1 Mr Francesco Mazzagatti (the “Applicant”) filed CA/OA 14/2025 (“OA 14”) for permission to appeal against a decision of a judge of the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) in HC/SUM 711/2025 (“SUM 711”) to the Court of Appeal. The respondent in OA 14 is Alliance Petrochemical Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Alliance”). By SUM 711, Alliance applied for permission to file a further affidavit in respect of committal proceedings it had initiated in HC/SUM 195/2025 (“SUM 195”) against the Applicant for breach of a pre-action discovery order made in HC/OA 740/2023 (“OA 740”). On 21 July 2025, this Court declined permission to appeal and accordingly, OA 14 was dismissed with costs fixed at $8,000 (all-in). We now provide the grounds for dismissing OA 14.

2 In brief, the relevant facts and events leading up to SUM 711 are as follows.

3 Alliance is a company incorporated in Singapore on 7 March 2005. It is an investment holding company in the business of wholesale of fuels and related products. The Applicant was a former director of Alliance. He was also the sole director of Alliance’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Alliance Petrochemical Trading LLC (“AP Trading”), which has since been dissolved.

4 Alliance intends to file legal proceedings against the Applicant for breach of fiduciary duties and/or breach of trust in his capacity as Alliance’s director. Alliance alleges that the Applicant exercised control over Alliance’s bank accounts, including a bank account with United Overseas Bank Limited (“UOB”) that was subsequently closed in March 2022. Furthermore, the Applicant had allegedly, on 23 December 2018, incorporated AP Trading without approval from Alliance’s other directors. At all material times, the Applicant was the sole manager of AP Trading with full authority to manage its affairs. AP Trading was subsequently dissolved, allegedly by the Applicant, and its bank accounts were also allegedly closed by him. According to Alliance, it had not been able to revive AP Trading or retrieve information relating to AP Trading’s bank accounts.

5 Separately, Alliance has 60% equity in Mehr Petrochemical Company (Private Joint Stock) (“MHPC”), a company registered in Tehran, Iran. The main business of MHPC is in the production and sale of heavy duty polyethylene.

6 Sometime in 2021, Alliance’s review of its financial statements and accounting records for the financial years ending 31 December 2020 and 31 December 2021 revealed large discrepancies and unexplained transfers of moneys into and out of its UOB bank account, all of which raised suspicion that the Applicant had siphoned large sums belonging to both Alliance and AP Trading. However, other than a 70-page ledger of Alliance’s transactions (the “Ledger”), there were no supporting documents to verify the genuineness of the various transactions. It was under these circumstances that Alliance, on 26 July 2023, commenced OA 740 against the Applicant to seek pre-action production of documents pursuant to O 11 r 11(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”).

7 The application in OA 740 was granted by an Assistant Registrar on 24 April 2024. The Applicant appealed in HC/RA 93/2024. The Judge dismissed the Applicant’s appeal with slight modifications to the scope of documents ordered to be produced. By HC/ORC 3067/2024 dated 6 June 2024 (the “Discovery Order”), the Applicant was ordered to, inter alia:

(a) produce to Alliance the relevant documents in his possession or control falling within the descriptions set out in Schedule 1 of the Order; and

(b) file and serve on Alliance a list of documents verified by an affidavit stating whether the documents described in Schedule 1 are, or have at any time been, in his possession or control, and if not now in its possession or control, when he parted with the documents and what has now become of them.

8 The documents described in Schedule 1 pertained to documents in relation to Alliance for the period from 31 July 2018 to 31 December 2021 and documents in relation to AP Trading for the period from 23 December 2018 to 31 December 2021, with the qualification that these documents corresponded or related to the transactions recorded in the Ledger. These documents included invoices, payment advice, used cheque books, issued cheques and agreements with counterparties that corresponded to the transactions exhibited in the Ledger. Additionally, the bank statements of all bank accounts held in the name of AP Trading were also ordered to be produced.

9 Pursuant to the Discovery Order, the Applicant filed a list of documents verified by an affidavit on 4 July 2024 stating that he did not have possession or control of the documents described in Schedule 1. Dissatisfied with the Applicant’s position taken in affidavit, Alliance commenced committal proceedings against the Applicant. In HC/SUM 22/2025 (filed on 27 December 2024), Alliance obtained permission from the Judge to make a committal application. Consequently, Alliance commenced SUM 195 against the Applicant on 20 January 2025.

10 On 7 August 2024, Alliance commenced concurrent legal proceedings against the Applicant and one Francesco Dixit Dominus in the High Court of Justice, Business and Property Courts of England and Wales (the “UK Proceedings”). In the UK Proceedings, Alliance alleged that a sum of at least €143,808,798.66 had been misappropriated from itself and AP Trading. In the course of the UK Proceedings, Alliance obtained some documents which it wished to rely on in SUM 195.

11 Before the hearing of SUM 195, on 17 March 2025, Alliance filed SUM 711 for permission to file a further affidavit, containing five categories of documents it wished to adduce:

(a) documents relating to the opening of Alliance’s UOB accounts;

(b) documents relating to AP Trading;

(c) documents produced by the Applicant’s UK solicitors in the UK Proceedings relating to letters from Alliance to the Inspection Organisation of Iran and an e-mail from MHPC to Alliance;

(d) the Applicant’s Commercial Bank of Dubai bank statements; and

(e) a letter dated 15 January 2025 from the Applicant’s previous solicitors to Alliance’s solicitors, making payment of the outstanding costs of S$44,000 ordered in the cause of OA 740.

12 The Judge granted Alliance’s application in SUM 711 save for the last category of documents relating to the letter dated 15 January 2025. In other words, the Judge allowed the other four categories of documents (at [11] above) to be adduced in a further affidavit. He did so on the basis that they were potentially relevant to the committal proceedings, keeping in mind the Ideals of the ROC 2021 and the principles expressed in Farooq Ahmad Mann (in his capacity as the private trustee in bankruptcy of Li Hua) v Xia Zheng [2025] SGHC 70 (“Farooq”) on when a court may allow a committal applicant to file further affidavits.

13 The Judge first held that the court has the power to grant a request to file a further affidavit in committal proceedings. Order 23 r 7(3) of the ROC 2021 which states that “[t]he committal applicant must rely on only the grounds set out in the affidavit under Rule 3(3)”, was inapplicable. This is because SUM 711 is not an application seeking to introduce fresh grounds for committal, but rather to adduce further evidence in support of the existing ground of committal in SUM 195 – the Judge drew a distinction between “grounds” and “evidence”. Even if SUM 711 amounted to introducing fresh grounds for committal, the Judge held that the court has power pursuant to O 3 r 2(1) of the ROC 2021 to allow a committal applicant to rely on additional grounds.

14 Second, the Judge held that the test in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 (“Ladd v Marshall”) is not the applicable test to determine SUM 711 because no ruling has been made on any issue in SUM 195, the substantive matter underlying SUM 711. Even if the Ladd v Marshall test was applicable, the Judge held that the requirements should be greatly attenuated in their application to SUM 711, following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Anan Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341 (“Anan”).

15 The Applicant submitted that the Judge made a prima facie case of error in holding that the court has the power to permit an additional affidavit containing further evidence to be filed for committal applications. The Applicant gave three main reasons for why there is no such power:

(a) First, there is no basis for the distinction between “grounds” and “evidence” in the context of O 23 r 7(3) of the ROC 2021.

(b) Second, unlike as expressly provided under O 52 r 5(3) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”), the express provision granting the court power to allow the committal applicant to rely on new grounds has been removed in the ROC 2021 and is not found in O 23 of the ROC 2021 which addresses committal proceedings.

(c) Third, O 3 r 2(1) of the ROC 2021, which the Judge relied on, does not apply to committal applications.

16 A second prima facie case of error committed by the Judge related to the test the court applied to permit a further affidavit to be filed for committal applications. The Judge erroneously adopted the “relevance” test. The applicable test to determine whether further affidavit should be adduced is the Ladd v Marshall test. It is relevant to consider O 3 r 5(6) of the ROC 2021 which provides for only one round of affidavits to be filed in an application, except in a “special case”. As the factors for determining a “special case” are similar to the Ladd v Marshall test, it is the appropriate test for deciding whether to allow further affidavits in committal applications. Had the Judge applied the correct test, SUM 711 would not have been allowed.

17 Alliance submitted that:

(a) First, the Judge was correct to distinguish between the grounds of a committal application and the evidence relied on in support of the application.

(b) Second, the lack of an express provision in the ROC 2021 that is equivalent to O 52 r 5(3) of the ROC 2014 does not reflect legislative intent to remove the court’s discretion to allow further affidavit evidence in committal proceedings.

(c) Third, the court does have the inherent power to admit further evidence in committal proceedings under O 3 r 2 of the ROC 2021.

18 Alliance further submitted that O 3 r 5(6) of the ROC 2021 is not applicable as it had sought permission to adduce additional affidavit evidence even before the Applicant filed his reply affidavit in SUM 195. In any event, the Judge was right to relax the Ladd v Marshall requirements in their application.

19 The Applicant has to satisfy at least one of the grounds for granting permission to appeal which are well-established. The grounds are as follows: (a) there is a prima facie case of error; (b) there is a question of general principle to be decided for the first time; and (c) there is a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage: Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862 at [16].

20 An overarching consideration of the three grounds is that a denial of permission would result in a miscarriage of justice. Similarly, permission to appeal would not be granted if the outcome of the case will remain unchanged: Three Arrows Capital Ltd and others v Cheong Jun Yoong [2024] 1 SLR 419 at [22] and [32].

21 The Applicant in OA 14 proceeded solely on the ground that the Judge had made a prima facie case of error in his decision. On that basis, two main issues arose for our consideration:

(a) whether the Judge erred in holding that the court has the power to allow a request for a further affidavit to be filed in committal proceedings; and

(b) whether the Judge erred in ruling that the Ladd v Marshall test did not apply to determine whether to grant the request to file a further affidavit.

22 As we explain below, this ground was not made out. In our view, the court has power to grant a request to file a further affidavit in committal proceedings; and the Ladd v Marshall test is not the applicable test to determine the merits of such a request as the Judge rightly held. We will also remind below that parties are typically expected to file one affidavit containing all the evidence under the ROC 2021 regime. As such, a court is less likely to allow further affidavits after the other party has filed his reply, unless it is a special case: see O 3 r 5(6) of the ROC 2021 and CZD v CZE [2023] 5 SLR 806 (“CZD”). A distinguishing feature in this case is that SUM 711 was filed before the Applicant filed his affidavit in reply to Alliance’s O 23 r 3(3) affidavit. Generally, to obtain permission to file a further affidavit, Alliance as the party seeking permission must, at least explain why a further affidavit is necessary and relevant to the committal application (ie, SUM 195). This process is likely to succeed when, in balancing the overall facts and circumstances, the court is persuaded that justifiable reasons exist to warrant a grant of permission to file an additional affidavit.

23 The Applicant’s primary contention is that the Judge was mistaken as to the court’s power to grant SUM 711 in the absence of an express provision conferring upon the court such a power in O 23 of the ROC 2021. The Judge’s mistake arose from his conclusion that the court’s power was not affected by the absence of an express provision in O 23 of the ROC 2021 that allows a committal applicant to rely on new grounds for committal. The Applicant invited this court to compare O 23 with O 52 r 5(3) of the ROC 2014. The latter provided that “[e]xcept with the leave of the Court hearing an application for an order of committal, no grounds shall be relied upon at the hearing except the grounds set out in the statement under Rule 2.”

24 The Applicant relied on the dicta from Neo Chin Heng v Good Year Contractor Pte Ltd [2024] 4 SLR 1102 (“Neo Chin Heng”) where it was held (at [8]) that the differences between the relevant provisions in O 23 of the ROC 2021 and O 52 of the ROC 2014 relating to committal proceedings are procedural rather than substantive in nature. In particular, O 52 r 2(2) of the ROC 2014 required the committal applicant to file a statement setting out the particulars of the committal applicant and the committal respondent with the grounds for committal, along with an affidavit verifying the facts relied on. O 23 r 3(3) of the ROC 2021 dispenses with the need for the committal applicant to file a statement – instead, he or she only needs to file a supporting affidavit which contains the grounds for committal and the facts relied on (see Neo Chin Heng at [8]).

25 The Applicant’s submission, as we understand it to be, was that given that the O 52 statement and verifying affidavit under the ROC 2014 have been replaced by a single affidavit which should contain both the grounds for committal and the evidence supporting the grounds, the reference to the “grounds for committal” in O 23 r 3(3) of the ROC 2021 must include the evidence that the committal applicant seeks to rely on in support of the committal application. In that sense, the Applicant argued that the Judge was wrong to have drawn a distinction between “grounds” and “evidence”. That error affected his reasoning that Alliance’s application to file a further affidavit was not to rely on fresh grounds for its committal application, but merely to adduce additional evidence in support of an existing ground.

26 We accept that there is no provision in O 23 of the ROC 2021 for the committal applicant to seek permission to rely on grounds that are not set out in the O 23 r 3(3) supporting affidavit. However, the Applicant’s argument that depended on a comparison and change in the rules did not assist him. O 23 r 7(3) of the ROC 2021, which provides that the committal applicant must rely on only the grounds set out in the affidavit under O 23 r 3(3), also did not assist the Applicant’s argument. In our view, O 23 rr 7(3) and 7(4) (which provides that a committal respondent must rely on matters stated in his affidavit at the hearing but may give oral evidence with the court’s permission) simply supplement the general provisions on the hearing of originating applications and summonses in O 15 r 7 of the ROC 2021. Notably, Alliance in SUM 711 sought to rely on additional documents to be adduced by affidavit to further support the same ground for committal, namely the breach of the Discovery Order. In other words, the intention was to adduce additional documents in an affidavit to supplement the evidence contained in the O 23 r 3(3) supporting affidavit.

27 Pausing here, even if SUM 711 involved fresh grounds being relied upon, we agree with the Judge that O 23 r 7(3) would still not support the Applicant’s contention given the court’s broad powers under O 3 r 2 of the ROC 2021. Order 3 r 2(1) states that the rules in the ROC 2021 “are subject to the Court’s discretion to order otherwise in the interests of justice, even if they are expressed using imperative words such as ‘must’…”. We also do not agree with the Applicant that the Judge’s reliance on Farooq – for the proposition that the court may allow an applicant seeking permission to make a committal application to furnish additional grounds in a further affidavit – was misplaced.

28 We agree with the Judge that there is a valid distinction between the grounds for committal and the supporting evidence. The fact that a committal applicant no longer has to file a statement when applying for permission and instead must file a supporting affidavit containing the grounds which used to be in the statement and the facts relied on does not change the analysis.

29 While we accept that the supporting affidavit under O 23 r 3(3) should contain both the grounds for committal and the evidence to substantiate those grounds, that does not necessarily mean that the two are the same. A committal applicant seeking to adduce further evidence in support of the same ground for committal is not the same as one seeking to introduce fresh grounds for a committal order. The ground for the committal application in SUM 195 is based on non-compliance with the Discovery Order, and the supporting evidence in the proposed additional affidavit is to substantiate the same breach of the Discovery Order. That such a distinction exists can also be seen from the decision in Summit Holdings Ltd and another v Business Software Alliance [1999] 2 SLR(R) 592 (“Summit Holdings”). There, Yong Pung How CJ referred to the different allegations of contempt of court as grounds for committal (at [9]–[11]), and made the distinction between the grounds for committal and the evidence adduced to support them (at [15]):

30 Although O 23 of the ROC 2021 is silent on the court’s power to grant a request to file a further affidavit, we agree with Alliance that that does not mean that the court has no power to allow further evidence in committal proceedings. In our view, there is nothing in O 23 that prevents or restricts a committal applicant from seeking permission to file a further affidavit in support of the same grounds in the applicant’s O 23 r 3(3) supporting affidavit. The structure of the ROC 2021 is such that it is necessary to turn to the court’s broad powers conferred under O 3 r 2(2) of the ROC 2021, which states that:

31 To determine if there is an applicable express provision in the ROC 2021, it is convenient to begin with O 3 r 5 of the ROC 2021, which is the general provision that deals with applications to court in an action. The relevant provisions in O 3 r 5 are as follows:

(a) O 3 r 5(1) states that “[s]ubject to these Rules, all applications to the Court in an action must be made by summons… and supported by affidavit”.

(b)  O 3 r 5(5) states that a party who wishes to contest the application must file and serve his or her affidavit within 14 days after being served with the application and affidavit.

(c) O 3 r 5(6) states that except in a special case, the Court will not allow further affidavits to be filed after the other party files his or her affidavit under O 3 r 5(5).

(d) O 3 r 5(7) provides that an affidavit must contain all necessary evidence in support of or in opposition (as the case may be) to the application and may contain statements of information or belief with their sources and grounds clearly stated.

32 In our view, SUM 711 does not fall within the ambit of O 3 r 5(6) of the ROC 2021. The application in SUM 711 had been filed before the Applicant filed his reply affidavit in SUM 195 – Alliance filed SUM 711 on 17 March 2025, whereas the Applicant only filed his reply affidavit on 27 March 2025. Order 3 r 5(6) only applies after the party contesting the application files his or her reply affidavit. Thus, O 3 r 5(6) is not the applicable provision to determine SUM 711.

33 For completeness, the Applicant’s contention for a “special case” as the applicable test to determine whether a further affidavit should be allowed (at [16]) also falls by the way side as the Ladd v Marshall test is not the applicable test (see [41] below).

34 Returning to the Ideals of the ROC 2021 as the overarching guiding principles, in our view, the court has power under O 3 r 2(2) to grant a request to file a further affidavit in committal proceedings, and the Judge was correct in holding the same. It would be consistent with the Ideals, to ensure fair access to justice (O 3 r 1(2)(a) of the ROC 2021), in this case, to allow Alliance to file a further affidavit to exhibit documentary evidence in support of the same alleged breach.

35 Order 3 r 5(7) of the ROC 2021 (at [31]) provides that an affidavit in support of or in opposition (as the case may be) to an application must contain all necessary evidence and may contain statements of information or belief with their sources and grounds clearly stated. As for a committal applicant, his supporting affidavit for permission to file a committal application must comply with additional requirements. First, O 23 r 3(3) states that the supporting affidavit (ie, the O 23 r 3(3) supporting affidavit) must set out the names, descriptions and addresses of the committal applicant and intended committal respondent as well as the grounds on which the committal order is sought. Second, the grounds on which the committal order is sought must be sufficiently particularised so that the committal respondent knows the case that he or she has to meet and has the opportunity of refuting the allegations: Tay Kar Oon v Tahir [2017] 2 SLR 342 at [41] citing Summit Holdings at [17]. Third, the committal applicant is also required to provide full and frank disclosure of the background facts to the application: Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 at [57].

36 With the above requirements in mind, a court considers whether a request to file a further affidavit should be granted. As mentioned earlier (at [22] above), a party making the request must explain why the further affidavit is necessary and relevant. This requirement could weigh against a party who failed to comply with the above requirements (at [35]), for instance, where the applicant’s conduct indicated that a further affidavit is needed to supplement his defective or ill-prepared affidavit, unless there are good reasons to explain the non-compliance (see Farooq at [26]).

37 A list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in the exercise of the court’s discretion to allow the request to file a further affidavit are:

(a) an explanation as to why information or evidence in the further affidavit could not have been included in the first affidavit;

(b) whether the information or evidence in the further affidavit bears some relevance to the application;

(c) whether the request to file a further affidavit was made promptly; and

(d) whether there is undue procedural prejudice to the other party if the request is granted.

38 It was not seriously challenged that the five categories of documents were made available to Alliance after the O 23 r 3(3) supporting affidavit was filed and served. There is therefore no basis to interfere with the Judge’s view that the new evidence could not have been obtained earlier. In this case, SUM 711 was filed on 17 March 2025, before the Applicant filed his reply affidavit to the O 23 r 3(3) supporting affidavit. The Applicant’s solicitors filed the Applicant’s unsworn affidavit on 27 March 2025. The Applicant’s signed affidavit was subsequently filed on 31 March 2025.

39 The Applicant, through Alliance’s further affidavit, would have been given adequate notice and information to enable him to meet the complaint against him in the committal application. Given the consequences of a committal order and the quasi-criminal nature of committal proceedings, it would be in his interests to be apprised of the full extent of the allegations before the committal hearing. The Applicant would in turn be given a further opportunity to respond to the further affidavit. Any procedural unfairness or prejudice would be mitigated by the opportunity and time given to file a further affidavit in reply and/or compensated by an appropriate order as to costs.

40 When deciding whether to grant a request for further affidavit to be filed in SUM 195, the Judge hearing SUM 711 must balance the need for the relevant evidence with the need to protect the Applicant’s right as the committal respondent. The court’s consideration of the relevance of the evidence would involve a light touch assessment of the relevance of the categories of documents sought to be adduced in SUM 195. It is a light touch assessment as it is for the court hearing SUM 195 to decide on the admissibility and weight of the affidavit evidence (see generally DNO v DNP [2025] 4 SLR 362 at [44] where the court there granted permission to file a further affidavit without affecting the respondent’s right to oppose at the hearing the admissibility of the affidavit or the weight to be given to the evidence). As for the Judge’s assessment on the relevance of the different categories of documents sought to be adduced in the further affidavit, we see no reason to interfere with his exercise of discretion.

41 In our view, the Judge did not err in finding that the Ladd v Marshall test is not the applicable test. The Ladd v Marshall test only applies to applications to adduce further evidence on appeal. In the context of a party seeking permission to file a further affidavit in a committal application that has yet to be determined on the merits, the Ladd v Marshall test is simply not engaged. As this court held in Anan (at [23], [24] and [26]), the rationale behind the Ladd v Marshall rule is to preserve the finality in litigation and the interests of fairness for parties to advance their entire case at trial or a hearing on the merits. In the present case, however, there has not been a determination on the merits of SUM 195, nor have the parties advanced their entire case at the hearing of SUM 195. On the contrary, the parties are still in the process of building their case for the hearing at first instance. Thus, the interests in preserving finality and ensuring fairness in parties’ conduct of the hearing on the merits are not applicable to the present case, and it follows that the Ladd v Marshall test is not the appropriate test to be applied either in its full rigour or in an attenuated form.

42 For the reasons stated, we see no reason to interfere with the Judge’s exercise of discretion. Accordingly, we are of the view that the Judge did not make a prima facie case of error in SUM 711.

43 We dismissed OA 14 with costs fixed at $8,000 (all-in) to be paid by the Applicant to Alliance.