1 This application arises from a breach of the Riddick principle. The underlying suit involved an action in defamation commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to 15 posts that the defendant published on her Facebook account between 1 March 2021 to 4 June 2021. Both parties are Vietnamese nationals. The plaintiff currently lives in Singapore, whilst the defendant resides in Vietnam. The underlying suit was tried before me from 5-7 January 2026 (the “Trial”), and on 11 March 2026 I dismissed the plaintiff’s claim: see Nguyen Thuy Ha v Tran Thi Bich Ha & Jarta (S) Pte Ltd & Anor v Tran Thi Bich Ha [2026] SGDC 84.

2 In the course of the underlying suit, the defendant successfully made an application for specific discovery for all correspondence, emails, letters messages sent on instant message platforms, notes of telephone calls, notes, memoranda, and copies thereof between a Mr Nguyen Hai (“Hai”) and the plaintiff for the period of December 2020 – March 2021. ¹

3 To comply with the disclosure order, the plaintiff disclosed the following documents in the plaintiff’s 2nd supplemental list of documents on 17 March 2025: ²

(a) Screenshots of short message service correspondence between Hai and the plaintiff dated 11 January 2021 (the “SMS Correspondence”); and

(b) The transcript of WhatsApp chat history between Hai and the plaintiff in the period from 11 January 2021 to 31 March 2021 (the “WA Correspondence”).

4 The defendant subsequently posted the WA Correspondence on her SafeChat and Facebook pages, in the period from 24 October 2025 to 11 December 2025. The defendant’s posting of the WA Correspondence is the subject matter of the present application before me. The claimant contends that the defendant has breached her Riddick undertaking to the court in respect of the WA correspondence. The claimant filed the present application for a committal order to be issued against the defendant for the breach.

5 The defendant’s contention is the defendant did not intend to breach her Riddick undertaking or disrespect the court’s authority. The defendant contends that even if the defendant is found to have breached her Riddick undertaking, the orders sought by the plaintiff are disproportionate and unwarranted because insofar as the court finds that the defendant had breached her Riddick undertaking such breach was not deliberate. The defendant also contends that the plaintiff suffered no prejudice, given that only partially cut-off extracts of the WA Correspondence were posted, and the WA Correspondence was used in open court during the Trial not long after the postings. The defendant further contends that the defendant has entirely purged any contempt as all images of the WA Correspondence were removed from the social media by 27 February 2026, shortly after she was notified of the plaintiff’s present application.

6 For the reasons set out below, I am allowing the plaintiff’s application.

7 The issues to be decided by me in this application are as follows:

8 The starting place in the analysis of this application would be the statutory provisions found in the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (“AJPA”).

9 Section 4(1) of the AJPA provides as follows:

10 It is seen that s 4(1) of the AJPA provides that any person who intentionally disobeys or breaches any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court commits a contempt of court. In other words, contempt of court is committed if there is intentional disobedience or breach of a judgment or order of court.

11 Section 21 of the AJPA should also be noted. It reads as follows

12 As seen, if it can be shown that the person’s failure to comply with the order was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure to understand the obligation imposed by the order, that person ought fairly to be excused, and he will not be guilty of contempt.

13 It is also well established that to show that there has been a contempt of court, the complainant will need to show that in committing the act complained of or in omitting to comply with an order of court, the alleged contemnor had the necessary mental element. In the case of PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others [2018] 4 SLR 828 (“PT Sandipala”) at [46], the High court set out a two-step approach to determine whether contempt has been committed: ³

14 It is seen that not all failures to comply with court orders are deemed contemptuous. Whilst it is not necessary for the complainant to show that the alleged contemnor appreciated that he was breaching the order, the failure of the contemnor to comply with the court order in question must be intentional. The requisite mens rea for contempt must be proven. The Court of Appeal provided valuable guidance as regards what the requisite mens rea might look like. In Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 (“Mok Kah Hong”) at [86], the court of Appeal stated:

15 Therefore, the breach by the alleged contemnor must be intentional. It should also be noted that the applicable standard of proof is that of the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt: The Court of Appeal stated in Mok Kah Hong at [85]:

16 I turn next to the applicable law on the Riddick principle. The legal principles relating to the Riddick undertaking are uncontroverted. A party who discloses a document in discovery in an action under compulsion is entitled to the protection of the court against use of the document otherwise than in that action. In ED&F Man Capital Markets Ltd v Straits (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 695 (“ED&F Man Capital Markets”) the Court of Appeal held as follows at [66]:

17 As seen, the Riddick principle is an implied undertaking. It disallows the use of the protected documents otherwise than in that action. The Riddick principle applies only to documents disclosed under compulsion of court process, whether by virtue of the enforcement of the rules of the court or by a specific court order. It is not engaged simply because information has been disclosed in the course of court proceedings. The critical factor is the element of compulsion that accompanies the disclosure. The implied undertaking does not apply to documents voluntarily disclosed in legal proceedings.

18 It should be noted that the Riddick undertaking is an obligation owed to court and not just to the party who was compelled to make disclosure and is an obligation which only the court can modify. Consequently, it has been held that a breach of the Riddick undertaking is a contempt of court, and punishable accordingly: Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v Karaha Bodas Co LLC [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518 (“Pertamina Energy Trading”) at [38].

19 With the above legal principles in mind, I turn to the present case. As alluded to above, the defendant filed an application for disclosure by the plaintiff of all correspondence between the plaintiff and Hai from December 2020 to March 2021, on the basis that they were relevant and necessary for the defendant’s defence of justification. The application was granted by the learned deputy registrar on 18 December 2024. ⁴ Following unsuccessful appeals to the district judge in chambers and subsequently the General Division of the High Court, the plaintiff filed her 2nd supplemental list of documents on 17 March 2025, disclosing the WA Correspondence. ⁵

20 It is undisputed that thereafter, from 24 October 2025 to 11 December 2025, the defendant posted images of extracts taken from the WA Correspondence on her SafeChat page on six instances (the “Offending SafeChat Posts”). ⁶ The defendant also posted images of extracts taken from the WA Correspondence on her Facebook page on 63 instances from 16 October 2025 to 19 December 2025 (the “Offending Facebook Posts”). ⁷

21 I note at the outset that it is not disputed the documents disclosed in the plaintiff’s 2nd supplemental list of documents on 17 March 2025, including the WA Correspondence, were subject to her Riddick undertaking at the material time. The plaintiff pointed out that the defendant would be aware of her obligations under her Riddick undertaking in view of the exchange of correspondence between the parties’ solicitors in regard to two other occasions where the defendant posted images of extracts taken from the WA Correspondence. In these other occasions, which are not the subject matter of the application before me, the defendant used the WA Correspondence in the following manner:

(a) sending two emails to third parties on 6 May 2025 (the “6 May Emails”) which referred to and contained excerpts of the WA Correspondence; and

(b) posting on SafeChat on 23 April 2025 references to the WA Correspondence (the “23 April SafeChat Post”).

22 On 16 May 2025, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the defendant’s solicitors regarding the defendant referring to the WA Correspondence on the above two occasions. ⁸ Upon receiving the plaintiff’s solicitor’s letter, the defendant removed all references to the WA Correspondence from the 23 April SafeChat Post. ⁹ In a letter from the defendant’s solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors dated 21 May 2025, it was stated that the defendant: ¹⁰

23  I agree therefore with the plaintiff that the defendant was indeed aware of her obligations under the Riddick principle. In any event, I note that whether the defendant was aware of the Riddick principle is neither here nor there. This is because not only is the undertaking to the court under the Riddick principle implied, but it is also in the nature of a legal obligation. In other words, the undertaking arises by operation of law by virtue of the circumstances under which the documents are obtained. Therefore, by obtaining the WA Correspondence through a disclosure order, the defendant is obliged as a matter of law not to use them otherwise than in the underlying suit. I also agree with the plaintiff that the Riddick principle applies with greater force where there is an order for specific discovery or production of specific documents because the element of compulsion is direct and targeted.

24 It follows from the above that in view of the defendant posting images of extracts taken from the WA Correspondence on her SafeChat page from 24 October 2025 to 11 December 2025 ¹¹ and on her Facebook page from 16 October 2025 to 19 December 2025, ¹² she has breached her Riddick undertaking.

25 I turn next to the question of whether the defendant’s breach of her Riddick undertaking amounted to contempt of court.

26 In this regard, the defendant explains the reason behind her posting extracts taken from the WA Correspondence on her SafeChat and Facebook pages. She says it started with the plaintiff filing her affidavit of evidence in chief (the “AEIC”) in the underlying suit on 3 September 2025. In the AEIC the plaintiff stated that she had two biological children and one adopted child (her brother’s biological daughter). ¹³ Subsequently on 13 October 2025, the defendant received a Facebook message from one Mr Nguyen Minh Hung (“Minh Hung”), requesting that the defendant remove a photo of him and the plaintiff from one of the defendant’s earlier Facebook posts. After receiving this message and upon viewing Minh Hung’s Facebook account (which featured photos of him and his two sons), the defendant came to believe that: (a) Minh Hung was the plaintiff’s ex-husband; and (b) the plaintiff had two sons with Minh Hung, in addition to the three children mentioned in the AEIC. ¹⁴

27 The defendant perceived that the plaintiff had not been truthful in the AEIC and the WA Correspondence regarding the number of children she had. The defendant says she was concerned that the lie would remain unexposed. As such, in the period from 16 October 2025 to 19 December 2025, the defendant decided to post the WA Correspondence to expose what she deemed to be the plaintiff’s lie. ¹⁵ She explains that she did not then think about the implications of posting the WA Correspondence, and whether her Riddick undertaking applied to the WA Correspondence. As she explains it, she had forgotten about her Riddick undertaking in the heat of the moment. It was not her intention to deliberately breach her Riddick undertaking in posting the WA Correspondence on her SafeChat and Facebook pages. ¹⁶ The defendant also pointed out that she did not post the entire WA Correspondence. She only posted partly cut-off images of extracts, without any added comments. ¹⁷

28 The defendant further pointed to her taking swift steps to purge the alleged contempt of court by removing all images of the WA Correspondence from her SafeChat Posts and Facebook pages when she was served with the present application. Her solicitors also informed the defendant’s solicitors of the removal of the postings. ¹⁸

29 As discussed above, not all failures to comply with court orders are deemed contemptuous. The failure of the contemnor to comply with the court order in question must be intentional. At the same time, it is not necessary for the complainant to show that the alleged contemnor appreciated that he was breaching the order. What is required to be shown is that the contemnor possessed the requisite mens rea for contempt. In the present case, whether the defendant’s breach of her Riddick undertaking amounted to contempt of court turns therefore on the question of her intention. The breach by the defendant must be shown to be intentional. As discussed above, the applicable standard of proof is that of the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

30 In my view, I note firstly that the defendant could not contend that the failure to comply with the Riddick undertaking was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure to understand the obligation imposed by the undertaking. As alluded to above, the defendant was aware of her obligations under the Riddick principle. Second, as regards the defendant’s reasons for posting the WA Correspondence, I note her contention that her sole motivation in doing so was to expose what she perceived to be untruths in the plaintiff’s AEIC regarding the plaintiff’s children. She formed her perception after receiving the Facebook message from Minh Hung on 13 Oct 2025. She contends that at no point did she deliberately breach her Riddick undertaking or post with the knowledge that doing so would constitute a breach. However, whilst that might be so, it does not follow that the breach was not intentional. As discussed above, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant appreciated that she was breaching the order. The motive of the defendant and her reasons for disobedience are also irrelevant to the issue of liability, and are relevant only to the question of mitigation: PT Sandipala at [48].

31 The fact remains that the posting of the WA Correspondence was clearly not unintentional. The defendant had intentionally posted the WA Correspondence for the reasons she offered. She has done so despite been aware of her obligations under the Riddick undertaking. With that being the case, it is beyond a reasonable doubt her conduct in so doing would properly be deemed contumelious. The defendant’s breach of her undertaking in the circumstances amounted to contempt of court.

32 I turn next to the matter of sentencing. In this regard I would refer to the case of Tay Kar Oon v Tahir [2017] 2 SLR 342 (“Tay Kar Oon”). The Court of Appeal’s approach in considering the appropriate sentence in a case where contempt was made out is instructive. The Court of Appeal stated as follows at [55]:

33 It is seen that in deciding on the appropriate sentence for civil contempt, the Court of Appeal considered the following factors as framework for analysis:

34 In Tay Kar Oon the Court of Appeal in sentencing considered the above factors and found them in favour of the contemnor. The Court of Appeal held that the contemnor there had substantially purged her contempt by complying with the various orders and directions in question (at [57]). The Court of Appeal also made the distinction between the purposes of punishment and coercion in sentencing. The Court of Appeal held that in the case of a one-off breach that cannot be remedied, punishment is the only focus. In the case of a continuing breach, the focus is on both punishment and coercion (Tay Kar Oon at [56]–[57]).

35 As for the question of when a custodial sentence might be appropriate, in SpaceSATS Pte Ltd v Chan Chia Sern and others [2023] SGHC 40 at [103] and [105], the High Court noted that a term of imprisonment is only warranted where:

(a) substantial prejudice is caused which cannot be remedied by costs;

(b) the contemnor has engaged in a continuing, deliberate and persistent course of conduct;

(c) the contemnor-+ has failed to resolve the situation and continues to remain uncooperative;

(d) there is egregious behaviour and motive; and/or

(e) the conduct evinces a flagrant disregard for the court’s authority.

36 It is also held in Lee Shieh-Peen Clement v Ho Chin Nguang [2010] 4 SLR 801 at [49] that imprisonment is generally said to be a measure of last resort.

37 In the present case, I note that the defendant when served with the present application on 6 February 2026, swiftly purged the alleged contempt by removing all images of the WA Correspondence from her Facebook page (by 8 February 2026) and her SafeChat page (by 27 February 2026). To the extent that the defendant says this demonstrates her acknowledgement of the court’s authority, I agree. I also agree with the defendant that in considering the appropriate sentence, it is relevant to consider whether steps have been taken since the breach to purge the contempt: PT Sandipala at [77]. I recognise that the defendant has taken steps to purge her contempt by removing the posts. Given that she has taken down the posts, the focus of sentencing would be confined to punishment and not coercion. The need for specific deterrence in this application is low.

38 As for prejudice suffered by the claimant, I agree with the defendant that any prejudice suffered by the plaintiff is limited. First, not the complete WA Correspondence but only portions of it were posted. Second, not long after the WA Correspondence was posted (the final post was made on 19 December 2025), the trial of the underlying suit took place from 5-7 January 2026, during which the WA Correspondence was referred to. It is not disputed that the Riddick principle ceases to apply once a document is used in open court: see Foo Jong Long Dennis v Ang Yee Lim and another [2015] SGHC 23 at [54]-[60]. There was thus only a short period between the posts and when the Riddick undertaking ceased to apply. Third, I note that the plaintiff has not detailed the harm or prejudice she has suffered as a result of the defendant posting the WA Correspondence in this period.

39 The penalty under s 12(1)(b) of the Act applicable for contempt in relation to proceedings under the State Courts is a fine not exceeding $20,000.00 and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months. In the light of all of the foregoing, a custodial sentence is not called for. The appropriate sentence in my view would be a fine of $3,000.

40 The defendant’s breach of her Riddick undertaking amounted to contempt of court. The appropriate sentence in the circumstances of the breach would be a fine of $3,000.

41 As for costs, there is no reason for costs not to follow the event in this case. The defendant is to pay the costs of these proceedings. The range of costs prescribed in Appendix H of the State Court Practice Directions 2021 (“PD”) for applications for a committal order is $1,000 to $3,000. For the application for permission to file committal proceedings, the applicable range provided in the PD would be that for an uncontested hearing, which is $200 to $1,000. After considering the work done in these proceedings, the issues involved, and the respective submissions on costs, I fix the costs of the committal proceedings at $2,500 plus disbursements in the sum of $448.34; and the costs of the application for permission at $1,000 plus disbursements in the sum of $1,573.20.