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DISTRICT JUDGE
SALINA ISHAK
4 November 2025
In the state courts of the republic of singapore
[2025] SGMC 67
Magistrate Arrest Case No 900443 of 2024
Magistrate’s Appeal No 9158-2025-01
Public Prosecutor
Against
Zhang Long
grounds of decision
[Criminal Law] — [Offences] — [Employment of Foreign Manpower Act] — [Section 22(1)(d) punishable under section 22(1)(ii)] — [False declaration in work pass application]
This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.
Public Prosecutor v Zhang Long
[2025] SGMC 67
Magistrate Arrest Case No 900443 of 2024 Magistrate’s Appeal No 9158-2025-01
District Judge Salina Ishak
8 - 10 January 2025, 24 March 2025,
16 June 2025, 29 August 2025
10 October 2025
4 November 2025
District Judge Salina Ishak:
Introduction
1 The present case involves a false declaration by an applicant in a work pass application for skilled foreign workers to the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”).
Background
2 The accused, Mr Zhang Long a 36-year-old PRC national, claimed trial to the following charge under s 22(1)(d) and punishable under s 22(1)(ii) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Cap 91A, Rev Ed 2009) (“EFMA”):
are charged that you, on or about 3 March 2021, in Singapore, in connection with an application for a work pass, did make a statement to the Controller of Work Passes, which you knew was false in a material particular, to wit, you declared, in a “Declaration Form” for an S Pass (the “Form”) submitted to the Work Pass Division of the Ministry of Manpower, that you would be employed by Oleegey Pte Ltd (UEN: 202013237Z) (the “Company”) as a Sales and Marketing Manager, when you had no intention to be employed as such, and you have thereby committed an offence under section 22(1)(d) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Cap 91A, Rev Ed 2009) (“EFMA”), punishable under section 22(1)(ii) of the EFMA.
3 The accused is alleged to have made a false statement that he would be employed by Oleegey Pte Ltd (“Oleegey”) as a sales and marketing manager, when he had no intention to be employed as such.
4 At the conclusion of the trial
Foot Note 1
Oral Judgement dated 29 August 2025.
, I found the accused guilty and convicted him on the charge. I imposed a sentence of nine weeks’ imprisonment for MAC 900443 of 2024.
5 This is the accused’s appeal against his conviction. The accused is presently on bail pending the hearing of his appeal.
6 I now set out the grounds of my decision in full.
Issues
7 As the Prosecution sought to rely on the accused’s investigative statements and their voluntariness was challenged, as a preliminary issue first I had to determine if the statements were involuntary under s 258(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC) and therefore not be admitted. Second, whether the prejudicial effect of the statements outweighed their probative value and should therefore be excluded.
8 After determining the admissibility of the statements, the main issue before me was whether the Prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the declaration was materially false when the application was made to MOM.
Ancillary hearing
9 Essentially, the Defence challenged the voluntariness of the accused’s statements
Foot Note 2
Exhibit P5 dated 19 May 2022 and Exhibit P6 dated 8 June 2023.
on the following grounds
Foot Note 3
Defence’s Submissions (Ancillary Hearing) at [2] of page 2.
:
(a) The IOs ie the recorders of the statement
Foot Note 4
1AH-PW1 and 1AH-PW7.
induced the accused into giving incriminating statements by telling him that he must be truthful and that if he gives untruthful answers, he is liable for prosecution but failing to inform him of his right to remain silent and not self-incriminate (the “Inducement”). The Inducement applied to both statements.
(b) They also promised the accused that MOM was not going after him but only after his boss and, that if the accused helped them, he would be treated leniently and/or MOM would help him recover the money that he lost (the “Promise”). The Promise only applied to the first statement.
10 The legal principle applicable in determining the admissibility of an accused’s statement was set out by the Court of Appeal in Sulaiman bin Jumari v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 557 (“Sulaiman”) at [35] to [53]. Hence, first I had to determine whether the statements were given voluntarily based on the requirements set out in s 258(3) of the CPC. Second, even if I found the statements to be made voluntarily, I had to determine whether the prejudicial effect of the statements outweigh its probative value.
11 As highlighted by the Prosecution, this is a partly an objective and partly subjective test. The objective limb is satisfied if there is a threat, inducement or promise, and the subjective limb when the threat, inducement or promise operates on the mind of the particular accused through hope of escape or fear of punishment connected with the charge (see Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [1998] S SLR(R) 619 (“Chai Chien Wei Kelvin”) at [53]).
Ruling on statements
12 In the present case, I noted that the two statements were recorded slightly over a year apart. I also noted that there was no evidence that the accused complained about his experience during his arrest and while he was in MOM's custody or of any irregularities during the recording of his two statements, until the first day of his trial. He did not complain of any discomfort in his health declaration form, nor did he seek medical help while he was at MOM or even after.
13 During the ancillary hearing, apart from the allegations at [9] above, the accused also alleged that when he was arrested, the handcuffs were placed on him too tightly for an extended period and despite complaints, they were never loosened. He also alleged that he was placed in a cold cell and had not eaten before giving his statement. Notably, these claims of oppression were eventually not pursued in the Defence’s submissions, and the challenge was confined to the inducement and promise made to the accused.
14 Nevertheless, in respect of the second or further statement recorded on 8 June 2023, the accused testified that he had no issues communicating with the recorder
Foot Note 5
NE Day 4, Page 18 lines 11 - 13.
. He was not promised anything, he was not threatened, nor did he have any complaints about the first statement
Foot Note 6
NE Day 4, Page 18 lines 14 - 27.
. The accused conceded during his cross-examination that he gave that statement voluntarily
Foot Note 7
NE Day 4, Page 18 lines 28 - 32 and Page 19 lines 1 - 2.
. Hence, in my view it was no longer necessary for me to examine the evidence and rule on its voluntariness of his further statement.
15 In respect of the first statement recorded on 19 May 2022, after a careful consideration the evidence before me, I was of the view that the allegations set out at [9] above did not in fact, amount to an inducement or promise by the Investigation Officer (IO), Neo Dehua Wesley (AH-PW1) to the accused. In any event, I found that adequate measures were taken to ensure the accused’s well-being while he was held in custody. I accepted the documentary evidence
Foot Note 8
Exhibit 1AH-P3.
that corroborated the Prosecution’s position that lunch was served to the accused.
16 Further, I accepted the Prosecution’s assertion that the proper procedures for statement recording had been followed, including reading the statements back to the accused and allowing for amendments to be made to the statements. I agreed with the Prosecution that the amendments made by the accused to his first statement demonstrated his clarity of mind during the statement recording process and his control over what he wanted included in this statement. The accused himself testified that he was not too afraid to ask for amendments to be made to the statement
Foot Note 9
NE Day 4, Page 17 lines 14 – 16.
.
17 I rejected the Defence’s assertion that the IOs (the recorders) of the statements induced the accused into giving incriminating statements by telling him that he must be truthful and that if he gives untruthful answers, he is liable for prosecution and for failing to inform him of his right to remain silent and not self-incriminate. I was of the view that there was no merit to the allegation that the accused was induced into giving the incriminating statement due to the caution administered by the recorder. The caution for the accused to tell the truth and being liable to prosecution if anything false or untruthful is stated, is a standard one that is routinely administered during statement recording. The accused himself has a duty to state truly what he knows of the facts and circumstances of the case
Foot Note 10
Section 22(2) of the CPC.
.
18 As highlighted by the Prosecution, it is clear from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Public Prosecutor v Mazlan bin Maidun [1992]3 SLR(R) 968 at [20] that there is no positive obligation on the police or for that matter, law enforcement agencies to inform suspects or accused persons that they may decline to answer a question that may incriminate them. This is expressly provided in Illustrations (c) and (d) to Explanation 2 of s 258(1) of the CPC which sets out the circumstances which would not render statements inadmissible.
19 Further, I did not accept the Defence's assertion that the recorders promised the accused that MOM was not going after him but only after his boss and, that if he helped them, he would be treated leniently and/or MOM would help him recover the money that he lost. I accepted the testimonies of the various Prosecution witnesses that no such promises were made to the accused.
20 In any event, I agreed with the Prosecution that the alleged statements, if indeed made, did not directly relate to any specific charge against the accused himself. Further, the accused could not specify how his statement was affected by any alleged inducement or promise. During cross-examination, the accused admitted to stating the truth when giving his statement and that he was not just giving answers that he thought the investigation officers expected of him
Foot Note 11
NE Day 4, Page 17 lines 24 - 32.
.
21 All things considered, I found the various challenges raised by the Defence were afterthoughts and a belated attempt to cast doubt on the voluntariness of his statements. I agreed with the Prosecution that the absence of any contemporaneous complaints, despite ample opportunity to raise them, significantly undermined the credibility of the accused’s allegations. Based on the factual matrix before me, I also did not think that the prejudicial effect of the statements outweighed their probative value and should therefore be excluded. Accordingly, I found that both statements were given by the accused voluntarily and admitted them as part of the Prosecution's case.
22 After determining the admissibility of the statements, I next turned to the main issue of whether the Prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the declaration was materially false when the application was made to MOM.
Prosecution’s case
23 The Prosecution asserts that the accused sought to purchase an S Pass under Oleegey without any intention of being genuinely employed in Singapore. The Prosecution further asserts that he did so by making monthly payments to an unknown individual. His sole purpose of obtaining the work pass was to stay in Singapore and eventually apply for permanent residency in Singapore.
24 To establish its case, the Prosecution relied on the oral testimonies of its witnesses as well as documentary evidence tendered at trial. In particular, the Prosecution relied on the evidence from the co-accused, Mr Seah Hong Chuan Adriel (“Adriel Seah”) who was the sole director of Oleegey from 5 August 2020 until the company was struck off on 4 September 2023
Foot Note 12
Exhibit P7 - Statement of Facts for PP v Seah Hong Chuan Adriel at paragraphs [1].
.
25 As a director, his responsibilities involved the collection of work permits of foreign workers and to send it to the said workers, as well as to also accompany them to MOM Services Centre to register their thumbprints. He would liaise with one ‘Jack’ whenever he was required to perform his responsibilities as a director. He had no access to the company’s bank accounts and had no sight of the inflow and outflow of funds from the bank accounts
Foot Note 13
Exhibit P7 - Statement of Facts for PP v Seah Hong Chuan Adriel at paragraphs [3] and [6].
.
26 The Prosecution asserts that Mr Adriel Seah would receive the contact number of the foreign workers, and his contact number would also be provided to them. They would send messages through WeChat or SMS to each other to arrange for a meet up to hand over the work permits to them
Foot Note 14
NE Day 5, Page 13 lines 22 - 32.
.
27 The Prosecution further asserts that during his time as the sole director of Oleegey, the company made six false work pass applications (including that involving the accused) attributable to his neglect as Oleegey’s director. He pleaded guilty for his involvement in this scheme on 30 May 2024 and was sentenced globally to eight weeks’ imprisonment
Foot Note 15
Certificate under s 45A of the Evidence Act 1893 at page 2 of Exhibit P7.
.
28 The Prosecution also relied on the accused’s investigative statements (P5) and (P6) as well as the S Pass Declaration Form (P3). The Prosecution asserts that S Pass Declaration Form was submitted and received by the Work Pass Division (“WPD”) of the MOM. A work pass was issued to the accused pursuant to this declaration.
29 The Prosecution asserts that the declaration that he would be employed by Oleegey is a material consideration in the approval of the said application by MOM. The Prosecution further asserts that the accused never intended to be employed as a sales and marketing manager at Oleegey based on his investigative statements and his conduct after the issuance of the work pass. The Prosecution urged the Court to give full weight to his statements as they were accurately recorded.
30 The Prosecution highlighted that it was undisputed that the accused never worked for Oleegey and did not receive any salary. It was further highlighted that it was unchallenged that the accused never visited Oleegey’s office nor attempted to contact the director of Oleegey regarding his salary payments or work at the company.
Defence’s Case
31 The accused denies the charge and asserts that he lacks the requisite mens rea. The Defence asserts that the accused genuinely believed that he would be employed at Oleegey as a sales and marketing manager when the work pass was applied for. He took reasonable and logical steps around the point in time, such as, providing his details and seeking details after he collected his work pass.
32 The Defence asserts that the accused only realised that he had been cheated by Oleegey after he collected the work pass and after he was informed of the company’s address. The Defence further asserts that the accused’s intention to obtain an S-Pass so that he could subsequently apply for permanent residency is not self-incriminatory. An individual may genuinely intend to work for a company, while at the same time take steps towards obtaining permanent residency.
33 The Defence asserts that the portion of accused’s statement P5, which states that when he applied for the S-Pass, he had no intention of working for the company was inaccurate. The Defence further asserts that what he said was that he had no intention of working very hard for the company. In addition, the Defence asserts that the accused testified that he had not said that he had no intention of working for Oleegey. Rather that he wanted to apply for a job with more flexibility and freedom.
34 The Defence relied on testimony of Oleegey’s sole director, Mr Adriel Seah where he agreed that the real boss of Oleegey lied to people and may also have played out the accused. The Defence asserts that his testimony corroborates the accused’s testimony that he was responding to a seemingly legitimate advertisement on WeChat. It was only later that they realised that they had been cheated by the real boss of Oleegey.
Undisputed Facts
35 In the present case, the following facts were not disputed:
(a) The accused came across an advertisement on WeChat and contacted an unidentified individual on WeChat. The accused subsequently liaised with the unidentified individual for matters relating to his work pass under Oleegey.
(b) The accused was issued an S Pass by MOM on 3 March 2021 after the WPD of MOM received an application for the accused to work for Oleegey as a sales and marketing manager and a Declaration Form signed by the accused as part of the application (P3).
(c) From 3 March 2021 to 19 May 2022, the accused never worked for Oleegey. The accused never received his monthly salary from Oleegey.
(d) The accused made several payments to an individual to maintain his S Pass under Oleegey.
(e) From 3 March 2021 to the date of his arrest on 19 May 2022, the accused never contacted any authorities in Singapore regarding salary or employment issues under Oleegey.
(f) The declaration of the accused’s intention to be employed as a sales and marketing manager at Oleegey was a material consideration by WPD of MOM when issuing the accused’s work pass.
The Law on Making or Providing False Information in making or renewing work pass applications
36 To prove its case, the Prosecution must satisfy the following elements of the charge namely:
(a) The accused made a statement to the Controller of Work Passes.
(b) The statement relates to the accused’s employment.
(c) The statement was materially false.
(d) The accused knew the statement was false.
Assessment of Evidence and Findings
37 To prove its case on the proceeded charge, the Prosecution led evidence from eight witnesses while only the accused gave evidence in his defence.
38 In the present case, it was undisputed that the accused made a statement relating to his employment to the Controller of Work Passes in P3, the S Pass Declaration Form. Hence, the first two elements were satisfied.
Was the statement materially false?
39 Next, I considered whether the statement was materially false. As highlighted earlier, from the time the work pass was issued on 3 March 2021 until his arrest, it was unchallenged that the accused never worked for Oleegey. I note that the accused agreed with the Prosecution that he was never interviewed by anyone from Oleegey
Foot Note 16
NE Day 5, Page 52 lines 10 - 11.
. I also noted he was evasive in his responses when the Prosecution suggested that he never signed an employment contract.
Foot Note 17
NE Day 5, Page 52 lines 12 - 31.
40 The accused testified that he never received his monthly salary from Oleegey
Foot Note 18
NE Day 5, Page 52 line 32 and Page 53 line 1.
. He also testified that from January 2021 to about May 2022 he did not do any work at all
Foot Note 19
NE Day 5, Page 49 lines 5 - 7.
. Further, he had not reported to the Oleegey’s office
Foot Note 20
NE Day 5, Page 53 line 21 – 23.
, nor did he make any attempt to contact the director of Oleegey regarding his salary payments or work at the company. If he intended to be employed by Oleegey, the fact that the accused never reported the company to MOM about not being asked to start work, was puzzling. This was particularly since this was not the first time he worked in Singapore.
41 Hence, I accepted the Prosecution’s assertion that it was clear from his own conduct after receiving the work pass that the accused did not intend to work for Oleegey. For the reasons stated earlier, I rejected the Defence’s assertion that the accused genuinely believed that he would be employed at Oleegey as a sales and marketing manager when the work pass was applied for. I found it to be incredible that he waited for 14 months ie 3 March 2021 to 19 May 2022 in the belief that he would be working for Oleegey.
42 I further disagreed with the Defence’s assertion that the accused took reasonable and logical steps around the point in time, such as, providing his details and seeking details after he collected his work pass. By logical extension, it would only be reasonable if he reported to ascertain his job scope as a sales and marketing manager at Oleegey’s office or even attempt to contact the director of Oleegey regarding his salary payments or work at the company.
43 In the present case, I agreed with the Prosecution that the accused was an unreliable witness whose defence was also wholly unconvincing when weighed against his own conduct after receiving his work pass and during his arrest. In my view, his main purpose of obtaining the work pass was to enable him to continue his stay in Singapore and eventually apply for permanent residency in Singapore. Hence, I rejected his claim that it was only later that he discovered that he was cheated by the real boss of Oleegey. Further, the fact that he made monthly payments to Oleegey from the start of the issuance of his work pass to maintain his S Pass instead of receiving salaries as an employee contradicted his claim that he genuinely believed that he would be employed by Oleegey.
44 In the present case, I found that his statements were accurately recorded. In my view, both recorders gave clear and credible evidence of the statement- recording process. Further, I was of the view that the various amendments made by the accused in his first statement (P5) demonstrated the accused’s clarity of mind during the statement recording process and his control over what he wanted included in his statement. Accordingly, I gave full weight to his investigative statement, that he never intended to be employed as a sales and marketing manager at Oleegey.
45 Consequently, I rejected his assertion that the statements were not accurately recorded including his claim that what he said was that he had no intention of working very hard for the company. I agreed with the Prosecution that his assertion of inaccuracy was an afterthought as well as a belated attempt to avoid culpability for his offence. Hence, based on the evidence before me, I found that his declaration in the Declaration Form that he was to be employed as a sales and marketing manager at Oleegey to be materially false.
Knowledge of falsity of statement
46 Flowing from my earlier finding that the accused never intended to be employed as a sales and marketing manager at Oleegey, I found that he knew that the statement in the Declaration Form was false when the work pass application was submitted. As stated earlier, his main purpose of obtaining the work pass was not to work for Oleegey but to enable him to eventually apply for permanent residency. Hence, I rejected his claim that he was cheated by the real boss of Oleegey.
47 Instead, based on the evidence before me, it was clear that he entered an illicit arrangement with the unidentified individual on WeChat to legitimise his continued stay in Singapore as a foreigner. I found no merit in the Defence’s reliance on the co-accused’s evidence that the real boss of Oleegey lied to people and may also have played out the accused. Instead, it was clear that Oleegey was a shell company that was set up to obtain work passes for foreign nationals like the accused to legitimise their stay in Singapore in exchange for monthly payments to maintain these passes.
48 In my view, Mr Adriel Seah’s evidence should be considered in the proper context. I agreed with the Prosecution that Mr Adriel Seah’s position as Oleegey’s director was materially different from that of a purported employee. As Mr Adriel Seah is a Singaporean citizen, there was no necessity for him to obtain a work pass to work for Oleegey. Unlike the accused, Mr Adriel Seah did not make monthly payments to maintain any work pass. Instead, he was paid $500 to his CPF account every month for his role as a nominee director in the scheme to enable foreigners to legitimise their stay in Singapore in exchange for monthly payments to maintain their work passes.
49 Furthermore, as set out at [27] above, Mr Adriel Seah had pleaded guilty for his involvement in this scheme as the sole director of Oleegey, the company that made six false work pass applications (including that involving the accused) to MOM.
Conclusion
50 After a careful consideration of the totality of the evidence before me, I found that the Prosecution has established all the elements of the charge in MAC-900443-2024 beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I found the accused guilty and convicted him on the charge.
Salina Ishak District Judge
Nee Yingxin, Nur Shahirah Nassir, Ameerhan Shikandar
(Ministry of Manpower) for the Public Prosecutor.
Arshad Bin Mohamed Tahir (Fernandez LLC ) for the accused.
This judgment text has undergone conversion so that it is mobile and web-friendly. This may have created formatting or alignment issues. Please refer to the PDF copy for a print-friendly version.