1 Three accused persons – Goh Meng Kwee (“Goh”), Tay Chun Hsiong (“Tay”) and Fang Yih Uei (“Fang”) – were jointly tried before me. Each faced one charge in the trial. Goh was charged (in DAC 903794/2022) with corruptly receiving gratification of $50,000 from Tay as a reward for advancing the business interests of Lantro (S) Pte Ltd (“Lantro”) with Pico Art International Pte Ltd (“Pico”). Tay and Fang were charged (in DAC 903808/2022 and 903809/2022 respectively) for abetment by engaging in a conspiracy with each other, to corruptly give Goh the said gratification, and to that end, Tay passed the corrupt gratification to Goh. The offences were alleged to have taken place around 4 May 2018.

2 Goh did not dispute that Tay handed him $50,000 in cash on 4 May 2018. Tay and Fang did not dispute that they worked together to procure the $50,000 that was given to Goh, that Fang handed the $50,000 in cash to Tay, and that Tay then gave it to Goh. What was disputed was why the money was given and received. In essence, the prosecution’s case was that the $50,000 was a reward to Goh for his having introduced Lantro to Pico, and hence was a corrupt gratification. The defence’s case was that the money was for a legitimate purpose, that is, for licenced electrical work (“LEW”) (or LEW services) to be conducted by Goh for a company named New Eminent Construction Pte Ltd (“NEC”) and was thus not corrupt.

3 After the close of the trial, I convicted all three accused persons in December 2025. Sentencing was delayed because Goh faced a further 12 charges, one of which (DAC 903786/2022) had been the subject of a separate trial before another District Judge and was pending sentencing, while the remaining 11 charges had been stood down. After the present conviction, Goh indicated a willingness to plead guilty (“PG”) to the stood down charges. The order in which Goh’s charges were to be resolved therefore needed to be determined. Eventually, Goh was sentenced for DAC 903786/2022 in March 2026 and accepted an offer to PG to four of the remaining 11 charges, with seven taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. I took Goh’s guilty plea in May 2026, then sentenced him for those PG charges as well as the charge for which I convicted him after trial. I sentenced Tay and Fang on the same day.

4 Goh did not file any appeal and has begun serving his sentence. Tay and Fang both appealed against their conviction and sentence. These are the grounds of my decision, which necessarily include my reasons for convicting and sentencing Goh. These grounds incorporate and supercede the oral remarks I delivered in convicting and sentencing the three accused persons, as well as the remarks I gave at the end of the ancillary hearings held to determine the admissibility of statements given by Tay and Fang to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”).

5 I begin by noting the undisputed facts:

(a) Goh, also known as Andrew, was an Assistant Director in the Exhibit Design Department of Wildlife Reserves Singapore (“WRS”) at the material time. In this capacity, he had contact with various vendors who provided services to WRS. WRS owned and managed the Singapore Zoological Gardens (“Zoo”). Goh had joined WRS in 2011, and was also qualified to provide LEW services.

(b) Tay, also known as Leslie, was a sales manager at the material time with Lantro, which provided structural cabling services. He had joined Lantro in 2017 and his supervisor was PW8 Louis Poh (“Poh”). Tay and Goh had known each other since 2012. Tay estimated that between 2012 and 2018, he had done at least 15 to 20 projects at the Zoo.

(c)  Fang, also known as Ray, was the owner and director of RH Creation Pte Ltd (“RH Creation”), which provided electrical and wiring services. He also freelanced as a project manager with NEC, which provided construction services. Tay and Fang had known each other since 2017.

(d) On the night of 26 March 2018, Poh met Goh to introduce Lantro to WRS (“the 26 March meeting”). Tay had arranged this meeting to bring more business to Lantro and was present as well. About two hours after this meeting, Goh sent Tay a WhatsApp message containing the mobile phone number of one “trevos from pico”. ¹ This was PW4 Trevor Soh (“Soh”), a senior vice president for business development in Pico. Pico was in the business of providing event agency and project management work. On 29 March 2018, Tay sent Goh a WhatsApp message stating, “Trevo have reply me. He will get his people to contact me.” ²

(e) The Zoo intended to set up an audio-visual night walk called the Rainforest Lumina project (“Lumina project”), as part of its 45th anniversary celebrations, and awarded the Lumina project to Pico. In this regard, the letter of intent issued by the Zoo to Pico was dated 29 March 2018, ³ and the contract was dated 30 April 2018. ⁴ PW5 Benny Boo (“Boo”), who was the Pico employee in charge of the Lumina project, first contacted Tay on or about 2 April 2018. ⁵ Boo’s supervisor was DW3 Lim Kian Meng (“Lim”).

(f) Pico appointed Lantro as its sub-contractor for the supply and installation of cables for the Lumina project. The sub-contract was for $300,932.10. A letter of acceptance issued by Pico to Lantro was dated 16 April 2018, and it was signed by parties on 27 April 2018. ⁶ Lantro was not known to Pico before this sub-contract.

(g) Lantro in turn appointed NEC as its sub-contractor for the supply and installation of cables for the Lumina project. To this end, Lantro issued a purchase order dated 7 May 2018 to NEC for $240,745.68. ⁷

(h) On 28 April 2018, RH Creation issued an invoice to NEC for “One year LEW service from 2 December 2017 to 1 December 2018”, for $50,000, which service was stated to be provided by Goh (“the LEW invoice”). The LEW invoice also contained Goh’s LEW licence number. ⁸ On 2 May 2018, NEC issued a cheque for this amount to RH Creation, which cheque was deposited. ⁹

(i) The amount of $50,000 was encashed by Fang on 4 May 2018, ¹⁰ and Fang handed the cash to Tay in an envelope. On the same day, Tay handed the cash of $50,000 to Goh, then asked Goh for a loan of $6,000. Goh agreed to this and gave Tay $6,000 from the cash that Tay had just handed to him. Goh then banked $43,600 into his bank account. ¹¹ Goh did not sign any payment voucher to acknowledge receipt of this money, and there was no documentary proof that he performed any LEW services for NEC pursuant to this payment of $50,000.

(j) Goh was placed under arrest and brought to the CPIB on 30 May 2018. ¹²

(k) On 20 June 2018, Goh sent Fang an email containing a draft backdated letter of appointment, for RH Creation to appoint Goh for LEW services. ¹³ Fang did not sign the letter, and Goh did not press him.

6 The law relating to the present offences, under s 5(a)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“PCA”) for Goh as the receiver of the gratification, and under s 5(b)(i) of the PCA for Tay and Fang as the givers of the gratification, was uncontroversial.

7 The offences under s 5(a)(i) and s 5(b)(i) of the PCA are mirror offences for the receiver and giver, respectively, of a gratification, and it was not disputed that the four elements that the prosecution needed to prove for such offences were as follows:

(a) Element 1: The giving or receipt of the gratification.

(b) Element 2: As an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter.

(c) Element 3: There was an objective corrupt element in the transaction.

(d) Element 4: The gratification was given or received with guilty knowledge, ie, the giver or receiver knew that what he did was corrupt by the ordinary and objective standard.

These were based on reading Public Prosecutor v Leng Kah Poh [2014] 4 SLR 1264 at [20] with Kwang Boon Keong Peter v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 SLR(R) 211 at [32] and Public Prosecutor v Tan Kok Ming Michael and other appeals [2019] 5 SLR 926 at [54] and [55].

8 On the matter of whether a corrupt element was present, the objective corrupt element would be found if the court was satisfied that a reasonable man, looking at the transaction objectively, would view that situation as being corrupt, while the subjective element required the court to be satisfied that the offender knew that what he did was corrupt by that ordinary and objective standard – see Chan Wing Seng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 1 SLR(R) 721 (“Chan Wing Seng”) at [20] and [23]. ¹⁴ In this regard, it was also held at Chan Wing Seng at [67] that there can be instances where an offender’s actions are “so obviously corrupt by the ordinary and objective standard that he must know his conduct is corrupt.” It has also been held by the High Court that in determining the parties’ intentions behind the transaction, regard may be had to “surrounding circumstances” including the “surreptitiousness or furtiveness of the transaction, the size of the gratification, relationship of the parties [and] breaking of rules or code” – see Public Prosecutor v Low Tiong Choon [1998] 2 SLR(R) 119 at [29] – [30]. ¹⁵

9 The charges against Tay and Fang were additionally read with s 29(a) of the PCA, as they were charged with engaging in a conspiracy with each other to corruptly give Goh the said gratification. It is trite that the essence of conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act.

10 As noted at [5(i)] above, the giving and receipt of the sum of $50,000 in cash was not disputed. Element 1 had thus been proven. It was therefore left for the prosecution to prove Elements 2, 3 and 4 for each accused person.

11  As part of its case, the prosecution relied on the statements that each of the three accused persons gave to the CPIB. It was not disputed that an accused person’s confession could be relied on solely to convict him on the charges faced by him, if the court was satisfied that the confession was voluntary, true and reliable, even if that confession was subsequently retracted – Lim Thian Lai v Public Prosecutor [2006] 1 SLR(R) 319 at [43].

12 It was also not disputed that since all the statements used in the present trial were recorded before the 2018 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, Rev Ed 2012) (“CPC”) were effected, the pre-amendment version of s 258(5) of the CPC applied, which stated that where accused persons were tried jointly for the same offence, a confession made by one accused person could be taken into consideration by the court against the other accused person, as well as against the one who made the confession.

13 For the present trial, since Tay and Fang were tried for the same offence while Goh was tried for a different offence, this meant that Tay and Fang’s confessions could be taken into consideration against each other, but not against Goh. By the same token, a confession by Goh could not be taken into consideration against Tay or Fang.

14 During the trial, the prosecution sought to admit the following statements into evidence:

(a) Five statements from Goh (P16, P17, P18, P19 and P20);

(b) Three statements from Tay (P7, P8 and P9); and

(c) Three statements from Fang (P2, P3 and P4).

15 Goh consented to the admission of his statements, while Tay and Fang contested the admission of theirs. Two ancillary hearings were held – one each for Tay and Fang. I admitted their statements at the close of the ancillary hearings.

16 It was not disputed that the case law governing such statements was set out in Chai Chien Wei Kelvin [1998] 3 SLR(R) 619. It was held therein (at [65], [69], [70] and [72]) that a witness’ credit can be impeached by proof of a former statement inconsistent with his oral testimony in court, and that former statement is admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein. Even if the witness retracts his statement in court, the weight to be given to the statement is assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding it at the time it was made. In particular, the court is to have regard to all the circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement, including matters such as the contemporaneity of the statement and whether the maker had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent the facts. The court may also, with reason, accept one part of a witness’ evidence and reject other parts.

17 As for mixed statements, it is clear from Chan Kin Choi v Public Prosecutor [1991] 1 SLR(R) 111 (“Chan Kin Choi”) at [34] – [35] that both the inculpatory and exculpatory portions must be considered in determining where the truth lies, bearing in mind that the incriminating parts are likely to be true whereas the excuses do not carry the same weight.

18 The first issue to be addressed was whether Element 2 of the offences was made out – that is, whether the amount of $50,000 was a reward to Goh for advancing the business interests of Lantro with Pico. Three questions needed to be answered in this regard. The first was whether Goh did in fact recommend Lantro to Pico. If this was answered in the affirmative, then the second question was why Goh did so, and the third question was why Tay and Fang paid Goh the money. The contents of Tay’s and Fang’s statements were relevant to the third question, and the matter of the admissibility of their statements arose in that context. I thus dealt with these issues of admissibility as sub-issues to the third question under the first issue.

19 It was only if the first issue was answered in the affirmative, that the second issue of whether the transaction was objectively corrupt (Element 3), and the third issue of whether the accused persons knew that the transaction was corrupt (Element 4), could be addressed. It was only thereafter that the matter of whether the charges were made out could be determined.

20 The first question under Issue 1 was whether Goh recommended Lantro to Pico. In this regard, the testimonies of Soh, Boo and Lim were relevant.

21 Soh testified that he was first referred to Lantro when Goh sent him a text or WhatsApp message stating that if Pico was sourcing for a cabling company, Lantro was “a good one” that Pico may want to consider. Soh then passed this information to his colleagues from Pico’s Special Projects Team – either Lim, or Boo, or both. ¹⁶ Soh’s initial evidence was that the message from Goh recommending Lantro came in early April 2018. However, upon being shown the WhatsApp messages showing that Goh sent Soh’s contact number to Tay on 26 March 2018 and that Tay informed Goh on 29 March 2018 that, “Trevo have replied me”, Soh accepted that Tay must have contacted him sometime between 27 and 29 March 2018. By extension, Soh reasoned that he must have received the Lantro recommendation from Goh around 26 March 2018. ¹⁷

22 Goh’s case was that he did not recommend Lantro to Soh. Instead, Goh recommended three contractors – KT Engineering, Highness Electrical, and Sunrise – and gave Tay’s name to Soh. In cross-examination, Soh stated that he was unable to remember receiving the three contractors’ names or passing these names to his colleagues, and maintained that he knew only about Lantro rather than Tay, because Goh recommended the company to him. ¹⁸ Tay’s case was that when he spoke with Soh, he did not mention the Lumina project. Soh’s response to this in cross-examination was that since Pico had a large number of projects running at the time, there must have been a reason why he passed the information about Lantro to the team running the Lumina project. ¹⁹ The implication was that either from his conversation with Tay or the context in which Goh gave him the information about Lantro, Soh understood Lantro to be a potential sub-contractor for the Lumina project.

23 Soh’s evidence was corroborated by Lim’s and Boo’s. Lim testified that Soh informed him about Lantro, which supposedly had experience in Zoo projects. According to Lim, no other names were mentioned by Soh. Lim then either passed the information to Boo, or told Boo to obtain the information from Soh. ²⁰ Boo in turn confirmed that he heard about Lantro from one of his bosses, either Soh or Lim, who gave him Tay’s contact information and told him to reach out to Lantro, as it was a recommendation from the Zoo. In this regard, Boo’s first message to Tay on 2 April 2018 ²¹ stated that he wished to find out about “the scope that your company would be able to offer”. I noted that the reference to Tay’s company corroborated the evidence that it had been a company that was recommended to Pico, rather than an individual, and that Tay was the contact point. I also noted that while Lim and Boo confirmed that Lantro would need to satisfy Pico’s requirements before being awarded the job, Boo testified that the fact that Lantro was recommended by the Zoo would have carried weight with Pico, though it would not have been a deciding factor. ²² Lim testified all else being equal, the fact that Lantro had been recommended by the Zoo would be a “tie-breaker”. ²³

24 Soh, Lim and Boo struck me as forthright witnesses who had no reason to lie. In Soh’s case, when he was presented with the evidence of the WhatsApp messages which contradicted with his recollection of when Goh recommended Lantro to him, he was reasonable and accepted that the earlier dates were more likely. Based on their evidence, which I accepted, it was clear that Goh did recommend Lantro to Pico as a good cabling company, and without this intervention, Pico would not even have known of Lantro, let alone reach out to them and eventually award the sub-contract to them.

25 The second question under Issue 1 was why Goh recommended Lantro to Pico. Poh testified that after the 26 March meeting with Goh, as he walked out with Tay, Tay told him that to “move forward”, a “kickback” or “token” for Goh would be required. Poh understood this to be a bribe or monetary payment to Goh to get a job, and immediately rejected the notion, telling Tay that it was illegal. He stated that he remembered this clearly because he had gone to the meeting to introduce Lantro and get business leads, but this incident then happened. ²⁴ In cross-examination, it was put to him that this conversation did not happen immediately after the meeting, but that it happened in the office sometime later. Poh’s response was that he did not recall any such conversation in the office, and maintained that it occurred right after the 26 March meeting. Although he admitted under cross-examination that his recollection of the conversation was “hazy”, he later clarified that this related to the words which Tay used to describe the monetary payment needed, but not the fact that the incident happened. In this regard, he was clear that Tay told him about the “kickback” that night, right after the 26 March meeting. ²⁵

26 I found Poh to be a forthright witness as well, with little incentive to lie. Given that it would have been an unusual occurrence for him to be presented with the idea of a bribe immediately after meeting Goh, it was unlikely for him to have misremembered this incident. I therefore accepted Poh’s evidence that it was immediately after the 26 March meeting that Tay raised the matter of the “kickback” or “token” to be paid to Goh. This meant that Tay must have known by then at the latest of the need to pay Goh a bribe for any referral or recommendation by Goh for Zoo projects.

27 In this regard, I noted that Goh stated in his statements that at this meeting, Tay had quietly asked Goh (out of Poh’s earshot) how much was needed to “cover” Goh. ²⁶ Although Goh disavowed these portions of the statements in his testimony, he was unable to satisfactorily explain why he did not amend or clarify these portions despite having been given the opportunity to do so, and despite having amended or clarified other portions of his statements. ²⁷ This strongly suggested that these portions of the statements were true, and if so, would be consistent with the finding that Tay knew of the need to pay Goh a bribe, at the latest by the end of the 26 March meeting.

28 Goh admitted in his testimony that his views and recommendations carried weight with the Zoo’s contractors. ²⁸ This was confirmed by Lim and Boo. ²⁹ Based on Goh’s testimony ³⁰ and statements, I was also satisfied that when he met Poh and Tay on 26 March 2018, he knew about the Lumina project and that Pico was involved in it. This was because about two hours after the meeting, he sent Soh’s contact information to Tay, aptly linking two employees of companies who had a common interest in procuring and providing cabling services. The matching of these two parties would otherwise have been too coincidental. Logically, to avoid the awkward situation if Tay contacted Soh before Soh knew anything about Lantro, Goh must also have told Soh about Lantro before, or at the latest, very soon after, giving Soh’s contact information to Tay.

29 Since I accepted Soh’s evidence that Goh recommended Lantro as a good company for cabling works, the inevitable question was why Goh would have done that, especially since Lantro was not known to Goh before the 26 March meeting and he would not have seen their work. Goh would thus have had little basis to make such a recommendation unless there had been some prior understanding between him and Tay. ³¹ Given the evidence and circumstances, the inexorable conclusion was that Goh, knowing that his views would carry weight and knowing that Tay was prepared to “cover” him (that is, to pay him a “kickback” or “token”), made the recommendation about Lantro to Pico in the expectation that he would be rewarded by Tay. In this regard, I accepted the prosecution’s submission that this would amount to corruption: Tjong Mark Edward v Public Prosecutor and anor appeal [2015] 3 SLR 375 at [29]. ³² The defence submitted that Goh’s recommendation to Soh had been made in a “cursory manner”, and that if there had truly been an agreement between Goh and Tay for a reward for the recommendation, Goh would have made more attempts at persuading Soh to engage Lantro. ³³ While I accepted that the recommendation appeared to be a simple or straightforward one, this did not mean that it was “cursory” – Soh’s evidence was that Goh told him that Lantro was a good company to consider for cabling works. It was quite specific and clearly very timely from Soh’s/Pico’s perspective. Given that Goh knew the weight that would be given to his recommendations, there was no need for him to repeat himself or pester Soh. I therefore rejected the contention that the mere fact that this recommendation was simple suggested that there was no corrupt intent underlying it.

30 On the third question of why Tay and Fang paid the $50,000 to Goh, the Prosecution relied on Tay’s and Fang’s statements given to the CPIB. As Tay and Fang contested the admission of their statements, I pause here (at [31] to [59]) to set out the key evidence and my findings in the ancillary hearings, before returning to their evidence in the main trial.

31 The three statements from Tay which the prosecution sought to admit, P7, P8 and P9, were recorded on 30 May 2018, 31 May 2018 and 6 August 2018 respectively by PW2 Chief Special Investigator (“CSI”) Chris Lim.

32 Tay objected to their admission essentially on the ground that inducements and promises were made. He contended that CSI Lim told him that if he co-operated with CPIB to “catch” Goh, then CSI Lim would put up a good report to the case investigation officer (“IO”), who would then put up a good report to the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”), so that he would not be charged. The promises were linked to Tay not being charged for two matters: first, for the giving of $50,000 to Goh as a referral fee, and second, for the receipt of $3,000 from a company named UCC (United Channel Construction & Facility Services Pte Ltd), which was referred to as the “moonlighting offence”. Believing in these promises, Tay signed the statements although they contained inaccuracies and untruths. In particular, Tay’s case in respect of P8 was that at some point during the interview for or the recording of this statement on 31 May 2018, the following happened:

(a) CSI Lim left the interview room, then returned with two to three pieces of paper and asked him to read them. Some parts of this document (which appeared to be an extract of a statement) were accurate and some were inaccurate, but Tay felt that he could live with the inaccuracies, and accepted the document. CSI Lim then continued the questioning and interview. ³⁴

(b) Thereafter, CSI Lim left the interview room a second time, and returned with another version of an incomplete statement, which consisted of three to four pages. Tay again spotted inaccuracies, but felt that he could live with them, and thus told CSI Lim that this document was correct. ³⁵

(c) CSI Lim then left the room a third time, and returned with a complete statement with the signature page. Tay’s case was that this third version of the statement had a “big change” from the earlier two documents, as paragraphs had been “shuffled” around and it contained matters that Tay did not say to CSI Lim. He was “shocked and surprised” at the changes and felt that these showed that the CPIB was “really out to catch” Goh. He nevertheless did not object to these inaccuracies and signed the statement because he was afraid of displeasing CSI Lim and was hopeful that since CSI Lim had said that Goh was CPIB’s target, that he (Tay) would then not be charged. ³⁶

33 CSI Lim’s testimony on the allegation of the promises was straightforward – no such promises were made. He also stated that he would not have said anything to Tay about putting up a good report because he was only assisting the case IO to record statements, and would not need to put up any report, whether to the case IO or AGC. ³⁷ His evidence was also that the information in the statements, including events and dates, came from Tay in response to questions from him, though he paraphrased some of what Tay said, to make the statements easier to read. ³⁸

34 I agreed with the prosecution that CSI Lim’s evidence was not selective – there were aspects of his evidence where he admitted to not being able to recollect what happened, while where events were possible, such as him having multiple smoke breaks with Tay during the interviewing and statement recording process, he acknowledged these. He also agreed with Counsel that he went for the smoke breaks with Tay in part to build rapport with Tay so that Tay would trust him. ³⁹ On the face of his evidence, I had no reason to disbelieve him.

35 As for Tay’s case, I noted that there were slight variations about whether the initial report would be put up to CSI Lim’s supervisor, the chief IO or the case IO. ⁴⁰ There were also inconsistencies on when exactly the various inducements were made or promises were given – whether they were during the smoke breaks or during the interviews/recording of the statements. I was willing to overlook these variations and inconsistencies, given my observations of the level of Tay’s spoken English during his testimony and given that Tay’s first detention in CPIB lasted for over a day, so the precise moment when each alleged inducement or promise was made were details that could have been lost to time. In essence, Tay’s contention was that CSI Lim would put up the good report to someone in authority, who would then put up a good report to AGC for Tay’s benefit, and he thus “co-operated” with CSI Lim.

36 However, since being called up by CPIB would have been an unusual event for Tay, while for CSI Lim, this was yet another out of many interviews and recording of statements that he would have done, my view was that Tay should have a deeper impression of the key events than CSI Lim. These key events included the nature of the inducements and promises that were made to him. In this regard, I could not ignore some key internal inconsistencies and illogicality in Tay’s position and testimony. These included the following.

(a) First, when Counsel put Tay’s case to CSI Lim, it was that CSI Lim said that if Tay was co-operative with CPIB’s investigations, he would help to put up “a good report” not to charge Tay for the moonlighting offence. ⁴¹ There was no reference to the present offence concerning the Lumina project and the giving of $50,000 to Goh. However, when Tay took the witness stand, his position evolved such that CSI Lim’s promise extended to also helping Tay with the present offence involving the Lumina project and the $50,000. ⁴² This indicated that Tay’s position shifted from the time he instructed his Counsel to the time he gave his testimony. As this concerned the nature of the inducement or promise that CSI Lim purportedly made to him, I considered it to be a shift in a material point, which adversely affected his credibility.

(b) Second, Tay testified in evidence-in-chief that on 6 August 2018, when he and CSI Lim had their first smoke break even before the interview or statement recording for P9 began, CSI Lim told him that the alleged “good report” had already been submitted, and it was now out of CSI Lim’s hands. ⁴³ However, Tay later said in cross-examination that CSI Lim repeatedly made the said promises to him on 30 to 31 May 2018 – during his interview for P7, during the first smoke break, during his interview for P8, during the second to sixth smoke breaks – and again on 6 August 2018, during the smoke break before P9 was recorded. When asked why CSI Lim would keep repeating the promises, Tay stated that it was because he kept asking CSI Lim if he had been co-operative. ⁴⁴ I had two main difficulties with this account. One was that it was internally inconsistent – if CSI Lim had already submitted the report by 6 August 2018, then there was no reason for him to continue promising Tay on that day that he would submit the “good report”. The other was that Tay’s persistent questioning of CSI Lim was illogical and counter-intuitive because he risked irritating CSI Lim with his repeated inquiries, especially after CSI Lim said that the report had already been put up.

(c)  Third, I agreed with the prosecution that it did not make sense for CSI Lim to bring in various versions or drafts of an incomplete statement for Tay’s perusal, since Tay’s testimony was that he had been “co-operative” with CSI Lim and had said what CSI Lim wanted to hear. If this had been so, there would have been no need to go through various versions, or change anything – CSI Lim could simply have put one preferred version before Tay, and have him sign it.

(d) Fourth, I noted that when pressed in cross-examination, Tay was prone to changing his evidence.

(i) One example concerned the so-called inaccurate portions of his statements. In evidence-in-chief, Tay stated that he told CSI Lim “inaccurate things” in P7 because when he told CSI Lim the “actual facts”, CSI Lim seemed displeased. CSI Lim had suggested the “inaccurate” parts of P7, and he simply repeated these back to CSI Lim. In relation to P9, Tay also stated that he told CSI Lim the “inaccurate things” therein because “this is what [CSI Lim] want[ed] to hear.” ⁴⁵ However, in cross-examination, Tay stated that he said these things to CSI Lim to help CPIB to catch Goh. More importantly, he also stated, in relation to P9, that he did not make things up, and only told CSI Lim “the right thing”, and the “facts”. ⁴⁶ By asserting that he gave “inaccurate” information to CSI Lim just to please him, the clear implication was that these were untruths. If so, Tay’s subsequent assertion that he did not make things up and only told CSI Lim the facts, could not stand. Conversely, if he only told CSI Lim the facts, then the contents of his statements would not have been “inaccurate”. Tay had also asserted in evidence-in-chief that he was “shocked and surprised” when he saw paragraphs 36 to 38 of the final version of P8 when CSI Lim returned after leaving the interview room for the third time (see [32(c)] above). However, when taken through paragraphs 37 and 38 during cross-examination, Tay professed to be unable to recall whether the information therein came from him or CSI Lim, and also stated that “maybe” he gave some of the information therein “to help” CSI Lim. ⁴⁷ If Tay knew what the truth was, then it should have been clear in his mind which parts were “suggested” by CSI Lim, but the inconsistencies indicated otherwise. Further, if indeed he had given the information just to please CSI Lim or to help CPIB to “catch” Goh, then he should not have been “shocked” to see that the statement incriminated Goh.

(ii) A secondary example cited by the prosecution which I noted concerned some uncertainty by Tay on the number of pages of the extracts of the statement that CSI Lim supposedly brought to him on the various occasions 31 May 2018. ⁴⁸ While this was arguably a minor inconsistency, my view was that if he was truthful, there was no reason for uncertainty in this aspect of his evidence, since the final statement only consisted of three sheets of paper (with the substantive content covering five pages).

37  In the final analysis, given the problematic nature of Tay’s testimony, I was unable to accept his evidence that the alleged promises were made to him, or that he signed the three statements in the circumstances as alleged. I did not find that any reasonable doubt was raised as to the voluntariness of the statements, and I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that they were given voluntarily. I therefore admitted them into evidence.

38 The three statements from Fang which the prosecution sought to admit, P2, P3 and P4, were recorded on 31 May 2018, 6 August 2018 and 3 October 2018 respectively by PW1 Mak Jia Yuan, who was a Senior Special Investigator with the CPIB when the statements were recorded, but who had since left the CPIB.

39 Fang objected to the admission of his statements primarily on the ground that he signed the statements in reliance on promises and threats that Mak made to him – that if he “co-operated” with CPIB to “catch” Goh, Mak would put up a “good report” or “favourable report” to AGC so that he would not be charged. Fang also alleged that when he was reviewing his first statement, Mak rushed him by stating that the staff would be leaving soon for the day and he might need to stay overnight in the CPIB if his bail could not be processed. In addition, Fang stated that Mak spoke to him with a raised voice when he denied banking in a cheque, and said he would not help Fang if Fang did not “co-operate”. Fang therefore tried his best to co-operate with Mak. ⁴⁹

40 In the alternative, it was submitted that even if the court was not with the defence that the promises were made, the statements should be excluded as their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value, due to a “compromised” recording process. This was because Fang claimed that Mak spoke to him mostly in Mandarin, albeit mixed with some English, and that he responded to Mak mostly in Mandarin – yet, the statements were stated to have been recorded in English. Fang also stated that he did not read his statements thoroughly before signing them – he relied on Mak’s interpretation of them into Mandarin, and signed when he heard that the interpretation was correct. ⁵⁰ To support his claim of a lack of proficiency in English, Fang produced his school results which showed that in 2006, he received an “F9” grade for English in the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Unified Examination. ⁵¹

41 Mak’s evidence was that based on his recollection and what was in the statements, Fang was sufficiently proficient in English to understand what Mak was saying and what was written in the statements. Fang also did not request for an interpreter. Mak stated that he paraphrased Fang’s answers to his questions (without changing the meaning) so that they would be presented in narrative form as seen in the statements, unless there was a specific “question and answer” section in the statement, in which case the answers would be recorded verbatim. Fang had opportunities to amend his statements when Mak read them back to him in the midst of the recording the statements, and at the end when the statements were printed out for Fang’s perusal. Mak’s evidence was that Fang was forthcoming, and that he did not make any threats, inducements or promises to Fang. He also denied promising to put up a “good report” for Fang not to be charged, stating that since he was not the IO for the case, he was not in a position to decide whether to charge an interviewee. He added that the law was clear – it was an offence to both give and receive a bribe, so it made no sense for him to say that he would let the witness off for helping him to catch the receiver, or that the giver was a “victim”. Mak also denied the allegation put to him that he had threatened Fang with an overnight stay at the CPIB, stating that it was the IOs (and not “staff”) who would process an interviewee’s bail, so there was no cut-off time for this since the IOs would be present till late. For the subsequent statements, Fang was given the opportunity to read over his previous statements and state if there were corrections to be made. ⁵² In cross-examination, Mak disagreed that he spoke with Fang in Mandarin while recording Fang’s answers in English – he did however acknowledge that while interviewing Fang before beginning to record the statements, he could have spoken to Fang in a mixture of English and Mandarin, and estimated this to be in the proportion of about 70%/30%. ⁵³

42 I found Mak’s evidence to clear – where he did not recall certain events or matters put to him, he admitted so. Where he was testifying based on his usual practice rather than his memory, he admitted so. He also admitted that many portions of the statements were his own paraphrasing of what Fang told him. He denied making the alleged promises to Fang, and was steadfast about having recorded the statements in English. On the face of his evidence, I had no reason to disbelieve him.

43 As for Fang, there were numerous inconsistencies in his case on when the alleged promises to put up a “good report” for him were made by Mak – whether they were made only during the smoke breaks, or during the interviews/statement recording process as well. However, as with Tay, I was willing to overlook these.

44 That said, I found that there were other troubling aspects to Fang’s evidence. Chiefly, these were due to the inconsistencies between his testimony and his actions, as well as what was in his Case for the Defence (“CFD”) or his instructions to counsel. These gave the impression that many of Fang’s assertions were afterthoughts, and I treated them with caution. Some examples of these were as follows:

(a) First, he claimed that he was shocked when he was served with his charge at CPIB, as this meant that Mak had failed to keep his promise to put up a good report for him to AGC if he co-operated. ⁵⁴ However, there was no mention of this broken promise in his cautioned statement.

(b) Second, there was no mention in the CFD about Mak raising his voice and saying that he would not help Fang if he did not co-operate, when Fang denied banking in the cheque. ⁵⁵ This was also not put to Mak. This surely would have been an important point for Fang, especially since he testified that it “put fear” in him and caused him to be afraid that Mak would not help him. ⁵⁶

(c) Third, it was put to Mak that the alleged threat or inducement about Fang not being able to return home early because staff at CPIB might no longer be around happened when Fang was reviewing his first statement. ⁵⁷ This suggested that it was close to the end of the statement recording process. However, Fang’s evidence was that this occurred well before the statement recording process began. ⁵⁸ This betrayed a clear inconsistency between the instructions Fang gave his Counsel and his testimony. In addition, Mak’s point that there was no impediment to releasing Fang on bail late because the IOs would be able to process it also indicated that this alleged threat or inducement was one that was unlikely to have been uttered.

(d) Fourth, Counsel repeatedly put to Mak that when he presented Fang’s previous statements to Fang for review, he said that Fang could not change anything therein as that was an offence (which allegations Mak denied). ⁵⁹ However, Fang did not make any assertion of this sort when he was on the stand. This was yet another indication that Fang’s position had shifted from the time he instructed his Counsel to the time he took the stand, and did not reflect well on his credibility or consistency.

45 On the matter of the language in which the statements had been recorded, although the defence claimed to be surprised by Mak’s testimony that they had been recorded in English, I nevertheless noted that no issue was raised in the CFD as to the accuracy of the statements. Fang attempted to portray the standard of his English as woefully inadequate, such that he needed help to even write his business documents as well as make the amendments in the statements. ⁶⁰ As at the end of the ancillary hearing, the difficulty I had with this was that despite his poor academic performance in English in school, he could clearly now read English, because when shown Mak’s investigation diary by Counsel and asked to identify the timings of the smoke breaks, he scanned the document and was able to identify them fairly quickly ⁶¹ – this meant that he could see which entries referred to the breaks and which ones referred to other matters. He also clearly understood spoken English, because although he gave his testimony in Mandarin, he interrupted the interpreter on more than one occasion when he perceived that the interpretation was inaccurate. ⁶² He also answered two questions speaking in English. ⁶³ Thus, even if I was minded to accept that the standard of Fang’s English was not high, as the somewhat extreme position taken by him on his level of understanding of English was not borne out by what I observed during his testimony, I found it difficult to accept his evidence fully in this regard.

46 Importantly, I found it difficult to believe that Mak would have interpreted to Fang a version of the statements that was consistent with what Fang had told him, while at the same time typing out a different version, ⁶⁴ one that was presumably incriminating and which he got Fang to sign. Apart from the fact that this allegation was raised very late in the day, it would have been practically extremely difficult for Mak to keep the separate versions in his head to carry out this alleged subterfuge. It would also have been extremely risky for Mak to do this, since he could have easily been found out when Fang reviewed the statements before signing them.

47 In the circumstances, I was unable to conclude that the alleged promises, inducements or threats had been made by Mak to Fang, and I did not find that any reasonable doubt was raised as to the voluntariness of Fang’s statements. I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that they had been given voluntarily, and admitted them into evidence. As for whether the statements’ alleged inaccuracies were such that they should not be admitted, my view was that it was premature to rule on this matter at the end of the ancillary hearing, especially given my doubts about Fang’s alleged inadequacies with English. My view was that if it was shown at the main trial that the statements were wanting in accuracy, then minimal weight could be given to them, with limited prejudice to Fang.

48 Having admitted the statements, I made some observations about them, before assessing the weight to be given to them in the light of the independent evidence and the evidence given by Tay and Fang in the main trial.

49 Tay’s statements broadly stated as follows:

(a) In P7, he stated that as sales manager in Lantro, he had a business sales target of $6 million to meet each year. Sometime in March 2018, he brought Goh and Poh together so that WRS would know about Lantro. About two weeks later, Goh called him asking for referral fees if Lantro were to be engaged for jobs in WRS. Tay told Goh that he was keen to pay the referral fees, which could also be in the form of LEW fees or consultancy fees. Tay conveyed Goh’s request to Poh, who refused to “pay bribes to get business.” Tay stated that he intended to give referral fees to Goh because he had problems meeting his sales target. ⁶⁵

(b) In P8, he expanded on the above and stated that the call from Goh asking for a referral fee to introduce Lantro for the Lumina project in WRS took place sometime in March 2018. After Poh rejected this idea, Tay told Fang about Goh’s request, stating that Goh could refer projects to Lantro which would also benefit their contractors such as NEC, as well as Fang, since NEC would typically engage RH Creation to do the job. He thus asked Fang to ascertain if NEC was willing to give Goh the referral fee in the form of an LEW fee. Fang subsequently informed Tay that NEC was willing to do so, and Tay conveyed this to Goh, who wrote on a piece of paper the details that should go into the invoice to engage him for the LEW services. Tay passed this piece of paper to Fang. Sometime in early April 2018, Goh told Tay that it would be better to give him the money before work commenced, though Tay and Fang did not have the money at the time. Sometime in mid-April 2018, Tay received a call from Boo, and after presentations and negotiations, Pico appointed Lantro as its sub-contractor for the Lumina project. In early May 2018, Fang secured the funds from NEC, and handed the money to Tay. Tay in turn handed it to Goh, but asked for the loan of $6,000, which Goh agreed to. Tay also stated that he and Fang gave Goh the referral fees in the form of LEW fees so that Goh would refer more jobs to Lantro, although he accepted that it was not right, since Goh was in WRS and there would be a conflict of interest. ⁶⁶

50 Tay’s evidence was that if the words “LEW fees” were substituted for “referral fees” in certain sentences in the statements, then the sentences would be accurate. He nevertheless stated that the order and timing of events was inaccurate – in particular, Boo first got in touch with him in early April 2018, rather than in “mid-April”. CSI Lim’s evidence had been that he simply recorded the information and dates as stated by Tay.

51 The defence submitted that CSI Lim’s disinterest in “specific timelines” contributed to a high risk of inaccuracy in the recording of Tay’s statements, and that the statements as well as Tay’s admissions therein thus needed to be carefully scrutinised. ⁶⁷ I accepted that there were issues in P8 with the timing of when Goh first asked Tay for a referral fee, and when Boo got in touch with Tay. The estimate for the latter event appeared to be off by about two weeks, and I noted that some of the statements had been recorded without reference to the parties’ text or WhatsApp messages. However, I did not find these irregularities in the timings to constitute a grave impediment to my fact-finding, since there was independent evidence to fix some of the events. I thus did not place too much reliance on the sequence of events set out in P8, since the independent evidence from Soh, Boo, Lim and Poh which led to my findings in Questions 1 and 2 above made it clear that Tay and Goh already had the understanding about the gratification payable as at 26 March 2018 – before Boo contacted Tay, and before Lantro/NEC started work on the Lumina project. On the matter of Tay’s admissions in his statements, I will deal with them at [64] below.

(a) For paragraph 19, instead of Goh calling him to ask for “referral fees” for Lantro to be engaged to do jobs for WRS, Tay stated that Goh wanted to offer his “consultant work in the form of LEW.” ⁶⁸

(b) For paragraph 24 at Q&A 1, instead of him telling Goh that he wanted to give Goh “referral fees if Lantro was to get jobs from WRS”, Tay stated that the reference should have been to “LEW fees” instead. ⁶⁹

It was clear that Tay was trying to divorce the matter of “referral fees” from the advancing of Lantro’s business interests with projects in the Zoo. However, as I note below at [65], this portion of Tay’s evidence was inconsistent with the main planks of his defence. In any case, the substitution of “referral fees” with “LEW fees” did not necessarily exonerate Tay since it still linked the payment of money with the advancing of Lantro’s business interests through getting jobs with the Zoo, and was still suggestive of the “LEW fees” being a euphemism for the corrupt gratification given to Goh, especially if no LEW services were rendered.

53 Fang’s statements included the following points:

(a) In P2, he stated that Tay told him that it would be useful to pay Goh a $50,000 referral fee, because when Goh referred the Zoo’s jobs to Lantro, it would then sub-contract its jobs to NEC and RH Creation. He stated that he knew it was wrong to do this. He confirmed that he prepared the LEW invoice based on information on a piece of paper which Tay passed to him, and confirmed that he obtained the $50,000 cash, then passed it to Tay for onward handing to Goh. ⁷⁰

(b) In P3 and P4, Fang also asserted that he and Tay knew that the $50,000 was meant as a referral fee, and that no LEW services would be provided by Goh to NEC. Fang also stated that he knew that it was wrong to give Goh $50,000, because he wanted the job to go smoothly. Concerning the email that Goh sent him on 20 June 2018 which contained the backdated letter of appointment for Goh, Fang handwrote the following in P3 at paragraph 55:

54 As noted earlier, Fang’s evidence was that his standard of English was insufficiently high for him to understand what was written in his statements and he did not review them thoroughly before signing them. However, I noted that he took some time to review each statement upon the conclusion of its recording, before signing it – 25 minutes each for P2 and P3, and 20 minutes for P4. My view was that these lengths of time were suggestive of a proper review, because he would otherwise not need to take that long before signing them. He also claimed that the handwritten amendment at paragraph 55 of P3 was “taught” to him by Mak, after he told Mak what he wanted to say (although this had not been put to Mak during the ancillary hearing). ⁷² Mak thereafter testified in the main trial that Fang had not asked for interpretation assistance when writing those words, adding that if he had interpreted those amendments to Fang, then they would have been in his handwriting, rather than Fang’s. ⁷³ I also noted the grammatical errors in the handwritten amendment, which in all likelihood would not have been there if they had effectively been dictated by Mak, as Fang claimed. This indicated that the amendment did emanate from Fang, was again suggestive of him being able to understand more English and be more proficient in it than he claimed.

55 Concerning business documents that needed to be prepared in English, Fang’s evidence was that DW7 Tay Yong Whai (also known as Thomas) assisted him – an example of a document for which stated he received assistance from Thomas Tay was a quotation issued on NEC’s letterhead to Lantro, for the supply and installation of cables for the Lumina project (“NEC quotation”). Fang’s evidence was that Thomas Tay would explain contractual matters or details in projects and assist him to prepare documents or write official replies. Fang testified in his ancillary hearing that Thomas Tay was paid $1,800 for this assistance that he rendered to NEC for the Lumina project, but changed this amount to $5,000 in his testimony during the main trial. In any case, no such payment was made eventually. ⁷⁴ The inconsistency in the amount Thomas Tay was purportedly paid for his services suggested that these were not standard or regular payments that were made, while the increase in the amount alleged to be paid suggested that Fang was attempting to pitch these services rendered at a higher level than they in fact were.

56 Thomas Tay confirmed that he explained contracts to Tay and Fang as well as assisted them to draft conditions of contracts so they would not be put at a disadvantage. However, he stated that the NEC quotation was not prepared by him, although he may have prepared other drafts for Fang, which Fang then copied or adapted into the NEC quotation. Thomas Tay also stated that although Fang said he would be paid for his assistance in the documentation for the Lumina project, no figure was mentioned, and he was in any event not paid. He added that while he conversed with Fang using mostly Mandarin, they would use English for technical terms. ⁷⁵ I accepted Thomas Tay’s evidence as he gave his evidence in a matter-of-fact manner and had little reason to lie.

57 I was therefore reinforced in the view I had formed as at the end of Fang’s ancillary hearing, that the standard of his English was not as poor as he purported it to be. I was satisfied that he was at least able to draft basic business documents such as quotations, read emails and speak in English. In this regard, he had also admitted that he would speak English to non-Chinese persons at work, including DW5 Kalam Abul (“Kalam”). As observed at [45] above, even if I accepted that the standard of his English was not high, it was clearly not as hopeless as he claimed. I was therefore unable to accept his claim that he was entirely reliant on Mak to interpret his statements to him, and did not otherwise comprehend what he signed. Mak testified in the main trial that a number of the words and expressions found in Fang’s statements were paraphrasing done by him, and was honest in this regard. ⁷⁶ He also testified that if Fang had appeared to be uncomfortable giving his statement in English, he would have asked Fang if he preferred to speak in another language – if it was Mandarin and the statement needed interpretation to be recorded, this would have been reflected in the statement. ⁷⁷ The fact that it was not, meant that the statement was recorded in English. There was no reason for Mak to deliberately reflect this inaccurately, and I therefore accepted his evidence that Fang’s statements were recorded in English. By extension, I did not accept Fang’s submission that only minimal weight should be given to his statements.

58 A final point submitted by the defence concerning Fang’s statements was how quickly they were seemingly recorded, and that this was not possible if Mak went through the process as he claimed of typing out Fang’s responses to his questions and reading over the paragraphs to confirm their accuracy. ⁷⁸ P2 contained just over six pages of text and took one hour and 35 minutes to record, P3 contained nine pages of text and took 55 minutes to record, while P4 contained seven-and-a-half pages of text and took one hour and 45 minutes to record. In particular, it was suggested that it was not possible that Mak recorded P3 in 55 minutes. Mak’s evidence was that he had no reason to change the start and end timings on the statement, and that these had been noted as accurate by Fang as well in his signing of the statement. Mak added that a fair amount of background information and fact finding would have been done during the interview process before the statement was recorded, such that the recording process was smoother and more efficient. By the time he recorded the statement, he would thus have an idea of the answers that Fang would give to his questions. ⁷⁹

59 In my view, the time taken to record P2 and P4 did not seem inordinately quick, given their length. As for P3, 55 minutes did appear at first blush to be objectively quick for a nine-page statement. However, short of putting Mak and Fang through a re-enactment of how this might have been done, it was difficult to say that it was impossible. I also noted Mak’s evidence that Fang accepted the timings by signing on the statement, and that he would have gathered the requisite background information before beginning the recording of the statements, such that the process could move quite quickly. I therefore declined to conclude that for this reason alone, Fang’s statements could not have been reliably recorded.

60 Returning to the main trial, Tay’s and Fang’s case about why the $50,000 was paid to Goh was as follows, based on their testimonies.

(a) About a week or two after the 26 March meeting, Goh called Tay to ask if Poh wished to engage Goh as a consultant. Tay then checked with Poh, who rejected this. Tay did not inform Goh immediately of Poh’s decision, so as not to be seen to be rejecting Goh so quickly. ⁸⁰

(b) Thereafter, when Lantro had already gotten the sub-contract from Pico and had started its work, Goh called Tay again, congratulated him, then asked again if Poh wanted to engage Goh as a consultant. Tay then told Goh that Poh had rejected this request. At this, Goh got very angry, and accused Tay of being ungrateful since Goh had recommended the job to them, and threatened Lantro and Pico to “watch out”, as they would “never get any job or future business in WRS”. Tay initially testified that Goh then hung up. However, Tay later claimed that during this phone call, Goh also demanded $50,000 as a referral fee or commission. Tay then told Fang about this, and said that if they did not get Goh the money, they would have to “standby to get in trouble” with Goh. Fang then asked the boss of NEC whether he would be willing to pay the money, and was rejected on the ground that they had gotten the Lumina project on their own ability. ⁸¹

(c) One to two weeks later, Tay met Goh in the Zoo, and Goh made no more mention of any referral fee or commission. He merely said to Tay, “You see if anyone need any services of mine, can introduce to me?” By this, Tay and Fang understood Goh to be offering an “alternative to what he wanted in the first place.” To help Goh, Tay thus asked Fang to check with NEC if they wanted LEW services. Tay asserted that although Goh did not tell him the cost of the LEW services, he took it to be $50,000 because Goh had offered this amount to another company which Tay worked with. Tay also stated that although this figure of $50,000 for LEW services was the same as the amount Goh sought earlier as the referral fee, it did not “ring any alarms” to him. ⁸²

(d) Thereafter, as Goh did not have the time to prepare an invoice, he hand-wrote the necessary information and gave it to Tay, who passed the information to Fang. I noted that although Goh denied giving Tay any such handwritten note, Goh at least accepted in his statement that he had verbally conveyed to Tay the information that needed to be in the invoice. ⁸³ In this regard, I accepted that this information must somehow have been conveyed to Tay, since he and Fang would not otherwise have Goh’s LEW licence number to insert into the LEW invoice. Further, it was unlikely that Tay and Fang would otherwise have gotten involved in this aspect of the payment process or have known what to state in the LEW invoice. I noted that this portion of Tay’s and Fang’s cases were consistent with what was in their statements.

(e) When Tay passed the money to Goh, no acknowledgment of receipt was required because of the “trust” that Tay had in Goh. ⁸⁴

61 I accepted that Tay and Fang had discussed how to obtain the $50,000, and that Tay gave Fang the necessary information to prepare the LEW invoice. It was not disputed that Fang thereafter withdrew the money and passed it to Tay who then handed it to Goh. They thus acted in concert to give Goh the money. Beyond these points, I had numerous difficulties with this version of events from Tay and Fang, as it was illogical and internally inconsistent.

(a) First, the matter of Goh’s threatening phone call was not reflected in Tay’s statements to the CPIB. ⁸⁵ He stated in the main trial that he informed the recording officer of this, but it was somehow not recorded. ⁸⁶ His case was that he had been told to “co-operate” with CPIB to catch the “big fish”, meaning Goh. If this was true, then surely the matter of a threat being issued by Goh was incriminating, and there was no reason for the recording officer to exclude this from Tay’s statements. The fact that it was not in Tay’s statements was strongly suggestive of this allegation of a threat being an afterthought. During the trial, his account of the details of this conversation also varied as he repeated it, even within his evidence-in-chief – as noted in [60(b)] above. This was a further indication that it was untrue, since he appeared to be omitting key details, then later adding them to his account to prop it up and make it more believable.

(b) Second, Tay did not tell anyone from Lantro or Pico about the threat. If indeed such a threat was uttered by Goh, it was clearly wrongful and it was difficult to understand why Tay did not report it to someone in authority. His silence reflected the conduct of one who was complicit, rather than one who had been genuinely threatened.

(c) Third, Tay’s evidence was that he had known Goh since 2012, and they had made friendly referrals for each other as a matter of market practice, with money or a reward never being mentioned. ⁸⁷ If so, it was very odd that Goh suddenly demanded a reward of $50,000 and even threatened adverse consequences if this was not paid. There was no explanation for this alleged change in Goh’s conduct, which made the account of his sudden outburst questionable. Further, Goh’s supposed threats were levelled at Pico as well, which did not make sense since there was no indication that he had sought a bribe from them. ⁸⁸

(d) Fourth, according to this version of events, after Goh got angry, issued his threat, demanded the money, then hung up on Tay, he seemingly had a change of heart a week or two later, and was suddenly friendly towards Tay again. This change was similarly inexplicable, since Tay still had not agreed then to give Goh the reward sought.

(e) Fifth, Tay seemingly unilaterally decided that the amount of “LEW fees” to pay to Goh was $50,000, although he did not ascertain the nature of the services that NEC needed or how much Goh would charge for those. It was not normal that Tay would not have sought to verify the cost of the LEW services, or that it did not occur to him that it was unusual that this amount was exactly the same as the “referral fee” demanded earlier and which Poh had refused to pay. The coincidence in the amounts was unusual, to say the least, and too convenient.

(f) Sixth, Tay stated that did not require any acknowledgement of receipt from Goh due to an alleged trust he had in Goh. However, he also admitted that he had given Goh the money so that Goh would not “find trouble” for him and Pico. ⁸⁹ If the latter was true, it was difficult to see why he would trust Goh.

62 On balance, this account seemed designed to support the claim that Tay and Fang were somehow placed under duress to give the $50,000 to Goh, and to create a justification for why they purportedly engaged him for “LEW services” and created the supporting documentation. Given the difficulties I had with this account and some of its surrounding details, I rejected it insofar as it purported to show how Goh demanded the $50,000. It also caused me to treat Tay’s and Fang’s testimonies with caution as their inconsistencies betrayed a lack of candour.

63 This brought me back to Tay’s and Fang’s statements.

64 As noted above at [26], the fact that Tay raised the matter of the “kickback” with Poh immediately after the 26 March meeting showed that Tay knew by then of the need to pay Goh a bribe for any referral that Goh made for a Zoo project. Reliance on his statements to show his mindset in this regard was therefore not strictly necessary. Nevertheless, in my view, his self-incriminating assertions in his statements were consistent with this finding, since he stated therein that Goh had asked for referral fees if Lantro were to be engaged for jobs in WRS (which was incidentally the net effect of the two phone calls that Tay claimed in testimony to have received from Goh), that he and Fang gave the money to Goh because Tay wanted to meet his sales target, and they wanted Goh to refer more projects to Lantro. I therefore gave weight to those assertions. I noted that these also implicated Fang with the requisite guilty knowledge that the payment was a reward for the referral, and not for LEW services. Tay also admitted in cross-examination that he handed the money to Goh so that Goh would not “find trouble” for him and Pico. ⁹⁰ He therefore had ulterior motives in giving the money to Goh.

65 I noted above at [52] that Tay had disclaimed the accuracy of certain portions of his statement, claiming that references to “referral fees” should have been replaced with “consultant work in the form of LEW”, or “LEW fees” instead. However, his assertion during his ancillary hearing that paragraph 19 of P7 should have stated that Goh called him to offer “consultant work in the form of LEW” was inconsistent with his testimony in his main trial, which was that these were separate matters, since Goh first offered consultancy services, and only after Poh rejected this and after Goh’s outburst, did Goh later ask Tay to refer LEW work to him, allegedly without a mention of a referral fee. Tay’s inconsistencies on this key point led me to treat the exculpatory portions of his testimony with caution.

66 As for Fang’s intentions in paying the money to Goh, based on his statements, he also knew that it would be useful to pay Goh the $50,000, and that the money was meant as a referral fee, and not for LEW services. As stated above, I rejected Fang’s argument that minimal weight should be given to his statements on account of his purportedly poor standard of English and inability to comprehend his statements before signing them. However, even if I did not give his statements full weight, my view was that the evidence pointed inexorably to the fact that he, too, must have known and intended that the $50,000 was meant as a reward for Goh’s recommendation, and not for LEW fees. I elaborate.

(a) First, Fang admitted in testimony that he found it suspicious that Goh initially asked for a referral fee of $50,000, and that the value of the LEW services was for the same amount. However, he did not probe into this. ⁹¹ This betrayed a willingness to look the other way.

(b) Second, the LEW invoice which he prepared contained a key error – it was dated 28 April 2018 but was purported to be for LEW services from 2 December 2017 to 1 December 2018. Fang was unable to explain why this was so, and claimed not to have noticed this error, even though it was glaring. He flippantly added that he “always ma[d]e mistakes on the date”, and that he was “in a rush” preparing this. He also stated that no-one in NEC asked him about this irregularity. ⁹² However, this irregularity meant that the LEW invoice was false on its face, since it was obvious that Goh did not perform the LEW services from December 2017, and could not have done so. If the payment was genuinely meant for LEW services, then this would also clearly have shortchanged NEC with at least four months’ worth of services. This betrayed a complete disregard for the accuracy of the LEW invoice, which supported the conclusion that it was not created to support a genuine contract.

(c) Third, the LEW invoice named Goh as the person performing the LEW services, when he was not an employee of or contractor for RH Creation. When asked in cross-examination if this would give the false impression that Goh worked for RH Creation, Fang was repeatedly evasive in his responses, first claiming not to understand the question, then claiming that he did not know what others who looked at the LEW invoice would think. ⁹³ In my view, if the invoice was genuinely for LEW services, there was no reason for Fang to be so defensive and evasive about what it purported to say. His evasiveness was thus suggestive of his knowledge that it was not genuine.

(d) Fourth, there was no objective evidence of any electrical drawings being endorsed by Goh pursuant to this alleged contract for LEW services with NEC. The accused persons’ evidence was also inconsistent in this regard.

(i) Goh claimed in testimony that he completed the reviews and endorsements of the drawings that Tay passed to him on NEC’s behalf on two occasions – 4 and 11 May 2018. The dates were based on text messages which Goh had received from Tay. The one dated 4 May 2018 stated, “You free already pass you the drawings”, while the one dated 11 May 2018 stated, “There is a few LEW endorsement work for some ID work might need your advice I talk to you when I see you”. ⁹⁴

(ii) However, Tay’s evidence was that while he passed drawings to Goh on 4 May 2018, he did not recall receiving any endorsed drawings back from Goh. In this regard, he stated that since he passed Goh a “stack” of drawings that day, it could not be “that fast” that Goh reviewed and endorsed them on the spot without studying them first. As for 11 May 2018, while he admitted sending Goh the above-mentioned text message, he was unable to recall whether they in fact met and whether he passed Goh any drawings. ⁹⁵

(iii) Fang’s testimony was that he passed drawings to Tay on 4 May 2018 to hand to Goh, but never received the endorsed drawings back from Goh. He also admitted that he had no evidence that these drawings had been passed to Tay to hand to Goh. While he stated that there was another occasion about a week later in which he also passed drawings to Tay, he never got any drawings back from Goh. ⁹⁶

These inconsistencies meant that it could not be that all three accused persons’ accounts were true. Given that there being work done pursuant to the payment would have been highly relevant to the accused persons’ defence, I rejected the defence’s submission that these inconsistencies might have been due to memory loss instead of fabrication of evidence. ⁹⁷ Instead, my view was that when the inconsistencies were taken with the absence of objective evidence that drawings had been handed over and endorsed, they were highly indicative of the accused persons’ claims being untrue. It also suggested that the accused persons were clutching at these messages as alleged proof that any mentions of drawings around 4 May 2018 had to be of drawings from NEC, to demonstrate that there was indeed an agreement for Goh to carry out LEW services for NEC. ⁹⁸ In this regard, the prosecution pointed out that this detail about the drawings (or work done for the LEW fees paid) was also not mentioned in Tay’s and Fang’s CFD or their statements, ⁹⁹ which suggested that it was an afterthought. I agreed.

(e) Fifth, Goh’s position was that after investigations began, based on what the investigation officer at CPIB told him, he believed that the $50,000 had come from RH Creation instead of NEC. In late June 2018, he thus attempted to have Fang sign the backdated letter for RH Creation to appoint him for the provision of LEW services. His evidence was that Fang did not respond, and he thus did not press the matter. ¹⁰⁰ However, Fang’s evidence was that he told Goh in a face-to-face meeting that the payment was from NEC, and not his company, and thus he would not sign the new document. ¹⁰¹ Importantly, this was not put to Goh in cross-examination, suggesting that it was also an afterthought by Fang.

(f) Sixth, Fang’s evidence was that he decided to pay Goh in cash, although Goh did not ask for cash. To explain this, he made a bare assertion that he did so because “we were already late in the payment”. He was unable to satisfactorily explain why the payment was not done through a bank transfer, and why no acknowledgement of receipt was sought. ¹⁰² Further, the circumstances under which the cash was handed over – in an envelope and in a car park – were secretive and unusual. Taken with the fact that no acknowledgement of receipt was required from Goh, it pointed to the conclusion that this was not a bona fide payment for a genuine contract.

67 Therefore, in relation to Fang, I was also satisfied that he knew that the $50,000 was not meant for the provision of LEW services by Goh, and that he must have known that it was a reward to Goh. Insofar as he asserted these points in his statements, I gave weight to those portions.

69 Goh’s testimony was that he recommended Tay to Soh, but never asked Tay for any referral fees for this and denied calling Tay “ungrateful”. He denied speaking to Tay right after Lantro had gotten the job from Pico, and claimed that he knew about this only in early May 2018. Goh’s case was that in mid to late April 2018, Tay informed Goh that he required some “LEW works certification” but did not tell Goh who the client would be, and Goh did not ask, asserting that it was sufficient that he knew Tay. Goh stated that he only found out that the client was NEC on 4 May 2018, when Tay handed him the $50,000. This was despite the fact that he admitted that he should have known who he was doing LEW services for to ensure that they would not be WRS’s contractors. He also did not ascertain the nature or complexity of the LEW services he would need to do. ¹⁰³

70 If the agreement for the provision of LEW services was genuine, I found it difficult to believe that Goh did not even know who he was providing the services to until he received the $50,000 and did not bother to find out beforehand. This was especially so since Goh’s evidence was that he bore lifetime liabilities for the endorsements he did for his LEW, and that the amount he would charge for the work depended on the complexity of the projects. ¹⁰⁴ I therefore disbelieved Goh’s testimony that the payment of the $50,000 to him by Tay and Fang was pursuant to any genuine agreement for him to carry out LEW services for NEC. I also noted that Goh’s account of how he came to be retained to perform LEW services for NEC for $50,000 was different from Tay’s – given that both accounts could not be true and the logical difficulties I found in accepting either version, my view was that they both must have been lying to suppress the truth.

71 Goh’s testimony on why he was unable to issue an invoice for his alleged LEW services was also suspect. He claimed that he could not issue a tax invoice because he was still working for WRS at the material time and did not have his own company, ¹⁰⁵ but this did not make sense. It also did not explain why he did not issue a simple letter acknowledging his appointment and the receipt of the $50,000. His subsequent conduct on 20 June 2018 in asking Fang to sign the backdated letter of appointment was also inconsistent with his claim that he could not issue any documentation without a company, for although he had left the employ of WRS by then, he still had not incorporated any company for the provision of LEW services. ¹⁰⁶ These inconsistencies and illogical aspects of Goh’s evidence led me to conclude that Goh was not truthful, and that his act of asking Fang to sign the backdated letter of appointment was nothing more than a belated attempt to give the transfer of the $50,000 a veneer of legitimacy.

72 As for Goh’s statements, I did not find it necessary to place much reliance on them. Nevertheless, I made certain observations concerning them. In essence, Goh disclaimed the incriminating portions thereof, claiming that he was “totally exhausted” when he signed P16 at about 5 pm on 31 May 2018, and that the recording officer PW6 IO Lim Shu Hui had in any event told him that he could come back and amend the statements at a later time, when he had more clarity. ¹⁰⁷ Even if I accepted that Goh was tired by the time he signed P16, since it was not disputed that he was brought into CPIB in the early morning of 30 May 2018 and been kept there overnight, I noted that he retained sufficient clarity to handwrite at the end of P16 (at paragraph 88 Q&A4) exculpatory words that, “Money was given to me by Leslie Tay, as per my understanding was for the LEW services rendered to NEC”. In any case, he returned on 6 August 2018 and thereafter to give his subsequent statements, when he would have been refreshed. In P17, he sought (at paragraph 119) to “correct” certain incriminating portions of P16 and was allowed to do so. When P18, P19 and P20 were recorded on 7, 10 and 13 August 2018 respectively, he did not seek to correct any portions of P17. ¹⁰⁸ In P17, he admitted (at paragraph 136) that Tay had asked how much he should “cover” Goh, but claimed (at paragraph 118 and 136) that he “scolded” Tay for offering him a bribe and declined the bribe, maintained (at paragraph 119) that the $50,000 was for his LEW services, and amended paragraph 138 to strike out a reference to scribbling notes for what Tay should write in the LEW invoice. However, he admitted (at paragraph 141) that he had not signed off on any jobs for NEC. My view was that Goh was attempting in P17 to push blame to Tay and disclaim liability. Nevertheless, certain admissions still came through.

73 On balance, my view was that Goh’s claim that the incriminating portions of his statements were left there because he was promised that he could amend them later was a hollow one, since he had been given the opportunity to amend them but did not. I was therefore minded to give these portions weight, since as noted in Chan Kin Choi, the incriminating portions of mixed statements were likely to be true whereas the excuses did not carry the same weight. Thus, I noted that Goh’s admission that Tay had asked him on the night of the 26 March meeting how much was needed to “cover” him was consistent with the finding that both men knew even then of the need to pay Goh for his referral of Lantro, while Goh’s admission that he had not signed off on any jobs for NEC supported the finding that there had not been a genuine agreement with NEC for LEW services and thus no work was needed to be done thereunder.

74 Ultimately, I was satisfied that there was no real agreement for the provision of LEW services, and that no such services were rendered by Goh for to the $50,000 that was paid to him. It was noted above at [60(c)] Tay and Fang understood Goh’s offer of “LEW services” to be an “alternative to what he wanted in the first place.” In my view, rather than this being an indication of the bona fide actions of Tay and Fang, it betrayed the reality of the situation – that this supposed “alternative” was simply the bribe by another name.

75 To round up this Issue, based on the independent evidence and my rejection of the accused persons’ testimonies on why the $50,000 was paid, I was led inexorably to the conclusion that it was paid to Goh as a reward for the introduction of Lantro to Pico. Certain portions of the accused persons’ statements evidenced a guilty conscience on their part, and since they were consistent with my conclusions, I gave weight to those portions. Having concluded that Tay and Fang acted in concert to pay the $50,000 to Goh as a reward, I then turned to the questions of whether this was objectively corrupt, and whether the accused persons knew that it was corrupt.

76 On the question of whether the transaction was objectively corrupt, I answered it in the affirmative, as it was my view that any reasonable person viewing this transaction would think it was corrupt. Apart from the fact that I found that the money was paid to Goh as a reward for his introducing Lantro to Pico, the following points affirmed my conclusion that this was a corrupt transaction.

77 First, Goh refused to invoice NEC directly for his alleged LEW services, even though that would have been the natural thing to do had this been a genuine agreement. By the same token, NEC did not or could not pay Goh directly, and the “convoluted process” of having RH Creation issue the invoice with Goh purportedly as its contractor or service provider thus had to be undertaken. ¹⁰⁹ If this transaction was above-board, there would have been no need for the payment of the LEW fees to be processed in this roundabout manner.

78 Second, the circumstances under which the payment was made have been noted – the $50,000 was paid in cash that had been placed in an envelope, and it was handed over in a car park, and without requiring acknowledgement of receipt. My view was that all this had an air of surreptitiousness and furtiveness. ¹¹⁰ This was not negated by the fact that Goh subsequently deposited the money into his bank account, because it remained that he did not declare to his employers that he received this money, or that he was purportedly doing work outside of his normal job scope. Goh’s employment contract required that he needed his employer’s written consent to engage in any work outside WRS. Goh claimed that he had been permitted by his employers to render LEW services such that the work he was purportedly to have done for NEC was permitted. ¹¹¹ However, PW9 Cham Tud Yinn, who oversaw the department that Goh was in, testified that there was no declaration to this effect made by Goh. ¹¹² By extension, no such written consent had been given for Goh to render any LEW services outside of WRS. If the $50,000 he received was above-board and for permitted LEW services, there was no reason for Goh to hide this from his employers. The fact that he did not declare this alleged work or seek permission to do it was highly suggestive of it not being genuine. If so, it added to the surreptitious nature of the transaction. In this regard, it was argued that the fact that an invoice was created was evidence of a paper trail and contradicted the notion of this being a surreptitious transaction. However, given the lack of care with which the invoice was prepared and its glaring errors (as noted above at [66(b)]), my view was that it was a poor attempt at giving the payment a cloak of legitimacy, rather than it being proof of such legitimacy as claimed by the defence.

79 Third, the gratification, at $50,000, was objectively large. In this regard, the defence’s position was that in their industry, it was common to pay workers their salary in cash, and that it was therefore not unusual to pay Goh in cash. ¹¹³ I was unable to accept this as a valid explanation for the cash payment, since $50,000 is objectively a large amount, and while such an amount may be withdrawn to satisfy a company’s monthly payroll, surely no single worker received such a large sum in cash. My view was therefore that there was no satisfactory explanation as to why this payment needed to be made in cash.

80 Fourth, given that Goh was an employee of WRS and was remunerated by them, it was trite that he should not be receiving large payments from external parties for favours done for them.

81 I then moved to the question of whether the accused persons knew that what they did was corrupt.

82 In respect of Goh, as noted at [69] and [70], I found it absurd that he would not have checked what LEW services Tay wanted him to provide or who the client was.

83 On the matter of why he was paid in cash rather than in any other form, he testified that it was “the way [he did] business” for “people that [he did] not know”, because he had experienced bounced cheques in the past. ¹¹⁴ Insofar as this suggested that needed to be paid in cash because he did not trust NEC as he had not done business with them before, it was inconsistent with his assertion that he did not need to check who was engaging him for the LEW services because he trusted Tay. If his assertion was true, then since NEC was Tay’s contact, he should have trusted NEC as well. I also noted that he claimed that he did not need to issue any acknowledgement of receipt for the $50,000 because there was “mutual trust”. ¹¹⁵ However, there was clearly no mutuality about this alleged trust, because although NEC seemingly trusted him sufficiently not to require an acknowledgement of receipt from him, he clearly did not trust NEC sufficiently to accept a cheque payment from them. He was unable to satisfactorily explain these inconsistencies pursuant to questions posed by the court, ¹¹⁶ and my view was that this betrayed a lack of any reasonable explanation for the payment in cash, apart from a desire to reduce a paper trail.

84 Further, as noted at [66(d)], there also was no objective evidence that any LEW services had been performed by Goh for NEC. The text/WhatsApp messages of 4 and 11 May 2018 that Goh relied on as proof of such work did not state that the drawings were from NEC, and the message of 11 May 2018 in fact only reflected Tay wishing to seek advice from Goh, instead of wishing him to endorse the drawings. Goh’s CFD also stated that the LEW services he performed were around 20 June 2018, which was clearly inconsistent with the position he took at trial. ¹¹⁷ In this regard, Goh claimed that he told the recorder of his statements as well as his lawyer about the LEW services rendered on 4 and 11 May 2018, but that they both somehow omitted to reflect this in his statements and CFD. ¹¹⁸ I found this double omission to be incredible and too convenient. It was more likely that his assertion in paragraph 141 of his statement P17, that he never signed off on any jobs for NEC, was the truth.

85 While it was claimed that further work would have been referred but for the fact that the CPIB’s investigations started and the accused persons were not allowed to communicate with each other, I found this to be a weak claim. The money was received on 4 May 2018, and Goh was first brought to the CPIB only on 30 May 2018. This gave Tay, Fang and NEC nearly a month to refer work to Goh, but there was no objective evidence of this, despite Fang’s claim that NEC had a few jobs from three landed properties and a condominium at the relevant time. ¹¹⁹ In any case, this injunction from CPIB was clearly breached since Goh communicated with Fang on 20 June 2018 when he asked Fang to sign the fresh document that appointed him as a provider of LEW services to RH Creation. It was therefore clear that the accused persons paid little heed to CPIB’s injunction against communicating with each other, and it would not have formed any real impediment to them communicating if they wished.

86 As noted above, Goh’s act of asking Fang to sign a fresh letter of appointment was also a clear attempt to change the justification for the payment after the fact. Goh claimed that he asked this of Fang because he initially thought that he was providing his services to NEC based on what Tay told him, ¹²⁰ but thereafter thought that it was RH Creation based on what the CPIB officer told him. However, he dropped the matter when Fang did not sign the new appointment letter. If the agreement was genuine, I found it difficult to believe that Goh’s attempt to right such an error thereafter would be so feeble. He was also evasive when asked whether his evidence made sense insofar as he claimed that Fang had declined to sign the backdated letter of appointment. ¹²¹ Assuming that it was true that the party that engaged him was RH Creation instead of NEC, this also meant that he had not been paid for the endorsement work he did for NEC on 4 and 11 May 2018. He stated that he did not ask to be paid for that although he estimated the work to be worth $8,000 to $10,000, claiming once again that it was because he was not permitted by CPIB to speak to anyone. ¹²² As above, I did not believe this aspect of his evidence, since this injunction from CPIB did not stop him from communicating with Fang on 20 June 2018. In any case, I also noted that Goh’s explanation for this 20 June 2018 communication was inconsistent with Fang’s, as Fang claimed that he was referring LEW to Goh that was unrelated to the $50,000 that had been paid to Goh. ¹²³

87 In all, this led me to the conclusion that no LEW services were rendered by Goh to NEC pursuant to the $50,000 paid to him, that it was not a genuine contract, and that Goh therefore knew that the payment to him was a corrupt reward for his introduction of Lantro to Pico.

88 In respect of Tay, he immediately asked Goh for a loan of $6,000 upon handing him the money. If, as Tay claimed, Goh had been angry with him for initially not wanting to give Goh a referral fee, and if Goh then needed help to get LEW, it meant that Goh wanted or needed this money, so it would not have made sense for Tay to then be so bold as to ask Goh for a loan. To my mind, this also pointed to an understanding between the parties, that Tay and Goh knew of the nature of the payment as a corrupt gratification. Thus, Tay knew that his request was not likely to be rejected since Goh would accede to it as an act of reciprocity.

89 Tay also handed the $50,000 to Goh in cash and did not tell anyone in Lantro that he was doing this. I earlier rejected the claim that it was normal industry practice to pay a single person $50,000 in cash in an above-board transaction. Further, if the transaction was legal, there was no reason why Tay could not have informed Lantro or Poh about it. The fact that he did not, indicated his knowledge that it was not above-board. He also admitted in his statements that he knew it was not right to give Goh referral fees in the form of LEW fees. I accepted those portions of his statements, and my finding was that Tay also knew that what he did was corrupt.

90 As for Fang, he seemingly decided, without prompting, to pay Goh in cash instead of a bank transfer. As noted above, he was unable to give a satisfactory reason for this, which suggested that he must have known that what he was doing was not above-board, and was corrupt. He, too, admitted in his statements to knowing that it was wrong to pay a referral fee in this manner to Goh.

91 As for his belated attempt in late June 2018 to refer LEW to Goh, Fang claimed that he had only been told not to communicate with the other accused persons about the case, and thus it was permissible to communicate with Goh about LEW services that were not under the NEC contract. ¹²⁴ I was unable to accept that this was a genuine attempt to help Goh or refer work to him, especially since Fang’s account was that he knew that Goh had uttered the threat to Tay, and that he felt it suspicious that the referral fee that Goh had initially asked for and the eventual amount paid for LEW services were the same. Given that he would have known by June that he and Tay were in trouble with the law over their dealings with Goh, I found it difficult to believe that he would still attempt to “help” Goh by referring work to him. It was far more likely that this was a late attempt to lend an air of authenticity to their earlier dealings by purportedly referring LEW to Goh. In all, I also find that Fang knew that what he did was corrupt.

92 Given these findings on Tay’s and Fang’s knowledge that their act was corrupt, I also concluded that there was an agreement between them to carry out this illegal act, and that they thus did engage in a conspiracy with each other to corruptly give Goh the $50,000 as a reward for advancing Lantro’s business interests with Pico.

93 Both the prosecution and defence raised a number of other points for their respective cases and against the opposing parties’ cases. I did not find it necessary to deal with all of them, save for the following three which I address for completeness.

94 The first point concerned what transpired between Fang and NEC that led NEC to make the payment of $50,000 to RH Creation, which amount Fang subsequently encashed and handed to Tay. To be clear, since it was not disputed that the funds came from NEC and given my findings that no LEW services were rendered to NEC and there was no genuine agreement between it and Goh, I did not find it strictly necessary to examine what Fang told NEC to have them agree to disburse the funds to him. Nevertheless, I addressed it for completeness. In this regard, the testimonies of Kalam and DW6 Hasanuzzaman (“Hasan”) were relevant. It should also be noted that one Esther/Vinge, who was Kalam’s wife, was also named as being involved in NEC, though she was not called as a witness as she had moved to Australia and declined to return to Singapore to testify. ¹²⁵

95 On how he procured the $50,000, Fang asserted that he initially told Kalam, whom he said was NEC’s boss, that Goh wanted the $50,000 as a referral fee, but Kalam reacted strongly and refused. Later, when Goh offered his LEW services, Fang relayed this to Kalam, who agreed and did not ask why the cost of the LEW services was the same as the previously sought referral fee. ¹²⁶

96 Kalam denied the above, stating that he was not the boss of NEC at the material time, as he was then working with a company named KSM Construction and Engineering Pte Ltd (“KSM”). He claimed that he knew of the Lumina project only after he was called to CPIB for an interview, and denied that in mid to end April 2018, Fang had spoken to him about the request for a referral fee of $50,000 from someone from the Zoo. He also denied that about a week later, Fang told him that the person from the Zoo was now offering unlimited LEW services for a year for $50,000, and that he had agreed to engage this person for $50,000. ¹²⁷ The defence sought to show that Kalam was not truthful about his non-involvement in NEC, by adducing evidence of emails that had been forwarded to him by Hasan, as well showing that he was in certain WhatsApp chat groups with Fang. ¹²⁸ Where these were undated or dated after 2018, I did not give them much weight in showing Kalam’s involvement in NEC at the material time. However, there was at least one email in 2017 mentioning NEC which Hasan forwarded to Kalam, and Kalam was unable to explain why this was so.

97 Hasan had been an employee of NEC from around 2013 to 2022, and testified that when he worked there, he reported to Kalam for the sites that he worked on. Nevertheless, he stated that Vinge was “always in the office”, that “everything was handled by her”, and that when he was in the office, he saw Vinge and Kalam “always dealing with the money matters.” He also stated that he forwarded one of the emails to Kalam because the name list of workers therein had been prepared by Kalam’s office. ¹²⁹ In his statement to the CPIB, Hasan stated that Kalam was the husband of his lady boss, and that Kalam was not involved in NEC’s day to day business as he had a job outside of NEC. ¹³⁰ In court, he stated that he had lied in this statement as he had been told to do so by Kalam and Vinge. ¹³¹

98 Vinge’s statements were admitted into evidence by consent. In these, she stated that she owned NEC and was its director, while Kalam worked for KSM. She stated that although she had no expertise in the work to be done for the Lumina project, NEC worked with Fang and Lantro to bid for the project as NEC had workers to supply. She stated that Fang told her that the $50,000 was needed for LEW fees for a year as they were doing the electrical work for the Lumina project and needed the “licence”, and that they could not start the project without the fee. ¹³² The defence’s case was that Vinge was lying in her statements to protect Kalam, and that Kalam (who was called by the defence but treated as a hostile witness) was lying in his testimony as well, because he was a long-term visit pass holder at the time, and thus did not want to admit to running the operations at NEC.

99 My views were as follows. I found Kalam to be somewhat evasive, and that his credibility was suspect. Further, when the hearing broke for the evening and he was to return to continue his testimony the next day, he contacted Hasan overnight to ask why Hasan forwarded the emails to him. ¹³³ Although he did not press when Hasan declined to engage with him, his act of contacting Hasan was quite inappropriate, as he had been directed not to contact Hasan. As for Hasan, he was an admitted liar insofar as he claimed that he had lied in his statement to the CPIB, despite knowing that he could get into serious trouble for doing so. ¹³⁴ He had left NEC as he was not only unhappy about the salary he was paid, but said that it was also sometimes paid late, and he took the view that Kalam was not someone who would tell the truth in court. ¹³⁵ His motivations for testifying against Kalam and Vinge were therefore questionable. Finally, as Vinge was not present in court, the veracity of her account could not be tested. Ultimately, I did not think that it was safe to place weight on the testimonies of Kalam and Hasan, or the statements of Vinge. It nevertheless remained that NEC provided the funds at Fang’s request and did not appear to take issue either with the erroneous LEW invoice that Fang prepared or that they had paid this money but had not received the LEW services from Goh.

100 The second point, put forward by the defence, was that Tay and Fang objectively had little “incentive” to give Goh a substantial bribe of $50,000 just for his recommendation for the Lumina project. ¹³⁶ However, such a “kickback” to Goh was precisely what Tay had suggested to Poh. Even by Tay’s and Fang’s account in trial, they had been prepared to facilitate such a payment as Tay asked Poh to engage Goh for undefined “consultant” work and when Poh refused, Fang then asked the boss of NEC to fund this payment as well but was also rejected. They then braced themselves to “standby to get in trouble” when they initially thought that they could not pay Goh the money. Tay had even admitted that the $50,000 was eventually paid in part to prevent Goh from making trouble in the Lumina project. Thus, putting aside the quantifiable financial benefits that Lantro or NEC could earn from the Lumina project, Tay and Fang were clearly prepared to facilitate and pay such a bribe, so there were clearly benefits that they perceived they could receive from this payment. I therefore rejected the defence’ argument on this point.

101 Relatedly, the defence also submitted that since Goh was not an employee of Pico, his influence was limited such that it was illogical that Tay and Fang would believe that his sway was so great as to justify a $50,000 payment just for a recommendation. ¹³⁷ However, it was clear from the evidence that Goh’s recommendation of Lantro to Soh in fact worked, because Soh passed Tay’s contact to his colleagues, Boo then contacted Tay, and the appointment of Lantro followed. As noted above, without Goh’s referral, Pico’s employees would not even have known about Lantro, much less gotten in touch with them such that Lantro’s appointment could result. The facts thus did demonstrate the effectiveness of Goh’s recommendations, and it was therefore not illogical that contractors would be willing to pay him for this. Since the said companies would henceforth be known to each other, this also presented future opportunities for working together, and the benefits of the recommendation were therefore not necessarily limited to just the Lumina project.

102 Third, the defence noted that the messages on Goh’s mobile phone appeared not to have been taken into consideration during the CPIB’s investigations, and that Tay’s and Fang’s mobile phones had not been seized during the investigations. It was submitted that this led to certain events in the timeline such as the 26 March meeting having been omitted in the Case for the Prosecution, and an investigation conducted with a “preconceived notion” that the $50,000 must have been a bribe to Goh, with only “feeble attempts” made to investigate into whether the $50,000 was truly for LEW services. ¹³⁸

103 My view was that this overstated the matter. This was because even if the WhatsApp or text messages between the parties had not been considered during investigations, this was not fatal since they had been produced at trial, addressed by the parties in testimony, and considered by this court. Similarly, even if there had been insufficient attempts by the CPIB to look into whether the payment of $50,000 was genuinely for LEW services instead of being a bribe, this had been canvassed at the trial, and the accused persons had their opportunity to produce satisfactory evidence to show that the LEW endorsement work had been done, but failed to do so.

104 These three points therefore did not serve to raise any reasonable doubt in my mind about the accused persons’ guilt. Ultimately, I was satisfied that the prosecution had proven its case against all three accused persons beyond a reasonable doubt, and I convicted them as charged.

105 The three accused persons were liable to be punished with a fine not exceeding $100,000, or to an imprisonment term not exceeding five years, or both. Before the present series of offences, Goh was untraced. Tay had dated antecedents from 1996, when he was just under 21, and the prosecution was not regarding these as relevant for the present purposes. Fang was untraced.

106 The parties’ positions on sentencing were as follows:

(a) The prosecution’s position was that:

(i) Goh should receive a sentence of at least eight months’ imprisonment;

(ii) Tay should receive a sentence of at least seven months’ imprisonment; and

(iii) Fang should receive a sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment. ¹³⁹

(b) The defence’s position was that:

(i) Goh should receive a sentence of four to six months’ imprisonment; ¹⁴⁰ and

(ii) For Tay and Fang, while the custodial threshold was not necessarily crossed, if it was crossed, then an imprisonment term of not more than four months for each of them would suffice. ¹⁴¹

107 It was not disputed that in sentencing for corruption offences, deterrence is key. The High Court held in Ching Hwa Ming (Qin Huaming) v Public Prosecutor [2024] 3 SLR 547 at [79], that in sentencing an offender for an offence under s 5 of the PCA, the framework in Public Prosecutor v Syed Mostofa Romel [2015] 3 SLR 1166 (“Romel”) applies, but that the court may also consider the offence-specific factors going towards harm and culpability set out in Goh Ngak Eng v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 SLR 1385 (“Goh Ngak Eng”).

108 The case of Romel (at [26]) sets out three non-exhaustive categories in private sector corruption cases. Category 1 is where the receiving party was paid to confer on the paying party a benefit that is within the receiving party’s power to confer, without regard to whether the paying party ought properly to have received that benefit. In such cases, whether the custodial threshold is crossed depends on the facts. I agreed with the prosecution that the facts of the present case were closest to Category 1, albeit a step removed, since Goh did not have the power to confer the benefit of granting the contract to Lantro.

109 On the point of whether the custodial threshold was breached, case law has noted that where the amount of gratification was significant, where the gratification was received over a lengthy period of time, or where there was a compromise of one’s duty or a serious betrayal of trust, the starting point was likely to be a custodial sentence (Romel at [23], citing Sentencing Practice in the Subordinate Courts). In the present case, it was not disputed that the amount of gratification, at $50,000, was significant and substantial. My view therefore was that the starting point should be a custodial sentence.

110 As for the offence-specific factors used to calibrate the sentence, I had reference to the factors set out in Goh Ngak Eng which went towards harm and culpability. The prosecution submitted that the level of harm in the present case was “slight”, but in the middle of that band. The three factors cited by the prosecution that went towards harm were:

(a) Loss suffered by third parties;

(b) Benefit to the givers of the gratification; and

(c) Public disquiet and reputational loss caused to Goh’s employer, WRS, in part due to the media attention on the case. ¹⁴²

111 On culpability, the prosecution submitted that Goh’s culpability fell in the “medium” band, but at its lower end, while Tay’s and Fang’s culpabilities fell under the “low” band, but on its higher end. The five factors cited by the prosecution that went towards culpability were:

(a) The amount of gratification;

(b) The degree of planning and premeditation;

(c) The abuse of trust;

(d) The offenders’ motives in committing the offences; and

(e) The roles played by the offenders in the corrupt transaction. ¹⁴³

112 I began my analysis with the factors going towards harm.

113 First, on the matter of loss suffered by third parties, I accepted that other companies lost the opportunity of contracting with Pico due to Goh’s intervention in introducing Lantro to Pico. That said, I balanced this against the fact that Lantro appeared to have won the job on its own merit after it had put in its quotation.

114 Second, on the benefit to the givers of the gratification, my view was that there were clear benefits in this regard, even if they could not be precisely quantified. In Tay’s case, the award of the contract by Pico to Lantro meant that he could secure a large contract for his new employers which went towards meeting his sales target. As a direct consequence of the payment of this bribe, he also obtained a loan of $6,000 from Goh, which loan he would not otherwise have gotten. In Fang’s case, he managed to work on the Lumina project and earned a salary from NEC for it.

115 Third, I accepted that Goh’s acts would have caused some reputational loss to WRS, in that they would have caused WRS to gain a reputation that its employees would solicit bribes in exchange for showing favour to others. However, I agreed with the defence ¹⁴⁴ that the prosecution overstated the point on the alleged public disquiet caused by the offences – media attention did not mean public disquiet. Further, while WRS or the Zoo might be a “stalwart within Singapore’s tourism industry”, ¹⁴⁵ my view was that corruption in such an organisation was of not of the order of magnitude, say, of corruption in the defence industry which could compromise Singapore’s security, or in the transport industry where bribery could compromise the safe construction of tunnels for the Mass Rapid Transit system.

116 A fourth factor not cited by parties, but which I noted, was that Tay and Fang acted together to procure and then give the gratification to Goh. While it was only two of them and not a larger enterprise or syndicate, it remained that such joint action emboldened co-conspirators to further a common criminal end, and in the present case, the offence would not have been completed without Tay and Fang working together.

117 On balance, I agreed with the prosecution that the harm caused in this case was slight. I did not pitch it at the bottom/middle/top of the “band”, because while the offence-specific factors listed in Goh Ngak Eng could be considered in the present case, I did not consider myself strictly bound by the sentencing ranges in the bands set out therein since that case concerned a different offence under the PCA.

118 As for the factors going towards culpability, even the defence accepted that the amount of gratification involved was significant, ¹⁴⁶ and I agreed that this was the most aggravating factor in this case.

119 On the degree of planning and premeditation, this was clearly not gratification paid on the spur of the moment. My finding was that Tay raised the matter of a “kickback” for Goh with Poh immediately after Poh’s first meeting with Goh on 26 March. This meant that Tay already knew then of the need to pay Goh the gratification, had contemplated it, and was taking steps to effect this. This also meant that there was already an understanding between Goh and Tay of the need to pay Goh some gratification. Goh thereafter introduced Lantro to Pico, and gave Soh’s contact information to Tay. In my view, this was evidence of premeditation on the part of Goh and Tay.

120 I agreed with the prosecution that evidence of planning could be seen in the creation of the cover story that the payment to Goh was meant for LEW services, and in the subsequent creation of the documentation to support this fiction. Goh provided his LEW licence information to Tay, Tay passed Goh’s particulars to Fang, and Fang then created the false LEW invoice. The defence contended that since the transaction left a “substantial documentary trail”, ¹⁴⁷ it could not be said that the accused persons took deliberate steps to avoid detection. I disagreed with this contention. As I noted at [77] above, the documentation was created to give the movement of money a cloak of legitimacy. Put another way, the documentation was not a demonstration of transparency in their conduct. In this regard, I also agreed with the prosecution that the passing of the gratification in cash, in an envelope, in a car park and with no acknowledgment of receipt, smacked of surreptitiousness. ¹⁴⁸

121 The next factor concerned abuse of trust. In this regard, while Goh’s offence was not directly in relation to WRS as his principal, it could not be denied that he took advantage of his position within WRS to gain the $50,000 for himself, contrary to WRS’s policies. Since it was not disputed that Goh’s views and recommendations carried weight with the Zoo’s contractors, I rejected his contention that he could not be said to have had much trust vested in him only because he did not occupy a “senior position” within WRS. ¹⁴⁹ As for Tay and Fang, they also acted contrary to what their respective employers would have permitted. It was submitted for Tay and Fang that the severity of this point needed to be moderated for them, as they were not senior executives within their respective companies. ¹⁵⁰ However, given that they were the key players for Lantro and NEC in the acquisition and execution of the Lumina project, great trust was reposed in them by the respective companies. I therefore did not think that the mere fact that they were not senior executives meant that there was only limited abuse of trust.

122 The final factors concerned the offenders’ motives and the roles played by them. I agreed with the prosecution that all three accused persons were motivated by personal gain. There was thus no mitigating feature here. As for their roles, it was contended by Goh that he played a passive role in the transaction, ¹⁵¹ while it had been Tay’s and Fang’s case that they paid the money only because Goh asked for it. I disagreed with any suggestion that all of them played passive roles. As noted above, I found that as at the 26 March meeting between Goh, Tay and Poh, there was an understanding between Goh and Tay of the need to pay Goh some gratification. Thereafter, Goh provided his LEW licence information for the creation of the LEW invoice, and Tay conveyed this information to Fang, who prepared the invoice, obtained the money from NEC, and withdrew the cash. Tay then passed the cash to Goh. Each man thus played his respective role in facilitating the movement of the money and cloaking the transaction, and none of them could be said to have been passive.

123 In the round, I agreed with the prosecution that the culpability of Goh was in the “medium” band, while Tay and Fang’s culpabilities were in the “low” band, with Tay’s culpability higher than Fang’s, since he brought Fang into this enterprise. Given the amount of gratification and the clear premeditation and planning that went into this, my view was that a custodial sentence was appropriate for each accused person.

124 On the offender-specific factors, given that the three accused claimed trial to their charges, there was no issue of any discount in sentencing to be granted on account of a guilty plea.

125 The prosecution cited a few sentencing precedents to guide this court. I agreed with the defence ¹⁵² that the precedents were mostly distinguishable. The two cases which had scenarios closest to the present case in terms of the number of charges or quantum of gratification were Kannan s/o Kunjiraman v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 294 (“Kannan”) and Public Prosecutor v Koh Puay Boon [2016] SGDC 159 (“Koh Puay Boon”). However, the case of Kannan was very dated, and concerned match fixing with the national football team. I noted Counsel’s observation that the offence implicated the integrity of national sport, and I agreed that it was in a different league from the present case.

126 As for Koh Puay Boon, it concerned offences under s 5(a)(i) of the PCA, similar to the present case. It involved the receipt by the offender (who was a shareholder and director of a company named Artmazement (Global) Pte Ltd [“Artmazement”]) of funds totalling $49,500 to hand to an employee of Louis Vuitton Asia Pacific / Louis Vuitton (Singapore) Pte Ltd [“LV”], as an inducement for the said employee to further Artmazement’s business relationship with LV. Artmazement was a renovation contractor specialising in fitting out luxury boutiques. The appellant had claimed in his defence that the funds received by him were his commission for projects he brought to Artmazement, but this was rejected by the trial judge. Although the case of Koh Puay Boon involved five charges and corrupt acts which spanned eight months, the total amount involved in the charges was $49,500, which was comparable to the amount of gratification in the present case. The individual amounts involved in the charges ranged from $6,500 to $13,000. Sentences of six months’ imprisonment were imposed for the charges concerning gratifications of $10,000 to $13,000, while a sentence of three months’ imprisonment was imposed for the charge concerning gratification of $6,500. The total sentence was nine months’ imprisonment. The prosecution’s submission was that balancing these factors, Goh’s sentence should be slightly lower, at eight months’ imprisonment, and that the sentences for Tay and Fang should be correspondingly lower, at seven and six months’ imprisonment respectively.

127 Based on Koh Puay Boon as a guide, given the shorter time-frame involved in the present case and the single transaction, and bearing in mind the offence-specific and offender-specific factors set out above, I broadly agreed with the prosecution that a starting point sentence of seven to eight months’ imprisonment for Goh was appropriate. For Tay and Fang, since my view was that their culpabilities were slightly lower than Goh’s, I agreed that the starting point sentence for them should be lower, and I pegged it at about six months’ imprisonment.

128 I noted that there were no notable offender-specific aggravating or mitigating factors for all three accused persons, that would cause me to move substantially from the starting point sentences. I thus disagreed with Counsel’s oral submission made on the day of sentencing that a high fine of $80,000, being close to the maximum fine permissible fine, was a suitable alternative punishment for Tay and Fang. ¹⁵³

129 In the final analysis, given the slightly different roles that each man played in this enterprise and their slightly different overall culpabilities, I calibrated their sentences to reflect this, and I sentenced them as follows:

(a) For Goh, on DAC 903794/2022, to eight months’ imprisonment;

(b) For Tay, on DAC 903808/2022, to seven months’ imprisonment; and

(c) For Fang, on DAC 903809/2022, to six months’ imprisonment.

130 For Goh, since he was the recipient of the gratification, he was additionally liable to have a penalty imposed on him, of a sum equal to the amount of gratification received. In this regard, s 13 of the PCA applied, along with the case of Chang Peng Hong Clarence v Public Prosecutor [2024] 2 SLR 722. The penalty that I imposed on Goh for DAC 903794/2022 was therefore $50,000. Goh’s total sentence, including what was imposed by the District Judge in DAC 903786/2022 as well as what I imposed on him for the charges that he pleaded guilty to, was 29 months’ imprisonment. Penalties totalling $200,000 (in default 22 weeks’ imprisonment) were also imposed on him. I do not elaborate further herein on the reasons for the global sentence imposed on Goh, since his sentences are not the subject of the present appeals. Goh began serving his imprisonment sentence on 22 June 2026 and has not paid the penalties as at this time of writing.

131 Tay and Fang are on bail pending their appeal, and a stay of execution has been granted on their respective imprisonment terms.