1 In HC/CC 37/2024, the appellant (“Appellant”) was convicted on two charges for rape under s 375 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (as at 1 January 2020) (“2008 PC”), and two charges for outrage of modesty under s 354 of the 2008 PC. A Judge of the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”) found that all these offences were liable for enhanced punishment under s 73(1) of the 2008 PC (now s 73(1) of the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) (“PC”)) as they were committed against a migrant domestic worker (“MDW”) by a member of the MDW’s employer’s household. The Judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 19 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The Judge’s grounds of decision are published as Public Prosecutor v CFE [2025] SGHC 106 (“GD”). CA/CCA 2/2025 is the Appellant’s appeal against his conviction and sentence.

2 This appeal engages two important issues pertaining to the Appellant’s sentence: first, the appropriate sentencing approach for the offences of rape and outrage of modesty, where these offences are punishable with the enhanced penalties under s 73(1) of the 2008 PC; and second, the scope of the exception to the enhanced penalties under s 73(2) of the 2008 PC (now s 73(2) of the PC). Sections 73(1) and 73(2) of the 2008 PC are identical to ss 73(1) and 73(2) of the PC – our observations therefore apply to the provisions under both the 2008 PC and the current PC.

3 Having considered the parties’ submissions, we dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against his conviction but allow his appeal against his sentence. We substitute the global sentence of 19 years and 6 months’ imprisonment imposed by the Judge with a sentence of 16 years and 7 months’ imprisonment.

4 We begin by outlining the salient facts. In or about November 2019, the Appellant, then 63 years old, moved in to live with two of his daughters (“D1” and “D2”) in a two-storey apartment owned by D1 (“Flat”). The Appellant describes himself as a “researcher” in the field of health and health supplements. He kept stocks of various health supplements, injections, and Traditional Chinese Medicine products in the Flat.

5 The complainant (“Complainant”) is a Filipino national. At the time of the alleged offences, she was 35 years old. She came to Singapore to work as an MDW in 2016 and worked for D2 from August 2018. In or about 2019, D2 and her family moved into the Flat. The Complainant moved in with them and had a bedroom on the first floor of the Flat.

6 On 1 January 2020, D1 and D2 flew to Taiwan to settle the affairs of their deceased mother, leaving the Appellant and the Complainant as the only occupiers of the Flat from 1 to 8 January 2020. The acts which formed the basis of the charges against the Appellant (“Incident”) took place sometime between 11.50pm on the night of Sunday 5 January 2020 and 12.20am on the morning of Monday 6 January 2020.

7 There were two CCTV cameras installed in the Flat, one in the living room (“Living Room CCTV”) and the other in the Complainant’s bedroom (“Bedroom CCTV”). The video and audio footage from the Living Room CCTV (“Footage”) captured a substantial portion of the events leading up to, during, and after, the Incident. The CCTV cameras were motion-activated, which accounted for some gaps in the Footage. Nonetheless, the integrity of the Footage was not challenged by the Appellant; nor was it his position that the Footage failed to capture material events which supported his case.

8 We first set out the events leading up to the Incident as found by the Judge. Most of these findings were based on, or supported by, the Footage.

9 The Complainant returned to the Flat at around 7.30pm on 5 January 2020. At approximately 11.14pm, the Appellant invited the Complainant to drink wine with him. The Complainant accepted his offer, and they watched TV as they drank the wine. At around 11.32pm, the Complainant told the Appellant that she was having trouble sleeping and told the Appellant about pain in her stomach and her breast.

10 Following this exchange, the Appellant agreed to administer injections of health supplements to the Complainant. The Appellant went to retrieve the materials he needed to prepare the injections from the second storey of the Flat. At 11.49pm, the Appellant went to the Complainant’s bedroom and shifted the Bedroom CCTV such that the Complainant’s bed was no longer within the Bedroom CCTV’s field of view. The Appellant returned to the living room, where he chatted with the Complainant before saying, “Ok! We go and give you injection and then you can sleep”. The Complainant got up from the living room floor where she had been sitting and remarked that she felt dizzy.

11 The Appellant took the injections he had prepared and switched off the lights in the living room, prompting the Complainant to exclaim. The Appellant switched the lights back on. The Appellant suggested administering the injections in the Complainant’s bedroom and switched off the living room lights again. He switched on the living room lights again after the Complainant insisted on receiving the injections in the living room. The Complainant pulled out the sofa bed in the living room. The Appellant switched off the living room lights yet again and switched on the kitchen lights. At about 11.57pm, the Complainant lay down on the sofa bed and unbuttoned her shorts before assuming a prone position, with her arms beside her body. It was not disputed that the Appellant had previously administered injections of health supplements to his family members on their buttocks and that the Complainant was aware of this practice. The Complainant assisted the Appellant in pulling down her shorts, just enough to expose the top half of her buttocks. The Appellant administered an injection into the Complainant’s left buttock. At this point, the Complainant appeared motionless in the Footage.

12 The Judge found that the Footage captured several sexual acts performed by the Appellant on the Complainant between 12.06am and 12.15am, save for the acts relating to the 2nd Charge (see below at [13(a)]) which were not captured. Throughout the Incident, the Complainant was silent and motionless, save for some weak movements discussed below. The acts which form the subject of the charges (see [24]) against the Appellant are set out below.

13 The sequence of the acts is as follows:

(a) The Appellant inserted at least one finger into the Complainant’s vagina while she was lying face-down on the sofa bed (“2nd Charge”).

(d) The Appellant climbed on top of the Complainant and inserted his penis into her mouth (“4th Charge”). The Appellant then licked her vagina again (together with the act set out at [13(c)] above, these acts of licking the Complainant’s vagina formed the “5th Charge”).

(e) The Appellant climbed off the Complainant, positioned himself between her legs and pulled her body to the edge of the sofa. He then inserted his penis into her vagina (“1st Charge”).

14 After the Incident, the Complainant was partially clothed and lying motionless and silent on the sofa bed. Following a gap in the Footage of about two minutes, the Complainant was seen fully clothed but still lying motionless. It was not disputed that it was the Appellant who had clothed the Complainant in this period.

15 The Appellant attempted to lift the Complainant from the sofa bed, but she flopped back down without any discernible physical or verbal response. He tried again and succeeded, manoeuvring her from the living room to her bedroom by supporting her from under her armpits and pushing her along from behind. Throughout this period, the Complainant’s body flopped listlessly and the Appellant could be heard panting. The Appellant placed the Complainant on her bed before shifting the Bedroom CCTV back to its original position, such that the Complainant’s bed was once again within the camera’s frame.

16 The Complainant woke up at about 3.36am on 6 January 2020. She called her sister, “S”, at about 3.43am and could be heard crying. The Complainant continued to confide in S over the next three days regarding the Incident. Between 6 January 2020 and 8 January 2020, she also confided in several other individuals about the Incident, including:

(a) “N”, a Filipino MDW in a neighbouring flat;

(b) “Bing”, a volunteer from the Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics (“HOME”); and

(c) “GF”, S’s friend who was a nurse based in the Philippines.

17 When D1 and D2 returned on 8 January 2020, the Complainant informed them about what had happened. On 9 January 2020, D1 and D2 told the Complainant that they wanted to go to the police. The Complainant made a police report that day, and the Appellant was arrested.

18 The investigation officer, Assistant Superintendent Gan Mei Huey (“IO Gan”), conducted three video recorded interviews (“VRI”) with the Appellant and recorded statements on:

(a) 10 January 2020 at 10.49pm (“10 January 2020 VRI Statement”);

(b) 14 January 2020 at 4.30pm (“14 January 2020 VRI Statement”); and

(c) 15 January 2020 at 4.31pm (“15 January 2020 VRI Statement”).

(collectively, “VRI Statements”)

19 In the VRI Statements, the Appellant made various admissions pertaining to the Incident. First, the Appellant admitted to penetrating the Complainant’s vagina with his penis. In his 10 January 2020 VRI Statement, he stated:

20 When he was posed follow up questions by Deputy Superintendent Sarah Ann Lee (“DSP Lee”), the Appellant confirmed this account:

21 Second, the Appellant admitted to kissing the Complainant’s vagina. In his 10 January 2020 VRI Statement, after being shown portions of the Footage, the Appellant stated:

22 The Appellant repeated this admission in his 15 January 2020 VRI Statement. When IO Gan suggested to the Appellant that he had used his mouth to kiss and lick the Complainant’s vagina, he did not refute this. Instead, he explained why he “kissed” the Complainant’s vagina:

23 Third, in the 10 January 2020 VRI Statement, the Appellant admitted that the Complainant was unresponsive during the Incident and did not consent to having sex:

24 The Prosecution brought the following charges against the Appellant:

25 The Prosecution relied principally on the Complainant’s evidence, the Footage, and the abovementioned admissions in the VRI Statements. The Prosecution maintained that the Complainant did not consent to any sexual acts, as she was in a weak and unresponsive state throughout the Incident.

26 As a preliminary point, the Appellant challenged the voluntariness of the 10 January and 15 January VRI Statements, on the basis that Deputy Superintendent Ryan Yue Rui Sheng (“DSP Yue”) had made threats, inducements, or promises to him prior to their recording. He sought to explain away his admissions in the VRI Statements on the basis that they were made when he was not in the right state of mind.

27 In respect of the Incident, the Appellant denied committing all the alleged sexual acts save for those in the 3rd Charge. In respect of the 3rd Charge, the Appellant claimed that the Complainant had consented to the relevant acts. In the alternative, the Appellant raised the defence of consent in respect of the remaining charges as well. He claimed that the Complainant had shown interest in engaging in intimacy with him prior to the Incident, demonstrated consent during the Incident, and that her post-Incident conduct reflected the consensual nature of the acts. He further claimed that her limp and unresponsive appearance in the Footage was an act, being part of a plan to frame him out of hatred for D2 and to extract monetary compensation.

28 The Appellant also adduced medical evidence that he suffered from erectile dysfunction, and pointed to the fact that the Complainant had tested positive for two sexually transmitted diseases (“STDs”) which were not detected on him.

29 The Judge found that the 10 January and 15 January 2020 VRI Statements were given voluntarily by the Appellant. The Judge found that DSP Yue did not make the statements alleged by the Appellant. In any case, even if the alleged statements had been made, they were too vague to constitute threats, inducements, or promises (GD at [79]–[85]). The Judge also found no evidence that the alleged threats, inducements, or promises, had operated on the Appellant’s mind through hope of escape or fear of punishment connected with the charges (GD at [86]–[90]).

30 The Judge found that the Prosecution had proven the physical elements of the 1st Charge, 3rd Charge, 4th Charge and 5th Charge beyond a reasonable doubt:

(a) On the 1st Charge (ie, penile-vaginal penetration), the Judge found that the Complainant’s testimony was internally consistent (at [101]). Her testimony was also supported by her account of the Incident to other people, including her examining doctor (at [102]). Importantly, her account was corroborated by the Footage (at [105]–[108]). Her testimony was also supported by the Appellant’s admissions in the VRI Statements (at [109]–[113]) which he failed to sufficiently explain away (at [120]–[125]). Finally, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s arguments that the medical and forensic evidence (namely, his erectile dysfunction, the absence of DNA and semen in the Complainant’s vaginal swabs, and the fact that the Complainant tested positive for two STDs not detected in the Appellant) contradicted the Complainant’s account of penile-vaginal penetration having taken place (at [114]–[118]).

(b) On the 3rd Charge (ie, touching of the Complainant’s breast and vagina), the Judge found that the Complainant’s truthful and unembellished conditioned statement and trial testimony were consistent with the Footage which captured the acts in full (at [139]–[144]), and the Appellant’s own admissions at the trial that he performed the acts (at [145]–[146]).

(c) On the 4th Charge (ie, penile-oral penetration), the Judge found that the Complainant’s conditioned statement and testimony in court were corroborated by her account to the examining doctor and the Footage (at [150]–[152]). The Appellant gave multiple inconsistent accounts in the VRI Statements and at trial and could not provide a cogent explanation for the numerous discrepancies in his narrative (at [153]–[156]). The Judge also drew an adverse inference against the Appellant under s 261 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) on the basis that he had failed to raise in his cautioned statement his defence that he had not inserted his penis into the Complainant’s mouth (at [157]–[161]).

(d) On the 5th Charge (ie, licking of the Complainant’s vagina), the Judge found that the Complainant’s account in her conditioned statement and at trial was consistent with her account to the examining doctor and was corroborated by the Footage (at [164]–[168]). The Complainant’s account was further corroborated by the Appellant’s admission in the VRI Statements (at [169]–[173]). As with the 4th Charge, the Judge also drew an adverse inference against the Appellant for his failure to assert in his cautioned statement that he had not licked the Complainant’s vagina (at [175]–[177]).

31 The Judge found that the Complainant did not consent to any of the sexual acts as she was physically impaired. This was evidenced by her consistent account in her conditioned statement and at trial, her accounts to various persons after the Incident, and the Footage showing her limp, unresponsive and too weak to offer any effective resistance (at [188]–[200]).

32 The Judge also rejected the following arguments that the Appellant raised in support of his case of a consensual sexual encounter:

(a) First, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s claim that the Complainant lured him into having sex with her and framed him to exact revenge against D2 and seek monetary compensation. The only objective evidence the Appellant relied upon was a series of messages exchanged between the Complainant and N, but these messages did not suggest that the Complainant harboured so deep a hatred for D2 as to be motivated to plot against her. In any event, accusing D2’s father of rape and sexual assault would have been a “convoluted and potentially self-sabotaging means of exacting such revenge”. The Judge further found that the Complainant had not made any request for money in exchange for not reporting the matter to the police, and that she had given a reasonable explanation for her initial reluctance to make a police report (at [201]–[219]).

(b) Second, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant had attempted to seduce him prior to the Incident. The Appellant relied on a series of incidents in support of his claim that the Complainant had signalled her readiness for sexual intimacy: (i) the Complainant had emerged from the bathroom in revealing clothing on three occasions; (ii) she had shared details of her health issues with him; (iii) she had laughed in response to a suggestive remark he had made about oral sex; and (iv) just prior to the Incident, she agreed to watch television, drink wine with him late into the night, and invited him to touch her stomach when she spoke of her abdominal pain. The Judge found that none of these incidents amounted to attempts by the Complainant to seduce the Appellant. Further, such behaviour was incapable of constituting consent to sexual activity (at [220]–[223]).

(c) Third, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant’s behaviour during the Incident demonstrated her consent to the sexual acts. The Judge found that the Footage clearly showed the Complainant lying motionless throughout the Incident, and that the audio feed from the CCTV footage did not capture any “moaning sounds” as the Appellant had claimed (at [224]–[225]).

(d) Fourth, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant’s post-Incident conduct suggested that she had consented to the sexual acts. The Judge found that the Complainant’s decision to feign normalcy in her interactions with the Appellant until D2’s return was understandable and reasonable. Further, the Complainant’s post-Incident communications with S and N showed that she had expressed worry about a repeat of the sexual assault by the Appellant (at [226]–[230]).

33 Further, although not explicitly raised by the Appellant, the Judge also considered the defence of mistaken consent and found that it had not been made out (at [234]–[237]).

34 For the foregoing reasons, the Judge was satisfied that the Prosecution had established all the elements of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges.

35 In respect of the 2nd Charge, the Judge found that the “unusually convincing” standard applied as it was the only charge where the relevant act was not captured in the Footage (at [133]–[134]). Although the Judge found the Appellant to be a “shifty” witness while the Complainant was “honest”, the Judge did not find it safe to conclude that the Complainant’s testimony alone sufficed to prove the 2nd Charge (at [137]) and accordingly, acquitted the Appellant of the same.

36 The Appellant’s arguments are broadly a rehash of his case below:

(a) The VRI Statements were recorded under duress.

(b) The Appellant denies committing the sexual acts in the 1st, 4th and 5th Charges. He also argues that he did not penetrate the Complainant owing to his erectile dysfunction. For completeness, the Appellant maintains his admission that he committed the sexual acts in the 3rd Charge.

(c) The Complainant had consented to the sexual acts. In support of this, the Appellant highlights that the Complainant had willingly consumed the wine he offered her and agreed to the injections administered by him. He claims that the Complainant was not passive during the Incident, pointing to the “gyrating movement of her buttocks and low moaning” as evidence of her consent.

(d) The Complainant had plotted the Incident to exact revenge against the Appellant and his family. In support of this, the Appellant submits that the Complainant had dressed in a revealing manner on prior occasions to “[trap]”, “entice” and “lure” him. The Appellant also argues that the Complainant’s post-Incident conduct – including her messages with S, GF, and Bing – was inconsistent with that of a rape victim, and more consistent with her having plotted the Incident.

37 The Prosecution largely aligned itself with the Judge’s findings set out at [29]–[34] above.

38 It is trite that the role of the appellate court is not to re-assess the evidence in the same way a trial court would: Pram Nair v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 1015 (“Pram Nair”) at [55], citing Haliffie bin Mamat v Public Prosecutor [2016] 5 SLR 636 at [31]–[32]. The appellate court should instead consider:

(a) whether the trial Judge’s assessment of witness credibility is “plainly wrong or against the weight of evidence”;

(b) whether the trial Judge’s “verdict is wrong in law and therefore unreasonable”; and

(c) whether the trial Judge’s “decision is inconsistent with the material objective evidence on record”, bearing in mind that an appellate court is in as good a position to assess the internal and external consistency of the witnesses’ evidence, and to draw the necessary inferences of fact.

39 Having reviewed the evidence and the parties’ submissions, we dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against his conviction. We find no basis to disturb the Judge’s findings that:

(a) the VRI Statements are admissible, and the Appellant’s admissions contained therein were given voluntarily;

(b) the evidence establishes the physical elements for the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges; and

(c) the Complainant did not consent to the sexual acts, nor did she engineer any plot to frame the Appellant or extort him or his family.

40 We first address the admissibility of the VRI Statements. To recapitulate, the Appellant challenged the voluntariness of the 10 January and 15 January 2020 VRI Statements. In his written submissions, the Appellant does not specify why the VRI Statements ought to have been excluded, save for a general assertion that they were recorded when he was under duress. We therefore examine the Appellant’s case below.

41 It was the Appellant’s evidence that while he was alone with DSP Yue at Tampines Neighbourhood Police Centre on 9 January 2020, DSP Yue made the following statements to him:

(a) First, words to the effect of, “What you have done is a very serious offence, and based on your age, you will be in there for the rest of your life” (“First Alleged Statement”).

(b) Shortly thereafter, “If you cooperate…” (“Second Alleged Statement”). The Appellant’s evidence was that he could not remember if DSP Yue had said anything else after uttering these words.

(collectively, the “Alleged Statements”)

42 When an issue is raised as to the voluntariness of a statement under s 258(3) of the CPC, the burden is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made voluntarily: Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535 (“Roshdi”) at [45]. The test for voluntariness has both an objective and a subjective limb. The objective limb is concerned with whether there was a threat, inducement, or promise. If there was, the court then considers the subjective limb, which is whether that threat, inducement, or promise had the effect of operating on the mind of the accused person at the material time so as to render his statement involuntary: Roshdi at [44]–[45], citing Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 619 at [53].

43 We are of the view that the Judge did not err in admitting the 10 January and 15 January 2020 VRI Statements. This is for three reasons.

44 First, the Judge’s finding that DSP Yue did not make the Alleged Statements is not against the evidence. We note that the Appellant’s account of who made the Alleged Statements was inconsistent. At trial, the Appellant initially alleged that it was Deputy Superintendent Liao Chengyu (“DSP Liao”) who made the Alleged Statements, but later retracted this allegation and claimed that it was DSP Yue who had done so. The Appellant offered no convincing explanation for this change. The Appellant also said that he could remember the “first few sentences that [DSP Liao] said to [him]” because “it was a shock for [the Appellant]”. However, when cross-examining DSP Yue, the Appellant did not mention the Alleged Statements at all.

45 Second, even if the Alleged Statements were made by DSP Yue, they were objectively insufficient to amount to a threat, inducement or promise. We agree with the Judge that the Alleged Statements were simply too vague, and it was unclear what the Appellant was being threatened or induced into doing:

(a) As regards the First Alleged Statement, the words, “[w]hat you have done is a very serious offence, and based on your age, you will be in there for the rest of your life” contain no threat, inducement, or promise.

(b) As regards the Second Alleged Statement, the words, “if you cooperate” alone, without more, cannot amount to any threat, inducement, or promise. This is more so given that the Appellant’s admission that any prospect that he could receive a lighter sentence was his own assumption and not a statement made by DSP Yue.

46 Third, on the Appellant’s own case, the Alleged Statements subjectively had no effect on the voluntariness of the VRI Statements. In the Appellant’s Petition of Appeal, he states that the VRI Statements were given “honestly and truthfully”:

This assertion is difficult to reconcile with his contention that the VRI Statements were not made voluntarily or were made under duress.

47 At the hearing, the Appellant repeatedly asserted that the VRI Statements were made before he saw the Footage and the text messages from the Complainant. In our view, this does not assist him. Whether the Appellant had or had not seen the Footage or the Complainant’s text messages before the VRI Statements were recorded has no bearing whatsoever on whether the Alleged Statements were made or had operated on his mind. We therefore reject the Appellant’s argument that the VRI Statements were not voluntarily given and affirm the Judge’s finding that they were admissible.

48 We turn next to consider the physical elements of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges. In our judgment, the Judge’s findings are not against the weight of the evidence. In particular, the Footage provides clear corroboration of the Complainant’s account. We set out our decision in respect of each of the charges below.

49 As regards the 1st Charge, the Judge found that the Complainant’s testimony on the act of penile-vaginal penetration was credible. It was internally consistent and was also supported by her account of the Incident to other people, including her examining doctor (GD at [102]). That account was also corroborated by the Footage captured between 12:13:35am and 12:14:21am on 6 January 2020. The Footage showed the Appellant lying on top of the Complainant, who was lying on her back, such that his groin area was positioned over hers, as he thrust his hips vigorously toward her. At one point, the Appellant moved his body into a more upright position and continued the thrusting motion of his hips and buttocks. The Judge found that although both of their crotches could be seen, the Appellant’s penis could not be seen, which strongly suggested that his penis was inside the Complainant’s vagina. Further, the Judge found that while the Footage did not provide explicit visual confirmation of the Appellant’s penis entering the Complainant’s vagina, what could be seen from the Footage, in particular, the positioning of the Appellant’s body over the Complainant and the thrusting motion of his hips and buttocks toward her, corroborated her testimony that there was penile-vaginal penetration (GD at [105]–[108]). We agree with the Judge that the Footage corroborated the Complainant’s account of penile-vaginal penetration.

50 The Judge also found that the Complainant’s testimony was corroborated by the Appellant’s own admission in the 10 January 2020 VRI Statement that he had penetrated the Complainant (GD at [109]–[113]). This admission is evident from the portions of the VRI Statements set out at [19]–[20] above. The Judge also found the Appellant’s version of events at trial unbelievable and plagued with obvious inconsistencies. As the Judge noted, the Appellant initially claimed that he had merely “rubbed” his “flaccid” penis up and down the outside of the Complainant’s vagina, before changing his account and claiming that his penis had been positioned outside the Complainant’s anus, between her buttocks and the sofa bed, and that he had been rubbing himself hoping to get an erection (GD at [126]–[128]). In our judgment, the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility – both in respect of his attempts to retract the admission in his 10 January 2020 VRI Statement and his account at trial – cannot be said to be plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence. We therefore see no reason to disturb her findings.

51 On appeal, the Appellant appears to maintain his case that he could not have penetrated the Complainant because he suffered from erectile dysfunction. He relies on medical reports from Dr Lee Song Liang Joshua (“Dr Lee”) and Dr Wong Kang Min (“Dr Wong”). The Judge rejected this argument below, finding that the Appellant’s erectile dysfunction did not negate the possibility of penetration, as both Dr Lee and Dr Wong had testified that it was still possible for the Appellant to achieve an erection in a non-clinical setting (GD at [115]). While the medical reports did show that the Appellant had a history of erectile dysfunction, they fell short of establishing reasonable doubt that penetration was possible. We note that Dr Lee testified that it was still possible for the Appellant to have an erection that was potentially hard enough for sexual intercourse. The medical reports therefore do not support the Appellant’s case that the Judge’s finding was against the evidence.

52 For completeness, we also see no reason to disturb the Judge’s findings that the following two pieces of evidence did not assist the Appellant:

(a) First, the Appellant relied on the absence of his DNA or semen on the Complainant’s vaginal swabs. However, Dr Judith Ong (“Dr Ong”), the Complainant’s examining doctor, testified that the examination of the Complainant was conducted more than four days after the Incident. In the circumstances, it was likely that any DNA evidence would no longer be present at the time of the examination (GD at [116]).

(b) Second, the Appellant pointed to the fact that the Complainant had tested positive for two strains of STDs which were not detected in the Appellant. However, there was no evidence that the Appellant tested negative for the STDs. Even if the Appellant did in fact test negative for these infections, the Appellant himself accepted that their transmission via intercourse was not inevitable (GD at [117]).

53 In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Judge did not err in finding that the evidence established the physical elements of the 1st Charge.

54 With respect to the 3rd Charge, the Judge accepted the Complainant’s evidence that the Appellant sucked her breast and rubbed her vagina, finding that it was unembellished and internally consistent (GD at [139]–[141]). The Complainant’s testimony was also corroborated by the Footage taken between 12:06:37am and 12:07:19am, which the Judge found provided unassailable corroboration of the Complainant’s testimony (GD at [142]–[144]).

55 Crucially, the Appellant admitted to the physical elements of the 3rd Charge in his evidence-in-chief. In cross-examination, he sought to walk back from these admissions by claiming that he had only “licked” the Complainant’s nipple instead of sucking it, and that he had not rubbed her vagina but only felt the outer surface of the Complainant’s vagina (ie, the labia). The Judge rejected these qualifications, finding that they did not assist the Appellant’s defence as even on his (new) account in cross-examination, he conceded to skin-to-skin contact with the Complainant’s breast and genitals. The Judge further found that the Appellant’s attempt to walk back his admissions only arose when he belatedly realised the adverse ramifications of having made them (GD at [146]). We agree with the Judge’s assessment. The Appellant’s concession of skin-to-skin contact with the Complainant’s breast and genitals was sufficient to establish the physical elements of the offence of outrage of modesty under s 354(1) of the 2008 PC.

56 In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Judge did not err in finding that the evidence established the physical elements of the 3rd Charge.

57 We consider the 4th and 5th Charges together, as the Appellant’s alleged actions giving rise to each charge overlap with one another.

58 The Judge accepted the Complainant’s account that the Appellant licked her vagina, then climbed on top of her and inserted his penis into her mouth while licking her vagina. That account was corroborated by the Footage taken between 12:09:19am and 12:09:56am on 6 January 2020. In respect of the 4th Charge for penile-oral penetration, the Footage showed the Appellant first moving into a position whereby his crotch was over the Complainant’s head. The Appellant then moved his head toward the Complainant’s crotch. While the Footage did not explicitly show the Appellant’s penis entering the Complainant’s mouth, the Judge found that the actions which were visible in the Footage aligned closely with the Complainant’s account of how the Appellant had inserted his penis into her mouth (GD at [152]).

59 In respect of the 5th Charge for licking the Complainant’s vagina, the Footage first showed the Appellant crouching with his mouth between the Complainant’s legs at her crotch. The Appellant then got up and moved out of frame; at this point he was wearing boxer shorts, but when he reappeared, they had been removed. The Appellant, with his back to the CCTV, then lifted his right leg and appeared to align his penis with the Complainant’s mouth before laying down over her with his head moving towards her crotch and remaining in that position for around 16 seconds. The Judge found that the Appellant’s movements in this part of the Footage suggested that he was licking the Complainant’s vagina as he lay on top of her (GD at [166]–[168]).

60 In his submissions, the Appellant does not offer a different interpretation of the Footage, nor does he explain how the Judge had made any error in finding that the physical elements of the 4th and 5th Charges had been established. Having reviewed the evidence, we agree with the Judge that the Footage corroborated the Complainant’s account of the acts constituting the 4th and 5th Charges.

61 Further, in respect of the 4th Charge of penile-oral penetration, the Judge found the Appellant’s explanation for his actions inconsistent. When IO Gan played and replayed the relevant Footage during the VRI on 10 January 2020, the Appellant insisted that he had no recollection of what was being shown to him. However, during the VRI on 15 January 2020, his position changed. He asserted that he was certain his penis was not in the Complainant’s mouth, reasoning that he would have achieved a full erection had that been the case. Later in the same VRI, when asked whether he had tried to insert his penis into the Complainant’s mouth, the Appellant claimed that he had tried but claimed that he could not do so. He changed his account during cross-examination, this time claiming that he had not even tried to insert his penis into the Complainant’s mouth (GD at [153]–[156]). The Appellant offered no reasonable explanation for these shifting accounts, and we agree with the Judge that they could not be believed.

62 As regards the 5th Charge of licking the Complainant’s vagina, the Appellant’s case below was that he intended to lick the Complainant’s vagina but decided against doing so when he encountered a strong smell near her vagina. He decided to lick her inguinal region (ie, the region where the lower part of her stomach joined the tops of her thighs) instead. The Judge found that evidence untenable in light of the Appellant’s admissions in the 15 January 2020 VRI Statement as well as the Footage (GD at [171]–[172]). We agree with the Judge. The Appellant’s account was directly contradicted by the Footage and his own admission in the 15 January 2020 VRI Statement reproduced at [22] above that he had “kissed” the Complainant’s vagina.

63 In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Judge did not err in finding that the evidence established the physical elements of both the 4th and 5th Charges.

64 The Appellant argues that the Complainant had consented to the sexual acts. In support of this, he relies on her conduct prior to, during, and after, the Incident:

(a) As regards her pre-Incident conduct, the Appellant claims that the Complainant had hinted at her interest in engaging in sexual intimacy with him. He alleges that she: had dressed in revealing clothing to “entice and lure” him; had shared with him sensitive health issues relating to her body, including menstrual pain and vaginal discharge; and had been willing to consume the wine offered to her (without telling him that D2 had prohibited her from drinking in the Flat), to have the injections administered by him, and to watch TV late into the night with him.

(b) As regards her conduct during the Incident, whilst acknowledging that the Complainant was in a limp and unresponsive state, he thought she was simply “shy”. In the same vein, he states that she was not passive as there was “gyrating movement of her buttocks and low moaning”, and he took that as an “invitation” to commit the sexual acts on her.

(c) As regards her post-Incident conduct, the Appellant relies on the fact that the Complainant had behaved normally after the Incident, continued to interact with him in a friendly manner, and showed no signs of trauma.

65 We have no hesitation rejecting the Appellant’s defence of consent, which we find completely baseless. We first address the Appellant’s contention that the Complainant had consented to the sexual acts during the Incident, which we find unbelievable for several reasons.

66 First, the Appellant himself acknowledged in his 10 January 2020 VRI Statement that the Complainant was “unresponsive” during the Incident and that she did not consent to having sex (see above at [23]).

67 Second, as the Judge found (see GD at [199]), the Footage showed that the Complainant was limp and weak and did not say anything throughout the Incident:

(a) From 12.06am to 12.07am, the Complainant appeared limp and unresponsive as the Appellant struggled to flip her body over. When the Appellant began sucking her breast, she remained unresponsive for the first eight seconds. After this, she could be seen shaking her head slowly and feebly. She also raised her arm briefly before it dropped back onto the sofa bed.

(b) From 12.09am to 12.10am, the Complainant could be seen making a brief and clearly ineffectual attempt to get up from the sofa bed by lifting her right arm and rolling over to her side. She was unsuccessful as the Appellant swiftly grabbed her right arm and placed it back on the sofa bed, causing her to lie back down in a supine position.

(c) At 12.10am, the Complainant was shown being supported and re-positioned by the Appellant. The Appellant could be heard asking her if she wanted to go back to her bed, but there was no response from her, and she remained motionless.

(d) From 12.13am to 12.15am, apart from a moment when the Complainant was seen attempting to raise her right hand, her body remained limp and unresponsive. The moment the Appellant withdrew his penis from her vagina, her legs could be seen falling limply over the edge of the bed, making a “thud” sound.

(e) In the immediate aftermath of the Incident, the Complainant was shown lying motionless on the sofa bed for approximately four minutes. The Appellant put her clothes back on for her and asked her to “go back to bed”. Receiving no response, he attempted to lift her up; she flopped back down without any discernible physical or verbal response. On his second attempt, he succeeded and manoeuvred her to her bedroom by supporting her from under her armpits and pushing her along from behind. Throughout, the Judge found that the Complainant’s body “flopped listlessly” and that she remained entirely unresponsive (see GD at [38]; see above at [15]).

68 Importantly, it is not the Appellant’s case, even on appeal, that the Complainant had asked him to do any of the specific sexual acts, to remove her clothing and clothe her back again, or to carry her back to her room. Against this backdrop, we reject the Appellant’s submission that the “gyrating movement of [the Complainant’s] buttocks and low moaning” was evidence of her consent. This was neither observed nor heard on the Footage, which showed that the Complainant was not responsive, reciprocating, or in any way engaging in the sexual acts. It also runs counter to his admission that she was unresponsive, or limp and weak. In our view, it is clear from the evidence, and consistent with the Appellant’s own admission in the 10 January 2020 VRI Statement, that the Appellant performed the sexual acts on the Complainant in the full knowledge that she was incapacitated. In other words, the Appellant knew that the Complainant was unable to give, and had not given, her consent during the Incident.

69 We also reject the Appellant’s submission that the Complainant’s earlier interactions with him constitute evidence of her consent to the sexual acts. A complainant’s prior sociable, friendly or even flirtatious conduct should not be construed as consent (see Pram Nair at [67] and [72]). The Appellant’s case that the Complainant’s manner of dress (as alleged by him), her acceptance of wine and injections, or her watching television with the Appellant, could amount to consent to the relevant sexual acts was without merit. It is also worth noting that the Appellant made no mention in the VRI Statements of any of the conduct prior to the Incident which he claims led him to believe that the Complainant was interested in engaging in sexual intimacy with him. This omission leads us to conclude that such claims are mere afterthoughts.

70 We likewise reject the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant’s post-Incident conduct was evidence of her consent to the sexual acts. Preliminarily, it bears repeating that there is no archetypal or standard reaction to sexual assault (Public Prosecutor v BZT [2022] SGHC 91 at [241]) and attempts to conventionalise the behaviour of sexual assault victims have been roundly rejected by this court (Yue Roger Jr v Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 SLR 829).

71 In any event, contrary to the Appellant’s case, the evidence suggests that the Complainant was in fact fearful of the Appellant as she had immediately informed her friends and a volunteer from HOME about the Incident, describing it in distressed tones. Her communications with S and N are especially revealing in this regard – they showed that she feared a repeat of the sexual assault, and S and N had advised her on how to protect herself from the Appellant (eg, by keeping a pen as a weapon or placing toys outside her bedroom door as an early warning system if the Appellant tried to enter her room). We also place no weight on the Appellant’s contention that the Complainant’s messages to her friends in the aftermath of the Incident sounded “gleeful” merely because she had used texting conventions such as “hehehe”, and that this was inconsistent with the behaviour of “a real ‘rape victim’ [who would] be ashamed and humiliated”. Such conventions say little about a person’s true emotional state. If anything, the general tenor of the messages suggested fear and anxiety, and her use of such language was consistent with her explanation that she was trying to keep calm. Nothing in the Complainant’s messages suggests that she had engineered the Incident or is inconsistent with her account of having been sexually assaulted by the Appellant.

72 Further, we agree with the Judge that the Complainant’s post-Incident behaviour is adequately explained by her account that she had tried to act “calm” and to “pretend…as if nothing happened” to manage her fear and unease. Additionally, as an MDW, she had little choice but to continue carrying out her household chores and live in close proximity with the Appellant (GD at [227]–[228]).

73 For these reasons, we are satisfied that the Judge’s finding on the Complainant’s lack of consent is not against the weight of the evidence. For completeness, and although this was not explicitly raised by the Appellant on appeal, we are also of the view that the defence of mistaken consent under s 375(5) of the 2008 PC is not available to the Appellant. In this regard, we agree with the Judge that based on the objective evidence of the Footage, the Complainant’s limp and unresponsive state throughout the Incident would have been apparent, and would have signalled, to any reasonable person the need to obtain explicit confirmation of her consent to sexual activity. The Appellant’s failure to do so ruled out any possibility that the Appellant could avail himself of the defence of mistaken consent (GD at [236]–[237]).

74 Before we leave the issue of consent, we pause to make three observations that arise from the arguments canvassed before us. The first concerns the specificity of consent. As mentioned above at [69], this court held in Pram Nair that prior friendly or flirtatious conduct between a victim and an accused does not, in and of itself, constitute consent to sexual activity. In Pram Nair, the court considered the victim’s alleged conduct at a beach club, such as placing her hands on the accused’s arm or waist and being in close physical contact with him, but did not regard these as “particularly suggestive gestures”. The court further held that the more material events for analysis were those that occurred closer to the assault, ie, after the victim left with the accused for the beach where the assault took place, rather than their earlier interactions at the beach club (Pram Nair at [67]–[73]). This is primarily because consent must be given to the specific act in question and it is therefore critical to assess the victim’s words and conduct in relation to that act. Indeed, this is evident from the statutory definitions of sexual offences. Section 375 of the PC, for instance, defines rape as the penetration of a person’s vagina, anus, or mouth with the offender’s penis without that person’s consent. Thus, the consent to be established must be specific to the act of penetration and not to other acts.

75 The second is as to what constitutes consent. Tay Yong Kwang J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Iryan bin Abdul Karim [2010] 2 SLR 15 (“Iryan”) endorsed the following definition of consent at [123], citing Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes: A Commentary on the Indian Penal Code 1860 vol 2 (C K Thakker & M C Thakker eds) (Bharat Law House, 26th Ed, 2007) at p 2061:

76 This definition was affirmed by this court in Pram Nair at [93] and Mustaph bin Abdullah v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGCA 30 at [103]. We would only add that consent may be expressed through words or conduct. In this regard, we gratefully adopt the Canadian Supreme Court’s observations in R v Barton [2019] 2 SCR 579 (“Barton”) at [95]–[100] that an accused cannot rely on the following propositions to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case that a complainant had in fact consented to the act: (a) that silence or passivity, alone and without more, amounts to consent; (b) that prior sexual activity makes consent more likely; (c) that consent can be given broadly and in advance to undefined sexual activity; or (d) that unless a complainant resists or protests, he or she is deemed to have given their consent. While these observations were made in the context of the defence of mistaken consent, they apply with equal force where an accused seeks to rely on them to raise a reasonable doubt that the complainant consented. Beyond this, we say no more, as much will turn on the precise facts of each case. That said, it is the Prosecution’s burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent to the relevant act.

77 However, where an accused relies on the defence of mistaken belief of consent under s 375(5) of the PC, the burden is on him to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he believed “by reason of a mistake of fact in good faith” that the victim had consented to the relevant sexual act. The threshold to demonstrate “good faith” is high – the offender must show that he believed that the victim had consented to the sexual acts, having exercised “due care and attention” (Asep Ardiansyah v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 74 at [45]). In this regard, we endorse the view expressed in Barton at [121] that for the defence to apply, the accused must (a) honestly believe that the complainant had affirmatively communicated to the accused her consent through words or conduct – a mere belief that the complainant inwardly desired the relevant act is plainly insufficient; and (b) take steps to ascertain consent that are objectively reasonable, and the reasonableness of those steps must be assessed in light of the circumstances known to the accused at the time.

78 The third observation concerns the continuing validity of consent. For consent to be valid, a person must not only have consented to the sexual act in question but must also retain the ability to withdraw that consent at any time prior to that act. In our view, this flows naturally from the definition of consent articulated in Iryan at [123], which states that consent implies “the exercise of a free and untrammelled right to forbid or withhold what is being consented to”. The implication of this is that where a person loses the capacity to withdraw consent – whether by reason of intoxication or otherwise – any prior consent that person may have given must necessarily cease to be operative as it can no longer be freely retracted. To hold otherwise would be to allow an offender to rely on consent that the victim, at the material time, was powerless to revoke.

79 In this regard, we add that it would be extremely difficult for an accused person to avail himself of the defence of mistaken consent under s 375(5) of the PC where it would be apparent to a reasonable person prior to the sexual act that the victim was incapacitated or otherwise unable to freely retract any prior consent. This is because any mistake an accused person may be labouring under is unlikely to have been made in good faith. That said, as this scenario did not arise on the facts of the present case (given that the Complainant did not at any time consent to the sexual acts in question) and we did not have the benefit of submissions from the parties on this point, we say no more about it and leave it to be decided on a future occasion when it arises for determination.

80 Finally, we express our profound displeasure at the Appellant’s submissions, which seek to impugn the Complainant’s character by reference to her alleged choice of clothing and purportedly revealing photographs posted on her social media account. As we made clear at the hearing, such arguments are nothing short of victim-blaming and are entirely unacceptable. Any accused person who persists in mounting such attacks on a complainant’s character demonstrates a blatant lack of remorse, and risks having his sentence enhanced (see, eg, Seng Yong Yi Lucas v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 838 at [27]).

81 For completeness, we reject the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant had masterminded the Incident. The Appellant’s case is that the Complainant wanted to exact revenge against him and his family, motivated by what he described as her “great hatred” toward her employer, D2, arising from D2’s refusal to advance her $200 of her salary and D2 scolding her for her repeated mistakes. The Appellant further submits that the Complainant had dressed in a revealing manner on prior occasions to “[trap]”, “entice” and “lure” him. He also submits that her “gleeful” messages to her friends suggest that this was part of a plan, and that her friends had “coached her”.

82 We reject the Appellant’s arguments entirely. Aside from the fact that the Appellant’s submissions are without any basis, a fundamental difficulty with his case is that it was he who offered the Complainant wine prior to the Incident, which meant that, on his case, the Complainant must have formulated and executed an elaborate scheme on the spur of the moment to lure him to commit the sexual acts. In our judgment, such a scenario is wholly fanciful and implausible.

83 There is likewise no evidential basis for the Appellant’s assertion that the Complainant had been “play-acting” throughout the Incident. This characterisation is directly contradicted by the evidence: the Complainant’s text messages and conduct in the aftermath of the Incident are inconsistent with any suggestion of fabrication or extortion. Notably, the Appellant himself made no mention of this allegation in the VRI Statements – instead, he accepted that the Complainant was “unresponsive” (see above at [23]). He claimed to have become aware of the Complainant’s alleged plan only after viewing the Footage and the Complainant’s text messages to S and N. That explanation, however, is unconvincing – it was not his evidence that the Footage revealed anything he had not personally witnessed at the time, nor could he explain how the Complainant’s text messages lent any support to his assertion.

84 We also reject the Appellant’s assertion that the Complainant was in any way attempting to extort money or exact “revenge” on him or his family. The evidence showed that the Complainant had a good relationship with her employers. In her conversation with the HOME volunteer, the Complainant described her employers as “kind” and expressed that she did not want their reputation to be destroyed. Even in her conversations with D1 and D2, both expressed concern for the Complainant and encouraged her to report the Incident to the police. There is simply no evidence showing that the Complainant had asked for money or other benefits in exchange for not reporting the matter. Although D1 had initially made that assertion, she eventually conceded in cross-examination that the Complainant had not done so.

85 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against his conviction on the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges.

86 Although the Prosecution is not appealing against the Judge’s decision to acquit the Appellant on the 2nd Charge, we pause to make some observations on that decision. To recapitulate, in respect of the 2nd Charge, the Complainant testified that after the Appellant administered the injections to her buttocks, she felt him touch, before inserting at least one finger into, her vagina. However, there was no video footage corroborating the Complainant’s account (GD at [134]). As explained above (at [7]), there were gaps in the Footage and the Prosecution’s case was that the act of digital-vaginal penetration occurred during one such gap which lasted between 12.01am and 12.06am.

87 The Appellant also denied inserting his finger into the Complainant’s vagina in his VRI Statements. He claimed that because the Complainant’s vagina was already “so moist”, he saw no need to further stimulate her by inserting his finger into her vagina. The Appellant maintained his denial during cross-examination.

88 Although the Judge found the Complainant to be an “honest witness who did not seek to exaggerate her account of events”, the Judge noted that “even honest witnesses may make mistakes and/or have imperfect recollections of an event”, and did not find it safe to conclude that the Complainant’s testimony alone sufficed to prove the physical element of the 2nd Charge (GD at [137]). In arriving at this conclusion, the Judge appears to have decided that there was reasonable doubt because, unlike the other four charges, there was no corroboration in the form of CCTV footage or VRI admission in respect of the sexual acts described in the 2nd Charge, and the Complainant’s evidence did not meet the “unusually convincing” threshold.

89 The “unusually convincing” standard is typically invoked where the uncorroborated evidence of a witness forms the sole basis for conviction (GII v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 SLR 578 (“GII”) at [25], citing Public Prosecutor v GCK [2020] 1 SLR 486 (“GCK”) at [87]). It is a qualitative description of the overall calibre of the testimony of that sole witness, and its use stems from the recognition that while there is no formal legal requirement for corroboration under the law, it may be unsafe to convict an accused person on the basis of the uncorroborated evidence of a witness alone unless such evidence is unusually convincing (GII at [25], citing XP v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 686 (“XP”) at [27]–[28]).

90 Nonetheless, the abiding inquiry remains whether any reasonable doubt exists as to the accused person’s guilt (GII at [26], citing XP at [30]). Put simply, the “unusually convincing” standard entails that the witness’s testimony alone is sufficient to prove the Prosecution’s case beyond a reasonable doubt (GCK at [90]). The “overwhelming consideration” that triggers the application of the “unusually convincing” standard is the amount and availability of evidence (GCK at [90], citing Teo Keng Pong v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 890 at [73] and Kwan Peng Hong v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 SLR(R) 824 at [29]).

91 Having reviewed the evidence, we express our reservations about the Judge’s conclusion that there was reasonable doubt as to the Appellant’s guilt in respect of the 2nd Charge. First, the Judge found the Complainant to be a truthful and consistent witness in relation to the other charges, where her evidence was corroborated by the Footage and the Appellant’s admissions. Second, her conduct following the material events was consistent with her account. As the Judge observed (GD at [132]), her testimony about the act of digital-vaginal penetration was consistent with the allegations she had made during her conversation with D1 and D2, and the account she gave Dr Ong during the medical examination on 9 January 2020.

92 Beyond this, there were several other considerations that supported the Complainant’s account. The facts relating to the 2nd Charge formed part of the same continuous series of events giving rise to the other four charges of which the Judge convicted the Appellant. While the Complainant was feeling dizzy and as though “everything [was] spinning around [her]” with her surroundings appearing “a bit blurry” during the Incident, she was consistent in her evidence that she remained “very conscious” and was able to understand what was happening to her. Indeed, her ability to recall and give an accurate account of what happened was unaffected as demonstrated by her evidence in relation to the other charges being corroborated by the Footage and the Appellant’s admissions. Crucially, the Judge did not identify any aspect of the Complainant’s testimony in relation to the 2nd Charge that she doubted; nor did the Judge identify any aspect of the Complainant’s evidence in relation to the 2nd Charge which suggested a mistaken or imperfect recollection. Instead, she described the Complainant as an “honest witness who did not seek to exaggerate her account of events” (GD at [137]). In fact, the sexual acts constituting the 2nd Charge were, if anything, comparatively less serious than those underlying some of the other charges on which the Complainant’s testimony was found to be truthful and consistent, which made it less likely that it was inaccurate or exaggerated.

93 In the circumstances, we see no reason for the Judge to have found reasonable doubt in respect of the Complainant’s account of, and the evidence establishing, the 2nd Charge.

94 The present case illustrates the importance of not applying the “unusually convincing” standard in a way that may unwittingly preclude convictions for sexual offences founded solely on a complainant’s testimony. As the Court of Appeal observed in GCK at [91], the “unusually convincing” standard serves as a cautionary reminder of the high threshold that the Prosecution must meet to secure a conviction, and of the anxious scrutiny required given the severe consequences that follow from a conviction. Where a complainant’s testimony, when weighed against the overall backdrop of the available facts and circumstances, carries that ring of truth which leaves the court satisfied that no reasonable doubt exists in favour of the accused (see Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601 at [39]), the standard is met. Here, the Complainant’s testimony was consistent across multiple occasions, supported by her conduct in the aftermath of the events, and untainted by any finding of exaggeration or dishonesty on her part. Assessed against this backdrop and bearing in mind the Appellant’s own lack of credibility (GD at [137]), we are satisfied that the Complainant’s testimony carried the requisite ring of truth and that no reasonable doubt exists in favour of the Appellant in respect of the 2nd Charge. However, as the Prosecution did not appeal against the acquittal on the 2nd Charge, we leave the Judge’s finding on this point undisturbed.

95 We turn next to address the Appellant’s appeal against his sentence. This entails a consideration of the appropriate sentencing framework for the offences of rape and outrage of modesty where the offender is liable for enhanced punishment under s 73 of the 2008 PC.

96 Before the Judge, the Prosecution sought a global sentence of between 19 years and 2 months’ and 20 years and 3 months’ imprisonment. In respect of the applicable sentencing approach for rape and outrage of modesty offences punishable under s 73(1) of the PC, the Prosecution proposed adding a default multiplier of 1.5 times to reflect the vulnerability of MDWs and the abuse of authority inherent in such offences. This default multiplier could be adjusted depending on the extent of these factors in each case. On the facts, the Prosecution submitted that a multiplier of 1.3 times was appropriate, taking into account the Complainant’s four years of prior working experience in Singapore and her relatively robust support network, tempered by her unfamiliarity with the Singapore justice system and consequent hesitance to report the offences, as well as the relatively lower degree of authority the Appellant held over her as D2’s father rather than D2 herself.

97 The Appellant sought a global sentence of 8 years and 20 months’ imprisonment, citing his mistaken belief as to consent, his lack of premeditation or predatory intent, his status as a first-time offender, his remorse, and the care he had provided to the Complainant.

98 The Judge sentenced the Appellant to an aggregate term of 19 years and six months’ imprisonment (GD at [240]).

(a) At the first stage, the court applies the first step of the sentencing frameworks for rape or outrage of modesty as established in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 449 (“Terence Ng”) and Kunasekaran s/o Kalimuthu Somasundara v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 580 (“Kunasekaran”) respectively, by considering the offence-specific factors, identifying the band within which the case falls, and determining the indicative starting sentence within that band (GD at [257]–[258]).

107 The Appellant appeals against his sentence but does not advance any substantive reasons, other than maintaining that he did not abuse his position as the father of D2 or force the Complainant to do anything against her will.

108 The Prosecution agrees with the Judge’s proposed framework. The Prosecution further submits that the Judge did not err in applying the sentencing framework and that there is no basis to disturb the sentence imposed.

109 Given that this is the first case to come before this court on the enhanced penalty provisions for offences of rape and outrage of modesty against MDWs punishable under s 73 of the PC, and that the Appellant is not legally represented, we appointed Ms Jerrie Tan (“Ms Tan”) as Independent Counsel (“IC”) to assist us with the following questions:

(a) Question 1: What is the appropriate sentencing approach for the offences of rape and outrage of modesty where the enhanced penalties under s 73(1) of the PC apply?

(b) Question 2: What is the scope of the exception to the enhanced penalties under s 73(2) of the PC?

110 On the appropriate sentencing framework, the IC largely agrees with the Judge’s sentencing framework, subject to minor modifications as to the multiplier step (ie, Stage 2 of the framework). Specifically, the IC submits that the appropriate factors to be assessed at this stage should be:

(a) the extent of exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability (as opposed to the vulnerability of the victim per se); and

(b) the degree of abuse of authority (as opposed to the authority of the offender per se).

111 The IC submits that it would not be sufficient to simply consider factors relating to the victim’s vulnerability and the offender’s authority without linking them to the specific wrong committed. The IC further submits that this approach is in line with the plain wording of s 73(2) and is supported by case law.

112 On the scope of the exception under s 73(2) of the PC, the IC agrees with the Judge that s 73(1) of the PC would not apply where there is no link between the MDW’s vulnerability and the offence. The IC cautions that the court must be careful not to allow s 73(2) of the PC to become a vehicle for “victim-blaming”. According to the IC, the question is not whether the MDW could have done more in hindsight or whether the court can imagine some theoretical avenue of complaint or escape she might have taken. Rather, it is whether the employment relationship adversely affected the MDW’s ability to protect herself from the offender. The IC submits that, if the relationship between the MDW and the offender made resisting, retreating, or seeking help more difficult, the exception in s 73(2) should not apply.

113 We first deal with the enhancement provisions in s 73 of the PC, which provides as follows:

114 The enhanced penalties for offences against MDWs were first passed by Parliament on 20 April 1998 and came into effect on 15 May 1998 (“1998 Provision”).

115 The 1998 Provision applied in limited circumstances, that is where an employer of an MDW or a member of the employer’s household is convicted of only five specific offences listed therein, and increased the punishment to one and a half times the standard penalty.

116 Subsequently, s 73 was amended and came into effect in its current form on 1 January 2020. Pursuant to this amendment, four significant changes were made: first, the provision was expanded to apply to all offences save for certain narrowly scoped excluded offences; second, the provision now covered employment agents; third, the enhanced punishment was increased to up to twice the standard punishment; and fourth, an exception was introduced under s 73(2), which we deal with later below.

117 We turn to the proper interpretation of s 73(1), having regard to its plain language and legislative purpose.

118 The language of s 73(1) is relatively clear and uncontroversial – it increases the maximum punishment for a criminal offence under the PC (other than an excluded offence) by up to two times where: (a) the victim of that offence is an MDW; and (b) the offender is an employer, a member of the employer’s household or an employment agent of the victim. It is the Prosecution’s burden to establish both elements. The use of “may” makes clear that the enhancement of sentence is discretionary, not mandatory.

119 The parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction of the 1998 Provision illuminate the purpose behind it. The 1998 Provision was introduced in response to a near-doubling in reported cases of MDW abuse over three years. Then-Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan Seng emphasised the need to “curb such incidents before they got out of hand” (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 68, Sitting No 15; Col 1924; [10 April 1998] (“1998 Parl Debates”)), and explained the rationale for singling out MDWs for enhanced protection, namely that they were particularly vulnerable (1998 Parl Debates at Col 1923–1924 and 1946):

120 The Minister further clarified the scope of the provision. The enhanced penalties apply only to those who “exercise authority over the maid” – thus covering household members but excluding visitors or individuals in other households where the MDW works on an ad hoc basis. Part-time MDWs were excluded on the basis that they “maintain their network of family and friends and are consequently less vulnerable to abuse” (1998 Parl Debates at Col 1925–1926).

121 As mentioned above, s 73 was amended in 2020 as part of a broader suite of reforms introducing enhanced punishments for offences against vulnerable groups, including children under 14, vulnerable adults, and victims in intimate relationships. Further, provisions specific to offences against MDWs were introduced, including ss 304B (causing death of a child below 14 years of age, domestic worker or vulnerable person by sustained abuse), 304C (causing or allowing death of a child below 14 years of age, domestic worker or vulnerable person in the same household) and 335A (allowing neglect, physical or sexual abuse of domestic worker or vulnerable person).

122 These amendments reflected the recommendations of the Penal Code Review Committee in part.

123 In introducing the 2020 amendments, Minister for Home Affairs K Shanmugam stated that the impetus was to provide “stronger protection for those who cannot protect themselves” and “vulnerable victims” (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 94, Sitting No 103; [6 May 2019] (“2019 Parl Debates”)).

124 Although Parliament did not specifically debate the amendments to s 73, the overarching purpose of the 2020 reforms is clear: to strengthen protection for victims in vulnerable positions who cannot adequately defend themselves (2019 Parl Debates). Section 73 is thus best understood as a provision designed to deter the exploitation of a structurally vulnerable class of persons, with the court retaining the discretion to calibrate the extent of enhancement to the facts of each case. How that enhancement is to be determined is discussed below.

125 As s 73(2) of the PC operates to disapply s 73(1), its meaning and scope are critical. In this regard, and as we explain below, s 73(2) presents some interpretive challenges. What is clear from the language of s 73(2) is that it places the burden squarely on the offender to establish its application, with that burden to be discharged on a balance of probabilities.

126 The Judge held that s 73(2) did not apply in this case because “there was clearly a link between the Complainant’s position as a domestic helper and her susceptibility to the sexual offences committed by the [Appellant]” (GD at [272]). With respect, this reasoning does not, on its face, engage the wording of s 73(2). In particular, the Judge’s analysis does not address the question of whether the Complainant’s relationship with the Appellant adversely affected her ability to protect herself in respect of the harm she suffered – which is the precise inquiry under s 73(2).

127 We turn to the interpretation of s 73(2). It is trite that courts adopt a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, preferring an interpretation which promotes the purpose or object underlying a statutory provision: see s 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Interpretation Act”). This involves the following three steps (Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [54]):

(a) The first step is to ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard to the text of the provision and the context of that provision within the written law as a whole. This is informed by determining the ordinary meaning of the words, and aided by canons of statutory construction, including the presumption that Parliament shuns tautology and does not legislate in vain such that significance should be given to every word in an enactment (Tan Cheng Bock at [38], citing JD Ltd v Comptroller of Income Tax [2006] 1 SLR 484 at [43]). 

(b) The second step is to ascertain the legislative purpose of the provision, based on: the text of the provision; the surrounding context of the written law as a whole; and where permissible, extraneous material capable of giving assistance. Extraneous material may be considered in three situations under s 9A(2) of the Interpretation Act: to confirm that the ordinary meaning is correct; to resolve ambiguity or obscurity in the provision; or to avoid a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result (Tan Cheng Bock at [47], referring to Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng [2017] 1 SLR 373 at [65]).

(c) The third step is to compare the possible interpretations against the statute’s purposes or objects, and to identify the interpretation that best gives effect to both the ordinary meaning and the purpose of the provision.

128 To recapitulate, s 73(2) of the PC provides as follows:

129 The plain language of s 73(2) provides that its application turns on the relationship between the offender and the MDW, namely, whether there is a causal nexus between that relationship and the MDW’s ability to protect herself. This means that any vulnerability stemming from a source unconnected to that relationship would not suffice. However, it is unclear whether the inquiry as to that nexus is temporally confined to the moment the offence is being committed (eg, the victim’s ability to physically defend herself at the time of the assault) or whether the phrase “ability to protect herself” should be read more broadly such that it extends to rendering the MDW more susceptible to the offence perpetrated against her or affected her ability to seek redress for its consequential harm.

130 Put another way, there are two possible interpretations of s 73(2):

(a) on the narrower interpretation, the provision asks whether, at the time the offence was committed, the relationship between the offender and the MDW adversely affected her ability to protect herself from the specific harm inflicted; or

(b) on the broader interpretation, the provision asks whether the relationship between the offender and the MDW placed her in a position of vulnerability such that she was more susceptible to the offence committed against her or affected her ability to seek redress for the harm she suffered.

131 The difference between these two interpretations is well illustrated by the present case. If the narrow interpretation is correct, s 73(2) would arguably be engaged, as the real cause of the Complainant’s inability to defend herself against the Appellant was her physical state – it was her evidence that she wanted to stop the Appellant from sexually assaulting her but was too weak to push him away. In other words, it was not her relationship with the Appellant which adversely affected her ability to protect herself from the harm she suffered.

132 There is also ambiguity in respect of how the term “adversely affect” in s 73(2) should be interpreted. In particular, what is the strength of the causal nexus required between: (a) what the offender did in his capacity as the MDW’s employer/member of the employer’s household/employment agent to commit the offence; and (b) the MDW’s ability to protect herself, before s 73(2) is engaged?

133 We turn first to the surrounding statutory context, in particular, the legislative history of the provision. As mentioned above, the 1998 Provision contained no exception. Section 73(2) was introduced by the 2020 amendments, which also extended the provision to cover all offences under the PC (save for a few), expanded the class of persons falling within its scope, and increased the quantum of enhanced punishment (see [116] above). The introduction of s 73(2) alongside this expansion suggests that Parliament was seeking to strike a balance: ensuring more robust protection for vulnerable MDWs, while avoiding the imposition of enhanced punishment in certain cases.

134 As neither the explanatory note to the Criminal Law Reform Bill, which introduced the 2020 amendments, nor the Minister’s speech during the Second Reading of the Bill addressed the scope of s 73(2), we turn to the responses given to Members of Parliament during the debate on the Second Reading of the Bill. During the Second Reading of the Bill, MP Sylvia Lim and NMP Anthea Ong questioned the necessity of s 73(2), expressing concern that it might lead to victim-blaming and undermine the protection that the provision sought to afford. In response, the Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr Amrin Amin replied (2019 Parl Debates):

135 While not explicitly engaging the specific language of the provision, the parliamentary debates make clear that the purpose of s 73(2) is to disapply s 73(1) only where the victim’s vulnerabilities as an MDW did not make her more susceptible to, or was not a factor in her being a victim of, the relevant offence. It was plainly not to exclude s 73(1) in cases where the offender’s relationship with the MDW enabled him to prey on, or take advantage of, the vulnerabilities of the MDW to commit the offence on her or to escape its consequences. This lends support to the broader meaning.

136 Further, since s 73(2) disapplies s 73(1), it stands to reason that s 73(2) must be interpreted in a manner which does not undermine the purpose of s 73(1) to protect MDWs as a vulnerable class by deterring the commission of offences against them. In our view, adopting the narrow interpretation would clearly do so as it would (a) invariably focus the inquiry on whether the MDW had done all that she reasonably could to prevent the commission of the offence, which would invite the prospect of victim-blaming that Parliament had plainly eschewed; and (b) considerably limit the instances in which s 73(1) would apply.

137 In the circumstances, it is our judgment that the broader interpretation would give effect both to the plain wording and legislative purpose of s 73(2). In this regard, we make the following observations on the proper scope of s 73(2):

(a) First, whether s 73(2) is engaged must be determined on the specific facts of each case, in particular, the nature of the relationship between the offender and the MDW and the specific vulnerabilities of the MDW as it relates to the offence. It cannot be resolved by reference to generalised assumptions about the vulnerabilities of MDWs or the nature of the employer-employee relationship.

(b) Second, s 73(2) should be construed in a manner consistent with the legislative purpose of protecting MDWs as a vulnerable class and the court’s ability to enhance punishments under s 73(1) should apply (or not be disapplied) where the relationship between the offender and the MDW has made her more susceptible to the offences committed against her. The question of whether the relationship between the offender and the MDW adversely affected her ability to protect herself is therefore not to be assessed solely by reference to what she could have done at the time the offence was committed. Rather, a broader examination is called for, including the circumstances leading up to the commission of the offence and what transpired thereafter.

(c) Third, the burden is on the offender to establish that s 73(2) applies. In other words, the offender must prove that his relationship with the MDW did not adversely affect her ability to protect herself. This may be done by, for example, showing that what the offender did in his capacity as the MDW’s employer/member of the employer’s household/employment agent to facilitate the commission of the offence played no part at all in the commission of the offence or the MDW’s ability to protect herself or seek redress for the harm she suffered. In the circumstances, so long as the relationship between the offender and the MDW was a material factor which made the MDW more susceptible to the offence and the harm suffered by her, the offender would have failed to discharge his burden.

138 Turning to the present case, we are of the view that s 73(2) does not apply. Preliminarily, we note that the Appellant did not question the application of s 73(1), nor did he raise s 73(2), at trial or on appeal. Nonetheless, we are satisfied that the Appellant would not have been able to discharge the burden on him to establish that s 73(2) applies. In our view, the Complainant’s relationship with the Appellant was clearly a material factor which made her more susceptible to the offences committed by the Appellant.

139 First, the Appellant exercised control over both the Complainant and the home environment where the offences took place. In the days leading up to and including the Incident, he was alone with the Complainant in the Flat and was the sole person in a position of authority over her. On the night of the Incident, he took advantage of his position of authority to set the stage for the sexual acts. He entered the Complainant’s bedroom to reposition the Bedroom CCTV to avoid detection of the sexual activity he anticipated, plied the Complainant with wine and arranged to administer the injections to her in a manner which placed her in a vulnerable position.

140 Second, and more importantly, it was the Appellant’s position of authority over the Complainant, and the trust she reposed in him, that caused her to lower her guard. She accepted the wine from him and agreed for him to administer injections that required her to lay down on the sofa bed, pull down her shorts and expose her buttocks. In this regard, the Complainant explained that, while D2 did not permit her to drink alcohol in the Flat, she accepted the wine from the Appellant because she trusted him and, as she put it, “since [he was] the father of [her] employer, [she] didn’t think of any malice or any reason why [she should] resist [him]”. In other words, it was her trust in the Appellant, borne out of their relationship as between a member of the employer’s household and an MDW, which caused or contributed to her placing herself in a position of vulnerability that the Appellant then exploited. The Appellant’s relationship with the Complainant was therefore a material factor which made her more susceptible to the offences. In the circumstances, the Appellant cannot invoke s 73(2).

141 For completeness, we do not accept some of the factors relied on by the Judge in rejecting the application of s 73(2). In particular, the Judge reasoned that the Complainant’s increased vulnerability as an MDW was evident from her lack of familiarity with the Singapore criminal justice system which contributed to her harbouring fears about lodging a police report (GD at [272]). With respect, while such considerations undoubtedly form part of the rationale for protecting MDWs and enhancing sentences under s 73(1), it is difficult to see how they fall within s 73(2) in this case – there is no evidence that the Complainant felt in any way constrained by her relationship with the Appellant from reporting him.

142 That said, the outcome might be different on a different set of facts. Illustrations can be found in ADF v Public Prosecutor [2010] 1 SLR 874 (“ADF”), where the offender deliberately cultivated in the MDW a fear that reporting the offences would result in her imprisonment, repeatedly threatening to have her jailed for minor lapses in her household duties and underscoring that he was a police officer, and Public Prosecutor v Lim Hwang Ngin Lawrence [2009] SGHC 27, where the offender similarly made threats of imprisonment to the complainant if she disobeyed him, exploiting her fear of and deference to authority. In such a case, the relationship between the offender and the MDW would clearly be a material factor – given that such threats would make it less likely that the MDW would report the offender, it would have rendered her more susceptible to the offences.

143 Having set out the proper interpretation of ss 73(1) and 73(2) of the PC, we turn to consider the appropriate sentencing approach where the offences of rape and outrage of modesty are punishable with the enhanced penalties under s 73(1). We start by setting out the existing sentencing frameworks for the offences of rape and outrage of modesty.

144 The sentencing framework for rape is set out in Terence Ng. At the first stage of the Terence Ng framework, the court identifies the sentencing band applicable to the offence by reference to the offence-specific factors alone. Having regard to the number of offence-specific factors present, the court then identifies the appropriate sentencing band which the offence falls within. The sentencing bands are (at [73(b)]):

(a) Band 1 (10 to 13 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane): This comprises cases at the lower end of the spectrum of seriousness. Such cases feature no offence-specific aggravating factors or are cases where these factors are present only to a very limited extent such that they have a limited impact on sentence.

(b) Band 2 (13 to 17 years’ imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane): This comprises cases of rape of a higher level of seriousness. Such cases usually contain two or more offence-specific aggravating factors.

(c) Band 3 (17 to 20 years’ imprisonment and 18 strokes of the cane): This comprises cases which, by reason of the number and intensity of the aggravating factors, are extremely serious cases of rape. 

145 Once the appropriate sentencing band is identified, the court then determines precisely where within that range the offence falls, to derive an “indicative starting point”. In exceptional cases, the court may decide on an indicative starting point which falls outside the prescribed range, although cogent reasons should be given for doing so (Terence Ng at [73(a)]).

146 At the second stage of the Terence Ng framework, the court should have regard to the offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors (at [73(c)]).

147 The sentencing framework for outrage of modesty is set out in Kunasekaran. At the first stage of the Kunasekaran framework, the court considers offence-specific factors – specifically, the degree of sexual exploitation, the circumstances of the offence, and the harm caused to the victim (at [45] and [48]). Having assessed the gravity of the offence by reference to these factors, the court then places the offence within one of the following three bands (Kunasekaran at [45(b)] and [49]):

(a) Band 1 (less than five months’ imprisonment): This includes cases with no offence-specific factors, or at most one such factor. These are typically cases that involve a fleeting touch or no skin-to-skin contact, and no intrusion into the victim’s private parts.

(b) Band 2 (five to 15 months’ imprisonment): This includes cases where two or more of the offence-specific factors are present. The lower end of the band covers cases where the victim’s private parts are intruded upon but without skin-to-skin contact, while the higher end covers cases involving skin-to-skin contact with the victim’s private parts or the use of deception.

(c) Band 3 (15 to 24 months’ imprisonment): This includes cases where numerous offence-specific factors present themselves, especially factors such as the exploitation of a particularly vulnerable victim, a serious abuse of a position of trust, and/or the use of violence or force against the victim.

148 At the second stage, the court considers the offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors.

149 We turn to consider the appropriate framework for enhancing sentences under s 73(1).

150 In this regard, we agree with the Judge and the IC that the following approaches are not appropriate.

151 The first is to scale the sentencing bands of an existing framework to account for the enhanced punishment. This approach was adopted in Public Prosecutor v Cheng Kim Han Stanley [2019] SGMC 66 (“Stanley Cheng”), a case concerning a charge of outrage of modesty against an MDW under the 1998 Provision. To enhance the sentence under s 73, the court applied an uplift of 1.5 times to the applicable sentencing bands at Stage 1 of the Kunasekaran framework (Stanley Cheng at [214]–[215]).

152 We agree with the IC that increasing the sentencing bands in such a manner would result in a disproportionate enhanced starting sentence. For example, if such an approach were adopted and a multiplier of two times is applied to the applicable sentencing bands for the offences of rape, the enhanced starting sentences for the least serious form of rape against an MDW under Band 1 of the modified Terence Ng framework would fall within the range of 20 to 26 years, which is considerably higher than even the indicative starting sentence under Band 3 of the unmodified Terence Ng framework. However, the existing Terence Ng framework already treats the exploitation of vulnerable persons as an aggravating factor. As noted in Terence Ng, Band 3 is reserved for “extremely serious cases of rape” (at [73(b)(iii)]) featuring “victims with particularly high degrees of vulnerability” (at [57]). Thus, to presumptively double the sentences for all offences against MDWs would be disproportionate and would go well beyond the protective purpose s 73(1) was intended to achieve.

153 Further, and importantly, we agree with the IC that the extent of exploitation of the MDW’s vulnerability and the abuse of the offender’s authority over the MDW lie on a spectrum. While it is theoretically possible to accommodate varying degrees of exploitation and abuse by placing a case at the lower or higher end of the expanded sentencing band, there would be no transparency as to how the multiplier or uplift was arrived at, which would be undesirable.

154 Another approach is to treat factors which are inherent in an MDW-offender relationship such as abuse of power and exploitation of vulnerability as aggravating factors. This has been a consistent trend in our jurisprudence (see, eg, ADF; Farida Begam d/o Mohd Artham v Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 SLR(R) 592; Public Prosecutor v Chong Siew Chin [2001] 3 SLR(R) 851; Ong Ting Ting v Public Prosecutor [2004] 4 SLR(R) 53; Janardana Jayasankarr v Public Prosecutor [2016] 4 SLR 1288; Ang Lilian v Public Prosecutor [2017] 4 SLR 1072).

155 An example is the case of Public Prosecutor v Pal Muhammad Irzuan Bin Mokhtar [2024] SGMC 1 (“Pal”), which involved a case of outrage of modesty against an MDW. The court in Pal treated the abuse of trust and exploitation of vulnerability of the MDW as aggravating factors that warranted the imposition of a stiffer sentence (Pal at [89]).

156 A similar but modified approach was adopted in Anita Damu v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 922 (“Anita Damu”). For the offence of voluntarily causing hurt with dangerous means under s 324 read with s 73(2) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (prior to the 2020 amendments), the court adopted the existing s 323 framework as the starting point, with uplifts applied to account for the dangerous means used and potential harm caused. Crucially, the court also applied a further uplift of up to 3.5 years pursuant to the then s 73(2) to account for the victim’s vulnerability and psychological harm. In this regard, the court identified the following factors from Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 1315 (“Tay Wee Kiat”) at [72] (see [159] below) as relevant: (i) whether there was behaviour calculated to reinforce the offender’s authority and to oppress and bully the victim into submission; (ii) whether there was humiliating or degrading treatment of the victim; and (iii) whether the psychological harm arose from a sustained pattern of abuse.

157 However, we agree with the Judge and the IC that it would not be appropriate to simply apply existing sentencing frameworks while treating an MDW’s vulnerability merely as an aggravating factor. Had Parliament intended this, the existing sentencing frameworks would have been sufficient as they already treat the vulnerability of the victim as an aggravating factor. The introduction of enhanced punishment of up to twice the ordinary maximum reflects Parliament’s intention that punishment should go above and beyond what a single aggravating factor may warrant.

158 In the court below, the Prosecution suggested applying a default multiplier of 1.5 times, with upward or downward adjustments depending on the degree of exploitation of vulnerability or abuse of authority. We agree with the Judge that such an approach is not appropriate. A benchmark or default multiplier may be suitable where it is possible to identify an archetypal case of sexual offence committed against an MDW and to calibrate the multiplier based on the extent of exploitation and abuse of authority. Such an approach has typically been adopted where it involves offences which manifest overwhelmingly in a particular way (see Seah Ming Yang Daryle v Public Prosecutor [2024] 4 SLR 1561 at [15]). However, that clearly is not the case for sexual offences committed against MDWs. The multiplier to be applied will necessarily be dependent on the specific facts, and it would be contrary to sound sentencing principles to begin with a “default” multiplier. A “default” approach may cause the sentencing court to apply such a multiplier as a starting point, which would not be consistent with s 73(1) which does not mandate the enhancement of sentences but gives the court a discretion to do so (see [118]). Ultimately, there should be a principled and transparent method of determining the multiplier based on the facts. This would also facilitate consistent application across different offences and fact scenarios.

159 A fourth approach is to create an entirely new framework for the specific offence read with s 73. In Tay Wee Kiat, the High Court did so for the offence of voluntarily causing hurt against MDWs under s 323 of the PC, reasoning that MDW abuse occurs in circumstances of inherent inequality and oppression, and that the dimension of psychological abuse may be under-emphasised under the ordinary sentencing framework for s 323 offences.

160 We agree with the Judge that it is not necessary to create a new framework. Cases involving sexual assault against MDWs are not so fundamentally different in nature from other sexual assault cases as to warrant such an approach. Indeed, many sexual assault cases already involve vulnerable victims and an abuse of position and trust (see, eg, Terence Ng at [44(b)] and [44(e)] and Kunasekaran at [57]). Moreover, psychological harm is inherent in sexual offences of this nature (Public Prosecutor v BMR [2019] 3 SLR 270 at [32]), rendering the concerns echoed in Tay Wee Kiat less relevant in this context.

161 In the circumstances, we agree with the Judge that it is sufficient to adapt the existing sentencing frameworks for sexual offences by adding an appropriately calibrated multiplier to the starting sentence. Adopting the Terence Ng and Kunasekaran frameworks would ensure consistency in sentencing by preserving the settled approaches for the base offences of rape and outrage of modesty. The use of a calibrated multiplier would ensure transparency by providing a structured basis for determining the appropriate uplift pursuant to s 73(1) where a sexual offence is committed against an MDW. It would also afford sentencing courts an appropriate degree of flexibility and discretion, recognising that some sexual offences against MDWs may be more egregious than others owing to the varying degrees to which an MDW’s particular vulnerabilities may be exploited or the accused’s authority may be abused. Finally, it would allow the full range of prescribed penalties to be utilised.

162 We now set out the applicable sentencing framework. At the first step, the court applies stage one of the Terence Ng or Kunasekaran framework, depending on the offence in question. However, the court must consciously disregard at this stage factors relating to the offender’s abuse of position (as an employer or a member of the employer’s household or an employment agent) and the victim’s vulnerability (as an MDW). This is necessary to avoid double counting, as these relationship-specific factors will be considered when determining the appropriate multiplier in the next step. Having said that, other aspects of the victim’s vulnerability or the accused’s abuse of position that do not stem from the specific MDW-offender relationship should be taken into account at this juncture. These might include cases where the victim’s vulnerability stems from a physical or mental disability, or temporary intoxication. Once an appropriate sentencing band is selected based on the offence-specific factors, the court should determine the indicative starting sentence within that band (see also GD at [257]–[258]).

163 At the second step, the court should apply a multiplier – ranging from 1% to 100% – to the indicative starting sentence to derive an indicative enhanced starting sentence. We agree with the IC’s gloss added to the Judge’s reasoning that the selection of the multiplier figure should be dependent on two factors: (a) the extent of exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability; and (b) the degree of abuse of authority. In particular, it is necessary to link these factors to the wrong committed and it is not sufficient to consider the victim’s vulnerability or the offender’s authority over the victim generally.

164 In ADF, VK Rajah JA observed that while the vulnerability of an MDW and the potential for abuse of authority by an employer is an intrinsic feature of every such relationship, the critical questions are how that vulnerability has been exploited and the extent of that exploitation (at [166(a)]; see also Stanley Cheng at [242]). Similarly, in Public Prosecutor v CPS [2024] 2 SLR 749 (“CPS”), a case involving the rape of a 14-year-old victim, this court held at [34] that:

165 Having regard to the two principal factors identified above, we are of the view that the appropriate multiplier is to be determined as follows:

166 We would add that there may be rare cases where the accused may not be able to bring himself within s 73(2) but there may be no discernible abuse of authority and exploitation of vulnerability. Even in such cases, some uplift would nonetheless be warranted to give effect to the purpose of s 73, which is to protect MDWs as a class that faces vulnerabilities arising from their status as MDWs and to reflect society’s disapprobation of offences committed against them. We reiterate that it is ultimately in the court’s discretion as to whether to impose an uplift.

167 In determining the appropriate multiplier, we endorse the Judge’s suggested factors (see [100(b)] above) but amend them to draw a clearer and more direct link between each factor and the commission of the offence. The underlying principle is that the multiplier should reflect not merely the existence of vulnerability or authority, but the extent to which the offender exploited these circumstances to commit or perpetuate the abuse.

168 In terms of exploitation of the MDW’s vulnerability:

(a) The MDW’s young age and limited work experience in Singapore may translate into a lack of familiarity with her rights and the Singapore legal system, rendering her more vulnerable to sexual abuse. An offender may exploit this by acting in the knowledge that she would be unable or reluctant to report the abuse or seek help, or by manipulating her into believing that such conduct is acceptable in Singapore or that it would be futile to report or complain about the same.

(b) The MDW’s social isolation and limited access to a support network may make her more vulnerable to sexual abuse. An offender may exploit this by acting in the knowledge that she would be unable or unwilling to seek help, or by actively restricting her movements or controlling her mobile phone usage to prevent her from doing so. This would be particularly relevant in cases of repeated abuse.

(c) The MDW’s history of abuse by the offender or other members of the household may make her more vulnerable to sexual abuse. An offender may exploit this by threatening further abuse if she does not comply with his demands for sexual acts.

(d) The MDW’s position as the sole breadwinner for her family, or the fact that she has taken on significant debt, may make her more vulnerable to sexual abuse. An offender may exploit this by committing abuse in the knowledge that she is unable or unwilling to take any step which may jeopardise her employment, or by threatening to dismiss her or diminish her prospects of obtaining alternative employment.

169 In terms of abuse of authority:

(a) The offender’s relationship to the MDW – whether as employer, employment agent, or member of the employer’s household. Generally, the employer would have the highest degree of control over the MDW and therefore the greatest capacity to exploit that relationship to commit abuse. An employment agent may have significant influence during the hiring process and initial placement, while members of the employer’s household may exercise varying degrees of authority over the MDW depending on their role within the family and their relationship to the employer.

(b) The extent to which the offender exercised control over the MDW’s day-to-day living conditions, including her workload and the imposition of restrictive rules that fetter her personal freedoms, such as restrictions on the use of communicative devices. The more pervasive this control, the greater the offender’s capacity to isolate the MDW and prevent her from reporting or escaping from the abuse.

(c) The extent of the offender’s authority or influence over the terms of the MDW’s employment, including her job security, salary, and overall employment conditions. An offender with the authority to terminate employment and withhold pay wields substantial power over the MDW, creating a significant power imbalance that can be exploited to facilitate and perpetuate the abuse. The more directly this authority was leveraged to commit or conceal the offence, the more it should weigh in favour of a higher multiplier.

170 At the third step, the sentencing court considers the offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors present to calibrate the final sentence for a particular charge.

171 In the present case, we disagree with the Judge that a 50% uplift is appropriate and consider that a 20% uplift better reflects the circumstances. Our reasons are as follows.

172 First, the Complainant was not especially vulnerable. There is no evidence that she had been subjected to abuse or intimidation by the Appellant or any member of the household, nor any evidence that such conduct had operated on her mind in a way that was connected to the offences against her. This may be contrasted with cases of repeated sexual, physical or emotional abuse, which may create a culture of fear that prevents the victim from reporting the abuse or seeking help, thereby enabling the commission of the offences. Additionally, the Complainant was not particularly vulnerable by virtue of her background. She was in her mid-thirties at the time of the Incident and relatively well educated, having completed secondary education in the Philippines and a secretarial course equivalent to a college diploma. She had also accumulated some working experience, having come to Singapore as an MDW in 2016 before being employed by D2 in 2018. There was no evidence that the Complainant lacked familiarity with her rights or that she was socially isolated. Notably, she had a support network that she was able to draw on: she described being “very close” to her sister and having “a lot of friends” – she was in fact able to contact them for assistance after the Incident, as well as reach out to HOME for help. These facts militate against a finding of heightened vulnerability that was exploited by the Appellant in the commission of the offences.

173 Second, there was no gross abuse of the Appellant’s authority over the Complainant. The Appellant did not enjoy any special power or authority over her beyond that ordinarily incident to the household member-MDW relationship. It was not the Complainant’s evidence that she felt compelled to accept the wine or injections offered by the Appellant or to obey any other instruction she was not comfortable with. The Footage suggests that their interactions were, prior to the Incident, informal and relaxed, and there was no evidence of the Appellant intimidating, or applying any pressure on, the Complainant. She was even assured enough to inform the Appellant that she wanted the lights in the living room to be turned back on (see [11] above). Relatedly, the Appellant did not deter her from reporting him, by making threats or preventing her from leaving the house or speaking to others.

174 Nonetheless, as detailed above, the Appellant did exploit the Complainant’s vulnerability and abused his authority to some extent. As the sole authority figure present in the household at the material time, the Appellant occupied a position that commanded the Complainant’s deference and trust. It was because of this trust that the Complainant let her guard down and accepted wine and the injections from the Appellant, even though her employer D2 would not have allowed it. She also felt comfortable enough to lay down on the sofa bed as instructed and to unbutton her shorts in anticipation of the Appellant pulling them down to expose her buttocks, although she was already feeling “dizzy” by then. Further, with no other person present in the household, there was no prospect of intervention, and the Complainant had no meaningful opportunity to seek assistance or escape.

175 For these reasons, we are of the view that there was a low level of exploitation of vulnerability and a low level of abuse of authority, justifying a 20% uplift.

176 We turn now to provide some clarifying comments on two aggravating factors falling within Step 1 of the framework laid down in Terence Ng.

177 Under the first step of the sentencing framework for rape set out in Terence Ng, this court identified the rape of a vulnerable victim as an offence-specific aggravating factor that a court ought to take into account when classifying the offence into the appropriate sentencing band (at [44(e)]):

178 In Pram Nair, this court rejected the argument that the vulnerability factor as set out in Terence Ng must be “permanent or enduring [in] nature”, holding instead that temporary vulnerability suffices since a temporarily vulnerable victim is equally “less able to fend off the offender’s sexual advances in the moment of the offence” [emphasis added]. Accordingly, this court held that an intoxicated victim could be considered vulnerable for the purposes of this aggravating factor.

179 The relevant passages from Pram Nair bear reproduction:

180 We would observe that intoxication is an aggravating factor because it bears on both the harm caused to the victim and the culpability of the offender. As to harm, where the victim is fully unconscious, she does not know what is happening, is unable to protest, and may not be able to report the offence – potentially enabling sustained abuse. Where she regains consciousness during the offence, or drifts in and out of consciousness throughout, she may have no way of knowing how long the assault had been ongoing and will have been wholly powerless to protest in the intervening period. Where she is neither unconscious nor asleep but is heavily intoxicated, she may be physically and verbally unable to resist (ie, her movements feeble, her words slurred) and unable to remove herself from the situation, but may nonetheless be painfully aware of the assault being perpetrated on her.

181 As to culpability, an offender who knowingly exploits a victim’s intoxicated state by taking advantage of her inability to resist demonstrates a degree of moral blameworthiness that the sentence ought to reflect. That culpability is further heightened where the offender targets a victim he knows to be fully unconscious (as opposed to conscious but unresponsive), deliberately exploiting the fact that she will have no recollection of the assault and may therefore not report it.

182 Given that committing a sexual offence against a victim who is vulnerable by virtue of intoxication increases both the harm caused and the culpability of the offender, it plainly constitutes an aggravating factor. However, we reiterate that a victim’s intoxication constitutes an aggravating factor only where it results in the victim losing control, whether partially or fully, over her ability to respond to or resist the sexual assault (see also Pram Nair at [132]). Accordingly, this factor is not engaged merely because the victim had consumed some alcohol. A victim who is slightly intoxicated but remains able to speak, move, and communicate is in a materially different position from one who is slipping in and out of consciousness, or one who is wholly unconscious. Whether the victim’s intoxication renders her sufficiently vulnerable to engage this aggravating factor is ultimately a question of fact and degree. We would therefore caution against a blanket approach that treats any degree of intoxication as aggravating.

183 This position is borne out by a line of Singapore decisions in which the threshold for treating intoxication as an aggravating factor was clearly crossed: see, eg, Public Prosecutor v Yap Pow Foo [2023] SGHC 79 (victim “severely intoxicated” and her “complete helplessness” exploited); Public Prosecutor v Ong Soon Heng [2018] SGHC 58 (victim so “severely intoxicated” that she “lacked the capacity to respond to or resist the sexual advances” and had been “compelled” to move from a nightclub to the accused’s residence); Public Prosecutor v Jeffrey Pe [2023] SGHC 313 (victim “falling in and out of consciousness” and feeling “paralysed” at the time of the offence); and Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Isnalli David [2025] SGHC 100 (intoxication reduced the victim’s ability to resist and care for herself). In each of these cases, the victim’s intoxication resulted in a partial or total loss of control over his or her ability to respond to or resist the sexual assault and was accordingly correctly treated as an aggravating factor.

184 This is also consistent with the approach taken in foreign jurisdictions. In England and Wales, a victim’s vulnerability increases the harm caused and thus, the offence category which justifies a harsher sentence (UK Sentencing Council, Sexual Offences Definitive Guideline: Rape (1 April 2014) at p 10 (“UK Sentencing Guidelines”)). The English courts have consistently held that a victim who is asleep or unconscious through intoxication is “particularly vulnerable” for the purposes of the Guidelines. In R v Wisdom [2022] EWCA Crim 1332 (“Wisdom”) at [31], the English Court of Appeal surveyed the earlier authorities, including R v Bunyan [2017] EWCA Crim 872 (victim asleep and drunk in bed), R v Rak [2016] EWCA Crim 882 (victim “effectively comatose due to drink”), and R v Seplvida-Gomez [2020] 4 WLR 11 (victim in her own bed having consumed about half a bottle of wine and “asleep or half-asleep”). On the facts, the court found that although it may have been overstating matters to say the victim was unconscious through drink, she was nevertheless “particularly vulnerable due to her personal circumstances” given that she was, if not unconscious, then heavily intoxicated and asleep at the time of the assault (at [33]).

185 In Australia, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory in R v Incandela [2022] ACTSC 139 (“Incandela”) held that a complainant’s intoxication can increase her vulnerability and, where the offender was aware of that vulnerability, his moral culpability is correspondingly aggravated. On the facts, while the court accepted that the complainant was intoxicated and that the offender knew she had consumed some alcohol, the evidence did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that he appreciated the full extent of her intoxication. The court was nonetheless satisfied that he knew she was vulnerable to some degree and had taken advantage of her, and this was sufficient to increase the objective seriousness of the offence (at [18]–[21]).

186 The Canadian courts have adopted a similarly fact-sensitive approach. In R v Holland [2022] OJ No 1611, the Ontario Superior Court held that the victim’s intoxication and the vulnerability it created was an aggravating factor, while noting that the extent to which her intoxication was apparent to the offender was unknown and that there was no suggestion she was unconscious or incapacitated (at [19]). This fact-sensitive approach is further illustrated by R v Browne [2021] OJ No 5258, where the court declined to treat the victim’s intoxication as an aggravating factor because the evidence of its extent was unclear. The court distinguished the case from others where there was overwhelming objective evidence of significant intoxication, and noted that it was unable to determine whether the complainant was unconscious or merely asleep at the relevant time (at [77]–[78]).

187 We turn next to the offence-aggravating factor of violence. Under the Terence Ng framework, the actual or threatened use of violence during, or to facilitate, the commission of rape is an offence-specific aggravating factor. Indeed, this is statutorily encoded in s 375(3) of the PC. However, the court in Terence Ng specified that such violence must amount to “excessive force” (at [44(d)]). In our view, the use of the term “excessive” might suggest a high threshold, but this is plainly not what the court intended. Instead, it is clear from the context of [44(d)] of Terence Ng that the term “excessive force” was intended to mean “the use of violence over the force necessary to commit the rape”. In our judgment, it may be helpful to refine the formulation from “excessive force” to “violence or threats of violence (beyond that which is inherent in the offence)” per the UK Sentencing Guidelines at p 10. This would better capture a graduated range of conduct and more accurately reflect the intention of the court in Terence Ng as to how violence as an aggravating factor should be assessed. On this approach, an accused who pins the victim down aggressively, causing visible marks, would fall at the lower end of this aggravating factor; one who uses restraints would be more culpable; and one who threatens to kill the victim or holds a weapon to her would be more culpable still.

188 With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the Appellant.

189 We first consider the indicative sentence for the rape charges, applying the Terence Ng framework.

190 The Judge adopted an indicative starting sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment for the 1st and 4th Charges (ie, the rape charges). In coming to this conclusion, the Judge determined that the rape charges fell within the low to mid-point of Band 2 of the Terence Ng framework, having identified three offence-specific aggravating factors: first, the Complainant’s vulnerability as she was in a physically weakened state; second, the Appellant’s premeditation; and third, the Appellant’s failure to wear a condom, thereby exposing the Complainant to various risks including the risk of unwanted pregnancy and STDs.

191 We agree with the Judge’s findings on two of the aggravating factors. First, the Complainant was in a physically weakened state which rendered her unable to resist the Appellant’s advances, and the Appellant was aware of this (see [23] and [66] above). Second, the Appellant failed to wear a condom, thereby exposing the Complainant to the risk of unwanted pregnancy and STDs.

192 However, we respectfully disagree with the Judge on the issue of premeditation. The Judge found premeditation on the basis that: (a) the Appellant invited the Complainant to watch TV with him and offered her wine, creating a relaxed environment which caused her to let her guard down; (b) the Appellant offered to administer injections to the Complainant as a pretext to place her in a physically vulnerable position; (c) the Appellant adjusted the CCTV camera away from the Complainant’s bed and attempted to move her to the bedroom, suggesting a plan to conceal his subsequent actions; and (d) when the Complainant said she wanted the injections administered in the living room, the Appellant dimmed the lights to create a poorly lit environment. Taken together, the Judge considered these actions to be deliberate and calculated steps towards creating conditions conducive to the offences (GD at [281]–[283]).

193 However, there is no evidence that the Appellant had plied the Complainant with alcohol or administered the injections intending to incapacitate her or knowing that she would be incapacitated. At the hearing of this appeal, the Prosecution conceded that it is not its case that the Appellant had deliberately rendered the Complainant physically vulnerable with a view to facilitating the offences. As for the Appellant adjusting the Bedroom CCTV and asking the Complainant to go to the bedroom for the injections, these acts are not inconsistent with the Appellant acting on the (misguided) belief that the Complainant might consent to the sexual acts. In the circumstances, the Prosecution has not established premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.

194 Accordingly, we consider this case to fall at the lowest end of Band 2 of the Terence Ng framework, with an appropriate indicative starting sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment.

195  We next apply the multiplier under s 73(1) of the PC. As mentioned above at [175], we consider the appropriate multiplier to be 20%, which would translate into an enhanced sentence of 15 years and 7 months for each of the rape charges.

196 We next turn to consider the indicative sentence in respect of the outrage of modesty charges, applying the Kunasekaran framework.

197 The Judge adopted an indicative starting sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment for the 3rd and 5th Charges (ie, the outrage of modesty charges) each, finding that the offences fell at the higher end of Band 2 of the Kunasekaran framework by reason of the Complainant’s vulnerability (from her physically weakened state) and the Appellant’s premeditation. Additionally, there was significant sexual exploitation given the Appellant’s direct skin-on-skin contact with the most intimate parts of the Complainant’s body.

198  For the reasons stated above at [193], we do not find any premeditation on the part of the Appellant. However, we agree with the Judge that the Complainant was vulnerable and that there was a significant degree of sexual exploitation, as both charges involved direct skin-on-skin contact with the most intimate parts of the Complainant’s body.

199 Accordingly, we are of the view that the present case falls within the lower end of Band 2 of the Kunasekaran framework and reduce the sentence to 10 months’ imprisonment for the 3rd and 5th Charges each. Applying the 20% multiplier, the enhanced sentence for each outrage of modesty charge is 12 months’ imprisonment.

200 Turning finally to the global sentence, we see no reason to interfere with the Judge’s decision to order the sentences for one rape charge and one outrage of modesty charge to run consecutively (GD at [301]). This will result in a global sentence of 16 years and 7 months’ imprisonment.

201 Lastly, we consider the totality principle and whether the final sentence imposed on the Appellant is disproportionate to his overall criminality. As explained in Public Prosecutor v Raveen Balakrishnan [2018] 5 SLR 799 (“Raveen Balakrishnan”) at [73], there are two limbs to the totality principle. First, the court should examine whether the aggregate sentence is substantially above the normal level of sentences for the most serious of the individual offences committed. Second, the court should examine whether the effect of the aggregate sentence on the offender is crushing and not in keeping with his past record and future prospects. If an aggregate sentence is considered excessive, the court may opt for a different combination of sentences or adjust the individual sentences.

202 Applying both limbs of the totality principle and having regard to the relevant sentencing precedents for the offences of rape and outrage of modesty, we see no need to make any adjustment. The aggregate sentence of 16 years and 7 months’ imprisonment is not substantially above the normal level of sentences for rape, especially considering that this sentence was arrived at after applying the uplift of 20% pursuant to s 73(1) of the PC. Further, we do not consider a sentence of 16 years and 7 months to be crushing in the circumstances or disproportionate to the overall criminality of the Appellant.

203 In conclusion, we find no basis to disturb the Judge’s conviction of the Appellant in respect of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges. The appeal against conviction is therefore dismissed.

204 We allow the appeal against sentence, and we substitute the global sentence of 19 years and 6 months’ imprisonment imposed by the Judge with a sentence of 16 years and 7 months’ imprisonment. Finally, we wish to record our appreciation to Ms Tan for her assistance in this matter.