1 The appellant, Mr Wang Yunhe (“Mr Wang”), was arrested by the Singapore authorities pursuant to an extradition request from the US. He applied for a ruling that 12 of his items were unlawfully seized by the police during his arrest (“Seized Items Legality Application”). The application was dismissed by a district judge sitting in her capacity as a magistrate (“Magistrate”) under the Extradition Act 1968 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Extradition Act”). Mr Wang then applied for permission to commence judicial review proceedings against the Magistrate’s decision, but this too was dismissed by a judge (“Judge”) sitting in the General Division of the High Court (“General Division”). CA/CA 48/2025 was Mr Wang’s appeal against the Judge’s decision. After hearing the parties’ submissions, we dismissed the appeal. We now set out our detailed grounds of decision.

2 On 10 May 2023, Mr Wang was indicted in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for: (a) conspiracy to commit computer fraud; (b) aiding and abetting computer fraud; (c) conspiracy to commit wire fraud; and (d) conspiracy to commit money laundering. The US authorities alleged that Mr Wang was involved in the development and distribution of malicious software with the intent to infect residential computers worldwide including in the Eastern District of Texas. An arrest warrant was issued that same day.

3 On 14 February 2024, the Singapore authorities received a request from the US authorities for the extradition of Mr Wang and “the seizure of all articles, documents and evidence connected with offences charged for eventual surrender with the fugitive if extradition to the United States is granted” (“Extradition Request”). This was supported by an affidavit of one Ryan Bradbury, a Special Agent with the US Defense Criminal Investigative Service (“Ryan Bradbury Affidavit”).

4 In an e-mail from the US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to the Singapore Attorney-General’s Chambers dated 15 March 2024 (“15 Mar 2024 E-mail”), the US authorities requested “the seizure of any evidence related to Wang’s U.S. offenses found during his arrest for extradition and search of his premises”, including “all evidence, fruits and instrumentalities of the crimes that are connected with the subject matter of this request”. The US authorities referred to a non-exhaustive list which included the following:

5 On 21 May 2024, the Minister for Law (“Minister”) notified the magistrate in State Court 4A of the Extradition Request and authorised the magistrate to issue a warrant for the apprehension of Mr Wang. On 23 May 2024, a warrant for the apprehension of Mr Wang was issued.

6 On 24 May 2024, Mr Wang was arrested in Singapore. He has been in remand since, pending the committal hearing in the extradition process. Fifty items belonging to Mr Wang were seized by the police during the arrest.

7 On 21 February 2025, Mr Wang filed APP-2025-0221-48937 for the following relief:

(a) An order that the Republic of Singapore (“State”) allow Mr Wang access to or make copies of four flash drives and his WhatsApp communications with his US lawyer contained in his mobile phone.

(b) A ruling that 12 items (comprising four bank cards, two mobile phones, four flash drives, a laptop and a computer processing unit, collectively the “Seized Items”) were unlawfully seized, ie, the Seized Items Legality Application.

(c) An order that the State call, at the committal hearing, all prosecution witnesses whom the US DOJ intends to call or otherwise rely upon in the submission of testimony and/or evidence in the proceedings before the Eastern District of Texas, in order to give evidence and be cross-examined at the committal hearing.

(d) An order that the State provide to Mr Wang the sworn witness statements of all prosecution witnesses and documentary exhibits which the US DOJ may intend to enter as evidence in the proceedings before the Eastern District of Texas (“Witness Statements and Documentary Exhibits Application”).

8 APP-2025-0221-48937 was heard by the Magistrate. At the hearing, Mr Wang applied for the following in the alternative to the Witness Statements and Documentary Exhibits Application:

(a) An order that the State provide to Mr Wang the sworn witness statements of all witnesses referred to in the Ryan Bradbury Affidavit and/or all witnesses whose testimony the State intends to rely upon at the committal hearing.

(b) An order that the State provide to Mr Wang the originals and/or other primary evidence of documents referred to in the Ryan Bradbury Affidavit and/or other documents which the State intends to rely upon at the committal hearing (“Alternative Documentary Exhibits Application”).

9 The Magistrate dismissed all of Mr Wang’s applications. Her grounds of decision were published in In the matter of Wang Yunhe [2025] SGMC 39 (“MC GD”).

10 Mr Wang then filed HC/OA 969/2025 (“OA 969”) seeking: (a) permission to seek a quashing order against the Magistrate’s decision in respect of the Seized Items Legality Application and the Alternative Documentary Exhibits Application; and (b) if permission is granted, the said quashing order, a declaration-in-terms for the Seized Items Legality Application, and a mandatory order-in-terms for the Alternative Documentary Exhibits Application.

11 The Judge heard and dismissed OA 969. His grounds of decision were published in Wang Yunhe v Attorney-General [2026] SGHC 11 (“HC GD”).

12 Mr Wang filed CA/CA 48/2025 appealing against the whole of the Judge’s decision. However, he clarified in his Appellant’s Case that he was no longer appealing against the Judge’s decision regarding the Alternative Documentary Exhibits Application. Therefore, the appeal before us concerned solely the Judge’s decision regarding the Seized Items Legality Application.

13 Before the Magistrate, Mr Wang submitted that the Seized Items were not “identified or described” by the US authorities as required by s 15(3) of the Extradition Act. The Extradition Request and 15 Mar 2024 E-mail were overly general, vague, ambiguous and did not lend sufficient particularity for the State to identify and seize the Seized Items. He also submitted that there was no evidence adduced by the State to show that the authorised officers had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the Seized Items fulfilled either limb of s 15(1) of the Extradition Act. The State ought to show in sufficient detail how it identified the Seized Items and should not be allowed to rely on the broad statements by the US authorities as grounds for seizure without elaboration.

14 The State submitted that the Seized Items clearly fell within the categories set out in s 15(1) and were identified and seized pursuant to a request from the US authorities thereby fulfilling the requirements of s 15(3). In this regard, Senior Investigation Officer Boo Jon You (“SIO Boo”) filed an affidavit on behalf of the State and attested as follows:

15 We reproduce the relevant portion of the Magistrate’s decision as it succinctly sets out the Magistrate’s analysis of the issue (MC GD at [49]–[51]):

16 Before the Judge, the State submitted that Mr Wang should not be granted permission to commence judicial review proceedings as he had failed to exhaust an alternative remedy available to him, namely a revision application under s 27 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”). Mr Wang submitted that s 27 of the SCJA merely indicated that he had the option of challenging the Magistrate’s decision by way of either the supervisory or revisionary jurisdiction of the General Division. Absent guidance from case authorities that the revisionary route was available in such a case, Mr Wang argued that it was unclear whether he could apply for revision.

17 The Judge agreed with the State that the remedy of revision was available to Mr Wang, and having failed to exhaust all alternative remedies, he should not be granted permission to commence judicial review proceedings. The Judge rejected Mr Wang’s submission that it was unclear whether he could apply for revision – the language in s 27(1) of the SCJA was broad and there was no reason why it should be interpreted to exclude decisions made by a magistrate in proceedings under the Extradition Act. Apart from pointing out that there were no cases on this point, Mr Wang provided no reasons for his submission. The Judge also rejected Mr Wang’s submission that s 27 gave him the option of invoking either the supervisory or revisionary jurisdiction of the General Division – this did not change the fact that revision was an alternative remedy and it was incumbent on Mr Wang to avail himself of it before applying for judicial review (HC GD at [23]–[24]).

18 Mr Wang also argued that there was an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that the Seized Items were seized ultra vires s 15 of the Extradition Act. He submitted as follows:

(a) Under s 15(1), the State had to at least assert and explain that it formed its independent assessment that the seizure of items fell within either limb of the provision. The State could not simply rely on assertions from the US DOJ. Under s 15(3), the items described by the US DOJ needed to have a minimum level of particularity or granularity.

(b) There was no connection between the vague and generic words in the Extradition Request and the Seized Items. Even if the Seized Items fit the descriptions used in the 15 Mar 2024 E-mail, the State failed to satisfy itself that the Seized Items fell within either limb of s 15(1) and were identified or described by the US DOJ as required under s 15(3), as opposed to simply relying on what the US DOJ asserted.

(c) Even if the Magistrate was right that granular particularity was unnecessary, s 15 should not be broad enough to encompass a situation where no particulars had been given, and the only descriptions were generic and vague.

(d) The effect of the Magistrate’s approach was to allow the requirement of “reasonable grounds for suspecting” to be satisfied by the descriptions originating from the requesting state, without any requirement on the State to even apply its mind as to the nature or reasonableness of the descriptions by the requesting state, thereby rendering the statutory safeguard under s 15(1) nugatory.

(e) The State’s failure to demonstrate compliance with ss 15(1) and 15(3) was a relevant consideration which the Magistrate failed to consider.

19 The State submitted that OA 969 was an impermissible attempt to overturn the Magistrate’s decision on its merits and there was no prima facie case in favour of quashing the Magistrate’s decision. Given that Mr Wang’s arguments were also raised to the Magistrate, there could be no question that the Magistrate had failed to consider them. Mr Wang’s arguments were against the Magistrate’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State, which went towards the merits of her decision. Further, Mr Wang’s proposed reliefs would in effect require the court to grant the Seized Items Legality Application, thereby evidencing that his arguments went towards the merits of the Magistrate’s decision. In any event, the Magistrate’s decision was plainly correct in law and fact. The US authorities had identified various categories of items to be seized which were neither vague nor broad and which were exactly the type of categorical descriptions envisaged by s 15(3). As noted by the Magistrate, these categories bore a reasonable connection to the nature of the crimes Mr Wang was alleged to have committed, and it was reasonable for the police to have seized the Seized items pursuant to s 15(1).

20 The Judge agreed with the State that Mr Wang’s submissions had no merit. It was plain from the MC GD that the Magistrate summarised Mr Wang’s arguments (MC GD at [47]) and gave her decision and reasons for rejecting them (MC GD at [49]–[51]). Mr Wang knew this as he had also challenged the correctness of the Magistrate’s approach. His arguments focused on why the Magistrate’s decision was wrong. It was clear that the judicial review application in respect of the Seized Items Legality Application was an appeal in disguise and therefore Mr Wang should not be granted permission to commence judicial review proceedings (HC GD at [42]–[46]).

21 On appeal, Mr Wang submitted that: (a) the Judge erred in deciding that he had not exhausted all alternative remedies because the remedy of revision under s 27 of the SCJA was available; (b) the Judge erred in deciding that OA 969 was an appeal in disguise against the Magistrate’s decision on the Seized Items Legality Application; and (c) he had disclosed an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought in OA 969.

22 The State’s submissions were largely aligned with the findings of the Judge set out at [17] and [20] above.

23 We dismissed the appeal for three principal reasons, each of which, on its own, was dispositive of the appeal:

24 We elaborate on each point in turn.

25 We first note that the Extradition Act does not include an express mechanism by which a fugitive may challenge the police’s seizure of his property before a magistrate. At the hearing before us, counsel for Mr Wang, Mr Suang Wijaya (“Mr Suang”), suggested that the Magistrate could hear the Seized Items Legality Application pursuant to s 20 of the Extradition Act. We disagree. Section 20 simply confers upon a magistrate the power to dispose of property that was not delivered up with the fugitive on his surrender. It is a power invoked at the conclusion of extradition proceedings to dispose of remaining property and does not imply the jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the property was lawfully seized to begin with.

26 On what basis, then, did the Magistrate hear the Seized Items Legality Application? In our view, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the application because it was in substance a judicial review application to set aside the police’s seizure of the Seized Items. We note that the relief sought by Mr Wang before the Magistrate was a “ruling” that the Seized Items had been unlawfully seized, and not an order quashing their seizure or mandating their return to him. But that did not change the fact that the application sought to characterise the police’s seizure of the Seized Items as unlawful for being ultra vires s 15 of the Extradition Act and invited the Magistrate to scrutinise the legality of the police’s conduct. In other words, the Seized Items Legality Application purported to invoke a supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate. However, it is trite that the supervisory jurisdiction belongs only to the General Division. The supervisory jurisdiction refers to the scrutiny and control exercised by the General Division over the decisions of inferior courts and tribunals or other public bodies discharging public functions (Amarjeet Singh v Public Prosecutor [2021] 4 SLR 841 (“Amarjeet”) at [17]). It is invoked by way of an application to the General Division for judicial review against the impugned decision. The power of judicial review is vested in the General Division and not the lower courts (see Amarjeet at [43]; s 18(2) and para 1 of the First Schedule of the SCJA; O 24 r 1 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC”); and ss 19(3) and 52(2) of the State Courts Act 1970 (2020 Rev Ed)).

27 In the circumstances, the Seized Items Legality Application should not have been made to the Magistrate to begin with. The Seized Items were also not seized pursuant to the Magistrate’s decision, which raised the question of what Mr Wang was hoping to achieve by seeking judicial review against it. If Mr Wang truly believed that the police had seized the Seized Items unlawfully, he should have filed a judicial review application to the General Division against the police. In doing so, he would have had to comply with the procedural requirements of judicial review, such as applying for the court’s permission to commence proceedings within three months of the impugned decision (see O 24 rr 5(1)(b) and (2) of the ROC). As we explain below, this requirement serves an important filtering function. By applying to the Magistrate, Mr Wang effectively circumvented this requirement. We note that at the time the Seized Items Legality Application was made, Mr Wang was already well out of time to bring a judicial review application against the police’s seizure of the Seized Items, as it would have been close to nine months after the seizure took place.

28 While the State did not object to the Magistrate hearing the Seized Items Legality Application, counsel for the State, Mr Vincent Leow (“Mr Leow”), submitted at the hearing before us that such an omission could not confer upon the Magistrate a supervisory jurisdiction which she did not have. We agree. The Magistrate did not have the jurisdiction to hear the Seized Items Legality Application, and there was no question of the State being estopped from objecting, or having waived its right to object, against that lack of jurisdiction (Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd v Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 658 at [44]).

29 It appeared that the parties may have overlooked the Magistrate’s want of jurisdiction because the Seized Items Legality Application was bundled together with three other applications and two alternative applications (see [7]–[8] above). Those other applications were ancillary to the extradition process in that they were intended to facilitate Mr Wang’s preparation for the committal hearing and were undoubtedly within the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to hear. The same could not be said of the Seized Items Legality Application which the State correctly described as a “standalone from committal hearing” before the Judge. When we pointed this out to Mr Suang during his oral submissions, he was unable to explain why the Seized Items Legality Application ought to have been heard with the other applications before the Magistrate.

30 In the circumstances, the Seized Items Legality Application was fundamentally flawed. The conclusions of the Judge (to deny Mr Wang permission to commence judicial review proceedings against the Magistrate’s decision) and of the Magistrate (to dismiss the Seized Items Legality Application) were correct albeit for different reasons relating to the Magistrate’s lack of jurisdiction. The appeal therefore failed in limine.

31 For completeness, we deal below with the arguments raised by the parties which were premised on the Magistrate having the jurisdiction to hear the Seized Items Legality Application and the General Division having supervisory jurisdiction over the Magistrate’s decision.

32 As a general rule, an applicant must exhaust all alternative remedies before invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the court (“Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule”). Originally established under the common law, the rule now finds expression in O 24 r 2(2) of the ROC which prescribes that an application for a prerogative order must not be made before the applicant has exhausted any right of appeal or other remedy provided under any written law.

33 The central question before us was whether criminal revision was an alternative remedy that was available to Mr Wang which he should have exhausted before commencing judicial review proceedings against the Magistrate’s decision. To answer this question, it is necessary to first understand the relationship between the supervisory and revisionary jurisdictions.

34 Section 27(1) of the SCJA provides that “the General Division has general supervisory and revisionary jurisdiction over all subordinate courts”. This is a composite reference to two separate and distinct, albeit related, bases of jurisdiction (Ng Chye Huay v Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR 106 (“Ng Chye Huey”) at [53]). Their differences may be summarised as follows (Ng Chye Huey at [46]):

35 Bearing in mind that extradition proceedings can be characterised as criminal proceedings (see Christanto Radius v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 749 at [10] and Fatimah bte Kumin Lim v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 547 (“Fatimah”) at [110]), s 23 of the SCJA also provides that “[t]he General Division may exercise powers of revision in respect of criminal proceedings and matters in subordinate courts in accordance with the provisions of any written law for the time being in force relating to criminal procedure”.

36 Sections 23 and 27(1) of the SCJA are phrased broadly. There is no reason or basis for construing them as excluding the remedy of criminal revision in the extradition context. Indeed, our courts have recognised that, where a fugitive has been denied bail by a magistrate, the fugitive may make a revision application to the General Division challenging the magistrate’s decision (see Paulus Tannos v The State [2025] 5 SLR 620 at [12] and Ge Zhi v Attorney-General [2026] SGHC 114 at [17]). There is no reason why Mr Wang could not similarly make a revision application challenging the Magistrate’s decision on the Seized Items Legality Application.

37 There is equally no basis to interpret ss 23 and 27(1) of the SCJA as suggesting that the remedy of revision need not be exhausted before a judicial review application can be made. In fact, there is foreign authority, albeit only in obiter, suggesting that the Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule applies to the remedy of revision. In Mrs. Annie Besant v Advocate General of Madras (1919) 2 MLJ 139 (cited in Ng Chye Huey at [49]), the appellant was subject to legislation which required her to declare before a magistrate her possession of a printing press and her status as a printer and publisher, and to deposit a specified sum of money to the magistrate as security. The legislation gave the magistrate the discretion to dispense with the deposit and to cancel or vary an earlier order. In the appellant’s case, the magistrate initially dispensed with the deposit but later cancelled that order and required her to pay a deposit. The appellant challenged the magistrate’s order requiring her to pay the deposit, but it was unclear whether her challenge was a revision petition or an application for certiorari. The Privy Council held that the appellant’s challenge could not be characterised as a revision petition because (among other reasons) the magistrate’s acts were administrative and not judicial in nature, and the appellant could not bring an application for certiorari because (among other reasons) of an ouster clause. That aside, the following obiter comment of the Privy Council suggests that, had the remedy of revision been available to the appellant, she would have had to exhaust it before making an application for certiorari (at 152):

38 On appeal, Mr Wang submitted that he was not required to exhaust the remedy of criminal revision because: (a) it is wrong to impose a hierarchy between two equal alternatives; (b) the revisionary jurisdiction is of a “higher order” than the supervisory jurisdiction; (c) it is circular as the Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule applies to revision applications as well; and (d) criminal revision is not an equally effective and convenient remedy compared to judicial review. We reject each of these submissions.

39 Mr Wang’s first submission operates on the premise that the supervisory and revisionary jurisdictions are equal alternatives. This is allegedly because they are both prescribed in s 27(1) of the SCJA, quashing orders may be granted under both jurisdictions, and the revisionary jurisdiction has been described as a “statutory hybrid” of the supervisory and appellate jurisdictions (see Amarjeet at [19], citing Ng Chye Huey at [46]). From this premise, he argues that the Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule does not apply as between sub-species of the court’s inherent jurisdiction – to hold otherwise is supposedly to impose a hierarchy between two co-equal limbs of the same jurisdictional provision which is unsupported by the plain reading of s 27(1) or by authority.

40 However, Mr Wang’s premise is fundamentally wrong. The fact that both the supervisory and revisionary jurisdictions are referred to in s 27(1) of the SCJA does not imply they are “equal”. As stated in Ng Chye Huey at [53], the two jurisdictions are “separate and distinct”. It is also not true that quashing orders may be issued under the revisionary jurisdiction (Ng Chye Huey at [53]). That simply cannot be the case because prerogative orders are remedies unique to judicial review (Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore – Administrative Law vol 1 (LexisNexis, 2025) at para 10.117). The fact that the revisionary jurisdiction is described as a “statutory hybrid” of the supervisory and appellate jurisdictions at most indicates that there is a degree of overlap between the various jurisdictions, but that does not imply an equality in status.

41 Further, the way Mr Wang jumps from his premise to his conclusion is illogical. His suggestion that a hierarchy between the supervisory and revisionary jurisdictions is not supported by the plain reading of s 27(1) of the SCJA and authority completely ignores the fact that the Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule is well-established in our administrative law jurisprudence.

42 To the contrary, it is only logical that a remedy which does not require the court’s permission (ie, revision) must first be exhausted before a remedy which does (ie, judicial review). It is trite that an application for a quashing order (such as OA 969) can only be made with permission from the court (O 24 r 5(1)(b) of the ROC). The permission stage is a means of filtering out groundless or hopeless cases at an early stage (Attorney-General v Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah [2022] SGCA 46 at [19], citing Re Nalpon, Zero Geraldo Mario [2018] 2 SLR 1378 at [19]). Such a requirement “provides a mechanism for the efficient management of the judicial review caseload” (Wong Huiwen Denise & Makoto Hong Cheng, “Raising the Bar: Amending the Threshold for Leave in Judicial Review Proceedings” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 527 at para 4). The importance of safeguarding the judicial review process underscores the general principle that judicial review is a remedy of last resort (Goh Seng Heng v Official Assignee [2026] 3 SLR 541 at [61]; Commersol Commodities Ptd Ltd v Comptroller of Goods and Services Tax [2026] SGHC 101 at [28]). It is this underlying concern which explains the rationale for the Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule. As one commentator explained, “the public interest dictates that judicial review should be exercised speedily, and to that end it is necessary to limit the number of cases in which judicial review is used” (Clive Lewis, “The Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies in Administrative Law” (1992) 51(1) CLJ 138 at 140). In many cases, alternative remedies will be sufficient to address an applicant’s grievance, thereby obviating the need for judicial review. It therefore conduces to general efficiency that these alternative remedies are exhausted first, and the permission stage of judicial review proceedings is a cost-effective method of ensuring that applicants have satisfied this requirement and do not add to the judicial review caseload unnecessarily. The same considerations do not apply to revision applications which do not have a permission stage, and this structural difference between the supervisory and revisionary jurisdictions clearly indicate that the remedy of revision ought to be exhausted before invoking judicial review.

43 Mr Wang’s second submission goes a step further – he claims that the revisionary jurisdiction is not only equal to, but arguably of a “higher order” than, the supervisory jurisdiction because of the wider discretion and greater flexibility of remedies available to the court in the former. It is unclear what he means by “higher order”. It is also unclear how this submission is consistent with his first submission that the revisionary and supervisory jurisdictions are equal alternatives. In any event, the argument is flawed. As compared to its supervisory jurisdiction, a court in its appellate jurisdiction has greater scope to disagree with an inferior court’s decision, including on its merits, and to revise the orders given below (Wong Keng Leong Rayney v Law Society of Singapore [2006] 4 SLR(R) 934 at [79]). Yet, it is not suggested that the appellate jurisdiction is of a “higher order”, and it is in fact trite that an applicant must exhaust his right of appeal before applying for judicial review (see O 24 r 2(2) of the ROC). Indeed, it is precisely because a court in its revisionary jurisdiction can reconsider the merits of a decision and has greater flexibility of remedies that an applicant should first exhaust the remedy of revision before invoking the court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

44 Mr Wang’s third submission is that it is circular to require him to exhaust the remedy of revision before applying for judicial review because if he applied for a quashing order in a revision application, O 24 r 2(2) of the ROC would similarly require the exhaustion of alternative remedies including judicial review. The effect is that he would never be able to apply for a quashing order. However, the argument is plainly wrong as he cannot apply for a quashing order in a revision application (see [40] above). Additionally, Mr Wang’s assumption that O 24 applies to revision applications is inaccurate. While O 24 does not expressly state that it only applies to judicial review applications, this can be inferred from the fact that the requirement for permission under O 24 r 5 is unique to judicial review and does not apply to revision.

45 Mr Wang’s fourth submission is that the Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule does not apply to revision because it is not an equally effective and convenient remedy compared to judicial review. He submits that revision is impractical considering the high threshold of “grave and serious injustice” before the court will exercise its discretion under its revisionary jurisdiction. This threshold is higher than that for permission to commence judicial review proceedings – that is, arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion – and it could not have been intended that an applicant must first fail at a higher threshold before being permitted to invoke a lower one.

46 It is true that under the Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule, the alternative remedies which must first be exhausted are those which are “adequate” (Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [103]) and “equally effective and convenient” (R v Hillingdon London Borough Council, Ex parte Royco Homes Ltd [1974] QB 720 at 728F). It is also true that the court will only exercise its powers of revision where there is a “grave and serious injustice” (Amarjeet at [21]). But it is misleading to compare this with the threshold at the permission stage of judicial review proceedings. The more accurate comparator is the threshold at the merits stage of judicial review proceedings, and it was not suggested that the threshold at this stage is any less onerous than that in a revision application. In any event, the fact that revision involves a high threshold does not necessarily render it an inadequate or less effective or convenient remedy compared to judicial review. As mentioned earlier, a court in its revisionary jurisdiction can scrutinise the merits of the inferior court’s decision and revise that decision directly, whereas a court in its supervisory jurisdiction is confined to reviewing the inferior court’s decision on established grounds of judicial review and will rarely substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court. Revision is thus arguably an even wider and more effective remedy as compared to judicial review.

47 For the foregoing reasons, we find that criminal revision was an alternative remedy that was available to Mr Wang which he should have exhausted before commencing judicial review proceedings against the Magistrate’s decision. As Mr Wang failed to comply with the Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Rule, the Judge was right to deny Mr Wang permission to commence judicial review proceedings. The appeal therefore failed for this reason as well.

48 Permission to commence judicial review proceedings will only be granted if three cumulative requirements are met (Gobi a/l Avedian v Attorney-General [2020] 2 SLR 883 at [44]):

49 Subject to what we have said above about the Magistrate’s lack of jurisdiction to hear the Seized Items Legality Application, only the third requirement was in dispute before us. The key question to be determined was whether Mr Wang had established an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of quashing the Magistrate’s decision.

50 In judicial review proceedings, it is important for the applicant to clearly identify the impugned decision and decision-maker, for that affects the arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion they need to establish. It became clear to us during the appeal that this was something Mr Wang had not fully grasped until we put this to his counsel during oral submissions. OA 969 was an application for judicial review against the Magistrate’s decision. In other words, the arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that Mr Wang needed to establish was that in favour of quashing the Magistrate’s decision. While Mr Wang’s arguments were at times directed against the Magistrate, on other occasions, they were directed against the police. For instance, in his Appellant’s Case, Mr Wang submitted that he had established an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that the Seized Items were seized ultra vires s 15 of the Evidence Act.

51 Mr Wang’s misunderstanding of the prima facie case that he needed to establish demonstrated that his true grievance was with the police’s seizure of the Seized Items. This reinforced our view that what Mr Wang ought to have done was to file a judicial review application to the General Division against the police’s act of seizure instead of making the Seized Items Legality Application to the Magistrate (see [27] above). Even assuming that the Seized Items Legality Application was correctly made to the Magistrate, Mr Wang’s misunderstanding also demonstrated that his disagreement with the Magistrate lay with the merits of her decision. This supported our view that what Mr Wang ought to have done was to file an application for criminal revision challenging the merits of the Magistrate’s decision instead of erroneously invoking the General Division’s supervisory jurisdiction as a first resort (see [47] above).

52 Regardless of how Mr Wang’s arguments were framed, we were satisfied that he had not established an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of quashing the Magistrate’s decision. We elaborate below.

53 The Seized Items were seized pursuant to s 15 of the Extradition Act, the relevant provisions of which are as follows:

54 Mr Wang’s primary contention on appeal was that there was no evidence to show that the authorised officer who seized the Seized Items had independently formed “reasonable grounds for suspecting” as required under s 15(1). SIO Boo simply asserted on affidavit that the State properly placed reliance on the US authorities’ position on the types of items which were liable to seizure. There was nothing showing that the Singapore authorities had applied their minds to the nature and reasonableness of the descriptions by the US. Mr Wang argued that the Magistrate failed to consider this as a relevant consideration, and the Judge overlooked this omission.

55 We found it difficult to pinpoint what Mr Wang’s complaint truly was. On the one hand, his submission appeared to be that, in determining whether there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that either limb of s 15(1) is satisfied, the authorised officer must make that determination by carrying out independent investigations, and it is not sufficient for him to simply rely on information provided by the requesting state. Therefore, the police’s seizure of the Seized Items was unlawful because the State had simply relied on information provided by the US authorities in the Extradition Request and 15 Mar 2024 E-mail without any independent investigation on its part. On the other hand, his submission also appeared to be that an authorised officer is entitled to rely on information provided by the requesting state without having to carry out independent investigations, but it is incumbent on the authorised officer to be personally satisfied (in the sense of forming a subjective belief) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that either limb of s 15(1) is satisfied. Therefore, the police’s seizure of the Seized Items was unlawful as SIO Boo’s affidavit did not include an express averment that the authorised officer made such a subjective assessment. We asked Mr Suang to clarify his submission at the hearing, but his answers appeared to vacillate between supporting either version of the argument. In any event, it was clear to us that neither formulation of the argument had any prospect of success.

56 Insofar as Mr Wang’s contention was that an authorised officer must carry out independent investigations in determining whether there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that either limb of s 15(1) is satisfied, this argument was clearly considered and rejected by the Magistrate:

(a) The Magistrate began by summarising Mr Wang’s argument (MC GD at [47(b)]).

(b) She then observed that the argument “appeared to rest on the premise that the satisfaction of ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ under s 15(1) must stem from personal belief by the authorised officer, which could only be established through direct investigations”. She rejected this interpretation on the basis that extradition proceedings were meant to be expeditious, and it would be unreasonable to require the Singapore authorities to conduct thorough investigations. Instead, on her interpretation of s 15(1), “reasonable grounds for suspecting” could “be duly founded upon credible information provided by the requesting state in the extradition request and other related documents”. This was satisfied in the present case because SIO Boo attested on affidavit that the State “properly placed reliance on the US authorities’ position on the types of items … that were connected to the US Extradition Request” (MC GD at [50]).

(c) She went on to explain the connection between the Seized Items and the alleged offences and why the grounds for suspecting that the Seized Items fell within either limb of s 15(1) were reasonable (MC GD at [51]).

57 In the circumstances, the Magistrate did consider Mr Wang’s argument, but she simply came to a different interpretation of s 15(1) and therefore a different assessment of whether the “reasonable grounds for suspecting” requirement was satisfied. It is misconceived for Mr Wang to argue that the Magistrate’s disagreement with his conclusions constituted a failure to consider them.

58 In our view, the Magistrate correctly took into account relevant considerations in coming to her decision. In particular, she was cognisant of the context of extradition which informs the proper interpretation of s 15(1) of the Extradition Act (see MC GD at [28]–[30] and [50]). We elaborate by providing a brief overview of the extradition process.

59 Generally, an extradition matter begins with a foreign state making a request for the surrender of a fugitive to the Minister. The Minister then has the discretion to inform the magistrate of the request by way of written notice and to authorise the magistrate to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive (s 11(1)(a)). If the magistrate is satisfied that the evidence before her would, if the act or omission constituting the extradition offence had taken place in or within the jurisdiction of Singapore, justify the issue of a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or such apprehension without a warrant, she must issue the warrant (s 12(1)(b)). The warrant is then executed by an authorised officer (s 13) who has the power to search and seize property belonging to the fugitive if the conditions in s 15 are met. If the fugitive does not consent to his surrender to the requesting state, the matter is set down for a committal hearing where the fugitive may tender evidence against his surrender (s 16(8)(c)). Among other requirements, if the magistrate is satisfied that there is a prima facie case that would justify the trial of the fugitive if the act or omission constituting the extradition offence had taken place in or within the jurisdiction of Singapore, the magistrate must commit the fugitive to prison to await the warrant of the Minister for his surrender (s 16(8)(b)(i)). Such a warrant issued by the Minister may order that the fugitive be surrendered to some person appointed by the requesting state to receive him (s 19(9)(c)). If the property seized pursuant to s 15 are material as evidence in proving the offence to which the request for the fugitive’s surrender relates, such property must (with the Minister’s direction) be delivered up with the fugitive on his surrender (s 20(1)).

60 It is apparent from the above summary that the role of the Singapore authorities is not to independently investigate the alleged offence. That would simply be impractical because, in most cases, the alleged offence would have been committed in the jurisdiction of the requesting state, and the evidence would primarily be situated there. Nor is such an investigation necessary as it is not the role of the Singapore courts to make any finding as to the fugitive’s guilt or innocence. That would not be possible since, absent any domestic criminal investigations and proceedings, the Singapore courts would not have the jurisdiction to make such a finding. Rather, the role of the Singapore authorities and courts is primarily to facilitate the extradition request within the terms of the Extradition Act, so that the fugitive can stand trial in the requesting state (see Vasiljkovic v Commonwealth of Australia [2006] HCA 40 at [40], cited in Fatimah at [134]).

61 Therefore, when an authorised officer exercises his power of seizure under s 15 of the Extradition Act, it is wholly impractical and unrealistic to expect him to conduct independent investigations to determine if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that either limb of s 15(1) is satisfied. Having investigated the alleged offence, the authorities of the requesting state would be in the best position to ascertain which of the fugitive’s property would be material as evidence in proving the offence or had been acquired by the fugitive as a result of that offence. It follows that the authorised officer is entitled to rely on information provided by the requesting state in relation to the property to be seized, unless there is clear material to show that the information provided is patently wrong or that the property to be seized plainly bears no connection with the alleged offence.

62 In the present instance, Mr Wang did not produce any material to show that the information provided by the US authorities in the Extradition Request and 15 Mar 2024 E-mail was patently wrong or that the Seized Items plainly bore no connection with the alleged offences. The Magistrate was entitled to find that the authorised officer could rely on such information in the seizure of the Seized Items without carrying out independent investigations, and that the grounds for suspecting that the Seized Items fell within either limb of s 15(1) were reasonable. Her decision could not be described as illegal, procedurally improper or irrational in any sense. Therefore, there was not even an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of quashing the Magistrate’s decision.

63 We now turn to Mr Wang’s alternative contention that SIO Boo’s affidavit did not include an express averment that the authorised officer was personally satisfied (in the sense of forming a subjective belief) that the Seized Items fell within either limb of s 15(1) of the Extradition Act. Mr Wang’s argument appeared to be that, due to the absence of such an express averment, it should be assumed that the authorised officer’s mind was an empty slate, and he blindly relied on the Extradition Request and the 15 Mar 2024 E-mail without applying his mind to the connection between the Seized Items and the alleged offences.

64 At the hearing before us, Mr Suang pointed to portions of the Respondent’s Case which appeared to concede that SIO Boo’s affidavit lacked such an express averment. The State had argued that “the connection between the seized items and alleged offences was so obvious on the face of the materials that proof of the SPF having undergone some separately documented cognitive exercise was plainly unnecessary” and that “the State’s reply affidavit did not explicitly refer to such a cognitive exercise given that it was not in issue – at the time of its filing on 10 April 2025, [Mr Wang] had yet to allege that the SPF had not exercised independent thought”. In a similar vein, Mr Leow submitted that Mr Wang’s primary case before the Magistrate was the point regarding independent investigations, and if Mr Wang had made it clear from the beginning that his true complaint was the lack of an express averment by the authorised officer, then the State could have filed a supplementary affidavit addressing the same in the proceedings below.

65 Be that as it may, we were of the view that Mr Wang had incorrectly understood SIO Boo’s affidavit. As set out at [14] above, SIO Boo averred that “State Counsel has already explained to the Fugitive that the Seized Items were lawfully seized pursuant to sections 15(1) read with 15(3) of the [Extradition Act]” and “it is clear that the seizure of the Seized Items fall within sections 15(1)(a) and/or 15(1)(b), read with 15(3) of the [Extradition Act]”. In our view, these averments make it sufficiently clear that SIO Boo, in his capacity as an authorised officer, was personally satisfied that the Seized Items fell within either limb of s 15(1) of the Extradition Act. At the hearing before us, Mr Suang argued that what was missing in SIO Boo’s affidavit was the line “I, the authorised officer, have, relying upon information by the requesting state, satisfied myself that section 15(1) is satisfied”. While such a sentence might have placed the matter beyond doubt, we do not consider it accurate to say that there was no express averment of personal satisfaction in SIO Boo’s affidavit as drafted.

66 The transcript of the hearing before the Magistrate showed that Mr Wang’s argument that SIO Boo’s affidavit did not include an express averment of the authorised officer’s personal satisfaction was only canvassed before the Magistrate in oral submissions. In rebuttal, the State pointed to the same quotes in SIO Boo’s affidavit that we highlighted at [65] above to show that there was personal satisfaction. Ultimately, the Magistrate “accepted the State’s submission that the authorised officers had reasonable grounds to suspect that either limb of s 15(1) were satisfied” (MC GD at [51]). It was clear that the Magistrate was apprised of Mr Wang’s argument but decided against it. There was no basis for Mr Wang to contend that the Magistrate failed to consider his argument or any other relevant consideration. In our view, the Magistrate’s decision could not be described as illegal, procedurally improper or irrational in any sense. Therefore, there was not even an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of quashing the Magistrate’s decision.

67 For the foregoing reasons, the Judge was right to deny Mr Wang permission to commence judicial review proceedings against the Magistrate’s decision because he had not established an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion. This was yet another reason why the appeal had no merit.

68 In the circumstances, we dismissed the appeal. After hearing the parties on costs, we ordered Mr Wang to pay costs of $30,000 (all-in) to the State.