1 On 28 March 2022, the applicant in this criminal motion, Yeo Liang Hou (“Yeo”), was convicted of an offence under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) for trafficking in a controlled drug by having in his possession three packets containing not less than 991.2g of crystalline substance, which was analysed and found to contain not less than 669.3g of methamphetamine (“Drugs”), for the purpose of trafficking. On 10 May 2022, a Judge of the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”) imposed the mandatory death sentence on Yeo: Public Prosecutor v Yeo Liang Hou [2023] SGHC 157 (“GD”).

2 On 22 October 2025, the Court of Appeal heard and dismissed Yeo’s appeal in CA/CCA 20/2022 (“CCA 20”). The court affirmed the decision below. No written grounds of decision were issued by the court.

3 Yeo’s main defence, both at trial and on appeal, was that the Drugs had been erroneously delivered to him. The present application is Yeo’s application in CA/CM 9/2026 (“CM 9”) under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) pursuant to which he seeks permission to review the Court of Appeal’s decision in CCA 20 which dismissed his appeal against conviction and sentence. Yeo relies on eight sets of materials and three allegations against his former counsel on appeal in CCA 20, Mr Ramesh Chandr Tiwary (“Mr Tiwary”), to support his application. The content of these eight sets of materials and his three allegations against Mr Tiwary are summarised below at [34] and [95] respectively.

4 Having heard and considered the parties’ submissions, I do not grant permission for Yeo to make a review application. In brief, I find that none of the eight sets of materials relied on by Yeo satisfy the requirements for this court to grant permission for him to seek a review of the decision in CCA 20. Yeo also falls quite short of being able to establish his allegations against Mr Tiwary or that the allegations, even if made out, would have made any difference to the outcome of CCA 20.

5 On 6 March 2018 at about 2.35am, Yeo drove his Honda Civic (“Honda Civic”) to a bus stop located at Oasis LRT station in Punggol (“Bus Stop”). He alighted at the Bus Stop, removed the cover of the dustbin at the Bus Stop (“Dustbin”), and retrieved a plastic bag containing the Drugs (“Plastic Bag”) from the Dustbin before replacing the cover of the Dustbin. Yeo returned to his Honda Civic and drove off: GD at [6].

6 Yeo then drove to Block 635C Punggol Drive (“Blk 635C”) and parked in front of the rubbish chute. Yeo opened the Plastic Bag and found two bundles wrapped in blue tape (“Two Bundles”). Yeo threw one bundle out of the passenger’s side window of the Honda Civic and then threw the other out of the driver’s side window of the Honda Civic: GD at [7], [9].

7 The Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) officers, who had followed Yeo to Blk 635C, eventually arrested Yeo at about 3.15am, under the Tampines Expressway flyover near Tebing Lane. At about 4.00am, the Two Bundles were recovered and seized by CNB officers. One bundle “A1A” was retrieved from a grass patch behind the staircase landing near the rubbish chute area of Blk 635C, while the other bundle “B1” was retrieved by the wheel of a recycling bin at the rubbish chute area of Blk 635C: GD at [7], [9]. The Two Bundles together contained three packets of crystalline substance, which was subsequently analysed and found to contain methamphetamine.

8 The trial took place from March to May 2022. Yeo stood trial together with Nagaiah Rao a/l Alumanar (“Nagaiah”), who was the person who had placed the Drugs in the Dustbin.

9 At trial, the Prosecution’s case was that Yeo was in possession of the Drugs for the purpose of trafficking. Specifically, the Prosecution contended that Yeo had retrieved the Plastic Bag from the Dustbin and only decided to throw the Drugs out of his car after discovering that he was about to be apprehended by CNB officers. The Prosecution relied on the presumption under s 17(h) of the MDA that Yeo possessed the Drugs for the purpose of trafficking. The Prosecution submitted that they had proven that Yeo was in actual possession of the Drugs and had actual knowledge of the nature of the Drugs.

10 In particular, the Prosecution highlighted how Yeo’s account of what had happened was inconsistent and lacked credibility. The Prosecution submitted that there were numerous inconsistencies between Yeo’s account in his contemporaneous statement, investigative statements, and on the witness stand. These included inconsistencies regarding whether Yeo recognised and handled the Drugs, whether one “Kelvin” was his drug supplier, friend and/or customer, and whether one “Danny” was his drug supplier.

11 The Prosecution also submitted that an adverse inference should be drawn against Yeo for deliberately refusing to provide the correct passcode for one of his phones used for drug dealing, “F1A”. Neither of the two passcodes provided by Yeo (ie, “111111” and “120495”) was able to unlock “F1A”.

12 As was alluded to at [3] above, Yeo’s case at trial was that the delivery of the Two Bundles to him via the drop-off at the Dustbin was a wrong delivery instead of the methamphetamine that he had ordered. Yeo claimed that he only expected to receive one bundle containing 350g of methamphetamine when he retrieved the Plastic Bag from the Dustbin. He had thrown away the Two Bundles after realising that they were not his order of drugs.

13 Yeo did not dispute being in possession of the Drugs. However, as the Drugs were wrongly delivered to him, Yeo claimed that he did not and could not have had knowledge of the nature of the Plastic Bag’s contents, and that he did not have any intention to traffic the Drugs.

14 Yeo’s wrong delivery defence rested on four main planks. The first plank of Yeo’s defence rested on the Police Camera (“PolCam”) footage of the Bus Stop where Yeo collected the Drugs. In particular, Yeo pointed to how the PolCam footage captured two persons loitering near the Dustbin about two to three minutes after Yeo had collected the Drugs. Yeo submitted that it should be inferred that these two persons were the intended recipients of the Drugs. They appeared to be interested in the contents of the Dustbin as they had loitered next to the Dustbin for about 15 seconds, and this had taken place in the early morning when no buses were running.

15 The second plank of Yeo’s defence was his assertion that he realised that the Drugs were wrongly delivered from the fact that he received two bundles instead of one. While Yeo’s past orders of 500g of methamphetamine were typically delivered in two consignments of 250g each, Yeo expected to collect 350g on this occasion, which was what he ordered. In particular, Yeo claimed to have been expecting a single bundle of 350g. Upon receiving two bundles with a total weight of 991.2g, Yeo realised that the Drugs were wrongly delivered due to the discrepancy in the number of packets and the weight of the Drugs.

16 The third plank of Yeo’s defence was how there were “hiccups” throughout the night in making arrangements for delivery of the methamphetamine he had ordered, giving rise to the possibility that Yeo might have collected the Drugs from the wrong bus stop. On Yeo’s case, one such “hiccup” involved miscommunication between Yeo and his drug supplier, “Danny”, over the phone regarding the arrangements for collection of the Drugs. This purportedly resulted in the delivery driver not appearing at the agreed collection locations and Yeo eventually collecting the Drugs from the Dustbin himself, after having noticed that the delivery driver’s van had stopped near that location. I do not propose to delve further into the details of these “hiccups” for the purpose of CM 9, save to say that these “hiccups” have been detailed in the GD (at [51]–[54]).

17 This plank of the defence gave rise to the related issue of whether Yeo’s phone and call records corroborated his account regarding the “hiccups”. In response to the Prosecution’s submission that Yeo had lied and deliberately refused to disclose the passcode for “F1A”, Yeo denied having done so. Instead, Yeo claimed that the correct passcode to “F1A” was “111111” and he had stated this during the recording of his contemporaneous statement. Yeo claimed that he only informed the statement recorder of a second passcode “120495” after having been asked for another passcode. In support of this account, Yeo relied on two matters. First, he relied on how the investigation officer, ASP Neo Zhan Wei (“IO Neo”), had not relayed the passcode “111111” to the forensic specialist Teo Jin Sin Genevieve (“Forensic Specialist Teo”). Second, Yeo submitted that there was no evidence that “F1A” could not be unlocked by the passcode “111111”. On this basis, Yeo contended that the passcode to “F1A” could have been changed by an officer who had accessed the phone using the passcode “111111”.

18 The fourth plank of Yeo’s defence was that he had thrown the Drugs out of his Honda Civic because he realised the Drugs were not meant for him. Yeo claimed that he had planned to call “Danny” after throwing the Two Bundles away. However, before Yeo could make the call, he saw many cars and motorcycles turning into the driveway of the road on which he was parked. Yeo claimed to have thought it was strange that there were so many vehicles in the middle of the night and decided to drive off. Although Yeo was eventually arrested before he could make any calls to “Danny”, Yeo explained that, if “Danny” had confirmed that the Drugs were not Yeo’s, he would have told “Danny” where he had thrown away the Drugs so that “Danny” could arrange to retrieve them. But, if “Danny” were to confirm that the Drugs were his, he would have returned to retrieve the Drugs.

19 The Judge rejected all four planks of Yeo’s wrong delivery defence and found that Yeo had failed to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case that Yeo intended to possess the Drugs and knew that the Plastic Bag contained the Drugs: GD at [69]. The Judge also found that the Prosecution successfully invoked the presumption of trafficking under s 17(h) of the MDA: GD at [73].

20 On the first plank of Yeo’s defence, the Judge found Yeo’s submission to be “entirely speculative and without merit” as the two persons did not appear from the PolCam footage to be interested in the contents of the Dustbin. They did not remove the cover of the Dustbin, which Yeo testified was necessary to be able to see clearly what was inside the Dustbin, and they did not appear to be bending down in an attempt to retrieve anything from the Dustbin: GD at [46], [47].

21 On the second plank of Yeo’s defence, the Judge found that Yeo’s submission was “inherently illogical”. Yeo would not have known whether his drug supplier would pack 350g of methamphetamine in one bundle or two bundles, as Yeo’s usual order was two bundles of 250g each: GD at [49].

22 On the third plank of Yeo’s defence, the Judge found that Yeo’s narrative of “hiccups” was a bare assertion that was not substantiated by any evidence. Despite Yeo’s claim that there had been no fewer than eight phone calls between Yeo and his drug supplier throughout the night, there were no such phone or call records to corroborate Yeo’s account: GD at [55]. In respect of “F1A” which could not be unlocked, the Judge agreed with the Prosecution that Yeo had not supplied the passcode to unlock the phone and, pursuant to illustration (g) of s 116 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed), drew the inference that the contents of “F1A” would disclose evidence unfavourable to Yeo: GD at [56]–[57].

23 On the fourth plank of Yeo’s defence, the Judge found Yeo’s account to be unbelievable for three reasons. First, it was simply illogical for Yeo to have thrown several thousand dollars’ worth of drugs out of his car without first clarifying the situation with “Danny”. Second, if Yeo intended to retrieve the Drugs or he intended to arrange with “Danny” for the retrieval of the Drugs, he would have taken time to carefully conceal the Drugs instead of throwing them out of his car in a haphazard manner that would not be conducive to subsequent retrieval. Third, the bundle “B1” was found some distance away from where Yeo had parked his car, which suggested that the bundle was thrown out of the car after Yeo had started driving off. This was inconsistent with Yeo’s account that he had already thrown both bundles out before noticing the CNB vehicles, while the car was stationary: GD at [62]–[65]. The Judge thus found that Yeo threw the Drugs out of his car in order to dissociate himself from the Drugs because he realised that the CNB was about to arrest him.

24 Finally, the Judge also found that Yeo was not a credible witness. Yeo was internally inconsistent as he provided at least three different accounts across his statements and at the trial. There were inconsistencies regarding the identity of his drug supplier (ie, “Danny” and/or “Kelvin”), whether he recognised the Two Bundles, and whether he knew that the Two Bundles contained methamphetamine. Yeo’s account was also externally inconsistent with evidence, including phone records and the location where bundle “B1” was found: GD at [66]–[67].

25 The Judge found that Yeo had not rebutted the presumption of trafficking. The Judge’s finding was that Yeo intended to possess the Drugs which he collected for the purpose of trafficking: GD at [73]. On 28 March 2022, Yeo was convicted of the charge under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA. On 10 May 2022, the Judge imposed the mandatory death sentence on Yeo. The Judge found that Yeo was not eligible for the alternative sentencing regime under s 33B of the MDA. Yeo did not meet the requirements of s 33B(2)(a), as there was clear evidence that he intended to sell the Drugs, and he had not been issued a certificate of substantive assistance.

26 On 13 May 2022, Yeo appealed against the Judge’s decisions on conviction and sentence. I do not propose to repeat all the arguments that Yeo had advanced before the Court of Appeal, save to highlight the arguments that are of salience to CM 9. In particular, Yeo argued that the Judge erred in rejecting his wrong delivery defence, with reference to the same four planks he had relied on at trial.

27 On the first plank of his defence regarding the PolCam footage, Yeo argued that, contrary to the Judge’s findings, the PolCam footage supported his wrong delivery defence. Yeo’s arguments included that:

(a) the mere fact that the two persons captured on the PolCam footage did not remove the cover of the Dustbin did not, in and of itself, lead to the conclusion that the Drugs were not meant for them;

(b) notwithstanding Yeo’s admission that one would have to remove the cover of the Dustbin in order to see what was inside, Yeo also gave evidence that, even without removing the cover of the Dustbin, one could still see what was at the top of the Dustbin, but not the bottom; and

(c) the Judge erred in “speculating as to the position of the upper bodies of these unknown individuals, even though the same cannot be seen in the video”. This evidence was not given by any of the witnesses or put to Yeo.

28 On the second plank of his defence regarding how he realised that the Drugs were wrongly delivered based on the discrepancy in the number and weight of the bundles, Yeo reiterated his case at trial by urging the court to consider how “the delivery in question contained 2 bundles instead of the usual 1 bundle”.

29 On the third plank of his defence regarding the “hiccups” in making arrangements for delivery, Yeo argued that the Judge erred in rejecting his account of the “hiccups” that night as the Prosecution had not provided any evidence to contradict Yeo’s account.

30 Yeo also argued that the Judge erred in drawing an adverse inference against Yeo in respect of the contents of phone “F1A”. Yeo’s arguments included that:

(a) he genuinely believed that the passcode to “F1A” was “111111”;

(b) up till 10 May 2018, he had not been informed that “111111” was not in fact the password for either of these phones, “F1A” and “F2A”, nor was he asked whether the password could have been another combination of numbers; and

(c) the evidence did not show that the forensic team had been provided with any passcode by IO Neo, much less that the forensic team had tried to use the passcode “111111” to unlock “F1A”.

31 On the fourth plank of Yeo’s defence regarding how he had thrown the Drugs out of his Honda Civic after realising that the Drugs were wrongly delivered, Yeo submitted that, contrary to the Judge’s findings, he had thrown the Two Bundles out of his Honda Civic because he genuinely believed that the Drugs represented a wrong delivery. Yeo’s arguments included one that the Judge erred in finding that the second bundle could only have been thrown out of the Honda Civic after Yeo started driving off and not while he was still parked in front of the rubbish chute: see GD at [64]. This was not the Prosecution’s case and this had not been put to Yeo.

32 Additionally, in his Petition of Appeal, one of the grounds of appeal raised by Yeo was that the Judge had erred “in concluding that [Yeo] was not a credible witness”. However, this was not elaborated on in Yeo’s written submissions on appeal.

33 On 22 October 2025, after hearing the parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeal dismissed Yeo’s appeal in CCA 20. The Court of Appeal stated that it was “of the view that the trial judge was correct in his assessment of the evidence, in coming to his conclusions”.

34 On 2 April 2026, Yeo filed this application in CM 9 for permission to make a review application under s 394H of the CPC in respect of the Court of Appeal’s decision in CCA 20. Yeo relies on eight sets of materials to support this application:

(a) Set 1: Yeo relies on the call logs for Nagaiah’s phone on the night of the drug delivery. Nagaiah had delivered the Drugs to Yeo that night. Yeo relies on Nagaiah’s call logs as support for the proposition that there was more than one drug delivery going on in the area on the night of their arrest, and claims that this reinforces his defence that the Drugs he had received were the subject of a wrong delivery.

(b) Set 2: Yeo seeks to provide his explanation in respect of the Judge’s finding that he had deliberately refused to disclose the passcodes for his phones: see GD at [56]–[57]. Yeo claims that he had provided the correct passcode to unlock the phone “F1A” and also points to alleged discrepancies in how his phones were handled by the Police and the Central Narcotics Bureau Forensic Response Team (“FORT”).

(c) Set 3: Yeo relies on the PolCam footage of the Bus Stop where he collected the Drugs. Yeo explains his disagreement with the Judge’s findings regarding the actions of the two other persons captured in the PolCam footage: GD at [46]–[47]. Yeo maintains the position that he took at trial – that the suspicious actions of the two persons were sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in his favour.

(d) Set 4: Yeo explains his disagreement with the Judge’s finding that Yeo could not have inferred, from the fact that there were two bundles instead of one in the Plastic Bag, that the Drugs were not the drugs he ordered: see GD at [49].

(e) Set 5: Yeo seeks to corroborate his account regarding the “many hiccups” on the night of his arrest using Nagaiah’s call logs in Set 1.

(f) Set 6: Yeo claims that the Judge had found that one of the bundles of drugs (ie, bundle “B1”) “could only have been thrown out of the car after Yeo had started driving off and not while the car was still parked in front of the rubbish chute”, and that Yeo disagrees with this finding: GD at [64]. Yeo relies on a video re-enactment by his brother (“Video Re-enactment”) to prove that, contrary to the Judge’s finding, it was possible for Yeo to have thrown the bundle “B1” out of the car before he drove off.

(g) Set 7: Yeo explains his disagreement with the Judge’s finding that Yeo would have called his drug supplier or, at the very least, concealed the Drugs if he suspected a mistaken delivery instead of throwing the Drugs out: GD at [62]–[63]. Yeo asserts that it was “normal” to have done so “due to so many hiccups that night”.

(h) Set 8: Yeo explains his disagreement with the Judge’s findings regarding the internal and external inconsistencies in his evidence: GD at [66]–[67].

35 For completeness, I refer to the eight sets relied on by Yeo as “materials”, in light of the requirement under s 394J(2) of the CPC that there be “sufficient material” before the appellate court may exercise its power of review (see [41] below). I do so notwithstanding that five of the eight sets comprise Yeo’s arguments for why the Judge erred, rather than “material” in the ordinary sense of that word.

36 Yeo also makes some allegations against his former counsel who argued his appeal in CCA 20, Mr Tiwary. These include allegations that Mr Tiwary had not sent Yeo a copy of his written submissions on appeal before the appeal hearing took place on 22 October 2025, and that Mr Tiwary had failed to seek Yeo’s input in detail regarding the preparation for the submissions on appeal. Consequently, this court directed Mr Tiwary to file a reply affidavit responding to the allegations made by Yeo. Mr Tiwary filed his reply affidavit on 19 May 2026.

37 In the lead up to the hearing of CM 9, Yeo sent a series of letters to the court supplementing his case. The contents of these letters are summarised as follows:

(a) On 19 April 2026, by way of letter to court (“19 April 2026 Letter”), Yeo attempted to substantiate the assertion in his affidavit for CM 9 that there had been “miscommunication” between him and Mr Tiwary at the appeal. The contents of the 19 April 2026 Letter are set out in greater detail at [95] below.

(b) On 4 May 2026, by way of letter to court (“4 May 2026 Letter”), Yeo asked the Prosecution to clarify the date that five exhibits were received and returned by the FORT. The five exhibits were Exhibits “F1A”, “F2A”, “F1C”, “F1D”, and “F1E”, which were phones and SIM cards in Yeo’s possession at the time of his arrest. This information was purportedly relevant to Set 2 of the materials relied on by Yeo in CM 9. On 7 May 2026, the Prosecution responded with the relevant information based on IO Neo’s conditioned statement that was admitted in evidence at trial.

(c) On 10 May 2026, by way of letter to court (“10 May 2026 Letter”), Yeo asked the Prosecution to clarify the date that the five exhibits were received and returned by the FORT officers based on evidence other than IO Neo’s conditioned statement, such as the records of the FORT Officer who had conducted the initial examination on “F1A” and “F2A” (ie, FORT Officer Izzat). The Prosecution did not respond to this request.

(d) On 4 June 2026, by way of letter to court (“4 June 2026 Letter”), Yeo sought the court’s direction on how to adduce additional evidence in relation to Set 3. This additional evidence was his brother’s testimony that it was “possible to see deep into the dustbin without removing the cover” based on tests that he had conducted on a dustbin with the same design.

(e) On 24 June 2026, by way of letter to court (“24 June 2026 Letter”), Yeo exhibited a formal statement written by his brother “claim[ing] that it is possible to see the bottom of the dustbin without removing the dustbin cover”. This was the piece of further evidence which Yeo sought permission to adduce in his 4 June 2026 Letter.

(f) On 7 July 2026, by way of letter to court (“7 July 2026 Letter”), Yeo sought permission to file an additional reply affidavit. Yeo claimed to have missed out on replying to one of the paragraphs in Mr Tiwary’s affidavit, where Mr Tiwary claimed to have “went [sic] through the main points of the submissions with [Yeo] during [Mr Tiwary’s] meetings with him”. The court granted permission for Yeo to file a further affidavit limited to responding to that specific paragraph.

38 Even after the hearing of CM 9 on 13 July 2026, Yeo wrote a further letter to court on 15 July 2026 clarifying the sequence of events that he relies on for Set 2.

39 Relying on the eight sets of materials and his allegations against Mr Tiwary, Yeo argues that permission should be granted to make a review application.

40 The Prosecution submits that CM 9 should be dismissed as the application does not fulfil any of the cumulative requirements necessary for the exercise of the court’s power of review, as set out in s 394J of the CPC. The evidence relied on by Yeo is neither sufficient nor compelling. There is thus no basis to conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice.

41 The requirements for the exercise of an appellate court’s power of review are set out in s 394J of the CPC. Section 394J involves an inquiry into whether “there is sufficient material (being evidence or legal arguments) on which the appellate court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made” [emphasis added]: s 394J(2) of the CPC. The applicant must establish the composite elements of “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice”: see Lingkesvaran Rajendaren v Public Prosecutor (“Rajendaren”) [2026] SGCA 5 at [10], citing Rahmat bin Karimon v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 860 at [22]. Sections 394J(3) and 394J(5) of the CPC respectively prescribe what amounts to “sufficient” material and a “miscarriage of justice”. It bears emphasis that the appellate court’s power of review is exercised sparingly, and the requirements set out in s 394J present a high hurdle for an applicant to cross. As previously explained by this court in Roslan bin Bakar v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 1451 (“Roslan”) at [21]:

42 The provisions in s 394J of the CPC that are of particular relevance to CM 9 are reproduced below:

43 Consistent with how the appellate court’s power of review is exercised sparingly, the review mechanism includes a permission stage to filter out unmeritorious applications at an early stage. The s 394H permission stage was introduced by s 108 of the Criminal Justice Reform Act 2018 (Act 19 of 2018) and came into effect on 31 October 2018, as part of the enactment of specific statutory provisions to govern criminal review applications.

44 In deciding whether to grant permission to make a review application, the appellate court must consider the matters set out in s 394H(6A) of the CPC. Section 394H(6A) of the CPC states as follows:

45 Section 394G sets out the types of decisions against which a review application may be brought. There is no dispute here that this court’s decision to dismiss CCA 20 is a decision against which a review application may be brought (see s 394G(1)(a) of the CPC). Section 394K sets out, amongst other things, several restrictions as to when a review application can be brought, eg, that an applicant cannot make more than one review application in respect of any decision of an appellate court (see s 394K(1) of the CPC). None of the restrictions in s 394K apply in this case.

46 From the authorities surveyed, applications for permission have tended to turn on a review of the s 394J requirements. That was the Prosecution’s position in this application as well. That said, I have some observations regarding:

(a) the standard to which the s 394J requirements must be satisfied when the court determines whether to grant permission to bring a review application; and

(b) how the consideration of “whether the review application to be made has a reasonable prospect of success” under s 394H(6A)(d) is relevant to s 394H(6A)(a), which requires the court to also consider, amongst other things, “whether the conditions or requirements in section … 394J are satisfied”.

47 To explain my first observation, I begin with examining some of the tests that have been applied in applications for permission thus far. In examining these tests, one should bear in mind that the specific considerations now found in s 394H(6A) of the CPC were only introduced sometime after the enactment of the s 394H permission stage, by s 3(j) of the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (Act 41 of 2022) (“PACC Act”) and came into effect on 28 June 2024. By virtue of s 5 of the PACC Act, these s 394H(6A) considerations apply to applications for permission to make a review application filed on or after 28 June 2024 (s 5 of the PACC Act). Prior to 28 June 2024, s 394H of the CPC then in force did not set out any specific considerations when deciding whether to grant permission. It merely provided that an applicant must apply to the appellate court for permission before making a review application.

(a) As was alluded to earlier, when the statutory provisions governing criminal review applications were enacted in 2018, the permission stage of criminal review applications under s 394H was included to filter out unmeritorious applications. Only those applications which disclose a legitimate basis for the exercise of the appellate court’s power of review would be allowed to proceed, so as to better balance the rights and interests of all persons who make use of scarce judicial resources (see the comments in Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 at [133]–[134], a decision which pre-dated the enactment of the statutory provisions governing review applications, and Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor [2020] 2 SLR 1175 (“Kreetharan”) at [17]).

(b) After the enactment of s 394H of the CPC, this court in Kreetharan suggested (at [18]) that the applicable test in determining whether permission should be granted was whether an applicant had “raised any material which might meet the statutory requirements of s 394J of the CPC” [emphasis added].

(c) This court suggested a stricter test in Roslan (at [21]), namely that “the applicant must be able to show the court that the material it will be relying on in the review proper is almost certain to satisfy the s 394J requirements” [emphasis added]. This standard of review has since been applied in numerous cases, including Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 1127 (“Pausi”) (at [57(d)]).

(d) This court referred to an even higher standard of review in Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed v Attorney-General [2023] 1 SLR 1437 (at [26]) that “the applicant must establish that the cumulative requirements under s 394J of the CPC for the appellate court’s exercise of its power of review are satisfied” [emphasis added].

48 This leads to my second observation regarding whether the legislative intention was for ss 394H(6A)(a) and 394H(6A)(d) of the CPC to be considered together, such that the test to be applied in determining whether to grant permission is for the court to consider if the applicant has a reasonable prospect of success in showing that the requirements in s 394J are satisfied, which is a lower standard than having to show that the s 394J requirements are satisfied. For completeness, I note that this specific question was not expressly addressed during the Second Reading of the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Bill, which introduced s 394H(6A) into the CPC. However, a similar question was raised by Mr Pritam Singh in respect of s 60G(7) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), which largely mirrors the considerations set out in s 394H(6A) of the CPC, but for applications for permission to make post-appeal applications in capital cases (“PACC applications”) (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 95, Sitting No 77; [29 November 2022] (Pritam Singh, Leader of the Opposition); see also Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2025] 1 SLR 220 at [26]):

49 Although I accept that the legislative intention of s 60G(7) of the SCJA may not necessarily be the same for s 394H(6A) of the CPC, the Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Law Ms Rahayu Mahzam’s response to Mr Singh’s question is still of note given the similarity between the two provisions (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 95, Sitting No 77; [29 November 2022] (Rahayu Mahzam, The Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Law)):

50 In my view, the explanation by the Senior Parliamentary Secretary may shed some light on the approach to be taken to permission applications under s 394H. It may suggest that the legislative intention was that, giving effect to the words in s 394H(6A)(d), the applicant need only show that he has a reasonable prospect of succeeding in his intended review application. I pause here to make the point that, when I refer in this judgment to a reasonable prospect of success in showing that the requirements of s 394J are met, this is the same as saying that there is a reasonable prospect of success in showing that the intended review application will be successful. This is because the requirements of s 394J must be met before the court will exercise its power to review: see s 394J(1)(a) of the CPC.

51 I raised these observations (at [46] above) to the parties at the hearing on 13 July 2026. While Yeo was unable to provide a substantive response as he was self-represented, the Prosecution submitted that, even with the enactment of s 394H(6A), an applicant must show that the material being relied on in the review application is “almost certain” to satisfy the s 394J requirements (see [47(c)] above), relying on the case of Pausi at [57(d)], which adopted the test first set out in Roslan (see [47(c)] above). According to the Prosecution, this was the first of two steps. At the second step, the court then considers whether in light of that sufficient material, the review application to be made has a reasonable prospect of success. The Prosecution explained that an applicant can satisfy the second step by showing a reasonable prospect of success that the reviewing court will overturn its previous decision. The Prosecution further submitted that the two steps were conceptually distinct as the fact that there had been a miscarriage of justice in a criminal matter did not necessarily mean that the earlier decision would be overturned. For instance, in such a situation, the court could conclude that the earlier decision on conviction and sentence was correct after reviewing the case de novo in a review application.

52 As I had indicated during the hearing itself, I have some doubts regarding the two-step test put forth by the Prosecution. I was particularly sceptical about the submission that the applicant, despite showing that the s 394J requirements are “almost certain” to be met, still has to go on to establish that he has a reasonable prospect of being able to persuade the court to overturn the decision under review. As I already explained earlier, if the requirements in s 394J are “almost certain” to be met, then it must follow that the intended review application is likely to be successful. However, given that I did not have the benefit of full argument on these two issues, I do not make any conclusive determination on either point. Instead, I will just express the following tentative views.

53 It is not clear to me how the various tests for determining permission to make a review application that had been applied before the enactment of s 394H(6A) are still relevant. This is especially when there is a specific standard of review now expressly set out in s 394H(6A)(d) of the CPC that is applicable to the permission stage, which is that of a “reasonable prospect of success” of the intended review application. If the court has to be “almost certain” that there is sufficient material to demonstrate that there has been a miscarriage of justice, as advocated by the Prosecution, it would follow that the intended review application would have a reasonable prospect of success, in that the previous conviction or decision might be set aside. In my view, such an approach would effectively render the consideration in s 394H(6A)(d) meaningless and is not likely to be what Parliament intended by the introduction of s 394H(6A).

54 In any case, I will proceed to explain why I am of the view that CM 9 should be dismissed regardless of the appropriate test to be applied at the permission stage. Even applying the lower standard of review (which, for the avoidance of doubt, I am not expressing a concluded view is the appropriate test at the permission stage), Yeo has not raised any material which has a reasonable prospect of satisfying the statutory requirements of s 394J of the CPC. That being so, there is no reasonable prospect of success of any review application. There is thus no legitimate basis for this court to grant permission for Yeo to apply for a review of the decision in CCA 20.

55 There are two key issues before this court:

(a) whether the eight sets of materials have a reasonable prospect of satisfying the requirements under s 394J of the CPC; and

(b) whether Yeo received inadequate legal assistance from Mr Tiwary in CCA 20, such that he would have a reasonable prospect of showing that there had been a miscarriage of justice.

56 As a preliminary point, I agree with the Prosecution that the eight sets of materials fall into two categories. The first category comprises materials which Yeo claims are “new evidence”, but some of which had instead already been canvassed at trial and/or on appeal. Sets 1, 3 and 6 fall within the first category. The second category comprises materials which Yeo claims are “new legal arguments”, but are instead reasons for his disagreement with the Judge’s findings of fact, which had already been canvassed at trial and/or on appeal. Sets 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 fall within the second category. I will address the materials falling within each of the two categories in turn.

57 In my judgment, Yeo has not been able to show a reasonable prospect of being able to persuade this court that any of the eight sets of materials constitutes sufficient material as is required under s 394J(2) of the CPC. I also find that there is no reasonable prospect that any of the materials relied on by Yeo can show that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the case of his unsuccessful appeal.

58 Set 1 refers to the call logs for Nagaiah’s phone on the night of the drug delivery (ie, from the night of 5 March 2018 to the early morning of 6 March 2018). In particular, Yeo highlights how ten calls were exchanged between Nagaiah and one “Thines Rao” within a mere span of 34 minutes that night, between 11.10pm and 11.44pm. Yeo relies on these phone calls to argue that the Judge erred in finding that his assertion that “there were no fewer than eight phone calls between [him] and ‘Danny’ throughout the night” was unsupported: GD at [55]. Yeo submits that these phone calls lend support for the “possibility that there [was] more than one drug deal around the area” that night, reinforcing his defence that the Drugs he had received were the subject of a wrong delivery.

59 I find that Yeo has not shown any reasonable prospect of the requirements under s 394J(3) of the CPC being satisfied for Set 1 of the materials relied on by Yeo.

60 Crucially, contrary to Yeo’s assertion that “no question[s] [were] ask[ed] about the call log issue” at trial and on appeal, Nagaiah’s call logs were canvassed at trial and do not constitute “new” material. At trial, the forensic specialist who conducted the forensic examination of Nagaiah’s phone, Lee Jia Ying Cheryl, had testified regarding how the table setting out Nagaiah’s call logs was to be interpreted. Regardless of what Nagaiah’s response may have been and even if he denied knowledge of any drug deals, the burden was on Yeo to establish his case and Yeo’s counsel at trial had elected not to cross-examine Nagaiah. CM 9 is thus not the first time that Nagaiah’s call logs have been canvassed.

61 I also find that there is no reasonable prospect of showing that the specific call log entries are compelling in the sense as described in s 394J(3)(c) of the CPC. Simply put, there is no reasonable prospect that they can show almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice. The probative value of these call log entries is limited as there are unanswered questions regarding the identity of Thines Rao, the content of the calls between Nagaiah and Thines Rao, as well as the relationship between Thines Rao and “Danny”. I reiterate that Nagaiah was not cross-examined on these issues at trial. Yeo cannot now claim that he “don’t know that this call log is an issue”. In any case, even if Nagaiah’s call logs did demonstrate that there was another drug delivery happening that night in the area, they do not go so far as to show that there were “hiccups” in the specific drug delivery to Yeo and that the Drugs were wrongly delivered.

62 Finally, the specific call log entries between Nagaiah and Thines Rao could have been adduced in court with reasonable diligence, and Yeo himself accepts that “this call log [was] there when Trial start[ed]”. Yeo’s explanations in CM 9 do not demonstrate otherwise. Yeo merely claims that he had not brought up what he terms the “call log issue” at an earlier stage of the proceedings as he had not known about this issue until the Judge’s finding that there were “no fewer than 8 calls”. He claims to have only “go[ne] through Nagaiah’s call log after [his] appeal [was] dismissed”. However, with Nagaiah’s call logs having already been admitted into evidence, Yeo could have gone through these call logs and adduced the specific entries during the trial with reasonable diligence.

63 Set 3 refers to the PolCam footage of the Bus Stop, which falls squarely within the first plank of Yeo’s defence at trial. In CM 9, Yeo submits that the Judge erred in finding that:

(a) one would have to remove the cover of the Dustbin in order to see clearly what was inside the Dustbin. Yeo argued that it was instead “possible to see deep inside from the side hole of the [D]ustbin”; and

(b) the two other persons captured in the PolCam footage “were standing straight throughout the entire time that they were next to the Dustbin” based on “what could be seen of their legs during this time”: see GD at [46]. Yeo’s disagreement with the Judge’s observations stems from his assertion that only the hand (and not the legs) of one of the two persons was captured in the PolCam footage, such that one would not be able to tell “even if the person ben[t] his leg or body”.

Yeo maintains his position at trial that the suspicious actions of the two persons at the Bus Stop at a time when no buses were running – a point which was noted by the Judge (GD at [46]) – was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in his favour (see [14] above).

64 I find that Yeo has not shown any reasonable prospect of the requirements under s 394J(3) of the CPC being satisfied for Set 3 of the materials.

65 In particular, I find that Yeo’s submissions regarding the PolCam footage are not capable of showing that he has a reasonable prospect of establishing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Even taking Yeo’s case at its highest, the mere fact of a passerby looking into the Dustbin is insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the intended recipient of the Drugs. It does not detract from the fact that, ultimately, Yeo had collected the Drugs from the Dustbin and does not show that the Drugs were wrongly delivered. Yeo himself “agree[s] that … [Set 3] would not be consider[ed] compelling evidence” in his Reply Submissions for CM 9.

66 Additionally, the PolCam footage has clearly been canvassed both at trial and on appeal (see [14] and [27] above respectively), and Yeo accepts that he had seen the PolCam footage at trial. The portions of the PolCam footage involving Yeo and the two persons were played in court on multiple occasions, and submissions on the inferences to be drawn from the PolCam footage were made at both stages of the proceedings.

67 As was held by the Court of Appeal in Kreetharan (at [21]), “it is insufficient for an applicant to attempt to re‑characterise the evidence already led below or to mount fresh factual arguments on the basis of such evidence” [emphasis in original]. Yeo is simply seeking to re-characterise evidence that was already before the court and that is insufficient. Yeo’s first submission regarding the Judge’s alleged erroneous factual finding directly contradicts his testimony at trial that one “ha[s] to remove the cover” “to see clearly into the dustbin”. To be clear, this finding by the Judge cannot be challenged because it cannot be said to be plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence before him at trial. Yeo’s second submission could have been raised with reasonable diligence at the trial and Yeo has not explained why he failed to do so despite having seen the PolCam footage even before trial began.

68 In support of his first submission that it was possible to see into the Dustbin without removing the cover, Yeo seeks to adduce a letter written by his brother stating that “it is possible to see the interior contents of the dustbin … [b]y simply looking into the dustbin through its side openings” after having conducted tests on a dustbin with the same design. This was raised by Yeo in his 4 June 2026 Letter and 24 June 2026 Letter.

69 However, in my assessment, the letter written by Yeo’s brother also has no reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purpose of a review application. The explanation by Yeo’s brother falls well short of being compelling, in that it is not capable of demonstrating that there is a reasonable prospect of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Even if it were true that one can see into the Dustbin without removing the cover, this does not show that the two persons captured in the PolCam footage were the intended recipients of the Drugs. Additionally, this evidence could have been adduced earlier with reasonable diligence, particularly since Yeo was already aware at trial that there was the factual issue of whether one had to “[open] the cover [of the Dustbin] … [to] see to the bottom of the [D]ustbin”.

70 Set 6 refers to the Video Re-enactment in support of Yeo’s claim that the Judge had erred in finding that bundle “B1” “could only have been thrown out of the car after Yeo had started driving off and not while the car was still parked in front of the rubbish chute” [emphasis added]: GD at [64]. Yeo argues that it was not physically impossible to throw the bundle “B1” out of the Honda Civic before he drove off.

71 While CM 9 is the first time that the Video Re-enactment has been adduced, Yeo has not shown any reasonable prospect of the Video Re-enactment being regarded as compelling in that it can show almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice. This is for two reasons.

72 First, the Judge never made any finding of physical impossibility. I agree with the Prosecution that the Judge’s finding must be read in context, in which case it becomes clear that the Judge was referring to how it would be illogical for Yeo to have thrown the Two Bundles in two separate locations located some distance away, unless it was the case that he was driving off from his parked location because he had seen the CNB vehicles approaching his location. The Judge was reasoning that, if indeed Yeo was in the parked car when he threw out the two bundles, it was unlikely for them to have been found some distance apart from each other. The Judge’s findings in GD (at [64]) were as follows:

73 Second, even if the Judge had been referring to physical impossibility, which has since been disproved by the Video Re-enactment, there is no reasonable prospect that such evidence will show almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Ultimately, the Video Re-enactment goes towards the fourth plank of Yeo’s defence at trial – that he had thrown the Drugs out of his Honda Civic as he realised the Drugs were not meant for him. The fact that the Drugs could have been thrown out of the Honda Civic while the car was stationary does not explain the reason for the Drugs having been thrown out of the car in the first place. The Judge’s finding that he disbelieved Yeo’s account was premised not just on the illogicality of the eventual location of the two bundles, but also on how it was illogical for: (a) Yeo’s first response upon suspecting a wrong delivery to be to throw several thousand dollars’ worth of drugs out of his car without first clarifying the situation with “Danny” (GD at [62]); and (b) Yeo to have thrown the Drugs out of his Honda Civic in a haphazard manner, instead of carefully concealing them if, as he claimed, there was an intention for the Drugs to be retrieved at a later time (GD at [63]). While Yeo argues under Set 7 that the Judge had also erred in respect of these two points, I will explain at [87]–[89] below why there is no reasonable prospect that Set 7 can be shown to constitute sufficient material. On that basis, the Judge cannot be said to have erred in disbelieving Yeo’s account regarding why the Drugs were thrown out. It was not a finding that was plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence that was before him at trial.

74 I next turn to explain why none of the five remaining sets of materials under the second category have a reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material under s 394J(2) of the CPC. The materials in sets 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are all arguments about findings of fact that had been canvassed at an earlier stage of the proceedings and, in fact, Yeo himself refers to them as “old evidence”. It is simply not enough for Yeo to raise the same arguments that had already been rejected either at the trial or on appeal in the hope of persuading the court to grant him permission to make a review application. Even where Yeo raises arguments that are somewhat different from those made at the trial and on appeal, they are premised on evidence that had already been considered by both the Judge and this court in CCA 20.

75 Set 2 refers to Yeo’s explanation in respect of the Judge’s finding that he had deliberately refused to disclose the passcodes for his phones: see GD at [56]–[57]. To be clear, although Yeo’s submissions reference both phones “F1A” and “F2A”, the Judge only found that Yeo had deliberately refused to disclose the passcode for “F1A”, which even the new passcode of “120495” could not unlock. The Judge drew an adverse inference against Yeo in respect of “F1A” and inferred that its contents would disclose evidence unfavourable to Yeo: GD at [57]. I will address Yeo’s submissions in respect of “F1A” and “F2A” in turn.

76 For “F1A”, Yeo submits that he had provided the correct passcode for that phone (ie, “111111”) when his contemporaneous statement was being recorded on 6 March 2018 from about 4.50am to 6.45am. Yeo asserts that IO Neo had changed the password to “F1A” after using the passcode “111111” to access the phone. Yeo relies on four purported discrepancies in how “F1A” was handled to argue why an adverse inference should not have been drawn against him regarding the contents of “F1A”. These purported discrepancies are namely how there was no evidence that any forensic officer had tried using the passcode “111111” to unlock “F1A”, how IO Neo could not recall the date when he first tried the passcode “111111” on “F1A” and discovered it was wrong, IO Neo’s delay in informing the FORT officers of the passcode(s) disclosed by Yeo, and how even on IO Neo’s case, he had failed to ask Yeo for his passcode(s) despite them having been at the same location when the exhibits were being processed.

77 Yeo’s submissions in respect of “F1A” do not have any reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purposes of a review application. Yeo repeats the same argument that he had run at trial – that a CNB officer was able to access “F1A” and change the passcodes to the phone (see [17] above). The evidence underpinning this argument had already been considered at trial and on appeal, including Yeo’s testimony at trial that he had disclosed the passcode “111111” when his contemporaneous statement was recorded, Yeo’s testimony that he had only volunteered the passcode “120495” after being asked if he had used any other passcodes previously, IO Neo’s testimony regarding how “F1A” was handled, and the dates on which Yeo’s phones and SIM cards were received and returned by the FORT officers (which are the subject of clarification in Yeo’s 4 May 2026 Letter and 10 May 2026 Letter) (see [37(b)] and [37(c)] above).

78 In any case, Yeo’s submissions in respect of “F1A” have no reasonable prospect of being shown to be compelling, in the sense of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Not only is the evidence relied on by Yeo insufficient to prove that IO Neo had changed the passcode to “F1A”, Yeo is also unable to explain why IO Neo would have done so. Even if no adverse inference were drawn against Yeo in respect of the contents of “F1A”, Yeo remains unable to adduce any phone or call records to corroborate the third plank of his defence regarding the “hiccups” on the night of the delivery, and consequently his wrong delivery defence.

79 For “F2A”, Yeo raises alleged discrepancies in the Police and the FORT’s handling of the phone to show that the Judge erred in his assessment of IO Neo’s evidence as “IO [Neo was] lying”. In particular, Yeo points to how there were 27 missed calls on “F2A” even after his arrest, leading to an inference that IO Neo had unlocked “F2A” using the passcode “111111”, then turned “F2A” on without setting it to “Airplane Mode”. He submits that such a procedure was not “normal”.

80 Notwithstanding how this is the first time that Yeo has raised these specific discrepancies in the handling of “F2A”, this argument also does not have any reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purposes of a review application. It is far from compelling. The adverse inference drawn by the Judge was in respect of the contents of the locked phone “F1A” and these alleged discrepancies in relation to “F2A” are of little probative value. The circumstantial evidence relied on by Yeo is also insufficient to impugn IO Neo’s credibility. Furthermore, these alleged discrepancies are a mere re-characterisation of evidence that was already before the court, including the missed call logs of “F2A” and Forensic Specialist Teo’s statement.

81 Additionally, these arguments could have been raised earlier with reasonable diligence, particularly since Yeo was represented at trial. Yeo’s counsel at trial could have cross-examined IO Neo and the forensic specialists or requested to cross-examine FORT Officer Izzat on these alleged discrepancies.

82 Set 4 refers to Yeo’s explanation for his disagreement with the Judge’s finding that no inference could be drawn from the fact that there were two bundles instead of one, that the Drugs were not the drugs Yeo ordered: see GD at [49]. Yeo asserts that he would have been able to differentiate between the Two Bundles weighing close to 1kg and his expected delivery weighing 350g, even without a weighing scale, due to the “big differen[ce]”.

83 Set 4 does not have a reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purposes of a review application. Yeo is merely repeating the same argument, which constituted the second plank of his defence at trial, and which had already been rejected by the Judge and by this court on appeal (see [15], [21] and [28] above). Yeo himself had testified that he “wouldn’t have known how much each of the bundles weighed”. In any case, Set 4 is a bare assertion. There is no reasonable prospect of Set 4 being compelling, in that it can show almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice.

84 In Set 5, Yeo refers to the Judge’s rejection of the third plank of his defence regarding the “many hiccups” with the delivery of the Drugs on the basis that Yeo’s narrative was a bare assertion that was not substantiated by any evidence. Yeo submits that Nagaiah’s call logs in Set 1 corroborate his narrative regarding the “hiccups” on the night of his arrest.

85 Set 5 does not have a reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purposes of a review application. The limited probative value of Nagaiah’s call logs in Set 1 has been explained at [61] above. The point remains that, even if Nagaiah’s call logs did demonstrate that there was another drug delivery happening that night in the same area, they do not go so far as to show that there were “hiccups” in the specific drug delivery to Yeo and that the Drugs were wrongly delivered.

86 Set 7 refers to Yeo’s explanations for his disagreement with the Judge’s finding that he would have called his drug supplier or, at the very least, concealed the Drugs if he suspected a mistaken delivery, instead of throwing the Drugs out: GD at [62]–[63]. Yeo asserts that it was “normal” to have thrown the Drugs out before checking with “Danny” “due to so many hiccups that night”, which suggested to him that the drugs had been wrongly delivered. Yeo also asserts that there was “no reason for [him] to conceal the drugs” as it was up to the drug supplier to retrieve drugs which had been wrongly delivered.

87 Set 7 does not have a reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purposes of a review application because these same arguments had been raised and rejected at trial and on appeal (see [18], [23] and [31]). In his written submissions at trial, Yeo had submitted that it was “[l]ogical and credible for Yeo” to have thrown the Drugs out. On appeal, Yeo repeated the same argument in his written submissions, urging this court to consider his actions in light of the “multiple hiccups along the way”.

88 In this regard, the same underlying evidence had been canvassed at trial and on appeal. At trial, Yeo was cross-examined on whether it was “possible for [him] to have called ‘Danny’ first before throwing the bundles out”. Yeo also testified that if the drug supplier “clarified that the drugs were not [his] and [he] was asked to return the drugs, [he] would tell them that the drugs were at a certain location, and then they could go and retrieve it”. Thus, Yeo has not referred to any new evidence and is simply seeking to re-characterise the evidence that was before the court.

89 In any case, Set 7 does not have a reasonable prospect of being compelling in that Yeo’s bare assertions do not show almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice.

90 Set 8 refers to Yeo’s explanations for his disagreement with the Judge’s findings regarding the internal and external inconsistencies in his evidence: GD at [66]–[67]. In particular, Yeo seeks to explain the inconsistencies in his accounts across his statements and at trial.

91 Yeo first seeks to explain the inconsistencies regarding who his drug supplier was (ie, “Kelvin” and/or “Danny”). In CM 9, Yeo claims that he “did not mention Kelvin is [his] supplier for [his] capital issue” and that Kelvin had instead been identified as his supplier for a separate set of around 5g of methamphetamine. This explanation does not have a reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purpose of a review application. Yeo’s explanation regarding “Kelvin’s” involvement does not have a reasonable prospect of being compelling in the sense as required by s 394J(3) of the CPC. Even if it were true that “Kelvin” had supplied a separate set of methamphetamine to him, this would not explain the inconsistencies in Yeo’s account regarding the Two Bundles (see [24] above) or support Yeo’s mistaken delivery defence.

92 Additionally, this is not the first time that Yeo has sought to explain “Kelvin’s” involvement. In the First Contemporaneous Statement, Yeo stated that he had “drive[n] [his Honda Civic] to the rubbish chute” “to meet [Kelvin] to collect [his] order of 01 set of ‘Ice’ from him”. At trial, Yeo also testified that he had “purchased … one set of Ice from Kelvin”. It is simply insufficient for Yeo to now attempt to re-characterise or supplement the evidence already led below.

93 Additionally, in CM 9, Yeo “admit[s] [that he] did lie during [the First Contemporaneous] [S]tatement” in his “confusion” by denying recognition of the Two Bundles altogether, which led to the inconsistencies in his account regarding his knowledge of the Two Bundles. This explanation does not have a reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purpose of a review application. The First Contemporaneous Statement, and in particular Yeo’s lies in this statement, had been canvassed at trial. Yeo had been cross-examined on his lies and had refused to admit to these same lies at trial. For instance, the Prosecution had put to Yeo that he “didn’t mention the two bundles of drugs in [his] first contemporaneous statement” “because [he] didn’t want to admit anything when [he was] arrested” – a put question to which Yeo disagreed. An admission at this stage cannot assist Yeo in challenging the Judge’s finding regarding his credibility.

94 In his affidavit for CM 9, Yeo first claimed that the eight sets of materials “could not be adduced at the trial or appeal” due to “miscommunication between [his] previous counsel and [him]” such that he “did not explain [his] points clearly enough”. The Prosecution, in their written submissions, pointed out that Yeo “did not elaborate on the nature of the miscommunication, nor did he explain why he only reviewed the trial documents after the appeal”.

95 In his 19 April 2026 Letter and at a case management conference on 22 April 2026, Yeo elaborated on his allegations about the miscommunications and made several claims about Mr Tiwary:

(a) Despite Yeo having requested that Mr Tiwary “mail him” a copy of his written submissions on appeal (“Appeal Written Submissions”) on 10 October 2025, Yeo never received them before the appeal was heard on 22 October 2025. He only had sight of these submissions for the first time on 17 April 2026, through the Prosecution’s Bundle of Documents in this CM 9.

(b) Notwithstanding some discussions at an early stage of the appeal proceedings, Mr Tiwary had not sought Yeo’s input in detail regarding the preparation of the Appeal Written Submissions, nor had Yeo reviewed the Appeal Written Submissions before they were filed in court.

(c) Yeo did not have any opportunity to discuss in detail the points that he wanted Mr Tiwary to raise at the appeal hearing. As a result, Yeo alleges that, at the hearing of his appeal in CCA 20, Mr Tiwary did not properly explain in detail several points to the court.

96 Mr Tiwary responded to these allegations by way of his reply affidavit dated 19 May 2026. In summary, Mr Tiwary stated:

(a) In respect of Yeo’s allegation that he had not received a copy of his Appeal Written Submissions until after CM 9 was filed, Mr Tiwary claims that he had in fact mailed Yeo a copy of the Appeal Written Submissions after receiving his request on 17 October 2025.

(b) In respect of Yeo’s allegations that Mr Tiwary had not sought his input in detail for the preparation of the Appeal Written Submissions and for the appellate hearing, Mr Tiwary states that he had “prepared the submissions based on the discussions [he] had with [Yeo]”, “[gone] through the main points of the submissions with [Yeo]” and even “went through … the issues [Yeo] had raised in his letter dated 10 October 2025” at Mr Tiwary’s last visit on 17 October 2025.

97 Yeo was granted permission, pursuant to his 7 July 2026 Letter, to file a further affidavit responding to Mr Tiwary’s claim that he had “[gone] through the main points of the submissions with [Yeo] during [his] meetings with [Yeo]”. In Yeo’s further affidavit dated 10 July 2026, he recounted what transpired during each of Mr Tiwary’s visits leading up to the hearing of CCA 20. Yeo also reiterated his three allegations against Mr Tiwary.

98 At the hearing before me, Yeo clarified that the main thrust in these allegations is that, if he and Mr Tiwary had discussed the intended appeal arguments in CCA 20 in detail, Yeo would have instructed Mr Tiwary to raise all the points that he is now raising in CM 9. Put another way, Yeo’s complaints stem from his belief that Mr Tiwary did not put forward all the arguments that Yeo wanted to make for CCA 20, and this CM 9 sets out all those arguments that should have been made for that appeal.

99 The two steps for proving inadequate legal assistance were set out by the Court of Appeal in Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 907 (“Farid”) (at [134]–[135] and [139]). First, the appellant seeking to overturn his conviction must prove that the counsel had conducted his case with “flagrant or egregious incompetence or indifference”. This means showing that the counsel’s conduct of the proceedings fell so clearly below an objective standard of what a reasonable counsel would have done or would not have done in the particular circumstances of the case. Second, the appellant must show that there is a real possibility that such inadequate assistance has caused a miscarriage of justice on the particular facts of the case.

100 Even taking Yeo’s case at its highest, I find that his allegations against Mr Tiwary do not meet the high threshold of “flagrant or egregious incompetence or indifference”, let alone establish that any such inadequate assistance has a real possibility of causing a miscarriage of justice. First of all, Mr Tiwary already raised some of these arguments in CCA 20 (see, for example, [66], [83], [87] above for Sets 3, 4 and 7 respectively). And, even if the remaining arguments had been raised in CCA 20, it is patently clear that they would not have affected the outcome of the appeal.

101 In my view, a counsel’s tactical decision not to raise an unpersuasive argument because it does not have sufficient evidential basis cannot amount to conduct that falls below the objective standard of what a reasonable counsel would have done. To the contrary, it is counsel’s duty to ensure that the arguments he advances in legal proceedings have a proper basis, as a matter of the evidence and the law. His duty as counsel does not require him to simply parrot what his client insists on putting forward to the court, without any proper assessment as to whether the arguments can properly be made. For instance, even if Yeo had instructed Mr Tiwary to make arguments about Nagaiah’s call logs (ie, Set 1), it was entirely within Mr Tiwary’s prerogative as counsel to decide whether to use the call logs to buttress Yeo’s case. It was up to Mr Tiwary to decide whether these call logs constituted sufficient material to show that the Judge’s finding that the Drugs were not the subject of a wrong delivery was plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence. In his assessment, Mr Tiwary considered that these call logs could not be relied on in his arguments on appeal because Nagaiah had not been cross-examined on these call logs by Yeo’s then-counsel during the trial. That he made such an assessment was in fact confirmed by Mr Tiwary in the hearing before me. I should add that this was certainly the right call for Mr Tiwary to make. Nagaiah’s call logs were simply of no assistance to Yeo’s case on appeal.

102 Therefore, I find that Mr Tiwary cannot be said to have provided inadequate legal assistance that had a real possibility of causing a miscarriage of justice on the particular facts of this case. These allegations against Mr Tiwary thus do not have a reasonable prospect of constituting sufficient material for the purpose of a review application.

103 For the reasons given in this judgment, I dismiss Yeo’s application in CM 9.