1 At around midnight on 17 September 2025, the accused, Mohamed Fariz Bin Jamaluddin, rode his motorcycle along the Pan Island Expressway (“PIE”) at a speed of 125 kilometres per hour (“km/h”), far exceeding the speed limit of 90 km/h. A traffic police officer on patrol followed the accused until he came to a stop at a red light at the signalised junction of Ayer Rajah Expressway (“AYE”) towards Tuas Checkpoint and Tuas Road. The officer switched on his blinkers and ordered the accused to stop and dismount from his motorcycle. Instead of complying, the accused sped off through the junction while the traffic light signal was still red. The officer gave chase at a speed of about 128 km/h but was unable to catch up with the accused. The accused then cleared the Tuas Checkpoint and left the jurisdiction to Johor Bahru, Malaysia. To compound matters, the accused failed to affix the registration mark to the front and rear of his motorcycle. Consequently, the officer had to identify the accused by reference to images captured by surveillance cameras at Tuas Checkpoint. The accused eventually returned to Singapore at around 4.00am that day and was arrested.

2 For this series of infractions, the accused was charged with the following offences:

3 The accused pleaded guilty to the proceeded charges. He also consented to the following charge being taken into consideration (“TIC”) for the purpose of sentencing:

4 After considering parties’ submissions, I sentenced the accused as follows:

(a) For the dangerous driving charge (DAC-924741-2025): three weeks’ imprisonment and a disqualification from holding or obtaining all classes of driving licenses (“DQAC”) for a period of 18 months with effect from the date of his release.

(b) For the failing to stop charge (DAC-924742-2025): one week’s imprisonment.

5 I ordered that both sentences run concurrently, for a global sentence of three weeks’ imprisonment and a DQAC for 18 months with effect from the accused’s date of release.

6 The Prosecution, which sought a global sentence of six to 10 weeks’ imprisonment and a DQAC for 24 to 36 months, filed an appeal against the sentence imposed. The Defence, which sought a fine and a 12-month DQAC, also filed a cross-appeal against sentence. Parties applied for, and I granted, a stay of execution on the accused’s imprisonment term. As the DQAC was to take effect only after the accused’s release, parties did not seek any stay on the DQAC, and I did not order one.

7 When I sentenced the accused, I had provided brief oral grounds. These are the full reasons for my decision.

8 The following facts are taken from the Statement of Facts, which the accused admitted to without qualification.

9 On 17 September 2025, at or around 12.18am, SGT(2) Nigel Tan Jun Lin (“SGT Tan”) of the Traffic Police was on patrol and riding a traffic police motor vehicle when he witnessed the accused riding one Yamaha R1 motorcycle, along the PIE. SGT Tan’s speedometer indicated that the accused was riding at a speed of 125 km/h. The speed limit at the material location was 90 km/h.

10 SGT Tan followed the accused’s motorcycle until it arrived at the signalised junction of AYE towards Tuas Checkpoint and Tuas Road, Singapore. The accused came to a stop on the extreme left lane heading towards AYE (Tuas). SGT Tan slowed down and passed the accused’s motorcycle on his left, coming to a stop in front of the accused diagonally on the accused’s left. At the material time, the traffic light signal at the signalised junction was red.

11 SGT Tan, being a police officer in uniform, then switched on the blinkers of his Police motorcycle to order the accused to stop his vehicle and verbally instructed the accused to dismount from his motorcycle.

12 The accused turned to make eye contact with SGT Tan and, having seen SGT Tan, proceeded to ride through the signalised junction towards Tuas Checkpoint, failing to stop his motorcycle when required to do so by SGT Tan. This conduct was captured on the body-worn camera footage of SGT Tan.

13 Consequently, the accused committed an offence under s 127(5) of the RTA punishable under s 131(2)(a) of the RTA. The accused committed the offence because he was afraid of being stopped and investigated by SGT Tan at the time and thereby sought to evade capture by SGT Tan.

14 The accused drove through the signalised junction towards Tuas Checkpoint whilst the traffic light signal was still red. Hence, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road, and the volume of traffic which was, or might reasonably be expected to be, on the road at that time, the accused drove a motor vehicle on the road in a manner which was dangerous to the public by his failing to conform to the aforesaid red-light traffic signal. Consequently, the accused committed an offence under s 64(1)(b) of the RTA punishable under s 64(5)(a) of the RTA.

15 SGT Tan proceeded to chase after the accused when the traffic light signal turned green approximately 15 seconds later. SGT Tan pursued the accused at a speed of about 128 km/h, but he was unable to catch up with the accused even at that speed. SGT Tan tracked down the accused to Tuas Checkpoint, but he was unable to prevent the accused from clearing the immigration checkpoint and departing to Johor Bahru, Malaysia at or around 12.25am that day.

16 At the material time of the offences, the weather was fine, the road surface was dry, the visibility was clear, and the traffic conditions were light.

17 The accused’s offences did not cause any personal injury or property damage.

18 SGT Tan then instructed the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (“ICA”) officers to blacklist the accused and to stop him if or when he re-entered Singapore.

19 Additionally, at the material time, the accused failed to fix the registration mark of his motorcycle to its rear or front area, forming the subject-matter of the TIC charge, DAC-924743-2025. Owing to the absence of a displayed licence plate bearing the motorcycle’s registration number on the accused’s motor vehicle at the time, SGT Tan had to identify the accused and his vehicle with the ICA officers by reference to pictures of the accused captured by the surveillance cameras at the motorcycle departure zone of Tuas Checkpoint.

20 The accused was found re-entering Singapore through Woodlands Checkpoint at around 4.00am of that day. He was placed under arrest by Traffic Police officers on or around 6.55am that day. He was then released on agency bail on or around 4.49pm that day and had remained on agency bail since then.

21 The relevant provisions of the RTA provide as follows:

22 On 6 October 2024, the accused compounded an offence under s 74(1) of the RTA for using a helmet fitted with a visor which was not of an approved type. He was otherwise untraced.

23 For the dangerous driving charge (DAC-924741-2025), the Prosecution sought a sentence of six to 10 weeks’ imprisonment and 24 to 36 months’ DQAC. ¹

24 The Prosecution recognised that there was a dearth of appellate case law laying down the overall sentencing approach for dangerous driving offences where no hurt was caused (see Kwan Weiguang v Public Prosecutor [2022] 5 SLR 766 (“Kwan Weiguang”) at [46]). In the absence of a High Court sentencing framework, the Prosecution proposed referring to the sentencing factors highlighted in Kwan Weiguang itself:

(a) In terms of culpability, the Prosecution contended that the accused’s culpability was high. He was travelling at a very fast speed of at least 125km/h, which was far above the PIE speed limit of 90km/h. He maintained this speed for at least ten minutes until he reached the Tuas Checkpoint. SGT Tan was unable to catch up with him even at the speed of 128km/h. This posed a clear and serious hazard to other road users. ²

(b) In terms of harm, the Prosecution was cognisant that there was no actual harm caused in this case. However, there was potential harm to road users, including SGT Tan. This was exacerbated by the TIC charge for the accused’s failure to affix the registration mark to his motorcycle, which rendered it harder to identify and track him down, warranting more investigative resources being expended. ³

25 The Prosecution thus argued that the custodial threshold was crossed. Had the accused claimed trial, the Prosecution submitted that an appropriate sentence would have been two to three months’ imprisonment. According the accused a 30% discount for pleading guilty at Stage 1 of the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines on Reduction of Sentences for Guilty Pleas (“PG Guidelines”), the sentence sought was six to 10 weeks’ imprisonment. ⁴

26 As for the DQAC, the Prosecution highlighted that the High Court in Kwan Weiguang (at [56]) stated that a DQAC of 12 months or below would be imposed on first-time offenders with a clean driving record, where the degree of potential harm posed to other road users was relatively low. For moderate culpability cases, the DQAC would be in the range of 12 to 24 months (Kwan Weiguang at [57]). Since the accused’s culpability in this case was high, the appropriate DQAC should be 24 to 36 months. ⁵

27 For the failure to stop charge (DAC-924742-2025), the Prosecution sought a sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment. The Prosecution noted that the accused not only refused to stop, but also beat a red light and exited the jurisdiction. ⁶ This subsequent conduct aggravated his refusal to stop: Public Prosecutor v Liew Kang Jun [2017] SGMC 69 (“Liew Kang Jun”) at [30]. The Prosecution also compared the case to that of Public Prosecutor v Ramlan bin Misrop [2015] SGDC 172 (“Ramlan bin Misrop”) at [55]-[57], in which a sentence of one week’s imprisonment was imposed. The Prosecution argued that the accused’s high speed, his leading SGT Tan on a ten-minute chase, beating a red light and the TIC charge which made the accused more difficult to detect were offence-specific aggravating factors in the present case, absent in Ramlan Bin Misrop. ⁷ The appropriate sentence if the accused had claimed trial would have been two to three weeks’ imprisonment. Applying a 30% discount for pleading guilty at Stage 1 of the PG Guidelines, the appropriate sentence was two weeks’ imprisonment.

28 The Prosecution submitted that the sentences for the two proceeded charges should run concurrently as they were part of the same transaction, leading a global sentence of six to 10 weeks’ imprisonment and a DQAC of 24 to 36 months with effect from the accused’s date of release. ⁸

29 In relation to the dangerous driving charge (DAC-924741-2025), the Defence sought a fine and a DQAC for 12 months. ⁹ The Defence contended that the accused’s culpability was low. There was no road rage, aggression, targeting, intimidation or confrontation of other road users. The accused’s reaction was one of panic, not aggression. The road and traffic conditions were optimal, with fine weather, dry roads, clear visibility and light expressway traffic at 12.18am. This was compared to Kwan Weiguang, in which the rapid lane-changing and sudden braking could have caused a collision in the drizzling weather on a wet road. This was also a single instance of non-conformity to a red-light signal. This was compared to Liew Kang Jun, in which the offender beat red lights on four occasions during a 12-minute chase through arterial roads. ¹⁰

30 In terms of harm, the Defence pointed out that there was no actual harm caused, as there was no personal injury or property damage. The potential harm was only in relation to SGT Tan. However, the accused and SGT Tan were never in close proximity, so the only potential harm arose from SGT Tan’s speed when pursuing the accused. ¹¹

31 The Defence then compared the present case to various precedents, including Kwan Weiguang, Public Prosecutor v Ma Zhen Hu Michael [2023] SGDC 112 (“Ma Zhen Hu Michael”), Neo Chuan Sheng v Public Prosecutor [2020] 5 SLR 410 (“Neo Chuan Sheng”), Public Prosecutor v Shahram Jowkar [2024] SGDC 166 (“Shahram Jowkar”) and Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Irian Fairiz bin Burhan (SC-909224-2020) (“Irian Fairiz”), where the offenders were sentenced to between a fine of $1,600 and five days’ imprisonment and a DQAC of between 12 months and two years. The Defence highlighted that the offenders in each of these cases had engaged in conduct of comparable or materially greater seriousness than the present accused. Yet, a custodial sentence was not imposed in most of these cases. ¹²

32 In relation to the failure to stop charge (DAC-924742-2025), the Defence sought a fine. ¹³ The Defence argued that the case was materially less serious than Liew Kang Jun, in which the offender received one week’s imprisonment. As compared to Ramlan Bin Misrop, the Court in that case held that it would ordinarily have imposed the fine, but chose to impose a short custodial term only because it wanted to avoid consecutive default imprisonment terms for the impecunious offender (at [55]-[57]). This consideration did not apply in the present case. ¹⁴

33 The Defence further pointed out that the accused had no antecedents, save for one of a regulatory nature. He was also cooperative with the authorities, remorseful and pleaded guilty at Stage 1 of the PG Guidelines. ¹⁵

34 As there was no sentencing framework for the offence of dangerous driving where no hurt was caused under Section 64(5)(a) of the RTA, I considered the offence-specific harm and culpability factors to determine the appropriate sentence.

35 I first considered the primary sentence, that is, the fine and/or imprisonment term that should be imposed. In terms of harm, both parties accepted that there was no actual harm, as there were no personal injuries or property damage caused. However, the level of potential harm must also be assessed against, inter alia, the condition of the road, the volume of traffic, the number of pedestrians actually on or which might reasonably be expected to be on the road at the relevant time, the speed and manner of driving, visibility at the relevant time, the type of vehicle, and any particular vulnerabilities (Kwan Weiguang at [67]). The Prosecution fairly conceded that given the light volume of traffic along the roads at the time of the offence (12.18am), ¹⁶ the potential harm to any other road users was lower. The primary potential harm factor was to SGT Tan, who had to be in pursuit of the accused for ten minutes, riding his motorcycle at 128km/h in order to do so. I agreed with the Prosecution that the Defence’s argument that there was a lack of physical proximity between SGT Tan and the accused did not reduce the potential harm to SGT Tan. ¹⁷

36 As for culpability, I considered the following factors based on Wu Zhi Yong v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 SLR 587 (“Wu Zhi Yong”) at [36]:

(a) Increased culpability, including where the accused engaged in a particularly dangerous manner of driving. These included excessive speeding or deliberate dangerous driving: In the present case, the accused rode his motorcycle at 125km/h on the PIE where the speed limit was 90km/h. He deliberately continued at a high speed through the signalised junction towards Tuas Checkpoint, beating a red light in the process. I should clarify that I accepted the Defence’s argument that the accused’s exact speed after he beat the red light signal was unknown, and that it could have been less than 128 km/h (the speed of SGT Tan’s motorcycle in pursuit), because the accused had a 15-second headstart. ¹⁸ Nevertheless, it could not seriously be disputed that the accused was still travelling at a high speed.

(b) The offender’s conduct following the offence or attempt to evade arrest: Following the accused’s offence of dangerous driving by failing to conform to the red-light signal, the accused attempted to evade being stopped and investigated by SGT Tan for his offence. The accused even rode to Tuas Checkpoint and cleared the immigration checkpoint before departing Singapore’s jurisdiction to Johor Bahru, Malaysia. In this regard, I did not accept the Defence’s argument that the accused was intending to head to Johor Bahru on that day in any event, ¹⁹ because it was evident to me that his act of doing so when being pursued by SGT Tan was to evade detention and investigations. I agreed with the Prosecution that he was “driv[ing] in a dangerous manner in a deliberate attempt to avoid apprehension and evade arrest” (see Wu Zhi Yong at [69]). As a result of the accused leaving jurisdiction, SGT Tan had to instruct ICA to blacklist the accused so that he could be stopped if and when he came back to Singapore. This was further compounded by the fact that the accused failed to fix the registration mark of his motorcycle to its front or rear area (subject of the TIC charge, DAC-924743-2025), resulting in difficulties in identifying him. SGT Tan had to identify the accused and his vehicle with the ICA officers with reference to images of the accused captured by the surveillance cameras at the motorcycle departure zone of Tuas Checkpoint. ²⁰ This impeded the efficacy of investigations and required much more time and effort.

37 I turn to address the precedents cited by the Defence.

38 In Kwan Weiguang, the offender noticed the other party, Lo Heng Sung (“Lo”), driving at a slow speed ahead and overtook Lo. The offender then saw that Lo high-beamed his lights at him. The offender tapped on his brakes while driving ahead of Lo’s vehicle. Lo sounded his horn continuously. When Lo tried to avoid the offender by changing lanes, the offender prevented this by changing to the same lane on four occasions. On the final occasion, the offender alighted from his vehicle and confronted Lo physically. After the confrontation, the offender walked back to his vehicle and accelerated to move off. A collision occurred when Lo’s motor car suddenly appeared in front of the offender’s vehicle. Scratches were sustained on both vehicles, but both individuals were uninjured. At the material time, it was drizzling, the road surface was wet, traffic volume was light and visibility was clear. The offender pleaded guilty to one charge of dangerous driving under s 64(1) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (“RTA Cap 276”), punishable under s 64(2C)(a) of the same Act. He had a clean driving record. He was sentenced by the District Court to a fine of $1,600 and a DQAC of 15 months. On appeal, the offender’s DQAC was reduced to 12 months.

39 I first note that Kwan Weiguang was an appeal only against the disqualification order imposed. The High Court did not consider the adequacy of the fine imposed. In any event, this offence bore elements of road rage. While the offender’s conduct aggravated his culpability, Lo was also culpable as he high-beamed the offender, honked at him and allegedly flashed his middle finger. Although the offender’s manner of driving appeared to be more egregious than the present case and the offender had caused property damage, this was not the end of the inquiry. Kwan Weiguang lacked other culpability-enhancing factors present in this case, such as the high-speed chase and leaving jurisdiction to evade arrest. Insofar as the Defence was using this as a precedent to submit that a fine or equivalent DQAC should be imposed in the present case as well, this did not take him very far.

40 In Ma Zhen Hu Michael (upheld on appeal), the offender reversed against the flow of traffic along lane 1 of a four-lane road for a distance of about 50m in order to avoid a traffic police roadblock. He then made a U-turn at the U-turn point, resulting in at least one driver on lane 1 taking evasive action by swerving to the left to avoid a collision. Two of the traffic police officers gave chase. One of them ran towards the offender’s motorcar when he was reversing but they did not manage to stop him. The offender then drove home. At that time, the weather was fine, road surface was dry and traffic flow was moderate. The offender pleaded guilty to one charge of dangerous driving under s 64(1) of the RTA Cap 276, punishable under s 64(2C)(a) of the same Act. He had nine previous antecedents, most of which were compounded offences (such as beating a red-light signal), and one of which was drink driving. He was sentenced to a fine of $3,500 and a DQAC for a period of 15 months. In my assessment, Ma Zhen Hu was not a comparable precedent. It did not involve potential harm to the traffic police officers who gave chase at high speed for a significant duration. It appeared that the officers in that case gave chase for a short distance on foot. The offender also did not speed, or leave the jurisdiction of Singapore in the aftermath of the offence.

41 In Neo Chuan Sheng, the offender reversed for about 203m to avoid a roadblock. The offender pleaded guilty to one charge under s 64(1) of the RTA Cap 276. He was traced for driving while underage and without insurance. He was sentenced to a fine of $4,500 and a DQAC of 10 months. There were two reasons why I was cautious to rely on this precedent. First, one of the High Court’s considerations was that the 12-month threshold was an important factor which could be taken into consideration when deciding on the DQAC period, because it meant that the offender had to re-take and pass the prescribed test of competence. The subsequent High Court decision in Kwan Weiguang (at [80]) cast doubt on this approach, and held that the 12-month threshold and the need to retake the driving test should not be considered in deciding on the appropriate disqualification period to be imposed. Second, the facts of the case were fundamentally different. The offender in Neo Chuan Sheng only reversed to avoid a roadblock. None of the aggravating factors in the present case, such as speeding, beating a red light, the high-speed pursuit and escaping from jurisdiction were present.

42 In Shahram Jowkar, the offender failed to conform to a red-light signal. He collided with a lorry, causing property damage to both vehicles but no injury to any person. At the time of the accident, the traffic flow was light, visibility and weather were clear, and the road surface was dry. The accused pleaded guilty to one count under s 64(1) punishable under s 64(2C)(a) of the RTA. He was untraced. He was sentenced to a fine of $1,800 and a DQAC for 12 months. This case was a straightforward one of dangerous driving by failing to conform to a red-light signal with no other aggravating factors. The fine and DQAC imposed could not be used as a relevant comparator to the present case.

43 In Irian Fairiz, referred to at Wu Zhi Yong v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 SLR 587 at [70(a)], the offender weaved in and out of three lanes on his motorcycle along an expressway at a speed of 120km/h (exceeding the speed limit of 90km/h) while attempting to evade apprehension by the police. The offender then exited the expressway and subsequently failed to stop at a “give way” line, causing an oncoming bus to brake. The offender had numerous traffic antecedents. He was also subject to a disqualification order for a period of ten years as a repeat offender. He was sentenced to five days’ imprisonment and a DQAC for two years. Irian Fairiz was ultimately an unreported decision, which was of limited precedential value in determining the appropriate sentence for any particular case before the court. This was especially because the lack of detailed reasoning behind the sentence imposed undermined the utility of such cases as relevant comparators: see Toh Suat Leng Jennifer v Public Prosecutor [2022] 5 SLR 1075 at [51]. In addition, while the manner of driving in Irian Fairiz appeared egregious, it also did not bear the same offence-specific harm and culpability factors as in the present case.

44 In summary, my assessment was that the present case was not ultimately comparable to the sentencing precedents cited by the Defence. This was not a case of dangerous driving simpliciter. This was a case of dangerous driving in the context of evading lawful investigations, leading to a high-speed chase to the peril of SGT Tan. In addition, the accused not only left the scene of the offence, but the jurisdiction of Singapore, and failed to put the identifying mark on his motorcycle, resulting in real risks that he could have escaped liability altogether.

45 However, considering that there was no actual harm caused, and that the accused returned to Singapore on the same day, in my view, the Prosecution's submission of six to 10 weeks imprisonment was beyond the appropriate range in the circumstances.

46 Specifically, I considered the case of Liew Kang Jun. I was cognisant that the offender in that case pleaded guilty to a different charge under s 279 of the Penal Code 1871 (rash riding on a public way). Although that was a different provision, the maximum punishment under s 279 of the Penal Code was the same as that under s 64(5)(a) of the RTA, and the factual matrix was similar to the present case.

47 In that case, the offender did not comply with a traffic police officer’s direction to stop and instead sped away from the scene. He failed to conform to the red-light signal on four occasions, and travelled at speeds of 131 and 150 km/h respectively along Boon Lay Way towards Upper Jurong Road (speed limit 70 km/h), and a stretch of the AYE towards the Marina Coastal Expressway (speed limit 90 km/h). The traffic police officer gave chase for approximately 12 minutes but was unable to catch up with the accused. The Court found that the riding was highly dangerous because the offender weaved through traffic when the lights were not in his favour and caused the traffic police officer to take evasive action to avoid colliding into other road users (a car, a bus and another car).

48 In my view, the manner of the offender’s riding in Liew Kang Jun was comparatively more egregious than that of the accused in the present case. He rode at excessive speeds and failed to conform to not one but four red light signals. The volume of traffic that the offender was navigating through was heavier and the potential harm – not only to the traffic police officer but also other road users – was higher.

49 Given these differences, the harm caused and culpability of the offender in Liew Kang Jun were higher. The offender received two months' imprisonment. In my view, the Prosecution’s seeking of a roughly equivalent sentence for the accused in the present case was excessive. In making this assessment, I was mindful that the Prosecution relied on the fact that the accused had left the jurisdiction as an aggravating factor. While I accepted that this was a relevant consideration, in my view, this factor alone did not justify a similar sentence as Liew Kang Jun.

50 In my judgment, an appropriate imprisonment term if the accused had claimed trial was four weeks' imprisonment. As the accused pleaded guilty at Stage 1 of the PG Guidelines, I accorded him the maximum discount of 30%. This was how I arrived at the eventual sentence of three weeks’ imprisonment.

51 I next address the appropriate order of disqualification. In Kwan Weiguang at [59], the High Court opined that a disqualification order served three sentencing objectives: punishment, protection of the public by removing a dangerous driver from the roads and deterrence. For first-time traffic offenders with a clean driving record (especially those without any history of compoundable offences or speeding tickets), the disqualification period should be set at 12 months or below, assuming that the degree of potential harm posed to other road users was relatively low. However, the disqualification period should exceed 12 months and can go up to 24 months and beyond where there was “very dangerous behaviour demonstrated by the offender, or conduct showing a disregard for traffic rules, etiquette and the interests of other road users” [emphasis added]. There must be something “affecting the privilege of driving a vehicle on the road to a substantial degree”. The Court should also consider relevant circumstances of the commission of the offence, including driving when the traffic volume was heavy, driving within residential or school zones, driving a heavy vehicle, etc. The extent of any property damage caused and the potential harm that could have resulted from the act of dangerous or reckless driving would also be relevant: Kwan Weiguang at [56]-[57] and [66]-[67].

52 I pause at this juncture to observe that the Prosecution’s submission that “[f]or moderate culpability cases under s 64(5)(a)…the appropriate DQAC period should lie within the range of 12-24 months’ DQAC” ²¹ [emphasis added] was with respect, an inaccurate encapsulation of Kwan Weiguang at [57]. The High Court in Kwan Weiguang did not characterise the circumstances it described as indicative of only moderate culpability. On the contrary, the Court was describing driving conduct of an egregious nature. I therefore did not accept the Prosecution’s consequent argument that “[o]n the basis that this is a high culpability case, we submit that the appropriate DQAC period should accordingly exceed 24 months” [emphasis added]. ²² At the same time, the Defence’s submission of DQAC for only 12 months did not properly account for the accused’s manner of driving and the potential harm in the present case.

53 Having considered the totality of the accused’s conduct, I was of the view that the level of potential harm was high, and the accused also showed a blatant disregard for traffic rules and the interests of other road users. In particular, he was first speeding at 125km/h along the PIE. He then drove through a signalised junction while the traffic light signal was still red, after being told by SGT Tan to stop for flouting the speed limit in the first place. After he failed to conform to the red-light signal, he still rode his motorcycle at a high speed, such that he was able to leave jurisdiction before SGT Tan could catch up with him. This resulted in potential harm to SGT Tan who had to pursue him at a speed of 128km/h for ten minutes. Balancing these considerations, I was of the view that the appropriate period of DQAC was 18 months.

54 I turn to the charge for failing to stop when ordered by a police officer, ie, SGT Tan.

55 In the present case, this was not merely a failure to stop when ordered to do so. Had that been the case, with no other aggravating factors, I would have agreed with the Court in Liew Kang Jun (and the Defence) that a fine might have been sufficient. But in the present case, the accused had “aggravated his initial refusal to stop” (Liew Kang Jun at [30]) by speeding away from the scene and beating a red light, compelling SGT Tan to give chase for ten minutes, at a speed of about 128km/h, placing SGT Tan in considerable peril. In addition, the accused not only failed to stop, but also left the scene entirely. He did not merely leave the scene, but also left the jurisdiction of Singapore altogether. He also complicated investigations by failing to affix his registration plate on his motorcycle.

56 I next consider the precedents cited by the Prosecution and the Defence.

57 In Liew Kang Jun, a traffic police officer signalled for the offender to stop for checks. The offender failed to comply with the order to stop, but instead proceeded to race ahead onto the AYE. The traffic police officer gave chase for 12 minutes, but was ultimately unable to keep up with him. The Court imposed a custodial term of one week’s imprisonment, given that the offender had aggravated his initial refusal to stop by leading the traffic police officer on a motorcycle chase.

58 The offender in Liew Kang Jun also rode away from the traffic police officer and led the officer on a high-speed chase. Although the volume of traffic meant that the traffic police officer was subject to even greater potential risks in the pursuit, ultimately Liew Kang Jun did not involve the offender leaving the jurisdiction of Singapore as a consequence of the failure to stop. In my view, a similar sentence to Liew Kang Jun was justifiable.

59 In Public Prosecutor v Ramlan bin Misrop [2015] SGDC 172 (“Ramlan bin Misrop”), police officers manning a roadblock required drivers such as the offender to stop their vehicles. When the offender approached the roadblock, he reversed the van against the flow of traffic and made a U-turn away from the roadblock. As he did so, both rear tyres of the van hit the road kerb. He then completed the U-turn and sped off in the opposite direction. The Court stated that it would ordinarily have sentenced the accused to a fine of $1,000, but noted that the offender did not appear to be financially secure. He thus imposed a short custodial sentence to avoid the accused having to serve additional consecutive default sentences if he failed to pay the fine (at [55]-[57]).

60 Ramlan bin Misrop was less aggravated than the present case, as the facts involved the accused evading a roadblock and making a U-turn to leave the scene. It did not involve any high-speed chase by the police officer, or the accused leaving jurisdiction, which were significant aggravating factors.

61 Finally, I turn to address one other argument raised by the Defence. The Defence contended that the Prosecution could not rely on the very same facts undergirding the dangerous driving charge to justify the crossing of the custodial threshold for the failure to stop charge. This amounted to punishing the accused twice for one course of conduct. ²³ I accepted that there was some degree of overlap between the sentencing factors considered in the two charges. However, I did not agree that this amounted to impermissible double-counting.

62 First, the two charges arose from a single transaction: the accused failed to stop when directed to do so, and then rode dangerously to evade detention and investigations by SGT Tan. As the Prosecution pointed out, the dangerous driving was aggravated by the fact that the accused’s motive was to evade arrest, and the failure to stop was aggravated by the accused’s manner of driving following that omission – namely, that he beat a red light, sped through the roads (leading SGT Tan on an extended chase), and subsequently left the jurisdiction. ²⁴

63 Second, I had ordered that the sentences for both charges run concurrently, precisely because they arose from the same transaction and the same facts, and this ensured that the accused was not punished twice for the same course of conduct. In this regard, the High Court expressly addressed a similar issue in Wu Zhi Yong at [62]. In that case, the Court considered that where an offender is charged with both dangerous driving as a serious offender and drink driving, the act of drink driving would already have been taken into account in sentencing under the dangerous driving charge, such that the sentence for the drink driving charge should generally run concurrently. In a similar vein, the accused's attempt to evade arrest had been taken into account in sentencing for the dangerous driving charge, while his dangerous manner of riding following the failure to stop had been taken into account in sentencing for the failure to stop charge. It was therefore appropriate to order the sentences to run concurrently, so that the accused's overall sentence remained proportionate to his criminality from this single transaction.

64 As both sentences were ordered to run concurrently, the total sentence imposed was therefore three weeks’ imprisonment and a DQAC of 18 months from the date of release.

65 The accused’s deliberate and sustained course of conduct to evade responsibility for his offences – from his riding at high speed, to his failure to stop when ordered to do so, to beating the red light and his subsequent departure from Singapore’s jurisdiction to Malaysia – significantly enhanced his culpability. His actions further placed the traffic police officer carrying out his duties at considerable risk. In my view, the custodial threshold was crossed in relation to both charges. The global sentence of three weeks’ imprisonment struck an appropriate balance between the need for deterrence and the fact that no actual harm was caused. The disqualification period of 18 months appropriately reflected the accused's blatant disregard for traffic rules and the safety of other road users. In my view, the sentence imposed is fair and proportionate.

66 The accused is presently on bail pending appeal.