This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports. |
Public Prosecutor
v
JGK
[2026] SGDC 142
District Court— District Arrest Case No. DAC-916325-2025 & Anor
Magistrate’s Appeal No. MA-9059-2026-01
District Judge Shaiffudin Saruwan
11 February 2026 & 4 March 2026
24 April 2026
District Judge Shaiffudin Saruwan:
Introduction
1 This is an appeal against sentence. The accused had pleaded guilty to one offence of penile-vaginal penetration. At the time of the offence, the victim was 13 years old, while the accused was 24 years old.
2 The accused was represented by Drew & Napier LLC.
3 There was a gag order prohibiting the publication of the name, address, photograph, any evidence or any other thing likely to lead to the identification of the victim.
The charge(s)
4 The offence was under s 375(1)(b) punishable under s 375(2) Penal Code 1871 (“PC”).
5 One charge under s 375(1A)(b) punishable under s 375(2) PC was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentence. The offence involved penile-oral penetration of the same victim committed on the same day as the offence in the proceeded charge.
The facts
6 The facts as set out in the statement of facts were –
a. In early April 2023, the victim became acquainted with the accused via the social networking application called “OMI”. Shortly after chatting on “OMI”, they exchanged contact details and continued to communicate on the Telegram Messenger app (“Telegram”).
b. On 6 April 2023, the accused invited the victim out for drinks. He offered her a choice of venues, asking her to select from a club, a bar, or his house. The victim expressed her indecision about the location, stating that she did not know where to choose. She raised the concern that if she were to consume alcoholic drinks in public, the police could catch her. She clarified that this was because she was an “underage drinker” and told the accused that it was a “hint” to him about her age. The accused acknowledged this and stated that it was a “good hint”. He suggested that they consumed the alcoholic drinks in his house and assured her that “confirm no one will catch” her. The victim subsequently accepted the accused’s invitation to consume alcoholic drinks in the accused’s three-room flat at Fernvale (the “Flat”).
c. On the same day, at 11.52 pm, the accused met the victim at the drop-off area in the vicinity of the Flat and brought her to the Flat. They consumed soju in the living room while playing drinking games, including “Truth or Dare” (the “Game”). At the material time, the accused and the victim were alone in the Flat. During the Game, the victim informed the accused that she was 13 turning 14 years old.
d. As the Game progressed, the accused “dared” the victim to change into his t-shirt and sit on his lap. The victim complied with the accused’s “dare” and changed into his t-shirt. However, she declined to sit on his lap. After the victim changed into the accused’s t-shirt, the accused found her appearance attractive and became aroused. After some persuasion by the accused, the victim relented and sat on his lap. She positioned herself facing him directly, with her legs wrapped around his waist.
e. While the victim was seated on the accused’s lap, the accused further “dared” the victim to kiss him. The victim complied with the accused’s “dare” and kissed him. During the kiss, the accused caressed the victim’s buttocks before they proceeded to the bedroom.
f. In the bedroom, the accused placed the victim on his bed in a supine position, facing upward. He then removed their clothes and climbed on top of the victim. In that position, he then penetrated the victim’s vagina with his penis. He later removed his penis from her vagina and penetrated the victim’s mouth with his penis. After some time, the accused removed his penis from the victim’s mouth and penetrated her vagina with his penis until he ejaculated on her groin area. At all material times, the accused did not use a condom. The victim thereafter washed up and left the Flat at about 2.08 am on 7 April 2023.
g. The accused and the victim remained in contact on Telegram. However, she eventually ceased contact with the accused as she felt “stupid” for accepting the accused’s invitation to the Flat and blamed herself for what happened. She did not want to engage in sexual acts with the accused but did not stop him as she did not know what she was thinking at the material time. The victim kept her sexual encounter with the accused to herself as she had no one to talk to.
h. She subsequently put up a post on her Instagram on 29 July 2023. In the post, she quoted section 375 PC on her Instagram story with the accompanying caption: “Honestly just kinda scared of silently bringing this into adulthood and it’ll be pointless to say it by then” (“the IG Story”). The victim’s school counsellor saw the IG Story on 31 July 2023 and notified her parents. Despite the victim’s parents’ probing on the IG Story, the victim remained tight-lipped. The victim’s mother eventually lodged a police report on 9 August 2023. The accused was subsequently arrested on 10 August 2023.
i. The victim was a virgin prior to 6 April 2023.
Antecedents
7 The Accused was a first offender.
The sentence
Prosecution’s sentencing submissions
8 The prosecution submitted for a sentence of 10 year’s imprisonment and six strokes of the cane saying that deterrence was the dominant sentencing consideration. Children should be protected from “such heinous sexual exploitation”. The public interest required that the sentence should befit the serious nature of the crime and should reflect the public’s aversion towards the sexual exploitation of children.
9 The prosecution highlighted the following aggravating factors –
(a) The accused had taken advantage of the victim’s gullibility and naivete. This was demonstrated by her compliance with his “dares” after being plied with alcoholic drinks; the dares beginning with changing into his t-shirt. He also persuaded her to sit on his lap despite her initial reluctance. Once seated on his lap, the victim was then prodded into kissing him. These kisses then culminated in her “yielding to the most violating of his advances: penile-oral and penile-vaginal intercourse”.
(b) There was no momentary lapse of judgment by the accused. The acts that led to the offence reflected his conscious choice to commit the offence. He had invited an “underaged drinker” to the Flat to imbibe alcohol. Despite having been told her age, he chose to continue his sexual advances. His advances towards the victim also “demonstrated a calculated pattern of exploitation which culminated in the most serious sexual violations”.
(c) The victim was a virgin prior to the offence. After the sexual assaults, she had kept the incident to herself. It was through the perceptive action of her school counsellor who had noted her “cry for help” from the IG story that brought the incident to light.
10 The prosecution applied the sentencing framework formulated by the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Ng Kean Meng Terence v PP [2017] 2 SLR 449 (“Terence Ng”). The CA set out the sentencing bands for offences of rape punishable under s 375(2) PC –
Band | Description | Sentencing Range |
1 | Cases with no or limited offence-specific aggravating factors | 10 - 13 years’ imprisonment, six strokes of the cane |
2 | Cases of higher level of seriousness involving two or more offence-specific aggravating factors | 13 – 17 years’ imprisonment, 12 strokes of the cane |
3 | Extremely serious cases owing to the number and intensity of offence-specific aggravating factors | 17 – 20 years’ imprisonment, 18 strokes of the cane |
11 The CA held that cases of statutory rape, where there was consent and there were no other notable aggravating factors, fell into the upper end of Band 1 with the indicative starting sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane.
12 The prosecution submitted that an uplift from the indicative starting sentence was warranted on account of two aggravating offence-specific factors namely –
(a) The accused had failed to use a condom thereby exposing the victim to the risk of pregnancy and of contracting sexually transmitted diseases. This warranted an uplift of one year’s imprisonment
(b) The TIC charge involving penile-oral penetration committed on the same victim on the same day. This warranted an uplift of one year’s imprisonment.
13 After factoring the sentencing discount of up to 30%, the prosecution submitted for a final sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane.
Defence’s sentencing submissions
14 The defence argued that a straightforward application of the framework in Terence Ng offended the principle of cardinal proportionality. This was because although s 375(2) PC carried a maximum imprisonment term of 20 years’ imprisonment, the State Court was only permitted by law to sentence up to a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. As a result of the limit, any offender who faced an indicative sentence of more than 10 years’ imprisonment would ultimately receive the maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. This would create a situation where an offender who was highly culpable, and had caused significant harm, and who chose to claim trial, would end up with the same sentence as an offender who had pleaded guilty and whose case involved only one or two aggravating factors that pushed the indicative sentence beyond 10 years. Ultimately, this would lead to an artificial clustering of sentences at the limit of the State Court’s sentencing jurisdiction.
15 To illustrate the artificial clustering of sentences, the defence cited two cases precedents namely, PP v Muhammad Mustaffa Kamal Bin Salim [2024] SGDC 221 (“Mustaffa Kamal”) and PP v GHB [2023] SGDC 247 (“GHB”). It was pointed out that the offenders in these two cases had demonstrated substantially higher culpability, and the cases contained significantly more aggravating factors, which were quantitatively and qualitatively more pronounced. Yet each offender received sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment.
16 To avoid the artificial clustering of sentences, the defence submitted that when the court exercised its obligation to consider the full spectrum of the punishment, the full spectrum of the punishment in this case should be 10 years imprisonment, the sentencing limit of the State Courts, and not 20 years imprisonment, the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence.
17 In the alternative, the defence advocated the judicious application of the totality principle to “ameliorate [the] inequity” which would be engendered in a straightforward application of the Terence Ng framework (at [64] of the Defence’s Closing Submissions). The defence cited PP v Isaac s/o Elangovan [2025] SGDC 180 (“Isaac”) where the court had applied the totality principle judiciously. The offender in Isaac, who was then 23 years old, pleaded guilty to penile-oral rape of a 13-year-old victim. The court found that the case fell within Band 1 of the Terence Ng framework, with a starting sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane, which was adjusted upwards to 14 years’ imprisonment on account of offender-specific factors. The final sentence arrived at was 9.8 years’ imprisonment after factoring in the 30% sentencing discount. After arriving at the final sentence, the court then considered the offender’s overall criminality, age and clean record, and applying the totality principle, calibrated the global sentence downwards to eight years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane. The defence submitted that Isaac demonstrated that even after applying the discount for a plea of guilty, it remained essential for the court to evaluate whether the resulting sentence remained fair and just. They argued that the totality principle should apply in situations where the sentence imposed was “crushing and not in keeping with the accused’s past record and his future prospects”: Mohamed Shouffee Bin Adam v PP [2014] 2 SLR 998 (“Mohamed Shouffee”).
18 In the present case, the defence agreed that the indicative starting point should be 12 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane. However, they submitted that there was only one offence-specific aggravating factor present that warranted an uplift, which was that unprotected intercourse had taken place. They submitted that an uplift of six months’ imprisonment was sufficient because the victim had not contracted any sexually transmitted diseases and the intercourse did not result in any pregnancy.
19 The defence submitted that the TIC charge did not warrant an uplift. This was because of two reasons – first, the TIC charge was committed during the same sexual activity that was already taking place and it related to the invasion of the same underlying interest which was the protection of minor persons from sexual exploitation; and secondly, had the TIC charge been proceeded with, there was a strong basis for arguing that the sentences for the two charges should run concurrently. Therefore, it was not appropriate to factor an additional uplift for the TIC charge.
20 Lastly, the defence submitted that as the accused had indicated his intention to plead guilty at Stage 1 of the proceedings, he should be accorded the full 30% sentencing discount. All considered, the final sentence should be 8 years’ and 9 months’ imprisonment.
21 The defence then submitted that following Isaac above, the court should take a “last look” at all the facts and circumstances of the case. The defence was of the view that this “last look” would result in a further downward adjustment of the final sentence. This was because, on account of the accused’s prior clean record, young age and future prospects, the sentence of 8 years’ 9 months’ imprisonment, which was close to the maximum of 10 years, constituted a crushing sentence, especially when compared to the sentence meted out in Isaac. Therefore, Mr Lim submitted that a downward adjustment to seven years was appropriate. In conclusion, the defence’s proposed final sentence was seven years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane.
The sentence by the court
22 On cardinal proportionality, this issue had been addressed by the High Court in PP v Soh Lip Yong [1999] 4 SLR 281 (“Soh Lip Yong”). The offender in Soh Lip Yong had pleaded guilty to one count of rape under s 376(1) PC. The district judge sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. In coming to his decision, the district judge considered, inter alia, the fact that the maximum sentence that he could impose sitting in the District Court was seven years’ imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane. This was not in keeping with the benchmark sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the case set by the High Court in Chia Kim Heng Frederick v PP [1992] 1 SLR 361. The sentence in Soh Lip Yong was enhanced to seven years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane. The court stated –
“34. … One of the district judge’s apparent reasons for imposing a sentence of five years’ imprisonment was that since the respondent was being dealt with in the district court, the maximum sentence that could be imposed was seven years and 12 strokes of the cane. This in turn made him conclude that it would not be inappropriate to pass a sentence of imprisonment below the benchmark.
35. This was an error in principle by the district judge … even though the fact that this case was dealt with in the District Court had the effect of capping the sentence at seven years and 12 strokes of the cane due to the limit on the district court’s sentencing jurisdiction … this should not otherwise be an additional factor in passing sentence.
36. Due to the need for consistency in sentencing, the appropriate sentence in this case should be determined by the benchmark guidelines relating to the offence itself, rather than the court in which the sentence is being passed, subject of course to the district court’s limits.”
23 I was bound by the judgment. Therefore, in determining the appropriate sentence, I must apply my mind to the full spectrum of the punishment prescribed for the offence, which was, 20 years’ imprisonment. The limit to my sentencing jurisdiction was not a relevant factor.
24 Next, I applied the sentencing framework in Terence Ng to the facts. Parties did not dispute that the circumstances surrounding the offence (at [9] above) put the indicative starting sentence at 12 years’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane: Terence Ng (at [51]). The accused’s conduct in this case was especially egregious. Despite knowing that the victim was too young to drink alcohol, he had invited her to the Flat to drink alcohol. Even after being told her age, he had persisted in his sexual advances on her, testing the boundaries by starting with minor boundary violations to see how she responded and gradually culminated in the ultimate violation of her body. Therefore, I found that the indicative starting sentence of 12 years and six strokes of the cane was wholly warranted and appropriate.
25 As the accused had engaged in unprotected sex with the victim, an uplift was warranted to address this aggravating offence-specific factor. On the quantum of the uplift, I agreed with the defence’s submissions that an uplift of six months was appropriate, instead of the one-year uplift proposed by the prosecution. This was because although the risk of potential harm remained relevant, no actual harm was caused from the failure to use protection. The victim did not become pregnant and had not contracted any sexually transmitted disease.
26 However, I disagreed with the defence’s position that the presence of the TIC charge did not warrant any uplift to the indicative starting sentence. This position was inconsistent with the principle set out in PP v UI [2008] SGCA 35 (“UI”). The CA in that case held that if there were TIC offences to be considered, the effect, in general, was that the sentence which the court would otherwise have imposed for the offence proceeded with would be increased. This was especially when the TIC offence was similar in nature to the proceeded offence. This was a commonsensical approach as the offender, by agreeing to have the TIC offence in question taken into consideration for sentencing purposes, has in substance admitted that he had committed the TIC offence: UI (at [38]). The TIC offence in the present case involved a similar offence, that was, oral-penile penetration. Therefore, it had the effect of significantly aggravating the proceeded offence. This was notwithstanding the fact that the TIC charge was committed during the same sexual activity that was already taking place, and it related to the invasion of the same underlying interest as the charge proceeded with. Under the circumstances, I was of the view that a one-year uplift was warranted and appropriate to account for the TIC charge.
27 As the accused had indicated that he wished to plead guilty at stage 1 of the proceedings. I accorded him the full 30% sentencing discount. Other than that, I did not find any other mitigating factor significant enough to warrant a further downward revision of the sentence. On caning, I was of the view that six strokes of the cane were appropriate. All considered, I imposed the sentence of nine years’ and five months’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane.
28 Lastly, I rejected the defence’s submissions that I should take a “last look” at all the facts and circumstances, and that this “last look” should result in a further downward adjustment of the final sentence. (at [21] above).
29 The totality principle was a concept in criminal sentencing that required a court, when imposing multiple sentences on an offender, to step back and consider whether the overall sentence was proportionate and just in the light of the offender's total criminality. The idea was that when sentences for several offences are combined — whether by running them consecutively or concurrently — the court must ensure that the aggregate sentence was not crushing or excessive relative to the overall gravity of the offending conduct and the offender's personal circumstances. Even if each individual sentence was appropriate on its own, stacking them together could produce a total that was disproportionately harsh. To avoid this unjust outcome, a court might then adjust individual sentences downward or decided to run some sentences concurrently rather than consecutively, such that the final sentence reflected the totality of the wrongdoing without being manifestly unjust. A structured approach to applying the principle was laid down in Mohamed Shouffee, that was, first selecting which sentences should run consecutively, then reviewing whether the total was proportionate. This review was the “last look” step proposed by the defence. It essentially served as a final check on the sentencing process to ensure the punishment fit not just each individual crime, but the person's conduct as a whole.
30 In the present case, there was only one charge proceeded with. As such I was not convinced that the concept of the totality principle applied here. Therefore, there was no reason for me to take a “last look” at all the facts and circumstances of the case. In any event, all the relevant facts and circumstances present in the case have already been considered and accounted for in my determination of the sentence. The specific circumstances in Isaac might have persuaded that court to find it appropriate to apply the totality principle in the manner she did. But not so in the present case. Having regard to all the offence-specific and offender-specific factors present, I was of the view that the final sentence of nine years’ and five months’ imprisonment and six strokes of the cane accurately reflected the overall criminality of the accused and the accused’s personal circumstances.
Conclusion
31 The Accused has lodged an appeal against sentence. He is presently serving sentence.
Shaiffudin Saruwan District Judge | | |
DPP Colin Ng & Quek Lu Yi (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the Prosecution
Marshall Lim & Ong Hui Wen (Drew & Napier LLC) for the Accused