1 SS 1957/2024 relates to the application of a father, Mr XSL’s (“Complainant”) for a personal protection order (“PPO”) against the mother, Mdm XSM (“Respondent”) for himself and the two children of the marriage, B, around 7 years of age (“Daughter”), and C (“Son”), around 8 years of age, (collectively, the “Children”).

2 The Complainant also applied for a domestic exclusion order (“DEO”) against the Respondent in respect of the residence where the Respondent is currently residing in with the Children (“the Residence”). During the course of the trial, the Complainant confirmed that he was no longer living at the Residence and that the Respondent and Children were residing there without him.

3 The Complainant subsequently claimed that he wanted a Mandatory Treatment Order (“MTO”) to be made for Respondent as he alleged that the Respondent had mental disorders. For completeness, this application for an MTO had not been set out in the Complainant’s Complaint Form.

4 During the course of the trial, the Complainant also repeatedly filed applications to summon witnesses (for ease of reference, these applications will also be referred to as the “subpoena applications”). In total, the Complainant had filed around 40 of such subpoena applications during the course of the trial.

5 In addition, during the last tranche of the trial, the Complainant also made an oral application for discovery and interrogatories. These applications are discussed in further detail below.

6 For context, it would be necessary to highlight the significant acrimony and conflict between the parties in the present matter. The Complainant’s own position was that the marriage was marked with significant conflict. This is a case where parties’ have filed numerous applications against each other, including PPO applications and applications relating to the interim care and control of the Children. The Complainant filed the present application on 14 October 2024.

7 In brief, the Complainant and Respondent were married around 12 December 2014.

8 The Son was born on XX March 2016.

9 The Daughter was born on XX August 2017.

10 Following the commencement of the divorce proceedings between the parties, the Interim Judgement (“IJ”) was made on 7 January 2025.

11 The Complainant cited the following incidents in his Complaint Form to claim that family violence had been committed against him and the Children. This is briefly summarised below and set out in chronological order:

12 In brief, the Respondent’s position is set out below:

(a) The Children have been under her care and are well looked after by her ¹ .

(b) The Respondent and the Complainant have been living separate and apart since April 2024. The Children have been living with the Respondent at the Residence since May 2024.

(c) The Respondent claimed that the Complainant’s allegations were frivolous and vexatious, made with ulterior and collateral motives ² .

(d) For the January Incident, the Respondent claimed that she did not abuse the Complainant. She claimed the parties’ had their usual family dinner around 6.30 pm to 8.30 pm or so, where they went home.

(e) For the May Incident, the Respondent claimed that the Complainant had removed the Children from her care around April 2024. She then alleged that the Complainant refused to allow her to see the Children or know their whereabouts. She highlighted that there had also been no agreed care plan in effect during the May Incident when the Complainant, Respondent and Children were at the office of the CPS. She claimed that the Children accompanied her willingly and voluntarily in the presence of the relevant CPS officer. The Respondent claimed that CPS had investigated and concluded that the Children were safe under her care.

(f) The Respondent pointed out that CPS had subsequently closed the case in relation to the parties and Children around July 2024.

(g) The Respondent claimed that the Complainant’s sole purpose in making the present application was to harass her and seek to gain the Children back. She alleged that he was trying to bolster his case for care and control through the application. She claimed that he was trying to make use of the PPO process inappropriately and custody disputes should not be resolved through retaliatory actions like filing for a PPO ³ .

13 As a preliminary point, the Complainant filed around 40 subpoena applications during the course of the trial.

14 It was incumbent on the Complainant to demonstrate why the subpoena applications should be allowed. Having heard both the Complainant’s and Respondent’s arguments on the subpoena applications during the course of the trial, I allowed the Complainant’s application to summon the following two witnesses (who attended the trial):

(a) Ms NV, a child protection officer (“CPO”). The Complainant’s application to summon this witness was granted on the basis that the said CPO had been present during the May Incident and could testify as to the events that had occurred during that date; and

(b) Dr JY, a family physician (“Doctor”), on the basis that the Doctor’s medical report dated 17 August 2024 (“Medical Report”) had been produced in the Complainant’s evidence, and the said Doctor had examined the Complainant and could testify as to the findings set out in his medical report.

15 For completeness, the Complainant’s application against another CPO, by the name of Ms ST, had also been allowed. However, despite reasonable attempts at service having been made on the said witness, she could not be served at the address that the Complainant had provided. Ms ST was thus not present as a witness during the course of the trial.

16 As for the remainder of the Complainant’s subpoena applications, the Complainant had not clearly demonstrated that the witnesses in question were material or relevant to his application. I elaborate on this below:

(a) For many of these applications, the Complainant himself had stated that the witnesses were “unknown”. This alone meant that no subpoena could have been issued for their attendance. The Court could not issue a subpoena against persons unknown.

(b) Furthermore, for some of the remaining witnesses, including the Respondent’s sister and father, the Complainant confirmed that these witnesses had not been present during the relevant incidents. As these applications had been made to summon persons who were not present during the relevant incidents, I did not find that the Complainant had shown a clear basis for the Court to allow his applications to summon such witnesses.

(c) The Complainant also cast a wide net on the witnesses he sought to summon such as the managing director of the relevant entity that managed Woodleigh Mall, the “commander” of the CISCO officers, the “CEO” of the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) etc., without clearly demonstrating whether such persons had been present at the relevant incidents or how such witnesses could have materially affected the outcome of some or all of the live disputes before the Court.

(d) In this regard, the issuance of a subpoena to testify requires the court to determine whether the proposed witness is in a position to provide oral and documentary evidence that is not just relevant to the issues in dispute but which could have materially affected the outcome of some or all of the live disputes before the court (see Karan Bagga v Stichting Chemical Distribution Institute [2023] SGHC 97 at [44]).

(e) For the rest of the witnesses that the Complainant had made applications in respect of, I was of the view that the Complainant did not clearly establish that their evidence would be relevant or could have materially affected the outcome of the issues before the Court. This is also in consideration that I had granted the Complainant’s applications to summon the CPO (who had been present at the May Incident, which was the latest incident between the parties set out in the Complaint Form), as well as the Doctor, as witnesses. In particular, I found the testimony of the CPO particularly helpful in determining the critical issues in dispute, particularly in respect of the issue of whether family violence had been committed against the Children by the Respondent. I had also placed some weight in considering the Doctor’s comments on the Complainant’s injuries, based on the overall evidence and context of the case. In view of the testimonies that had been provided by the CPO and Doctor, the Complainant had not provided clear evidence to show how the remaining witnesses he had sought to summon were relevant to the case or would have materially affected the outcome as to whether a PPO should be ordered, whether for himself or the Children.

(f) Finally, the Complainant filed around 9 subpoena applications at the last tranche of the trial. Many of these applications were duplicate applications, some of which had been filed two to three times repeatedly over the course of the trial for the same person. In this regard, I was of the view that the Complainant should not be permitted to have a second bite of the cherry in relation to these duplicate applications, insofar as he had not persuaded the Court as to why the evidence from these persons, who had not been clearly present at the relevant incidents were material to the issues in the dispute.

(g) In consideration of the circumstances of the case, I dismissed the Complainant’s subpoena applications, save for the applications in relation to the relevant CPOs and the Doctor.

17 The following documents had been filed by the parties:

18 For completeness, the relevant Notes of Evidence relating to the trial will be collectively referred to as the “NE”. For avoidance of doubt, the references to the relevant NEs are as follows:

(a) The NE for the hearing on 7 March 2025 will be referred to as “NE1”;

(b) The NE for the hearing on 15 April 2025 will be referred to as “NE2”;

(c) The NE for the hearing on 28 May 2025 will be referred to as “NE3”;

(d) The NE for the hearing on 29 May 2025 will be referred to as “NE4”; and

(e) The NE for the hearing on 16 July 2025 will be referred to as “NE5”.

19 During the last tranche of the trial, the Complainant also made an oral application for “discovery and interrogatories” for the following orders:

(a) That the Ministry of Social Development (“MSF”) and the CPS be ordered to provide the names and designations of all CISCO auxiliary police officers and CPS staff present or on duty at CPS Office;

(b) That the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”) and the SPF be ordered to provide the names, badge numbers, and stations of all police officers who were deployed to and/or attended to the incident involving the Respondent on 8 April 2024, at Woodleigh Mall;

(c) That the IMH be ordered to provide the name, designation, and medical registration number of the psychiatrist or medical officer who attended to the Respondent; and

(d) That the Complainant be granted leave to serve interrogatories to the MSF, CPS, AGC, SPF and the IMH.

20 When the Complainant was asked for the basis of his application, he cited Rule 170 and 173 of the Family Justice Rules.

21 In response, the Respondent claimed that she did not have anything to say as she did not understand the nature of the Complainant’s applications.

22 After considering both parties’ positions, I declined to make any orders or directions for discovery or interrogatories in relation to the institutions or organisations such as CPS, MSF, AGC, SPF or the IMH, for the following reasons:

(a) The Complainant had not demonstrated a clear legal basis for the Court to make such orders as to discovery or interrogatories in respect of proceedings relating to family violence under the Women’s Charter 1961 (“WC”).

(b) I first considered the Complainant’s claim that rule 170 and 173 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (“FJR 2014”) applied. In particular, as the Complainant had made the PPO application in October 2024, the provisions under the FJR 2014 applied.

(c) Having considered the relevant rules, I observed that rule 170 and 173 of the FJR 2014 applies to proceedings under the International Child Abduction Act, which is not relevant to the present proceedings.

(d) For completeness, the Complainant had also indicated that rules 474 and 496 of the FJR 2014 would apply. However, he did not demonstrate that these rules applied in the context of family violence trials, as defined under the FJR 2014.

(e) In particular, the Complainant did not demonstrate that the Court had the powers to make a discovery application in relation to family violence proceedings under the WC. In the absence of express wording under the FJR 2014 ⁴ allowing the court to make orders as to discovery in relation to a third party in family violence proceedings, the Complainant failed to show that the Court had such powers to do so in and I declined to make any orders as to the same.

(f)  In any event, the Complainant had not shown why the documents or information he claimed he required were relevant or necessary. For example, the Complainant’s reasons for making the application for information in relation to specific officers or personnel, including their badge numbers or medical registration numbers, were unclear. It was speculative as to how such information (including the names, badge numbers or medical registration numbers of such persons) may be relevant or material to the Complainant’s case that the Respondent had committed family violence against himself and the Children. For completeness, I would highlight that although the Complainant alleged that the Respondent had mental disorders, he did not provide clear evidence to demonstrate that this was the case or it directly related to the alleged family violence that had occurred.

(g) Similarly, the Complainant did not show that the Court had the powers to make orders in relation to interrogatories in relation to family violence proceedings. He did not point to any provision under the WC or FJR 2014 that allowed the Court to do so. The Complainant also failed to persuade the Court that the interrogatories were relevant or necessary, including details as to the government officers. For example, in relation to CPS, a CPO had already been called as a witness in the present case during the trial, and I did not see any need to make any additional orders for discovery and interrogatories in respect of CPS or the MSF.

23 As stated above, the degree of parental conflict between the parties in this case is particularly high. Orders had also been made in August 2024 for the parents to participate in the Supervised Exchange / Supervised Visitation programme ⁵ . Moreover, there are concerns that the Children have been triangulated in the dispute between the parents, where they have had to attend meetings with their parents at CPS’ office. Bearing in mind the nature of the present dispute, it would be apposite to highlight the observations set out in the case of WDC v WDD and others [2024] SLR(FC) 58; [2022] SGFC 41 at [8]:

24 As the Complainant’s present application was filed in October 2024, the pre-amendment provisions that were in force before amendments to the family violence provisions in the WC had been made on 2 January 2025, namely, the former sections 64 and 65 of the WC, would apply.

25 Before a PPO may be granted, two conditions must be satisfied (see section 65 of the relevant version of the WC; and UNQ v UNR [2020] SGHCF 21 (“UNQ”)).

(a) First, that family violence has been committed or is likely to be committed against the family member; and

(b) Second, that a PPO is necessary for the protection of that family member.

26 “Family violence” had been defined under section 64 of the relevant version of the WC to include the commission of any of the the following acts:

(a) wilfully or knowingly placing, or attempting to place, a family member in fear of hurt;

(b) causing hurt to a family member by such act which is known or ought to have been known would result in hurt;

(c) wrongfully confining or restraining a family member against his or her will;

(d) causing continual harassment with intent to cause or knowing that it is likely to cause anguish to a family member,

(e) but does not include any force lawfully used in self-defence, or by way of correction towards a child below 21 years of age.

27 The burden is on the Complainant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that family violence has been committed and is likely to be committed.

28 The protection of a PPO carries with it criminal sanctions. Ordering a PPO is not a decision that the Court would make lightly (UNQ at [28]). In XFL v XFM [2024] SGFC 103, it was highlighted that at [22]:

29 For a DEO, the Court may grant it in addition to a PPO where the Court forms the view that a DEO is necessary for the protection or personal safety of the family member pursuant to section 65(5) of the relevant version of the WC.

30 The issues are as follows:

(a) Whether family violence was committed or is likely to be committed against the Complainant and/or the Children.

(b) Whether a PPO is necessary to protect the Complainant and/or the Children.

(c) Whether a DEO is necessary to protect the Complainant and/or the Children.

(d) Whether there is a legal basis for the Court to grant the MTO.

31 I deal first with the Complainant’s claims in relation to himself, followed by his claims in relation to the Children.

32 In the present case, the Complainant highlighted that the Court’s power to grant a personal protection order is found in Section 65 of the WC, whereby the Court may make a PPO if, on a balance of probabilities, family violence has been committed or is likely to be committed and such an order is necessary for the protection of the family member.

33 As stated above, section 65 of the WC allows the Court to make a PPO, upon satisfaction on a balance of probabilities that family violence has been committed or is likely to be committed against the family member. In this regard, it has been stated in the case of UTH v UTI (on behalf of child) [2019] SGFC 27 (“UTH”), that a PPO may be made pre-emptively, where family violence is “likely to be committed”. It was stated in UTH that the Court may take into consideration the following factors, including the (1) nature of the dispute or conflict between the family members, (2) the level and nature of the escalation of the conflict, (3) the parties’ relationship and their overall conduct, behaviour and demeanour, and (4) the factors which may point towards a further deterioration of the relationship if left unchecked.

34 First, I considered the nature or dispute and conflict between the parties. The parties’ themselves do not dispute that they have a highly acrimonious relationship which culminated in the events that had occurred during the May Incident, where CPS was present during the situation when the Children had went home with the Respondent. The Complainant has repeatedly highlighted the Respondent’s “persistent aggression” and hostility towards him and alleged that the Respondent has a history of attacking him, insulting him, using vulgar and abusive language (including calling him the names, such as alleging that he is the son of Satan, etc.) ⁶ . The Respondent did not strongly dispute that the parties’ have a relationship that is particularly antagonistic in nature, where the Respondent stated that she expressly disapproved of the Complainant’s character by describing him as wicked, deceitful and malevolent ⁷ .

35 The acrimony between the parties is an observation that had also been highlighted by third parties/social service professionals. In particular, the CPO who had testified in the matter (and who was present during the May Incident) stated that CPS is aware of the acrimony between the parties and that both parents have a conflictual relationship, as set out in NE2:

36 Second, I considered the level and nature of the escalation of conflict between the parties. It is not strongly disputed that parties’ have a tendency to engage in aggressive confrontations, resulting in neutral third parties being brought into the dispute between the parties. This includes the police and CPOs, who had been present and involved during various incidents between the parties, including the May Incident. In particular, it is observed that the Respondent had admitted that there was violence on her part towards the Complainant. Specifically, when the Complainant had put to the Respondent during the trial that family violence had occurred in her hands and was likely to continue which was why a PPO would be necessary for him, the Respondent did not deny this but admitted that there had been violence between the parties, as set out in NE3:

37 Against the backdrop of the frequent conflict between the parties, the Complainant had produced a Medical Report where he claimed that he had suffered from bruises on his body including his private areas during the period where parties had lived together, whereby he alleged that his bruises were inflicted by the Respondent (for example, by the Respondent hitting him with a spatula). I observe that the Doctor also opined that the causes of the bruises found on the Complainant could have been caused by a blunt instrument at places which are generally difficult to reach, as set out at NE3. The Respondent did not strongly challenge that the injuries had been present on the Respondent during periods where the parties were living together nor provide clear evidence to demonstrate that these injuries had not been caused by her and had been self-inflicted by the Complainant. Even though she claimed that parties had been engaged in other activities on the date(s) in which the Complainant had claimed he developed the relevant injuries or bruises, she did not clearly rebut the Complainant’s claim that she had inflicted the bruises on him. Taking into account the Respondent’s acceptance that there had been violence during the course of the marriage in the context of the pattern of aggressive behaviour between the parties, I was of the view that, on a balance of probabilities, family violence was likely to be committed against the Complainant by the Respondent.

38 Third, I considered the parties’ relationship and their overall conduct, behaviour and demeanour, whereby I observed that the level of the acrimony between the parties continued to remain relatively high. There were multiple examples of the parties’ continued engagement in disputes with each other in public. For example, apart from the May Incident, the Respondent had not disputed that she had blocked the car that the Complainant was driving during the April Incident due to their disagreement over the Children. These incidents demonstrate that the parties’ have no qualms acting in an aggressive manner towards each other in public, which formed the context for the May Incident where parties had been highly conflictual in front of social service professionals.

39 To add further context to the level of acrimony between the parties, the Respondent also did not deny that she was the woman in the recordings that the Complainant had submitted who had shouted, “[g]et out”, “[k]neel outside”. Although the Respondent disagreed with the Complainant that these words were threatening, she did not dispute that she was the person who had used such words in her communications with the Complainant, as set out in NE3:

40 Fourth, there are factors that point to the overall increase in the deterioration of the relationship of the parties if left unchecked. The Respondent did not deny she continued to send the Complainant highly antagonistic messages claiming that he was the “devil in disguise” around August 2024 and that she told him to “F off” around October 2024. These messages were consistent with the Complainant’s claim that the Respondent had the tendency to use vulgar and abusive language towards him, as highlighted in his various documents.

41 This is exacerbated by the fact that parties’ tend to get into acrimonious confrontations, even though various social service professionals from MSF (including from CPS) have been present with them and involved in the matter, as demonstrated through incidents such as the April Incident and the May Incident. In this regard, there are no signs that the relationship between the parties was improving. As of the May Incident, the relationship between the parties were observed to be acrimonious and tense.

42 Taking the overall conduct, behaviour and demeanour of the Complainant and Respondent that had been illustrated in the evidence into consideration, it is noted that parties have a tendency to engage in aggressive fights/arguments, bearing in mind the highly acrimonious comments that parties have made against each other during the course of the present proceedings.

43 Based on the evidence before me, I was satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, that family violence is likely to be committed against the Complainant by the Respondent. Given the tendency of the parties to get into antagonistic arguments and altercations in public and in front of third parties, there was a high likelihood that the Respondent could continue to commit family violence against the Complainant or place him in fear of hurt as parties’ continue to interact regularly and would invariably remain in close proximity due to the Children’s caregiving arrangements.

44 The second legal requirement before a court may order a PPO is that of necessity.

45 The Respondent claimed that a PPO was not necessary for the Complainant since he had moved out of the Residence.

46 In response, the Complainant claimed that he would still need to interact with the Respondent and his encounters may lead to further violence or false accusations by her.

47 Having considered both parties’ position, I was of the view that it would be necessary for a PPO to be made to protect the Complainant in this case. Even though the parties have been living apart, they tend to get into arguments and fights in public, in the presence of third parties (including the CPS and the police), as highlighted above. These are clearly not one-off incidents. The parties have repeatedly demonstrated a pattern of hostility and aggression towards each other. This has been acknowledged by social service professionals, where the CPO had highlighted that CPS was aware of the acrimony and multiple cross-allegations between the parents; and that the parents were not able to ensure parental conflict was managed when they were with the Children. There was a high likelihood that both parties would continue to interact with each other in close proximity and on a frequent basis due to the arrangements relating to the Children in public areas and outside the Residence.

48 Due to the tendency for the parties to get into altercations where family violence would likely occur and the Complainant could suffer from harm or be placed in fear of harm, I was of the view that a PPO would be necessary, based on the unique facts and circumstances of the present case.

49 I now turn to whether PPOs should be granted for the Children.

50 To reiterate, before a PPO can be granted, the Court must be satisfied as to whether family violence committed or is likely to be committed against the Children; and whether a PPO is necessary to protect them. In this regard, the Complainant made the following allegations:

(a) The Respondent unilaterally took the Children away with her during the May Incident. He claimed that the Children were being wrongfully confined and restrained by her. He also claimed that he believed that the Children were held against their will by the Wife ⁸ .

(b) The Respondent had “unlawfully removed the [Children] from CPS supervision” and has since blocked all access to him.

51 Having considered the evidence and both parties’ positions, the Complainant had failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities that family violence had been committed in respect of the Children based on the incidents set out in his Complaint Form.

52 First, I considered the Complainant’s allegations in relation to the May Incident.

53 In respect of the May Incident, the Complainant had failed to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities that the Respondent had committed family violence against the Children during the May Incident. This is elaborated upon below:

(a) The Complainant’s allegations did not align with the testimony of the CPO (who was present during the May Incident) as to what had happened during the material time of the said incident.

(b) Contrary to the Complainant’s allegations, the CPO stated that the Respondent had left with the Children but that CPS had not prevented her from leaving as the Children did not feel scared or worried to leave with her.

(c) This corroborated the Respondent’s testimony that the Children left with the Respondent willingly and voluntarily in the presence of the CPS officer.

(d) The CPO had also testified that the last safety plan for the family had expired around April 2024 and the Complainant and Respondent had since been unable to agree on a further safety plan.

(e) This was in alignment with the Respondent’s explanation that there was no agreed care plan in place when she left CPS’ office with the Children. The Complainant did not demonstrate why the Respondent, who was the biological mother of the Children, was not entitled to leave the premises with the Children.

(f) Furthermore, the CPO confirmed on the stand that CPS’ social investigations did not indicate any immediate safety concerns for the Children under the care of the Respondent and that CPS had since concluded its investigations around July 2024, and was no longer involved with the family.

54 In this regard, I found the CPO to be a credible witness and accorded significant weight to her testimony, being a social service professional who had investigated the safety concerns relating to the Children. Further, I found that her testimony accorded with the Respondent’s account of the events that had occurred. The relevant portions of the CPO’s testimony from NE2 is set out below:

55 Having considered the CPO’s testimony above, I note that this differed from the Complainant’s account where he claimed that the Children had been unilaterally taken away by the Respondent and wrongfully confined and restrained by her. This is particularly since the CPO had affirmed that the Children had left willingly with the Respondent. The CPO also highlighted that both parents had been assessed to be suitable caregivers of the Children. In view of the same, I could not find that family violence had been committed against the Children by the Respondent during the May Incident, especially when CPS had assessed the Respondent to be a suitable caregiver of the Child. As such, I could not find that the Children were being held against their will by the Respondent or that this constituted family violence against the Children by the Respondent, as the Complainant had claimed.

56 With the context of the May Incident in mind, I turn to the April Incident (which occurred prior to the May Incident). I also observed that the Complainant had failed to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the Respondent had committed family violence against the Children. This is elaborated upon below:

(a) Under section 64 of the relevant version of the WC, family violence is defined to relate to behaviour directed against victim of the family violence. For example, this includes wilfully or knowingly placing the victim family member in fear of hurt. Similarly, under section 65 of the relevant version of the WC, the Court may make a PPO when family violence has been committed against the victim family member.

(b) In relation to the April Incident, the Complainant did not clearly establish that the Respondent had committed any actual acts of physical violence against the Children. Having examined the police report that the Complainant had made on 17 June 2024 (“June Police Report”) in relation to the April Incident, the Complainant’s claims on the April Incident in the police report and the Complaint Form were inconsistent. In particular:

(i) In the Complaint Form, the Complainant claimed that the Children were in fear of being hurt which is why they went unwillingly with the Respondent who forced them in the car and drove away during the April Incident.

(ii) However, the claim that the Respondent drove away with the Children was not consistent with the Complainant’s account set out in the June Police Report itself where the Complainant claimed that after the April Incident, the Children had been living with him. In particular, he stated in the said June Police Report that, “[the Children] were living with me since then in my parents’ home, until 13 May where [the Respondent] took the [Children] unilaterally without my consent and have been holding them in her home”. [Emphasis Added].

(iii) Turning to the Respondent’s police report on 10/4/2024 at R1 ⁹ , the Respondent claimed that the “[Complainant] drove away in [the Respondent’s] car, [XXX] XXXX X, from Woodleigh Mall carpark with both [the Children] at around 6pm, after he had pushed [the Respondent] away from the car.” This did not cohere with the Complainant’s account of this events in his Complaint Form that the Children had been taken away by the Respondent.

(c) Based on the Complainant’s differing accounts (coupled with the consideration of the Respondent’s account), it was not clear whether the Children had returned home with the Complainant or the Respondent after the April Incident. I did not place much weight on the Complainant’s claims that the Children had left unwillingly with the Respondent during the April Incident when he had also claimed in the June Police Report that the Children had been living with him in his parents’ home until the May Incident.

(d) Furthermore, I was unable to place much weight on the Complainant’s claims that the Children told the police that they wished to stay with him and not the mother (i.e. the Respondent) and that they were in fear of hurt. This is in the context of the overall facts and circumstances of the case, particularly since by the time of the May Incident, which was about a month after the April Incident, the CPO indicated that the Children were safe and it appeared that they had been willing to be present under the care of the Respondent insofar as they did not have any objections to residing under the Respondent’s care.

(e) In view of the above, I was unable to find that the Children were allegedly in fear of being hurt by the Respondent, bearing the acrimonious nature of the relationship of the parties’ in mind. This is also in consideration that the CPO reported that the Children felt that they wanted to proceed under the care of the Respondent during the May Incident. I thus do not find that the Complainant had shown, on a balance of probabilities, that the Respondent’s alleged conduct amounted to family violence directed against and/or caused to the Children.

57 For completeness, the Complainant raised further allegations that were not set out in his Complaint Form, including allegations that the Respondent had endangered the Children in subjecting them to physical punishment, harsh discipline and verbal abuse, including completing 40 pages of assessment books in one sitting. In this regard, I could not find that he had provided clear evidence to substantiate these bare statements or sufficiently prove that the Respondent had committed family violence against the Children, on a balance of probabilities. Even though parties had engaged in arguments in front of the Children, there was a lack of evidence provided by the Complainant to demonstrate that the Respondent had harmed the Children. This had also been considered in the context of the CPO’s overall testimony that by the May Incident, the Respondent did not pose any threat of harm or risk to the Children and that the Respondent was assessed to be a suitable caregiver of the Children.

58 Furthermore, the Complainant had also attached letters or documents in C1 that were allegedly written by the Children where the Daughter allegedly wrote “please help Mama to stop beating Papa” and the Son allegedly wrote “please help Mama get better by making Satan and all the evils go away from Mama”. However, the Respondent’s claim in R2 was that this was written by the Complainant and/or that the Complainant had manipulated the Son to write such statements. Having reviewed these letters, I could not place much weight on these documents that had allegedly been written by the Children, given their ages and the level of conflict between the parties, as well as the overall statements made by the CPO in relation to the Children, who are caught in the dispute between the parents.

59 It therefore remains for me to consider whether there is a likelihood of future family violence being committed against the Children. In considering this issue, I was unable to find that the Complainant had established, on a balance of probabilities, that the Respondent was likely to commit family violence against the Children. As it stands, the Children have been living with the Respondent and there have been no further reports of alleged abuse on the Respondent’s part in relation to the Children. Furthermore, this is buttressed by the CPO’s testimony, whereby the CPO had stated that the assessment was that the Respondent did not pose any threat of harm or risk to the Children and CPS’ investigations did not indicate any immediate safety concerns for the Children.

60 As the Complainant did not establish there was any family violence that was committed or is likely to be committed against the children, it is not necessary to consider the issue of the necessity of a PPO for the Children.

61 For a DEO, the court may grant it in addition to a PPO where the court forms the view that a DEO is necessary for the protection or personal safety of the family member. A DEO may function to exclude the perpetrator from the entire property or a specified part of it, regardless of whether the shared residence is solely or jointly owned (see section 65(5)(a) of the WC).

62 In the Complaint Form, the Complainant asked for a DEO in respect of the entire property at the Residence. In response, the Respondent highlighted that the Complainant was no longer living there and this was her property that she is currently residing in with the Children since 13 May 2024 ¹⁰ .

63 Having considered both parties’ positions, the Complainant did not show, on a balance of probabilities, how a DEO would be necessary, particularly when the Complainant himself confirmed that he was no longer residing at the Residence. Furthermore, the Respondent was living there with the Children.

64 It is also observed that the Complainant did not dispute the Respondent’s claim that he had other alternative places of accommodation to stay in. This is not a case where the Complainant had no choice but to return to live in close proximity with the Respondent on a daily basis, such that a DEO should be made.

65 As for the Complainant’s allegations that a DEO should be granted against the Respondent for the protection of the Children, it has been discussed above that the Complainant had not shown, on a balance of probabilities that family violence had been committed against the Children. As an overall comment, I was also of the view that a DEO should not be used as a mechanism to block a parent from seeing their children or to prevent a party from exercising their legal right to stay in a property that they own. The objective of a DEO under the family violence regime is to ensure the protection/personal safety of the family member and should not be used for any other purpose.

66 In the circumstances, I could not find that the Complainant had shown that a DEO would be necessary for himself or the Children, particularly when a PPO had already been granted for the protection of the Complainant.

67 While not stated in the Complaint Form, the Complainant asked for a MTO to be made in respect of the Respondent as he alleged that she had been an IMH patient. In response, the Respondent claimed that the Complainant must be held to strict proof.

68 In this regard, the Complainant did not demonstrate a clear legal basis in which the Court could make an order for a MTO, bearing in mind that his application had been made before the provisions relating to the granting of MTOs under the new family violence provisions had come into force on 2 January 2025. He did not show that the Court had the power to make such an MTO under pre-amendment sections 64 and 65 of the relevant version of the WC.

69 For completeness, I also considered that the Complainant had not provided clear evidence that the Respondent had an underlying mental health condition that may have contributed to any conduct of family violence on her part, such that a mandatory treatment order would be necessary in the present case.

70 To help the parties in their continuing journey, I ordered both to attend mandatory counselling with a counselling review date to be given. It is my hope that with the counselling order, parties will be able to navigate the rebuilding and healing of the relationship. This is an opportunity for the entire family to move forward and I sincerely hope that all parties make the best use of it.

71 I acknowledge that parties are going through a difficult time adjusting to this new chapter of their lives during the course of the divorce proceedings. There is still hope for them to work on being gentler towards each other.

72 While I have not found that the Complainant had satisfied the legal threshold for a PPO to be made in respect of the Children, this is not to say that the Court condones the manner in which both the Complainant and Respondent have treated each other in the midst of the Children. The arguments between the parties, including the unkind and harsh words that have been used, should not occur in front of the Children. I believe both parties would accept that it is not healthy for young children to be exposed to conflict. For completeness, I would like to stress that this Court is not making any findings on caregiving capabilities or access arrangements between both parents.

73 I would like to encourage both parties to try to work actively to become the best parents that they can be for their children. This includes supporting each other readily, with a gentle spirit, to meet the needs of their Children. Indeed, how the parties act and react to each other can affect their young and impressionable children. To that end, I urge parties to do their utmost to be more considerate to each other and extend graciousness, kindness, and forgiveness – no matter how difficult it may be in the heat of the moment.