1 This is an application to the district court for an order that relates to the renewal and reinstatement of a dependant’s pass issued by the Immigration and Checkpoint Authority (“ICA”). For the reasons below, I am dismissing the application.

2 The applicant and the respondent are both holders of Canadian passports, and United States Permanent Resident Cards (the “Green-Card”). ¹ The applicant applies in this application for the following orders:

(a) the respondent to take all necessary steps to reinstate or renew the applicant's dependant's pass and the respondent to bear any costs of the reinstatement or the renewal;

(b) the respondent not to take any steps to cancel the applicant's dependant's pass until the conclusion of the divorce and maintenance proceedings commenced between the parties; and 

(c) the respondent not to take any steps to cancel the parties' children's dependant's passes until the conclusion of the divorce and maintenance proceedings.

(a) Whether the district court has the jurisdiction to order a freestanding injunction to prevent injustice independent of substantive rights or causes of action.

(b) Whether the district court has the jurisdiction to order a renewal or reinstatement of a dependant’s pass issued by ICA.

4 The application is made by the applicant against the backdrop of divorce proceedings between the parties. The parties had entered into a Muslim marriage solemnised in Mississauga, Canada on 2 July 2005. ² As alluded to above, the parties are holders of Canadian Passports and the Green Card. The respondent has been in Singapore on an employment pass since 2014. The applicant has been in Singapore at the same time as a trailing spouse. ³ The applicant became a homemaker since the birth of the parties’ two children. ⁴ The children are 12 and 15 years old respectively (the "Children"). The Children are holders of United States of America passports. ⁵ They are currently studying in an international school in Singapore.

5 On 8 May 2026, the applicant commenced maintenance proceedings against the respondent at the Family Justice Courts (“FJC”) under the Women's Charter 1961. With a view to a divorce, the parties completed the marriage counselling programme with the Syariah Court of Singapore (“Syariah Court”) on 26 May 2026 ⁶ ; and on 9 June 2026 divorce proceedings were commenced at the Syariah Court. ⁷

6 The applicant filed the present application in the State Courts on 23 June 2026. Whilst the applicant has framed her application in the form of actions that the respondent should take in respect the dependant’s passes in question, the application is in substance an application for a mandatory and prohibitory injunction against the respondent for the reinstatement of the dependant’s passes, and the prevention of the cancellation of the passes until the conclusion of the divorce and maintenance proceedings commenced against the respondent.

7 Therein lies the first hurdle that confronts the applicant. As acknowledged by the applicant, the general principle is that injunctions are granted when they are incidental to the enforcement of a substantive legal right. ⁸ Injunctions in which the only relief sought is the injunction itself are not allowed. In Gazelle Ventures Pte Ltd v Lim Yong Sim and others [2024] 4 SLR 1066 (“Gazelle Ventures”), the Honourable Justice Jeyaretnam held at [2]-[3], [66]-[69] as follows:

8  As seen, Jeyaretnam J declined to follow Sulzer Pumps Spain, SA v Hyflux Membrane Manufacturing (S) Pte Ltd and another [2020] 5 SLR 634 which held that the court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction had the power to grant a freestanding injunction to prevent injustice even where there is no underlying cause of action. Instead, His Honour held that the equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions is exercised by the court to grant them incidental to and dependent on the enforcement of a substantive legal right. This substantive legal right may relate to an accrued cause of action or to a cause of action that would arise if the act in question were not enjoined.

9  In other words, freestanding injunctions, in which the only relief sought is the injunction itself, are not allowed. An injunction can be granted only if it is to enforce a substantive legal right, whether in relation to an underlying cause of action, or to a separate suit, or in relation to a cause of action that might arise if the injunction is not granted. There is therefore no such thing as a freestanding injunction to prevent injustice independent of substantive rights.

10 In the present application, by the applicant’s own case, she seeks the injunction in the district court pending the conclusion of the divorce and maintenance proceedings commenced between the parties in the Syariah Court, and the injunction is the only remedy sought. ⁹ To recap, her application is for a mandatory injunction to compel the respondent to reinstate or renew her dependant pass, and once reinstated or renewed, for a prohibitory injunction prohibiting the respondent from cancelling her the dependant pass, and that of the Children, until the conclusion of the divorce and maintenance proceedings. The applicant characterises her application to be an interlocutory application in the district court “ancillary to the main Syariah Court Proceedings in the Syariah Court”, and that “the injunction rests on the underlying matrimonial proceedings in the Syariah Court”. ¹⁰

11 Therefore, by her own case, her application is for an injunction without any cause of action to enforce. There is no subsisting cause of action in the district courts. Neither does the applicant assert that there is an inchoate cause of action that might arise if the application is not granted. Her reference to the application being one ancillary to “the main Syariah Court Proceedings in the Syariah Court” does not assist her in this regard. Whilst there are ongoing proceedings in the Syariah Court and maintenance proceedings in FJC, the applicant does not articulate what are the causes of action in those proceedings, and the substantive legal rights arising from those causes of action, that the injunction applied for seeks to enforce. The application is plainly one for a freestanding injunction.

12 The applicant contends that the cancellation of her dependant’s pass prevents her from being able to adequately represent herself in the Syariah Court and maintenance proceedings. ¹¹ In this regard, she makes much of the question of justice and fairness as the juridical basis for granting the injunction she seeks. ¹² But the question of justice and fairness is the very question dealt with in Gazelle Ventures. The law is clear that there is no such thing as a freestanding injunction to prevent injustice independent of substantive rights, and where there is an absence of a cause of action present or future, that gives rise to those substantive rights.

13 For completeness, I refer to the applicant’s allusion to ss 31(1) & 32 of the State Courts Act 1970 (“SCA”), which states that the district court, as regards any action within its jurisdiction, in any proceedings before it, is to grant such relief, redress or remedy as ought to be granted in the like action by the General Division of the High Court. The applicant also alluded to s 19(1) SCA which states that a district court has all the jurisdiction of the General Division of the High Court to hear and try any action in personam where the defendant is served with the originating process in Singapore in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. But these provisions of the SCA do not assist the applicant. These provisions concern the powers of the district court; they do not confer jurisdiction on the district court to grant freestanding injunctions. They do not detract from the position as laid down in Gazelle Ventures discussed above.

14 I therefore hold that I do not have the jurisdiction to grant the injunction sought and the application cannot be allowed.

15 For completeness only, I turn to the second hurdle that applicant faces in this application. I note that whilst crafted as an application against the respondent, the applicant is effectively seeking court orders relating to matters that are within the purview of ICA. In this regard, I agree with the respondent that the prayers sought by the applicant are in substance and effect matters within the discretion of the ICA or the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”). In VLI v VLJ [2021] SGHCF 27 (“VLI”) the General Division of the High Court (Family Division) dealt with an application similar in nature to the one before me. In VLI, the applicant wife who was a foreign national, applied to the Family Justice Courts for orders requiring the respondent husband to reinstate her long-term visit pass issued by the ICA, and to do all that is necessary to enable her to obtain the pass. The General Division of the High Court (Family Division) held at [15] as follows:

16 Likewise in the present case, in my view, the proper authority to which the applicant should apply in order to obtain the necessary permission to stay in Singapore may be the ICA or the MOM. I do not think that the district court is the proper forum.

17 As well for completeness only, I note that the applicant’s contention is that the respondent’s cancellation of her dependant’s pass was intended to prevent her from having the care and control of the children; and she seeks the reinstatement of the dependant’s pass until the conclusion of the divorce and maintenance proceedings. ¹³ But it appears that the respondent has made it clear that he does not seek care and control of the children. I note the children are presently living with the applicant. ¹⁴

18 Freestanding injunctions, in which the only relief sought is the injunction itself, are not allowed. There is no such thing as a freestanding injunction to prevent injustice independent of substantive rights. The applicant has not shown that the injunction sought is to enforce a substantive legal right, whether in relation to an underlying cause of action, or to a separate suit, or in relation to a cause of action that might arise if the injunction sought is not granted. In the premises, the application is dismissed.

19 I come to the question of costs. Costs are at the discretion of the court. It is trite that costs follow the event, and I see no reason to depart from that basic principle in this case. In regard to quantum, the costs guidelines for party-and-party costs awards in district court cases found in Appendix H provide a useful reference. In respect of the application for interlocutory injunction, Appendix H, at table A2 provides a costs range of $3,000 to $10,000 for a hearing fixed on a special date (as opposed to a hearing fixed on a list together with other cases). Taking into account the issues involved, and the work done relating to the various affidavits and written submissions, I find the respondent’s submission of the quantum of $5,000 reasonable. I fix costs of $5,000 (inclusive of disbursements) plus GST to be paid by the applicant to the respondent.