999 (for PW2) and 18 August 1999 (for PW3). The district judge found these endorsements, especially one marking `VISATPWS`, patently suspicious. Thirdly, he noted that the work permits shown to the appellant had not named either Esvar or A & A as the workers` employer.
50 Based on these three observations, the district judge held that the appellant should have made further inquiries, as required under the Immigration Act, and that, if he had done so, he would surely have realised that PW2 and PW3 were not in possession of any valid travel documents or work permits. He was of the view that, since the appellant himself did not understand English, he should have consulted his lawyer about the veracity of the passports and work permits, or asked someone else capable of providing independent advice to check the documents on his behalf. The district judge found that, on the appellant`s own evidence, he had only performed limited checks which were not sufficient to discharge the duty of due diligence.
51 The district judge found that on the objective facts the appellant had reasonable grounds for believing that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders. He was not able to avail himself of the defence that PW2 and PW3 appeared to him to be in possession of valid passports and work permits. He had failed to prove that he had exercised due diligence as required by s 57(9) of the Act to ascertain the validity of these documents. He had also failed to rebut the presumption in s 57(8) of the Act, of having employed PW2 and PW3 in the knowledge that they were immigration offenders.
52 The appeal
53
54 At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant did not contest the issue of `employment`. Therefore, I shall not deal with that issue. In any event, on the particular facts of this case, the appellant could have been charged for the offence of `harbouring` under s 57(1)(d) of the Act even if he had successfully contested the issue of `employment`. Hence, practically speaking, the key issue which fell to be decided was whether the appellant had the requisite mens rea for the offences, and this was what counsel for the appellant concentrated on at the appeal.
55 Counsel for the appellant raised three main issues before me. First, he argued that the presumption of knowledge under s 57(8) of the Act should not apply in the present case as it had not been triggered on the facts. Secondly, the district judge had erred in law and fact in concluding that the appellant had not exercised due diligence as required under s 57(9) and s 57(10) of the Act in ascertaining whether the work permits of PW2 and PW3 were valid under the Immigration Act and regulations. Thirdly, the district judge erred in law and fact in concluding that the appellant had reasonable grounds to believe that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders.
56 The presumption of knowledge
57
58 Section 57(8) of the Immigration Act reads :
Where an immigration offender is found at any premises or place, other than premises used solely for residential purposes, the occupier of the premises or place shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to have employed him knowing that he is an immigration offender.
59 Limb (a) of s 2 of the Act defines the term `occupier` to include `the person having the charge, management or control of either the whole or part of the premises or place, either on his own account or as an agent`.
60 Counsel for the appellant submitted that it was wrong to invoke the presumptions in s 57(8) of the Act in this case, as PW2 and PW3 had been arrested in the room above the restaurant and not on the restaurant premises itself. I see no difference whether the immigration offenders were arrested in the room above the restaurant or the restaurant itself. The appellant in the present case clearly fell within limb (a) of the definition of an `occupier` - he was the person having the `charge, management or control` of the room above the restaurant premises when PW2 and PW3 were arrested on 26 June 1998. PW3 testified that both Kumar and the appellant had told him that he could stay in the room above the restaurant. As it is improbable that Kumar was in charge of the room above A & A, the natural inference was that the appellant was the person with the authority to allow PW2 and PW3 to stay in that room. During his examination-in-chief, the appellant himself admitted that the room on the first storey above the restaurant was provided by his restaurant to the workers. The appellant, being the sole proprietor of A & A, clearly had the charge, management and control of the room above A & A. It was not contested that the room above the restaurant was not used solely for residential purposes. Hence, the presumptions in s 57(8) of the Act were triggered in the present case.
61 The effect of s 57(8) of the Act is to shift the burden of proof onto the defence to disprove, on a balance of probabilities, both the presumption of employment and the presumption of knowledge. This means that the accused must prove the issue, so that the judge is persuaded that it is more probable than not that the accused`s contentions are true. If the probabilities are equal, the burden of proof on the defence will not be discharged. This is in accordance with the Privy Council`s decision in Yuvaraj v PP [1969] 2 MLJ 89 , which was applied by Wee Chong Jin CJ in Chew Chee Sun v PP SLR 352 [1975] 2 MLJ 58 .
62 The duty of due diligence
63
64 In this case, the appellant did not wilfully contravene the law. This was also not a case of the appellant having `wilfully shut his eyes to the obvious`. He was paying S$1,200 a month to Esvar for each worker sent to clean his restaurant. Clearly, he was paying the workers salaries pegged at the market rate for legal workers, as was the case in Kuek Ah Lek v PP [1995] 3 SLR 252 at p 260. It was inconceivable that the appellant would take the risk of engaging an illegal worker and pay him the market rate for a legal one.
65 However, the appellant must do more than just prove lack of actual knowledge in order to rebut the presumption of knowledge. As FA Chua J in PP v Vadivelu [1992] 1 SLR 105 put it:
To rebut the presumption of knowledge, it is not enough for the respondent merely to deny knowledge or the acquisition of knowledge. Even if the respondent proves to the satisfaction of the court that he in fact does not know that these ... were overstayers, he is still not entitled to be acquitted unless he proves on a balance of probabilities that he could not have reasonably known that they were overstayers.
66 FA Chua J went further to hold that:
It is quite clear from the enhanced punishments that the legislature intends to curb the problems of illegal immigrants by discouraging the employment and harbouring of such persons. This would not be achieved if mere negligence and recklessness on the part of the accused to enquire about the status of the illegal immigrant or overstayer, if he knows or has reason to believe that the person is a foreigner, would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of knowledge. [Emphasis mine.]
67 Section 57(9) of the Act states that a defendant accused of `harbouring` or `employing` an immigration offender does not have a valid defence simply because he proves that the offender held a pass or permit. He has to prove further that he had exercised due diligence to ascertain that any such pass or permit was at the material time valid under the Immigration Act or regulations.
68 Section 57(10) of the Act (as it was worded at the time of the charge) states that to discharge the duty of due diligence, the appellant must have personally checked the passport of the respective worker and also have had reasonable grounds to believe that the worker had, at the material time, in force, a permit issued under the Immigration Act or regulations. This subsection was amended with effect from October 1998. However, in the present case, we were concerned with the version of s 59(10) at the time of the charge.
69 Section 57(10) of the Act merely states that the appellant has to `personally check` the worker`s documents. Past cases like Kuek Ah Lek v PP [1995] 3 SLR 252 and Ramli bin Daud v PP [1996] 3 SLR 225 made it clear that s 57(10) prohibits an accused from delegating his duty to personally check the workers` documents. However, neither s 57(10) itself nor past cases elaborate on what exactly the appellant must have looked out for while he was personally checking the documents.
70 The prosecution submitted that it was not reasonable for the appellant to have left the legal arrangements to his `contractors`, and to have accepted the documents at face value as originals. The district judge appeared to agree with the prosecution, and he saw no difference between the present case and that of Ramli bin Daud `s case, where the accused had delegated the task of checking his workers` particulars to his agents.
71 With respect, I was unable to agree with the district judge on this point. What the appellant meant, when he said that he had `left everything to the contractors`, was that he had left the actual legal arrangements for the work permits and workers` levies to Esvar. This was not unreasonable in the light of his belief that the workers were employed by Esvar and that Esvar was in charge of such legal arrangements. In any event, the Immigration Act does not require the appellant to have personally handled the legal arrangements for the workers` work permits.
72 The present case was unlike the case of Ramli bin Daud , where the accused had delegated his duties under s 57(9) and s 57(10) of the Act to someone else. The appellant in the present case did personally check the passports and work permits of the workers. The real issue in this case was simply whether the appellant`s efforts while conducting the inspection of the documents were sufficient, in the eyes of the law, so that the court could accept that the appellant had reasonable grounds to believe that PW2 and PW3 had in force valid permits.
73 The appellant admitted in cross-examination that he had not read the documents of PW2 and PW3 in detail as he did not understand English. He looked at the passports and work permits for `about a minute or so`, and he checked the names and the photographs on the work permits and passports. He understood the words `work permit` and `passport`, and he understood that the workers were going to clean his restaurant. He also admitted that he did not ask either his lawyer or someone else who understood English to check the documents on his behalf. He did not find anything suspicious about the documents and thus did not suspect them to be invalid or forgeries.
74 Counsel for the appellant put great emphasis on the fact that the relevant legislation for the purposes of this case was that before the latest amendments to s 59(10) of the Act. He contended that the appellant`s efforts were sufficient for the purposes of discharging the duty of due diligence under the version of s 59(10) before the latest amendments. All that the appellant had to do was to check the names and the photographs on the work permits and the passports, and see that they tallied. The appellant was not required, for the purposes of discharging his duty of due diligence, to look out for dates or markings on the documents, nor was he required to get someone else who understood English to peruse the documents.
75 The latest amended version of s 59(10), which came into effect in October 1998, merely sets out in more detail the steps to be taken by a person charged under s 57(1)(d) and s 57(1)(e) of the Act. Like the previous version of the subsection, the amended version of s 57(10) requires the accused to ask for the production of the original copy of the worker`s pass or permit for inspection. Where the pass or permit is endorsed on the passport or travel document, the amended version of the subsection requires that the accused must also ask for the production of the original copy of the worker`s passport or travel document for inspection. The amended subsection also requires the accused to check both the pass or permit as well as the passport or travel document to ascertain that the particulars on both documents correspond materially. Where the accused is not the employer, and the name of the employer of the worker is specified in the pass or permit, the amended subsection goes further to require the accused to check with the named employer that the worker is indeed employed by him and that the particulars of that worker correspond with the records of the named employer.
76 The fact that s 59(10) of the Act has been amended is not relevant to the present case. Although the latest amendments make s 59(10) more detailed than the prior version of s 59(10), neither version elaborates on exactly what particulars an accused must look out for while checking the documents.
77 The issue in the present case was whether sufficient steps were taken to discharge the duty of due diligence. This question falls to be determined on the facts of each case. The hypothetical blind man in Lim Dee Chew v PP [1997] 3 SLR 956 may have discharged the required standard of due diligence if he had simply asked someone else to check the documents on his behalf. What about a person in the position of the appellant in the present case, who is illiterate in English, and unfamiliar with immigration procedures or procedures relating to foreign workers ?
78 The Parliamentary Debates preceding the introduction of s 57(9) and s 57(10) of the Immigration Act in 1993 show that these two subsections were included to deal specifically with the situation where an accused person raises the defence that he had seen a work permit or pass. These two subsections were included after a series of cases in which the prosecution lost in the courts, and the employer was able to get an acquittal against the charge of illegal employment simply by arguing that he was shown a document which was a work permit, even though that work permit later turned out to be forged. The duty of due diligence was imposed on the employer as it was felt that the employer or harbourer cannot be allowed to evade s 57(1)(d) and s 57(1)(e) simply by alleging that he had seen a work permit. It was stated at the second reading of the Bill in which s 57(9) and s 57(10) were to be added to the Immigration Act that :
[T]he Immigration`s position is that that is not enough for an employer to discharge his onus. All he needs to do is to ask of the potential employee, `Let me have a look at the passport.` And that will make it clear whether he has authority to stay in Singapore, whether that authority has expired and so on and so forth. [Emphasis mine.]
79 It is obvious from the above extract that, apart from checking the names and photographs in the documents, the appellant must also check the dates permitting the worker`s entry and stay in Singapore. How else is the appellant to know whether the foreign worker had authority to stay in Singapore, or whether that authority has expired? Despite the fact that the relevant legislation does not state so specifically, I fully agree with the district judge that the dates of the workers` entry into Singapore and the dates permitting the worker`s stay in Singapore are amongst those particulars of the passports which the law requires the appellant to check in order to discharge his duty of due diligence. Of course, the appellant must also check the dates of expiry of the work permits and passports - otherwise he would not be able to say that he had found the documents valid.
80 In the present case, even if the appellant had checked the relevant dates, he would not have found anything amiss as the dates would have appeared to be in order. However, a person under a specific duty in law must discharge that duty, and it is no defence to argue that the consequences of discharging that duty would not have differed from the consequences of not discharging that duty.
81 What else must the appellant have watched out for? Obviously, a person would be put on notice if there are patently suspicious markings or irregularities in the documents that would put a reasonable man on notice of the possibility that the documents are forged. However, I accepted the appellant`s submissions that in this case there was nothing patently suspicious that could have put him on notice that the documents were forged. I was not convinced (as the district judge was), that the `VISATPWS` markings were so patently suspicious that they would have put a reasonable man on notice as to the genuinity of the passports. Most people would not know what markings constitute suspicious marks in travel documents unless they happen to be familiar with immigration procedures.
82 The relevant legislation also requires that an accused checking the permit and passport must, at the very least, take steps to ensure that he understands what is written on the documents. Parliament could not have intended to leave a loophole in the legislation for all who profess not to be able to read what is written on a work permit. Hence, the appellant also failed to discharge his duty of due diligence by virtue of the fact that he failed to take steps to understand what was written on the documents. A person who understood English and who had conducted a personal check of the work permit would easily have noticed the words on the back of the work permit. The appellant himself did not read or understand English. Admittedly, he had limited knowledge and experience of the legalities and documentation involved in the employment of foreign workers. However, he should, at the very least, have asked someone else who was literate in English to check what was written in English on the documents. Had he done so, he would have discharged his duty of due diligence, even if he had been misinformed by that other person.
83 It is likely that, even if the appellant had found out what was written on the back of the work permits, he might not have understood the full legal implications of the words. He might not have realised that even if the work permits were valid, PW2 and PW3 were contravening immigration regulations by engaging in employment other than that stated on the work permits. In other words, even if the appellant had found out what was written on the back of the work permits, he might not have had reason to believe that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders. I repeat what was said in Kuek Ah Lek v PP at pp 260-261 and in PP v Koo Pui Fong [1996] 2 SLR 266 at p 272, that while ignorance of the law is generally no defence,
this maxim does not elevate facts which would have put an accused on notice if he had knowledge of the law to one which would have put him on notice regardless of whether he had the requisite knowledge of the law. If the [respondent] was truly unaware that something was in contravention of the law, then the fact remained that it did not put him on notice because he was unaware that the relevant circumstances should have put him on notice ... It is open to the court to draw the proper inference when a person claims that he is unaware of legal provisions that are relevant to his trade.
84 However, it was not open for the appellant to raise this as a defence in the present case. The question of notice did not arise at all because, in the first place, the appellant had failed to discharge his duty of due diligence to find out what was written on the documents. It was irrelevant whether he would have understood the full legal implications of what was written.
85 This appeal could be dealt with simply on the basis that the appellant`s efforts at checking PW2 and PW3`s passports and work permits were insufficient, and he had not discharged the duty of due diligence imposed on him by s 57(9) and s 57(10) of the Act. The appellant had no reasonable grounds to believe that PW2 and PW3`s work permits were valid and he could not rely on the defence that he had been shown work permits. Had the appellant discharged his duty of due diligence, I would have gone on to consider whether anything would have put a reasonable man in that position on notice, so that the appellant had reasonable grounds to believe that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders. In this case, there was no need to go so far. In the circumstances the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge on a balance of probabilities as he had failed to show that he could not have reasonably known that PW2 and PW3 were immigration offenders.
86 Sentence
87
88 The appellant was given the mandatory minimum sentence of six months` imprisonment on each charge, to run concurrently. As the sentences were already the minimum mandatory sentences, the appeal against sentence was also dismissed.
89 Conclusion
90
91 I dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence. Social and public policy dictates that the law relating to immigration offences is deliberately strict. Those who come into contact with foreign workers are required to learn, one way or the other, what they must do and what they need not do in their dealings with foreign workers.
92 Outcome:
93 Appeal dismissed.
B Ganesh (Ganesha & Partners) for the appellant
Kan Shuk Weng (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent