1 Mr Loh Guang Ze (“the Accused”) devised a scheme in 2018 to obtain sexual services from women by posing as a fictitious agent on Locanto (a website for classified advertisements), never intending to pay them for their services. He successfully met up with multiple victims to obtain their sexual services in various locations, including a female minor who was 15 years old at the time of the offence. He also covertly recorded videos of some of the victims performing sexual acts or engaging in sexual intercourse with him during these encounters. He was arrested when the police received an anonymous tip from a female stating that she had been cheated by an agent on Locanto, having not been paid for the sexual services she had provided to a client.

2 There is a gag order against publishing the name, address, photograph, any evidence or any other thing likely to lead to the identification of the victims in this case.

3 Beyond the sentencing analysis for each of the five proceeded charges under three different offence provisions in the Penal Code 1871 (“PC”) – namely, PC ss 376A(1)(a), 420A(1) and 377B(5) – this case raises two issues of broader sentencing significance.

(a) First, the sentencing approach for an offence under PC s 420A involving the dishonest or fraudulent obtaining of sexual services, and in particular:

(i) whether the framework established in Wong Tian Jun De Beers v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 SLR 805 (“De Beers”) for cheating to procure sex and other sexual acts under PC s 417 applies, with appropriate modifications, to such an offence; and

(ii) what non-exhaustive factors going to harm and culpability ought to guide the sentencing analysis.

(b) Second, the sentencing approach for voyeuristic recordings of another person’s private regions without consent under PC s 377BB(5), and in particular:

(i) whether the framework established in Nicholas Tan Siew Chye v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 SLR 1223 (“Nicholas Tan”) for operating equipment to observe another person’s private regions without consent under PC s 377BB(4) applies, with appropriate modifications, to such an offence; and

(ii) how the Nicholas Tan framework interacts with the framework in Prakash s/o Mathivanan v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 1386 (“Prakash”) in the context of a PC s 377BB(5) charge that is amalgamated under s 124(4) and punishable under s 124(8)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“CPC”).

4 The Accused faced ten charges in respect of his acts against six victims. He pleaded guilty to five of the charges, and consented to the remaining charges being taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing (“TIC”), as detailed in the tables below.

5 Following a 20% sentencing reduction on account of the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 2 of the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s “Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas” (“Guilty Plea Guidelines”), I impose the following sentences for the proceeded charges:

6 The aggregate sentence based on the above is 67 months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane. I now elaborate on the reasons for my decision.

7 The following facts are based on the Statement of Facts, ¹ to which the Accused admitted without qualification. Where undisputed facts are additionally drawn from the mitigation plea, ² this is indicated by an appropriate footnote.

8 The Accused is a 40-year-old male Singaporean as at the time of this decision. At the material time of the offences, he was married with three children. ³

9 In 2018, the Accused devised a scheme to receive sexual services from females, as he had lost attraction to his wife after seeing the birth of their children. The Accused claimed that he had been facing several stressors in his life, including the fact that his daughter had been diagnosed with intellectual disabilities, and his wife having been “essentially bedridden due to her broken leg for 3 months”. ⁴ This was the background to him seeking “sexual favours elsewhere”. ⁵

10 The scheme involved the Accused putting up an advertisement on Locanto. The advertisement invited females interested in earning “fast cash” of $3,000 to $5,000 to get in touch for more details. He then posed as an agent named “Sherry” and contacted the females, informing them about “sugar daddy” or sexual services arrangements that “Sherry” could facilitate. As requested by “Sherry”, the females would send photographs of themselves to the Accused. The Accused would then move to the next step with females to whom he was attracted. In all, he received queries from about 30 females. He successfully arranged to meet up with nine of them to obtain their sexual services.

11 The Accused’s scheme operated as follows. Within a week of a victim contacting “Sherry”, he would inform the victim that she had a customer interested in her service. He would tell the victim that the customer requested that the victim wear a blindfold and required the victim to show up at the meeting place with a blindfold on. This was on the basis that this was the customer’s kink, or for the protection of the customer’s identity. However, the real reason for the request was because the Accused wanted to ensure that the victims could not identify him.

12 The general terms of the agreement were that the victim would provide sexual services to the “customer” (who, unknown to the victim, would be the Accused himself), and the victim was not allowed to remove the blindfold until the “customer” had left the venue.

13 After receiving the sexual services, “Sherry” would ignore the victims’ requests for money and block the victims on messaging applications. The Accused did this because he never intended to pay the victims for their services.

14 The specific facts relating to each proceeded charge will be discussed charge-by-charge in the following sections. A chronology of the subject matter of the various charges is as follows:

15 The SPOM Charge is a charge under PC s 376A(1)(a) punishable under s 376A(2)(b). It concerns the Accused’s sexual penetration of V1 – a female minor who was 15 years old at the time of the offence.

16 Sometime before 4 August 2021, after V1 responded to the Accused’s advertisement on Locanto, V1 chatted with “Sherry” via an online messaging service. “Sherry” told V1 that she would receive $5,000 for providing sexual services to a customer. V1 told “Sherry” that she did not want to fellate the customer and did not allow ejaculation into her vagina. “Sherry” and V1 then came to an agreement where V1 would provide three separate sessions of sexual services to the customer. “Sherry” instructed V1 to dress in her school uniform and bring along a sleeping mask to blindfold herself, and informed V1 that the earnings would be put into V1’s letterbox after the provision of sexual services.

17 On 4 August 2021, V1 proceeded to a Community Club in her Secondary School uniform and brought along a sleeping mask as requested. She headed to the agreed venue – an accessible toilet in the Community Club – and messaged to inform “Sherry” that she had arrived at the toilet. She then put on her sleeping mask and waited for the customer.

18 The Accused then entered the toilet and saw that the blindfolded V1 was wearing her school uniform. The Accused asked V1 to fellate him and, despite feeling uncomfortable, V1 did so. She squatted and fellated the Accused for about 20 minutes. While she was fellating the Accused, he placed his right hand on her left breast (over her brassiere). The Accused eventually ejaculated and then left the toilet.

19 When V1 was fellating the Accused, he turned on his mobile phone’s camera and recorded her performing this sexual act. She did not know that the Accused was recording the act as she was blindfolded and, in any event, did not agree to any such recording. The Accused recorded a video (of 11 minutes’ 23 seconds’ duration) of the act. V1’s face (save for her eyes, which were covered by a blindfold) and school uniform were fully visible. This is the subject of Voyeurism Charge 3, a TIC charge.

20 After the encounter, V1 contacted “Sherry” to ask about her payment. “Sherry” replied that V1 did not meet the requirement of three sessions with the same customer. V1 informed “Sherry” that she did not wish to continue with the remaining sessions as the customer did not respect her wishes not to engage in fellatio. “Sherry” asked V1 several times to continue the agreement but V1 refused to do so.

21 For the SPOM Charge, the Accused is liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, or to a fine, or to both. The relevant offence and punishment provisions (PC s 376A(1)(a) punishable under s 376A(2)) are as follows:

22 In AQW v Public Prosecutor [2015] 4 SLR 150 (“AQW”) at [41], the court held that for an offence under PC s 376A, the starting point sentence is between ten and 12 months’ imprisonment, based on the following circumstances:

23 I further note that AQW and the precedents cited in arriving at the indicative starting point sentencing range involved guilty pleas.

24 In relation to the SPOM Charge, the Prosecution sought a sentence of 16 to 18 months’ imprisonment. ⁶ The Defence sought a sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment. ⁷

25 I am satisfied that a sentence beyond the indicative sentencing range in AQW is warranted. Seven offence-specific factors, going to both harm and culpability, support this conclusion.

(a) First, the Accused had used the internet to procure sexual services from V1. As the Accused admitted, he had come up with a scheme that “would allow him to receive sexual services from girls and women on Locanto”, “a website for classified adverts”. ⁸ The High Court has emphasised its “contempt for such predatory behaviour in the digital realm”, observing – in the context of offences under the same provision (ie, PC s 376A(1)(a)) – that using the internet with the intention of committing sexual offences is an aggravating factor (Yap Lee Kok v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGHC 78 (“Yap Lee Kok (HC)”) at [8]–[9], where the accused had used Facebook to seek females to befriend and to pursue sexual relations with them). See also the discussion at [29(a)] and [65(c)] below.

(b) Second, the Accused had taken significant effort to conceal his identity through his use of a false online persona known as “Sherry”, making V1 wear a blindfold throughout the encounter, and arranging for the venue to be an accessible toilet at a Community Club. In Yap Lee Kok (HC), the court found that the use of false online monikers and meeting at a venue instead of the offender’s home revealed an intention to conceal identity and avoid detection (Yap Lee Kok (HC) at [10]; see also AQW at [61]). See also the discussion at [65(c)] below.

(c) Third, there was significant premeditation and planning (see also Yap Lee Kok (HC) at [11]). As is evident from [9]–[13] above, the entire scheme was designed by the Accused to allow him to receive sexual services from his victims without payment, and with his identity concealed.

(d) Fourth, the Accused had induced V1 to provide sexual services by informing her that she would receive $5,000 for such services.

(e) Fifth, the Accused had shown a blatant disregard for V1’s clearly expressed boundaries. V1 had communicated beforehand that she did not wish to perform fellatio, yet the Accused proceeded to ask her to do so. This demonstrates that the Accused was not merely opportunistic but was willing to override V1’s stated wishes in pursuit of his own gratification. The fact that V1 ultimately complied does not diminish the gravity of this conduct; rather, it underscores that the Accused had exploited a blindfolded minor who found it difficult to refuse demands made of her in that toilet. Separately, the Accused’s act of placing his hand on V1’s breast while she was fellating him was an opportunistic act of additional violation.

(f) Sixth, the Accused had reason to believe that V1 was a minor. He had instructed her to dress in her school uniform for the encounter, an instruction which she complied with by wearing her Secondary School uniform. While the Statement of Facts does not expressly state that the Accused knew that the Victim was a minor, the Defence did not disagree with the Prosecution’s argument on this point. ⁹

(g) Seventh, the Accused (through his persona, “Sherry”) asked V1 “several times” to continue the agreement with the client, despite V1 informing “Sherry” that she did not wish to continue given that her wishes (not to engage in fellatio) were not respected. ¹⁰ It is aggravating that the Accused had attempted to extract further sexual services from a minor, and to continue having sexual interactions with her after the offence.

26 In relation to offender-specific factors, I make two observations:

(a) First, there is a TIC charge involving the same victim, namely Voyeurism Charge 3. While this would ordinarily be an offender-specific aggravating factor, I do not factor it into the sentence for the SPOM Charge as it will be separately considered in the context of the Voyeurism Charges. This avoids double counting the same TIC charge.

(b) Second, it is mitigating that the Accused had pleaded guilty to the SPOM Charge.

27 I now turn to compare the SPOM Charge with the reported precedents. The relevant cases are AQW and the precedents cited there in, as well as Public Prosecutor v Yap Lee Kok [2020] SGDC 261 (“Yap Lee Kok (DC)”, which was appealed to the High Court in Yap Lee Kok (HC)).

28 In AQW, the 35-year-old accused became acquainted with a male minor through a Facebook account that he operated under a pseudonym. The accused knew that the minor was 14 years old at the material time. The accused met with the minor in person, and the minor eventually stayed at the accused’s home. That night, as they lay in bed, the accused hugged and kissed the minor, which the minor reciprocated. The accused then undressed both himself and the minor. He then fellated the minor, resulting in a charge under PC s 376A(1)(c). On appeal, the High Court reduced the sentence to a term of imprisonment of ten months, which was at the lower end of the indicative range of ten to 12 months (AQW at [64]). The High Court observed that there was no reason to depart from the indicative sentencing range – amongst other things, the High Court found that the offence was committed without much premeditation (AQW at [62]). In addition, the High Court imposed a sentence at the lower end of the range in view of the accused’s “good prospects of rehabilitation” (AQW at [64]).

29 There are significantly more aggravating factors in the present case than in AQW which, taken together, warrant a sentence significantly above the ten months’ imprisonment imposed in AQW. I highlight five differences:

(a) First, unlike in AQW where there was nothing to suggest that the accused’s use of Facebook was with the intention of committing the sexual offence against the minor (see AQW at [60] and Yap Lee Kok (HC) at [8]), the Accused here had deliberately leveraged an internet platform to procure sexual services from his victims. Indeed, it was through V1’s response to the Accused’s online advertisement that led to the sexual encounter.

(b) Second, the present case involved significant premeditation, planning, and deliberate steps to conceal the Accused’s identity. In contrast, the court in AQW found that there had not been much premeditation (AQW at [62]).

(c) Third, the Accused had induced V1 to provide sexual services with a promise of payment of $5,000, a feature absent in AQW.

(d) Fourth, the Accused showed a blatant disregard for V1’s clearly expressed boundaries by demanding fellatio despite her prior objections and subsequently seeking to persuade her to provide such services again. In contrast, there was no suggestion in AQW that the minor had been pressured to engage in the sexual acts (AQW at [8]).

(e) Fifth, unlike the accused in AQW who was found to have good prospects of rehabilitation, the same cannot be said of the Accused in the present case.

30 The present case is also more aggravated than three precedents analysed in AQW, which each resulted in a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment per charge of engaging in fellatio with a minor. These cases did not involve the elements of premeditation and planning; concealment of identity; inducement to provide sexual services; elements of coercion or exertion of pressure; or disregarding a minor’s expressed boundaries. In brief:

(a) In Public Prosecutor v Suhaimi bin Shamsudin DAC 98971/2013 (discussed in AQW at [30]), a 23-year-old accused met a 14-year-old minor through a mobile phone application, and they engaged in consensual sexual activity which included mutual fellation.

(b) In Public Prosecutor v Lim Zhixiang Adin DAC 22916/2013 (discussed in AQW at [31]), a 24-year-old accused met a 14-year-old minor through Facebook. They checked into a chalet and, that night, began hugging and kissing. The accused then fellated the minor.

(c)  In Public Prosecutor v Alex Fong Guo Yuan DAC 12314/2010 (discussed in AQW at [32]), a 26-year-old accused met a 13-year-old minor online, and through conversations on an instant messaging platform, the accused asked the minor if he was interested in meeting for sex, to which the minor said yes. The minor fellated the accused on two occasions.

31 The present case is materially more aggravated than all the abovementioned precedents.

32 In Yap Lee Kok (DC), the accused pleaded guilty to two charges under PC s 376A(1)(a). In this case, the accused had befriended the victim – a 14-year-old female – through Facebook, learnt about her age, and initiated conversations of a sexual nature. They exchanged photographs of his penis and her breasts and vagina. This eventually led to the sexual encounters that were the subject of the two proceeded charges:

(a) The first proceeded charge concerned the accused’s penile-oral penetration of the minor in the rear of the accused’s vehicle. During fellatio, the accused rubbed the minor’s exposed vagina with his finger and exposed her breasts by pulling her brassiere and t-shirt upwards, before sucking and rubbing her right nipple. The District Court considered AQW and imposed a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment for this charge (ie, at the high end of the indicative sentencing range). No appeal was brought against this sentence.

(b) The second proceeded charge concerned the accused’s penile-vaginal penetration of the same female on the same occasion, after she had fellated him (which was the subject matter of the first charge). He penetrated her vagina with his penis, before she fellated him a second time. After the second fellatio, he instructed her to lie down, held her legs apart with his hands, and penetrated her exposed vagina with his penis for a second time. Following penetration, he pulled his erect penis from her vagina and ejaculated on her stomach and face. The District Court imposed a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment for this charge. The sentence was upheld by the High Court in Yap Lee Kok (HC).

33 In imposing the above sentences, the District Court considered three TIC charges, namely – two charges under PC s 376A(1)(a) (relating to the first penile-vaginal penetration and the second fellatio), and one charge under PC s 292(1)(a) amalgamated under CPC s 124(4) (relating to the accused sending eight photographs of his penis to the minor).

34 Of the two proceeded charges in Yap Lee Kok (DC), the SPOM Charge is less egregious than the second proceeded charge. As observed by the Defence, the second proceeded charge in Yap Lee Kok (DC) involved penile-vaginal penetration of a minor and other aggravating factors (such as the lack of consent to vaginal penetration and the non-use of a condom which carried with it the unwanted risk of pregnancy). ¹¹ The first proceeded charge in Yap Lee Kok (DC) bears greater similar to the SPOM Charge, and it is against this charge that comparison should be made.

35 In relation to offence-specific factors:

(a) On the one hand, the SPOM Charge is more aggravated than the first proceeded charge in Yap Lee Kok (DC). This is in view that:

(i) First, the Accused had concealed his identity from V1 through the use of the “Sherry” persona, and by requiring V1 to be blindfolded throughout the encounter. Although a moniker was used in Yap Lee Kok (DC), the victim was not prevented from seeing the accused’s face or identifying him.

(ii) Second, the Accused induced V1 to provide sexual services by promising payment of $5,000. There was no such inducement in Yap Lee Kok (DC).

(iii) Third, the Accused went beyond V1’s indicated boundaries regarding her unwillingness to perform fellatio by asking her to fellate him when she was blindfolded and in a confined space (ie, an accessible toilet) with him. In Yap Lee Kok (DC), it appears that the victim had agreed after some persuasion to meet with the accused to perform fellatio on him (Yap Lee Kok (DC) at [6(a)] and [10(b)]).

(b) On the other hand, the first proceeded charge in Yap Lee Kok (DC) is more aggravated than the SPOM Charge in that the accused had forged a friendship with the victim prior to the sexual encounter and had additionally made skin-to-skin contact with the victim’s vagina and nipple during the encounter (see [32(a)]).

36 In relation to offender-specific factors:

(a) First, while there were related TIC charges in Yap Lee Kok (DC) (see [33] above), it is unclear if or how these were factored into the sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment on the first proceeded charge.

(b) Second, on appeal, the High Court noted the accused’s efforts in voluntarily attending counselling sessions and observed that these were “indicative of his resolve to change”, and that “rehabilitation therefore factors into the sentencing equation” although deterrence and retribution ultimately remained the paramount considerations (Yap Lee Kok (HC) at [23]). In contrast, there is nothing in the present case that would similarly bring rehabilitation into the sentencing equation.

37 Having considered the offence-specific and offender-specific factors in relation to the SPOM Charge, as well as the various sentencing precedents, I agree with the Defence that an appropriate imprisonment term for the SPOM Charge is 14 months’ imprisonment. This is above the indicative sentencing range in AQW, and is warranted by the numerous aggravating factors in this case. No further sentencing reduction is given on account of the Accused’s guilty plea, given that the cited precedents concerned sentencing in guilty plea scenarios.

38 The Accused pleaded guilty to two proceeded Fraud Charges under PC s 420A(1) punishable under s 420A(2). These concerned his fraudulent obtaining of sexual services from victims on the basis of an intention to pay a promised fee, which he had no intention of paying, thus dishonestly inducing the victims to deliver sexual services to him. He consented to Fraud Charges 3, 4 and 5 being TIC for the purposes of sentencing.

39 I set out the facts relating to the Fraud Charges 1 and 2. These are based on the Statement of Facts, to which the Accused admitted without qualification.

40 Fraud Charge 1 involved V2, a female victim who was 19 years old at the time of the offence.

41 Sometime before 1 January 2021, V2 came across the Accused’s advertisement on Locanto, and provided her handphone number to the Accused. The Accused, posing as “Sherry”, contacted V2 on the WhatsApp messaging service and began to engage in conversation with her. Through the conversation, V2 agreed to a cash-for-sex arrangement which would involve V2 being blindfolded during the encounter. V2 was told that she would be able to earn up to $5,000 for her services. “Sherry” then informed V2 to show up blindfolded as she was not meant to know the client’s identity. “Sherry” requested that V2 send photographs of her face and body, and V2 did so.

42 Within a week, “Sherry” contacted V2 and arranged for her to meet with the supposed client for sexual intercourse. V2 agreed to have sex with the client without a condom, and to allow the client to ejaculate in her mouth, for payment of $5,000. “Sherry” informed V2 that the client had requested that she wear a blindfold when meeting him, and V2 agreed.

43 On 1 January 2021, V2 headed to a specific room in a hotel in Chinatown. She put on a sleeping mask before knocking on the door. The Accused, posing as the client, was waiting in the room. When V2 knocked on the door, the Accused opened the door and brought her into the room. They then entered the shower, where they showered together. Throughout this, V2’s sleeping mask continued to cover her eyes. After the shower, the Accused led V2 to the hotel bed. V2 then performed oral sex on the Accused before they had penile-vaginal sexual intercourse which lasted for about an hour.

44 After sexual intercourse, V2 and the Accused had a conversation. The Accused told her that he would arrange for a second session and would make payment for both sessions. However, he never intended to pay her for her services. Had she known this, she would not have provided such sexual services.

45 Following the encounter, V2 followed up with “Sherry” for payment. “Sherry” provided V2 various excuses for why payment could not be made, and V2 did not eventually receive any payment.

46 Fraud Charge 2 involved V3, a female victim who was 22 years old at the time of the offence.

47 Sometime before 31 July 2021, V3 came across the Accused’s advertisement on Locanto, and provided her Telegram ID to the Accused. The Accused, posing as “Sherry”, contacted V3 shortly after this. “Sherry” informed V3 that “Sherry” was from an agency and could introduce clients to V3. “Sherry” told V3 that she could earn up to $5,000 for sexual intercourse with a client while blindfolded, ad that payment would be made the day after sexual intercourse. V3 agreed to this arrangement and sent photographs of herself to “Sherry” via Telegram.

48 Within a week, “Sherry” messaged V3 to inform her that there was a client for her. “Sherry” told V3 that the client wanted to have sexual intercourse without a condom, and that V3 had to be blindfolded throughout the session. V3 agreed to these terms in exchange for earning up to $5,000.

49 An appointment was scheduled for 31 July 2021. A few days prior to this, “Sherry” instructed V3 to book a hotel room at a hotel in Trengganu Street. V3 booked a room online and paid $198 for the room.

50 On 31 July 2021, V3 proceeded to the hotel and checked into the room. “Sherry” instructed V3 to put on her eye mask before opening the door for the client. Sometime after V3 entered the room and put on her eye mask, the Accused knocked on the door posing as the client.

51 V3 proceeded to open the door for the Accused. In the room, V3 fellated the Accused and had penile-vaginal intercourse with him. The Accused ejaculated on V3’s body after half an hour of intercourse. He then told her that he would be making payment to “Sherry”, and that “Sherry” would transfer the money to her.

52 V3 provided these sexual services to the Accused on 31 July 2021, believing that she would be paid up to $5,000 for the services provided. However, the Accused did not intend to pay her for the services. Had she known this, she would not have provided such sexual services.

53 After the encounter on 31 July 2021, “Sherry” messaged V3 and asked if she could meet the client again on 16 August 2021. V3 agreed and booked a room at another hotel.

54 On 16 August 2021, V3 headed to the room she had booked and waited in the room while wearing her sleep mask. She let the Accused in when he arrived at the room. Again, she fellated the Accused and had penile-vaginal sexual intercourse with him, before the Accused ejaculated. The Accused then told V3 that he wanted a long-term relationship with her, and that if V3 agreed, he would deal directly with her and pay her via fund transfer.

55 V3 provided these sexual services to the Accused on 16 August 2021, believing that she would be paid up to $5,000 for the services provided. However, the Accused did not intend to pay her for the services. Had she known this, she would not have provided such sexual services.

56 Following the encounter on 16 August 2021, V3 asked “Sherry” for the money. However, “Sherry” dodged V3’s requests for payment, before becoming unresponsive and blocking V3.

57 For completeness, the Prosecution has not preferred a charge against the Accused for the encounter on 16 August 2021. ¹² However, the Prosecution’s position is that the repetition of the Accused’s conduct is an aggravating circumstance to be considered in sentencing. ¹³

58 For each of Fraud Charges 1 and 2, the Accused is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or to a fine, or to both. The relevant offence and punishment provisions (PC s 420A(1) punishable under s 420A(2)) are as follows:

59 In relation to the sentencing approach, the Prosecution submitted that guidance should be taken from De Beers, which established the sentencing framework for cases involving cheating to procure sex and other sexual acts under PC s 417. ¹⁴ The Prosecution submitted that both De Beers and the Fraud Charges involved an offender posing as a freelance agent to lure victims who wanted to provide sexual services for money, and deceived them into providing sexual services to the offender himself. However, given that the maximum imprisonment term under PC s 420A(2) (ten years’ imprisonment) is more than three times higher than that under PC s 417 (three years’ imprisonment), the Prosecution submitted that an uplift ought to be imposed on the sentencing ranges set out in De Beers. ¹⁵

60 Defence Counsel disagreed with the Prosecution on the application of De Beers. Instead, Defence Counsel submitted that the applicable guidance is found in Public Prosecutor v Abdul Rahman Bin A Karim [2021] SGDC 72 (“Abdul Rahman”), where the court declined to propose a sentencing matrix for offences under PC s 420A (see Abdul Rahman at [57]–[59]).

61 I agree with the Prosecution that it is appropriate to adapt the De Beers sentencing framework in relation to the Fraud Charges, for the following reasons.

(a) First, as the Prosecution rightly observed (see [59] above), there are close parallels between the offence of cheating to procure sex (under PC s 417) and that of obtaining sexual services dishonestly or fraudulently (under PC s 420A). I acknowledge that in De Beers, the court expressed doubt as to whether PC s 420A would have applied to the facts before it (De Beers at [35]). However, that doubt arose from two features in that case: the victims were “auditioning for a role” rather than providing sexual “services” to the accused, and were in any event not doing so with any expectation of payment (De Beers at [35]). The court was not suggesting that the sentencing framework developed for cases involving cheating to procure sex under PC s 417 cannot be suitably adapted to the dishonest or fraudulent obtaining of sexual services under PC s 420A.

(b) Second, in Abdul Rahman, the court had declined to propose a sentencing framework for PC s 420A on the basis that such offences may arise in factually diverse situations involving varying degrees of harm and culpability (Abdul Rahman at [59(b)]). That reservation must, however, be understood in its proper context: the court in Abdul Rahman did not have the benefit of De Beers, which had yet to be decided. In De Beers, the court acknowledged that cheating offences under PC s 417 did not readily lend themselves to a sentencing framework because of the array of different scenarios that might arise, but nonetheless found it appropriate to establish a harm-culpability sentencing matrix for a “particular species of cheating” involving “cheating to procure sex and other sexual acts” (De Beers at [38]). In my view, the reasoning applies with equal force to PC s 420A: a sentencing matrix can be usefully applied to a particular species of offending under PC s 420A that involves the dishonest or fraudulent obtaining of sexual services.

(c) Third, the harm-culpability sentencing matrix in De Beers accounts for the full range of sentences provided for in the offence-creating provision, and does not ignore the higher ranges of sentences that may be imposed (De Beers at [40]). This helps ameliorate the potential concern that prosecuting offences that involve a violation of a victim’s bodily and sexual integrity under PC s 417 may result in understating the gravity of such offences (De Beers at [40]). These observations apply with equal force to PC s 420A. As with offences involving cheating for sex under PC s 417, offences involving the dishonest or fraudulent obtaining of sexual services under PC s 420A likewise “rank at a particularly high level of odium and gravity” (De Beers at [39]) within the sentencing range prescribed for the offence.

(d) Fourth, I acknowledge that two post-De Beers decisions involving PC s 420A did not apply the De Beers framework – namely, Public Prosecutor v Tan Chip Huat [2022] SGDC 180 (“Tan Chip Huat”) and Public Prosecutor v Ng Hui Yi [2022] SGDC 279 (“Ng Hui Yi”). Both courts instead applied Abdul Rahman (see Tan Chip Huat at [79]–[84] and Ng Hui Yi at [63]). That said, De Beers was not discussed in those cases. I therefore do not regard those decisions as foreclosing the approach I have taken.

62 Adapting from the De Beers sentencing framework, but accounting for the higher maximum punishment for offences under PC s 420A, the sentencing ranges for offences under PC s 420A, on a claim-trial basis, are as follows:

63 In Abdul Rahman, the court set out a non-exhaustive list of harm and culpability factors relating to the dishonest or fraudulent obtaining of sexual services. These factors remain useful for assessing where a case falls within the harm-culpability matrix set out at [62] above. I revisit them here, and where appropriate, offer refinement or supplementation.

64 Factors relevant to harm include:

(a) First, the amount cheated. The amount cheated represents at least part of the harm caused to the victim (Abdul Rahman at [64]). A higher amount cheated should ordinarily lead to a higher sentence (Abdul Rahman at [64]).

(b) Second, the nature of the sexual services provided. Penile-vaginal or penile-oral sexual intercourse, for instance, rank amongst the most intrusive forms of sexual activity, involving a significant compromise of the victim’s bodily and sexual autonomy.

(c) Third, whether the sexual services rendered went beyond those agreed upon. Where the accused obtained more from the victim than she had consented to provide, this occasions additional harm to the victim. It is therefore aggravating if, for instance, the victim agreed to have paid protected sex with the accused but was subsequently made to have unprotected sex on the accused’s insistence (see Tan Chip Huat at [21] and [82(b)], cited illustratively as the court there analysed this conduct from the perspective of the health risks of unprotected sex rather than the victim being made to provide more than what she had agreed to).

(d) Fourth, whether other forms of harm were caused to the victim.

(i) This includes physical harm, for instance, where the accused continued the sexual acts despite the victim’s protests, causing her pain (Abdul Rahman at [82] – the accused forcefully penetrated the victim’s anus with his penis despite her screams and pleas to stop, causing her immense pain; the victim subsequently experienced pain and bleeding when washing her anal cavity; Tan Chip Huat at [82(d)] – the accused continued penile-vaginal intercourse despite the victim’s requests to stop, causing her to scream in pain).

(ii) It also includes psychological harm, which exists on a spectrum. At one end sits transient emotional distress or emotional distress that does not rise to the level of medically established psychiatric harm, such as fear in the moment or anxiety caused by the risk of unwanted pregnancy or transmission of sexual disease arising from unprotected sex (Tan Chip Huat at [82(b)]; Yap Lee Kok (HC) at [16], cited illustratively as it concerned a distinct offence of sexual penetration of a minor under PC s 376A(1)(a)). At the other end sits “lasting and medically established psychiatric harm” (De Beers at [45], cited illustratively as it concerned a distinct offence of cheating for sex under PC s 417).

(iii) Also relevant is any significant embarrassment or loss of reputation suffered by the victim as a result of the offence (Abdul Rahman at [66(a)]; Tan Chip Huat at [80] and [81(a)]).

65 Factors relevant to culpability include:

(a) First, the offender’s motive for committing the offence. This refers to why the offender committed the offence, rather than the offender’s mens rea (see Public Prosecutor v GED and other appeals [2023] 3 SLR 1221 (“GED”) at [63]). For instance, where the offender harboured an additional intention to harm or humiliate the victim, this is an aggravating factor going to culpability (GED at [66]). While GED concerned an offence under PC s 377BE, the principle expressed ought also to apply in the present case. For instance, where the offender’s motive for committing the PC s 420A offence goes beyond the mere obtaining of sexual services without payment and into harming or humiliating the victim, this is an aggravating factor going to culpability.

(b) Second, the degree of planning and premeditation. Where an offender has carefully planned and premeditated the offence, this reflects a higher degree of culpability than an offence that was committed on impulse or opportunistically, as the deliberate nature of such conduct reflects a stronger and more considered commitment to breaking the law (Abdul Rahman at [68]).

(c) Third, the level of sophistication and difficulty of detection. This includes the complexity and scale of the criminal operation in question (Abdul Rahman at [70]). Where an offender has taken deliberate and carefully orchestrated steps to evade detection (Abdul Rahman at [71]) – whether through elaborate ruses, false identities, or other deceptive measures – this heightens culpability. The use of online platforms as a vehicle for offending is similarly aggravating, as such platforms not only afford the offender a greater degree of anonymity but also extend the reach of the criminal operation, thereby exposing a larger pool of potential victims to harm (Abdul Rahman at [72]). Also relevant is whether the accused arranged for the sexual services to be provided at a venue deliberately chosen to minimise any connection to him, thereby reducing the risk that his identity would be discovered (Abdul Rahman at [90]; see also AQW at [61] and Yap Lee Kok (HC) at [10], albeit in the context of different offence provisions).

(d) Fourth, the role played by the offender. An offender who was the mastermind or organiser of the deceptive operation is more culpable than one who was a mere participant.

(e) Fifth, the duration and persistence of deception. Where the deception was sustained over a prolonged period, this ordinarily reflects greater persistence in unlawful conduct and thus higher culpability than a deception that was brief or spontaneous.

66 The relevant offender-specific factors are well-established and need not be discussed at length. In brief, the aggravating factors include charges TIC for the purposes of sentencing, relevant antecedents, and lack of remorse, while the mitigating factors include the presence of a guilty plea, voluntary restitution, and cooperation with the authorities (Abdul Rahman at [74]–[75]).

67 I turn now to the sentencing analysis and decision for Fraud Charges 1 and 2.

68 In relation to Fraud Charge 1, the Prosecution sought a sentence of 32 to 40 months’ imprisonment after factoring in a sentencing reduction of 20% (on account of the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 2 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines). ¹⁶ The Defence sought a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment after a 20% sentencing reduction. ¹⁷

69 On a harm-culpability analysis, I found that Fraud Charge 1 falls within the medium harm, medium culpability band of the matrix, which attracts an indicative sentencing range of 30 to 60 months’ imprisonment on a claim trial basis.

70 In my assessment, the harm done is at the lower end of the medium harm band, for the following reasons:

(a) First, in relation to the amount cheated, V2 was promised $5,000 for her sexual services. She was not paid this amount.

(b) Second, V2 provided the Accused with penile-vaginal and penile-oral sexual intercourse, which are highly intrusive forms of sexual activity.

(c) Third, the sexual services rendered were within the bounds of the arrangement between V2 and “Sherry”, given that she had agreed to have unprotected sex with the client and to allow the client to ejaculate in her mouth for $5,000.

(d) Fourth, there was no evidence of any significant other forms of harm caused to V2.

71 In relation to culpability, the Accused’s culpability is situated at the middle of the medium culpability band, for the following reasons:

(a) First, there is no evidence that the Accused’s motive for committing the offence went beyond the obtaining of sexual services without payment.

(b) Second, there was a significant degree of planning and premeditation. The Accused had created a profile on Locanto holding himself out as a female agent known as “Sherry” and took steps to conceal his identity during the sexual encounter by requiring V2 to wear a blindfold throughout.

(c) Third, and related to the above, there was a moderate level of sophistication, and the offending was not easy to detect. The Accused utilised a false female identity (ie, “Sherry”) and an online platform to achieve a greater degree of anonymity and to extend the reach of his criminal scheme. The requirement that V2 remain blindfolded throughout the encounter further reduced the risk of detection, as did the Accused’s arrangement for the encounter to take place in a hotel room (rather than at a location where he might more readily have been identified, such as his residence – see Abdul Rahman at [90]).

(d) Fourth, the Accused was the sole mastermind of the scheme and the sole recipient of the sexual services obtained from V2.

(e) Fifth, the deception lasted for approximately a week from the time V2 responded to the Accused’s advertisement on Locanto. While this is not a particularly extended period, it is aggravating that the Accused attempted to perpetuate the deception by arranging a second sexual encounter with V2 despite not paying (and not intending to pay) her for the first sexual encounter.

72 Keeping these factors in mind, I assess Fraud Charge 1 to fall below the middle of the medium harm, medium culpability band. The indicative sentence is therefore around 35 months’ imprisonment on a claim trial basis.

73 I pause to address Defence Counsel’s argument that the indicative imprisonment term for Fraud Charge 1 should be 30 months’ imprisonment on a claim-trial basis, by reference to the indicative term of 24 months’ imprisonment in Abdul Rahman. ¹⁸ In my judgment, a comparison of the two cases does not support this conclusion. This is because Fraud Charge 1 is in several respects more aggravated than Abdul Rahman.

(a) Specifically, Fraud Charge 1 is more aggravated than Abdul Rahman in the following ways:

(i) First, the amount cheated was substantially higher in Fraud Charge 1 than in Abdul Rahman ($5,000 as compared to $1,500).

(ii) Second, the deception was more elaborate and the difficulty of detection greater. The Accused arranged for the encounter to take place at a hotel, a venue unconnected to him and which left no trace of his identity, and also required V2 to remain blindfolded throughout the encounter. Both of these measures to conceal his identity were absent in Abdul Rahman, where the services were rendered at the accused’s home and he had provided his phone number to the victim.

(iii) Third, the duration of the deception was longer and the Accused’s persistence in the scheme more pronounced – the lead-up to the encounter spanned approximately a week as compared to what was effectively a same-day encounter in Abdul Rahman. In addition, the Accused had further attempted to arrange a second sexual encounter with V2 despite having no intention of paying her for the first.

(b) The main aggravating factor in Abdul Rahman that is absent in Fraud Charge 1 is the anal intercourse which had caused the victim physical pain.

74 Holistically considered, an indicative sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment is not disproportionate when compared with Abdul Rahman.

75 In relation to offender-specific factors, the main aggravating factor concerns the Fraud Charges 3, 4 and 5 which are TIC. To avoid double counting this aggravating factor, however, I will consider the TIC charges only in relation to Fraud Charge 2. The only mitigating factor is the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 2 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines, which would afford him a sentencing reduction of up to 20%.

76 In relation to Fraud Charge 1, a claim-trial sentence would have been around 35 months’ imprisonment. Applying the 20% sentencing reduction, the eventual sentence for Fraud Charge 1 is 28 months’ imprisonment.

77 In relation to Fraud Charge 2, the Prosecution sought a sentence of 40 to 45 months’ imprisonment after factoring in a 20% sentencing reduction. ¹⁹ The Defence sought a sentence of 22 months’ imprisonment after a 20% sentencing reduction. ²⁰ The Defence’s position is somewhat puzzling as it suggested a lower sentence for Fraud Charge 2 than Fraud Charge 1, when the former is evidently more aggravated than the latter.

78 On a harm-culpability analysis, Fraud Charge 2 is more aggravated than Fraud Charge 1, although it would still fall within the medium harm, medium culpability band. This is primarily on account of the additional harm and culpability arising from the second sexual encounter on 16 August 2021, which would itself have constituted a separate instance of a PC s 420A offence. Although no charge has been preferred in respect of this second encounter, the Prosecution has urged that it ought to be considered holistically in determining the appropriate sentence. ²¹ The Defence has not objected to this approach and has indeed accepted that both incidents are relevant to the sentencing exercise. ²²

79 The decision in GED is instructive in relation to what the court has referred to as “uncharged adjacent offending”, ie, “facts surrounding the commission of the [charged offence] which could have given rise to separate charges against the offender, but in respect of which no charges were brought by the Prosecution” (GED at [82]). The general principles guiding the relevance of uncharged adjacent offending are as follows:

(a) First, the court may have regard to relevant facts that may constitute an uncharged separate offence, provided the facts have been admitted or proved (GED at [83], citing Cheang Geok Lin v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 548 (“Cheang Geok Lin”) at [27]–[30]).

(b) Second, the facts must have a “sufficient nexus” to the offence for which the offender is being punished; what constitutes sufficient nexus is a fact-sensitive inquiry that depends on the circumstances of the case, and particularly the degree of temporal and spatial proximity between the uncharged offending and the charged offence (GED at [83], citing Chua Siew Peng v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2017] 4 SLR 1247 at [84]). In this regard, the court takes a common-sense and contextual approach when considering the importance of the proved relevant facts (GED at [83], citing Public Prosecutor v Bong Sim Swan Suzanna [2020] 2 SLR 1217 (“Suzanna Bong”) at [73]).

(c) Third, the court cannot impose a sentence that is aimed at punishing the offender for an uncharged offence, even if such an offence is disclosed on the facts (GED at [84]). It cannot effectively allow the Prosecution to achieve the effect of aggregating the sentences imposed for both the charged and the uncharged offences (GED at [84]).

(d) Fourth, any enhancement of sentence must be balanced against the extent to which the offender could have been punished had a separate charge been brought (GED at [84], citing Cheang Geok Lin at [27] and [31], and Suzanna Bong at [64]).

80 In relation to Fraud Charge 2, it is appropriate to take the 16 August 2021 encounter into account as uncharged adjacent offending, for the following reasons:

(a) First, the facts of that encounter have been admitted by the Accused through his acceptance of the Statement of Facts, satisfying the requirement in [79(a)] above.

(b) Second, there is a sufficient nexus between the 16 August 2021 encounter and the charged offence of 31 July 2021. The two encounters were not independent or unrelated events. Rather, they formed part of a single, continuous deception that the Accused maintained from the outset (see [53]–[56] above).

(c) Third, I am mindful of the constraints in [79(c)] and [79(d)] above. I take the 16 August 2021 encounter into account not as a separate offence to be punished, but as a surrounding fact that bears on the gravity of the charged offence – specifically, on the duration and persistence of the Accused’s deception and the cumulative harm visited upon V3.

81 Against this backdrop, I find that the harm done is above the middle of the medium harm band, for the following reasons:

(a) First, in relation to the amount cheated, V3 was promised $5,000 for her sexual services on 31 July 2021. She was not paid this amount. She also incurred personal loss when complying with instructions from “Sherry” to book a hotel room for the sexual encounter, at a cost of $198. Taking into account the 16 August 2021 encounter as uncharged adjacent offending, V3 again provided sexual services to the Accused on the same fraudulent promise of $5,000 and similarly bore the cost of booking a hotel room. The total financial loss suffered by V3 across both encounters therefore exceeded the $5,000 promised for the charged offence alone.

(b) Second, V3 provided the Accused with penile-vaginal and penile-oral sexual intercourse, which are highly intrusive forms of sexual activity. This happened not just on 31 July 2021, but subsequently on 16 August 2021.

(c) Third, the sexual services rendered were within the bounds of the arrangement between V3 and “Sherry”, given that she had agreed to have unprotected sex with the client.

(d) Fourth, there was no evidence of any significant other forms of harm caused to V3.

82 I find that the Accused’s culpability is above the middle of the medium culpability band. The same reasons as those listed in [71(a)]–[71(d)] above (in relation to Fraud Charge 1) apply equally to Fraud Charge 2. However, the Accused’s culpability is higher in Fraud Charge 2 given that the duration and persistence of deception was significantly increased here. The deception extended to a further (unpaid) sexual encounter on 16 August 2021, and culminated in the Accused suggesting a long-term relationship with V3 through which she would be paid by fund transfer.

83 Keeping these factors in mind, I assess Fraud Charge 2 to fall above the middle of the medium harm, medium culpability band. The indicative sentence is therefore around 48 months’ imprisonment on a claim trial basis.

84 In relation to offender-specific factors, the main aggravating factor concerns the TIC Fraud Charges 3, 4 and 5. Each of these charges involves a serious offence, involving amounts cheated of $3,000 (Fraud Charge 3), “a few thousand Singapore dollars” (Fraud Charge 4), ²³ and $5,000 (Fraud Charge 5). This warrants an uplift of four months’ imprisonment.

85 The only mitigating factor is the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 2 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines, which would afford him a sentencing reduction of up to 20%.

86 In relation to Fraud Charge 2, a claim-trial sentence would have been around 52 months’ imprisonment. Applying the 20% sentencing reduction, the eventual sentence for Fraud Charge 2 is 41 months’ two weeks’ imprisonment.

87 The Accused pleaded guilty to Voyeurism Charges 1 and 2, both under PC s 377BB(5) punishable under PC s 377BB(7). These concern the Accused’s video recording of his victims’ genitals, breasts and/or buttocks during sexual activity with him, without their consent. He consented to Voyeurism Charges 3 and 4 being TIC for the purposes of sentencing.

88 I set out the facts relating to the Voyeurism Charges 1 and 2. These are based on the Statement of Facts, to which the Accused admitted without qualification.

89 During the sexual encounter mention at [43] above, the Accused used his mobile phone to record three videos of the sexual acts between him and V1, without V1’s knowledge or consent. The videos were as follows:

(a) First, a video of 6 minutes 32 seconds in duration, capturing V1 fellating the Accused and engaging in sexual intercourse with him. Her breasts were visible and her face (aside from her eyes) was fully visible.

(b) Second, a video of 15 minutes 46 seconds in duration, capturing V1 fellating the Accused and engaging in sexual intercourse with him. Her genitals, breasts and buttocks were visible, and her face (aside from her eyes) was fully visible.

(c) Third, a video of 3 minutes 20 seconds in duration, capturing V1 fellating the Accused. Her breasts were fully visible, and her face (aside from her eyes) was fully visible.

90 While V3 was engaging in sexual activity with the Accused on 31 July 2021 (see [51] above), he used his mobile phone to make video recordings of the encounter (“the 31 July Footage”). The 31 July Footage, which was 29 minutes and 1 second in duration, captured V3 fellating and engaging in sexual intercourse with him. Her breasts, buttocks and face (aside from her eyes) were fully visible in the video. V3 was unaware that she was being recorded and had not consented to this.

91 While V3 was engaging in sexual activity with the Accused on 16 August 2021 (see [54] above), he set up his mobile phone on the bedside to record the encounter. He made two recordings without V3’s knowledge or consent (collectively, “the 16 August Footage”):

(a) First, a video of 8 minutes 38 seconds in duration, capturing V3 fellating the Accused and engaging in sexual intercourse with him. Her genitals, breasts, buttocks and face (aside from her eyes) were fully visible in the video.

(b) Second, a video of 4 minutes 17 seconds in duration, capturing V3 fellating the Accused. Her breasts and face (aside from her eyes) were fully visible in the video.

92 For Voyeurism Charge 1, the Accused is liable to be punished with imprisonment for up to two years, or with fine, or with caning, or with any combination of such punishments The relevant offence and punishment provisions (PC s 377BB(5) punishable under s 377BB(7)) are as follows:

93 For Voyeurism Charge 2, which is an amalgamated charge under CPC s 124(4) punishable under s 124(8)(a)(ii), the court may sentence the Accused to up to twice the amount of punishment to which he would otherwise have been liable for an offence under PC s 377BB(5) punishable under s 377BB(7). As such, he may be punished with imprisonment for up to four years, or with fine, or with caning, or with any combination of such punishments.

94 Two sentencing frameworks are relevant to the Voyeurism Charges. The first is the framework established in Nicholas Tan, which – as explained below – applies to offences under PC s 377BB(5) punishable under s 377BB(7). The second is the framework established in Prakash, which applies to amalgamated charges.

95 For Voyeurism Charge 1, only the Nicholas Tan framework applies. As for Voyeurism Charge 2, which is an amalgamated charge, the Prakash framework ought to serve as the overarching framework, with the Nicholas Tan framework applying primarily in relation to the appropriate sentence for the “base offence” at the first stage of the Prakash framework. I elaborate on the details of each framework and their interaction below.

96 In Nicholas Tan, the court established a sentencing framework for an offence under PC s 377BB(4) punishable under s 377BB(7), based on the two-stage, five-step framework in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 609. A brief outline of this framework is as follows:

(a) Step 1: Consider offence-specific factors to identify the level of harm caused by the offence, and the level of the offender’s culpability (Nicholas Tan at [64]).

(b) Step 2: Identify the applicable indicative sentencing range, based on the following sentencing matrix which applies to a first offender convicted after trial (Nicholas Tan at [83]):

(c) Step 3: Identify the appropriate starting point within the indicative sentencing range.

(d) Step 4: Consider offender-specific factors, both aggravating and mitigating. These are the well-settled factors that are generally applicable across all criminal offences (Nicholas Tan at [87]; see also [66] above).

(e) Step 5: In a case where the offender has been convicted of multiple charges, the court will consider whether adjustments to the sentence for individual charges is required in view of the totality principle (Nicholas Tan at [88]).

97 The preliminary issue is whether the Nicholas Tan framework, which was established in relation to an offence under PC s 377BB(4), should be applied to an offence under PC s 377BB(5). In Nicholas Tan, the court saw no reason why the same sentencing framework should not so apply, but preferred to leave this point to be considered in an appropriate future case (Nicholas Tan at [62]).

98 In my judgment, the Nicholas Tan framework applies to an offence under PC s 377BB(5). I draw on the reasons expressed in Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Faiz Bin Mohamed Yasin [2023] SGMC 28 (“Muhammad Faiz”) (a case concerning PC s 377BB(2)) and Public Prosecutor v Devin Ngo Rong Siang [2024] SGMC 5 (“Devin Ngo”) at [38]–[39], and supplement these with an observation specifically on PC s 377BB(5).

(a) First, there is nothing in the legislative history surrounding the introduction of voyeurism offences into the PC that indicates a Parliamentary intention that each distinct manifestation of voyeurism under PC s 377BB should be governed by a separate sentencing framework (see Muhammad Faiz at [24]–[32]).

(b) Second, the Penal Code Reform Committee’s Report, which eventuated in the enactment of the voyeurism offences in the PC, did not suggest that a different sentencing framework should apply for each manifestation of voyeurism under PC s 377BB (Muhammad Faiz at [32]). Indeed, the Committee’s recommended scheme of punishment was that the same maximum imprisonment terms should apply to the offences of observance, accessing and possession, and the making of voyeuristic recordings (Muhammad Faiz at [32]).

(c) Third, similar mitigating and aggravating factors remain applicable for the various offences of voyeurism under PC s 377BB (Muhammad Faiz at [33]).

(d) Fourth, there is an inevitable overlap in the nature of offences that could potentially fall within the various offence-creating provisions in PC s 377BB (Devin Ngo at [39]).

(e) Fifth, and specifically in relation to PC s 377BB(5), there are substantial similarities between this provision and PC s 377BB(4). Both provisions are directed at the same object of the prohibited conduct, namely, a victim’s genital region, breasts (for females), or buttocks (whether exposed or covered) in circumstances where they would not otherwise be visible: PC s 377BB(4)(a) and s 377BB(5)(a). Both provisions prescribe the same mens rea, namely, that the offender must know or have reason to believe that the victim did not consent: PC s 377BB(4)(b) and s 377BB(5)(b). Further, offences under both provisions are punished under the same provision, with the same type and range of sentences, ie, PC s 377BB(7). The sole distinction between the two provisions lies in the nature of the offender’s act: the offence under PC s 377BB(4) is committed by operating equipment with the intention of enabling observation of the mentioned private regions, regardless of whether any recording was in fact made (see Nicholas Tan at [7]), whereas the offence under PC s 377BB(5) requires that an actual recording of those regions has been made. This distinction does not, however, preclude the application of a common sentencing framework for the reasons explored in [98(a)]–[98(d)] above. That said, the analysis of the harm and culpability factors at Step 1 of the Nicholas Tan framework must necessarily be calibrated to the specific offence in question. For instance, the making of a recording is identified as an aggravating offence-specific harm factor in the context of a PC s 377BB(4) offence (see Nicholas Tan at [69]). However, where the offence charged is under PC s 377BB(5), this should not be treated as a separate aggravating factor since the making of a recording is an inherent element of the PC s 377BB(5) offence.

99 For completeness, the Nicholas Tan framework was previously applied to offences under PC s 377BB(5) in Public Prosecutor v Ng Sheng Wei Dean [2024] SGDC 185 (see [55]–[61]) (“Dean Ng”) and Public Prosecutor v Elgin Ng [2026] SGDC 51 (“Elgin Ng”).

100 As Voyeurism Charge 2 is an amalgamated charge, the three-stage framework in Prakash applies. Under this framework:

(a) At the first stage, the court identifies the punishment prescribed for a single instance of offending, ie, the “base offence” (Prakash at [42] and [129(a)]). The court applies the relevant sentencing framework or benchmark for the “base offence”, or draws on analogous precedents where no such framework or benchmark exists. The sentencing factors considered at this stage are offence-specific in nature, encompassing the harm caused and the manner and mode in which the offence was committed (Prakash at [42]).

(b) At the second stage, the court determines the appropriate starting point sentence for the amalgamated offence, based on a holistic assessment of the offence-specific factors bearing on the aggregate harm caused and the offender’s overall culpability over the entire course of conduct (Prakash at [43] and [129(b)]). The court has regard to the doubled punishment limit in CPC s 124(8)(a)(ii), and considers the following factors in this assessment:

(i) First, in addition to the culpability-related factors identified at the first stage, the court considers the duration and frequency of the offending conduct (Prakash at [45(a)] and [129(b)(i)]). Where an offender has repeated the offence multiple times over a sustained period, this demonstrates greater recalcitrance, which is an aggravating factor.

(ii) Second, in assessing the harm caused by the course of conduct, the court has regard to the factors identified at the first stage (Prakash at [45(b)] and [129(b)(ii)]).

(iii) Third, the court considers whether the nature of the aggregate offending warrants a different type of sentence altogether, such as crossing the custodial threshold (Prakash at [45(c)] and [129(b)(iii)]).

(c) At the third stage, the court adjusts the starting point sentence to account for offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors (Prakash at [46] and [129(c)]). These are the same factors as those applicable to non-amalgamated offences (Prakash at [46] and [129(c)]).

101 As foreshadowed at [95] above, in relation to Voyeurism Charge 2, the Prakash framework should be applied as the overarching framework given that the charge is an amalgamated charge. The Nicholas Tan framework (specifically, the first three steps thereof), which was established in relation to non-amalgamated charges, applies primarily in identifying the punishment for the “base offence” at the first stage of the Prakash framework. The fourth step of Nicholas Tan, concerning offender-specific factors, will be considered at the third stage of the Prakash framework, as this assessment rightly takes place only after the court has determined a starting sentence for the amalgamated charge. The fifth step of Nicholas Tan, which concerns the proportionality of the global sentence in cases involving multiple charges, will then be considered as the final step.

102 This approach is warranted for two reasons:

(a) First, the sentencing matrix in Nicholas Tan spans only the sentencing range for a non-amalgamated charge. It is capped at two years’ (or 24 months’) imprisonment. Amalgamated charges are, however, subject to a doubled punishment limit in CPC s 124(8)(a)(ii) – a factor to be considered at the second stage of the Prakash framework. It is therefore logical that the Nicholas Tan sentencing matrix should be applied to the “base offence” (at the first stage of Prakash) rather than the amalgamated offence (at the second stage of Prakash). To apply the matrix at the second stage of Prakash may lead one to overlook the full range of punishment for an amalgamated offence.

(b) Second, this approach preserves clarity in analysing the starting point sentences for the “base offence”, and in comparing these with precedent cases (especially those which involve non-amalgamated charges).

103 Deterrence is generally the dominant sentencing consideration for voyeuristic offences; indeed, it would rarely be the case that emphasis would shift to rehabilitation, even where the offender had demonstrated an extremely strong propensity for reform (Nicholas Tan at [42]). This is because (Nicholas Tan at [43]–[48]):

104 The sentencing court must therefore send a stern and unequivocal signal that such offences will not be tolerated (Nicholas Tan at [43]).

105 I turn now to the sentencing analysis and decision for Voyeurism Charges 1 and 2.

106 In relation to Voyeurism Charge 1, the Prosecution sought a sentence of eight months’ imprisonment and one stroke of the cane, after factoring in a 20% sentencing reduction on account of the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 2 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines. ²⁴ The Defence sought a sentence of 26 weeks’ imprisonment after a 20% sentencing reduction. ²⁵

107 I agree with the Prosecution and the Defence that Voyeurism Charge 1 falls within the moderate harm, moderate culpability band of the matrix, which attracts an indicative claim-trial sentencing range of eight to 12 months’ imprisonment with caning. ²⁶ In my assessment, the appropriate starting point sentence is in the middle of that range – ie, ten months’ imprisonment with one stroke of the cane. This is in view of the offence-specific factors discussed in the following paragraphs.

108 In relation to the harm done by the offence, this falls at the middle of the moderate harm band.

(a) The main offence-specific harm factor is the high degree of intrusiveness in the recordings captured. Here, the Accused took three video recordings, totalling footage of 25 minutes and 38 seconds in duration, capturing V2 fellating the Accused and engaging in sexual intercourse with him. In two of the recordings, V2’s breasts and face (aside from her eyes) were visible. In the third, her genitals, breasts, buttocks and face (aside from her eyes) were all visible. In the mitigation plea, Defence Counsel highlighted that the Accused did not record the entire hour-long sexual encounter; ²⁷ but this, surely, is not a mitigating factor – capturing footage of almost half that duration is itself significantly aggravating. In addition, the level of intrusiveness here is considerably higher than that in Dean Ng, where the recorded video was much shorter in duration (being 2 minutes and 13 seconds), and captured the victim’s face and naked body with exposed breasts and genitals when showering (rather than in the act of sexual intercourse).

(b) Defence Counsel pointed out that the Accused and V2 had mutually agreed to engage in sexual acts, and that the videos were not distributed or used to threaten or harm V2. ²⁸ I accept both points as matters of fact. However, they do not operate as mitigating factors. The consent to engage in sexual acts is separate from, and does not diminish, the non-consensual nature of the recording itself. As for the absence of distribution or threats, these are properly understood as the absence of what would have been additional aggravating factors, rather than as mitigating circumstances.

109 In relation to the Accused’s culpability, this falls at the middle of the moderate culpability band.

(a) Here, the Accused knew that V2 had not consented to his making of the recording, because he had done so when she was wearing a blindfold that she had been instructed not to take off. Relatedly, there was some level of premeditation and planning. Leaving aside the premeditation and planning leading to the sexual encounter itself (see [71(a)] above), the Accused had instructed V2 in advance to wear a blindfold throughout the sexual encounter. This enabled him to film her private regions when she was engaging in sexual activity, without her knowledge.

(b) Defence Counsel contended that the Accused did not set up his phone in an unsuspecting location, as opposed to the accused in Dean Ng who had set up his phone in the bathroom before inviting the victim to take a shower. ²⁹ However, the point remains that the Accused had no need to set-up or conceal his phone beforehand, given his knowledge that V2 would be blindfolded throughout the encounter and would not be able to detect the filming in any event.

(c) Defence Counsel pointed out that the victim in Dean Ng was a friend of the accused, and that there would be greater emotional impact in that trust being destroyed. ³⁰ I accept that V2 did not have such a prior personal relationship with the Accused in relation to Voyeurism Charge 1. This is also why I have assessed the Accused’s culpability to be at the middle of the moderate culpability band, rather than the middle-to-high end of the moderate culpability band in Dean Ng.

110 In relation to offender-specific factors, the main aggravating factor concerns the other Voyeurism Charges 3 and 4, which are TIC. To avoid double counting this aggravating factor, however, I will consider it only in relation to Voyeurism Charge 2. The only mitigating factor is the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 2 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines, which would afford him a sentencing reduction of up to 20%.

111 I do not consider Step 5 of the Nicholas Tan framework at this juncture. Instead, I reserve totality-related considerations to the section on “Global Sentence” below.

112 In relation to Voyeurism Charge 1, a claim-trial sentence would have been around ten months’ imprisonment and one stroke of the cane. Applying the 20% sentencing reduction, the eventual sentence for Voyeurism Charge 1 is eight months’ imprisonment and one stroke of the cane.

113 The Prosecution and the Defence agreed that Voyeurism Charge 2 falls within the moderate harm, moderate culpability band of the matrix, which attracts an indicative claim-trial sentencing range of eight to 12 months’ imprisonment with caning. ³¹ In arriving at this assessment, both sides considered the acts on 31 July 2021 and 16 August 2021 holistically, treating the three videos taken across two occasions as collectively forming the basis for their assessment of harm and culpability. ³² The Prosecution submitted (and the Defence agreed) that there ought to be an uplift in view that this was an amalgamated charge, which indicated persistence in the Accused’s misconduct. ³³

114 The Prosecution therefore submitted that the appropriate starting point claim-trial sentence was 15 months’ imprisonment and two strokes of the cane. ³⁴ With a 20% sentencing reduction on account of the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 2 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines, the Prosecution sought a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment and two strokes of the cane. ³⁵ The Defence submitted that the starting point sentence should be 12 months’ imprisonment and one stroke of the cane, ³⁶ which would be reduced to ten months’ imprisonment and one stroke of the cane after a 20% sentencing reduction. ³⁷

115 I make three observations:

(a) First, the Prosecution’s submission of a “starting point (claim trial) sentence” ³⁸ of 15 months’ imprisonment and two strokes of the cane appears to have factored in the two TIC Voyeurism Charges. ³⁹ However, TIC charges are offender-specific factors. They should not be factored in when deriving a starting point sentence under the Nicholas Tan framework.

(b) Second, it is unclear how the Defence factored the two TIC Voyeurism Charges into its proposed sentence.

(c) Third, while Voyeurism Charge 2 is an amalgamated charge, neither the Prosecution nor the Defence discussed or applied the Prakash framework.

116 Given that the Prakash framework ought to be overarching framework in relation to Voyeurism Charge 2 (see [101] and [102] above), I turn to analyse Voyeurism Charge 2 in accordance with that framework.

117 Taking the 31 July 2021 encounter as the “base offence”, the analysis of harm and culpability factors relating to the 31 July 2021 encounter is broadly similar to that in Voyeurism Charge 1 (see [108] and [109] above), save that the harm done in the 31 July 2021 encounter is slightly lower. This is because the 31 July Footage captured the victim’s breasts and buttocks, whereas the lengthiest of the three videos in Voyeurism Charge 1 was more intrusive in that it also captured the victim’s genitals in the act of sexual intercourse with the accused.

118 As such, at Step 3 of the Nicholas Tan framework, the starting point sentence for the “base offence”, on a claim-trial basis, is about nine months’ imprisonment and one stroke of the cane.

119 At the Prakash second stage, the court has regard to the doubled punishment limit in CPC ss 124(8)(a)(ii). At this stage, the starting point sentence may be increased beyond the relevant indicative sentencing range in Nicholas Tan, given the increased aggregate harm and culpability involved in the recurrent offending.

120 In relation to Voyeurism Charge 2, I find that the amalgamated offence warrants a three-month uplift in imprisonment term, and one additional stroke of the cane. This is in view of the following aggravating factors:

(a) First, in terms of duration and frequency of the offending conduct, the Accused repeated his illicit recording of the V3’s private regions during sexual intercourse. This took place on a completely different occasion (ie, on 16 August 2021), the two encounters being between two to three weeks apart.

(b) Second, the offending on 16 August 2021 was more aggravated than that on 31 July 2021. While the 16 August Footage was less than half the duration of the 31 July Footage, it was more intrusive in that it captured footage of V3’s genitals, in addition to her breasts and buttocks. The Accused’s culpability was also markedly higher in respect of the 16 August Footage: having already committed the offence on 31 July 2021, the Accused this time took the deliberate step of setting up his phone by the bedside. This reflected a greater degree of premeditation and preparation than on the earlier occasion.

121 The uplift brings the starting point sentence to 12 months’ imprisonment and two strokes of the cane on a claim-trial basis.

122 The Defence cited Elgin Ng as a sentencing precedent for an amalgamated charge under PC s 377BB(5). ⁴⁰ In Elgin Ng, the accused – a photographer in the National Dental Centre of Singapore (whose role was to take photographs of patients’ teeth and jaws, as ordered by dentists) – secretly took photographs of dental patients’ cleavage. These were either top-down images which captured the top of the victim’s breasts, or bottom-up images which capture the bottom of the victim’s breasts, or both. He sometimes approached patients who had not been scheduled for dental photography, fraudulently claiming that the dentist had requested that photographs be taken. He took and retained the photographs for personal sexual gratification, and masturbated to them (Elgin Ng at [11]). The court found that under the Nicholas Tan framework, the amalgamated offence (involving 31 voyeuristic photographs taken on three separate days) fell at the high end of slight harm, and at the borderline between medium and high culpability (Elgin Ng at [33] and [72]). It also found that the starting point sentence would be “lowered slightly” from ten months’ imprisonment (Elgin Ng at [72(a)] read with [33]).

123 It is difficult to compare Elgin Ng with Voyeurism Charge 2, given the very different factual circumstances in both cases. What is clear is that the level of harm done under Voyeurism Charge 2 is significantly higher than that in Elgin Ng, a point recognised by the Defence. ⁴¹ Against this backdrop, a starting point sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment and two strokes of the cane for Voyeurism Charge 2 is not disproportionate to the starting point sentence of slightly below ten months’ imprisonment in Elgin Ng. Indeed, the starting point sentence I have derived is not very different from the starting point sentence suggested by the Defence (of 12 months’ imprisonment and one stroke of the cane) – see [114] above.

124 At the third stage of the Prakash approach, the court considers offender-specific factors.

125 The main aggravating factor is the TIC charges for similar offences – ie, Voyeurism Charges 3 and 4. I find that a three-month uplift in imprisonment term is appropriate, taking into consideration the gravity of these charges:

(a) Voyeurism Charge 3 is a charge under PC s 377BB(3) for intentionally recording a minor, V1, “doing a private act” without her consent. Specifically, the Accused captured footage of 11 minutes and 23 seconds in duration of V1 fellating him, with her face (save for her eyes) and her school uniform fully visible in the video (see [19] above). Her private regions were not captured in the video. It is aggravating that this offence was committed against a minor who was blindfolded and made to do an act that she was uncomfortable doing (see [18] above).

(b) Voyeurism Charge 4 is a charge under PC s 377BB(5) for intentionally recording footage of V4’s genitals, breasts and buttocks. Specifically, the Accused captured two videos totalling 29 minutes and 57 seconds in duration, of V4 fellating and engaging in sexual intercourse with him. This charge is broadly similar in egregiousness to Voyeurism Charge 1.

126 The only mitigating factor is the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 2 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines, which would afford him a sentencing reduction of up to 20%.

127 In view of the analysis across the three stages of the Prakash framework, an appropriate claim-trial sentence for Voyeurism Charge 2 is 15 months’ imprisonment and two strokes of the cane. With a 20% sentencing reduction, the final sentence for Voyeurism Charge 2 is 12 months’ imprisonment and two strokes of the cane.

128 Where an accused person is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for at least three distinct offences, CPC s 307(1) mandates that the sentences for at least two of those offences run consecutively.

129 In Public Prosecutor v Raveen Balakrishnan [2018] 4 SLR 799 (“Raveen”), the court explained the relationship between this statutory requirement, the “one-transaction rule” (ie, that sentences for related offences forming part of a single transaction should run concurrently – Raveen at [39]), and the “general rule” (ie, that sentences for unrelated offences should run consecutively – Raveen at [41]).

130 The court also emphasised that despite the “general rule”, the court must run a final check to ensure that the aggregate sentence is proportionate to the overall criminality of the offender (Raveen at [65]). This is what the court referred to as the “totality principle”. This principl e is applied at the end of the sentencing process, and requires the sentencing judge to take a “last look” at all the facts and circumstances, and be satisfied about the sufficiency and proportionality of the aggregate sentence to the offender’s overall criminality (Raveen at [73]). There are two limbs to the “totality principle” (Raveen at [73], citing Mohamed Shouffee bin Adam v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 998 at [54] and [57]):

131 If the aggregate sentence is excessive, the court may opt for a different combination of sentences to run consecutively or adjust the individual sentences (Raveen at [73]).

132 In the present case, the five proceeded charges did not arise from a single transaction. Each represented a separate and independent instance of offending, directed at different victims on different occasions, and violating different legally protected interests. The “general rule” thus points towards all five sentences running consecutively. Nevertheless, the “totality principle” requires that I consider the sufficiency and proportionality of the aggregate sentence to the Accused’s overall criminality.

133 In this regard, the Prosecution submitted that the sentences of imprisonment for the SPOM Charge, Fraud Charge 2 and Voyeurism Charge 2 should run consecutively, with the imprisonment terms for Fraud Charge 1 and Voyeurism Charge 1 running concurrently. On the Prosecution’s proposed individual sentences, this would yield an aggregate sentence of “68 months – 75 months’ imprisonment and 3 strokes of the cane”. ⁴² The Defence accepted the Prosecution’s position on the sequencing of sentences, ⁴³ although on the Defence’s proposed individual sentences, this would result in an aggregate sentence of “46 months with one stroke of the cane”. ⁴⁴

134 From the perspective of the “totality principle”, I agree with the parties’ submissions on the sequencing of the sentences. Based on the individual sentences I have imposed, this yields an aggregate sentence of 67 months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane.

135 I am satisfied that this aggregate sentence is both sufficient and proportionate to the Accused’s overall criminality. Deterrence is the primary sentencing consideration in this case, cutting across all the proceeded and TIC charges alike. The Accused’s conduct was reprehensible: he exploited multiple victims (many of whom were young, and one of whom was a minor) in a calculated and persistent manner over a period of nearly two years (see [14] above). Against this, the only real mitigating factor is the Accused’s plea of guilt, entered within Stage 2 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines.

136 As regards the first limb of the totality principle, the aggregate sentence is not substantially above the normal level of sentences for the most serious of the individual offences committed (which is the 41 months’ two weeks’ imprisonment term imposed for Fraud Charge 2). As regards the second limb, the aggregate sentence is neither crushing nor out of keeping with the Accused’s past record or future prospects. The sheer number and gravity of the sexual offences he committed warrants a robust deterrent sentence. The aggregate sentence therefore does not offend either limb of the totality principle. Indeed, it sends a clear and unequivocal signal that such conduct will not be tolerated.

137 This is an egregious case involving the Accused’s persistent sexual offending against multiple victims over an extended period. With the sentencing reduction of 20% in recognition of his plea of guilt, the sentences imposed are summarised in the table below.

138 The imprisonment terms for the SPOM Charge, Fraud Charge 2 and Voyeurism Charge 2 shall run consecutively, with the imprisonment terms for Fraud Charge 1 and Voyeurism Charge 1 running concurrently. The aggregate sentence, which reflects the gravity of the Accused’s overall criminality, is 67 months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane.