[2025] SGDC 311

In the state courts of the republic of singapore

[2025] SGDC 311

District Arrest Case No 901508 of 2024
Magistrate’s Appeal No 9134-2025-01

	Public Prosecutor

Against

Teo Yeong Kiat Henry

grounds of decision

Criminal Law — Road Traffic Act — Section 65(1)(b) — Driving without due care and attention for other persons using the road — Causing death

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Road Traffic Act — Section 65(2)(a) — Sentencing

This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.

Public Prosecutor
v
Teo Yeong Kiat Henry

[2025] SGDC 311

District Arrest Case No 901508 of 2024
Magistrate’s Appeal No 9134-2025-01
District Judge Kok Shu-en
11, 12 & 14 November 2024, 14 March, 11 April, 23 June, 21 July, 18 & 28 August 2025

1 December 2025

District Judge Kok Shu-en:

Introduction

1 The accused is a 45-year-old male who claimed trial to a single charge under section 65(1)(a) punishable under section 65(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (“RTA”), which stated:

You… are charged that you on the 19 January 2023, at about 1.15 a.m., within the Shell Petrol Station located at 61 Sengkang East Road, near pump 9, Singapore, did drive motor car, SMK8782L, without due care and attention, to wit, by failing to keep a proper lookout ahead when making a right turn, resulting in a collision with a pedestrian, namely, Ngoo Kong Ai, who was crossing ahead of you, from your left to right, within the petrol station, thus causing the death of the said pedestrian, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 65(1)(a) punishable under Section 65(2)(a) Road Traffic Act 1961.

2 At the conclusion of the trial, I found the accused guilty on the charge and convicted him accordingly.

3 I sentenced the accused to 6 months’ imprisonment and disqualified him from driving or obtaining all classes of driving licences for a period of 8 years with effect from his date of release.

4 The accused filed an appeal against both the conviction and sentence imposed.

Facts

The undisputed facts

5 The facts of the case were largely undisputed and were set out in the Statement of Agreed Facts.

6 The accused was a driver of a motor car bearing licence plate SMK8782L. In the early hours of 19 January 2023, the accused was at the Shell petrol station located at 61 Sengkang East Road. As the accused moved off from the petrol pump to leave the petrol station, he made a right turn towards the exit of the petrol station. This pathway involved the accused driving past the retail store of the petrol station.

7 On the same day, Mr Ngoo Kong Ai was working his shift as a petrol pump attendant at the petrol station. At around the same time that the accused was moving off from the pump to exit the petrol station, Mr Ngoo was proceeding across the carriageway in front of the retail store.

8 The incident was captured on video footage from the following sources:

(a) CCTV footage from the petrol station taken from three cameras ;

(b) In-car camera footage retrieved from the accused’s car .

9 Mr Ngoo was sent to the Sengkang General Hospital (“SKGH”) where he received medical attention and eventually passed away on 23 January 2023.

10 Through the Statement of Agreement Facts, various reports prepared by doctors who had examined Mr Ngoo before and after his demise were admitted into evidence by agreement:

(a) A medical report issued by Dr Ruban a/l Dayalan of SKGH Department of Emergency Medicine dated 19 April 2023 that was prepared based on documentations made by Dr Eunizar Bte Omar (PW3), which stated that Mr Ngoo was found to have suffered a traumatic brain injury.

(b) A medical report issued by Dr Freddy Xu (PW2) of SKGH Department of General Surgery, Neurosurgery Service dated 27 April 2023, which also stated that Mr Ngoo suffered a head injury and detailed the procedures that were carried out on him.

(c) An autopsy report of Mr Ngoo prepared by Dr Marian Wang (PW7) of the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”) dated 31 January 2023, wherein Dr Wang stated her conclusion that the cause of death was ‘Head Injury’.

(d) A clarification of postmortem report dated 18 April 2023 issued by Dr Wang , stating that the nature of the head injury was consistent with the scenario described in the NP303 report .

The Prosecution’s case

11 The Prosecution called a total of 7 witnesses.

12 Three of the witnesses were present at the petrol station around the time that the incident occurred, though none of them witnessed the moment preceding Mr Ngoo’s fall to the ground in the forecourt of the petrol station. Their evidence largely concerned events that transpired after the incident had occurred.

13 Mr Gary Chang (PW4) was the driver of a car that was at the petrol station at the time of the incident, who placed a call to ‘995’ to request for assistance at about 1.17am on 19 January 2023 . While he was at his car, Mr Chang heard a loud thud, and when he looked up, he saw that the pump attendant was lying on the ground next to a black vehicle. He confirmed that did not see whether there had been a collision between the vehicle and the pump attendant.

14 Ms Nan Kay Khine Win (PW5) and Ms Ong Fang Lee (PW6) were Mr Ngoo’s colleagues at the petrol station.

15 Ms Win was at the cashier counter of the petrol station when the incident occurred. She rushed out to the forecourt when a customer informed her that there had been an accident and when she saw Mr Ngoo lying on the ground, she called Ms Ong, her supervisor, to inform her of the incident. Ms Ong then rushed down to the petrol station, where she retrieved the CCTV footage, which was subsequently shown to the medical staff at SKGH.

16 In explaining her findings as set out in the autopsy report and subsequent clarification, forensic pathologist Dr Marian Wang explained in the court that the head injury that was found on Mr Ngoo was consistent with him (i) having been hit by a car, which caused him to fall down, and (ii) falling backwards, as described in the NP303 report.

17 Dr Wang also confirmed her finding that apart from the head injury, there were no other significant injuries or natural disease in the rest of Mr Ngoo’s organs that might have caused or contributed to his death.

18 Dr Xu from the Neurosurgery Department of SKGH also testified and provided explanations of the contents of the medical report that he prepared. He also indicated that there were no pre-existing medical conditions that were relevant to the injury sustained, and that there was no aggravation of any existing condition.

19 Dr Eunizar, the emergency specialist who attended to Mr Ngoo when he was admitted to SKGH, testified that Mr Ngoo did have some pre-existing conditions, namely diabetes, hypertension and cholesterol, though she indicated that these were not relevant to her management of the patient.

20 When asked to comment from a medical point of view on the force of the victim’s fall, Dr Eunizar said that there had been significant force in Mr Ngoo’s fall. She explained that based on her observation from the viewing of the footage that Mr Ngoo had been knocked down by a vehicle, this gave rise to the concern about significant force and trauma.

21 She also noted that Mr Ngoo’s level of alertness had deteriorated very quickly from the time that he was first triaged to the time that she saw him, which she said was an indication of significant injury. These factors led to her decision to “up-triage” Mr Ngoo, which meant that she deemed his injuries to be life-threatening and requiring the highest level of attention.

Close of the Prosecution’s case

22 The Defence did not make any submission of no case to answer at the close of the Prosecution’s case. I was satisfied that a prima facie case had been established by the Prosecution on the charge, and accordingly I called upon the accused to enter his defence.

The Defence’s case

23 The accused elected to give evidence in his own defence and called an additional witness, Mr John Robert (DW2).

24 The main thrust of the accused’s evidence was that he did not collide into Mr Ngoo. He said that as he started to move off from the pump and turned right, he saw Mr Ngoo going out onto the carriageway and quickly stopped his car. According to him, Mr Ngoo hit the bonnet of his car and fell down. Apart from Mr Ngoo hitting the bonnet of his car with his hands, the accused maintained that there had been no contact between his car and Mr Ngoo, because his car did not sustain any damages or scratches.

25 In cross-examination, the accused agreed that he would have been able to see Mr Ngoo crossing the road if he had kept a proper lookout. He then said that he had not seen Mr Ngoo crossing the road, claiming that his view of Mr Ngoo had been obstructed by the structure of his car.

26 Mr Robert had also been at the petrol station on 19 January 2023 to pump petrol. In his examination-in-chief, he explained that this was his usual petrol station and that he had seen Mr Ngoo before. He claimed that as he was opening the fuel cap of his car, he glanced towards the direction of the store front when he saw Mr Ngoo bang the bonnet of a car before falling.

27 He took the view that there had been no traffic accident and said that he did not see any collision between the car and Mr Ngoo . Instead, he described Mr Ngoo as having “walked in the line of fire in front of the vehicle and then he actually used his hands and smacked the bonnet of the vehicle” before falling backwards.

28 In cross-examination, Mr Robert was taken through the CCTV footage from the petrol station, which he was not shown during his examination-in-chief. From the viewing of the footage, it emerged that Mr Robert did not arrive at the petrol station until after the incident had occurred, such that it was not possible for Mr Robert to have witnessed Mr Ngoo falling to the ground.

The elements of the charge

29 Section 65(1)(a) of the RTA creates the offence of driving without due care or reasonable consideration. The subsequent sub-sections of section 65 provided for the applicable punishment provisions depending on the consequence of the careless or inconsiderate driving.

30 The charge as framed by the Prosecution in this case was for the offence of driving without due care and attention, by failing to keep a proper lookout while making a right turn, resulting in the death of another person by the driving of the accused, under section 65(1)(a) read with section 65(2) of the RTA.

Analysis of the evidence

31 In considering whether the accused had driven without due care and attention, I found it helpful to have regard to the comments of the High Court in Public Prosecutor v Tubbs Julia Elizabeth [2001] 2 SLR(R) 716, where the Court noted that “[t]he standard of care expected of a reasonable and prudent driver is not determined in a vacuum, but in accordance with the type of road and prevailing traffic conditions”.

32 The issue for the court to determine in this case was whether the accused had failed to keep a proper lookout such that it can be said that he had driven without due care and consideration in the given circumstances.

33 The Prosecution’s case was that the accused failed to keep a proper lookout when making the right turn, which resulted in a collision with Mr Ngoo and his fall, from which he sustained his fatal injury.

34 The Defence’s case was that there was no collision, and that the accused stopped when he noticed Mr Ngoo in front of his car before any collision took place. The Defence’s position is that Mr Ngoo had fallen on his own, and not because of the accused’s driving. Effort was made to emphasise that Mr Ngoo could be seen in the footage walking slowly and with a slight limp.

35 Having considered the matters that were in dispute, I identified the following issues for determination in this matter:

(a) Did the accused drive without due care and attention by failing to keep a proper lookout ahead while making the right turn?

(b) Was there a collision between the car and Mr Ngoo?

Did the accused drive without due care and attention

36 Based on the footage taken from the in-car camera footage, it appeared to me that the accused would have had an unobstructed view of the carriageway ahead of him within the petrol station. The CCTV footage also showed that the lighting within the petrol station was also sufficiently bright such that a person positioned in the area between the storefront and the pumps ought to have been visible to the driver in the accused’s position, despite the late hour of the night.

37 It was evident from the footage that Mr Ngoo had already entered the forecourt before the accused’s car started to move off from the pump. This meant that the accused would have had the opportunity to observe Mr Ngoo’s presence from the moment Mr Ngoo entered the carriageway and walked slowly from the left to right perspective of the car.

38 By the time the accused’s car stopped, Mr Ngoo had already proceeded across a substantial portion of the carriageway, having made his way from the left to right perspective of the car’s front and was standing near to the front right portion of the car. At this point, the car was already at extremely close quarters with Mr Ngoo’s person.

39 In my view, the fact that the accused’s car only came to a stop where it did – at such proximity to Mr Ngoo’s person – was a clear indication that he had not kept a proper lookout. If he had kept a proper lookout, then he could and should have stopped his car at a much earlier point when there was a safer distance between the car and Mr Ngoo’s person.

40 As the accused eventually made plain during cross-examination, he had simply failed to spot Mr Ngoo.

41 The accused suggested during cross-examination that his view of Mr Ngoo was obstructed by the frame, or the ‘bone’, of the car such that he was unable to see Mr Ngoo until just before he stopped his car. The Defence’s point was that the view from the driver’s seat was not identical to the view seen in the in-car camera footage, given that the camera was not positioned in the exact place where the driver was seated, and it could not be assumed based on the camera footage that the driver had an unobstructed view of the carriageway ahead.

42 I accepted the accused’s point that his perspective from the driver’s seat may not have been identical to the perspective captured in his in-car camera footage, though it was not clear to me on the evidence that there had indeed been some blind spot created by the structure of the car. However, even if I were to assume that there was such a blind spot, given the speed at which both the car and Mr Ngoo were moving, there would have been ample time for the accused to account for the blind spot and to ensure that he had a full view of the carriageway before moving ahead.

43 Indeed, the accused accepted in cross-examination that if he had kept a proper lookout when he moved off from the pump, he would have seen Mr Ngoo crossing the road and that there would have been ample time for him to stop before colliding with Mr Ngoo.

44 For these reasons, I was satisfied that the accused had failed to keep a proper lookout, and accordingly he had driven without due care and consideration.

Did the accused’s driving cause Mr Ngoo’s death

45 I move on to deal with the third issue, before returning to the second issue for determination, namely whether the accused’s driving resulted in Mr Ngoo’s death, which is an element of the offence under section 65(1) punishable under section 65(2) of the RTA.

46 The Defence’s position was that Mr Ngoo’s fall, and consequent death were unconnected with the accused’s driving, as the accused had managed to stop his vehicle in time to avoid any collision with Mr Ngoo. When asked what had caused Mr Ngoo to fall backwards, the accused said that he thought Mr Ngoo had either been startled or because he had tripped over himself.

47 In the footages, it can be seen in the moments before he fell backwards that Mr Ngoo was clearly reacting to the car and attempting to manoeuvre his body to avoid the car. In my view, but for the accused’s car coming to such close quarters with Mr Ngoo, there was no reason for Mr Ngoo to have fallen in the manner that he did. The objective evidence before me simply did not support the Defence’s position that Mr Ngoo’s fall was entirely of his own doing and unconnected with the accused’s driving.

48 I return to the issue of whether there had been a collision between the accused’s car and Mr Ngoo’s person in greater detail below, but suffice to state at this stage that regardless of whether there had been a collision between the accused’s car and Mr Ngoo or not, I was satisfied that it was the accused’s driving that caused Mr Ngoo’s death in that it directly precipitated Mr Ngoo’s fall, from which he sustained his fatal head injury.

Did the accused’s car collide with Mr Ngoo

49 As the Prosecution rightly noted in its closing submission, the main element of the offence under s65(1)(a) is that the offender had driven without due care and attention. However, as the Prosecution has framed its case against the accused – as set out in the charge – that the failure to keep a proper lookout resulted in a collision with Mr Ngoo, then that was the case that the Prosecution had to prove.

50 The Defence’s position that there had been no collision was premised on the following factors:

(a) The lack of footage that captured the lower part of Mr Ngoo’s body by the time was at the front right of the accused’s vehicle, just before he fell to the ground,

(b) There were no eyewitnesses who saw a collision between the accused’s car and Mr Ngoo.

(d) The lack of any noticeable damage to the accused’s car.

51 To be clear, the footages did capture Mr Ngoo having contact with the accused’s car, in that his right hand was seen hitting the bonnet of the car before he fell to the ground, and as I noted above, it was clear from the footage that the car was in extreme proximity with Mr Ngoo’s person. In fact, he was so close to the car that PW4 observed that one of Mr Ngoo’s legs was underneath the vehicle after he had fallen to the ground.

52 I also observed from the footage that Mr Ngoo fell backwards in an uncontrolled fashion, falling straight to the ground seemingly without any ability to stop himself or break his fall.

53 As for the lack of injuries on other parts of Mr Ngoo’s body and damages on the accused’s car, given the relatively low speed that the accused’s car was moving, it was not surprising that there were no injuries resulting from the point of impact between Mr Ngoo’s body and the car, or damages to the car.

54 When asked to comment on the lack of injuries on Mr Ngoo’s leg, Dr Eunizar explained that this was due to the velocity of the car not being very high. However, she explained that given the large difference in the mass of the car and Mr Ngoo, there was still a very significant transfer of force from the car to the person despite the low velocity.

55 It was not clear to me that these observations made by Dr Eunizar were strictly within her remit of expertise as a medical doctor. Nevertheless, given her experience as an emergency specialist with significant experience with traffic accidents and trauma cases, I accorded some weight to her observations.

56 For these reasons, I agreed with the Prosecution that there was sufficient basis for me to conclude that there had been a collision between the car and Mr Ngoo, in the sense that there was a transfer of force from the car to Mr Ngoo that caused him to fall backward and sustain his fatal injury to the head.

Decision on the charge

57 For the reasons set out above, I was satisfied that the charge against the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I found him guilty and convicted him on the charge.

Antecedents

58 The accused did not have any previous convictions, though he had a history of compounded offences, namely (i) an offence of inconsiderate driving in 2019, which was compounded for $300 and (ii) an offence of using a mobile phone whilst driving in 2009, which was compounded for $200.

Sentencing

59 Section 65(2)(a) of the RTA provided that where grievous hurt is caused to another person by the driving of a motor vehicle by an offender who has been convicted of an offence under section 65(1) of the RTA, the offender is liable to be punished with a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to both.

60 In addition, section 65(6)(a) of the RTA provided that a court convicting a person under section 65(1) where section 65(2)(a) applies, order the offender to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence for a disqualification period of not less than a period of 8 years, unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to not order or to order otherwise.

Prosecution’s address on sentence

61 The Prosecution sought a sentence of between 7 to 9 months’ imprisonment and the minimum period of disqualification of 8 years.

62 In deriving this proposed sentence, the Prosecution relied on the sentencing framework in the case of Public Prosecutor v Selvakumar Ranjan [2020] SGDC 252 (“Selvakumar Ranjan”) and submitted that the culpability of the accused in this case could be considered low. Apart from the fact that the accused had failed to keep a proper lookout, there were no other culpability enhancing factors.

63 Sentencing precedents were cited in support of this position, including Selvakumar Ranjan, as well as Public Prosecutor v Wilson Koh Zheng Hao [2023] SGDC 131 (“Wilson Koh”) and Public Prosecutor v Setoh Weng Yew Roger (Situ Rongyao, Roger) [2024] SGDC 318, which all involved offences under section 65(2)(a) RTA where the level of culpability had similarly been assessed to be low.

64 In particular, the Prosecution highlighted the present case bore most similarity with the case of Wilson Koh, where the offender had been convicted after trial and was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment and a disqualification period of 8 years. The offender was a motorcyclist who failed to keep a proper lookout and collided with the rear end of a lorry, causing the death of a passenger in the rear cabin of the lorry along with minor injuries to other passengers.

Defence’s address on sentence

65 The Defence sought the imposition of a fine with no disqualification.

66 Citing the case of Public Prosecutor v Kabra Chandra Prakash [2024] SGDC 307 (“Kabra Chandra”), where a sentence of 1 month imprisonment was imposed for an offence under section 65(2)(a), the Defence argued that the accused’s culpability in this case was at an exceptionally low level, which warranted the imposition of a fine under the Selvakumar Ranjan framework. It submitted that the level of culpability in this case was even lower than that of the offender in Kabra Chandra, given that the accused had been driving at a low speed in a petrol station and had not engaged in any forms of dangerous driving behaviours.

67 The Defence highlighted the personal circumstances of the accused, namely that he is a divorced father who supports a son, ex-wife and aged parents. His job as a retail salesman required him to make deliveries and he had also previously supplemented his income as a Grab driver.

68 On the issue of the disqualification period, the Defence argued that there were “special reasons” for the court not to impose the mandatory minimum disqualification period of 8 years, on account of a very low level of culpability and the severe financial hardships that would befall the accused and his family should he be deprived of the ability to drive.

Sentencing frameworks

69 There is presently no sentencing framework for an offence under section 65(2) of the RTA for the offence of careless or inconsiderate driving causing death that has been set down or endorsed by the High Court.

70 The District Court decision of Selvakumar Ranjan suggests a sentencing framework for offences under section 65(2)(a) of the RTA, under which the sentencing court first identifies the accused’s level of culpability based on a set of working definitions:

Level of culpability	Definition
Low	Generally, no dangerous driving behaviour exhibited. Typically careless or inconsiderate manner of driving like failing to give way when other road users have the right of way or exhibiting poor control of the vehicle.
Moderate	Some manner of dangerous driving behaviour exhibited. This may include swerving across lanes suddenly and without warning, driving against the flow of traffic, weaving in and out of traffic, speeding, beating red light, handphone driving, sleepy driving or failing to use visual aids while driving, etc.
High	Serious manner of dangerous driving exhibited. This may include several forms of dangerous driving exhibited, dangerous driving behaviour exhibited over an extended distance or deliberate bad driving behaviour.

71 Based on the assessed level of culpability, the framework sets out corresponding sentencing ranges for each tier of culpability as follows:

Level of culpability	Sentencing range under section 65(2)(a) RTA
Low	6-12 months’ imprisonment (a fine of up to $10,000 or a lower sentence may be imposed in exceptional circumstances)
Moderate	12-24 months’ imprisonment
High	24-36 months’ imprisonment

72 Once a starting point is identified within the indicative sentencing range, adjustments can be made to take into account offender-specific factors, followed by a final look to consider any application of the totality principle.

73 Since Selvakumar Ranjan, the High Court has set down sentencing frameworks for adjacent offences under sections 64 and 65 of the RTA.

(a) In Chen Song v Public Prosecutor and ors [2024] SGHC 129 the High Court set out a sentencing framework for offences punishable under section 65(3)(a) and section 65(4)(a) of the RTA.

(b) In Ng En You Jeremiah v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 395 (“Jeremiah Ng”), the High Court set a sentencing framework for the offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender, punishable under sections 64(2)(a) and 64(2)(c) of the RTA.

Reasons for the sentence imposed

74 As noted above, there have been no sentencing frameworks for the offence under section 65(2)(a) RTA set down or endorsed by the High Court. Selvakumar Ranjan was the decision of a District Court, which does not bind this Court, but has nonetheless been a point of reference for other similar cases involving offences under section 65(2)(a) since.

75 In the time since Selvakumar Ranjan was decided, there have been other sentencing frameworks set by the High Court for adjacent offences under the RTA – such as Chen Song, for careless driving causing grievous hurt and hurt, and most recently, Jeremiah Ng. While not directly applicable to the offence under section 65(2)(a) RTA, I found it helpful to take reference from these frameworks, specifically the sentence approach and relevant factors for consideration, in determining the appropriate sentence in the present case.

76 I agreed with both parties that the accused’s level of culpability in this case can be considered low. He failed to keep a proper lookout, but not in a manner that I considered to be of a higher degree of carelessness such that it ought to be regarded as an offence-specific aggravating factor.

77 As for the other factors that the Defence raised in support of its submission of exceptionally low culpability – the slow speed of the car, the lack of dangerous driving behaviours, prolonged inattention or gross negligence – I accepted that these were indeed the case. However, in my view they simply placed the accused’s level of culpability at the low level, but not exceptionally low. Had these factors been present, they would have heightened the level of culpability. The fact that they were not present in this case was merely a neutral factor that did not warrant a downward adjustment in the level of culpability.

78 As for the precedent of Kabra Chandra where the offender was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment for the offence of careless driving causing death, the Court in that case had found that the victim motorcyclist’s high speed had a material impact on the offender’s culpability, such that the case exceptionally fell outside the indicative Band 1 sentencing range for low culpability cases under the Selvakumar Ranjan framework.

79 In the present case, the deceased Mr Ngoo started walking through the forecourt at a slow pace even before the accused’s car started moving off. In my view, there was nothing in Mr Ngoo’s conduct that had a direct bearing on the culpability of the accused, and I disagreed with the Defence that the accused’s level of culpability was exceptionally low, let alone lower than that of the offender in Kabra Chandra.

80 Apart from culpability factors, it may also be appropriate to consider harm factors in considering the appropriate sentence to be imposed. In Selvakumar Ranjan, the Court took the view (at [119]) that given that the only eventuality of the harm caused in fatal accidents is death, there would be no distinction in the level of harm between cases. As such the sentencing framework set in that case primarily focused on the level of culpability.

81 In Jeremiah Ng, which concerned the offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender, the High Court set a sentencing framework that includes consideration of the level of serious potential harm, property damage, and any other harm other than the harm which is the subject of the charge. In other words, it is not sufficient to only consider the death that is the subject matter of the charge as the harm caused by the offender’s driving conduct.

82 In the present case, I was satisfied that there were no other significant harm factors that need to be considered. The accused’s car was moving at a relatively slow speed within a petrol station, such that the degree of potential harm to others was not significant. There was also no discernible property damage caused, including to the accused’s own car.

83 Taking all these factors into account, I agreed with the Prosecution that the appropriate starting point would be at the lower end of the low culpability spectrum.

84 The accused had a history of compounded traffic offences, namely a handphone driving offence in 2009 and an inconsiderate driving offence in 2019. The 2019 offence could be considered a similar antecedent, but I bore in mind that the antecedent record was not an extensive and did not involve any court convictions.

85 Taking these matters into consideration, in my view, the appropriate sentence in this case was 6 months’ imprisonment.

86 As for the disqualification period, the position as to what constitutes “special reasons” that would warrant a departure from a legislatively mandated disqualification period has been clearly set out in case law. In Lee Shin Nan v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGHC 354, the High Court reiterated (at [76]) that “special reasons” are (a) extenuating or pressing circumstances; and which (b) relate to the offence itself and not to the offender.

87 The claim that financial hardship would befall the accused’s family if he were unable to drive was clearly a matter that related to the offender and not the offence itself. The mere fact that the accused’s level of culpability was low in this case was also not the sort of extenuating or pressing circumstance that warranted a departure from the mandatory minimum.

88 Accordingly, I was not satisfied that there were any special reasons to impose anything less than the mandatory minimum period of disqualification on the accused.

Conclusion

89 For the reasons set out above, I convicted the accused and sentenced him to 6 months’ imprisonment and disqualified him from driving or obtaining all classes of driving licences for a period of 8 years with effect from the date of his release.

90 The accused is presently on bail pending appeal. A stay of execution was granted on the imprisonment term and the disqualification order.

Kok Shu-en
District Judge

DPP Cheronne Lim for the Public Prosecutor;

Mr Thomas Tham Kok Leong (Tactica Law) for the accused.