1. The parties were married in August 2010 and have 2 children, A and B. The Applicant filed for divorce on 15 October 2019. Interim Judgment was made on 5 November 2019 which included consent orders in relation to two properties, Property 1 and Property 2, owned jointly by the parties. The judgment was made final in February 2020.

2. This appeal concerns an application to vary paragraphs 3(d)(i) and 3(d)(ii) of the Interim Judgment made on 5 November 2019 which provided for the following:

3. The Applicant sought the following orders in the application:

4. The Respondent also sought that the Respondent shall pay the Applicant the difference between S$1.58m and the sale price, should the eventual sale price of the Property 2 fall below S$1.58m.

5. The Applicant filed the following:

6. The Respondent filed his affidavit in reply on 17 July 2025.

7. The Applicant provided the following reasons for the variation for Property 1:

c. Applicant wished to purchase the Respondent’s 50% share to avoid similar disputes, ensured that he would receive his fair share without incurring additional costs, delays and uncertainties and provide a clear break for parties.

d. Applicant would like to be able to determine its future use.

8. The Applicant provided the following reason for the variation of the order for Property 2:

e. She was solely responsible for managing it, including securing tenants, coordinating with agents, handling replacements, overseeing renovations, managing legal matters and payment of management and strata fees and property tax.

f. The Respondent only covered 30% of the monetary shortfalls and did not contribute time and effort to its management. As of 31 January 2025, there was an outstanding loan of $652,867.01. There had been financial shortfalls each month amounting to about $650 per month or $7,800 per year for which she had to bear 70% of the amount. The loss placed a significant financial strain on her, depleting her resources month after month. Selling it aligned with the terms of the interim judgment and it was prudent to have it sold. The current lease would expire in September 2025. She had received a favourable offer for $1.58 million and wished to proceed with the sale.

g. The Respondent’s refusal was impractical, inequitable and inconsistent with the terms of interim judgement which gave the Applicant the predominant financial interest in its sale.

h. Applicant also wanted to reinvest and utilize funds that would benefit her and the children, example, funding the children’s private education. After the sale, she could establish a trust independently. The Respondent had not authority to dictate how she managed her share.

9. The Respondent disagreed with the variation application in respect of the two properties as the parties intended to preserve the properties for the children’s future. The order provided these to be gifts to them if not sold. He proposed that if sold the proceeds should be placed in a trust or custodial accounts for the children financial needs. Alternatively, the properties should be maintained for their potential appreciation in value.

10.  The counsel for each party submitted written submissions and the matters set out below at the hearing.

11.  On behalf of the Applicant:

i. in respect of Property 1, she wished to have the property bought over at market value based on valuation by an independent valuer;

j. in respect of Property 2, the clause was unworkable as it did not state when the property was to be sold and suggested that this should be by agreement. It was reiterated that the rental income was insufficient for the parties to hold on to the property. The property should be sold for parties to have a clean break.

k. In respect of Property 2 it was pointed out that though the clause provided for the proceeds to be divided 70:30 in favour of the Applicant, there was a dispute as to whether the division should be before or after CPF refunds ¹ . The Applicant sought to vary the sequence of the CPF refunds such that these refunds were made after the division of the proceeds of sale based on 70:30 apportionment in favour of the Applicant.

l. The Applicant’s counsel submitted that the Applicant had wanted to have the CPF refunded after division. In view of that she had agreed to the following “adjustment” clause which reads:

12. The Applicant’s counsel explained that when the order was agreed, the property was worth about $1 million ² . However, the clause did not contemplate a situation when the property value and sale price would significantly appreciate. Counsel also pointed out that there was a separation deed contemplated and other surrounding circumstances which supported the Applicant’s contention that the parties intended for the division of proceeds be 70:30 before CPF refunds in favour of the Applicant. One of the circumstances concerned the Applicant agreeing to the parties’ overseas properties be transferred to the Respondent without any compensation made to the Applicant.

13. On behalf of the Respondent, it was also submitted that:

m. It was dangerous to decipher parties’ intention which led to the consent order. What was evident was that parties took at least one month to decide on the matter and what parties had contemporaneously agreed to were as set out in the court order.

n. The effects of the variation application for Property 2, if allowed were different from those consented to.

14. In deciding the application , the legal provisions and authorities set out below were considered.

15. Under sections 112(1) and 112(4) of the Women’s Charter 1961, the Court has the power to vary the orders for division of assets. The provisions read:

16. In relation to orders made by consent, in XNG v XNH [2025] SGHCF 32 the Court stated (at [9]):

17. The principles to be applied for variation of ancillary orders are set out by the Court of Appeal’s case of AYM v AYL [2012] SGCA 68. The Court of Appeal also clarified the threshold required for a court to intervene and vary orders relating to the division of matrimonial assets. At [23] the Court made it clear that there should be a “fundamental importance of finality” which applies in the context of division of assets. The Court would make, inter alia, the necessary variations to an order for division only when the order was unworkable or has become unworkable (but before it has been fully effected or implemented). There could be situations where a court order has become unworkable as a result of new circumstances which have arisen. However, the change in question must be “very rare and very extreme” (at [26]).

18. In relation to parties who are legally represented, in AUA v ATZ [2016] SGCA 41, the Court of Appeal stated that any agreement in relation to the issue of division of assets which has been freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties upon legal advice should be almost determinative of the outcome and the role of the court “is greatly circumscribed”.

19. The Applicant’s application was dismissed for the reasons set out below.

20.  In respect of Property 1, as mentioned above, the Applicant wished to purchase the Respondent’s 50% share to avoid similar disputes, ensured that he would receive his fair share without incurring additional costs, delays and uncertainties and provide a clear break for parties. The Applicant would like to be able to determine its future use.

21. I was of the view that the above reasons did not amount to a material or radical change in the circumstances.

22. In respect of Property 2, the Applicant main reason for seeking a variation was that she had been suffering shortfalls in the net income received of $650 per month. Her 70% share of this amount came up to $455 per month.

23.  The Applicant had agreed to take on the obligation to maintain the property and in return, 70% of the net income would be retained by her whilst the remaining 30% be the Respondent’s share if there had been net profit. Any net loss would have to be shared in the same proportion. As the property was to be rented out, she would have anticipated that there would be occasions where the property would be vacant or rented at a loss in which case, a net loss was to be expected . I did not find that the $455 she had to incur each month caused a financial burden on her as claimed .

24. For a court to vary an ancillary order, it could also be shown that the order was unworkable. I was of the view this was not the case here for both properties . The order has been in operation for 5 years. In these 5 years, the properties had increased in value and to continue maintaining the properties, the Applicant had adhered to what had been agreed. It is not open to her now to claim that the order had been unworkable.

25. I was also of the view that the reasons given were not sufficient to amount to a radical or material change in the circumstances in respect of Property 2.

26. In addition to the above reasons, I was of the view that variation of the order should not be allowed for the following additional reasons:

27. For the reasons given, the application was dismissed with costs.

28. The Respondent estimated the disbursements incurred to be in the region of $800 to $1,000. The sum of $4,000 was sought by the Respondent while the Applicant proposed $1,000 as there was only 1 reply affidavit filed by the Respondent. Having regards to the work done to resist the application, I fixed cost of $2,500 to be paid to the Respondent.