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In the court  OF APPEAL  of the republic of singapore
[20] SGCA  29
Civil Appeal  No 45  of 201
Between
QUEK YEN FEI KENNETH SUING BY LITIGATION REPRESENTIVE PANG CHOY CHUN
…  Appellant
And
YEO CHYE HUAT
…  Respondent
Civil Appeal No 52  of 2016
Between
YEO CHYE HUAT
…  Appellant
And
QUEK YEN FEI KENNETH SUING BY LITIGATION REPRESENTIVE PANG CHOY CHUN
…  Respondent
In the matter of  Suit No 695  of 201
Between
QUEK YEN FEI KENNETH SUING BY LITIGATION REPRESENTIVE PANG CHOY CHUN
…  Plaintiff
And
YEO CHYE HUAT
…  Defendant
JUDGMENT
[Damages] — [Measure of damages] — [Personal injuries cases]  


 
 
 
This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in  LawNet  and/or the Singapore Law Reports.
Quek  Yen  Fei  Kenneth

(by his litigation representative Pang Choy Chun)

v

Yeo  Chye  Huat and another appeal
[201] SGCA  29
Court  of Appeal  —  Civil Appeal No 45 and 52  of 2016

Sundaresh  Menon CJ and  Andrew  Phang  Boon Leong JA

23 January 2017
24 April  2017    Judgment reserved.
Andrew  Phang  Boon Leong JA (delivering the  judgment  of the court):
Introduction
1    ivil Appeal No 45  of  2016 (“CA 45”) and  Civil Appeal  No 52 of  2016 (“CA 52”) are  respectively  an appeal  (by the plaintiff)  and a cross-appeal  (by the defendant)  against the decision of  the High Court Judge  (“the  Judge”) in Suit No 695  of  2012 (see  Quek  Yen  Fei  Kenneth v Yeo  Chye  Huat  [2016] 3 SLR 1106 (“the  GD”)). The Judge awarded the plaintiff,  Quek  Yen  Fei  Kenneth (“Quek”), damages of $452,509.41 in respect of a motor accident for which the defendant, Yeo  Chye  Huat (“Yeo”), had been found to be 100% liable. The Judge also awarded  Quek  costs on a standard basis for the trial on liability up until the date of  an  offer to settle (“OTS”)  made by Yeo  on 15 February 2016, and ordered that each party bear  his  own costs for the assessment of damages hearing.
Background
2    Quek  was born on  17 November 1991, and is 25 years old today. He stopped his studies in March 2007 at 1 years of age, dropping out three months into his repeat year for the Secondary Three Normal (Technical) course. He enlisted  for  National Service on 4 March 2011.  
3    On 11 August 2011,  when  Quek was still in National Service, he  was riding his motorcycle when a taxi driven by Yeo collided into him  (the “Accident”). His right foot was severely mangled and his right leg had to be amputated below the knee. His right collarbone was also fractured. 
4    Quek  brought an action in negligence against Yeo. This action was heard by  the Judge, who  gave judgment in  Quek’s  favour with damages to be assessed  on the basis of  100% liability on the part of Yeo. The reasons for the Judge’s decision on liability are set out in  Quek  Yen  Fei  Kenneth v Yeo  Chye  Huat  [2013] SGHC 132. Yeo’s appeal on liability to the Court of Appeal was subsequently withdrawn.
5    The assessment of damages took place  also  before the Judge, who gave his decision on 3 March 2016. With the consent of the parties, this decision was subsequently revised  at a hearing in chambers before the Judge on 27 April 2016  to reflect the updated prices of an item  of future medical expenses (“FME”). Interest and costs were also assessed at this hearing. In the interim, however, both  Quek  and Yeo filed  notices of appeal against the 3 March 2016 decision on the assessment of damages (ie, before the Judge finalised his  awards for FME, interest, and costs
6    It was agreed before the Judge, and neither party is now disputing, that the two notices of appeal cover all issues in the proceedings, including the  orders made at the chambers hearing on 27 April 2016. Further,  either party is taking issue with the fact that the respective notices of appeal were filed before that chambers hearing.  
7    Yeo made two  OTS  before the assessment of damages  hearing on 16 February 2016, neither of which was accepted by  Quek 
(a)    n  28 January 2016, Yeo  made    first  OTS for  $480,000.00, which  remained open for 14 days (until 11 February 2016); and 
(b)    n  15 February 2016, Yeo made    second OTS  for $550,000.00, which  remained open for 14 days (until 29 February 2016) and included a clause that specifically withdrew the first OTS. 
8    Before us, the parties proceeded  on the basis that  Quek’s  claims  for  FME, loss of future earnings (“LFE”), and loss of earning capacity (“LEC”),  relate only to the period on and after  3 March 2016,  which was  the date  the Judge gave his decision   the assessment of damages. At that time,  Quek  was 24 years old.  Accordingly, we assessed FME, LFE, and LEC only for the period on and after 3 March 2016.


9    The Judge awarded  Quek  a total of  $452,509.41  in damages, which comprised  general damages, special damages, and interest  as follows  see the  GD at [123]) 
General Damages
Pain and suffering
$102,000.00
Below-knee amputation
$80,000.00  
Right collarbone fracture
$15,000.00  
Multiple scarring
$7,000.00  
FME
$106,737.87
K3 prostheses  (@  $3,493.30/year)
  $62,879.47  
Medical consultation  (@  $92.00/year)
  $1,656.00  
Aqua limb  (@  $710/year)
  $12,780.00  
Additional  K4 prosthesis
  $7,276.00  
One back-up  K3 prosthesis
  $6,146.40  
Neuroma surgery (provisional)
  $5,000.00  
Collarbone surgery (provisional)
  $11,000.00  
Future transport expenses  
$1,000.00
LEC  (@  $750/month  over  18 years)
$162,000.00
Total General Damages
$371,737.87  
Special Damages
Renovation fee
  $10,670.40  
Medical expenses
  $33,052.87  
Transport expenses
  $3,000.00  
Loss adjuster fees
  $279.00  
Pre-trial loss of earnings
  $14,500.00  
Total Special Damages
  $61,502.27  
Interest
General Damages (pain and suffering) from writ to interim payment of $50,000.00
$5,332.3 
General Damages (pain and suffering) from interim payment of $50,000.00  to judgment
  $7,077.07  
Special Damages (excluding pre-trial loss of earnings)
$5,728.12  
Special Damages (pre-trial loss of earnings only)
$1,131.75  
Total Interest
19,269.
Total Damages
$452,509.41  
10    On the issue of costs, the Judge also ordered  Yeo  to pay  Quek  the costs of the trial on liability up until 15 February 2016 (the date of the second OTS) on a standard basis,  while  the parties were to bear their own costs of the assessment of damages hearing  (see the  GD at [130])
Issues before this  court
11    CA 45 and CA 52 concern the Judge’s decision on damages  and on costs, and do not involve issues of liability for causing the  Accident. The  issues in dispute can be categorised  as follows:
(a)    whether, as Yeo argues in CA 52,  this court ought  to reduce the Judge’s award of $80,000.00  in  general damages for pain and suffering  for  the below-knee amputation;
(b)    whether  this court ought  to vary the Judge’s award of $106,737.87  in  general damages for FME
(i)    as  Quek  argues in CA 45, to:
(A)    increase the multiplier for FME from 18 years to 25 years, and  accordingly  the awards for the use and replacement of a  K3 prosthesis, the use and replacement of the aqua limb, and the medical consultations;
(B)    award the costs of the use and replacement of a  K4 prosthesis  with a multiplier of 18 years;
(C)    provide for price inflation at a rate of   to 5% per annum  in the award of FME in respect of the maintenance and replacement of the K3 and K4 prostheses;
(D)    award the costs of the Neuroma and collarbone surgeries as a lump sum rather than as provisional damages;
(ii)    as Yeo argues in CA 52, to:  
(A)    reduce the Judge’s award in respect of the use and maintenance of a  K3 prosthesis  on the ground that  Quek  would need only a  K2 prosthesis  after 60 years of age;
(B)    set aside the Judge’s award in respect of an aqua limb;
(C)    set aside the Judge’s award in respect of the  K4 prosthesis  purchased by  Quek  on the ground that an award for the same amount has been made as part of special damages;
(c)    whether, as  Quek  argues in CA 45,  this court ought  to make an award of damages for LFE, and, if so, whether to vary the Judge’s award of $162,000.00 of general damages for LEC; and
(d)    whether, as Yeo argues in CA 52,  this court ought  to reduce the Judge’s award of $162,000.00 of general damages for LEC, which was based on a sum of $750.00 per month for 18 years.
12    In addition, Yeo applies in CA 52 to vary the Judge’s order on costs for Yeo to pay  Quek’s  costs on a standard basis only up to the date of Yeo’s first OTS on 28 January 2016, rather than up until the date of Yeo’s second OTS on 15 February 2016.
Decision below
Pain and suffering
13    The Judge awarded  Quek  $80,000.00 for the pain and suffering  from  the below-knee amputation of his right leg. The  Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases  (Academy Publishing, 2010) (“Guidelines”)  provide  a range of $40,000.00  to  $70,000.00  for the pain and suffering  from  a below-knee amputation of one leg. The Judge gave  Quek a slight uplift of $10,000.00  for the  pain and  suffering from  his  losing  of a  leg at  the relatively  young age of 20 years,  his undergoing  surgery to  attempt  to  salvage  the  leg,  and his continued  experiencing  of phantom limb pain and pain from a neuroma at the amputation stump  even four years after the Accident  see the  GD at [14]–[16]).
FME
Multiplier
14    The Judge applied a multiplier of 18 years for FME, based on  Quek’s  age of 24 years at the date of the trial. He did not  grant the  24-year multiplier  sought by  Quek because it was speculative to determine the extent to which medical advancements would increase the life expectancy  of the average male during  Quek’s  lifetime so as to justify a 24-year multiplier see the  GD at [30]–[32]).
Multiplicand
15    The Judge found that prostheses ranging from levels K0 to K4  exist and  are designed to support increasing intensities of activity. A  K4 prosthesis was  equipped with a running blade and facilitate  a level of ambulation that allowed for  the  high impact activities (eg, sprinting) typical of an athlete. A  K3 prosthesis  supported  a lower intensity of activity  that fulfilled  the demands of a typical community  ambulator  (eg, light jogging and running for the bus) and allowed  a user to traverse most environmental barriers  as well as  engage in exercise.   K2 prosthesis,  by contrast, did  not admit of such activities, and  enable  only such  low intensity  activities as traversing curbs, stairs,  and  uneven surfaces (see the  GD at [35]).
16    The Judge  found  Quek  to be an active young man, whose day-to-day needs included light jogging and running for the bus. He thus  awarded  Quek a lump sum for  the costs of the use and replacement of a  K3 prosthesis  equivalent to the receipt  of $3,585.30  per annum  (comprising $3,493.30 for the  K3 prosthesis  itself and $92.00 for the medical consultations needed to fit  that  prosthesis)  for the remainder of  Quek’s life  Even if  the intensity of  Quek’s  activities would likely decline with age, it would, in the Judge’s view,  be unduly onerous for  Quek to suddenly have to adapt to the restricted range of activities  allowed by  a  K2 prosthesis having spent the majority of his life with a  K3 prosthesis see the  GD at [39], [42]  and [69]).
17    The Judge did not award  Quek  the costs of the use and replacement of  a  K4 prosthess. Although  Quek  had participated in sprinting trials,  sprinting was  merely  a  temporary recreational interest  of his. Further, awarding  Quek  the costs of  a  K4 prosthess on top of the costs of  a  K3 prosthess would overcompensate him. Nevertheless, the Judge awarded  Quek  the costs of the single  K4 prosthesis  ($7.276.00)  that  Quek  had purchased after the Accident to explore his options while adjusting to his post-amputation situation (see the  GD at [40] and [41]).
18    The Judge awarded  Quek the costs of  the use of an aqua limb, at a rate of $710.00  per annum. Unlike a regular  K3 prosthesis, an aqua limb was  waterproof. It would therefore allow  Quek  to shower standing up, instead of sitting or standing on only one leg Quek  would therefore be able to us  bathrooms that ha  not been modified to suit his needs  and  engage in activities on the beach, where contact with water  was  inevitable (see the  GD at [61]).
19    The Judge awarded  Quek  provisional damages of $5,000.00  for the surgical excision of his neuroma and $11,000.00  for the surgical treatment of his right collarbone  –  payable only if  Quek were to undergo  the surgeries and tender  the bill within three years Quek’s  orthopaedic experts  had  testified that both the neuroma and the right collarbone injury could be left untreated, but that the ultimate decision of whether  to undergo  surgery should be  left to Quek f the pain caused by the neuroma hindered the normal functioning of his limb and affected his quality of life see the  GD at  ] and  [66]).
LFE/LEC
Multiplier
20    The Judge applied a multiplier of 18 years  to Quek’s  claims for both LFE and LEC. He based his award  on  the Singapore High Court decision of  Teo  Seng  Kiat  v Goh Hwa Teck  [2003] 1 SLR(R) 333 (“Teo  Seng  Kiat”), where an 18-year multiplier was applied to a 28-year-old male claimant, and in which   P Selvam J  opined  (at [14])  that a multiplier of 18 years “accorded with the current trend in relation to  a  healthy young  ” (see the  GD at [78]). 
Multiplicand
21    The Judge rejected  Quek’s  claim for LFE but  awarded  Quek  $162,000.00 for LEC.
(1)    LFE
22    The Judge found that there was insufficient evidence to support a claim for LFE.  Quek had  dropped out of school in Secondary Three and had a sketchy employment history  ever since. The only clear  (and available)  evidence was that he had served National Service and ha  a keen interest in motorcycles. His career path was uncertain t was  thus  impossible to make an appropriate estimate of the income  Quek  would have earned but for the Accident.  Yet, it  was also  inappropriate to peg  Quek’s future earnings  to the  career model of the  civil service.  Quek  had been  unable to secure a stable full-time job and shuttled between part-time jobs. He was also  unable  to show any particular aptitude or interest in any trade (see the  GD at  [83] and  [85]).
23    The Judge, in fact, found  Quek’s  employment and remuneration history to be  as follows (see the  GD at [86]):
(a)    rom early-2008,  Quek  worked at TC Homeplus  Pte Ltd (“TC Homeplus”) as a sales promoter of bed linen.  However,  he was dismissed due to his tardiness in reporting for work.  Although  Quek  claimed to have earned a monthly income of $1,200.00  to  1,400.00  at TC Homeplus, he could not produce the relevant CPF income documents to support his claim
(b)    After his dismissal by TC Homeplus  up until September 2010,  Quek  worked at  Craftmark  (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Craftmark”), also  as a sales promoter. He earned  a monthly income  of between  $309.11  and  $1,190.34.
(c)    From September 2010 up until March  2011, when  Quek  enlisted for National Service,  he worked as a part-time assistant delivery driver.  However, he was unable to provide an estimate of his earnings from this job as they had been paid to him in cash.
24    The Judge rejected  Quek’s  evidence that  he could have, like his father, earned  $3,000.00  to  5,000.00  per month  as a tipper-truck driver.  Quek had  not called  his father as a witness, and  this evidence  was  therefore  hearsay. In any event,  Quek had  not shown any inclination for such work at all (see the  GD at [82]).
(2)    LEC
25    The Judge awarded  Quek  $162,000.00  for LEC, based on a multiplicand of $750.00 per month over an 18-year multiplier.  
26    he  Judge found that the  injuries caused by the Accident had reduced  Quek’s  earning capacity.  Quek  was unable to stand or walk for long hours, and could no longer carry loads of more than 20kg. Even if he were  to be  employed, he was likely to receive a lower income than an able-bodied person doing the same job (see the  GD at [89]).  
27    The Judge noted, however,  that  Quek  had previously fractured both his wrists in a prior unrelated accident  fewer  than two months before  the Accident (with Yeo. This injury, which was unrelated to  Yeo’s  negligence, had  already  diminished  Quek’s  ability to perform manual tasks such as lifting and therefore his earning capacity. The LEC multiplicand of $750.00  per month compensated  Quek  for the  further  disadvantage  caused by  the Accident to his subsequent employability and income (see the  GD at [90] and [91]).
Quek’s  Case
FME
28    Quek seeks  a multiplier of 25 years  for FME “based on a conservative estimate of [Quek’s]  expected  life span of 74 years”. This would  leav  him with another 50 years of  natural  life.  He submits that an FME multiplier is  roughly half of   claimant’s  expected  remaining  life expectancy. 
LFE/LEC
Multiplier
29    Quek  seeks a multiplier of 20 years  for  each of LFE and LEC. He argues that he had a remaining working life of at least 43 years as  at  the time of the assessment of damages, when he was 24 years of age, because the retirement age will soon be raised from 65 to 67 years. Indeed, given his low level of education, he  argues that he  would likely have worked past  67 years.  He submits that where a claimant has a remaining working life of 35 years or more, an LFE multiplier of just under half of the remaining working life  is  applied.
30    Quek distinguishes  Teo  Seng  Kiat (see above at [20])  because it involved a 28-year-old claimant, and  there were  no reasons or authority  given  for  the  finding that a  18-year multiplier represented the “current trend”.  Further,  he argues that  Teo  Seng  Kiat  was decided in 2000, and  that the  trend  then  is not  relevan today.  He then submit that  a 20-year  multiplier should be  applied to  a  claimant  between 22 and 23 years of age
Multiplicand
31    Quek seeks  an LFE multiplicand of $2,000.00  per month.  He argues that a  claim for LFE may be sustained even  if his  particular career path cannot be  determined, and  may be  derived from  the median salary  of  persons of equivalent education  set out in  the Ministry of Manpower  ables  on median gross monthly income from full-time employment (the  MoM Tables”).  Pursuant to those tables, a 24-year-old man with  Quek’s educational  qualifications would earn an average of $2,978.22 per month across his remaining working life.  
32    Quek  disputes  the Judge’s finding  that he had flitted from job to job. He contends that he had been a sales promoter for  four  years before he enlisted into National Service. Only after the Accident  was he unable to keep  a stable job. In addition, he earned $1,400.00  working  at TC Homeplus  at the age of 16 years  –  an 83% increase from the  average sum of $761.00  earned by 15  to  19 year olds,  according to the  MoM Tables.  He argues that in deriving his multiplicand for LFE, a  uplift of  at least  50% should be applied to the average median lifetime salary of $2,978.22 per month, to give a gross monthly income figure of $4,467.33 per month. This was within the range of  his  likely earnings but for the Accident, had he become a tipper-truck driver like his father.
33    Quek seeks  at least $100,000.00  for  LEC in addition to an award of LFE.  In the event that no award of LFE is made,  he contends that the LEC multiplicand should be more than $750 per month because his prior wrist injury,  on account of  which the Judge reduced the  LEC multiplicand to $750 per month,  retarded the range of motion of his wrist only  insignificantly
Yeo’s Case
Pain and suffering
34    Yeo  argues that  the award  of $80,000.00 for pain and suffering  from the below-knee amputation  should be reduced.  The Judge, he argues,  placed excessive weight on the  phantom limb pain experienced by  Quek  and the  unsuccessful  surgical attempt to salvage  his  leg. Phantom limb pain is common  after amputations, is already noted in the awards  for  amputation, and should not be factored  in  again  “to make an increased award”.  Further, the pain and suffering experienced by  Quek  was less “severe” than that  in  the Singapore High Court decision of  Pang Teck Kong v Chew  Eng  Hwa  [1992] SGHC 31 (“Pang Teck Kong”),  where  Warren  Khoo J awarded only $50,000.00 to a 22-year-old  claimant  whose right leg was amputated  below  the  knee after it was run over  twice  by a lorry; the second time when the driver of the lorry reversed the lorry over him when he was on the ground.  he  claimant  had also been admitted to hospital for 32 days.
FME
35    Yeo argues that the multiplier of 18 years for FME applied by the Judge should be upheld.  Quek  is a smoker and was 24 years old at the date of the trial. A multiplier of 18 years is thus fair and appropriate.
LFE/LEC
Multiplier
36    Yeo submits that the retirement age is usually adhered to for workers like  Quek, who would have engaged in physical work. Such workers rarely work beyond 60 years of age. Even if they do, their pay would be reduced.
Multiplicand
37    Yeo submits that there are insufficient objective facts to justify an award of LFE. The objective evidence in the form of  Quek’s income  statements  fail  to  corroborate his account of his pre-Accident  remuneration  Further,  Quek  with his  K3 prosthesis can  perform his pre-Accident vocation of a sales promoter save that  he  can no longer  lift weights over 20kg.  Quek  has been able to secure employment with Unique Motorsports Pte Ltd (“Unique Motorsports”) at a salary of  between  $1,400.00  and  $1,450.00  per month, save that he  “left Unique Motorsports not because he was not able to perform the job but because he was late for work consistently even though he was required to report for work only at 10.00 a.m  The real reason keeping  Quek  out of work is his attitude and not his disability. 
38    Yeo adds that  Quek  can now earn a income  higher than his pre-Accident income, and has suffered no loss to justify a claim for LFE. In any event, he never intended to study further after dropping out of school in Secondary Three. His highest educational qualification is thus that of a lower secondary education. At best, he  ould have achieved only the median gross monthly income of a worker with lower secondary qualification,  ie, $2,100.00  per month  based on the  MoM Tables. With future increments and bonuses,  Quek’s  current earning capacity of  between  $1,400.00  and  $1,450.00  per month (excluding  employer’s  CPF) could well exceed this sum of $2,100.00  per month (which includes  employer’s  CPF). Accordingly, there  is  no loss of income to justify LFE.
39    Yeo argues that  the award of  LEC  to  Quek should be reduced to $500.00 per month, or approximately $110,000.00  over  the 18-year multiplier.
40    Yeo argues that  Quek’s  pre-ccident  earning capacity of less than $1,000.00 per month is much lower than his post-ccident  earning capacity of $1,400.00 per month with Unique Motorsports. With the  K3 prosthesis,  Quek  can work in the same capacity as  he did  before the  ccident, save that he can no longer carry objects that weigh over 20kg. Moreover,  Quek  now owns two motorcycles and has been able to ride them safely with his prosthetic leg.  However, he “chose not to work for reasons only known to him”  There was thus no loss of earning capacity attributable to the  ccident. Nevertheless, on the authority of  Teo  Seng  Kiat, he accepts that $500.00 per month may be awarded to  Quek  for LEC.
Our decision
Pain and suffering
41    We  agree with the reasons given by the Judge  for the  $10,000.00  uplift  from the upper limit of the $40,000.00  to  $70,000.00 range in the Guidelines for the pain and suffering from a below-knee amputation  (above  at [13]) The Judge had expressly considered the award of $50,000.00 in  Pang Teck Kong  (see  the  GD at [12]). Moreover,  Pang Teck Kong  was decided  in  1992, and the  award made to  Quek  had to take  into  account  the changes in purchasing power  since  then.  Accordingly,  we uphold  the Judge’s award of $80,000.00  for the pain and suffering from the below-knee amputation. 
Multiplier-Multiplicand Approach
42    e pause  to review the  multiplier-multiplicand approach that forms the basis of  the  assessments of  damages for FME and LFE/LEC  for  non-fatal  personal injuries in Singapore.  The  multiplicand  represents the quantum of loss, whether in terms of an incurrence of medical expenses (for FME) or a reduction of earnings (for LFE/LEC),  that the claimant is expected to suffer at periodic intervals in the future. The  multiplier, in turn, is the  mathematical tool used to calculate the  lump-sum  present  value  of  the  stream of  future  periodic  loses  across the remaining life expectancy and the remaining working life  (collectively,  period of future loss”)  of the claimant
43    Three factual premises undergird the  multiplier see  Kemp & Kemp: The Quantum of Damages  (William Norris QC gen ed) (Sweet  Maxwell,  Looseleaf Ed, 2009, Release 137 (October 2015))  (“Kemp  Kemp”) at paras 10-009.1–10-009.2)
(a)    irst, he length of the expected  period of future loss, from the date of the assessment of damages to the date  of either death (for a lifetime  multiplier) or retirement (for an earnings multiplier
(b)    second,  the  receipt  of  compensation for  the  future losses  by the claimant  as a immediate  lump sum, which  can  almost invariably  be  invested at a rate over and above that of inflation  to make a profit, and the  probability that  mortality risks  and other  vicissitudes of life would curtail  his  expected  period of future loss; and
(c)    third,  the  continual drawing-down and spending of the invested lump sum  such  that by the end of the expected  period of future loss  the claimant will have nothing left.  
44    In effect,  the court awards the  claimant  a  lump sum  in  damages  that  represent the present value of  an  annuity offering a  rate of return  (net of contingencies)  ie, the discount rate)  that  the  claimant  is assumed to  be able to achieve by investing the lump-sum award  This annuity will pay the claimant  the amount of the multiplicand at each  periodic interval  over the  expected  period of future loss, and at the conclusion of which  the annuity  terminates  (see the House of Lords decision of  Mallett  v  McMonagle, a minor by Hugh Joseph  McMonagle, his father and guardian ad litem, and  nother  [1970] AC 166  (“Mallett  v  McMonagle”)  at 17
45    Admittedly,  it is never an easy task to  assess the expected  period of future loss  in order  to determine a multiplier, whether for  FME or for  LFE/LEC.  As so aptly observed by  the Privy Council  (in an appeal from South Australia)  in  Paul  and  nother v Rendell  (1981)  34 ALR 569 (“Paul v Rendell”)  at  571, such an assessment “involves a double  exercise in the art of prophesying not only what the future holds for the injured plaintiff but also what the future would have held for him if he had not been injured”.
Development of  law on  multipliers in Singapore
46    The first reported case in Singapore that applied the multiplier-multiplicand approach was  the decision of this court in  Attorney-General v  Rada Baskaran [1971–1973] SLR(R)  376 t that time, as  was the  practice  in the UK,  the courts in Singapore adopted a “rough and ready” approach to the assessment of multipliers  (see  Kemp  Kemp  at para 10-009.3).  The primary concern was  ensuring  consistency with the multipliers awarded  to  claimants of a similar age  in previous cases,  although  adjustments were occasionally  made on  account of  uncertainties  unique to  the claimant  in question 
47    In  Lai Wee Lian v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd  [1983–1984] SLR(R)  388 (“Lai Wee Lian”), the Privy Council (in an appeal from this court)  observed  at [20]  that the starting point for calculating    multiplier  was the period of time  in the future  that the claimant  “can be expected to live but, in consequence of the accident  not to earn”  This figure  was  then discounted to reflect, first, the inevitable contingencies and uncertainties of human life and working capacity, and second, the fact that the award of damages would be paid as a lump sum
48    The  Board  noted that the practice in England was to apply this discounted figure as a direct multiplier, whereas a common practice in Singapore  at that time  was to  calculate the relevant damages by reference to  a set of  present value (or financial)  tables  that had been  prepared by M/s Murphy and Dunbar, Solicitors  (“the  M&D Tables”). These tables were “calculated upon the assumption that the capital sum (ie  the sum awarded as damages) will be invested and will earn interest at 5% per annum”  (see  Lai Wee Lian  at [20][21]). 
49    The  Board observed  that  it was  not improper  to  use  the  M&D Tables  in assessing damages,  and that  the  M&D Tables  “enable the loss to be calculated more accurately than is possible by the direct application of a multiplier”  However, it cautioned against  erroneous double-discounting: reducing the award  for  contingencies and accelerated receipt  in  addition  to  the discounting implicit in an application of  a discounted figure as a direct multiplier  (as was the practice in England) The  Board  concluded that  “if confusion is to be avoided, it seems desirable that a uniform practice should be followed by all courts  (see  Lai Wee Lian  at  [25]–[27]). It then  discounted  the expected remaining working years of the claimant  there “in respect both of future contingencies and advance payment,  ie, an application of a direct multiplier without reference to the M&D Tables  (see  Lai Wee Lian  at [29]). his  approach  appears to have been  followed  ever  since,  despite  a  comment  by Goh  Phai  Cheng JC in  the Singapore High Court decision of  Toon  Chee Meng Eddie v  Yeap  Chin Hon  [1993] 1 SLR(R)  407 (“Eddie  Toon”)  at [5  that  there was no reason why a set of actuarial tables adduced by a party in the English  Court of Appeal decision  of  Croke  and  nother  v Wiseman and  nother [1982] 1 WLR 71 had no application in Singapore
50    In  Poh  Huat Heng Corp Pte Ltd  and others  v  Hafizul  Islam  Kofil  Uddin  [2012] 3 SLR 1003 (“Hafizul”),  this court noted  at [48] that  there are  at least four different  ways  of  calculating a multiplier:  
(a)    First, fixing the multiplier by looking at the multipliers  awarded in comparable cases (“the  Precedent Approach”)
(b)    Second, applying a pure arithmetical discount to the expected  period of future loss  on account of  accelerated receipt  and other vicissitudes of life (“the  Arithmetic Approach”)
(c)    Third,  determining the multiplier through the   of  actuarial tables, as  was  the practice in the UK  following  the House of Lords decision of  Wells v Wells  [1999] 1 AC 345  and the publication  of actuarial tables  by the  UK  Government Actuary’s  Department  The  multipliers in thse ables  were  calculated on the  basis that a lumpsum award would  be invested at a rate of return of 2.5% per annum net of tax,  and  in light of the expected mortality rates of the average British person  (but not risks other than mortality, although the tables  offered  a methodology to reduce the multiplier  on account of such  other contingencies see  Actuarial Tables with explanatory notes for use in Personal Injury and Fatal Accident Cases  (7th Ed, 2011)  (“the  Ogden Tables 2011”)  at  Section   paras 4–9
(d)    Fourth, applying a fixed formula, as  was  done  in  Malaysia pursuant to s 28A of the Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67) (Malaysia)
51    This court  observed  in  Hafizul that  absent  authoritative  actuarial tables like the  Ogden Tables 2011  in Singapore,  both  the Precedent Approach and the  Arithmetic Approach were relevant when  calculating a  multiplier. Thereafter,  adjustments to  the multiplier thereby derived  could  be made on account of,  inter alia,  such  personal  attributes  of the claimant  as  gender,  educational attainment,  employment status,  and  pre-existing  illness or  disabilit, as well as  the structural  features  of  the claimant’s  industry and  the  wider  economy  (see  Hafizul at [54]–[56]) 
52    This court added  that  ascertaining the age of the claimant was a necessary but not  a  sufficient condition in  determining a multiplier. More important  was the likely number of  remaining working years” (for LFE/LEC) or remaining living years (for  lifelong  FE)  that  the claimant would have enjoyed but for the accident. These  figures  would be determined predominantly (but not exclusively) by  reference respectively to  the statutory retirement age and average life expectancy in Singapore  (see  Hafizul at [60]  and [76])  We pause  here  to note that in this regard, the M&D Tables are not actuarial tables but present value  (or financial)  tables, which take account of only accelerated receipt but not mortality risks (see  Wai-Sum Chan and Felix   Chan, “Lai Wee Lian  Revisited – Should Actuarial Tables  e  Used  or  he  Assessment  f  Damages  n  Personal Injury Litigation  n  Singapore?:  Wells v Wells”  2000 ing  JLS 364 at 370
53    n  Lai Wai  Keong  Eugene v Loo Wei Yen  [2014] 3 SLR 702 (“Eugene Lai”) at [20]–[22] this court rejected a submission that  Hafizul essentially endorsed dispensing with the Precedent Approach in favour of the  Arithmetic Approach, and emphasised  that  neither  approach  could  invariably be preferred  over  the other.  In  Hafizul,  the  Precedent Approach was  eschewed  only because  the claimant  was a Bangladeshi national who would eventually be returning to  and investing his lump-sum award  in  Bangladesh,  and because  no information on real interest rates  in Bangladesh  was available. Further,  the claimant’s  job as a foreign construction worker was exposed to unique vagaries that did not  usually attend other forms of employment.  Simply applying the multipliers used in past cases involving local claimants would have been  unsatisfactory.
54    This court added  that where possible,  both  the Precedent Approach  and  the  Arithmetic Approach  should be used, albeit independently he multiplier derived under  the Arithmetic Approach should be  “cross-checked with the multipliers used in past cases so as to achieve consistency with cases involving similarlysituated plaintiffs”. In other words,  in determining the various discounts to be applied under the [Arithmetic] [A]pproach,  a court should not stray too far from the implicit discounts embedded in the multipliers used in comparable cases mphasis added]  (see  Eugene Lai  at [20] and [22])
55    This court acknowledged that the multipliers awarded  in  Singapore ha  traditionally been based on the assumption that the lumpsum award could  be invested to achieve real rates of return of  between 4 and 5%  per annum, and that the prevailing rates of return on fixed deposits were below 4% per annum and had remained so for 15 years. Nevertheless,  this court  held that  it was  not  for  it  to effect a radical and sweeping revision of the discount rate for accelerated receipt, even if a court  could  adopt a lower or higher discount rate where appropriate on the facts of a particular case  (see  Eugene Lai  at  [28] and  [32]–[38])
(a)    First, it was not reasonable for a claimant to invest his entire lump-sum award in fixed deposits, particularly where the award was meant to provide for a long period of future loss. A large portion of the award would not be called upon for many years, and that portion could be invested in equities or other asset classes to achieve a higher return (as compared to fixed deposits) meanwhile
(b)    Second, there was no guarantee that the  prevailing low rates of return would persist 
(c)    Third, although there was scope for reform in th  law  on multiplier awards for personal injury, the courts were not in a position to undertake that reform. Any drastic change to the discount rate for accelerated receipt could only be undertaken after a careful study, with input from experts and the various stakeholders involved. This was a matter that fell within the institutional competence of the Legislature
56    or completeness,  there remains an option for a court to order  provisional damages  in  lieu of  an award of general damages  pursuant to  aragraph 16 of the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed). Such an order would allow the  court  more  time to assess more accurately a loss  that  the claimant may potentially suffer  in the future.  This was done  by this court  in  Koh  Chai Kwang v  Teo  Ai Ling (by her next friend, Chua Wee Bee)  [2011] 3 SLR 610 (“Teo  Ai Ling”).
Our observations
57    There are two primary reasons why a stream of future losses is to be discounted on account of its immediate payment as a lumpsum award of damages,  viz: (a) accelerated receipt; and (b) contingencies  including mortality  and the  effect of  other personal and structural considerations  on the  remaining  life expectancy  (for lifelong FME) and remaining working  life  (for LFE/LEC) 
58    We agree with and endorse the observations in  Hafizul see  above  at [51])  on  the methodology by which  account  may be taken  of contingencies such as mortality and other vicissitudes of life in the calculation of a multiplier.
59    e  also  agree with  the observations in  Eugene Lai  see  above  at  [55])  that radical and sweeping revision  of the discount rate  on account  of accelerated receipt  lie within the province of  Parliament and not the courts Nevertheless,  nothing preclude  a court from adopting a lower or higher discount rate  where  this  is  appropriate  on the facts of  a particular  case.  Where  a case is not  truly comparable  to the precedents,  or where there is other good reason to depart from them, including the matter of expert or actuarial evidence which we touch on at [62] below, the  court  can  and should  depart from  past  multiplier  award and the discount rates  implicit in them. Indeed, as this court observed in  Hafizul at [54]:
…    blind adherence to the multipliers in previous cases is not desirable. The court should consider in each case whether the previous cases are truly comparable, and should not hesitate to depart from the multipliers used in previous cases if the circumstances call for it.
60    More specifically,  in applying the Precedent Approach,  we would caution against not only blind adherence to the multipliers awarded in previous cases, but also  against  blind adherence to the  ratios (or  conversely, the discount amounts)  between the multipliers and the expected  period of future loss  (as  Quek  urges us to do in the context of LFE/LEC (see above at [29])) Just as the Precedent Approach provides as a useful  cross-check  of a multiplier derived under the Arithmetic Approach (see  above at  54]), the Arithmetic Approach can  equally  be  a useful cross-check of a multiplier derived under the Precedent Approach. But more than simply applying a pure arithmetical discount to the expected period of future loss on account of accelerated receipt and other contingencies,  there is merit in using the  arithmetical tool of  the annualised discount  rate  in determining a multiplier 
61    As an annualised figure, the discount rate allows for more meaningful and accurate comparisons between the awards of multipliers in different cases. It is also of immediate  relevance  to the rates of return on investments, and  accordingly  the effect of accelerated receipt. Finally, the effect of contingencies can be reflected through direct  arithmetical  adjustment of the discount rate
62    The difficulties in the calculation of discount rates may be  mitigated  through the use of financial  and  in particular, actuarial tables as a  proxy  for having to calculate direct discount rates (net of contingencies). Accordingly, we echo the observations that we made recently in the context of dependency claims that it  would  be helpful for parties, in addition to canvassing the multipliers set out in the precedents,  to  assist the court  further  by providing relevant financial or actuarial data to justify the discounts which they seek. This would facilitate the principled yet pragmatic development of the law, while ensuring consistency with past cases involving similarly-situated claimants (see  Zhu  Xiu  Chun (alias  Myint Myint  Kyi) v  Rockwills  Trustee Ltd (administrators of the estate of and on behalf of the dependants of Heng Ang Tee Franklin, deceased) and other appeals  [2016] 5 SLR 412 (“Rockwills  Trustees”) at [85]–[86]). In fact the use of such  financial  or  actuarial  tables  in the assessment of damages for personal injuries is not foreign to  Singapore. As early as in the 1980s, legal practitioners were relying on the M&D Tables, and i 1993, the High Court  in  Eddie  Toon expressly  suggested that reliance could be placed on actuarial tables  (see above at [48–[49 In consequence, there remains little room for  the  formulaic or mechanistic approaches  of the past  in calculating a multiplier. Such approaches  include  the following:
(a)    approximately halving the expected period of future loss  (as was observed by the Singapore High Court in  AOD (a minor suing by his  litigation representative) v AOE  [2016] 1 SLR 217 (“AOD”) at [38])  and  
(b)    applying a principle that “that the multiplier for future medical treatment was usually two years longer than the multiplier for loss of future earnings  [or LEC]  (as was contended  by counsel  for  the plaintiff  (but which was rejected) in  the Singapore High Court decision of  Ho Yiu  v Lim Peng Seng  [2004] 4 SLR(R)  675  at [34]). 
63    In our view,  reason and logic suggest  that  the longer the  expected period of future loss, the greater the discount  amount  should be. This reflects the increased  compounding  of the effect of accelerated receipt, inflation, contingencies, and other vicissitudes of life where the period  of future loss  is longer (see  Rockwills  Trustees  at [87]).  
64    We are  also  of the view that  there  is merit in adopting  higher  discount  rates  in cases of  longer  expected periods of future loss, and that there is  (correspondingly)  nothing wrong in principle with having negative discount rates. The discount rate is the rate of return (net of contingencies) that the claimant  is expected  to realise on his investment of his lump-sum award across the period of future loss.  A claimant  who receives  a lump-sum award  in respect of  a long expected  eriod of  future  loss  is wellplaced  to ride out  the  short-term  volatility of higher-yield investments and to avail himself of increases in interest rates in the future. Conversely, a low or even zero discount rate may justifiably be adopted if the remaining working life or remaining life expectancy of the claimant is very short, such that there is less scope for investment in riskier assets or for drastic changes in the prevailing interest rates  (see  Eugene Lai  at [34] and [38]). This was, in fact, the approach adopted  in  Toh  Wai  Sie  and another v  Ranjendran s/o G Selamuthu [2012] SGHC 33 (“Toh  Wai  Sie”)  at  [37], and more clearly by the  Hong Kong Court of First Instance  in  Chan Pak Ting v Chan Chi  Kuen  (No 2)  [2013] 2 HKLRD 1 (“Chan Pak Ting”), where  Bharwaney J formulated a tiered framework of discount rates that varied with the length of the expected period of future loss. Each tier reflected the investment choices of a different class of claimant-investors, as driven by its specific needs and goals. The discount rates  adopted were as follows:
(a)    2.5% per annum for periods of future loss exceeding 10 years;
(b)    1.0% per annum for periods of future loss from 5  to  10 years; and
(c)    -0.5% per annum for periods of future loss of less than 5 years, on the authority of the decision of the Privy Council in  Simon v  Helmot  [2012] Med LR 394 (in an appeal from Guernsey) because the rates of inflation exceeded the rates of return on investments suitable for claimant-investors with such short investment horizons.
65    Nevertheless,  any  development of the law that involves  departing from the traditional discount rate which are based on rates of return of  between 4 to 5% per annum should be undertaken only  incrementally and  by reference to  or analogy with  past cases. Even legislators and administrators  with their  institutional  resources  struggle  to assess a fair rate of return that claimants should be expected to realise on their lumpsum awards, as  witnessed  in the  recent  call in the UK to  increase  the discount rate, which  had been  reduced to  2.5% per annum pursuant to  s 1 of the Damages Act 1996 (c 48) (UK) There is thus a real risk that courts, in attempting  to do justice to claimants by  compensating for  the low rates of return on fixed deposits at present, unwittingly produce injustice by over-compensating claimants at the expense of defendants and those who fund them  (see  Damages Act 1996: The Discount Rate  (A Joint  Consultation produced by the Ministry of Justice, the Scottish Government and the Department of Justice, Northern Ireland;  Consultation Paper CP 3/2013, 2013) at p 3)
At present the discount rate is set by reference to the expected rates of return on certain types of safe investments. However, there is evidence that recipients of these lump sums do not invest in the cautious way that is envisaged by the guidelines. Instead, the initial evidence indicates, they seem to invest in mixed portfolios, including higher risk investments. This may be the result of a number of factors, but it might suggest that the current legal parameters for setting the rate may produce a rate that is too low. This would result in over-compensation for claimants and extra cost for defendants and those who fund them.  …
66    In this regard, we note that  recently,  the Hong Kong  Court of First Instance held in  Chan Pak Ting  that a discount rate of 4.5% per annum was inappropriate  given  the  economic indicators that suggested that the exceptionally low interest rate regime would likely persist.  This figure of 4.5% per annum was based on the assumed rate of return set out by the House of Lords in  Cookson (Widow and  Administratrix  of the Estate of Frank Cookson,  decd) v Knowles  [1979] 1 AC 556 (“Cookson v Knowles”).  Bharwaney J observed as follows (at [14]-[16]):
14.      “Quantitative Easing” has now become a recognised economic concept. The experts have explained the operation of quantitative easing policies adopted by the US and UK Governments and other Governments in these terms:  
Usually, central banks try to raise the amount of lending and activity in the economy indirectly, by cutting interest rates. UK interest rates are currently at 0.5% — the lowest level in the Bank of England’s history.
Lower interest rates encourage people to spend, not save. But when interest rates can go no lower, a central bank’s only option is to pump money into the economy directly.
The way the central bank does this is by buying assets  usually financial assets such as government and  corporate bonds — using money it has simply created out of thin air.
The third round of quantitative easing was announced by the US Federal Reserve Bank on 13 September 2012 and is likely to put pressure on the UK to follow suit. In the US, the effects of quantitative easing on the US economy have been the depreciation of the US dollar, sharp rises in commodity prices, rises in the equity market, but a sharp drop in US Treasury bond yields.
15.      The experts have also referred to the “double whammy” effect in Hong Kong caused by the economic impact of imported inflation from China without a free hand in fixing a higher interest rate in Hong Kong because of the currency peg of the HK dollar to the US dollar. The  Renminbi  has been rising against the HK dollar for the past ten years. Strong internal demand within Mainland China has caused an increase in the price of food and other products in China. A significant amount of food is imported to Hong Kong from China daily. The rise of the  Renminbi  against the HK dollar has had a marked impact on consumer price inflation in Hong Kong recently. The peg is here to stay for a long, long time and the double whammy effect will continue in Hong Kong.
16.      The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and its potential impact on the Hong Kong economy is explained in an extract from the 2011 Economic Background and 2012 Prospects, published in February 2012 by the Financial Secretary’s Office:  
The Eurozone debt crisis, which broke out in early 2010 upon mounting concern over the fiscal sustainability of several peripheral Eurozone economies, has re-intensified distinctly since the second quarter of 2011 and emerged as the biggest threat to the global economy and financial market stability. …
Being a small and highly externally-oriented economy, the Hong Kong economy will inevitably be affected by the vicissitudes on the external front through both the trade and financial channels. The intensification of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis since mid-2011 has … also led to a region-wide deceleration in exports and production activities in Asia … . Against this background, the external environment has turned increasingly difficult and is expected to remain highly uncertain in the period ahead.
67    In our view, there is merit in the  approach  adopted in  Chan Pak Ting  which centred on  a  macroeconomic  analysis of the discount rate. However, on  the facts of this case, particularly the absence of evidence and submissions on the macroeconomic trends in Singapore, we will limit ourselves to an application of the Precedent Approach and the Arithmetic Approach.  However, counsel in future cases might take note of the guidance we have given in this judgment on the desirability and utility of suitable financial and actuarial evidence.
FME
Multiplier
68    It is undisputed that  Quek  needs medical treatment for the remainder of his life for  his  injuries  due to  the Accident.  His  FME award should therefore be  pegged to his remaining life expectancy:  the number of years that he is expected to live, going forward. Absent evidence that  his  lifespan differs from  that of  the national average  male,  his  remaining life expectancy is calculated by subtracting his age from the average male  life expectancy  in Singapore at the time of the assessment of damages  see the  decision of this court in  Lee Wei Kong (by his litigation representative Lee Swee Chit) v Ng  Siok  Tong  [2012] 2 SLR 85 (“Lee Wei Kong”) at [52])
69    In the  existing  precedents 75 years is  typically  taken as the life expectancy of a male claimant in Singapore (see,  eg,  Lee Wei Kong  and  the Singapore High Court decision of  Ng Song  Leng v  Soh  Kim Seng Engineering  Trading Pte Ltd and Another  [1997] SGHC 289  (“Ng Song Leng”). Nevertheless, counsel for  Quek  accepts  (correctly, in our view)  that it is appropriate to use a “conservative estimate” of 74 years as  Quek’s  expected  life span  (see above at [28]). Hence, we find that  Quek’s  remaining life expectancy  with reference to which the multiplier for FME will be calculated is 50 years. This is the difference between  Quek’s  expected  life span of 74 years and his age of 24 years at time of the assessment of damages.
70    We do not accept a submission  made  by  counsel for  Yeo that  Quek’s smoking of 10 cigarettes a day reduced his  remaining life expectancy.  There was  little  evidence on the effect of  Quek’s  smoking on his remaining life expectancy. Dr Lee Soon Tai (“Dr Lee”),  Yeo’s orthopaedic expert,  gave evidence  that “the smoking may affect his … longevity in life or life expectancy … but not severely.” No other expert  disputed this evidence, and indeed,  no other expert was even asked about  uek’s  remaining life expectancy e  therefore  see no reason not to take 50 years as  Quek’s  remaining life expectancy.
71    The parties referred us to a variety of past cases in which  multipliers for lifelong FME were awarded. These  precedents  can be  clustered  based on the length of the remaining life expectancy.
(a)    Claimants with remaining life expectancies of approximately 50 years have  received  FME multipliers of  between 17 and 20 years  These multiplies  represent discount amounts of  between 62% and 67% vis-à-vis the  claimants’ remaining life expectancies 
(i)    In  the Singapore Court of Appeal decision of  TV Media Pte Ltd v De Cruz Andrea Heidi  [2004] 3 SLR(R)  543 (“TV Media”), a claimant with a remaining life expectancy of 51 years  received  a 17-year multiplier – a 67% discount amount
(ii)    In  Lee Wei Kong, a claimant with a remaining life expectancy of 53 years  received  a 20-year multiplier – a 62% discount amount.
(b)    laimants with remaining life expectancies of  between 30 and 35 years  have  received  FME multipliers of  between 15 and 18 years.  These multipliers represent discount amounts of  between 47% and  %  vis-à-vis the  claimants’ remaining life expectancies
(i)    In  Ng Song Leng, a claimant with a remaining life expectancy of 35 years received a 17-year multiplier – a 51% discount amount.
(ii)    In  Hafizul, a claimant with a remaining life expectancy of 34 years  received  an 18-year multiplier – a 47% discount amount.
(iii)    In  the Singapore High Court decision of  Tan  Juay Mui  (by his next friend Chew Chwee Kim) v  Sher Kuan  Hock and another (Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd, co-defendant; Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd and another, third parties)  [2012] 3 SLR 496 (“Tan  Juay Mui”), a claimant with a remaining life expectancy of  32 years  received  a 17-year multiplier – a  47%  discount amount.
(iv)    In  Eugene Lai, a  claimant with a remaining life expectancy of 30 years  received a  15-year multiplier – a 50% discount amount. However,  it was held at [43] that  this award was “perhaps on the low side”
…  The AR’s choice of a 15-year multiplier for FME, while perhaps on the low side, remains within the range contemplated by the authorities. It is not manifestly inadequate. We therefore see no reason to interfere with the AR’s award for FME.
(c)    Claimants with  remaining life expectancies  of  under 30 years, a sampling of recent cases we survey for completeness 
(i)    In  AOD, a claimant with a remaining life expectancy of approximately  27 years  received a  14-year  multiplier – a  48% discount amount.
(ii)    In  Lee  Mui Yeng  v Ng Tong  Yoo [2016] SGHC 46 (“Lee  Mui Yeng”), a claimant with a remaining life expectancy of 21 years received a  10.5-year  multiplier – a 50% discount amount.
(iii)    In  Toh  Wai  Sie, a claimant with a remaining life expectancy of  9 years  received a  9-year  multiplier –  zero  discount.
72    For ease of comparison between these  FME  multipliers, which involve  claimants  of rather different remaining life expectancies, we have tabulated the annualised discount rates  (compounded annually)  implicit  in these awards.  We set out also the Judge’s award to  Quek  of an 18-year FME multiplier, which represents a 64% discount  amount  compared with his 50-year remaining life expectancy, and works out to an annualised discount  rate  of approximately 5.44% per  annum

Remaining Life Expectancy
Multiplier for FME
Discount  Amount 
Discount  Rate  (Annual)
Lee Wei Kong
53 years
20.0 years
62%
4.80%
TV Media
51 years
17.0 years
67%
5.89%
Quek’s  Case
50 years
18.0 years
64%
5.44%
Ng Song Leng
35 years
17.0 years
51%
5.10%
Hafizul
34 years
18.0 years
47%
4.51%
Tan  Juay Mui
32 years
17.0 years
47%
4.78%
Eugene Lai  
30 years
15.0 years
50%
5.72%
AOD
27 years
14.0 years
48%
6.00%
Lee  Mui Yeng
21 years
10.5 years
50%
8.45%
Toh  Wai  Sie
9 years
9.0 years
0%
0.00%
This discount rate is calculated based on the following formula:
We solved for the discount rate that would make the equation work, where “” denotes the discount rate  and  “” denotes the number of periods of future loss (or future payments)
We  derived  these discount rates  with a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, which calculated the rates  through a process of iteration: trying different discount rates to identify  a discount rate that  ives  a present value of the stream of future losses across this period that  equal the product of the multiplier and multiplicand.  Conversely, the sum of the present values (at the relevant discount rate) of the stream of future losses across the remaining life expectancy of each claimant would equal the quantum of  the  multiplier awarded to him  or her
73    We take  Quek’s  case as an example. At the 5.44%  discount rate  implicit in the Judge’s award, every $1 of annual multiplicand awarded to  Quek  has a present value of  (a) $1.0000 at the time of the assessment of damages (when  Quek  is 24 years of age) (b) $0.9484  one year later (when  Quek  is 25 years of age) (c) between  $0.0744  and  $0.9484  each year thereafter;  and  (d) $0.0744  in the last year of  Quek’s  remaining life expectancy (when  Quek  is 74 years of age). Summing this  stream of  receipts will give a present value equivalent to 18 times of every $1 of annual multiplicand awarded to  Quek  We set out the present values of each payment that  Quek  would receive  in an Annexure  to this Judgment.
74    A similar mathematical approach was taken  as far back as  in  Mallett  v  McMonagle at  177, where  Lord Diplock  observed (in the context of a  multiplier for a  dependency claim
…  In cases such as the present where the deceased was aged 25 and his widow about the same age, courts have not infrequently awarded 16 years’  purchase of the dependency. It is seldom that this number of years  purchase is exceeded. It represents the capital value of an annuity certain for a period of 26 years at interest rates of 4 per cent., 29 ears at interest rates of 4½  per cent.  r 33 years at interest rates of 5 per cent.  
Mallett  v  McMonagle  was followed in the context of a  multiplier for personal injuries in  the House of Lords decision of  Cookson v Knowles at 577 per  Lord Fraser of  Tullybelton  (this last mentioned case was departed from by the UK Supreme Court in  Knauer  v Ministry of Justice  [2016] 2 WLR 672, but not on this particular point And the observations of the House of Lords in  Cookson  v Knowles  have been followed by the Hong Kong Court of First Instance in  Chan Pak Ting  and this court in  Eugene Lai
75    We  recognise  that there is more than one way  of  calculating a discount rate,  depending particularly on  the  frequency with which  an annual interest rate is compounded. We acknowledge  too  the observations in  Paul v Rendell  at 579–580 that it may be unfruitful and even unhelpful “[t]o undertake detailed mathematical calculations in which  nearly  every factor is so speculative or unreliable in order to assess the capital sum to represent what is only one of several components in a total award of compensation”.  Our purpose for  calculating the discount rate here  is not to prescribe an exclusive methodology for doing so in personal injuries cases.  Rather, what we seek to do is to establish a more principled basis for comparing between the multipliers awarded in previous cases than simply looking at the discount amounts awarded there.  In  any event, as long as a single methodology is applied consistently, the differences in the results produced under different calculations are unlikely to be significant.  
76    Amongst the precedents referred to by the parties, we find  Lee Wei Kong  and  TV Media  to be most relevant. The 53-year and 51-year remaining life expectancies  in the respective cases  are most similar to the 50-year remaining life expectancy of  Quek. The investment choices of the claimants there in respect of their FME awards, as driven by their specific needs and goals  based on their age at least, would likely be most comparable to those of  Quek  (see  above at  64]).
77    There is, however, quite a large disparity in the discount rates reflected in  the FME multipliers in Lee Wei Kong  (4.80% per annum)  and in  TV Media (5.89% per annum) On  facts of this case, we prefer the discount rate of 4.80%  per annum applied in  Lee Wei Kong First, the position that  Quek  was in at the time of the assessment of damages was closer to that of the 22-year-old male claimant in  Lee Wei Kong  than that of the 29-yearold female claimant in  TV Media. Second, the economic circumstances of today are more similar to those in 2012 when  Lee Wei Kong  was decided, than those in 2004 when  TV Media  was decided. Third, the multiplier in  Lee Wei Kong  appears to have been determined on a more  persuasive  basis: the court in  TV Media  appears to have considered only the age of the claimant (see  TV Media  at [183]), whereas the court in  Lee Wei Kong  explicitly considered the effect of accelerated receipt and other contingencies (see  Lee Wei Kong  at [52]).  
78    But more  importantly perhaps, the implicit rate of return for awards  of damages  in Singapore has been  between 4% and 5% per annum  (see  Eugene Lai  at [28]). Although adjustments for contingencies may raise the discount rate beyond this range, multiplier awards involving discount rates significantly above the upper end of the range (ie, 5% per annum) should, in our view,  be treated with caution. This is particularly  the case  given the climate of low interest rates that has persisted for the past 15 years and  which  continues today (see  above at  55]).
79    Accordingly, we apply  the discount rate of 4.80 per annum in  Lee Wei Kong  to  Quek’s  50-year remaining life expectancy. This gives a multiplier  of 19.7 years  In light of the  possibility that the claimant in  Lee Wei Kong, unlike  Quek would not require FME for the entirety of the remainder of his life,  we  award  Quek  a 20-year  FME multiplier 
80    It is important, at this juncture, to emphasise the fact that the analysis that is entailed in proceedings of this nature is – as we have already noted – an interactive one in at least two ways. It is interactive inasmuch as no single  approach applies in a dogmatic or mechanistic fashion and, hence, the Precedent Approach and the Arithmetic Approach in fact complement each other – until such time when authoritative actuarial tables are available (a task which is outside the remit of the courts). We have also attempted to introduce more nuance into the process by considering discount rates (in addition to discount amounts) – thus facilitating an at least potentially more accurate ascertainment of the appropriate multiplier through a more nuanced interaction between the multipliers in the existing precedents  on the one hand  and the actual facts as well as  the  context of the case at hand, on the other  (this being  a second, and slightly different, process of interaction).
Multiplicand
81    We turn now to  consider  the  appropriate  multiplicand for FME.
(1)    Daily prosthes 
82    We agree with the Judge’s award of the costs of the use and replacement of a  K3 prosthesis  to  Quek at a rate of  $3,585.30 per annum  for the remainder of his life
83    We do not accept  Quek’s  submission that he needs a  K4 prosthesis Quek’s  own expert, Dr Euan  Wilson (“Dr Wilson”), testified that  Quek  needs only a  K3 prosthesis, and accepted that a  K4 prosthesis  is “not something that [Quek] needs at the moment”. The only sporting interest that  Quek  has demonstrated is that of archery, and Dr Wilson accepted that a  K3 prosthesis  is sufficient for archery. Finally, although  Quek appears to have worn  out the first  K3 prosthesis  with which he was fitted  on or around 28 October 2011 earlier than expected, there is no evidence that the  K3 prosthesis  that was installed in its place has been inadequate for  Quek’s  needs.
84    We do not accept Yeo’s submission that  Quek  should be downgraded to a  K2 prosthesis  after the age of 60 years.  Even if, as Yeo submits, muscle fatigue and atrophy with aging would reduce  Quek’s  activity level in his later years, it would be unduly onerous for  Quek  to have to adapt to the restricted range of activities that a  K2 prosthesis permits
85    There is no basis for  Quek’s  contention that  the award of FME in respect of his prostheses should be increased on account of  inflation  in the price of the prostheses at a rate of  between 3% and 5% per annum.  Although D Wilson  had suggested such a figure in his expert report, he had  accepted in cross-examination that he  did not expect the prices of K3 prostheses to be any more than their current prices.
(2)    Single  K4 prosthesis
86    We  set aside  the Judge’s award  of $7,276.00  for the costs of the single  K4 prosthesis  that  Quek  had purchased to explore his options while adjusting to his post-amputation situation.  These costs had been awarded to  Quek  as part of his special damages for pre-trial medical expenses, and should not have been awarded  again  as general damages for FME. Quek  was thus compensated twice over for his loss.  he setting aside of this part of the Judge’s award  does  not affect the calculation of interest  because the Judge awarded interest on general damages only in respect of pain and suffering (see the GD at [113] and [119]).  
(3)    Aqua limb
87    We agree with the Judge’s award  of the  costs of an aqua limb  to  Quek  at a rate of $710.00 per annum for the remainder of his life Quek  is entitled to such compensation as  is  reasonably necessary to restore him to the position he was in before the  ccident. It is a real possibility that  Quek  will have in the  future to shower in bathrooms that have not been adapted to his needs. To require  Quek  to shower in such bathrooms while sitting down or balancing on one leg would be    impose  an onerous burden on him, and the Judge cannot be faulted for seeking to spare  Quek this burden by  an award of an aqua limb.
(4)    Neuroma and right collarbone surgeries
88    We agree with the Judge’s award of provisional damages.  eyond pointing out that damages should be assessed once-and-for-all in the interests of certainty and finality in litigation,  Quek  offers no reasons in support of his submission that the damages for his neuroma and right collarbone surgeries should be  paid forthwith.  We agree that  the need for these surgeries is, as yet, unclear, and there is  therefore  no reason to disturb the Judge’s making of an award of provisional damages in respect of them.
Conclusion 
89    Based on a  multiplier of  20 year  and a  multiplicand of  4,295.30  per annum ($3,585.30 + $710.00  = $4,295.30,  we award  Quek  a total of $85,906.00  in  FME in respect of his prostheses and his aqua limb 
90    We  set  aside  the Judge’s award of  $7,276.00 in FME for the costs of th  single  K4 prosthesis  purchased by  Quek
91    We affirm the Judge’s award of provisional damages in respect of the surgical excision of  Quek’s  neuroma and the surgical treatment of  Quek’s right collarbone.
LFE/LEC
Multiplier
92    The  period of future loss for the purpose of the  multiplier for  LFE/LEC is the expected  remaining working life of the claimant but for the accident. The statutory minimum retirement age is one factor in the analysis.  Owing  to such factors as the particular characteristics of the claimant and the nature of the work concerned, he may be expected to retire before, at, or after the statutory retirement age (see  Eugene Lai at [26]).
93    With effect from 1 July 2017, the statutory minimum retirement age as set out in the Retirement and Re-employment Act (Cap 274A, 2012 Rev Ed) will be raised from 65 years to 67 years. This should be considered in determining the appropriate multiplier for  LFE/LEC for  Quek  (see  Eugene Lai at [26]).
94    Based on a statutory minimum retirement age of 67 years, but for the Accident, a 24-year-old like  Quek  (as of the time of the assessment of damages) would be expected to have a remaining working life of 43 years.  
95    In  Neo Kim Seng v Clough  Petrosea  Pte Ltd  [1996] 2 SLR(R)  413, the  Singapore  High Court  observed  at [15]  that  a manual worker would typically enjoy a shorter working life compared to a white collar worker. This was “in view of the physical demands made on a [manual worker] by the nature of his job”  (ibid 
96    t was undisputed that  but for the Accident,  Quek  would likely have been engaged in manual work, given his  relatively  low level of education.  However,  Quek  submits that he would likely have worked past the minimum retirement  age of 67 years due to his low level of education. On the other hand, Yeo  argues  that  Quek  would  likely experience difficulty in remaining employed in his later years  due to his declining physical abilities.  In our view, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate either possibility on a balance of probabilities.  e will  thus  take 67 years as  Quek’s  retirement age and adopt  a remaining working life of 43 years to calculate  his  LFE/LEC multiplier.  
97    The approach for calculating the  LFE/LEC  multiplier should be similar to  that  for calculating the  FME multiplier. Where possible, both the Precedent Approach and the Arithmetic Approach should be used, with the multiplier derived under each approach cross-checked against the multiplier derived under the other. Further, discount  rates  provide for more  meaningful and  accurate  evaluations of  different cases  as compared  with  discount amounts  (see above  at [60]–[65
98    Once again, we set out a table of the relevant precedents and the annualised discount rates implicit therein (net of contingencies), compounded  monthly, and derived through a similar iterative process as that which we applied for the FME multiplier (see  above at  72  Where necessary, we have calculated the figures for remaining working life based on the difference between the age of the claimant and the prevailing retirement age at the time of the assessment of damages.  For  Teo  Ai Ling, we used the multiplier awarded by the High Court  (see  Teo  Ai Ling  (by her next friend Chua Wee Bee)  v  Koh  Chai Kwang  [2010] 2 SLR 1037), which was not disapproved on appeal even though the Court of Appeal substituted the award for LFE with a provisional damages award.
Remaining Working Life
Multiplier for LEC/LFE
Discount  Amount
Discount  Rate  (Annual)
Lee Wei Kong
43 years
20.0 years
53%
4.27%
Quek’s  Case
43 years
18.0 years
58%
5.01%
Teo  Ai Ling
42 years
20.0 years
52%
4.21%
Hafizul
36 years
17.0 years
53%
5.00%
Teo  Seng  Kiat
34 years
18.0 years
47%
4.35%
99    We find annualised discount rates in  Lee Wei Kong  (4.27% per annum)  and Teo  Ai Ling (4.2% per annum)  the most  relevant to  Quek’s  case.  he claimants in  those cases were, like  Quek  young persons who had long remaining working lives of over 40 years at the time of their assessments of damages.  hey were  also  likely to have worked in Singapore for the remainder of their working lives. This is in contrast to the Bangladeshi claimant in  Hafizul who was “not likely [to] have worked as a construction worker in Singapore for the remainder of his working life” Because  of this  contingenc, a further discount to the multiplier (beyond the discount for accelerated receipt)  would have been  appropriate (see  Hafizul  at [59]).
100    Applying the discount rate of 4.21%  per annum  in  Teo  Ai Ling  or 4.27%  per annum  in  Lee Wei Kong  to  Quek’s  43 years of remaining working life would give a multiplier of approximately 20 years. Accordingly, we award  Quek  a multiplier of 20 years for  LFE/LEC
101    Going forward, we reiterate our observations  that we made in the context  of  the multiplier for FME  on the value  of  counsel providing relevant actuarial data to justify the discounts that they seek  (see above  at [62).
Multiplicand  for LFE
102    We agree with the Judge that there is insufficient evidence to justify an award of LFE.  
103    In  Teo  Ai Ling, we set out  at [37]  the principles relating to awards of LFE and LEC to personal injury claimants as follows:
Normally, damages on the basis of LFE are awarded when the injured party is  unable to go back to his pre-accident employment  and has to take on a lower paying job. In such a case, the loss will be calculated based on a multiplier and a multiplicand, the multiplicand being the monthly loss in pay and the multiplier being the appropriate period over which to compute the loss. In contrast, where the injured party does not suffered  [sic  an immediate wage reduction … but there is a risk that he may lose that employment at some point in the future and he may, as a result of his injury, be at a disadvantage in getting another job or getting an equally well-paid job in the open market, then the LEC would be the correct basis to  compensate him for the loss. [emphasis added]
104    Although  we  proceeded  to observe in  Teo  Ai Ling at [38] that  LFE can be awarded to a  claimant who is a young child or a student who has yet to enter the labour market, we  emphasised  that there must  be  sufficient objective facts or evidence to  enable the court to  reasonably make the assessment In particular, there must be a stream of future  income  that the claimant  had a reasonable expectation of earning, and of which he  or she  was deprived by virtue of the accident.  Such was the case in  AOD, where it was undisputed that the  year-old claimant would have started work at 22 years of age, and neither party suggested that the claimant would not have remained employed thereafter.  George  Wei J thus pegged the LFE multiplicand to  the  national  average, which he calculated by  averaging the  commencing salaries  across  the  eight broad occupational groups in  what appears to be  the  MoM Tables Similarly, in  the Singapore High Court decisions of  Eddie  Toon and  Peh  Diana  and another  v  Tan  Miang  Lee  [1991] 1 SLR(R)  22 (“Peh  Diana”), on which  Quek  relied in support of his claim for LFE, there was no  evidence that the claimants would not have entered and  then  remained in the workforce. 
105    he  MoM Tables  that  Quek  submits enable the calculation of LFE in his case  imply  provide objective data from which mean salaries can be extrapolated.  However,  before an award of LFE can be made, the claimant must  demonstrate  that  he had  in fact been preparing to embark on a career.  Such evidence is lacking in  Quek’s  case.  Quek  dropped out of school without completing Secondary Three and has had a very sketchy employment history since. In the four years between dropping out of school and enlisting in National Service, he was unable to secure a full-time job and shuttled between part-time jobs.  Moreover, as the Judge found,  Quek  has been unable to  demonstrate  a sustained interest in or aptitude for any trade,  having been dismissed on grounds of tardiness from his employment with TC Homeplus (in 2008, before the Accident) and again with Unique  Motorsports (in 201, after the  ccident).  Unlike the claimants  in  AOD,  Eddie Toon, and  Peh  Diana it is unclear  as to  whether  Quek  could  even  have obtained employment and continued in  such  employment. There was therefore no stream of future income that  Quek  could point to justify an award of LFE.
106    The mere existence of national income statistics such as the  MoM Tables cannot, in  of itself  justify an award of LFE. Otherwise,  every claimant will almost invariably be entitled to an award of LFE, for recourse can easily be had to national income statistics  and the court is unlikely to accept a proposition that someone is completely  inept.  A  claimant who would have in the absence of the accident earned an income  well  below the national average could  simply by refusing to  provide evidence on his income  place himself in a  position to  receive the national average income. Such enrichment  goes beyond the  permissible  scope of compensation for personal injuries
107    e  thus  agree  with  the Judge that there  are  insufficient objective facts or evidence to  enable the court to  reasonably  assess  LFE in  Quek’s  case.
Multiplicand for  EC 
108    We agree with the Judge’s award of $750.00 per month  for  LEC.
109    Yeo relies  almost exclusively  on  Teo  Seng  Kiat, which  the Judge  applied in awarding  Quek  an 18-year multiplier of LFE/LEC, to contend that  Quek  should receive only  $500.00 per month  as his  multiplicand  for LEC. In  Teo  Seng  Kiat at [13] and [16],  Selvam J awarded the 28-year-old claimant a multiplicand of  $500.00 per month after finding that the claimant had suffered approximately a 25% loss of his pre-accident earning capacity of $2,100.00 per month. However,  Selvam J noted  at [13]  that the claimant had “magnified [his loss of earning capacity] to maximise his claim for damages” and “psychologically opt[ed] out of hard work in the hope of recovering his perceived loss of earnings from the defendant who in fact was an insurance company” In contrast, the Judge found  in this case  that  it was clear that [Quek’s] injuries have  significantly  reduced his employability”  [emphasis added]  (see the  GD at [89]). Moreover, Yeo does not dispute the Judge’s finding that  Quek  can no longer  carry  loads of over 20kg (see  the GD  at [89]), and in fact  conceded  in his submissions that  Quek’s  “physical disability … may likely weaken his competitive position in the open labour market”  Although  Quek  accepts that his employment with Unique Motorsports was terminated because of his tardiness, Yeo does not challenge  Quek’s  evidence that he struggled with the  heavy loads that he was required to manoeuvre, even in a “sales admin”  job with Unique Motorsports.  
110    Although Teo  Seng  Kiat was reported only in the  first volume  of the  Singapore Law Reports  for 2003, it  was  actually  decided in 2000,  which was  16 years before the assessment of damages in  Quek’s  case. The change in the value of money due to inflation would not have been insignificant. The differences between the figures in the Guidelines  and in  Pang Teck Kong  for general damages for pain and suffering for a below-knee amputation provide a useful comparator.  The Guidelines  were promulgated 18 years  after  the decision in  Pang Teck Kong and  the authors  thereof recommended a 40% increase in the  maximum  value of the award (see above  at [41).  
111    As for Quek’s  contention that the Judge wrongly reduced the multiplicand on the ground of his prior wrist injury,  one of  Quek’s  orthopaedic experts,  Dr Chang  Haw Chong, testified  that the fractures in  Quek’s  wrist were  not  displaced and that  Quek was “very unlikely”  to  suffer post-traumatic osteoarthritis in his wrist. However, this evidence was not corroborated by the testimony of  Quek’s  other orthopaedic expert, Dr Foo  Siang Shen, Leon, who accepted that “the kind of work [Quek] could have done would have been restricted” and that  Quek  would be considered “not 100% able”  due to this prior wrist injury.  
112    e  thus  affirm  the Judge’s award of an LEC multiplicand of $750.00  per month.
Conclusion
113    We affirm the Judge’s refusal of  Quek’s  claim for LFE, and his decision to  make an  award  of  LEC instead. Based on a 20-year multiplier and a $750.00  per month multiplicand,  we award  Quek  a total of $180,000.00  for LEC
Our orders
114    For the reasons  set out  above, we increase the total award to  Quek  from $452,509.41 to  $471,823.94
115    We will hear parties on costs. 
Sundaresh  Menon                 Andrew  Phang  Boon Leong

Chief Justice                     Judge of Appeal
P Padman  and Hue  Jia  Pei  (KSCGP Juris LLP) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No 45 of 2016 and the respondent in Civil Appeal No 52 of 2016;

Renuka d/o Karuppan Chettiar  (Karuppan Chettiar & Partners) for the respondent in Civil Appeal No 45 of 2016 and the appellant in Civil Appeal No 52 of 2016.


NNEXURE
Present Values of Stream of Income  at  A  Discount Rate of 5.44%
Quek  has a remaining life expectancy of 50 years.  The 18-year multiplier awarded by the Judge  for FME  implies a discount rate of 5.44% per annum on a stream of future payments each equivalent to the value of the multiplicand. The present value of each future payment  as a fraction of its nominal value across the 50 years of the award  is set out in the table below. Summing  all these fractions gives 18.0000, which  is the multiplier awarded  by the Judge, based on an application of the  equation at [72] above:
Year
Nominal Value
Present Value
Year
Nominal Value
Present Value
1.00
1.0000
25
1.00
0.2657
1.00
0.9484
26
1.00
0.2520
1.00
0.8994
27
1.00
0.2390
1.00
0.8530
28
1.00
0.2266
1.00
0.8089
29
1.00
0.2149
1.00
0.7672
30
1.00
0.2038
1.00
0.7275
31
1.00
0.1933
1.00
0.6900
32
1.00
0.1833
1.00
0.6544
33
1.00
0.1739
1.00
0.6206
34
1.00
0.1649
10
1.00
0.5885
35
1.00
0.1564
11
1.00
0.5581
36
1.00
0.1483
12
1.00
0.5293
37
1.00
0.1406
13
1.00
0.5020
38
1.00
0.1334
14
1.00
0.4761
39
1.00
0.1265
15
1.00
0.4515
40
1.00
0.1200
16
1.00
0.4282
41
1.00
0.1138
17
1.00
0.4061
42
1.00
0.1079
18
1.00
0.3851
43
1.00
0.1023
19
1.00
0.3652
44
1.00
0.0970
20
1.00
0.3464
45
1.00
0.0920
21
1.00
0.3285
46
1.00
0.0873
22
1.00
0.3115
47
1.00
0.0828
23
1.00
0.2954
48
1.00
0.0785
24
1.00
0.2802
49
1.00
0.0744
Sub-Total
14.2213
Sub-Total
3.7787
Grand Total
18.0000
 
 
 
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Version No 1: 27 Oct 2020 (22:40 hrs)