1 Mr Dineshkumar Sambusivam (“Applicant”) is a prisoner awaiting capital punishment. He is scheduled for execution on 21 August 2026. On 17 August 2026, the Applicant filed the present application in CA/CM 28/2026 (“Application”) under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), for permission to make a review application in respect of the Court of Appeal’s decision in CA/CCA 19/2023 (“CCA 19”) upholding his conviction and confirming the mandatory sentence of death imposed on him.

2 The following facts were largely undisputed at the joint trial of the Applicant and his co-accused, Mr Tan Yew Kuan (“Mr Tan”). At around 10.25pm on 25 February 2020, the Applicant stopped his car (“Car”) near the entrance to the car park of Block 23 Toa Payoh East and Mr Tan boarded the Car with a black recycle bag (“Recycle Bag”). While Mr Tan was in the Car, a white tied-up plastic bag and a black tied-up plastic bag were placed in the Recycle Bag. At around 10.27pm, Mr Tan alighted from the Car when it stopped at the junction of Lorong 6 Toa Payoh and Toa Payoh East. The Car moved off after Mr Tan alighted. At around 10.28pm, Mr Tan was arrested by officers from the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) with the Recycle Bag containing the two tied-up plastic bags. At around 10.30pm, the Car was intercepted along Lorong 6 Toa Payoh towards Lorong 2 Toa Payoh, and the Applicant was arrested. The two tied-up plastic bags contained four black-taped bundles. Three of the black-taped bundles contained a total of not less than 37.95g of diamorphine (“Drugs”). The remaining bundle contained not less than 163.75g of methamphetamine and some glass utensils, but these were not the subject of the proceeded charges against the Applicant and Mr Tan. The Recycle Bag with its contents was placed in a tamper-proof bag and sealed by a CNB officer. CNB officers then escorted Mr Tan to his flat at Block 23 (“Unit”) where a search was conducted on, among other things, the Recycle Bag and its contents in Mr Tan’s presence. The two tied-up plastic bags were taken out of the Recycle Bag, and two black-taped bundles were removed from each of the plastic bags. The four black-taped bundles that were removed from the two tied-up plastic bags are hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Four Bundles”.

3 The Applicant was charged with trafficking in the Drugs by delivering the three black-taped bundles containing the Drugs to Mr Tan, which was an offence under s 5(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). The charge against the Applicant (“Charge”) read:

4 Mr Tan was charged with possessing the Drugs for the purpose of trafficking, which was an offence under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA. The charge against Mr Tan read:

5 A Judge of the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”) convicted the Applicant and Mr Tan on their respective charges. The Judge’s decision on conviction was published in Public Prosecutor v Tan Yew Kuan [2023] SGHC 235 (“Judgment”). Although the Judge subsequently found that the Applicant and Mr Tan were couriers within s 33B(2)(a)(i) to 33B(2)(a)(iv) of the MDA, the Public Prosecutor did not issue a certificate of substantive assistance under s 33B(2)(b) of the MDA for either of them. Accordingly, the Judge imposed the mandatory sentence of death on the Applicant and Mr Tan. As the Application does not concern Mr Tan, I only set out below: (a) the facts relating to and the positions taken by the Applicant at trial, and (b) the Judge’s findings and the Court of Appeal’s determinations thereto in CCA 19.

6 At the trial, the Applicant did not seriously dispute that he had delivered the Drugs to Mr Tan. Therefore, the first element for a charge of trafficking under s 5(1) of the MDA (ie, the act of trafficking in the Drugs) was made out (Judgment at [138]). The Judge found that the Applicant had delivered the Drugs to Mr Tan by placing the two tied-up plastic bags containing the Four Bundles in the Recycle Bag (Judgment at [140]).

7 The Applicant’s defence was that he did not know that he was delivering diamorphine at the material time. Instead, he thought that he was only delivering “ice”, while at the same time collecting cash for a friend, one Kelvin (Judgment at [45]). I refer to this defence as the “Knowledge Defence”. The Knowledge Defence was based on the Applicant’s claim that Kelvin had told him the Four Bundles only contained “ice”, and he had believed Kelvin (Judgment at [154]). Notably, the Applicant did not challenge at the trial the chain of custody of the drug exhibits. In fact, his counsel specifically confirmed that the Applicant was not taking issue with the chain of custody of the drug exhibits.

8 The Prosecution invoked the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA against the Applicant (Judgment at [142]). The Judge held that the Applicant had failed to rebut the presumption (Judgment at [150]). As the Applicant had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge, the Judge held that the Prosecution had proved the Charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, she convicted the Applicant on the Charge (Judgment at [162]) and subsequently imposed the mandatory death sentence on him.

9 The Applicant and Mr Tan appealed against the Judge’s decision. On appeal, the Applicant repeated the Knowledge Defence and argued that the Judge had erred in finding that he had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge. Notably, even on appeal, the Applicant did not raise any issue with the chain of custody of the drug exhibits.

10 The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, upholding the conviction of the Applicant and Mr Tan and confirming the mandatory sentence of death imposed by the Judge on them. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Judge that the Applicant had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge, noting that he had provided contradictory accounts about his role in the offence in his various investigative statements, and concluding that he knew that he was delivering illegal drugs to Mr Tan and was indifferent as to the nature of the drugs.

11 The Applicant confirmed via his letter dated 17 August 2026 that his grounds and arguments in support of the Application were set out in his supporting affidavit filed on 17 August 2026 (“Supporting Affidavit”). The Applicant’s primary argument concerns the chain of custody of the drug exhibits. As noted earlier, this issue was not raised by the Applicant in the criminal proceedings. The Applicant makes the following claims in his Supporting Affidavit:

(a) No drug exhibits were “exhibited” in the Unit, despite CNB officers claiming that they were.

(b) The Applicant’s DNA was not found on the Four Bundles even though it was found on the white tied-up plastic bag containing two of the said bundles.

(c) The Applicant did not see the drug exhibits when he was at the Exhibit Management Room (“EMR”) at CNB headquarters (“CNB HQ”), while the drug exhibits were processed there.

(d) The evidence of the CNB officer Station Inspector Wong Kah Hung Alwin (“SI Wong”), who had custody of the drug exhibits, that he had placed the drug exhibits in the locked cupboard in the Special Task Force (“STF”) office at CNB HQ, was not true.

12 The Supporting Affidavit did not exhibit an information sheet in Form B45 as provided in para 166(2) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021. The Supporting Affidavit also did not state matters that were required under r 11(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2018 (“CPR”) read with s 394H(3) of the CPC, including (a) the date on which the material (being evidence or legal arguments) that will be relied on in the review application (if permission was granted) was first obtained, (b) that there was good reason why the material could not have been adduced earlier, and (c) whether the Applicant was assisted by any person or organisation in the commencement, continuation or conduct of the Application.

13 The Applicant filed a supplementary affidavit on 19 August 2026 exhibiting Form B45, but the form was not filled in apart from the Applicant writing on it, “I do not know how to fill up this form”, along with his name, signature, and the date. The supplementary affidavit thus also did not contain anything that addressed the matters required under r 11(2)(b) of the CPR.

14 The Supporting Affidavit and supplementary affidavit were nonetheless accepted given the circumstances and urgency of the Application.

15 By a letter dated 19 August 2026, the Applicant requested permission to respond to the Prosecution’s submissions filed on 19 August 2026. I granted the Applicant permission, in the exercise of my discretion under s 394H(10)(d) of the CPC, directing that any further submissions be filed by 8.00am, 20 August 2026. Via an email from the Singapore Prison Service, the Applicant submitted two documents at 7.54am, 20 August 2026. The first document was a letter to the Attorney-General’s Chambers and the Registrar of the Supreme Court (“First Letter”). In the First Letter, various allegations were made against the Applicant’s counsel at the trial and in CCA 19. The second document was also a letter to the Registrar of the Supreme Court (“Second Letter”). In the Second Letter, the allegations that were made in the First Letter against counsel were repeated. In addition, further allegations and questions were raised along the lines of the first claim that the drug exhibits were not exhibited at the Unit (see [11(a)] above), the third claim that the Applicant did not see the drug exhibits at the EMR (see [11(c)] above) and the fourth claim that SI Wong did not place the drug exhibits in the locked cupboard in the STF office at CNB HQ (see [11(d)] above). Finally, an allegation was made as regards the statement (“Statement”) that was recorded by Station Inspector Lee Swee Leng (“SI Lee”) from the Applicant. In substance, the allegation is that a threat was made by SI Lee and the Statement was not read back to the Applicant in Tamil by the interpreter (“Mdm Vijaya”) after it was recorded by SI Lee. I shall refer to the allegations in the Second Letter collectively as “Further Claims”.

16 The Prosecution’s submissions were filed on 19 August 2026 and therefore preceded the First and Second Letters. Their submissions were therefore only in response to the claims set out in the Supporting Affidavit. The Prosecution submits that the Application should be summarily dismissed. It points out that the Applicant asserts for the first time that there is an issue with the chain of custody of the drug exhibits. The Prosecution argues that the Applicant has not put forward sufficient material on which the appellate court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice in his criminal matter (as required under s 394J(2) of the CPC) because he did not raise any evidence, let alone new evidence, in the Application. The Applicant instead makes baseless allegations with no evidential foundation. The Prosecution also points out that the Applicant chose not to make a review application in the two years since the dismissal of CCA 19, but only made it a few days before his scheduled execution.

17 In any event, the Prosecution contends that the Applicant’s allegations that the chain of custody was broken are without merit. The Applicant had specifically elected not to challenge the chain of custody at the trial and on appeal. In fact, the Applicant’s counsel specifically confirmed at the trial that the chain of custody was not being contested. In any case, the Applicant’s allegations are inaccurate. Evidence was led at the trial on the chain of custody of the drug exhibits, including SI Wong’s placement of the drug exhibits in the locked cupboard. The Applicant did not dispute this evidence at trial. As regards the Applicant’s claim that he did not see the drug exhibits when he was at the EMR, the Prosecution submits that the claim was refuted by multiple CNB officers and contradicted by the Applicant acknowledging and signing against the weight of the drugs recorded in the investigating officer’s diary. Finally, the fact that the Applicant’s DNA was not found on the Four Bundles was a neutral fact.

18 Before making a review application, an applicant must apply to the appellate court for, and obtain, permission of that court to do so (s 394H(1) of the CPC). In deciding whether to grant an application for permission, the appellate court must consider the following matters as stipulated in s 394H(6A) of the CPC:

(a) whether the conditions or the requirements in ss 394G, 394J and 394K of the CPC are satisfied;

(b) whether there was any delay in filing the application for permission after the applicant or counsel for the applicant had obtained the material mentioned in s 394J(2) of the CPC and the reasons for the delay;

(c) whether the requirement under s 394H(3) of the CPC to file written submissions and such other prescribed documents within the prescribed periods under the CPR was complied with; and

(d) whether the review application to be made has a reasonable prospect of success.

19 I address what constitutes sufficient material under s 394J(2) of the CPC below (at [23]–[24]) as this is the central issue in the Application.

20 Under s 394J(5) of the CPC, an appellate court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made only if:

(a) the earlier decision (being a decision on conviction or sentence) is demonstrably wrong; or

(b) the earlier decision is tainted by fraud or a breach of the rules of natural justice, such that the integrity of the judicial process is compromised.

21 Under s 394H(7) of the CPC, an application for permission may, without being set down for hearing, be summarily dealt with by a written order of the appellate court. This is subject to the conditions stipulated under s 394H(8) read with s 394H(6A) of the CPC (see Lingkesvaran Rajendaren v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGCA 5 (“Lingkesvaran”) at [14]).

22 I dismiss the Application. In my view, there is no basis for granting permission to make an application for review. Specifically, the requirements under s 394J of the CPC, which the court must take into account when deciding whether to grant permission under s 394H(6A) of the CPC, have not been satisfied.

23 Under s 394J(2) of the CPC, an applicant must satisfy the appellate court that “there is sufficient material … on which the appellate court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made”. The “material” may consist either of new evidence or legal arguments (s 394J(2) of the CPC; see Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 1127 at [57(d)]; Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 (“Kho Jabing”) at [52]). For the material to be “sufficient”, all three requirements in s 394J(3) of the CPC (see below) must be satisfied (Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 159 (“Syed Suhail”) at [18]; Lingkesvaran at [12]):

(a) before the filing of the application for permission to make the review application, the material has not been canvassed at any stage of the proceedings in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made;

(b) even with reasonable diligence, the material could not have been adduced in court earlier; and

(c) the material is compelling, in that the material is reliable, substantial, powerfully probative, and capable of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made.

24 Moreover, where the material relied upon by an applicant consists of legal arguments, such material will only be “sufficient” if the material is based on a change in the law that arose from any decision made by a court after the conclusion of all proceedings relating to the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made (s 394J(4) of the CPC; Syed Suhail at [25]). This is in addition to the three requirements set out in [23] above. The Applicant does not make any legal arguments based on any change in the law.

25  It is readily apparent that the Applicant’s claims (set out in [11] above) and the Further Claims in so far as they relate to the claims do not constitute new evidential material. They are mere assertions which attempt to raise questions or doubt. Also, the claims and the related Further Claims do not refer to or rest on new evidence. In this regard, the Applicant has not canvassed or sought to canvass any material in the form of new evidence that was not canvassed at any stage of the criminal proceedings that resulted in his conviction and sentence by the Judge and the subsequent dismissal of his appeal against conviction and confirmation of sentence by the Court of Appeal in CCA 19. This is made plain by the Form B45 which was enclosed in his supplementary affidavit where the Applicant has not identified what new evidence he is relying on. It is evident that the claims and the related Further Claims the Applicant makes in relation to the chain of custody of the drug exhibits relate to evidential material that was before the Judge in the trial, and the Court of Appeal in CCA 19, and is therefore material that was already canvassed in the criminal proceedings. Further, it is clear that the claims and the related Further Claims are nothing more than mere suspicions the Applicant harbours as the Applicant himself confirms in para 6 of the Supporting Affidavit. That is a wholly insufficient basis for permission to be granted to make a review application.

26 The thrust of the first and second claims (see [11(a)] and [11(b)] above) appears to be that the Four Bundles that were delivered by the Applicant to Mr Tan were not the bundles that were sent to the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”) for investigation.

27 The first claim is that CNB officers had falsely stated that they had “exhibited” the drug exhibits in the Unit. The evidence on what was exhibited in the Unit was before the Judge. The conditioned statements of the CNB officers, including that of SI Wong, Staff Sergeant Phang Yee Leong James (“SSgt Phang”), and Staff Sergeant Low Yi Xun (“SSgt Low”), describe how the drug exhibits were dealt with at the Unit. After Mr Tan’s arrest, the Recycle Bag was seized by SI Wong and placed in a tamper-proof bag and sealed. SI Wong then escorted Mr Tan to the Unit. Sometime after 10.41pm on 25 February 2020, while the CNB officers were carrying out their duties at the Unit after arresting Mr Tan, SSgt Phang cut open the sealed tamper-proof bag and conducted a search of the Recycle Bag in the presence of Mr Tan. SSgt Phang placed the two plastic bags containing the Four Bundles on a sheet of brown paper in the living room of the Unit in Mr Tan’s presence. SSgt Phang later seized the two plastic bags and the Four Bundles as case exhibits in Mr Tan’s presence, and SSgt Low assisted to place the two plastic bags and the Four Bundles in separate tamper-proof bags and sealed them.

28 The second claim concerns the presence of the Applicant’s DNA on the white plastic bag and the absence of his DNA on the Four Bundles. This DNA evidence was before the Judge, in the form of the report from the HSA DNA Profiling Laboratory dated 16 May 2020. The Applicant’s assertion that his DNA was present on the white plastic bag but not the Four Bundles is consistent with the findings in the report.

29 The Applicant did not challenge the evidence described above at the trial or on appeal. Also, the Applicant does not raise any new evidence regarding the first and second claims.

30 The third claim is that the Applicant did not see the drug exhibits when he was at the EMR, while the drug exhibits were being processed. The evidence regarding the third claim was before the Judge. The evidence of the CNB officers, including that of Assistant Superintendent Fernandez Anthony Leo, describes how the Applicant had witnessed the drug exhibits being processed in the EMR. At the trial, the Applicant testified that he did not witness the processing of the drug exhibits at the EMR because he was sleeping. This was refuted by the evidence of the CNB officers and was contradicted by the Applicant’s acknowledging and signing against the weight of the drugs recorded in the investigating officer’s diary, as the Prosecution points out. The evidence on whether the Applicant had witnessed the drug exhibits being processed at the EMR was thus before the Judge. The Applicant does not refer to any new evidential material on this issue.

31 The fourth claim is that SI Wong did not place the drug exhibits in the locked cupboard in the STF office at CNB HQ. The evidence regarding this point was before the Judge. SI Wong’s conditioned statement describes how he had placed the drug exhibits in the locked cupboard in the STF office at CNB HQ and later retrieved and brought them to the EMR. The Applicant does not raise any new evidence on the question of whether SI Wong had placed the drug exhibits in the locked cupboard.

32 It is evident that what the Applicant seeks to now do is to “put a new spin on old evidence which has already been considered by the court or take a new position on material which has already been analysed by the court” (Kho Jabing at [54]). That is not sufficient material for the purpose of a review application.

33 That leaves the allegations concerning the recording of the Statement and the allegations against counsel. The allegation that SI Lee had threatened the Applicant was before the Judge, as was the evidence regarding whether the Statement was read back to the Applicant in Tamil. The allegation against counsel is not new material that is relevant to the Applicant’s conviction and sentence. These are matters between the Applicant and his counsel at the relevant time.

34 Accordingly, the Applicant fails to satisfy s 394J(3)(a) of the CPC, which means that the Application must fail as all the three requirements of s 394J(3) must be satisfied. As s 394J(3)(a) has not been satisfied, it is unnecessary to consider ss 394J(3)(b) and 394J(3)(c) because those subsections are premised on the adduction of material that satisfies s 394J(3)(a). In the circumstances, it is clear that permission to make a review application cannot be granted and the Application must be dismissed.

35 I would add that in any event, the claims and the related Further Claims are wholly unmeritorious. As noted earlier, the Applicant – who was represented at the trial and in the appeal – confirmed at the trial through his counsel that he was not challenging the chain of custody of the drug exhibits. He did not resile from this position on appeal in CCA 19. It would have been in the Applicant’s interest to challenge the chain of custody during the criminal proceedings, if there was a basis to do so, particularly when the material that his claims and the related Further Claims relate to was already before the court. This suggests that his attempt to raise the issue now is an afterthought. Indeed, the evidence is clear and points to the complete lack of merit in the Applicant’s claims:

(a) The CNB officers’ conditioned statements describe in detail how the drug exhibits were dealt with in the Unit and account for the custody of the drug exhibits the whole time they were in the Unit.

(b) The fact that the Applicant’s DNA was not found on the Four Bundles is not consequential. As stated earlier, the Applicant did not seriously dispute at the trial that he had delivered the Four Bundles in the tied-up plastic bags to Mr Tan (Judgment at [30] and [138]–[140]). The Judge found that the Applicant had delivered the Drugs to Mr Tan by placing the two tied-up plastic bags containing the Four Bundles in the Recycle Bag (see [6] above). The Judge further found that the Applicant had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge, and the Court of Appeal in CCA 19 upheld this finding (see [8] and [10] above). Accordingly, the fact that the Applicant’s DNA was not found on the Four Bundles is not consequential.

(c) The conditioned statements of the CNB officers establish an unbroken chain of custody of the drug exhibits from the time they were seized from Mr Tan to the time the Applicant saw the drug exhibits being processed in the EMR.

(d) The Applicant’s claim that SI Wong did not place the drug exhibits in the locked cupboard in the STF office is a bare assertion. The Applicant has not raised any new evidence to rebut SI Wong’s unequivocal evidence that he had placed the drug exhibits in the locked cupboard.

36 The allegations concerning counsel are not relevant. The allegation that SI Lee had threatened the Applicant was before the Judge, as was the evidence regarding whether Mdm Vijaya had read back the Statement to the Applicant in Tamil. There is therefore a complete absence of merit in those claims as well.

37 For these reasons, I dismiss the Application summarily, without it being set down for an oral hearing, under s 394H(7) of the CPC.