1 This is a defamation action in which the Claimant obtained an interlocutory judgment against the Defendants but was not awarded damages. The case citation for the decision on the merits is [2026] SGDC 230. This is the costs decision.

2 The Claimant’s counsel, Mr Leng, urged the Court to make no order as to costs. First, he argued that the Claimant made genuine and repeated efforts to resolve the matter amicably, but they did not bear fruit. He took me through the correspondence exchanged between his firm and the Defendants, including the letters of demand. As far as the correspondence was concerned, neither party had behaved unreasonably.

3 The sums sought by the Claimant in that correspondence caught my attention, though. A claim, if made seriously, should not have a half-life. Here, the amount of damages that was “recoverable by due process of law” (r 8(4) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015), as calculated by the Claimant, decayed from $70,000 in a solicitor’s letter dated 26 May 2025 to $50,000 in a solicitor’s letter dated 21 July 2025 and then to $35,000 in the Opening Statement filed on 10 June 2026. None of the three documents explained how the figures therein were derived. This may give a reader the impression that the demands were inflated.

4 Next, Mr Leng submitted that the 2nd Defendant’s conduct was relevant, in that she only took part in the proceedings at a late stage, right before the assessment of damages hearing. Her late participation was not relevant because it was the natural consequence of the interlocutory judgment entered against the Defendants. The Defendants did not cause any delay to the proceedings.

5 Having drawn my attention to the conduct of the parties, I was reminded of the Claimant’s treatment of the 2nd Defendant. At the assessment of damages hearing, Mr Leng relied on a copy of the Claimant’s filed Bundle of Documents. It turned out that the Claimant had sent a different, outdated version of that bundle to the 2nd Defendant and did not inform her of the filed version. I had to stand down the matter for the correct bundle to be provided to the 2nd Defendant. When it came to the costs hearing, the Claimant filed costs submissions for the Court’s advance reading. This time, those submissions were not sent to the 2nd Defendant at all. Mr Leng also did not prepare a copy for the 2nd Defendant’s use at the hearing. That was not even-handed conduct.

6 Lawyers should bear in mind that a self-represented person (“SRP”) would not have the same clerical resources as lawyers do. An SRP lacks access to the electronic filing system from which cause papers may be retrieved. He or she tends not to constantly check the post, email inboxes or social media inboxes for newly served court papers. Lawyers must therefore take particular care to give sufficient notice of all relevant matters to their SRP adversary.

7 There is no excuse when it comes to documents filed in Court. Rule 30(1) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 provides:

Likewise, para 21(1) of the State Courts Practice Directions 2021 provides:

8 Finally, Mr Leng submitted that the matter was not complex. I cannot agree with him. His client has retained three lawyers on record to conduct its case. In any event, the complexity of a matter may affect the quantum of costs, but not the allocation of costs.

9 Turning to the quantum of costs, I also considered the extent to which the Claimant’s submissions assisted me in reaching my decision, as that may have a bearing on the quantum. The threshold issue that I had to decide when assessing damages was whether the Claimant possessed a trading reputation in Singapore at the material time. On this issue, the Claimant’s written submissions consisted of six paragraphs of argument, namely paragraphs 24 to 29. I need not reproduce them here. I briefly explain why those arguments did not shape my decision in any way:

10 I therefore determined costs in accordance with the usual rule and O 21, r 7 of the ROC, which provides that an SRP may be awarded costs that “would compensate him or her reasonably for the time and work required for the proceedings and for all expenses incurred reasonably”. In doing so, the Court estimates the amount of time required on an objective basis: Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General [2024] 5 SLR 1206 at [13].

11 I estimated that the 2nd Defendant would have spent at least 25 hours reviewing the cause papers, performing research, preparing her cross-examination questions and drafting her Opening Statement. This matter consumed at least three hours of hearing time. The 2nd Defendant did not file any closing submissions. I therefore assessed the compensable time at 28 hours.

12 I applied an hourly rate of $50 to the 2nd Defendant’s work, having regard to the principle that a litigant is not to profit from costs of legal proceedings and the competent cross-examination conducted by the 2nd Defendant. Had the 2nd Defendant not informed me that her hourly rate at work as an eye-lash artist was $40 to $50, I would have fixed her hourly rate at $80.  

13 Based on that multiplier and multiplicand, the 2nd Defendant was entitled to $1,400 for work done. The 2nd Defendant stated that she had incurred disbursements for transport, which I fixed at $90. Therefore, I ordered the Claimant to pay the 2nd Defendant costs fixed at $1,490 (all-in). I made no order as to costs in respect of the 1st Defendant, which was absent and unrepresented throughout the proceedings.

14 As Mr Leng informed me that they intended to file an appeal against my decisions, I remind the Claimant’s solicitors to send the 2nd Defendant all relevant papers well in advance of the appellate hearing.