1 The appellant claimed trial to eleven charges of voluntarily causing hurt to a domestic maid (“the victim”) under s 323 read with s 73(2) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”) and one charge of using criminal force under s 352 of the Penal Code. The District Judge convicted the appellant on the eleven charges under s 323 read with s 73(2) of the Penal Code but acquitted the appellant on the charge under s 352 of the Penal Code. The District Judge’s Grounds of Decision (“GD”) is reported as Public Prosecutor v Ang Lilian [2016] SGMC 55.

2 For the eleven charges under s 323 read with s 73(2) of the Penal Code, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment terms ranging from two weeks to six months per charge:

3 The District Judge ordered the imprisonment terms for MCN 900288/14, MCN 900290/14 and MCN 900302/14 to run consecutively. This resulted in an aggregate sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment. The appellant was also ordered by the District Judge to pay S$3,150 (in default three weeks’ imprisonment) as compensation to the victim.

4 I dismissed the appeals against both conviction and sentence. I found that an aggregate sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment more adequately met the justice of the case. I therefore ordered the sentences in MCN 900290/2014, 900302/2014, and 900307/2014 to run consecutively. I now set out the reasons for my decision.

5 The appellant was a 44 year-old Singaporean female at the time of the trial. The victim was a 27 year-old female Myanmar national, who had worked as a domestic maid at the appellant’s home. The victim was employed by the appellant from 12 January 2013 to 7 May 2013. Prior to working for the appellant, the victim had worked as a domestic maid in two other households in Singapore.

6 The brief particulars of the eleven charges on appeal were as follows (in chronological order):

(a) In February 2013:

(i) C1A and C2A: the appellant had on two occasions knocked the victim’s head three times with her fist.

(ii) C3B: the appellant dragged the victim to the toilet, sprayed water at her eyes with a water hose, and slapped her more than once.

(b) Sometime in March 2013:

(i) C4B: the appellant used a three-pin plug to hit the victim’s head once, pulled her hair, threw her onto the floor, and slapped her multiple times.

(c) In April 2013:

(i) C5A: the appellant slapped the victim’s face about 10 times.

(ii) C6A: the appellant dragged the victim by her hair into the bathroom and sprayed water on her eyes with the shower head.

(iii) C7A: the appellant used a dustpan to hit the victim’s head multiple times.

(iv) C8A: the appellant used a towel to hit the victim multiple times on her face and body.

(v) C12A: the appellant used a cane to hit the victim’s head multiple times.

(d) In May 2013:

(i) C9B: on 1 May 2013 at about 6am, the appellant hit the victim’s head once with her fist.

(ii) C10A: on 1 May 2013 at about 5pm, the appellant slapped the victim about three times, pushed her to the floor, and kicked her buttock once.

7 On 7 May 2013 at 8.11pm, Ms Santhi Sithirai (“Ms Santhi”), the appellant’s neighbour who resided in the apartment unit next door, went to the Marine Parade Neighbourhood Police Centre to make a Police report. The first information report stated the following:

8 Police Sgt Mohamad Danial Bin Mohamad Nazali (“Sgt Danial”) responded to Ms Santhi’s report. When he arrived at the appellant’s home, Sgt Danial observed that the victim had a bandage over her left eye. He then called the victim to the house gate area and asked her what had happened to her left eye but she did not reply. Sgt Danial then decided to bring the victim out of the house to the staircase landing. At the staircase landing, Sgt Danial asked the victim, “Did you[r] employer beat you?”. The victim nodded her head.

9 Sgt Danial proceeded to ask the victim “[w]hen was the last time your employer beat you?”. The victim responded “2 weeks ago”. He then asked the victim to lift her bandage and saw that the victim’s left eye was swollen and that she had bruises on the left and right side of her face. Sgt Danial testified that the victim was crying, shivering and appeared to be “scared and helpless” after she told him that the appellant had beaten her. Sgt Danial then called for an ambulance. Sgt Danial’s evidence was not challenged by the Defence at the trial below.

10 The victim was sent to Changi General Hospital where she was examined by two doctors, Dr Chen Yu Jia (“Dr Chen”) and Dr Hah Yan Yee (“Dr Hah”). Dr Chen’s medical report on the victim dated 14 May 2013 stated the following:

11 Dr Chen also recorded the following details in her clinical notes:

(a) The victim claimed that the appellant had used her hands, legs and water bottle to hit her;

(b) The victim claimed that she had been abused everyday by the appellant; and

(c) The latest episode had allegedly occurred one week before the medical examination.

12 At the trial, Dr Hah confirmed that she had seen the victim on 7 May 2013 upon Dr Chen’s referral. Dr Hah’s findings were contained in a report compiled by Dr David Justin Hernstadt (“Dr David’s medical report”) dated 16 October 2013. Dr David compiled the report on the basis of Dr Hah’s clinical notes because Dr Hah had left the employ of Changi General Hospital by the time the report was written. Dr David’s medical report stated the following:

13 After the medical examination at Changi General Hospital, the victim was brought back to the Bedok Police Division for further investigations. There, she was interviewed by the Senior Investigation Officer on duty, Police Sgt Ismail Bin Ali (“Sgt Ismail”), who observed that the victim looked “quite scared” because she was “trembling a bit”.

14 On the afternoon of the next day, 8 May 2013, the victim was brought back to the appellant’s house to retrieve her belongings and the items which the appellant had allegedly used to hurt her. During the visit, the Police seized a cane, a dustpan, and a three-pin cable plug. The Police did not manage to retrieve the towel that was mentioned in charge C8A (see [6(c)(iv)] above). Sgt Ismail, who accompanied the victim to the appellant’s house, testified that, during the visit, the appellant had raised her voice at the Police officers and had accused the victim of lying. Sgt Ismail also testified that the victim appeared “to be very scared” during the visit to the appellant’s house.

15 The District Judge convicted the appellant on eleven charges of voluntarily causing hurt to the victim under s 323 read with s 73(2) of the Penal Code. In convicting the appellant, the District Judge accepted the victim’s account of the incidents of abuse and also found that:

(a) The inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence were either immaterial or could be explained:

(i) The victim’s inability to specify dates and times did not shake her credibility; and

(ii) The inconsistencies in the victim’s account of the acts of abuse in the charges were immaterial.

(b) The victim’s failure to seek help was not a critical factor that should be held against her;

(c) The evidence of Ms Santhi, Sgt Danial, and Sgt Ismail were corroborative of the victim’s evidence; and

(d) The medical phenomenon of gravitational seepage could possibly explain why the victim had suffered bruising on her eyes even though her eyes were never directly assaulted.

16 The District Judge also rejected the appellant’s contention that the victim had fabricated her evidence in order to engineer a termination of employment with the appellant.

17 On appeal, the appellant’s case was largely focused on the alleged inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence and the inadequacy of medical evidence. Specifically, the appellant contended that the District Judge had erred in accepting the victim’s evidence in the light of:

(a) The inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence as to the dates of the offences, the sequence of events, and the particulars of each charge;

(b) The fact that the victim had not attempted to escape or seek help despite the abuse she had allegedly suffered; and

(c) The fact that the victim had a “clear motive” for making false allegations of abuse in order to secure a change of employer.

18 The appellant also argued that the District Judge erred in:

(a) accepting the evidence of Ms Santhi who was not a credible witness;

(b) relying on the medical evidence of the doctors who had examined the victim; and

(c) accepting the evidence of the Prosecution’s forensic expert over that of the appellant’s forensic expert.

19 With regard to the sentence imposed, the appellant contended that the District Judge failed to give sufficient weight to the mitigating circumstances in this case, and that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

20 The legal principles governing appeals against convictions are well-established. The hearing of an appeal against conviction is not a re-trial of the case. Where findings of fact hinge on the trial judge’s assessment of the credibility and veracity of witnesses, the appellate court will only interfere if the findings of fact are shown to be plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence (see ADF v Public Prosecutor [2010] 1 SLR 874 (“ADF”) at [16]). This is an eminently sensible approach given that the trial judge has the benefit of having observed the witness in court (see Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 4537 at [40]). Applying these principles, I found that the District Judge’s findings could neither be said to be plainly wrong nor against the weight of the evidence. I will deal with the appellant’s contentions in turn.

21 I rejected the appellant’s attempt to impugn the victim’s credibility by pointing to various inconsistencies in her evidence. In my view, these inconsistencies were explicable and have been properly addressed by the District Judge in the GD.

22 The inconsistencies that the appellant relied upon fell into two categories, namely:

(a) inconsistencies as to the date and time or sequence of events; and

(b) inconsistencies relating to details of how the hurt was caused in each offence.

23 However, before I turn to address the appellant’s contentions with respect to these two categories of inconsistencies, I will first deal with an argument the appellant’s counsel raised regarding the Prosecution’s amendment of the charges.

24 Many of the inconsistencies raised by the appellant were predicated on the differences between the original charges brought against her and the Prosecution’s subsequent amendments to those charges. The appellant contended that these amendments reflected the shifting accounts that the victim had furnished to the Police, the Prosecution, and the court.

25 I found no merit in this contention. The Prosecution’s amendments to the charges were insignificant and essentially related to minor details such as whether the appellant had “splashed” as opposed to “sprayed” water in the victim’s eyes, and the exact number of times that the appellant had hit or slapped the victim. Even accepting that these amendments had been occasioned by inconsistencies in the victim’s accounts, I was of the view that such minor amendments did not affect the victim’s overall credibility (see the remarks at [29] below).

26 In any event, the Prosecution’s amendments did not affect the appellant’s ability to mount her defence, which was essentially one of complete denial. Subject to certain procedural safeguards, s 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) provides that the court may alter charges or frame new charges at any time before judgment is given. The procedural safeguards found in ss 128 and 129 of the CPC include the following requirements:

(a) The altered charge must be read and explained to the accused.

(b) The court must immediately call on the accused to enter his plea and to state whether he is ready to be tried on the altered charge.

(c) If the accused declares that he is not ready to be tried on the altered charge, the court must duly consider any reason he gives.

If the court thinks that proceeding immediately with the trial is unlikely to prejudice the accused’s defence or the prosecutor’s conduct of the case, then it may proceed with the trial (s 129(3) CPC). If the court thinks otherwise, then it may direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for as long as necessary (s 129(4) CPC).

27 Ultimately, the court is concerned with whether the amendments cause the accused to be prejudiced or misled. This is demonstrated by Yong CJ’s approach to dealing with amendments to charges in Garmaz s/o Pakhar and another v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 453 at [43]:

28 In the present case, the Prosecution’s amendments to the charges did not prejudice the appellant in the conduct of her defence. All amendments to the charges were made before the appellant’s defence was called. The amended charges were read and explained to the accused and the accused did not raise any concerns as to her readiness to be tried on the amended charges. More crucially, the appellant did not object to the Prosecution’s application to amend the charges on 7 March 2016 and also did not apply to recall any of the witnesses as a result of the amended charge:

Accordingly, I found that there was sufficient opportunity for the appellant to reconsider her position and meet the Prosecution’s case.

29 I found that the victim’s inconsistencies as to dates and times of the incidents of assault were minor and immaterial. It must be borne in mind that when a witness gives evidence on matters after a significant lapse of time, “adequate allowance must be accorded to the human fallibility in retention and recollection” (see Public Prosecutor v Singh Kalpanath [1995] 3 SLR(R) 158 at [54] and [60]). In my view, such an allowance was appropriate in the present case as the alleged abuse occurred some two years before the commencement of the trial and it was reasonable that the victim’s memories of the abuse may have faded over the passage of time. Furthermore, the evidence showed that the victim had been frequently abused by the appellant on numerous occasions (including the specific incidents which were the subject of the charges) between January 2013 and May 2013. In the circumstances, I found that it was not unreasonable that the victim had difficulty recalling specific dates and times for each specific instance of abuse. I therefore found that the victim’s inability to recall specific dates and times with precision did not adversely affect the veracity and weight of her evidence.

30 Even accepting the appellant’s case at its highest, the victim’s inconsistencies and inability to specify exact dates and times in her evidence did not materially affect the charges. Most of the charges were worded such that references to the date and time of the offences were in general terms, save for two of the charges (C9B and C10A), which the appellant had not taken issue with. Having regard to the charges as framed, the Prosecution was not required to adduce evidence from the victim on specific dates and times for each and every charge in order to discharge its burden of proof.

31 I also found that the inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence regarding how the hurt was caused were immaterial.

32 The appellant contended that an inconsistency arose from charges C1A and C2A and the victim’s evidence at trial. Charges C1A and C2A averred that the appellant had used her “fist” while the victim’s evidence at trial was that the appellant had used her “knuckles” to hit her:

33 In my view, this inconsistency was immaterial because the “knuckles” could be considered to be a part of the “fist”.

34 The appellant contended that an inconsistency arose between the victim’s testimony during her evidence-in-chief (“EIC”) and her evidence under cross-examination. During her EIC, the victim testified that the spraying of the water lasted “[a]bout 5 minutes, 10 minutes. 5 to 10 minutes”. Under cross-examination, the victim testified that the “whole incident” lasted “5-10 minutes”. The victim eventually conceded that she was not able to tell how long her face/eyes were sprayed with water.

35 Despite the victim’s inconsistency as to how long the appellant had sprayed water at her eyes, I agreed with the District Judge that this detail was not material as “it did not detract from the fact that she has maintained throughout her testimony that her eyes [were] sprayed with water”.

36 The appellant contended that there was an inconsistency between the sequence of events given in the victim’s EIC and the sequence of events in her evidence under cross-examination. The victim’s evidence during EIC was that she was hit once on her head with a three-pin plug, pulled by her hair, pushed to the floor and then slapped three times on her cheeks. The appellant contended that this differed from the victim’s evidence in cross-examination where she said that she was pulled by her hair, pushed to the floor, hit on her head with the three-pin plug and then slapped on her cheeks.

37 In my opinion, the District Judge was right in finding that this discrepancy in the sequences of events was minor given that the nature of the individual acts and the attack as a whole remained the same.

38 The appellant contended that an inconsistency arose from the difference in the part of the body that the victim had been assaulted on. The victim alleged in her EIC that the appellant sprayed her face and body with water for a short while. In cross-examination, the victim claimed that the appellant allegedly sprayed water into her face and not her eyes. Again, this inconsistency was trivial given that the “eyes” may be considered to be a part of the “face”.

39 The appellant contended that the victim’s failure to run away, seek medical treatment or make a police report was incongruous with her allegations of abuse. In support of her contention:

(a) The appellant highlighted that the victim was at liberty to enter and leave the appellant’s house at all times leading up to 7 May 2013.

(b) The appellant relied on the fact that the victim had confirmed that she was issued with a booklet titled “A Guide for Foreign Domestic Workers” written in the Myanmese language and had also confirmed that she knew of the page which stated that if the “employer breaks the law or ill treats you, you can call the employment agency, police at 999, MOM at that number, your embassy at High Commissions, and your employer will be punished in accordance with the law”.

40 The appellant also attempted to characterise the victim as someone who knew how to safeguard and advance her own self-interest. The appellant cited the example of how the victim had requested Mdm June Siew Geok Kim (“June Siew”), her maid agent, to procure a transfer after she (the victim) felt that she could not cope with looking after an old lady while working for her previous employer. The appellant also alleged that the fact that the victim had not made any complaints to June Siew during the latter’s visits to the appellant’s home in February and March 2013 was evidence that she had not been abused.

41 I found the appellant’s contentions to be devoid of any merit. The fact that the victim had not attempted escape or sought help despite the abuse she allegedly suffered is neither here nor there. While an attempt to escape or seek help may be construed as conduct that can corroborate the existence of an abusive environment, a failure to attempt escape or to seek help could be equally indicative of the extent of the victim’s vulnerability and abject fear of her employer (to the extent that she does not dare to escape or seek help). In that regard, the difficulties which may be faced by domestic maids in reporting abuse were recognised by the Court of Appeal in ADF at [61]:

42 In my judgment, even if the victim was aware of her legal rights, it must be recognised that the act of reporting an abusive employer would have required a degree of fortitude on the victim’s part. The victim should neither be faulted nor have her credibility undermined simply because her fear had prevented her from lodging a complaint or extricating herself from the appellant’s abuse.

43 In any event, the victim had explained her passivity to some extent. I accepted her explanations. The victim’s evidence was that the appellant had told her that if she ran away, she would be caught by the Police. She also explained that she was unfamiliar with the area around the appellant’s house:

This, along with the victim’s personal vulnerability as a foreigner with limited command of English, and a timid personality (as observed by Ms Santhi, Sgt Danial and Sgt Ismail), reasonably explained why she had not attempted escape or sought help. The District Judge was clearly conscious of all these considerations.

44 I also found that little weight should be ascribed to the fact that the victim had not complained to June Siew during the visits June Siew made in February and March 2013. First, June Siew was never called as a defence witness during the trial despite being offered to the Defence as a witness at the close of the Prosecution’s case on 7 March 2016:

45 On 8 March 2016, the appellant informed the court that she did not intend to call June Siew as a witness:

46 Second, I also accepted the victim’s explanation during cross-examination that she did not complain to June Siew because the appellant was around during those visits:

47 The appellant contended that the victim had a clear motive to perjure herself in order to secure a change of employer. In support of this, the appellant highlighted the following:

(a) The victim’s admission that she found it difficult to work for the appellant. The victim had admitted that she could not cope with the appellant’s instructions and the fact that she was constantly scolded.

(b) The victim’s admission that she was disappointed with her salary being reduced from $500 per month with one day off per month, to $450 per month, with no days off.

(c) The victim’s admission that she had gained from the change from the appellant to her present employer.

48 I found no merit in the appellant’s contention. An accused person seeking to show that the victim has a motive to falsely implicate him or her has to adduce sufficient evidence of this motive so as to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case. A mere allegation is not sufficient, as was stated in Goh Han Heng v Public Prosecutor [2003] 4 SLR(R) 374 at [33]:

49 There was no basis to support the appellant’s contention that the victim had a motive to perjure. The fact that it was Ms Santhi, the neighbour, and not the victim who reported the abuse was strongly indicative of a lack of any such motive. If the victim had wanted to falsely accuse the appellant, she could have taken active steps to implicate the appellant. Instead, she adopted a position of stoic passivity. Furthermore, as rightly observed by the District Judge, there would have been no need for the victim to fabricate allegations of a litany of abuses by the appellant when one or two allegations of assault would have sufficed to secure her removal from the appellant’s house and employ. Finally, the District Judge rightly observed that there was no guarantee, even if she left the employ of the appellant, that the victim would be able to secure a new employer immediately.

50 The appellant contended that Ms Santhi “was not only unbelievable but a dangerous perjuror”. This submission was based on two assertions:

(a) Ms Santhi did not witness any of the alleged offences.

(b) Ms Santhi’s had exaggerated her evidence in court. In support of this, the appellant relied on the fact that no pinch mark was observed on the victim’s left upper arm during the medical examination at Changi General Hospital, despite Ms Santhi’s testimony that she saw such a pinch mark.

51 I rejected the appellant’s contention unhesitatingly. Notwithstanding certain discrepancies in her evidence, I found Ms Santhi’s testimony to be reliable and cogent evidence of the appellant’s treatment of the victim. As the appellant’s next-door neighbour, Ms Santhi was in a position to give reliable evidence of the sounds that she heard emanating from the appellant’s home. Ms Santhi’s evidence was that she had heard scolding, crying and beating coming from the appellant’s home at least four to five times a week. This corroborated the series of abuses that the victim was alleged to have suffered. Ms Santhi also gave reliable eyewitness evidence on what she saw on the morning of 7 May 2013 when she was on the way out of her house. Ms Santhi testified that she saw the victim sweeping the corridor floor outside the appellant’s house and noticed the bandage over the appellant’s left eye. This was corroborated by Sgt Danial’s evidence of what he observed when he visited the appellant’s home in the evening of 7 May 2013, as well as the photographs later taken at the Police station. Finally, there was no evidence of any dispute or acrimony between the appellant and Ms Santhi that would give rise to any conceivable motive on Ms Santhi’s part to perjure and falsely accuse the appellant.

52 With respect to the discrepancy between the findings of the medical examination and Ms Santhi’s observation of a “huge pinch mark” over the victim’s left upper arm, I found that this discrepancy was inconsequential. It was most likely due to the fact that Ms Santhi only had a momentary glance at the victim and had not stopped to examine the victim carefully when she was on the way out of her house on the morning of 7 May 2013.

53 The appellant did not challenge the medical observations of Dr Chen and Dr Hah. Instead, the appellant contended that the account of the abuse told by the victim to Dr Chen and Dr Hah was inconsistent with the victim’s evidence in court.

54 Dr Chen examined the victim on 7 May 2013 at Changi General Hospital. She noted in her clinical notes that the victim said that her employer had used her hands, legs and a water bottle to hit her. Dr Hah also examined the victim on 7 May 2013 upon Dr Chen’s referral. In cross-examination, Dr Hah testified that to the best of her recollection, in the absence of her clinical notes, the victim said she had been hit by her employer a week before the examination and that her employer had used a comb to hit her.

55 While none of the charges brought related to the victim being hit with a water bottle or a comb as noted by Dr Chen and Dr Hah respectively, these discrepancies were insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the appellant’s favour. Dealing first with Dr Chen’s evidence, Dr Chen examined the victim in the Accident & Emergency (“A&E”) room at the Changi General Hospital for less than 15 minutes. This was compounded by the fact that the victim spoke minimal English and had no interpreter with her. Dr Chen admitted that she had rephrased the victim’s simple English phrases and that the phrase “employer used hands, legs and water bottle to hit” recorded on her clinical notes might have been a rephrasing rather than a verbatim recording of what the victim had said to her.

56 On the whole, I found that the other parts of Dr Chen’s medical report were consistent and corroborated the victim’s testimony in court. The victim was last allegedly abused by the appellant on 1 May 2013, about a week before Dr Chen examined her. She also complained of pain on her frontal area, which was consistent with her evidence that the appellant had hit her on the head on multiple occasions.

57 With respect to Dr Hah, I found that the discrepancy between the victim’s testimony and Dr Hah’s recollection that the victim had claimed she was hit with a comb was also immaterial. As with Dr Chen, Dr Hah had also examined the victim for a short period of time, and faced the same issues relating to the victim’s limited proficiency in English. Furthermore, this discrepancy could also be explained by the fact that Dr Hah was speaking from memory without reference to her clinical notes, which she could not obtain because she had left the employ of Changi General Hospital.

58 The appellant contended that the District Judge erred in preferring the evidence of the Prosecution’s expert witness, Dr Cuthbert Teo (“Dr Teo”) over that of the appellant’s expert witness, Dr Chang Wei Chun (“Dr Chang”). At the trial below, Dr Teo and Dr Chang were consulted as experts to give their opinions as to whether the victim’s account of the assault was consistent with the injuries she sustained as reflected in the medical reports. From their observations of the victim’s photographs, Dr Teo and Dr Chang agreed that the victim suffered the following injuries:

(a) Left peri-orbital haemorrhage;

(b) Scleral sub-conjunctival haemorrhage, medially, of the left eye;

(c) Right infra-orbital bruise;

(d) Bruise over the mid front region of the neck;

(e) Possible bruising over the left side of the bridge of the nose;

(f) Possible bruising over the right cheek, somewhere midway between the right infra-orbital bruise and the level of the right corner of the mouth;

(g) Possible bruising over the left cheek, below the left peri-orbital bruise;

(h) Possible bruising over the upper front part of the neck;

(i) Possible reddish bruising over the regions of the left and right sternal-clavicular joints; and

(j) Possible bluish bruising over the lower right from part of the neck.

59 Dr Teo opined that the acts of abuse in the eleven charges could have caused the injuries seen on the victim. Dr Teo’s observations, inter alia, were that:

(a) The application of blunt force trauma of the frontal scalp region could be the cause of the peri-orbital and infra-orbital bruising due to gravitational seepage;

(b) The slapping incidents in C3B, C4B, C5A and C10A could also cause bruising to the face, providing a possible mechanism of the cause of the victim’s left sided facial bruising;

(c) The act of the appellant in pulling the victim’s T-shirt in C8A could also possibly account for the bruising of the victim’s neck over the Adam’s apple; and

(d) The victim’s account that she was hit on the head every one to two days might explain the swelling on the head. The victim’s description of the swelling as “soft and feels like liquid” was consistent with descriptions of swellings often given by children as soft and compressible.

60 In his report, Dr Chang expressed the opinion that the injuries noted in the photographs could not have been caused by the alleged actions described in the charges. Dr Chang explained that the injuries sustained must be caused by a direct assault to the location of the injury because “each area of bruising would require a direct blunt force to be applied”. Nevertheless, although Dr Chang’s initial opinion was that the victim’s peri-orbital bruising was more likely to have been caused by a direct assault to her left eye area, he agreed under cross-examination that it could also be explained by gravitational seepage:

61 Dr Chang also expressed his agreement to the following during cross-examination:

(a) That the sub-conjunctival haemorrhage could have resulted from a possible irritation of the conjunctiva of the eye due to the swelling around the eye caused by the periorbital bruise:

(b) That the bruising at the victim’s throat area could be due to the pulling of the victim’s shirt, depending on the direction the shirt was being pulled:

(c) One possible mechanism of facial bruising is by slapping, especially if the slapping is either forceful or repeated:

On the whole, it appeared that there was not much divergence between Dr Teo and Dr Chang’s opinion; both of them agreed on the possibility that many of the victim’s injuries could have been caused by the appellant’s alleged actions as averred in the charges.

62 The appellant contended that some of the acts of abuse particularised in the charges “ought to have” given rise to injuries, but no such injuries were observed on the victim. On this basis, the appellant submitted that the District Judge erred in ruling that some of these injuries may have healed by the time of examination. In support of this, the appellant relied on the fact that no medical witnesses testified that there were “recovered injuries”.

63 I rejected the appellant’s contention on this point. It was likely that many of the injuries would have healed by the time of the medical examination given the lapse of time between the acts of abuse and the medical examination on 7 May 2013. This lapse of time was at its shortest, six days and at its longest, about three months (from the date of the first three charges sometime in February 2013). Furthermore, Dr Chang agreed that it was not unreasonable that a bruise can fade in one week and that in the case of blunt force trauma where the skin is not broken, it was not unreasonable that there would be no residual scar. In any event, most of the injuries that the victim claimed to have sustained were swellings and bruises on her head. In respect of these injuries, Dr Teo explained, with reference to medical literature, that bruising of the scalp can be difficult to detect until the hair has been removed and that in clinical practice, shaving is often not an option.

64 For the abovementioned reasons, I was not persuaded that the District Judge had formed his conclusions against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, I dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction.

65 I dismissed the appellant’s appeal against sentence as the imprisonment terms ordered by the District Judge could not be said to be manifestly excessive. Instead, I found that the global sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment ordered by the District Judge was manifestly inadequate. I therefore modified the combination of the three imprisonment sentences that were to run consecutively. This resulted in an overall increase of two months’ imprisonment.

66 The powers of an appellate court in relation to sentences are stated in s 390(1) of the CPC:

67 Section 390(1)(b) makes clear that in an appeal from a conviction, the appellate court may enhance the sentence, even if there is no appeal by the Prosecution against the sentence imposed by the lower court. Nevertheless, the power of an appellate court to enhance or reduce sentences is subject to, inter alia, the condition that the sentence is either “manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances of the case”:

68 As noted by the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Kwong Kok Hing [2008] 2 SLR(R) at [14]–[15] (citing Yong CJ in Public Prosecutor v Cheong Hock Lai [2004] 3 SLR(R) at [26]), an appellate court may also interfere with a sentence imposed by a lower court where:

(a) The trial judge had made the wrong decision as to the proper factual matrix for sentence.

(b) The trial judge had erred in appreciating the material before him.

(c) The sentence was wrong in principle.

69 After the appellant was convicted by the District Judge, the Prosecution submitted for a global sentence of 14 to 16 months’ imprisonment. The Prosecution also urged the court to order that the appellant compensate the victim S$3,150 for her loss of monthly salary. The amount of S$3,150 represented the victim’s loss of monthly salary from May 2013, when she left the appellant’s employ, to December 2013, when she eventually found new employment. Apart from orally responding to the Prosecution’s address on sentence, the appellant did not make any plea in mitigation and did not address the District Judge on the appropriate sentence.

70 In the GD, the District Judge identified deterrence and retribution as the dominant sentencing considerations in maid abuse cases. He then took into account the following aggravating factors in determining the appropriate sentence:

(a) The abuse was prolonged and escalated in severity;

(b) The victim had suffered grievously as she was assaulted with various household objects and the acts of assault were mainly inflicted on her head; and

(c) The appellant showed a lack of remorse.

71 On appeal, the appellant contended that the District Judge erred in not considering the mitigating factors in her favour. In my judgment, there was no basis for the appellant to make this contention. The District Judge could not have erred in this regard because the appellant did not offer any plea in mitigation nor highlight any mitigating factors for the District Judge’s consideration. Furthermore, I found that the factors raised in the appellant’s written submission were of no mitigatory value as they only sought to downplay the extent of the harm visited upon the victim. The factors the appellant relied on were:

(a) The fact that the victim had not been hospitalised, warded or granted hospitalisation leave;

(b) The victim did not require any medication, treatment or prescription;

(c) The victim did not suffer any loss of earning capacity or loss of amenities; and

(d) The appellant had no antecedents prior to the present case.

These factors were neutral at best. If the victim had been hospitalised, or had required medication or medical treatment, or had suffered a loss of earning capacity, such factors would certainly have been treated as aggravating instead. Yet it is well established that the absence of aggravating factors is not in itself mitigatory (see Public Prosecutor v AOM [2011] 2 SLR 1057 (“AOM”) at [37]). In respect of the last factor, I agreed with the District Judge that in cases where the abuses were prolonged (as they were in the present case), a clean record is given no weight as a mitigating factor (see AOM at [42] and more recently Janardana Jayasankarr v Public Prosecutor [2016] 4 SLR 1288 (“Janardana”) at [18]).

72 In arguing that the aggregate sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive, the appellant also relied on s 95 of the Penal Code which provides that:

In my view, it was clear that the appellant could not avail herself of s 95 of the Penal Code because of the number of incidents of assault involved. Moreover, the injuries suffered by the victim in the present case, even disregarding those that no longer remained visible, still included other obvious visible injuries to her face and neck which clearly did not fall within the ambit of “slight harm” contemplated under s 95 of the Penal Code.

73 Lastly, I agreed with the District Judge that deterrence and retribution were the key considerations in sentencing for maid abuse cases. As the Court of Appeal stated in ADF at [55]:

The public interest in deterring maid abuse was also recently reiterated in Janardana at [4].

74 Applying the principles of deterrence and retribution to the present case, it was clear that the aggravating factors warranted a significant imprisonment term for each charge. The victim had sustained visible injuries to her face and neck which are vulnerable parts of the body. The assaults in most of the charges were not singular acts of violence but involved multiple blows. In my judgment, a sentence in the range of two months’ imprisonment for most of the charges involving simple assault was appropriate in the present case. This comported with the sentences meted out by the District Judge for the appellant’s offences involving simple assault save for charge C6A (MCN 900301/2014) where, although the appellant did not physically hit the victim, she had dragged her by the hair into the bathroom and sprayed water at her eyes. I did not disturb the District Judge’s sentence with respect to charge C6A, but I would observe that the imposed sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment was at the lower end given the nature of the offence.

75 I also agreed with the District Judge that longer imprisonment terms of four to six months’ imprisonment were appropriate for offences where objects and implements were used to cause hurt. The appellant had used household objects such as a three-pin plug, a dustpan and a cane to cause hurt to the victim. The lengthier terms of imprisonment for these charges properly reflected the use of these items as “weapons” against the victim.

76 The District Judge ordered three of the imprisonment terms to run consecutively. This was in keeping with the principle that consecutive sentences may be necessary to give effect to the interest of deterrence: ADF at [143]. However, while I agreed with the District Judge’s decision to order three of the imprisonment terms to run consecutively, I found that, with reference to the aggregate sentences that have been imposed for similar cases, the global sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment was manifestly inadequate given the gravity of the offences and the appellant’s culpability in the present case.

77 In ADF, the accused was convicted after trial on five charges of voluntarily causing hurt to his domestic maid, and acquitted on eight charges. The five charges on which the accused was convicted related to causing hurt to his domestic maid by hitting her on the head with his knuckles and hands and kicking her in areas such as her hips and abdomen. The abuse happened over a period of four months. The eventual sentences imposed ranged from six to nine months’ imprisonment per charge. Three sentences were ordered to run consecutively, resulting in a global sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment.

78 In Public Prosecutor v Wong Pui Kwan (MCN 863/2013 & Ors), the offender pleaded guilty to six charges, which included two charges of voluntarily causing hurt to the domestic maid. Seven other charges were taken into consideration. The victim was abused by the offender on several occasions from October 2011 till 6 December 2011, when she ran away. The victim sustained bruises and skin discolouration over her upper and lower limbs and buttocks. The court sentenced the offender to terms of imprisonment ranging from four weeks to seven months. The court ordered the sentences in respect of three charges to run consecutively. In all, the offender was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment.

79 In Public Prosecutor v Nuraini Binte Hassan (MCN 819/2013 & Ors), the offender pleaded guilty to four charges of voluntarily causing hurt to her domestic maid. Two other similar charges were taken into consideration. The offences spanned two weeks, from 22 July 2012 till 6 August 2012. The victim sustained chest and facial contusions. The court sentenced the offender to four months’ imprisonments for three of the charges and five months’ imprisonment for one charge. The court ordered one of the four-month sentences to run consecutively with the five-month sentence, resulting in a global sentence of nine months’ imprisonment.

80 Having considered the sentences imposed in these cases and their underlying factual substratum, I was of the view that the aggregate sentence in the present case should be higher given the duration and nature of the abuse, as well as the fact that the accused in the present case had claimed trial to the charges. This was in contrast to Public Prosecutor v Wong Pui Kwan and Public Prosecutor v Nuraini Binte Hassan where slightly more lenient aggregate sentences were ordered in the context of the offenders having pleaded guilty.

81 The appellant was convicted after a fairly lengthy trial on a total of 11 charges involving offences committed over a duration from February 2013 to May 2013. There were serious aggravating factors which fell for due consideration: first, the appellant had capitalised on the victim’s vulnerability and timidity and had sought to manipulate her into believing that running away would be futile and might even lead to her being arrested and imprisoned. In addition, the victim had to endure an increasing intensity of assaults over a prolonged duration.

82 More crucially, I found that the appellant displayed a complete lack of remorse. She mounted a spurious defence premised on a bare denial coupled with unbridled efforts to attack the credit of the prosecution witnesses, principally the victim and Ms Santhi. She was plainly insistent on making the victim relive the trauma of her experience of persistent and escalating abuse. I found no mitigating factors whatsoever.

83 I was particularly troubled by the submissions made by counsel (presumably on the appellant’s instructions) to attempt to persuade me that Ms Santhi was “hallucinating” and was a “dangerous perjuror”. I found absolutely no basis to cast serious aspersions on an independent witness who had come forward in the spirit of civic-mindedness to report her suspicions to the police. Without her intervention, the victim’s prolonged abuse at the hands of the appellant might never have come to light at all.

84 The conduct of the defence and the submissions raised on appeal demonstrated a deplorable lack of remorse. In my view, a global sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment more adequately met the justice of the case and was necessary to serve the ends of both general and specific deterrence. This represented the upper end of the sentence range sought by the Prosecution below. I therefore ordered the sentences in MCN 900290/2014, 900302/2014, and 900307/2014 to run consecutively.

85 For the reasons stated above, I dismissed the appeals against both conviction and sentence. I also ordered that the aggregate imprisonment term be enhanced from 14 months to 16 months.