1 The claimant and the defendant are residents and subsidiary proprietors of a strata development known as Costa Del Sol (“Costa Del Sol”). Additionally, the claimant held various appointments in the council (“Council”) of the Management Corporation — Strata Title Plan No. 2900 (the “MCST”), from 2012 to 2025 (save for 2016) ¹ . He was at the material time, and is still currently, the chairman of the Council.

2 Between March 2023 and October 2023, the defendant sent 6 allegedly defamatory emails (collectively, the “Emails”).

3 The defendant accepted that she had sent the Emails. However, she denied that the Emails were defamatory of the claimant or that publication had been established. She also relied on the defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege.

4 After reviewing the evidence and parties’ submissions, I find that while the claimant has established a prima facie case of defamation in respect of the Emails, the defendant has established a defence of qualified privilege. My detailed reasons are below.

5 I first set out a brief summary of the pertinent facts.

6 Between 2019 and 2023, the defendant had a string of disagreements with the Council and the managing agent of Costa Del Sol over how Costa Del Sol was being managed.

7 The disagreements that were the subject of the Emails concerned: (1) the Council’s installation of netting behind two basketball stands located within Costa Del Sol; (2) a mediation session between the claimant, the defendant, then-secretary of the Council, Mr Edward James Cripps (“Mr Cripps”), and then-council member Ms Lim Sok Geok (“Ms Lim”); and (3) the Council’s decision to hold the 2023 annual general meeting (the “2023 AGM”) virtually.

8 The basketball stands were located between tennis court 1 and substation 1, and between the golf driving court and substation 2. They had not been provided by the developer. ² They were however already in place by the time Costa Del Sol’s managing agent, Savills Property Management Pte Ltd, took over management of Costa Del Sol on 29 April 2009.

9 According to the claimant, there were safety concerns that children could miss the basketball board when attempting to throw the ball into the hoop, and the basketball would clear Costa De Sol’s perimeter fence and land onto Bayshore Road.

10 Hence on 15 October 2022, a motion was tabled at the 2022 annual general meeting (“the 2022 AGM”) to consider and if approved, resolve by way of a special resolution to install netting with a metallic frame behind the two basketball stands, at a cost of $5,800 (excluding GST) (the “2022 Motion”). The 2022 Motion failed as the subsidiary proprietors who voted in favour only constituted 69.08% of the share value of all the valid votes cast at the 2022 AGM, thus falling short of the 75% required.

11 Nevertheless, at a Council meeting on 12 December 2022, the Council decided to install netting behind the basketball stands, using recycled material and in-house manpower, which would not incur any costs.

12 The defendant took issue with the installation of netting.

13 On 7 March 2023, the defendant sent the first allegedly defamatory email, titled “YOU HAVE DISRESPECTED LAWS OF SINGAPORE Fwd: There’s no resolution passed for netting” (the “1st Email”) to the claimant, and copied the following email addresses ³ :

(a) k_shanmugam@mha.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr K. Shanmugam, then Minster of Home Affairs and a minster for Singapore’s Ministry of Law;

(b) edwin_tong@mlaw.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr Edwin Tong, then Minister for Culture, Community and Youth and second minister for Singapore’s Ministry of Law;

(c) desmondlee@mnd.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr Desmond Lee, then Minister for Singapore’s Ministry of National Development (“MND”);

(d) heng_swee_keat@pmo.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr Heng Swee Keat, then Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Coordinating Minister for Economic Policies;

(e) lawrence_wong@mof.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr Lawrence Wong, then Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Minister for Finance; and

(f) bedok@pap.org.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email of Mr Heng Swee Keat, Member of Parliament of East Coast Group Representation Constituency (“GRC”).

14 I will refer to the individuals named at (a) to (e) collectively as the “5 Ministers”.

15 The claimant contended that the 1st Email contained the following defamatory statements ⁴ :

16 On 24 March 2023, the defendant sent the second allegedly defamatory email, titled “Re: Please respect AGM outcome that net was not approved and needs to be taken down” (the “2nd Email”). ⁵ This was sent to the claimant, a lawyer from M/s Lee & Lee LLP (Mr Enzel Tan), Mr Cripps, and copied to the 5 Ministers, bedok@pap.org.sg, and lawyers and/or staff of M/s Lee & Lee LLP (Mr Toh Kok Seng and Ms Suan Gan). The claimant contended that the 2nd Email contained the following defamatory statements ⁶ :

17 On 11 September 2023, the defendant approached Mr Larry Chua Chin Leng (“Mr Chua”), at a Meet-the-People Session (“MPS”) to assist in arranging a mediation session to resolve the issue of the basketball stands and netting. ⁷ Mr Chua was the branch secretary of the Bedok’s People’s Action Party (“Bedok PAP”) as well as Chairman of the Bedok Citizens’ Consultative Committee. ⁸

18 On 14 September 2023, the Council notified all subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol that the 2023 AGM would be held on 14 October 2023 by fully virtual means. ⁹

19 On 17 September 2023, Mr Chua conducted a mediation session. The claimant, Ms Lim, Mr Cripps and the defendant attended. They entered into an oral mediation agreement on the following terms ¹⁰ :

(a) The Council is to procure an opinion from a Licensed Electrical Worker (“LEW”) assessing the safety of having play areas situated next to the electrical substations of Costa Del Sol;

(b) The findings of such a LEW are to be disclosed to the defendant;

(c) The issue of the retention of the basketball hoops shall be tabled as a resolution at the 2023 AGM for the subsidiary proprietors to vote on; and

(d) The Council shall abide by the voting results within one week of the same.

20 Pursuant to the mediation agreement, on 18 September 2023, the Strata Residential Manager of the MCST, Mr Wlkinder Singh (“Mr Singh”) wrote to the LEW, Mr Isaac Huang (“Mr Huang”), to obtain his professional opinion. ¹¹ On the same day, Mr Huang replied Mr Singh (the “LEW’s 18 September Email”) ¹² , stating:

21 In the meantime, on 18 September 2023, the defendant sent the third allegedly defamatory email titled “Re: PLEASE RESPECT ADVISORY ON ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND NOT EXPOSE KIDS TO STRAY CURRENTS” to the claimant and bedok@pap.org.sg, and copied the 5 Ministers (the “3rd Email”). ¹³ The claimant contended that the 3rd Email contained the following defamatory statements ¹⁴ :

22 Between 20 to 27 September 2023, the 3rd Email was forwarded by an officer in the MND to the Building Construction Authority (“BCA”) and the Energy Market Authority (“EMA”), and by an officer of the EMA to Singapore Power (“SP”). ¹⁵

23 On 19 September 2023, Mr Huang sent a further email to Mr Singh, stating “In our professional opinion as a licensed LEW, anyone can walk and/or run next [to the] substations and should not be concerned about stray currents” (the “LEW’s 19 September Email”). Mr Singh forwarded the LEW’s 19 September Email to the claimant on the same day. ¹⁶

24 On 20 September 2023, Mr Huang emailed the claimant directly, replicating the content of the LEW’s 19 September Email, save for correcting a spelling error (the “LEW’s 20 September Email”). ¹⁷ The claimant took a screenshot of the LEW’s 20 September Email and sent it to Mr Chua via WhatsApp, requesting not to show the unredacted version to the defendant, out of a concern that “we will lose that LEW”. ¹⁸ Mr Chua agreed that Mr Huang’s name and details would only be provided to him but not the defendant. ¹⁹

25 On 21 September 2023, the LEW’s 20 September Email was sent to the defendant. His name and details were redacted.

26 On 25 September 2023, the defendant submitted a petition signed by 31 subsidiary proprietors to the management office, requesting that the Council hold the 2023 AGM in hybrid mode (“Joint Letter Request”). ²⁰

27 On 26 September 2023, the Council sent a letter to the defendant to explain the reasons for holding the 2023 AGM virtually. ²¹ A similar letter was sent to another subsidiary proprietor, one Mdm Neo Sue Kim (“Mdm Neo”). The letter was signed off by Mr Cripps (the “Reply Letter”).

28 On 27 September 2023, the defendant sent the fourth allegedly defamatory email titled “Council cannot fully hold Fully Virtual AGM as you have not complied with BCA 26June 2023 Circular Annex B” to the claimant and Mr Cripps and copied the 5 Ministers and bedok@pap.org.sg (the “4th Email”). ²² The claimant contended that the 4th Email contained the following defamatory statements ²³ :

29 On 30 September 2023, the defendant sent the fifth allegedly defamatory email titled “Re: PLEASE RESPECT ADVISORY ON ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND NOT EXPOSE KIDS TO STRAY CURRENTS” to the claimant, and copied the 5 Ministers, bedok@pap.org.sg, Mr Cripps and Ms Lim (the “5th Email”). ²⁴ The claimant contended that the 5th Email contained the following defamatory statements ²⁵ :

30 On 14 October 2023, the defendant sent the sixth allegedly defamatory email titled “FW: EMA & SPPG ON RISK OF PLAYAREA NEXT TO SUBSTATION -Re: PLEASE RESPECT ADVISORY ON ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND NOT EXPOSE KIDS TO STRAY CURRENTS” to the claimant, Mr Cripps and Ms Lim, and copied the 5 Ministers and bedok@pap.org.sg (the “6th Email”). ²⁶ The claimant contended that the 6th Email contained the following defamatory statements ²⁷ :

31 On 14 October 2023, the 2023 AGM was held. A resolution was tabled to approve the continued installation of the two basketball stands along with the existing protective netting behind them, at no cost to the MCST. It was not passed as it only obtained 73.31% support.

32 Therefore, in accordance with the mediation agreement, the basketball stands along with their protective netting were permanently removed on 16 October 2023.

33 On 9 November 2023, the claimant’s solicitors sent the defendant a letter of demand, demanding amongst other things, that she cease and desist from making defamatory statements against the claimant.

34 The claimant commenced these proceedings on 7 December 2023.

35 It transpired during the proceedings that one Mr Ng Siang Chye, Bernard (“Mr Ng”), who was a member of the Bedok PAP, operated the email account at the address bedok@pap.org.sg and had access to its inbox as the administrator at the material time. ²⁸ He forwarded all the Emails to Mr Chua. ²⁹

36 The following issues arise for consideration:

(a) Has the claimant established a prima facie case of defamation in respect of the 6 Emails?

(b) Has the defendant made out the defences of justification, fair comment and/or qualified privilege? In this regard:

(i) Was the Council’s decision to install the netting behind the basketball stands in breach of the Building Management and Strata Management Act 2024 (“BMSMA”)?

(ii) Was the Council entitled to hold the 2023 AGM by virtual means only?

(iii) Did the claimant breach the BMSMA and/or mediation agreement when he withheld Mr Huang’s details?

(iv) Are the defences of fair comment and/or qualified privilege defeated by malice?

(c) What reliefs are the claimant entitled to, if any?

37 I will deal with these issues in turn.

38 To succeed in a defamation claim, the claimant must show that:

(a) There was a statement bearing a defamatory meaning;

(b) There was publication to a third party; and

(c) Reference was made to the claimant.

Yan Jun v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 752 (“Yan Jun”) at [109].

39 A statement is defamatory if it exposes a claimant to hatred, contempt or ridicule or tends to lower him in the esteem of right-thinking members of society: Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and another [2009] 2 SLR(R) 1004 (“Peter Lim”) at [81].

40 Whether a statement is defamatory is determined based on construing the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used or based on an innuendo meaning: Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 (“Review Publishing”) at [26].

41 The natural and ordinary meaning of words is that which is understood by an ordinary, reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal. The meaning must be gathered from the words themselves and in the context of the entire passage in which they are set out. The court is not confined to the literal or strict meaning of the words, but takes into account what the ordinary, reasonable person may reasonably infer from the words: Review Publishing at [27].

42 In contrast, an innuendo meaning is some other meaning that is not defamatory to the ordinary man but is defamatory to people with knowledge of the special meaning of the words or of extrinsic facts. The burden is on the claimant to show that: (1) there are facts extrinsic to the words, where such facts give rise to a defamatory imputation; (2) these facts were known to one or more of the persons to whom the words were published; and (3) knowledge of those extrinsic facts could cause the words to convey the defamatory imputation relied on by the claimant, to a reasonable person possessing knowledge of those extrinsic facts: Peter Lim at [106].

43 For the reasons I now come to, the claimant has established that there were statements in the Emails bearing a defamatory meaning.

44 The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 1st Email was that: ³⁰

(a) The claimant rallied support from the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol to advance his self-interests;

(b) The claimant disregarded Singapore law;

(c) The claimant was not transparent to the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol; and

(d) The claimant misrepresented Singapore law to suit his own advantage as he did on previous occasions.

45 Insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo however, the claimant has not pleaded any facts extrinsic to the words which would give rise to a defamatory imputation, that these facts were known to one or more of the persons to whom the words were published, or how knowledge of these facts could cause the words to convey the alleged defamatory imputation to a reasonable person possessing knowledge. ³¹ I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.

46 The defendant contended that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that: ³²

(a) The act of installation of the netting in disregard of the defeat of the 2022 Motion, was disrespectful of Singapore law;

(b) As friendly advice, the claimant, in his capacity as chairperson of the Council, should not be rallying the MCST community to push for any self-interests before Singapore laws, should be transparent to the MCST community that there are laws in Singapore to comply with, and should not misrepresent or contort the spirit and intent of such laws in Singapore to suit his advantage; and

(c) The claimant had committed misrepresentation and/or contortion to suit his advantage previously.

47 I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements relied on by the claimant was that:

(a) The claimant had instructed for the netting to be installed in disregard of Singapore law;

(b) The claimant had rallied the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol to advance his own self-interest;

(c) The claimant was not transparent to the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol; and

(d) The claimant had on previous occasions, misrepresented or contorted Singapore law to suit his advantage.

48 This was because the defendant did not merely assert that the installation of the netting was in breach of Singapore law. She specifically attributed it to the claimant, in saying that “to instruct for the outcome of the motion to be disregarded is UNLAWFUL, and you need to make restitution for this ASAP…”

49 While the defendant had couched it as “friendly advice” to the claimant that he should not be rallying the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol to push his self-interest, should be transparent to them, and not misrepresent or contort the law to suit his advantage, by this “friendly advice”, she was implying that he had already done the opposite. Particularly by her advising the claimant not to misrepresent or contort the laws to suit his advantage “as [he had] on previous occasions”, she was asserting that there were such previous instances.

50 These assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society as the imputation was that he had acted unlawfully and dishonestly to further his own interests.

51 The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 2nd Email was that the claimant was partial and influenced by personal interests when he was part of the Council that made the decision to install netting behind the two basketball stands. ³³

52 Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). ³⁴ I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.

53 The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that: ³⁵

(a) Disrespecting and acting against the outcome of the 2022 Motion wa irresponsible and unlawful, out of the AGM’s constraints, breaches s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and breaches the decision of the general body to defeat the 2022 Motion; and

(b) As a principle, wise decisions made in the foremost interest of MCST should be done in good faith and with absolute objectivity, and should not be influenced by emotions of “alarm and disappointment” or partiality and personal interests.

54 I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements relied on was that the claimant had, in instructing for the netting to be installed, disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion and breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA, and that he did so because he was partial and influenced by personal interests.

55 This was because the defendant had referred elsewhere in the 2nd Email to the installation of the netting, and specifically referred to “the decision by Council (which Chairman [the claimant] and Secretary [Mr Cripps] are part of)” which she claimed was “in breach of the outcome of the AGM where the motion was defeated”. A reasonable reader would therefore understand her assertion as directed against the claimant as well.

56 By asserting that wise decisions made in the interest of the MCST should not be influenced by partiality and personal interests, a reasonable inference was that she was asserting that the claimant had done the opposite.

57 These assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society as they portrayed the claimant as acting unlawfully to further his own interests.

58 The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 3rd Email was that, when the defendant raised the issue of the Council’s decision to install netting behind the two basketball stands during a session with Mr Chua, the claimant was unreasonable, disregarded Singapore law, and the claimant was part of the Council that made a decision which breached law and safety. ³⁶

59 Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). ³⁷ I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.

60 The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that: ³⁸

(a) The defendant had presented a copy of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA to the claimant to seek his understanding of the law;

(b) The defendant had presented copies of the minutes of the 2022 AGM to the claimant as the basis for discussion; and

(c) The claimant unreasonably refused to look at s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the minutes of the 2022 AGM, and the defendant saw this as reflecting an attitude on the claimant’s part that the law and the debate concerning the minutes of the 2022 AGM did not exist.

61 I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements the claimant relied on was that the claimant had acted unreasonably and displayed a disregard of Singapore law during the mediation session, and that the claimant was part of the Council which made a decision in breach of law and safety.

62 The defendant did not merely assert that that the claimant did not look at her copies of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the minutes of the 2022 AGM, but asserted that “this was unlike [how] any reasonable person would have responded”, and further, by refusing to look at the copy of the BMSMA, the claimant had displayed “an attitude that this law didn’t exist”.

63 The defendant said that she “valid concerns over breaches of law and safety”. The rest of the 3rd Email then referred to the mediation session which was held to address those concerns, and the alleged refusal of the claimant (whom she referred to as “Chairman Riccardo Boido”) to look at a copy of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA, which she described as an “attitude that this law didn’t exist”. A reasonable reader would therefore understand that the claimant was involved in the Council’s alleged breaches of law and safety.

64 These assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society, as it portrayed the claimant as someone who was unreasonable, did not have any heed for Singapore law, and made decisions in breach of law and safety.

65 The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 4th Email was that the claimant intimidated and caused distress to elderly subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol by depriving them of their entitlement to attend the AGM, and not catering to their lack of tech-competency. ³⁹

66 Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). ⁴⁰ I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.

67 The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that: ⁴¹

(a) The defendant received a call from an elderly subsidiary proprietor who had signed the Joint Letter Request, and who was distraught and distressed owing to the Reply Letter;

(b) The claimant and Mr Cripps had deprived elderly subsidiary proprietors of their right to attend the 2023 AGM by failing to cater for their lack of tech-competence;

(c) The Reply Letter had hit at the elderly subsidiary proprietors’ psychological weakness without showing compassion;

(d) The Reply Letter was intimidating and distressful; and

(e) The Reply Letter deliberately contorted the intent of the Joint Letter Request.

68 I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements the claimant relied on was that the claimant had deprived elderly subsidiary proprietors of their entitlement to attend the 2023 AGM by not catering to their lack of tech-competence. This is clear from the words “you need to respect our elderlies [sic]…Already you deprive them of their entitlement to attend AGM by not catering to their lack of tech-competence…”

69 I also find that a natural and ordinary meaning of the statements was that the claimant had, through the Reply Letter, intimidated and caused distress to elderly subsidiary proprietors. Even though the Reply Letter was signed off by Mr Cripps, it would be reasonable to infer that the defendant’s assertion of intimidation and causing distress was also made against the claimant. The defendant in her own affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) said that her statements presumed that the claimant as chairperson had sent similar intimidating response letters to co-signatories of the Joint Letter Request, which caused intimidation and distress to elderly subsidiary proprietors. ⁴² She had in the 4th Email, also addressed both Mr Cripps and the claimant, as evident from the phrase “I say to both of you..”, before alleging that they “hit at [the elderly subsidiary proprietors’] psychological weakness”.

70 The above assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society as they impugned the claimant’s personal character and suggested that he not only deprived the rights of a vulnerable group to attend an AGM but intimidated them and caused them distress.

71 The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 5th Email was that:

(a) The claimant disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion;

(b) The claimant breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;

(c) The claimant made a mockery of Singapore laws, processes, and systems; and

(d) The claimant is an outsider and/or foreigner who is not in sync with the Singapore government’s narrative. ⁴³

72 Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). ⁴⁴ I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.

73 The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that: ⁴⁵

(a) The Council or the claimant, in his capacity as Chairperson of the Council, breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA by disrespecting the outcome of the voting at the 2022 AGM;

(b) Singapore does not condone those who make a mockery of its laws, processes and systems; and

(c) In principle, the claimant, in his capacity of chairperson of the Council, should be in sync with Singapore laws, processes and systems.

74 I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements the claimant relied on was:

(a) The claimant disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion and breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA; and

(b) By doing so, the claimant had made a mockery of Singapore laws, processes and systems, and was not in sync with the Singapore government’s narrative.

75 The defendant was not merely stating as a general principle that Singapore does not condone those who made a mockery of its laws, processes, systems or that the claimant should be in sync with Singapore’s laws, processes and systems. This must be read in context: she had first accused him of breaching s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and disrespecting the outcome of the 2022 Motion before stating that Singapore does not condone those who made a mockery of its law. She also went on to conclude that “it [was] time [he] get[s] in sync with the narrative of this land”, thereby implying that the claimant was not in sync with the foregoing principle.

76 The above assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society as they asserted that the claimant acted unlawfully and made Singapore laws appear of no value.

77 The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 6th Email was that: ⁴⁶

(a) The claimant is skilful in misrepresenting and misinterpreting the law to suit his advantage, and provided feedback from bad people to the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol;

(b) The claimant disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion;

(c) The claimant disrespected s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;

(d) The claimant arrogantly and blatantly rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA during the mediation session;

(e) The claimant disrespected s 47 of the BMSMA and withheld information from subsidiary proprietors; and

(f) The claimant disrespected the mediation agreement.

78 Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). ⁴⁷ I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.

79 The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that: ⁴⁸

(a) The claimant had a usual prowess in misrepresenting and misinterpreting to suit his advantage;

(b) The claimant had provided feedback to the ministers of behaviours by bad actors in the community;

(c) The claimant or the Council disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion;

(d) The claimant or the Council disrespected s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;

(e) The claimant rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the existence of the minutes of the discussion of the said resolution at the mediation session;

(f) The claimant disrespected the spirit of s 47 of the BMSMA; and

(g) The claimant disrespected the mediation agreement.

80 I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements the claimant relied on was that the claimant:

(a) Had a usual prowess in misrepresenting and misinterpreting to suit his advantage;

(b) Provided feedback to the ministers of behaviours of bad actors in the community;

(c) Disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion;

(d) Disrespected s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;

(e) Arrogantly rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the minutes of the 2022 AGM during the mediation session;

(f) Disrespected the spirit of s 47 of the BMSMA; and

(g) Disrespected the mediation agreement.

81 This is because the defendant had specifically alleged that the claimant had self-demonstrated to “the Ministers” his “usual prowess in misrepresenting and misinterpreting to always suit [his] own advantage.” She then said that “they [i.e. the Ministers] have taken in the feedback [the claimant] self-provided of behaviours by bad actors in the community”. She also specifically stated that “you/Council” disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion and s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA. She did not merely state that he rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA or the minutes of the 2022 AGM, but asserted twice that two Council members “followed [his] arrogant lead”. She also accused the claimant specifically of disrespecting the spirit of s 47 of the BMSMA and the mediation agreement by “withholding information critical to the issue at hand”.

82 The above assertions would lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society as they portray the claimant as someone who acted dishonestly to further his own interests, did not have any heed for Singapore law, and acted unlawfully.

83 There are two components of publication: (1) an act that makes the statement available to a third party in a comprehensible form, and (2) the receipt of the information by a third party in such a way that it is understood: Qingdao Bohai Construction Group Co. Ltd and others v Goh Teck Beng and another [2016] 4 SLR 977 (“Qingdao Bohai”) at [35].

84 The burden of proving the second component of publication can be discharged directly by proving that at least one person, other than the claimant, saw, read or heard the communication, or in appropriate cases, indirectly, by an inference that publication must have occurred (Qingdao Bohai at [38]), such as by establishing a platform of facts from which it can properly be inferred that substantial publication within the jurisdiction had taken place: Zhu Yong Zhen v AIA Singapore Private Limited and another [2013] 2 SLR 492 (“Zhu Yong Zhen”) at [44]; [48].

85 Specifically in relation to email messages, there would be publication if it was received and seen by a recipient, other than its author and the person defamed, who is capable of understanding it: Ng Koo Kay Benedict v Zim Integrated Shipping Services Pte Ltd [2010] 2 SLR(R) 873 (“Ng Koo Kay Benedict”) at [27]; Qingdao Bohai at [37]; Zhu Yong Zhen at [42].

86 In Ng Koo Kay Benedict, while it could not be proven that every person in the list of recipients of the email in question had downloaded and accessed the email in Singapore, the court found that as it was sent to a large number of email addresses, it was more likely than not, that a not insubstantial number of persons would have downloaded and read the email in Singapore. This was buttressed by the fact that there were two individuals who testified that they had downloaded and accessed the email in Singapore (at [45]).

87 The claimant had pleaded that the Emails were copied to the email addresses of the 5 Ministers.

88 There was no direct evidence that any of the 5 Ministers had read and understood any of the Emails.

89 The claimant has also not established a platform of facts from which it can properly be inferred that any of the 5 Ministers had read the Emails.

90 All the claimant relied on were:

(a) Evidence that 5 of the email addresses to which the defendant sent the Emails were the official email addresses of the 5 Ministers at the material time ⁴⁹ ;

(b) The defendant’s confirmation that she had sent the Emails to the 5 Ministers’ addresses which she found on the online Singapore government directory ⁵⁰ ;

(c) The disclaimer on the online Singapore Government directory stating that e-mails will be routinely processed by administrators from each ministry (the “Disclaimer”) ⁵¹ ; and

(d) The fact that MND responded to the 3rd Email. ⁵²

91 The claimant submitted based on the above that it was reasonable to assume and foresee that the administrators from each ministry would read the Emails and report their contents to the relevant Minister.

92 However, all the Disclaimer stated was that emails would be “routinely processed”. It is not clear what “routinely processed” entails. This is not in my view sufficient to give rise to an inference that all the Emails sent to the 5 Ministers at those email addresses would be read, much less forwarded to them.

93 It is also not possible to infer solely from MND’s response to the 3rd Email, that MND also read the other five Emails, or that the other ministries which the 5 Ministers oversaw would have also read all the Emails. The defendant said she did not receive any reply from any of the ministries on the other five Emails. ⁵³

94 Lastly, the claimant sought to rely on s 116(e) of the Evidence Act 1893 which states that the court may presume that official acts have been “regularly performed”. However, for the reasons at [92], the claimant has not adduced any evidence as to what the “official act” would even encompass.

95 The claimant has also sought to rely on publication to other individuals, namely:

(a) Mr Ng (in respect of all the Emails);

(b) Mr Chua (in respect of all the Emails);

(c) Mr Cripps (in respect of the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Emails);

(d) Ms Lim (in respect of the 5th and 6th Emails);

(e) Officers of the MND, BCA, EMA and SP (in respect of the 3rd Email);

(f) Two lawyers and a staff from M/s Lee & Lee (in respect of the 2nd Email); and

(g) Mdm Neo (in respect of the 1st Email).

96 The defendant submitted that the claimant should not be permitted to rely on publication to individuals other than the 5 Ministers as this goes beyond his pleaded case, and would be prejudicial to the defendant.

97 The claimant ought to have fully pleaded the extent of publication he was relying on. O 43 r 3(4) of the Rules of Court 2021 requires a claimant to give full particulars in the statement of claim of the facts and matters on which the claimant relies in support of the claim for damages, including details of any conduct by the defendant which has allegedly increased the loss suffered and of any loss which is peculiar to the claimant’s own circumstances.

98 That being said, allowing the claimant to rely on the alleged publication to Mr Ng, Mr Chua, Mr Cripps, Ms Lim and officers in MND, BCA, EMA, and SP would not, in my view, result in prejudice to the defendant that cannot be compensated by costs:

(a) It was apparent from the face of the Emails that some of them were also copied to Mr Cripps and Ms Lim. Mr Cripps’ and Ms Lim’s AEICs stated that they had read and understood the emails which they were copied on. The claimant had, in his opening statement, also stated that he would be relying on the evidence of Mr Cripps and Ms Lim for publication. ⁵⁴ The defendant’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr Cripps and Ms Lim, and address this in closing submissions.

(b) The email address by which Mr Ng accessed the Emails, bedok@pap.org.sg, had been pleaded. It was in Mr Chua’s AEIC that Mr Ng had access to its inbox and had forwarded the Emails to him. The claimant had, in his opening statement, also stated that he would be relying on the evidence of Mr Chua and Mr Ng for publication. ⁵⁵ The defendant’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr Chua and Mr Ng, and address this in closing submissions.

(c) The purported publication to officers in MND, BCA, EMA, and SP was based on emails which the defendant herself had disclosed in these proceedings. The defendant had the chance to explain her position in cross-examination and address this in closing submissions.

99 The same however cannot be said in relation to the alleged publication to M/s Lee & Lee and Mdm Neo:

(a) While it was apparent from the face of the 2nd Email that staff of M/s Lee & Lee had been copied, it was not apparent from the claimant’s AEIC or his opening statement that he was relying on the alleged publication to M/s Lee & Lee. Even in the claimant’s closing submissions, it was only in the context of his submissions on damages that the claimant made a passing reference to the fact that two lawyers and a staff from M/s Lee & Lee was copied on the 2nd Email. ⁵⁶

(b) That Mdm Neo had also received the 1st Email was something that only arose when Mdm Neo was cross-examined. ⁵⁷ While the claimant argued that the defendant could have re-examined her on this, it was not until closing submissions that the claimant indicated for the first time that he was relying on the alleged publication to Mdm Neo.

100 In any event, even if I allow the claimant to rely on the alleged publication to M/s Lee & Lee and Mdm Neo, this would not further the claimant’s case.

101 The claimant did not in his submissions, address how copying two lawyers and a staff from M/s Lee & Lee on the 2nd Email amounted to defamation.

102 The defendant has, on the other hand, cited 2 Canadian authorities for the position that a letter sent to a claimant’s lawyer would not amount to publication for the purpose of defamation. In Grimmer v Carleton Road Industries Association 2009 NSSC 169, it was held that a defendant’s communication to a lawyer at the request of the claimant, of allegedly defamatory statements relating to the subject matter of the retainer, does not amount to publication at law (at [45] - [46]). Publication would also not be made out even if the claimant’s lawyer did not specifically request that the defendant write to him, if the claimant expected individuals raising legal issues to contact its solicitors: Monument Mining Limited v. Balendran Chong & Bodi 2012 BCSC 1769 at [92] - [94].

103 Here, the MCST had instructed M/s Lee & Lee to write to the defendant on 14 March 2023. In their letter, M/s Lee and Lee had asserted that the defendant’s claim that the installation of netting was in breach of the decision made at the 2022 AGM was baseless, and that there was no legal basis for her to demand that they be removed. ⁵⁸ It was in response to this letter that the defendant sent the 2nd Email to M/s Lee & Lee. I express doubt as to whether for this reason, the requirement of publication would not be made out (as per the Canadian authorities the defendant cited), or whether this would instead go towards establishing a defence to a claim in defamation. Either way, the claimant would not be able to successfully assert defamation in respect of the alleged publication to M/s Lee & Lee.

104 As for Mdm Neo, her evidence (which she repeated several times on the stand) was that the defendant had forwarded the 1st Email to her when the defendant asked her to be a witness. ⁵⁹ The claimant has not elaborated how forwarding the 1st Email to Mdm Neo, which based on her evidence, suggested that it was in the course of and for the purpose of these proceedings, would amount to defamation.

105 I now consider if the claimant has established publication in respect of Mr Ng, Mr Chua, Mr Cripps, Ms Lim and officers in MND, BCA, EMA, and SP.

106 Mr Ng read the Emails and forwarded them to Mr Chua. ⁶⁰ Mr Chua confirmed that he received the Emails from Mr Ng, and that he read and understood their contents. ⁶¹

107 The defendant has not contended that Mr Ng and Mr Chua’s receipt of the Emails were insufficient to establish publication.

108 Mr Cripps and Ms Lim’s evidence was that they had read and understood the emails which they were copied on. ⁶² Nevertheless, the defendant contended that this was insufficient to establish publication.

109 To constitute a defamatory statement, the statement must be published to a third party, i.e. a person distinct and external to both the alleged defaming party and the alleged defamed party: Karan Baga v Stichting Chemical Distribution Institute [2024] 5 SLR 1104 at [39]. In that case, the claimant failed to establish publication in respect of statements which the defendant organisation had made to its own internal bodies, namely, its board of directors, an executive board and an accreditation committee.

110 The defendant argued that Mr Cripps and Ms Lim were not external parties, as allegedly defamatory statements were also made against them as council members. ⁶³ In my view, they did not cease to be external third parties merely because some alleged defamatory statements may also have been made against them. The claimant is bringing a personal action for the allegations that were made against him. ⁶⁴

111 In any case, not all the statements which the claimant complained of were also made against Mr Cripps and Ms Lim. For instance, the statements in regarding the claimant’s alleged attitude during the mediation were only against the claimant.

112 The 3rd Email had also been forwarded to officers of the MND, BCA, EMA and SP. ⁶⁵

(a) On 20 September 2023, one Tan Kailin from the MND forwarded the 3rd Email to bca_csd@bca.gov.sg (copying 4 other email addresses with the domain “@mnd.gov.sg”) for their information and follow up.

(b) On 22 September 2023, one Lynn Chan Li Ing from the BCA replied, and directed the MND to the EMA instead. Hence on 25 September 2023, Tan Kailin forwarded the email chain (which included the 3rd Email) to EMA_Enquiry@ema.gov.sg, copying the same 4 email addresses with the domain “@mnd.gov.sg”, seeking the EMA’s follow-up.

(c) On 27 September 2023, one Desmond Nah from the EMA forwarded the email chain (which included the 3rd Email) to powerfeedback@spgroup.com.sg. He asked that SP look into the matter and provide the necessary assistance to the defendant. SP subsequently responded to the defendant on the issue of electrical safety in the vicinity of power substations.

113 Liability attaches to republications if they were intended by the defendant or were a foreseeable consequence: Continental Steel Pte Ltd v Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Southeast Asia Pte Ltd and another [2023] 5 SLR 445 at [171].

114 I find that the republication to the officers in the MND, BCA, EMA and SP was at the very least, a foreseeable consequence.

115 While the defendant had no control over how any government or ministry representative would act on the 3rd Email, the defendant wanted the 5 Ministers, or expected them to, act on her Emails. She had therefore copied them on the 3rd Email, and stated that she was setting out her “experience and observations during the session as feedback to the government (copied on this issue in this email chain)”. She also confirmed on the stand that she continued to send emails to the 5 Ministers because she wanted to give feedback. ⁶⁶ It was therefore foreseeable that the 3rd Email could be provided to other parties, as part of the follow-up on her feedback.

116 In summary therefore, while the claimant has not proven publication to the 5 Ministers, I find that there has been publication of the Emails, as follows:

(a) In respect of the 1st Email – to Mr Chua and Mr Ng;

(b) In respect of the 2nd Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng and Mr Cripps;

(c) In respect of the 3rd Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng and officers in MND, BCA, EMA and SP;

(d) In respect of the 4th Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng and Mr Cripps;

(e) In respect of the 5th Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng, Mr Cripps and Ms Lim; and

(f) In respect of the 6th Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng, Mr Cripps, and Ms Lim.

117 Apart from arguments that the statements in the 4th Email regarding the Reply Letter being intimidating and distressing was referring to Mr Cripps instead of the claimant, and that the statement regarding “bad actors” in the 6th Email was too vague to refer to the claimant (see [69] – [81] above), the defendant has not contended that the Emails did not refer to the claimant.

118 In any case, I find that a reasonable person would understand the statements in the Emails to refer to the claimant. The claimant was specifically named in all the Emails.

119 In conclusion therefore, I find that the claimant has established a prima facie case of defamation in respect of all the Emails.

120 For the reasons I will come to, I find that the Emails were published to the established recipients (i.e. Mr Cripps, Ms Lim, Mr Ng, Mr Chua and officers of the MND, BCA, EMA and SP) on occasion of qualified privilege.

121 A defendant must show that he has an interest, whether legal, social or moral, to communicate the information and the recipient has the corresponding interest or duty to receive the information: Yan Jun at [112].

122 The ultimate question is whether the statements were “fairly warranted by the occasion”. The court must consider all the circumstances and ask whether the defendant had a duty or interest in publishing the defamatory communication in question to the recipient in question: Chan Cheng Wah Bernard and others v Koh Sin Chong Freddie and another appeal [2012] 1 SLR 506 (“Chan Cheng Wah Bernard”) at [87]. It is not enough to assert some vague, ill-defined sense or moral or social duty: Goh Lay Khim and others v Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 546 (“Goh Lay Khim”) at [80].

123 The defence of qualified privilege would be defeated if it is proven that the communications were actuated by malice. Malice for the purposes of defeating qualified privilege may be proven in two ways: (1) by showing that the defendant knew the statement was false or was reckless as to its truth or did not believe in its truth, or (2) even if the defendant had a genuine or honest belief in its truth, by showing that his dominant motive was to injure the claimant or was otherwise improper. Goh Lay Khim at [81].

124 The inquiry into whether the defendant had knowledge of falsity or was reckless as to the truth is a subjective rather than objective exercise and the threshold is a high one. It had to be shown that the defendant knew the statement was false or was reckless to the point of wilful blindness. There would be such recklessness if the defendant disregarded obvious and pertinent facts in coming to his defamatory statement: Gao Shuchao v Tan Kok Quan and others [2018] SGHC 115 (“Gao Shuchao”) at [38] – [40].

125 An example of improper motive would be personal spite or the abuse of the occasion to obtain some private advantage unconnected with the duty or the interest constituting the reason for the privilege. Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei [2010] 4 SLR 331 at [38].

126 Malice for the purpose of defeating qualified privilege can be inferred from the introduction of extraneous matter which falls outside of this legitimate interest and the use of unnecessarily strong language: Golden Season at [108] – [110].

127 I accept that as a subsidiary proprietor in Costa Del Sol, the defendant had an interest in sending the Emails to Mr Cripps and Ms Lim, who were members of the Council at the material time, to uphold the Council’s compliance with the BMSMA.

128 Mr Cripps and Ms Lim, as then-members of the Council, had a corresponding interest to receive the Emails, as they are obliged under s 61 of the BMSMA to use reasonable diligence in the discharge of their duties.

129 Specifically in respect of assertions relating to compliance with the mediation agreement, the claimant, Mr Cripps and Ms Lim agreed that the Council was a party to the mediation agreement. ⁶⁷ Mr Cripps and Ms Lim agreed that the Council’s members therefore had an interest in the defendant’s and the Council’s compliance with the mediation agreement ⁶⁸ , and in knowing any allegation of non-compliance. ⁶⁹

130 I accept that as a subsidiary proprietor in Costa Del Sol, the defendant had an interest in communicating the Emails to Mr Ng and Mr Chua with a view to resolving her grievances with the Council.

131 The defendant agreed that she did not, in any of the Emails, specifically request that Bedok PAP help resolve her dispute ⁷⁰ . Nonetheless, the bedok@pap.org.sg address belonged to Bedok PAP and was an official email account for residents in the East Coast GRC to channel their feedback to their member of parliament. ⁷¹ Both Mr Chua and Mr Ng agreed that there was nothing wrong with a constituent like the defendant sending emails to Bedok PAP to raise her concerns. ⁷² Bedok PAP organised MPS to help constituents resolve their disputes, and would treat all emails sent to the Bedok PAP email address as MPS cases. ⁷³

132 The claimant had sought to distinguish the Emails as “abusive” emails which Mr Chua said the Bedok PAP would not treat as a valid case for an MPS. ⁷⁴ However, both Mr Chua and Mr Ng had confirmed, that in this instance, all the Emails were assigned as MPS cases for necessary follow-up. ⁷⁵

133 Mr Ng and Mr Chua had a corresponding duty and/or interest in receiving this information.

134 As a member of the Bedok PAP and administrator of bedok@pap.org.sg, Mr Ng’s main role was to ensure that all emails from Bedok PAP’s email address went to Mr Chua as secretary of Bedok PAP. ⁷⁶ Both Mr Chua and Mr Ng agreed that Bedok PAP had an interest in resolving neighbourly disputes ⁷⁷ , and that Mr Ng had an interest or duty to forward the Emails to Mr Chua. ⁷⁸

135 Mr Chua had in fact sought to mediate the dispute between the defendant and the Council in his capacity as Chairman of the Bedok Citizens’ Consultative Committee. Both Mr Chua and Mr Ng explained that this committee was under the People’s Association, but like the Bedok PAP, had an interest in helping resolve neighbourly disputes. ⁷⁹

136 I accept that as a subsidiary proprietor in Costa Del Sol, the defendant had an interest in sending the 3rd Email to the MND, to uphold the Council’s compliance with the BMSMA.

137 The MND had an interest or duty in receiving the 3rd Email. Under the 13th Schedule to the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Ministerial Responsibility) Notification 2020 (“MRN”), the BMSMA is listed as one of the statutes which fell within “National Development”.

138 The MND then forwarded the 3rd Email to BCA and EMA for their follow-up. BCA and EMA therefore had an interest or duty in receiving the 3rd Email to consider if any follow-up was required on their end. The EMA also had an interest or duty to forward the 3rd Email to SP for its follow-up, and SP had a corresponding interest or duty to follow-up on the 3rd Email, which it did when it responded to the defendant.

139 Given my finding that the claimant has not established publication to the 5 Ministers, there is no need for me to consider if the alleged communications to them were protected by qualified privilege. Nevertheless, even if there had been publication to them, the publication to 2 out of the 5 Ministers would be protected by qualified privilege.

140 I accept that the defendant had an interest in sending the Emails to the 5 Ministers to uphold the Council’s compliance with the BMSMA. She had initially reached out to the managing agent to ask that the netting be removed, but as this was not done, she decided to escalate the matter. ⁸⁰

141 While she did not explicitly request that the 5 Ministers help to resolve the dispute between her and the claimant ⁸¹ , the absence of an express statement seeking assistance is not determinative of whether she had an interest to communicate the information. The claimant had relied on in Koh Chong Chiah v The Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 4111 [2025] SGDC 146, where a letter addressed to the Prime Minister’s Office contained a statement seeking its assistance to arrange a mediation session. However, that was not a case on qualified privilege as the defendant there did not pursue this defence. The existence of this statement was simply a factor which the court considered when assessing damages, in finding that the letter was not sent with an improper motive (at [66]).

142 In any case, the defendant did, in the 1st Email, state that she will “monitor the net situation and any further non-conforming behaviours [sic]” and “will report to this panel when required.” This is consistent with her evidence that she wanted to send feedback to the 5 Ministers. ⁸²

143 I accept that the defendant could also have reached out to the BCA, the Strata Titles Board (“STB”) and/or the court to resolve her dispute. However, these were non-mandatory alternatives and did not negate the existence of an interest on her part to communicate the Emails to the 5 Ministers. It was also the defendant’s evidence that she wanted to explore other options which may be faster than going to the STB or the courts. ⁸³ Insofar as the claimant had relied on emails which he said showed that the defendant had been advised to apply to the STB for recourse, I note that those emails related to different complaints that were not the subject of the Emails. ⁸⁴

144 The claimant next relied on Ho Kee Sin v Vincent Teo [2024] SGMC 83 (“Ho Kee Sin”) where it was held that the BCA, a Member of Parliament and the Minister for National Development had no reciprocity of interest in receiving information relating to a private dispute between the subsidiary proprietors of a condominium unit and the management corporation. However, the facts are distinguishable.

145 There, the dispute in question was over an agreement that had been separately entered into between the subsidiary proprietors of a specific unit and the management corporation. The court also found that there was no interest on the part of the authorities in question to receive the information because by the time of the alleged defamation, the issue had been fully ventilated in previous emails with the Urban Redevelopment Authority (“URA”), BCA, the Member of Parliament, and the Minister for National Development. Further, the URA/BCA had in their emails stated that they were unable to intervene in the dispute over a private agreement: in particular, the BCA had said that it had already considered the appeals through the Member of Parliament and the Minister) (at [53]).

146 Further, the court in Ho Kee Sin also made clear that it was not making a finding that the authorities in question do not have a duty or an interest in receiving information on issues relating to the BMSMA or compliance with the URA/BCA’s guidelines and regulations or more generally concerns about how management corporations are run.

147 However, I am not persuaded that all the 5 Ministers had a corresponding interest or duty to receive the Emails. I am only prepared to accept that the following 2 ministers had a corresponding interest or duty to receive the Emails, based on their portfolios at the material time:

(a) Mr Heng Swee Kiat was a member of East Coast GRC, the constituency where Costa De Sol is located. The Bedok Branch, which fell within East Coast GRC, organises MPS to help constituents resolve their disputes ⁸⁵ ; and

(b) Mr Desmond Lee was the Minister for National Development. Under the 13th Schedule to the MRN, the BMSMA is listed as one of the statutes which fell within “National Development”.

148 On the other hand, it would be a stretch to argue that the following ministers also had a corresponding interest or duty to receive the Emails:

(a) Mr K Shanmuggam was the Minister for Law and Home Affairs. The defendant has only pointed to the inclusion of the Land Titles Act and the Land Titles (Strata) Act under the 11th Schedule to the MRN as statutes that fell within “Law”, but no breaches of these statutes were alleged. The BMSMA is not listed as one of the statutes within his purview;

(b) The same goes for Mr Edwin Tong who was at the material time, Second Minister for Law and the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth. The defendant has only pointed to a vague interest in ensuring that people living in Singapore abided by communal norms;

(c) As for Mr Lawrence Wong was the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore at the material time, the defendant has only asserted that he had an overarching responsibility over the department listed in the 2nd Schedule to the MRN as “Strategy Group and Whole-of-Government Strategic Planning and Policy Consideration”. A more specific duty and interest on the part of the receiver is required.

149 For the avoidance of doubt, whether a publication is made on an occasion of qualified privilege is a fact-sensitive enquiry which is tightly focused on the specific sender and receiver of the communication, its content and surrounding circumstances: Goh Lay Khim at [80]. My finding that qualified privilege would have been made out in respect of the alleged publication to 2 ministers in this case should therefore not be taken as an endorsement that all subsidiary proprietors can or should send all their complaints to their members of parliament or the Minister of National Development.

150 The claimant submitted that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity or was reckless as to the truth of the statements made in the E-mails, based on the following:

(a) Mr Singh had already informed the defendant on 18 January 2023 that the netting installed was different from the netting referred to in the 2022 Motion; ⁸⁶

(b) Alternatively, the defendant failed to verify on-site that the netting installed was different from that referred to in the 2022 Motion; and

(c) The defendant failed to seek legal advice, before sending the Emails, on the installation of the netting and s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA, on Council’s decision to hold a fully virtual AGM, and/or the alleged breach of the mediation agreement or s 47 of the BMSMA ⁸⁷ ; and

(d) Additionally in relation to the 5th and 6th Emails, the defendant had already received reassurance from SP via its email of 28 September 2023 that there was no danger of stray currents in the vicinity of the substations. ⁸⁸ This email was not disclosed to the MCST and she persisted in sending the 5th and 6th Emails with the same subject title as the 3rd Email, being “Re: PLEASE RESPECT ADVISORY ON ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND NOT EXPOSE KIDS TO STRAY CURRENTS”.

151 The claimant also argued that the defendant had a dominant intention to injure the defendant, relying on:

(a) The use of strong language with some words in capital letters in the Emails;

(b) Past instances of disputes over condominium affairs;

(c) The defendant’s “overconcern” with the basketball areas, which she only raised more than 2 years after being aware of their existence;

(d) Her persistence in sending the Emails even after obtaining clarification from Mr Singh that the netting installed was different from those in the 2022 Motion and was installed for safety reasons ⁸⁹ ; and

(e) Her choice of the highest level of Singapore government executives to inflict maximum damage on the claimant, whose right to live and work in Singapore as a non-citizen depended on government approval.

152 The claimant has not, in my view, proven that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity or was reckless as to the truth of her statements concerning the installation of netting. Even if the netting that was installed was different from those rejected at the 2022 AGM, this would not address her concern that its installation was unlawful as it had not been authorised by a special resolution. ⁹⁰

153 The defendant’s failure to seek legal advice on the Council’s alleged breaches did not make her reckless as to the truth of her statements. As noted, the threshold for establishing recklessness is a high one. A failure to independently verify information cannot amount to evidence of malice, because while it may suggest a certain amount of carelessness or imprudence, it did not by itself demonstrate a lack of honest belief, unless the context put a defendant on notice as to the truth or accuracy of the information: Gao Shuchao at [47] – [49]. There was nothing which would have put the defendant on notice that the alleged breaches could not be sustained.

154 I also do not find the defendant’s continued reference to the existence of “stray currents” in the subject titles of the 5th and 6th Email, despite SP’s email to the contrary, indicative of any knowledge of falsity or recklessness as to the truth. To the extent that the defendant argued that she was entitled to send the 5th and 6th Emails because the LEW’s 18 September Email stated that residents should keep clear of the substation, this cannot form a basis for her belief, at the time she sent the 5th and 6th Emails, that there were stray currents. This is because her own case was that she was not even aware of the LEW’s 18 September Email until these proceedings. ⁹¹

155 Having said that, I accept the defendant’s explanation that she simply overlooked changing the subject title as her focus was whether the location should be a play area ⁹² . In any event, it was not the claimant’s case that the subject title of the 5th and 6th Emails contained any imputation defamatory of the claimant.

156 The claimant has also not proven that the defendant had a dominant intention to injure the claimant.

157 None of the 17 disagreements which the claimant said the defendant had with the Council between 2019 and 2023 when he was the Chairman/Vice-Chairman/Treasurer ⁹³ featured complaints directed at him. Mr Singh agreed that none of the pleaded incidents related to the claimant personally ⁹⁴ :

158 Given that none of the complaints were directed at the claimant, the relationship between the claimant and the defendant therefore cannot be said to be such an acrimonious or litigious relationship sufficient to found malice, as was the case in Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2023] SGHC 22 at [61] to [71].

159 As evident from the chronology above, the defendant was an extremely vocal individual who had no qualms expressing her disagreement or dissatisfaction over any perceived breaches or lapses in the management of Costa Del Sol. There was therefore nothing out of the ordinary about the defendant complaining about the installation of netting around the basketball stands. This would not be the first time the defendant raised a complaint.

160  That she did not raise any complaint about the basketball stands until 2022 despite being aware by August 2020 of their existence, did not point to any dominant or improper motive on her part.

161 The defendant explained that in August 2020 when she complained to the BCA about residents at the basketball stands, she was preoccupied with the issue of non-compliance with safe management measures imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. It thus did not occur to her to raise any issue with the location of the basketball stands. ¹³² The defendant disagreed that taking issue with their location in 2022 was an afterthought or part of a campaign to defame the claimant. ¹³³ I find no reason to doubt her explanation.

162 There was also nothing exceptional about the defendant’s use of language or her decision to copy the 5 Ministers on the Emails. It can be seen from her earlier complaints that she has a tendency to use strong language, type out certain words entirely in uppercase and/or in bold font in her emails or even take to copying ministers or government agencies on her email complaints. ¹³⁴ While her tone of language and approach might come across as argumentative, even abrasive, this did not mean that she was motivated by a dominant intention to injure the claimant.

163 In the circumstances, I find that the Emails were protected by qualified privilege

164 Given my findings above, there is no necessity to consider whether the defendant was also entitled to avail of the defences of justification and fair comment. I will however address them for completeness. I will address both defences together in respect of each Email, as the defendant has essentially relied on the same facts for both defences.

165 To summarise, for the reasons I will come to, in addition to the defence of qualified privilege, the defendant would have also been entitled to rely on the defences of justification and/or fair comment in respect of some of the Emails, as follows:

166 The burden rests on the defendant to plead and show that the imputation is true or substantially true. The defendant must prove the meaning which the relevant statement is held to bear, and it is insufficient to prove the truth of a materially less serious meaning. The defendant however need not prove the literal truth of the words, and only the ‘sting’ of the charge: Chan Cheng Wah Bernard at [43] - [44].

167 To succeed in the defence of fair comment, the defendant must prove:

(a) The words complained of are comments, though they may consist of or include inference[s] of facts;

(b) The comment is on a matter of public interest;

(c) The comment is based on facts; and

(d) The comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved.

Review Publishing at [139].

168 A comment is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, judgment, remark, observance etc: Review Publishing, [141]. The test for whether the words are fact or comment is an objective one – namely: whether an ordinary, reasonable reader on reading the whole article would understand the words as comments or as statements of fact: Review Publishing, [140]. When such a reader cannot readily distinguish whether the defendant is stating a fact or making a comment, then the proper approach will be to deny the defendant the benefit of the defence. This is because it should be clear to a reader what purports to be an inference drawn from facts; otherwise, if fact and comments are so intermingled, the reader would suppose the injurious statements to be based on adequate grounds known to the writer: Review Publishing, [146].

169 Every allowance or latitude is to be given for any prejudice and exaggeration entertained by such a fair-minded man: Aaron Anne Joseph and others v Cheong Yip Seng and others [1996] 1 SLR(R) 258 at [78].

170 The defendant pleaded the following as the basis of her defence in justification and fair comment ¹³⁵ :

(a) No special resolution had been passed to authorise the Council to install the netting under s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;

(b) S 61 of the BMSMA obliged members of a council to “at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of the member’s office”; and

(c) The claimant had misrepresented at the 2022 AGM that the basketball courts were provided by the developer, to suit his preference for the basketball stands to remain.

171 I first deal with whether the claimant had instructed for the installation of netting in disregard of Singapore law. It is not disputed that no special resolution had been passed to authorise the installation of the netting, and that the claimant was part of the Council which agreed to proceed with the installation ¹³⁶ .

172 The relevant portions of s 29 of the BMSMA provide:

173 The claimant pleaded that the Council could install the nettings pursuant to s 29(1)(b) of the BMSMA. ¹³⁷ In submissions, the claimant relied on s 29(1)(a) and s 29(2)(b). ¹³⁸

174 I am not persuaded that ss 29(1)(a), 29(1)(b), or 29(2)(b) afforded the MCST any basis to install the netting in the absence of a special resolution.

175 Dealing first with s 29(2)(b) of the BMSMA, the installation of the netting was not for the enforcement of a by-law. The claimant accepted that there were no by-laws specifically dealing with the clearance areas or basketball stands. ¹³⁹

176 The next consideration is thus whether the netting was nevertheless “reasonably necessary” for the MCST’s performance of its “duties under this Part” (as per s 29(2)(b)).

177 It has been held that s 29(2)(b) of the BMSMA empowers an MCST to do all things reasonably necessary “to discharge its duties under s 29(1) of the BMSMA”: Fu Loong Lithographer Pte Ltd and others v Mok Wing Chong (Tan Ken Lin and others, third parties) [2018] 4 SLR 645 (“Fu Loong”) at [94] – [95]. In other words, the court must refer to s 29(1) to construe the extent of the MCST’s duties, before it can determine whether the act can be said to be “reasonably necessary”.

178 The claimant has not cited any authority for the proposition that s 29(1)(a), which imposes a duty to “control, manage and administer the common property for the benefit of all the subsidiary proprietors”, extends to the erection of structures on common property for safety reasons.

179 On the contrary, it has been held that a council’s power to undertake works on common property rests on 2 bases: (1) pursuant to s 29(1)(b) which sets out a duty to maintain and keep common property in a state of good and serviceable repair; and (2) pursuant to a special resolution at a general meeting of subsidiary proprietors directing it to install or provide additional facilities or make improvements to common property, per s 29(1)(d) (Fu Loong at [98]). Hence, if the works in fact satisfied the description of good and serviceable repair (i.e. the first basis), then no special resolution was required (Fu Loong at [106]). If, however, the works are only nice to have but not a must-have, then a special resolution under s 29(1)(d) would be required (i.e. the second basis) (Fu Loong at [109]).

180 The erection of structures on common property would thus only be permissible if there was a special resolution or if it is to properly maintain and keep common property in a state of good and serviceable repair. The installation of netting however cannot be characterised as being merely for the purpose of maintaining and keeping common property in a state of good and serviceable repair, as these are brand new structures with no existing equivalent. Additionally, the installation of the netting cannot amount to maintenance and repair as the locations they were placed were meant to function as clearance areas allowing access to substations ¹⁴⁰ and were not intended as basketball courts or play areas. ¹⁴¹

181 To construe s29(1)(a) as empowering an MCST to erect new structures, even if for safety reasons, would defeat the express requirement in s 29(1)(d) for a special resolution for installing any new facility or erecting any new structure to common property.

182 That a special resolution was required is buttressed by s 32(3)(a) of the BMSMA, which required a special resolution to make, amend, add to or repeal any by laws in respect of the use or enjoyment of common property, including for the purpose of safety and security measures.

183 The claimant agreed that the Council could not install permanent netting without a special resolution ¹⁴² , and that the Council had intended to table a resolution in the 2023 AGM to regularise the temporary netting and make it permanent. ¹⁴³

184 In any event, the safety concerns could have been addressed by removing the basketball stands altogether. While s 29(1)(d) requires a special resolution to remove a facility or structure on common property, an MCST arguably does not require a special resolution to remove a facility or structure that was not properly authorised in the first place. Even if a special resolution was required to remove the basketball stands, the Council could have tabled this at a general meeting, but did not do so until the 2023 AGM. The claimant agreed that none of the minutes of council meetings between November 2022 and July 2023 recorded the Council as having discussed the option of removing the basketball stands, though he said it would have been discussed. ¹⁴⁴ Mr Cripps, on the other hand, had no recollection of Council having discussed this. ¹⁴⁵

185 For the above reasons, in the absence of a special resolution, the Council was not entitled to install the netting. The imputation that the claimant had instructed for the netting to be installed in disregard of Singapore law was therefore justified.

186 However, the second defamatory imputation, i.e. that the claimant had sought to advance his self-interest, was not justified.

187 It was not disputed that s 61 of the BMSMA obliges council members to act honestly and with reasonable diligence in discharging their duties. I accept that the Council (which included the claimant) had installed the netting out of genuine safety concerns, as children had been observed to throw the basketball over the fence while playing basketball, which resulted in them going to the main road to retrieve the basketball. ¹⁴⁶ The MCST had also been informed by its insurers that if it was aware of a potential issue but chose to ignore it, this may amount to a breach of the MCST’s insurance policy. ¹⁴⁷

188 The remaining defamatory imputations that the claimant was not transparent to the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol and that he had on previous occasions, misrepresented or contorted Singapore law to suit his advantage, were also not justified.

189 The defendant has not proven that the claimant had misrepresented at the 2022 AGM that the basketball courts were provided by the developer. The claimant conceded that he had made this statement which was incorrect but explained that this was based on his understanding at that time. ¹⁴⁸ He only found out after the 2022 AGM that the basketball courts were not originally installed. ¹⁴⁹ The defendant has not adduced any evidence to suggest that the claimant had made the statement at the 2022 AGM knowing that it was untrue.

190 Further, even if the claimant had misrepresented at the 2022 AGM that the basketball stands were provided by the developer, this one instance of misrepresentation would not justify the imputation that the claimant he had misrepresented Singapore law on “previous occasions”, i.e. more than once, and that he did so to “suit [his] advantage”.

191 I now deal with the defence of fair comment.

192 The claimant argued, in relation to all the Emails, that the statements complained of were not comments but factual statements, based on the words, tone and language used. He also argued, based on how the defendant had copied the 5 Ministers and her motive in wanting them to investigate, that these statements were therefore of facts and not comments.

193 In my view, the defendant was not entitled to rely on the defence of fair comment. The statements complained of, when read in the context of the 1st Email, cannot be said to be comments.

194 The defendant stated that “the motion to install netting was DEFEATED by way of voting at the AGM on 15 Oct 2022 but yet after this outcome, the nets were installed”, and further, that “this is BLATANT DISRESPECT for the laws…to instruct for the outcome of the motion to be disregarded is UNLAWFUL” (emphasis added). She also stated that the claimant “should not be rallying the community to push self-interests before our laws” and “in fact, you should be transparent” and not “misrepresent nor contort the spirit and intent of our laws to suit your advantage as you have on previous occasions” (emphasis added). This is reinforced by the subject title of the 1st Email which was “YOU HAVE DISREPECTED LAWS OF SINGAPORE” (emphasis added). She had therefore clearly presented these assertions about the claimant as facts.

195 Even if these statements were comments, the statements that the claimant had sought to advance his self-interest, was not transparent, or had misrepresented on more than one occasion to suit his advantage, were not based on facts. As noted above, the defendant has only referred to 1 instance where the claimant mistakenly stated at the 2022 AGM that the basketball courts were provided by the developer. She has no evidence from which a fair-minded person could have formed the view that the claimant made this statement knowing it was false and/or to advance his self-interest.

196 The defence of fair comment therefore fails.

197 The defendant pleaded that the statements were justified because no special resolution had been passed to authorise the Council to install the netting under s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA, and s 61 of the BMSMA required all council members to act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of their duties. ¹⁵⁰

198 For the reasons set out at [171] – [187] above, the defendant has only established justification in respect of the allegation that the claimant had instructed for the netting to be installed which breached s 29(1) of the BMSMA, but not that he was partial or motivated by self-interest.

199 The defendant has also not proven justification in respect of the assertions that the installation of the nettings disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion.

200 I accept that the netting that had been installed was recycled, zero-cost and temporary ¹⁵¹ . This was different from what had been proposed and rejected at the 2022 AGM, which was metallic, cost $5,800 and was permanent. ¹⁵²

201 As for the defence of fair comment, the defendant is not entitled to rely on this as the statements complained of, when read in the context of the 2nd Email, cannot be said to be comments, but statements of fact.

202 In the statement which I found to be defamatory, the defendant stated that “disrespecting and acting against the outcome of the motion is undeniably irresponsible and unlawful….and no amount of your rhetoric can whitewash this” (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the 2nd Email, the defendant stated that “[Lee & Lee’s] heading “Allegation” is a misnomer. I have provided evidences [sic] and facts where it is documented in the AGM Minutes that motion is defeated therefore when you go ahead to put up the netting it is in breach of the outcome determined at the AGM. That is said wholly with base [sic] and merit…” (emphasis added). She also stated that “the decision by Council (which Chairman [the claimant is] part of) is in breach of the outcome of the AGM where the motion was defeated” (emphasis added) and that decisions made in the interests of the MCST should not be influenced by partiality or personal interests.

203 Even if the statements were comments, the defendant has not pointed to any facts from which a fair-minded person could honestly have formed the view that the claimant was influenced by partiality or personal interests.

204 The defence of fair comment therefore fails.

205 The defendant pleaded that the statements regarding the claimant’s conduct during the mediation session were true because she had presented a copy of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the 2022 AGM’s minutes to the claimant during the mediation session, and he unreasonably refused to look at them. ¹⁵³

206 I accept that the defendant had presented a copy of the 2022 AGM’s minutes and s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA to the claimant at the mediation, and the claimant did not look at them. The claimant, in his AEIC, merely denied acting unreasonably during the mediation session or disrespecting the existence of s29(1)(d) of the BMSMA during the mediation. ¹⁵⁴

207 However, the imputation that had to be justified was that the claimant’s failure to look at them during the mediation session was unreasonable and evidenced a disregard of Singapore law. The defendant agreed that other than her own assertion, she had provided no evidence or called any witness to show that the claimant displayed an unreasonable attitude or reaction ¹⁵⁵ or that he rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA. ¹⁵⁶

208 The defendant has therefore failed to make out the defence of justification in respect of this imputation.

209 The defendant has not sought to justify the defamatory imputation that the claimant was part of the Council which made a decision in breach of law and safety. In any event, for the reasons above, I find that the decision to install the netting was in breach of the BMSMA (see [171] – [185] above). It would also be in breach of safety because, while it was both Mr Huang’s and EMA’s views that while the risk of stray currents was low, there was still a risk of the basketball hitting the substation doors. ¹⁵⁷

210 The defendant’s statements regarding the claimant’s conduct during the mediation session would however amount to fair comment.

211 These were comments rather than statements of fact. The defendant prefaced the statement by describing it as her “experience and observations” during the mediation. A reasonable reader would interpret her statements as inferences drawn from facts, as she had set out his reaction to receiving a copy of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and minutes of the 2022 AGM, before setting out her criticism of his behaviour, as being “unlike any reasonable person”.

212 The defendant pleaded the following as the basis for her defence of justification ¹⁵⁸ :

(a) Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA entitled every subsidiary proprietor who has paid all contributions and any other moneys levied and recoverable to vote at a general meeting, while paragraph 1C(2) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA prohibited the holding of a general meeting using virtual meeting technology only unless all of the members who wish to participate in the meeting have access to the virtual meeting technology needed to participate. The Council’s decision to hold the 2023 AGM virtually failed to cater for elderly subsidiary proprietors’ lack of tech-competence and deprived them of their right to attend and vote at the 2023 AGM;

(b) The Reply Letter was intimidating and distressing as it stated that “we further regret this [Joint Letter Request] was written to smear the Chairman’s reputation by pre-supposing that [subsidiary proprietors] may be censored. The Council strongly encourages you to make up your own mind by reading important notices that are regularly posted on the notice boards and iCondo. Importantly, please also read the AGM document which has been delivered to your mailboxes for a comprehensive understanding of current matters in the estate.” The Joint Letter Request was however, not to smear the claimant’s reputation, but to urge the Council to offer a hybrid mode of AGM; and

(c) The defendant had received a call from an elderly subsidiary proprietor who had signed the Joint Letter Request, and who appeared to be distraught and in distress owing to the Reply Letter.

213 The defendant referred to Mr Yeo Sian Tean (“Mr Yeo”) and Mdm Neo as examples of elderly subsidiary proprietors who lacked technology competence ¹⁵⁹ and who consequently did not attend the 2023 AGM. ¹⁶⁰

214 The claimant had argued that the allegation that paragraph 1C(2)(a) of the First Schedule was breached was an afterthought as the 4th Email did not allege this. The absence of an express reference to this breach, did not however, preclude the defendant from relying on this for proving justification. The breach has, in any event, been pleaded. However, for the reasons below, while I find that paragraph 1C(2)(a) was breached, I do not find that this alone proves the defamatory imputation that the claimant had deprived elderly subsidiary proprietors of their entitlement to attend the AGM by failing to cater to their lack of tech-competence.

215 S 29(1)(h) of the BMSMA provides that “…it is the duty of a management corporation … to convene annual general meetings in accordance with the First Schedule”. Paragraph 1C(1)(c) of the First Schedule in turns provides that a general meeting of the MCST may be held using virtual meeting technology only. This is subject to the caveat in paragraph 1C(2)(a) of the First Schedule which states: “a general meeting of a management corporation … must not be held using virtual meeting technology only, unless all of the members who wish to participate at the meeting have access to the virtual meeting technology needed to participate at the meeting”.

216 In other words, the Council was only entitled to hold the 2023 AGM by fully virtual means if all the members who wished to participate at the 2023 AGM had access to the necessary virtual meeting technology.

217 The BCA had also issued a circular of 26 June 2023 to all MCSTs in Singapore. ¹⁶¹ This stated that with effect from 1 July 2023, all MCSTs will have the option to conduct general meetings in-person, or by fully virtual or partially virtually means. It advised that as a good practice, before deciding on the appropriate mode of conducting the meeting, a council should solicit feedback from subsidiary proprietors on their preferred mode and ensure that they have access to the technology needed.

218 On 4 August 2023, the MCST sent a notice to subsidiary proprietors informing them that the 2023 AGM will be held via fully virtual means, and to look for further updates in due course. ¹⁶² The claimant said that prior to deciding on a fully virtual meeting, the Council and the managing agent sought feedback from subsidiary proprietors on their preferred mode. ¹⁶³

219 A letter dated 14 September 2023 was then sent to all subsidiary proprietors providing a WhatsApp chat hotline for technical assistance ¹⁶⁴ . There was also a user guide explaining how to set up iCondo and Zoom for attending the 2023 AGM and containing the same WhatsApp Hotline. ¹⁶⁵ However, a hard copy was not circulated to subsidiary proprietors, and was only available for download via scanning the QR code on the letter. ¹⁶⁶

220 Subsequently, on 26 September 2023, the Joint Letter Request was sent. One of the reasons given for proposing a hybrid mode was that there were elderly subsidiary proprietors “who are tech-challenged by virtual-AGM”. Mr Yeo was one of the 31 subsidiary proprietors who signed the Joint Letter Request. He had attended the AGM in 2019 which was a physical meeting. ¹⁶⁷ At his signature on the Joint Letter Request, it was indicated that he had no computer or mobile phone. That Mr Yeo did not have a computer or mobile phone was not challenged by the claimant. The Council was therefore put on notice that there was at least one subsidiary proprietor who wished to participate at the 2023 AGM and who had no access to the necessary virtual meeting technology. Mr Yeo could also not have accessed the user guide which was only available via download.

221 In the Reply Letter, the Council said that pushback was received from less than 5% of the subsidiary proprietors in Costa Del Sol. It stood by its decision to convene a fully virtual meeting due to the perceived advantages over a hybrid or physical meeting. In particular, it stated that the attendance of any subsidiary proprietors will not be excluded as help was available to “non-digital savvy [subsidiary proprietors]”. ¹⁶⁸ The claimant confirmed that none of the Council members inquired with Mr Yeo whether he had access to virtual meeting technology, though he said there was a letter to Mr Yeo and the other 30 subsidiary proprietors informing them they could go to the management office for further explanation, but Mr Yeo did not do so. ¹⁶⁹ The Council then proceeded to convene a fully virtual AGM.

222 That Mr Yeo might have been informed to visit the management office for further explanation but failed to, did not change the fact that at least one subsidiary proprietor who wished to attend the 2023 AGM did not have access to the relevant technology. The requirement in paragraph 1C(2)(a) of the First Schedule to the BMSMA for holding a fully virtual meeting had therefore not been satisfied.

223 However, it is not true that the claimant failed to cater to elderly subsidiary proprietors’ lack of tech-competence. Steps had been taken to provide support and assistance for subsidiary proprietors to access the necessary meeting technology (see [219] above). Additionally, the same WhatsApp hotline was reproduced in the presentation slide at the 2023 AGM ¹⁷⁰ , and security and facility officers responded to 2 calls for assistance at residents’ homes ¹⁷¹ .

224 Further, there was also no evidence that by holding the 2023 AGM virtually, the claimant had in fact deprived elderly subsidiary proprietors of their right to attend it. The defendant can only prove, at best, that Mr Yeo did not have access to the technology required to attend the 2023 AGM and that he did not attend the 2023 AGM. However, there was no evidence that his failure to attend the 2023 AGM was solely attributable to his lack of access to the relevant technology. Moreover, it appears from the 2023 AGM’s minutes that the defendant attended the 2023 AGM as proxy for Mdm Neo. ¹⁷² It was unclear why Mdm Neo did not attend the 2023 AGM personally. In any event, as she was represented by the defendant as her proxy, it cannot be said that she was deprived of her right to attend the 2023 AGM. The defendant has not pointed to any other elderly subsidiary proprietor who wished to participate at the 2023 AGM but could not do so because they lacked access to the necessary technology.

225 The defence of justification has therefore not been made out in respect of the first imputation that the claimant had deprived elderly subsidiary proprietors of their entitlement to attend the AGM by not catering to their lack of tech-competence.

226 The defence of justification also fails in respect of the imputation that the claimant had, through the Reply Letter, intimidated and caused distress to elderly subsidiary proprietors.

227 The Reply Letter stated that the petitioners had intended to cause the claimant reputational harm even though, as acknowledged by Mr Cripps, there was nothing in the Joint Letter Request itself which smeared the claimant’s reputation. ¹⁷³ Even so, I do not see how the Reply Letter can be said to amount to intimidation. It did not set out any threat or statement which would frighten the subsidiary proprietors into taking a certain course of action. The rest of the letter merely set out the Council’s reasons for standing by its decision to conduct a fully virtual meeting.

228 The defendant had only referred to one phone call she received from Mdm Neo who appeared distraught and in distress due to the Reply Letter ¹⁷⁴ . However, it does not prove that the Reply Letter had caused distress to any other elderly subsidiary proprietors apart from Mdm Neo.

229 The defendant is also not entitled to rely on fair comment.

230 The assertion that the claimant had deprived elderly subsidiary proprietors of their entitlement to attend the AGM by not catering to their lack of tech-competence was presented as a statement of fact, not opinion.

231 This is apparent from how the defendant worded the first assertion: “Already you deprive them of their entitlement to attend AGM by not catering to their lack of tech-competence” (emphasis original).

232 The same goes for the assertion that the claimant had, through the Reply Letter, intimidated and caused distress to elderly subsidiary proprietors. The defendant termed the Reply Letter as “your letter of intimidation”, which was in the claimant’s “classic style of intimidation to supress feedback”, and an “act of intimidation”. She also said that the claimant was “accountable” for any elderly subsidiary proprietor’s deterioration in mental health or medical condition as a result of his “act of intimidation”, and that Singapore did not condone “acts of intimidation”. She also insisted that he issue an apology “to all [he] intimidated”, and apologise “that [he] had caused them distress…”

233 Even if these statements were comments, they were not based on facts. Steps had been taken to provide support and assistance for subsidiary proprietors to access the necessary meeting technology. The defendant has not proven that any other elderly subsidiary proprietors (beyond Mr Yeo, at best) were deprived of their entitlement to attend the 2023 AGM. The wording of the Reply Letter could not by any stretch, be said to amount to intimidation

234 The defendant pleaded the following as the basis of her defence of justification ¹⁷⁵ :

(a) The claimant breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA as no special resolution was passed to authorise the installation of netting;

(b) Singapore does not condone those who make a mockery of its laws, process and systems. For instance, s 61(3) of the BMSMA provides that a person who breached the obligation to act honestly and use reasonable diligence in discharging his duties of office and used his position to gain an advantage for himself or any person or caused damage to the MCST shall be liable to the management corporation for any profit made or for any damage suffered by the management corporation as a result, and shall be guilty of an offence. It is therefore right in principle for the claimant to be in sync with Singapore laws, processes and systems.

235 However, the sting was not merely that the installation of the netting was unlawful, but that he did so intentionally or wilfully. This is a materially more serious meaning which the defendant has not proven. The defence of justification thus fails.

236 The defendant is also not entitled to rely on fair comment.

237 The statements complained of were presented as statements of fact, not opinion. This is apparent from how the defendant stated it as a definitive fact, that “the repeated emails and communications is the result of the doings of yourself/ Council for breaching Singapore BMSMA Pt 29(1)(d) by disrespecting the outcome of the voting determined at last year’s AGM”. She also asserted that Singapore does “not condone those who make a mockery of our Singapore laws, processes and systems…It’s time you get in sync with the narrative of this land”, thereby stating that the claimant had made a mockery of Singapore laws, process and systems and was not in sync with the Singapore government’s narrative.

238 Even if they were comments, the defendant has not explained what were the facts upon which a fair-minded person would have concluded that the defendant breached the law intentionally or wilfully.

239 The sting of the 6th Email was that the claimant: (1) had a history of misrepresenting to suit his advantage; (2) instructed for the installation of the netting which was unlawful; (3) had acted unreasonably and displayed a disregard of Singapore law during the mediation session; and (4) acted unlawfully when he withheld allegedly critical information.

240 The defendant pleaded justification based on the following: ¹⁷⁶

(a) The claimant misrepresented at the 2022 AGM that “the basketball courts were there since the beginning, provided by the Developer”, to suit his preference for the basketball stands to remain;

(b) The Reply Letter deliberately contorted the intent of the Joint Letter Request as an attempt to smear the claimant’s reputation, when it was merely to urge the Council to offer a hybrid mode of meeting for the 2023 AGM;

(c) The claimant stated, in his email to the defendant on 11 October 2023, with the 5 Ministers in copy, that “the email from EMA that you shared below is confirming that there are NO STRAY CURRENTS” when, in fact, the key point from the email from EMA was that “[SP] would like to highlight the risk of having a play area just next to the substation. Not knowing the force and the frequency of the basketball hitting against the substation doors, the door panel(s) may give way overtime and result in injuries and intrusion into the live equipment area”;

(d) The netting was installed despite the defeat of the 2022 Motion;

(e) The claimant breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA as no special resolution was passed to authorise the installation of netting;

(f) The claimant refused to look at s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the 2022 AGM’s minutes at the mediation session;

(g) The claimant’s email of 21 September 2023 contained a screenshot of an email purportedly sent by an LEW, but the identifying information of the sender was redacted. There was however no provision in s 47 or elsewhere in the BMSMA for withholding this information, and it was understood and/or agreed at the mediation that the claimant would provide an opinion from an identified LEW.

241 The defendant has not proven that the claimant had a history of misrepresenting to suit his advantage.

(a) First, the defendant has not proven that the claimant’s representation at the 2022 AGM that the basketball courts were provided by the developer was made to suit his own advantage (see [186] – [190] above);

(b) As for the Reply Letter, Mr Cripps had accepted under cross-examination that there was nothing in the Joint Letter Request which smeared the claimant’s reputation. However, this letter was signed off by Mr Cripps. The onus is on the defendant to prove that it was the claimant who directed for this statement to be included and that he did so to suit his advantage. The defendant has not done so; and

(c) As for the claimant’s 11 October 2023 email ¹⁷⁷ , I do not see this as amounting to a misrepresentation of the EMA’s email. The EMA had stated that “the chances of stray current is [sic] very low as both building and equipment are earthed and maintained periodically…” ¹⁷⁸ The claimant did not omit that part of the EMA’s email highlighting potential concerns with having a play area next to the substation. He had referred to it in his email, but stated his view that the frequency and force of any potential impact was low and should not be of concern.

242 However, the defendant has proven justification in respect of the charge that the claimant had instructed for the installation of the netting which was unlawful (see [171] - [185] above).

243 The defendant has not proven justification in respect of the charge that the claimant acted unreasonably and displayed a disregard of Singapore law during the mediation session (see [206] – [208] above).

244 Finally, I accept that the claimant acted unlawfully when he withheld Mr Huang’s identity. The Council ought to have disclosed his identity, whether pursuant to s 47 of the BMSMA and/or the mediation agreement.

245 s 47(1)(b) of the BMSMA states:

246 The LEW’s 18 September Email, the LEW’s 19 September Email, and the LEW’s 20 September Email, comprised records or documents in the custody or under the control of the MCST.

247 The defendant had in the 5th Email referred to s 47 and stated that the withholding of information was not in compliance with s 47. Despite this, the Council did not provide Mr Huang’s full email. It did not assert that the defendant had to make a formal application or pay any fees before it would disclose the LEW’s details.

248 As for the mediation agreement, it did not specifically state that the identity of the LEW should be disclosed. Nevertheless, given that the purpose of obtaining an LEW’s opinion was to have an independent assessment of the safety of the play area, and the agreement was for the findings to be disclosed to the defendant, it would be reasonable to imply that the LEW’s opinion would be disclosed to the defendant in full without any redactions.

249 When the claimant sought Mr Chua’s concurrence on redacting Mr Huang’s details, he had only sent Mr Chua a screenshot of the LEW’s 20 September Email. ¹⁷⁹ Mr Chua was thus not aware of the LEW’s 18 September Email ¹⁸⁰ when he agreed to the redaction. In any event, he was not a party to the mediation agreement and therefore could not have waived the breach.

250 The defence of justification is therefore made out on the statement that the claimant acted unlawfully when he withheld Mr Huang’s details.

251 It did not matter what the claimant’s reasons were for redacting Mr Huang’s details. The defendant did not allege in the 6th Email that the claimant had done so for nefarious reasons.

252 I accept, in any case, that in seeking to redact Mr Huang’s details, the claimant had genuine concerns about Mr Huang potentially being inundated with emails from the defendant. While there was no evidence that the defendant would reach out to Mr Huang, or even if she did, that Mr Huang would thus cease to provide his services ¹⁸¹ , the claimant had personal experience with the defendant, who tended to send multiple emails to voice her disagreements.

253 I am also not persuaded that the claimant had redacted Mr Huang’s details because the LEW’s 18 September Email was unfavourable to the claimant’s position.

254 The claimant agreed that the LEW’s 18 September Email was part of the LEW’s assessment of the safety of having play areas beside the substations ¹⁸² , but explained that the LEW’s 18 September Email was not sent to the defendant only because it had a wording which he thought was not compliant with what the defendant wanted. ¹⁸³ He disagreed that he redacted the LEW’s details to prevent the defendant from reaching out to the LEW and finding out about the LEW’s 18 September Email. ¹⁸⁴ Although

255 Ultimately, the claimant had provided Mr Huang’s details to Mr Chua ¹⁸⁵ , obtained Mr Chua’s concurrence, and informed the defendant that he had done so. ¹⁸⁶ This was not the conduct of someone who was out to hide the LEW’s 18 September Email.

256 Lastly, the defendant is only entitled to rely on fair comment in respect of her observations of the claimant’s conduct during the mediation (see [211] above).

257 In respect of the other allegations, the statements complained of were presented as statements of fact, not opinion. The defendant stated that the claimant was “self-demonstrating to the Ministers your usual prowess in misrepresenting and misinterpreting to always suit your own advantage “ and that by doing so, had given “feedback…of behaviours by bad actors”. She stated that “it remains on record that” before setting out the instances where the claimant is said to have disrespected the 2022 AGM, the BMSMA, and the mediation agreement. Even if they were comments, the statements that the claimant had a history of misrepresenting to suit his advantage were not based on facts (see [195] above).

258 Justification is an absolute defence and cannot be defeated by proof of malice: Chan Cheng Wah Bernard at [43].

259 Malice for the purposes of defeating fair comment may be established only by proof that a defendant did not honestly believe in the view he expressed. Whatever his motivations may be, whether it be spite, animosity or an intent to injure, does not defeat the defence, even though proof of such motivation may be evidence from which lack of genuine belief in the view expressed may be inferred: Oei Hong Leong v Ban Song Long David and others [2005] 3 SLR(R) 608 [51]-[53].

260 For the reasons at [152] – [155] above, the claimant has not shown that the defendant lacked honest belief in her statements.

261 The claimant prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant from publishing or causing to be published the same or similar words defamatory of the claimant, an undertaking by the defendant not to repeat the words to the same or any similar effect in the future and general and aggravated damages. As the defendant has succeeded in the defence of qualified privilege, the claimant is not entitled to any of these reliefs.

262 Nonetheless, I shall briefly address the claim in damages. Even if the claimant had succeeded in his defamation claim, I am not persuaded that he should be awarded damages anywhere close to the extent sought.

263 General damages serve 3 functions: firstly as a consolation to the claimant for the distress suffered, secondly to repair the harm to his reputation, and thirdly, to vindicate his reputation: Arul Chandran v Chew Chin Aik Victor [2001] 1 SLR(R) 86 at [53].

264 The court may take into account the following factors in assessing general damages:

(a) The nature and gravity of the defamation;

(b) The conduct, position and standing of the claimant and defendant; and

(c) The mode and extent of publication.

Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2025] 4 SLR 95 (“Foo Diana (2025)”) at [20], [114] – [117], [120] – [123].

265 Aggravated damages are granted to compensate the claimant for loss suffered from the defendant’s conduct before and during the trial which has aggravated the hurt to the claimant’s feelings and such claim for damages has to be pleaded with specificity and particularity: Foo Diana (2025) at [22]. In assessing aggravated damages, the court would consider:

(a) The conduct of the defendant from the time the defamatory statement is published to the very moment of the verdict;

(b) The failure to apologise and retract the defamatory statement; and

(c) The presence of malice.

Foo Diana (2025) at [120] – [123].

266 The claimant sought a total of $200,000 in general damages and $50,000 in aggravated damages, broken down as follows:

267 The claimant submitted that an award of $20,000 - $40,000 for each of the Emails was justified based on Jasmin Nisban v Chan Boon Siang and others [2023] SGDC 158 (“Jasmin Nisban”), where general damages of $80,000 was awarded to the Honorary Treasurer of the Singapore Chess Federation and Alicia Tan Gek Cheng v Pok Vic Sent [2026] SGDC 1 (“Alicia Tan”) where general damages of $40,000 for one publication was awarded (out of a total of $130,000 for four publications) to the former Honorary Secretary of the Singapore Ice Skating Association.

268 The claimant sought aggravated damages of $5,000 or $10,000 for each of the Emails, on the basis that the defendant had repeated the allegations that were in her earlier Emails in the later Emails, and that she continued to make similar allegations in other emails sent to the 5 Ministers and Bedok PAP ¹⁸⁷ , and in 2 emails sent to 4 ministers and Bedok PAP on 15 and 26 August 2025 ¹⁸⁸ .

269 The defendant argued that the claimant should not be allowed to rely on these other emails because they had not been pleaded. I note though that the claimant did plead that the defendant continued to repeat her defamatory statements, and “sent many other emails to the [c]laimant (and copied to the same recipients of [the 6 Emails]”. ¹⁸⁹ These other emails had also been referred to by the claimant in his affidavit. ¹⁹⁰ Pleadings aside, while the defendant had in an email dated 15 August 2025 repeated that there had been non-compliance in holding the 2023 AGM via fully virtual means, she had sent the emails on 15 and 26 August 2025 in response to a survey by Council on whether the 2025 AGM should be held via fully physical or fully virtual means. ¹⁹¹ I have also found that she was right in asserting that the 2023 AGM should not have been held fully virtually.

270 The awards in Jasmin Nisban and Alicia Tan were based on circumstances that are distinguishable from the present case.

271 In Jasmin Nisban, the defamatory allegation was of sexual misconduct, and in particular, that a renowned female chess trainer had resigned due to an alleged incident involving the plaintiff at her workplace. The defendants were also prominent members of Singapore society who occupied high-ranking positions in the government and in the private sector. Publication was made to 28 persons. There had also been a finding that the defendants were motivated by malice.

272 In Alicia Tan, where $40,000 had been awarded for one publication, the defamatory allegations related to impropriety in the claimant’s management, and the publication was to at least 25 persons. The court also considered the standing of the claimant and the defendant in the skating community.

273 Here, the defamatory allegations were not comparable in severity to those in Jasmin Nisban. Further, the extent of publication was much more limited than in Jasmin Nisban and Alicia Tan. The claimant and the defendant were not of any particular standing among the recipients.

274 Additionally, the claimant suffered limited harm to his reputation, if at all.

275 In this regard, the court is not confined to the impact of any defamation on the claimant’s reputation as Council Chairman. In Koh Sin Chong Freddie v Chan Cheng Wah Bernard and others and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 629 at [36], the plaintiffs’ own statement of claim limited their claims to damage to their reputation and standing in the Singapore Swimming Club as members of the previous management committee. There was also no finding that the plaintiff’s reputation and standing in their respective professions were affected as the sting of the libel was limited to their positions as former office bearers. On these grounds, the court only took into account the plaintiffs’ standing and reputation in the club in assessing damages.

276 In contrast, the claimant did plead that his personal reputation, as well as his reputation as Chairman of the Council, have been seriously injured. ¹⁹² It is also trite that the law presumes that some damage would flow in the ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of a claimant’s absolute right to reputation, and a claimant therefore need not establish actual loss or that any person actually thought lower of him as a result: Foo Diana (2025) at [19].

277 That said, the defamatory statements were only directed at the claimant’s conduct as Chairman of the Council. There was also no evidence that the claimant’s personal reputation was affected. The claimant has kept his role as Asia Chief Information Officer of JCDecaux Asia since 2018. ¹⁹³

278 Mr Chua confirmed that the Emails did not affect his views of the claimant’s character. ¹⁹⁴ Mr Ng said he did not form a view on the claimant or the defendant. ¹⁹⁵ Both Mr Cripps and Ms Lim agreed that none of the Emails which they were copied on affected their view of the claimant’s competence or qualification to be on the Council, and they continued to support his nomination as Chairman of the Council in 2023, 2024 and 2025. ¹⁹⁶ In fact, the claimant continued to be re-elected as Chairman of the Council in 2024 and 2025. ¹⁹⁷

279 I am also express doubt as to the appropriateness of the claimant’s approach in seeking a separate award for each of the Emails and adding them up to arrive at a total claim of $250,000 in general and aggravated damages. The court in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576 cautioned that one must not lost sight of the pith and substance of the defamatory statements. Where the sting in each defamatory publication are similar, it would be wrong to consider each defamatory statement separately and determine an amount for each without reference to the other awards made in respect of the other defamatory statements (at [166] – 169]). While there were six publications, there was considerable overlap in the allegations and recipients.

280 Ultimately, the size of the award must be an amount that represents a fair and reasonable sum commensurate with or proportionate to the damage which the claimant suffered: Foo Diana (2025) at [137] – [139]. In Shanmugam Kasiviswanathan v Lee Hsien Yang and another matter [2024] 5 SLR 194 (“Shanmugam”), the then-Minister for Law and Home Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were each awarded general damages of $150,000 and aggravated damages of $50,000 for a substantial publication - the defamatory post had 2,765 “reactions”, 489 comments and 402 “shares”, the defendant’s Facebook page had 89,000 followers, and it was set to “public” ([100(c)], [138(c)] of Foo Diana (2025)).

281 The claimant’s submission of $250,000 in general and aggravated damages, if accepted, would result in an award exceeding that in Shanmugam even though he is not a public figure and the extent of publication was far lower.

282 In the circumstances, I dismiss the claim in full.

283 Unless parties can agree on costs, they are to file brief costs submissions, limited to 10 pages, within 2 weeks of the date of this judgment.