1 The 1st claimant was the managing agent of the condominium known as Bellewoods (“Bellewoods”). The 2nd claimant is the executive director and shareholder of the 1st claimant. He was also the managing agent of Bellewoods. The claimants were appointed as managing agents on 1 May 2020, and ended their roles on 16 January 2024. The defendant is the chairperson of the 5th management council (“5th MC”) of Bellewoods.

2 The claimants’ claim is for defamation and malicious falsehoods published and republished by the defendant on a Facebook page entitled Home @ Bellewoods (“Facebook Page”). The Facebook Page consisted solely of subsidiary proprietors (“SPs”) of Bellewoods. The claimants are not members of the Facebook Page. There were almost 600 members in the Facebook Page as of October 2023. ¹

3 The claim is that between September 2023 and October 2023, in the lead up to the 6th annual general meeting (“AGM”) of Bellewoods, the defendant had published four Facebook posts on the Facebook Page as well as sent an email dated 27 October 2023 (“27 Oct 23 Email”) to a number of different recipients while copying the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”) which contained statements which were defamatory and maliciously false of the claimants. The defendant also republished the 27 Oct 2023 Email on the Facebook Page. ²

4 The defendant resists the claim and relies on the defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege. ³ At various points of the trial and in his closing written submissions, ⁴ his counsel also appears to challenge meanings and whether the Facebook Posts were published and whether they referred to the claimants.

5 For the reasons as follows, I am allowing the claim.

6 The issues to be determined by me are as follows:

7 I turn first to the elements of the tort of defamation. They are trite. To establish a tort of defamation, there must be:

(a) a statement bearing a defamatory meaning;

(b) reference made to the claimant; and

(c) publication to a third party.

8 Once the above is established, defamation is made out and the question of the applicability of defences such as justification, qualified privilege and fair comment arises. See: Golden Season Pte Ltd v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 751 (“Golden Season”) at [35] & [39].

9 As for the question of publication, the leading case dealing with the element of publication in the context of Internet defamation is the High Court decision of Qingdao Bohai Construction Group Co, Ltd v Goh Teck Beng [2016] 4 SLR 979 (“Qingdao Bohai”). ⁵ I begin by first referring to the key passages in Qingdao Bohai that are relevant to the present case. The High Court stated as follows at [35]-[36]:

10 It is seen that in order to prove that the defendant published the offending material, the claimant must establish that the defendant has, by any act, conveyed or communicated the material to at least one other person who has received it. It is also necessary for the publication to have occurred within Singapore. Publication comprises the following two components referred to by the High Court:

11 In respect of the first component of publication, to satisfy its requirements in the context of Internet defamation, the claimant must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant as the Internet user had uploaded or posted the material on the Internet. By so uploading or posting the material on the Internet, the defendant would have made the offending material available to a third party under the first component.

12 As seen, the High Court however made it clear that this does not mean that electronic evidence is the only means by which the responsibility of a defendant for material appearing on the Internet can be established. The High Court makes the point explicitly at [74] as follows:

13 It is seen that whilst the use of electronic evidence to link a defendant to any particular material appearing on the Internet would be the most obvious way, the High Court held that the use of electronic evidence is not the only means by which the responsibility of a defendant for material appearing on the Internet can be established. Cogent evidence which is not electronic in nature can be adduced to meet the requisite standard of proof. What is important is the cogency of the evidence, and not the nature of the evidence.

14 As regards the second component of publication, the High Court held that there is no presumption of law that material appearing on the Internet has been published. The High Court stated at [41] as follows:

15 It is therefore insufficient for a claimant to simply allege that the defamatory material was posted on the Internet and was accessible in Singapore. It should be noted however that the High Court goes further to hold that publication on the Internet can be proved either directly or indirectly. The High Court reiterated the avenue of indirect proof of publication at [136]:

16 As seen, the proof of publication on the Internet can be inferred. What is required would be some facts in evidence to support an inference of publication in Singapore to a substantial number of third-party readers.

17 With the above legal principles in mind, I return to present case. As alluded to above, the statements in question are found in the Facebook Posts. The Facebook Posts in turn comprises four Facebook posts and the 27 Oct 2023 Email, which was republished in another Facebook Post (collectively, “FB Posts”).

18 The first Facebook Post was published by the defendant on 13 September 2023 on the Facebook Page containing the following words (“First FB Post”): ⁶

19 The second Facebook Post was published by the defendant on 14 September 2023 on the Facebook Page containing the following words (“Second FB Post”): ⁷

20 The third Facebook Post was published by the defendant in September 2023 on the Facebook Page containing the following words (“Third FB Post”): ⁸

21 The fourth Facebook Post was published by the defendant on 10 October 2023 on the Facebook Page containing the following words (“Fourth FB Post”): ⁹

22 The 27 Oct 2023 Email which was sent to a number of different recipients while copying the BCA, was published on 27 October 2023 by the defendant containing the following words: ¹⁰

23 On 27 October 2023 the defendant republished the 27 Oct 23 Email on the Facebook Page repeating the statements contained in the 27 Oct 23 Email (“Fifth FB Post”). ¹¹ It should be noted that the Facebook Page consisted solely of SPs from Bellewoods. ¹²

24 The claimants say that the meanings attributable to these statements are as follows: ¹³  

(a) they mean that the claimants were dishonest, fraudulent or deceptive, or were otherwise carrying on a business that was dishonest, fraudulent or deceptive;

(b) they mean that the claimants were unprofessional, or were otherwise carrying on a business that was unprofessional; and

(c) they mean that the claimants were engaged, or otherwise engage in illegal conduct or acts.

25 In determining the meaning of words in a defamation claim, the test is the natural and ordinary meaning attributable to the offending words. The legal principle in this regard in trite. The natural and ordinary meaning of the offending words could include inferences and implications that the ordinary reasonable reader might draw in the light of his general knowledge, common sense and experience, but would not include those based on extrinsic evidence: Ng Koo Kay Benedict and another v Zim Integrated Shipping Service Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 860 (“Ng Koo Kay”) at [12] – [13].

26 In other words, context is relevant. In deciding meaning, the court will determine what the offending words in context and in their natural and ordinary meaning, meant and were understood to mean. In the present case, I note at the outset that the SPs comprise the members of the Facebook Page and they are therefore the readers of the FB Posts. The readers of the Facebook Page would thus have likely attended the general meetings of Bellewoods and would have been aware of the issues to be determined at those meetings. They would also have been aware what had transpired at the 5th AGM. The readers would be acquainted with the roles of the claimants as managing agents and the work they have done; and with what has transpired on the Facebook Page.

27 It is apposite to refer to the events surrounding the FB Posts to see the context in which the SPs would have read the offending words. It started on 15 October 2022 when Bellewoods conducted the 5th AGM. At the 5th AGM, the defendant was elected the chairperson of the 5th MC. At the same time, the SPs voted (under resolution 14.0) not to empower the incoming 5th MC to appoint a managing agent for Bellewoods. Further, an SP, Mr Muneer Mohd Haneefa (“Mr Muneer”), proposed that resolution 14.0 be amended or modified to appoint the first claimant to continue as a managing agent of Bellewoods until the next AGM. Mr Muneer’s proposal was seconded by two other SPs. It was put to a vote and the SPs duly voted by ordinary resolution to re-appoint the 1st claimant as the managing agent until the next AGM. For completeness, I note that the defendant has asserted in his defence that it was the claimants who proposed the amendment to resolution 14.0. However, he admitted at trial that it was not so. ¹⁴ In fact, it appears to be the central plank of the pleaded defence that it was the claimants who had put forward the amended resolution under which the claimants themselves appointed the 1st claimant as MA for another term, till the conclusion of the 6th AGM. ¹⁵ But at trial, the defendant conceded that this was untrue. He agreed that contrary to his pleaded case, it was an SP and not the claimants who put forward the amendment resolution. Indeed, it is recorded in the minutes of the 5th AGM that it was Mr Muneer who had raised the resolution. The defendant’s witness, Mr Lim, also conceded likewise under cross-examination. ¹⁶

28 After the 5th AGM, on 10 September 2023, the defendant requested that a “private motion” be included for voting at the 6th AGM of Bellewoods. The “private motion” contained the following resolutions: ¹⁷

29 I will return to the fate of the defendant’s “private motion” at the 6th AGM below. Suffice it to say for now that as alluded to above, the members of the Facebook Page consisted of SPs, who would be voting at the 6th AGM.

30 In my view, in the context of the above events surrounding the FB Posts, it is clear that the offending words are capable of the meanings attributed by the claimants. The offending words in context and in their natural and ordinary meaning, are capable of been understood by the SPs to mean that the claimants were dishonest, fraudulent or deceptive, that the claimants were unprofessional, and that the claimants were engaged in illegal conduct or acts. I therefore find that the offending words are defamatory of the claimants. In this regard, for completeness, I would add that it is undisputable that the 1st claimant has a trading and business reputation in Singapore as per Qingdao Bohai at [51].

31 As regards the question of publication and reference, it cannot be seriously disputed that the FB Posts are published of the claimants. As discussed above, publication comprises two aspects (Qingdao Bohai at [35]-[36]): a) an act that makes the defamatory material available to a third party in a comprehensible form; and b) the receipt of the information by a third party in such a way that it is understood. In the present case, it is not disputed that it was the defendant who had uploaded or posted the defamatory words on the Facebook Page. By so uploading or posting the material on the Internet, the defendant would have made the offending material available to the members of the Facebook Page. The first component of publication is clearly satisfied.

32 In regard to the second component, as noted above, there were almost 600 members in the Facebook Page as of the material time. These constituted a large number of third-party readers of the defamatory words. As discussed above, the proof of publication on the Internet can be inferred: Qingdao Bohai at [136]. What is required would be some facts in evidence to support an inference of publication. It can plainly be inferred that the members of the Facebook Page would have read and understood the defamatory words. For completeness, I also note that there are a number of “likes” and comments registered in regard to the FB Posts. I therefore find that the element of publication is made out.

33 Strictly for the sake of completeness only, I turn now to the question of whether the FB Posts referred to the claimants. The approach to identifying the person defamed was laid down by the House of Lords in Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 (“Knupffer”). ¹⁸ Although Knupffer is the case authority recognised in the textbooks as the locus classicus for class or group defamation, the approach to identifying the person defamed as laid down by the House of Lords is of general application. The approach has been endorsed by our High Court in Golden Season at [46].

34 In Knupffer, the Lord Chancellor Viscount Simon held that the issue of identifying the appellant in that case as the person defamed is one of mixed law and fact; and posed the following two questions (at 121):

35 In other words, the first question to be answered is whether the alleged defamatory words, having regard to its language, can be regarded as capable of referring to the claimant. This is a question of law. The second question, which is one of fact, is whether reasonable people who know the claimant would arrive at the conclusion that the words refer to him. The second question does not arise unless the first question is answered in favour of the claimant. ¹⁹

36 Turning to the present case, I have noted above that the SPs made up the membership of the Facebook Page and they are therefore the readers of the FB Posts. They would also have likely attended the general meetings of Bellewoods and would have been aware of the issues to be determined at those meetings. Moreover, they would also have been aware of what had transpired at the 5th AGM. The readers would be acquainted with the role of the claimants and the work they have done; and with what has transpired on the Facebook Page. As the matter of the claimants and their terms of service was at the centre of the discussion at the 5th AGM, it is plain that the readers of the FB Posts would have understood that the defamatory words referred to the claimants. Further, I note that the Second FB Post referred to the 2nd claimant by name. As the FB Posts were posted by the defendant in quick succession in the same month, the readers will further infer that the FB Posts referred to the 2nd claimant as well. I therefore find that the element of reference to the claimants is satisfied in the present case.

37 It follows from all of the foregoing that the claimants have made out their case in defamation against the defendant. I turn next to the defences.

38 The defendant has raised the gamut of defences to a claim of defamation. None of them are made out. In regard to the defence of justification, the defendant has not shown that the FB Posts consisted of statement of facts which are true in substance and in fact. As pointed out by the claimant, O 43 r 3(2)(a) of Rules of Court 2021 mandates that where a defendant alleges that the words complained of consist of statements of fact which are true in substance and in fact, he must give particulars stating which of the words complained of are statements of facts. Further, the defendant must state the facts and matters the defendant relies on in support of the allegation that the words are true. A perusal of the defence shows that the defendant failed to do so. He did not specifically and sufficiently plead which of the words in question were statements of fact which are true in substance and in fact. Without doing so, his defence of justification is a non-starter. Further, the particulars of the facts and matters the defendant says he is relying on in support of his allegation that the FB Posts were true are not corelated to the substance of the FB Posts. He has not shown how they relate to his contention that the FB Posts were true in substance and in fact.

39 In this regard, for completeness, I turn to the matter of the statements made by the 2nd claimant at the 5th AGM to the effect that the 1st claimant will have to step down as managing agent if resolution 14.0 were defeated. These statements became the subject matter of cross-examination of the 2nd claimant at trial. For context, the managing agent agreement dated 1 May 2022 (“2nd MA Agreement”) contained the words “whichever is later” at clause 2. ²⁰ When shown clause 2 at the trial, the 2nd claimant conceded that he was mistaken in stating that the 1st claimant would have to step down as managing agent if resolution 14.0 were defeated at the 5th AGM. ²¹ Instead, the 1st claimant would step down only at the end of the 2nd MA Agreement. The 2nd claimant explained that all the MA agreements signed by the 1st claimant to be appointed as managing agent did not contain the words “whichever is later” in clause 2. ²² It was a later inclusion, and he did not know the reason for its inclusion. I note that the 2nd claimant’s explanation comports with the wording of clause 2 of the managing agent agreement dated 1 May 2020 (“1st MA Agreement”) which did not include the words “whichever is later”. ²³ In this regard, I agree that the 2nd claimant was a forthright witness who openly and willing conceded that he was mistaken. I accept that he proceeded under a mistaken belief at the 5th AGM.

40 In this respect, the defendant’s reliance on these statements made by the 2nd claimant to advance his defence of justification is misguided. As noted by the claimants, the defendant did not plead that the 2nd claimant had deliberately misled the SPs at the 5th AGM. The statements made by the 2nd claimant were not pleaded as corelating to the substance of the FB Posts, to support the defendant’s plead of justification. The defendant’s pleaded case does not go beyond that the claimants put forward the amendment to resolution 14.0, which as discussed, is in any event factually incorrect. More pertinently, the defendant did not plead any particular meaning that he is attributing to the FB Posts which he is justifying in reference to these statements made by the 2nd claimant. It is also not the defendant’s pleaded case that the 2nd claimant had a dishonest intention in making these statements.

41 It follows from the foregoing that the defence of justification is not made out by the defendant. I turn next to the defence of fair comment. The four elements of a defence of fair comment are as follows:

(See: Gary Chan Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2016) at para 13.013)

42 In this regard, a perusal of the FB Posts shows that they are clearly not expressions of opinions or comments by the defendant. On plain reading, they contain assertions of fact, not comments. In pleading the defence of fair comment, it is for the defendant to ensure that the reader of the defamatory words would not be confused as to whether the defendant was expressing an opinion or stating a fact. The defendant does not make clear in the FB Posts that they are his opinion and that he is not making statements of fact. I agree with the claimant that the context, tone and language employed in the FB Posts show that they are statements of facts. Further, the statements are not statements which a fair-minded person could honestly make on the facts. In particular, there is no basis for the defendant’s statements implying that the claimants were unprofessional or were otherwise carrying on a business that was unprofessional. I also agree with the claimant that there was no legitimate public interest at stake. What goes on at Bellewoods would not be of any public interest. The defendant has not pleaded any wider public interest at stake. The defence of fair comment is plainly not made out.

43 I consider next the defence of qualified privilege. The defence of qualified privilege may arise in one or more of the following circumstances:

(a) the defendant has an interest or duty to communicate information, and the recipient has the corresponding interest or duty to receive the information;

(b) the defendant makes a statement with a view to protecting his self-interests; or

(c) the statement constitutes fair and accurate reports of parliamentary and judicial proceedings.

(See: Gary Chan Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2016) at para 13.064)

44 In this regard, a defendant has to plead and prove all facts necessary to show that the publication was made on an occasion of qualified privilege. Further it should be noted that the privilege is qualified because even if the occasion of privileged is proved, the defence can still be defeated if the claimant shows that the defendant was actuated by malice when the publication was made. The Court of Appeal stated in Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2014] 1 SLR 639 at [52] as follows:

45 As seen, the defence of qualified privilege can thus be defeated by the claimant showing that the defamatory statements were made with express malice.

46 The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the facts and circumstances showing that the occasion was privileged. In the present case, except for the defendant’s defence in respect of the Fourth FB Post, the defendant has not pleaded any facts or particulars to support his defence of qualified privilege. It is nothing more than a bare assertion. The defendant did not plead and prove the facts to show that the FB Posts were was made on an occasion of qualified privilege. The defendant’s defence of qualified privilege therefore fails at the threshold in respect of the First, Second, Third and Fifth FB Posts, and the 27 Oct 23 Email.

47 I turn to the question of express malice. A defendant will be guilty of malice if he knew that his statement was untrue or he was reckless as to its truth, or even if he had an honest belief in the truth of his statement, he was actuated by some dominant improper motive: WBG Network (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Meridian Life International Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 72719 (“WBG Network”) at [72]. In the present case, it is plain that the defendant was desirous to get rid the claimants as the managing agent of Bellewoods. This was clear in the FB Posts. For example, the defendant stated in the Third FB Post that the SPs should not “waste time on this type of MA just vote them out” and that the SPs should “get a more professional one which are more interested in serving our estate”. In the Fourth FB Post, the defendant stated, “how can we let a MA run Bellewoods … that cannot write to BCA” and that the SPs “are wasting our money and paying for nothing”.

48 In this regard and for completeness, I would return to the saga of the defendant’s “private motion” at the 6th AGM and the events thereafter. On 28 October 2023 Bellewoods conducted its 6th AGM whereby: a) the minutes of the 5th AGM were received and adopted by the SPs without amendments; b) the defendant was re-elected the chairperson of the 6th Management Council of Bellewoods (“6th MC”); c) the 6th MC was empowered to appoint a managing agent; and d) the defendant’s private motion was defeated by an ordinary resolution with the SPs voting 62% against the defendant’s private motion. ²⁴ After the 6th AGM, in the period from 14 November 2023 to 21 November 2023, the 6th MC, via the defendant, purported to terminate the 1st claimant as managing agent of Bellewoods with a months’ notice. The claimants rejected the purported termination with a months’ notice on the basis that it did not comply with clause 10(a) of the 2nd MA Agreement. The 6th MC eventually relented and issued a further notice of termination dated 16 November 2023 with two months’ notice given to the 1st claimant as per the 2nd MA Agreement. ²⁵

49 The claimant contends that the foregoing shows that the defendant’s publication of the FB Posts was therefore actuated and motivated by an improper ulterior motive of the termination and removal of the claimants as the managing agent. I agree. The defence of qualified privilege is thus in any event defeated by the defendant’s express malice in posting the FB Posts.

50 As I have found that defamation is made out, and the defendant cannot succeed on any of his pleaded defences, I do not propose to consider the claimants’ alternative claim in malicious falsehoods.

51 I turn now to the question of damages to be awarded to the claimants. It is trite that the purposes of general damages in defamation are as follows:

52 It is also trite that the relevant factors in assessing the quantum of general damages for defamation include the following:

(See Gary Chan Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2016) at para 13.134)

53 The claimants contend that there is substantial publication of the defamation in the present case. ²⁶ They pointed out that the FB Posts were published on the FB Page which contained almost 600 members. Further, the claimants noted that the defendant’s witness Mr Lim gave evidence that after he had read the FB Posts, he discussed their contents with around 50 residents, and thereby increased its readership. ²⁷ Another witness, Mr Kng testified that his neighbours were discussing the contents of the FB Posts and he heard about it from them. ²⁸ The FB Posts were published between September and October 2023, and remain online on the FB Page, and have therefore been accessible for almost three years. The claimants therefore submit the quantum of general damages to be in the sum of $40,000 for each of them. In view of the nature and gravity of the defamatory statement; the mode and extent of publication of the FB Posts; and the failure of the defendant to apologise and retract the FB Posts, I agree that the appropriate general damages would be as proposed by the claimants.

54 Next, I consider the question of aggravated damages. The claimant has submitted that aggravated damages should be awarded. I turn first to the approach in awarding aggravated damages in defamation suits. In Goh Chok Tong v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1998] 2 SLR(R) 971 (“Goh Chok Tong”) at [51], the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge’s approach of awarding separate awards for general damages and for aggravated damages. The Court of Appeal held that “The courts should award one single lump sum as damages.” However, I note subsequently in Peter Lim, the Court of Appeal after making reference to Goh Chok Tong, elaborated on the approach as follows at [40]:

55 Therefore, whilst a single award can be made for damages in a defamation action, the court is to provide a breakdown of the sums awarded as general damages and as aggravated damages.

56 I turn next to the main factors of aggravation, which are well established. They generally include the following:

(a) express malice;

(b) defendant’s conduct after the publication;

(c) refusal or failure of the defendant to apologise; and

(d) a reckless unsuccessful plea of justification.

(See Peter Lim at [7].)

57 In regard to express malice, the Court of Appeal explained in Golden Season the meaning of malice in the law of defamation. The Court of Appeal held as follows at [92]:

58 Therefore, there are two ways to establish malicious intent on the part of the defendant in a defamation action:

(a) where it can be shown that the defendant had knowledge of falsity or where there was recklessness or lack of belief in the defamatory statement; or

(b) where although the defendant may have a genuine or honest belief in the truth of the defamatory statement, his dominant intention is to injure the claimant, or he has some other improper motive.

59 As seen, where the defendant has an improper motive in making the defamatory statement, it can be tantamount to express malice. In the present case, I have made the finding above that the defendant in publishing the FB Posts was actuated and motivated by an improper ulterior motive of the termination and removal of the claimants as the managing agent. I therefore find that there is the aggravating factor of express malice in the present case. I have also noted that the defendant has not apologised for the FB Posts, nor has he retracted them. In my view, an award of aggravated damages of $10,000 to each of the claimants is appropriate.

60 As for the 1st claimant’s contention that special damages should be awarded, I do not agree that it has been shown that as a direct and natural result of the defendant’s publication and republication of the FB Posts, the 1st claimant was terminated as the managing agent of Bellewoods. Whilst it cannot be disputed that the 1st claimant was terminated as the managing agent on 16 November 2023, he has not proved on a balance of probabilities that the termination was as direct consequence of the publication of the FB Posts.

61 In summary, I find that the FB Posts are defamatory and they are published of the claimants. I also find that the defendant cannot succeed on any of his pleaded defences. I award general damages in the sum of $40,000, and aggravated damages in the sum of $10,000 for each of the claimants.

62 I would add that the approach of defending a defamation claim by perfunctorily running through the gamut of all the elements of the tort of defamation and its defences is prolix, inefficient and indolent. Such a blunderbuss approach in litigation does not serve the interests of the parties. It only results in time and costs wasting.

63 Parties are to file written submissions on the question of costs, to be limited to three pages, within 10 days hereof.