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supreme
In the STATE COURTS of the republic of singapore
[2026] SGDC 323
District Arrest Case No. 908652 of 2026 & Ors
Between
Public Prosecutor
And
Teoh Kar Chiew
grounds of decision
[Criminal Law] — [Statutory Offences] — [s 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act]
[Criminal Law] — [Driving Without a Licence] — [Qualified Driver]
[Criminal Law] — [Driving Without a Licence] — [Accident with Hurt]
[Criminal Law] — [Driving Without a Licence] — [Stern Warning]
This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.
Public Prosecutor v Teoh Kar Chiew
[2026] SGDC 323
District Arrest Case No. 908652 of 2026 & Ors
District Judge Shawn Ho 6 November 2026
20 November 2026
District Judge Shawn Ho
Introduction
1 The Accused, Mr Teoh Kar Chiew, drove without a valid licence.
2 This case is novel. It is the first case under s 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 involving a Qualified Driver who did not convert his driving licence. None of the offenders in the Prosecution’s survey of 500 cases were drivers who failed to renew or validate their driving licence prior to the offence.
Foot Note 1
These 500 cases were for the period between 2019 and 2020: Public Prosecutor v Rizuwan bin Rohmat [2024] 3 SLR 694 at [39]. See Seah Ming Yang Daryle v Public Prosecutor [2024] 4 SLR 1561 at [36] and [42].
3 Was the custodial threshold crossed for the offence under s 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1961?
4 In my judgement, “Yes”.
5 Given that the Accused was a Qualified Driver, Daryle Seah’s benchmark sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment and two years’ disqualification
Foot Note 2
Seah Ming Yang Daryle v Public Prosecutor [2024] 4 SLR 1561 at [78].
did not apply.
6 The Accused caused hurt to a victim in a traffic accident.
7 Two months before the accident, the Accused had already been made aware by the authorities that it is an offence to drive in Singapore without a valid driving license and valid insurance. Despite this clear warning, the Accused chose to drive without a valid licence, demonstrating a deliberate willingness to flout the law.
8 I was mindful that the true gravamen of the s 35(1) offence is the driver’s disregard for the safety of other road users: Public Prosecutor v Eng Kwan Meng Garrick [2026] SGHC 116 at [40].
9 The linchpin of the offence lies in the degree to which the offender’s conduct discloses a disregard for the safety of others. It is this — the offender’s willingness to flout the rules of the road and the legal constraints on his right to drive — that must be the sentencing court’s central concern: Garrick Eng at [42].
10 On a holistic assessment of the facts, with fidelity to the gravamen of the offence, the custodial threshold was crossed for the s 35 offence.
11 This judgement:
(a) Traced the arc of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for s 35(1):
(i) PP v Rizuwan bin Rohmat [2023] 3 SLR 694,
(ii) Seah Ming Yang Daryle v PP [2024] 4 SLR 1561,
(iii) PP v Eng Kwan Meng Garrick [2026] SGHC 116, and
(b) Applied the Supreme Court cases to the facts.
12 The Accused pleaded guilty to three charges:
(a) One charge under s 65(1)(b) punishable under s 65(4)(a) read with s 42(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (“the Act”).
(b) One charge under s 35(1) punishable under s 35(3)(a) of the Act.
(c) One charge under s 3(1)(a) punishable under ss 3(2) and 3(3) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks & Compensation) Act 1960.
13 For the s 65 offence, applying Chen Song v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 SLR 509, the custodial threshold was not crossed.
14 All things considered, the Accused was sentenced to one week’s imprisonment, a fine of $2,600 in default 5 days, and disqualified from driving all classes of driving licences for 36 months.
15 There was no appeal.
16 I set out my reasons.
Charges
17 The Accused pleaded guilty to the following charges:
are charged that you on 22 May 2024, at about 9.30 am, along Joo Chiat Place towards the direction of Joo Chiat Avenue, near the junction of Chiku Road, Singapore, did drive a motor van bearing registration number GBG4916Xon a road without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road, to wit, by failing to keep a proper lookout while overtaking a stationary bus, thereby colliding into a motorcycle bearing registration number FBN1042A which was travelling on your right side, and by such driving you caused hurt to Lai Seow Hiang, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 65(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (“the RTA”) which is punishable under Section 65(4)(a) read with section 42(1)(a) of the RTA.
are charged that you, on 22 May 2024, at about 9.30 am, along Joo Chiat Place towards the direction of Joo Chiat Avenue, near the junction of Chiku Road, Singapore, did drive a motor van bearing registration number GBG4916Xon a road when you were not the holder of a valid driving licence authorising you to drive a motor vehicle of that class, and you have thereby committed an offence under section 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 ("the RTA") which is punishable under section 35(3)(a) of the RTA read with section 42(1)(a) of the RTA.
are charged that you, on 22 May 2024, at about 9.30 am, along Joo Chiat Place towards the direction of Joo Chiat Avenue, near the junction of Chiku Road, Singapore, did drive a motor van bearing registration number GBG4916Xwhilst there was not in force in relation to the use of the said vehicle a policy of insurance or a security in respect of third-party risks that complies with the requirements of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act 1960 ("the Act"), and you have thereby contravened section 3(1)(a) of the Act, which contravention is an offence punishable under section 3(2) read with section 3(3) of the Act.
18 A charge under s 96(1) read with s 42(1) of the Act was taken into consideration for sentencing.
Statement of facts
19 The accused person is Teoh Kar Chiew, a 51-year-old male Malaysian holding Singapore permanent residency. He was the driver of a motor van with licence plate number GBG4916X at the material time.
Foot Note 3
SOF at [1].
20 The victim is Lai Seow Hiang, a 62-year-old male. He was the rider of a motorcycle with licence plate number FBN1042A at the material time.
Foot Note 4
SOF at [2].
Facts relating to DAC 908652 of 2026
21 On 22 May 2024, at about 9.30 am, the Accused was driving the motor van GBG4916X along Joo Chiat Place towards the direction of Joo Chiat Avenue, near the junction of Chiku Road. Without keeping a proper lookout, he overtook a stationary bus by making a slight right turn, which resulted in a collision with the victim’s motorcycle, FBN1042, travelling on the right side of the Accused.
Foot Note 5
SOF at [3].
22 The right door of the Accused’s motor van sustained scratches as a result of the accident. On the same day, the victim sought medical treatment at Tan Tock Seng Hospital, where he was given outpatient sick leave for three days from 22 May 2024 to 24 May 2024. The victim reported to have sustained pain in his left body as a result of the accident.
Foot Note 6
SOF at [4].
23 The Accused has therefore committed an offence of driving without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road, which is an offence under s 65(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (“the Act”) and punishable under s 65(4)(a) of the Act.
Foot Note 7
SOF at [5].
Facts relating to DAC 908653 of 2026
24 Investigations revealed that the Accused was driving the motor van without possessing a valid Singapore driving licence at the time of the accident, and that the Accused has in fact never possessed a valid Singapore driving licence in Singapore despite being a Singapore Permanent Resident since 2016. He only held a Malaysian class B2 and D driving licence.
Foot Note 8
SOF at [6].
25 The Accused has therefore committed an offence under s 35(1) of the Act and punishable under s 35(3)(a) of the Act.
Foot Note 9
SOF at [7].
Facts relating to DAC 908654 of 2026
26 As the Accused did not possess a valid Singapore driving license, there was therefore no policy of insurance or security in respect of the Third-Party Risks that comply with the requirements of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act 1960, in relation to the use of the said motor van by the Accused.
Foot Note 10
SOF at [8].
27 The Accused has therefore contravened Section 3(1) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act 1960 (“the MVA”) which contravention is an offence punishable under section 3(2) read with section 3(3) of the MVA.
Foot Note 11
SOF at [9].
28 In March 2024, the Accused was made aware by the authorities that it is an offence to drive in Singapore without a valid driving license and valid insurance.
Foot Note 12
SOF at [10].
Prescribed punishment
29 The prescribed punishment for s 35(1) of the Act (first offender) was a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to both.
30 The prescribed punishment for s 3(1)(a) punishable under ss 3(2) and 3(3) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks & Compensation) Act 1960 was:
(a) A fine not exceeding $1,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or to both, and
(b) A disqualification for 12 months from the date of the conviction (unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise and without affecting the power of the court to order a longer period of disqualification).
31 The prescribed punishment for 65(4)(a) of the Act is a fine not exceeding $2,500 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both.
32 An offence’s statutory maximum sentence signals the gravity in which Parliament views such offences. A sentencing judge ought to take this into account when determining precisely where the offender’s conduct falls within the entire range of punishment set by Parliament: Public Prosecutor v Kwong Kok Hing [2008] 2 SLR(R) 684 at [44].
(Benny Tan, Assessing the Effectiveness of Sentencing Guideline Judgments in Singapore Issued Post-March 2013 and A Guide to Constructing Frameworks,(2018) 30 SAcLJ 1004 at [46])
33 The court should ensure that the full spectrum of sentences enacted by Parliament is carefully explored in determining the appropriate sentence, viz. Completeness principle: Poh Boon Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2014] 4 SLR 892 at [60].
Prosecution’s submissions on sentence
34 The Prosecution sought a global sentence of 4 weeks’ imprisonment, $600 to $800 and a driving disqualification of 48 months:
Foot Note 13
Prosecution’s Address on Sentence (“PAOS”) at [1] and [12].
Charge No.
Offence
Sentence
Status
DAC
908652 of 2026
s 65(1)(b)
p/u s 65(4)(a)
r/w s 42(1)(a)
RTA
1 week
+
DQ 24 months
Imprisonment and DQ to run consecutively
DAC
908653 of 2026
s 35(1)
p/u s 35(3)(a)
RTA
3-5 weeks
+
DQ 24 months
Imprisonment and DQ to run consecutively
DAC
908654 of 2026
s 3(1)(a)
p/u s 3(2) and
3(3)
MV(TPR&C)A
$600 to $800
+
DQ 12 months
Sentence and DQ to run concurrently
35 The Accused is a Malaysian citizen who obtained permanent residency in Singapore in 2016. At the time of the offences, he was found to hold a Malaysian driving license for Class B2 and D, which was valid from 12 June 2022 to 5 August 2026. The Accused has never held a valid Singapore driving licence.
Foot Note 14
PAOS at [2].
36 Section 38(1) of the Act allows the holder of a valid foreign driving licence to drive in Singapore for a period of 12 months from the date of his last entry into Singapore, but s 38(2)(a) states that this does not apply where the holder of the foreign driving license is a permanent resident in Singapore.
Foot Note 15
PAOS at [2].
37 Section 65. The Accused drove without reasonable consideration and collided into a motorcycle, causing pain in the left side of the victim’s body which necessitated a 3-day MC. Given the injuries caused to the victim, the custodial threshold was crossed and an imprisonment term of one week with a driving disqualification of 24 months wasappropriate in the circumstances.
Foot Note 16
PAOS at [3].
38 Section 3 MVA. The usual sentence imposed on a first-time offender under s 3(1)(a) of the MVA is a fine of $600 to $800 with a mandatory driving disqualification period of 12 months: Public Prosecutor v Shanthi d/o Govindan [2023] SGDC 263 at [18].
Foot Note 17
PAOS at [10].
39 Section 35. In Public Prosecutor v Eng Kwan Meng Garrick [2026] SGHC 116,the High Court established that the true gravamen of an offence under s 35(1) RTA is the driver’s disregard for the safety of other road users. In this case, given that the Accused has been a permanent resident in Singapore for about 10 years, he cannot claim to be unaware of the laws that govern this country. Further, he was made aware in March 2024 that driving without a valid Singapore license and valid insurance in Singapore are offences. Yet, he persisted in his conduct, endangering other road users.
Foot Note 18
PAOS at [4].
40 In Garrick Eng at [47], the High Court stated that a foreigner holding a valid foreign driving licence is a Qualified Driver, but those grounds of decision did not address the appropriate sentence for that category.
Foot Note 19
PAOS at [5].
41 The present case does not fall within the categories in Garrick Eng andDaryle Seah for which the High Court has established starting sentences.
Foot Note 20
PAOS at [7].
42 The following factors should be taken into consideration in sentencing:
(a) The Accused caused an accident while driving without a valid licence.
(b) The accident caused hurt to the victim.
(c) At the material time the Accused had driven in Singapore for 8 years without a valid licence since obtaining his permanent residency.
(d) Just two months prior to the offence, the Accused had been made aware by the authorities that driving without a valid license is an offence in Singapore, but proceeded to carry on nevertheless.
Foot Note 21
PAOS at [8].
43 The Prosecution submits that a sentence of 3 weeks’ imprisonment and 2 years’ driving disqualification was appropriate given the overall criminality disclosed on the facts.
Foot Note 22
PAOS at [9].
44 The driving disqualification periods for the offences under s 65 and s 35 of the Act should run consecutively in order to achieve the necessary deterrent effect: Garrick Eng at [64].
Foot Note 23
PAOS at [11].
Mitigation plea
45 The Defence sought a global fine of up to $10,600 and a driving disqualification for 36 months:
Foot Note 24
Mitigation at [2] and [53].
Charge No.
Offence
Sentence
Status
DAC
908652 of 2026
s 65(1)(b)
p/u s 65(4)(a)
r/w s 42(1)(a)
RTA
$2,000 i/d 4 days
+
DQ 6 months
DQ to run concurrently
DAC
908653 of 2026
s 35(1)
p/u s 35(3)(a)
RTA
Not Exceeding $8,000
+
DQ 24 months
DQ to run consecutively with s 3
DAC
908654 of 2026
s 3(1)(a)
p/u s 3(2) and
3(3)
MV(TPR&C)A
$600
+
DQ 12 months
DQ to run consecutively with s 35
46 Circumstances leading to the offences. On the early morning of 22 May 2024, the Accused was in the company office (located in the Luzerne along Bendemeer Road) waiting for the company driver to arrive and drive him in the company van (which was loaded with work materials) to a worksite for an urgent job to be completed. He then received word that the company driver had called in sick and was not able to come in.
Foot Note 25
Mitigation at [5].
47 He quickly activated the company’s back-up driver (who was supposed to be off that day) who was still at his residence in Eunos. The Accused was worried that if they waited for the back-up driver to arrive, they would arrive late at the worksite and not be able to complete the works on time. He was also worried that any late works might also lead to penalties or liquidated damages being imposed on the company.
Foot Note 26
Mitigation at [6].
48 He naively and impulsively thought that if he drove the company van to Eunos to pick up the back-up driver, it would be faster than waiting for the back-up driver to arrive. On his own accord, he therefore decided to drive the company van to Eunos MRT to pick up the back-up driver who would then drive the van to the worksite.
Foot Note 27
Mitigation at [7].
49 As he was driving along Joo Chiat Place near the junction of Chiku Road, he noticed a stationary bus ahead of him. He saw that the bus did not appear to be moving off anytime soon and decided to overtake the bus. He then turned on his right signal, looked out for oncoming traffic (and upon seeing none) started to inch the van out towards the right to begin the overtaking.
Foot Note 28
Mitigation at [8].
50 Joo Chiat Place is a relatively narrow two-lane road (with one lane going in each direction). While the Accused did check for oncoming traffic from the other direction (and did not see any) before starting to inch out), he did not check his blind-side to his right (and behind him) as he did not expect that there would be any other vehicle there (given that the narrow two-lane road had space only for one vehicle in each lane).
Foot Note 29
Mitigation at [9].
51 Accused’s background. In 2013, he married his wife (also a Malaysian) who was also working in Singapore as a petrol pump attendant at that time. They had a daughter (now around 13 years old) shortly after. In 2021, his wife suffered a serious haemorrhagic stroke. She was warded at the National University Hospital (NUH) for close to 3 months and underwent multiple surgeries. As a result of the stroke, she is unable to work and mostly bedridden. She is mostly unable to care for herself, and her mobility is extremely limited (requiring the aid of a wheelchair).
Foot Note 30
Mitigation at [17].
52 The Accused is the sole breadwinner in the family and must provide for his wife and young daughter (who is still schooling). He is also the main caregiver for his wife and despite a gruelling work schedule, returns home every lunch time to care for his wife (feeding and cleaning her) before returning to work, and then coming back at dinner to continue to care for his wife. At the same time, he is still supporting his mother (aged 76) in Malaysia, whilst also still paying NUH back for all the medical bills incurred for his wife’s condition and surgeries.
Foot Note 31
Mitigation at [18].
53 The Accused has worked in Singapore since 1995 and became a permanent resident in 2016. Throughout all this time (more than 3 decades) he has generally not gotten into trouble with the law. He did on a previous occasion in 2021 drive a vehicle in Singapore (without having the valid Singapore license) for which he was issued a warning on 31 March 2024 and given composition (for failing to properly secure his seatbelt).
Foot Note 32
Mitigation at [19].
54 Section 35 RTA. With guidance from Public Prosecutor v Rizuwan bin Rohmat [2024] 3 SLR 694:
(a) The Accused was a “Qualified Driver”. While he did not possess a valid Singapore class 3 license, he knew how to drive and held a valid Malaysian class D license.
(b) He did not drive with the intention to commit any criminal offence or any purely personal reasons. Rather, he drove the company van’s out of a misplaced desire to prevent the company from getting into trouble if it could not complete its contracted work on time.
(c) The distance intended to be travelled was relatively short (from Bendemeer Road to Eunos MRT, less than 7km).
(d) He was not speeding or otherwise driving recklessly or dangerously.
(e) He was involved in a relatively minor accident. Notwithstanding that he did not have a license, he did not try to flee from the scene but stayed on to render assistance and exchange particulars with the victim.
(f) He has since apologized and made full restitution to the victim.
(g) He is remorseful, fully cooperated with the police, and pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity.
Foot Note 33
Mitigation at [22].
55 The Accused falls under the category of being a “Qualified Driver” of the sort described in Garrick Eng at [47] and [49].
Foot Note 34
Mitigation at [37].
56 The High Court noted in Daryle Seah at [40]: “Where it involved a Qualified Driver who possessed a driver’s licence but who for one reason or another did not maintain its validity, that driver knew how to drive, or at the very least, was previously assessed to be capable of doing so. This was a significant distinction from the archetypal case of a driver who has never been licensed. Such cases can and should be dealt with outside of the benchmark sentence, as the benchmark sentence is meant to provide a touchstone for the archetypal s 35(1) offence.”
Foot Note 35
Mitigation at [38].
57 The High Court noted in Rizuwan at [60]:“As the archetypal case does not involve the Qualified Driver, I left open the question of the appropriate approach that should be taken to sentencing such offenders. The Prosecution suggested that an appropriate starting point could be a fine but that is best left for consideration in a suitable case in the future. Without being exhaustive, as noted above at [49]-[52], whether the absence of a valid driving licence was a cause or contributing factor to any accident that may have resulted would be a pertinent consideration in calibrating the sentence.”
Foot Note 36
Mitigation at [40].
58 In Garrick Eng at [31] and [32], the Prosecution in that case submitted that an appropriate benchmark sentence for Category 2 Qualified Drivers (drivers whose licenses had either ceased to be in force or who possessed a foreign license that had not been converted) should be “a $5,000 fine and a two-year DQ Period should apply to Category 2 Qualified Drivers who were first-time offenders, who did not cause an accident, and who pleaded guilty at the first stage of the PG Guidelines.”
Foot Note 37
Mitigation at [41].
59 In both those cases, the Prosecution had submitted that an appropriate starting benchmark sentence for Qualified Drivers (with lapsed or unconverted licenses) who do not get into an accident should be a fine.
Foot Note 38
Mitigation at [42].
60 The Defence concurred with those suggestions and submitted as such: that a similar framework as in Daryle Seah and Garrick Eng be adopted but that the starting benchmark of a Qualified Driver (with a lapsed or unconverted license) who does not get into an accident, and who pleads guilty, should be a fine (of around $5,000 following Prosecution’s own submissions in Garrick Eng).
Foot Note 39
Mitigation at [43].
61 It is important to recall the distinctions made between “Unqualified Drivers” (who had never held a driving license of any sort and who were unskilled and unqualified to drive), “Qualified Drivers” with lapsed or unconverted licenses (who were otherwise competent to drive but for a regulatory step), and “Qualified Drivers” with suspended or revoked licenses (who have been disabled by the operation of law following wrongdoing). In terms of culpability and potential harm, the category of “Qualified Drivers” with lapsed or unconverted licenses (such as in the present case) is at the lowest possible level as it is only a regulatory lapse which prevents them from legally driving (rather than any lack of skill or competency, or prior bad driving).
Foot Note 40
Mitigation at [44].
62 Would a Qualified Driver (with a lapsed or unconverted license) who gets into an accident immediately cross the custodial threshold? In considering this issue, the Defence was guided by the High Court’s pertinent views in Rizuwan:
Foot Note 41
Mitigation at [46].
(a) In declining the follow the young amicus curiae’s submissions, at [49] the High Court stated “Applying Mr Sim’s Framework would result in a Qualified Driver facing a custodial sentence once moderate or severe harm is suffered (see [22] above), even if the accident has no connection with the driver’s failure to possess a valid driving licence at the material time. This was significant. Such a driver is quite different from the Unqualified Driver, as noted earlier at [39]. He is not one who cannot handle the class of vehicle in question. Instead, he is qualified to drive the class of vehicle in question but has failed to renew or validate his licence prior to the incident in question, thereby bringing him within the ambit of s 35(1) RTA. The risk and danger he poses to other road users, the occupants of the vehicle in question and himself is not of the same level as the Unqualified Driver. In the case of the Qualified Driver, there may in fact be no nexus between the offence and the accident. In other words, the fact that he did not have a valid driving licence might have no connection with the accident. That is unlikely to be the case with an Unqualified Driver.”
Foot Note 42
Mitigation at [46].
(b) The High Court was of the clear view that “it would not be an appropriate outcome” if a custodial sentence were imposed on a Qualified Driver (with a lapsed or unconverted license) even if he was involved in “an accident that resulted in moderate or severe harm even if the accident had nothing to do with the fact that he did not hold a valid driving license at the material time”. In this case, it was clear that the absence of a valid driving was not a cause or contributing factor to this actual accident between the van and the motorcycle.
Foot Note 43
Mitigation at [47].
63 Further, the present case is far from the norm and very much different from the usual section 35(1) cases before the court, which almost exclusively involve archetypal cases of an Unqualified Driver. Even at [50] of Garrick Eng, it was noted that “In any event, cases involving these two categories of drivers appear to be uncommon.” The two categories of drivers being those who hold foreign driving licenses and those whose license cease to be in force due to certain prescribed ages. The Defence submitted that in such cases like the present, having regard to the offender’s existing driving qualifications and the given appropriate circumstances, a substantial fine and meaningful disqualification can satisfy the need for general deterrence without imprisonment.
Foot Note 44
Mitigation at [48].
64 In further calibrating the appropriate sentence in this case, the Defence also considered the factors cited in Rizuwan at [63], which Daryl Seah at [83] noted as helpful and supplementary to the benchmark framework.
(a) He had driven for a work emergency and not to commit any criminal offence. The Defence was not putting forward the view that this was the sort of emergency that would go towards exculpating, much less exonerating, the use of a vehicle without a driving license. However, the particular use of the company van in this instance should, at worst, be considered neutral and not aggravating.
(b) The length of driving (both to the intended destination and where the accident occurred) was relatively short (within 7km).
(c) Save for the accident which occurred due to a momentary lapse of judgment, there was no other bad driving or even prolonged bad driving.
(d) The accident itself was very minor and the harm caused was also very minor. Full restitution has been made.
(e) After the accident, the Accused responsibly remained at the scene and tended to the victim before exchanging particulars. He did not flee or attempt to flee or otherwise evade detection.
65 The only aggravating factor in this case is that the Accused had previously driven without a valid license in 2021 and was given a warning in March 2024. He is a very simple person. While he knew that driving without a license was wrong, he did it not because he stood to benefit from it but because he was worried that the company (his employer) would get into trouble if he did not. It is also worth noting that any penalty for late works would have fallen on the company and not on him personally. In his naïve and simplistic way of thinking, driving to pick up the replacement driver was the only way he knew how to solve the problem that had manifested at that time. This was wrong and he has acknowledged his mistake and will not make the same mistake again.
Foot Note 45
Mitigation at [50].
66 In the circumstances, after calibration and taking into account an uplift due to the prior warning, the Defence’s submissions of a fine of not more than $8,000and a disqualification term of 24 months would be fair and appropriate. A custodial sentence, even a short one, would crushing in this case and in the words of the High Court in Rizuwan not “an appropriate outcome”.
Foot Note 46
Mitigation at [51].
Sentencing
The Law for s 35 of the RTA
PP v Rizuwan bin Rohmat
67 In Public Prosecutor v Rizuwan bin Rohmat [2024] 3 SLR 694 at [39], the High Court stated that:
(a) Unqualified Drivers were drivers who neverheld a valid driving licence for the class of vehicles they were driving.
(b) Qualified Drivers were drivers who failed to renew or validate their driving licence prior to the offence under s 35(1) of the Act.
(c) There is an obvious distinction of substance between the drivers in the two categories. Unqualified Drivers never held a valid driving licence, and therefore were unskilled and unqualified to drive. That could not be said of Qualified Drivers.
68 A review of the parliamentary debates between 1955 to 2019 does not show that s 35(1) was enacted with Qualified Drivers in mind: Rizuwan at [56].
69 The archetypal case was an Unqualified Driver caught driving not because of an accident, but because of police enforcement action: Rizuwan at [40] and [59]. It does not apply to the Qualified Driver: Rizuwan at [59].
70 In calibrating the exact sentence, one of the factors was the consequences that arose from the offender’s driving: where an accident occurred, an uplift from the benchmark sentence would be warranted. The severity of the accident, in terms of damage and injury suffered, and whether the offender contributed or caused it would be relevant in determining the uplift: Rizuwan at [63(c)].
Seah Ming Yang Daryle v PP
71 In Seah Ming Yang Daryle v Public Prosecutor [2024] 4 SLR 1561 (“Daryle Seah”), the Court of 3 Judges stated that the harm that s 35(1) seeks to prevent is to keep unlicensed drivers off our roads:
(a) First, it reduces the risk of harm to other innocent road users. Unqualified Drivers have no basic competence to drive a motor vehicle, as a matter of law and fact. Thus, when an Unqualified Driver drives on our roads, the offender poses a potential danger to other road users. This danger is further amplified as the offender who drives without a licence is more likely to cause an accident and result in harm: Daryle Seah at [52].
(b) Second, keeping unlicensed drivers off our roads reduces the risk of innocent road users having to suffer without adequate compensation from the unlicensed drivers, who will not be covered by insurance (due to them driving without a licence) when there is an accident: Daryle Seah at [54].
(c) Third, the nature of s 35(1) offences, similar to many other road traffic offences, is that they are difficult to detect: Daryle Seah at [55].
72 The benchmark sentence for a s 35 offence is 2 weeks’ imprisonment with a disqualification order of 2 years: Daryle Seah at [75] and [91].
PP v Eng Kwan Meng Garrick
73 In Public Prosecutor v Eng Kwan Meng Garrick [2026] SGHC 116 (“Garrick Eng”) at [55], Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon held that a benchmark sentence of 3 weeks’ imprisonment is appropriate for the archetypal s 35(1) RTA offence involving a Qualified Driver who has lost his licence completely, is a first-time offender, is pleading guilty and did not cause an accident.
Decision on sentence for s 35 of the RTA
Applying the Law to the Facts
(1) Categories of s 35(1) RTA Offenders
74 An overview of the various categories of s 35(1) RTA offenders is shown in the diagram below:
Foot Note 47
DPP Johan Tay helpfully provided this diagram in Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Iman Bin Sulaiman [2026] SGDC 275.
75 Neither Daryle Seah’s nor Garrick Eng’s benchmark sentence applied to the present case.
76 Daryle Seah’s benchmark sentence did not apply as the Accused was a Qualified Driver.
77 Garrick Eng’s benchmark sentencedid not apply as the Accused was not a Qualified Driver who had lost his licence completely (i.e. a driver who is disabled from driving and must requalify for a driving licence before being permitted to drive again): Garrick Eng at [52(b)].
78 The present case involved a foreign driver who failed to convert a valid driving licence to a Singapore driving licence, a scenario that was not covered in Garrick Eng at [50].
79 The Accused had never possessed a valid Singapore driving licence in Singapore despite being a Singapore Permanent Resident since 2016,
Foot Note 48
SOF at [6].
that is, about 10 years. He only held a Malaysian class B2 and D driving licence.
Foot Note 49
SOF at [6].
80 The Defence argued that in terms of culpability and potential harm, the category of “Qualified Drivers” with lapsed or unconverted licenses (such as in the present case) is at the lowest possible level as it is only a regulatory lapse which prevents them from legally driving (rather than any prior bad driving, or lack of skill or competency).
Foot Note 50
Mitigation at [44].
81 I was mindful of the High Court’s warning in Daryle Seah that a court should avoid assessing a driver’s skill in the context of sentencing offences under s 35(1) of the Act: Daryle Seah at [41] and Garrick Eng at [40].
82 As the 3-Judge Panel in Daryle Seah explained at [41], focusing on the driver’s skill would introduce “significant complexities”. Moreover, the focus on a driver’s competence may obscure the true gravamen of the offence under s 35(1) of the RTA which is the driver’s disregard for the safety of other road users: Garrick Eng at [40].
83 The Defence argued that the High Court in Rizuwan “was of the clear view that ‘it would not be an appropriate outcome’ if a custodial sentence were imposed on a Qualified Driver (with a lapsed or unconverted license) even if he was involved in ‘an accident that resulted in moderate or severe harm even if the accident had nothing to do with the fact that he did not hold a valid driving license at the material time’. In this case, it was clear that the absence of a valid driving was not a cause or contributing factor to this actual accident between the van and the motorcycle”.
Foot Note 51
Mitigation at [47].
84 I acknowledged the Defence’s arguments.
85 However, there were countervailing points in the present case.
86 First, as Rizuwan involved an Unqualified Driver and a relatively minor accident with minor damage,
Foot Note 52
Public Prosecutor v Rizuwan bin Rohmat [2024] 3 SLR 694 at [65].
the court’s observations on a Qualified Driver in an accident that resulted in moderate or severe harm were obiter dicta.
87 The High Court in Rizuwan at [60] explicitly stated that as the archetypal case does not involve the Qualified Driver, it left open the question of the appropriate approach that should be taken to sentencing such offenders. The High Court added that the appropriate starting point is best left for consideration in a suitable case in the future.
88 Second, in the present case, hurt was caused to a victim in an accident. On the same day, the victim sought medical treatment at Tan Tock Seng Hospital, where he was given outpatient sick leave for three days.
Foot Note 53
SOF at [4].
The victim reported to have sustained pain in his left body as a result of the accident.
Foot Note 54
SOF at [4].
While the harm caused was not serious, a collision had occurred.
89 Third, the true gravamen of the offence under s 35(1) of the Act is the driver’s disregard for the safety of other road users: Garrick Eng at [40].
90 The linchpin of the offence lies in the degree to which the offender’s conduct discloses a disregard for the safety of others. It is this — the offender’s willingness to flout the rules of the road and the legal constraints on his right to drive — that must be the sentencing court’s central concern: Garrick Eng at [42].
91 Two months before the accident, the Accused had already been made aware by the authorities that it is an offence to drive in Singapore without a valid driving license and valid insurance.
Foot Note 55
SOF at [10].
Despite this clear warning, the Accused chose to drive without a valid licence, demonstrating a deliberate willingness to flout the law.
92 This fact matters. Each case turns on its facts.
(see Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, Cambridge University Press (Sixth Edition, 2015), pages 425-427)
93 That is why the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised a fact-sensitive approach for traffic cases:
(a) The highly fact-specific nature of traffic offences means that sentencing, being ultimately a matter of discretion, must be approached judiciously with the highest level of attention to the facts and circumstances of each case: Public Prosecutor v Ganesan Sivasankar [2017] 5 SLR 681 at [57]:-
(i) The High Court was reiterating the point made in Public Prosecutor v Chia Hyong Gyee (Oral Judgment, 25 May 2017, Magistrate’s Appeal No 001/2017/01).
(ii) The High Court in Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 755 stated at [46] and [73]: “In the final analysis, the appropriate sentence to be imposed will be the product of a fact-sensitive exercise of discretion, taking into account all the circumstances of the case.”
(b) The facts and circumstances which give rise to traffic offences are so infinitely varied that a blind and rigid adherence to precedents and sentencing norms by default is inadvisable. In this class of offences, attention to the particular facts and circumstances is of paramount importance: Koh Thiam Huat at [39].
(c) It bears repeating that the facts of each traffic case must be carefully evaluated, weighed and assessed: Lee-Teh Har Eng (Oral Judgment, 15 December 2016, Magistrate’s Appeal 9099/2016) referred to in Koh Thiam Huat at [36].
(d) In Tan Kai Yuan v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 152, the High Court cautioned against placing undue weight on case comparisons. The offender had submitted that a custodial sentence was excessive compared to sentences imposed in several other cases. The High Court responded to that submission by holding at [40] that it was not “particularly meaningful to engage in such a comparison as the facts and circumstances in different cases are rarely similar”.
94 On a holistic assessment of the facts, with fidelity to the gravamen of the offence, the custodial threshold was crossed for the s 35 offence.
Offence-Specific Factors
(1) Harm
95 Harm is a measure of the injury caused to society by the commission of the offence: Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat [2017] 4 SLR 1099 at [41].
96 The following non-exhaustive factors might be considered for s 35 of the Act (Rizuwan at [63] and Daryle Seah at [82]-[83]):
(a) The consequences that arose from the offender’s driving (e.g. accident) and
(b) Whether there were other occupants in the offender’s vehicle.
97 Consideration of actual harm focuses on the moment of a collision. Potential harm looks at the wider circumstances before and after a collision: Public Prosecutor v Cheng Chang Tong [2023] SGHC 119 at [57].
98 Potential harm refers to harm that was likely to have been caused to otherroad users but which ultimately did not eventuate: Chen Songv Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 SLR 509 at [129] and Public Prosecutor v Johnson Tan Wee Kiat [2026] SGHC 59 at [13].
99 The level of potential harm may be assessed against facts such as the condition of the road, the volume of traffic or number of pedestrians actually on or which might reasonably be expected to be on the road at the relevant time, the speed and manner of driving, visibility at the relevant time, the type of vehicle, and any particular vulnerabilities (eg, a truck or car colliding into a motorcycle or pedestrian). It was observed that these relate to the circumstances of driving that could increase the danger posed to road users (Wu Zhi Yong at [36(a)]): Chen Songat [129].
100 It would only be appropriate to have regard to potential harm if there was a sufficient likelihood of the harm arising and this in turn should be assessed in the light of the gravity of the harm risked (Neo Ah Luan v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 1153 at [67]): Chen Song at [129].
101 The potential for harm has to be assessed with reference not only to the actual distance travelled, but the distance which the offender intended to travel: Chan Chow Chuen v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGHC 294 at [24]. In Fan Lei v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGHC 278 at [10], travelling a distance of 17km was not enough to point to increased potential harm. In Fan Lei, there was no evidence that the offender was driving in a careless manner over that 17km.
102 In the present case, there was an accident and hurt was caused to the victim.
103 On the same day, the victim sought medical treatment at Tan Tock Seng Hospital, where he was given outpatient sick leave for three days. The victim reported to have sustained pain in his left body as a result of the accident.
Foot Note 56
SOF at [4].
104 There were no occupants in the Accused’s vehicle.
105 I was mindful that in assessing the level of harm or potential harm, the sentencing court should be careful not to double-count any factors which may already have been taken into account in assessing the level of culpability: Ye Lin Myint v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1005 at [58] (see also Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (6th Ed, 2015, Cambridge University Press) at [4.3] and [4.5]).
(2) Culpability
106 Culpability is a measure of the degree of relative blameworthiness disclosed by an offender’s actions and is measured chiefly in relation to the extent and manner of the offender’s involvement in the criminal act: Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock [2017] 5 SLR 1141 at [35] (see Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 6th Ed, 2015) at [4.5]).
107 The following non-exhaustive factors might be considered for s 35 of the Act (Rizuwan at [63] and Daryle Seah at [82]-[83]):
(a) The offender’s reason for driving (e.g. drove in order to commit an offence vs drove in an emergency);
(b) The offender’s manner and length of driving (e.g. failed to obey traffic rules); and
(c) The offender’s conduct after the offence had been committed (e.g. attempted to evade arrest).
108 In the present case, I accepted the following points advanced by the Defence:
(a) The Accused had not driven with the intention to commit any criminal offence or for any purely personal reasons.
Foot Note 57
Mitigation at [22].
(b) The distance intended to be travelled was less than 7km (from Bendemeer Road to Eunos MRT).
Foot Note 58
Mitigation at [22].
(c) He did not try to flee from the scene but stayed on to render assistance and exchange particulars with the victim.
Foot Note 59
Mitigation at [22].
109 The Prosecution argued that at the material time the Accused had driven in Singapore for 8 years without a valid licence since obtaining his permanent residency.
Foot Note 60
PAOS at [8(c)].
However, this was not found in the Statement of Facts.
110 When accused persons plead guilty, their plea marks their acceptance of the charges against them as well as what is set out in the statement of facts if one is prepared. The charges and the statement of facts constitute the four corners of the case against them: Public Prosecutor v Development 26 Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 309 at [16].
111 The Prosecution’s sentencing submissions cannot attempt to introduce new facts which the accused person has not already accepted in his plea of guilt, before he is found guilty and convicted on his own plea. If additional facts are introduced in the submission, the accused person may challenge those facts and/ or seek to qualify or retract his plea. Thus, viewed in proper perspective, the plea of guilt does not and cannot extend to additional facts or information outside of what has been conceded. This is an important procedural safeguard, without which new aggravating facts can easily slip in by the back door, as it were, in the prosecution’s submission: Development 26 Pte Ltd at [16].
112 I am mindful that where a material factor that either aggravates or mitigates the offence is put forward by the Prosecution or Defence, it is incumbent on them to either have it agreed in the SOF, or to prove it: K Saravanan Kuppusamy v Public Prosecutor [2016] 5 SLR 88 at [27]. Such proof may be by way of: (a) a Newton hearing; or (b) based on submissions, with the burden on the party to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fact it wishes to rely on is supported by the SOF or that the relevant inferences should be drawn: Kuppusamy at [27] (Yeo Seong Bee Eric v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 207).
113 Given that the Defence disputed that the Accused had driven in Singapore for 8 years without a valid licence (which was not found in the SOF), and the Prosecution was unable to prove this point, I did not take it into consideration for sentencing.
Offender-Specific Factors
(1) TIC charge
114 The effect of taking into consideration outstanding charges is to enhance the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed for the proceeded charges: Public Prosecutor v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500 at [38] (see also s 148 of the Criminal Procedure Code).
115 There was a charge under s 96(1) read with s 42(1) of the Act that was taken into consideration for sentencing.
(2) Antecedents
116 The Accused’s driving record was not unblemished.
117 He had a driving-related compounded offence. An offender’s compounded offences are a relevant sentencing consideration for road traffic violations: Teo Seng Tiong v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 65 at [80]-[81] and [99]-[108].
(See also Public Prosecutor v Ong Heng Chua [2018] SGHC 95 at [39]-[47] and Public Prosecutor vKoh Thiam Huat [2017] SGHC 123 at [56]-[60])
118 Under s 139AA of the Act, a court may take offences that have been compounded (on or after 1 November 2019) into account as an aggravating factor: Public Prosecutor v Able Wang Ziyi [2026] SGHC 230 at [63]-[64].
119 This is based on the wording and legislative history of s 139AA, including the Explanatory Statement tothe Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2021 (Act 12 of 2021).
120 I was aware that the Court of Appeal in Teo Seng Tiong v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 65 at [17] considered an earlier version of s 139AA of the Act:
139AA. For the purpose of determining the appropriate sentence for an offence committed by a person under this Act, a court may take into account, as an aggravating factor, any offence that has been compounded (whether before, on or after the date of commencement of section 21 of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2019) under this Act before the date of the sentencing. (emphasis added)
121 The Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2021 (Act 12 of 2021) amended s 139AA of the Act as follows:
Section 139AA of the principal Act is amended by deleting the words “whether before,” (emphasis added)
122 Importantly, the Explanatory Statement tothe Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2021 (Act 12 of 2021) stated:
Clause 28 amends section 139AA so that a sentencing court, when determining the appropriate sentence for an offence committed by a person under the Act, may take into account as an aggravating factor, any offence that has been compounded on or after (and not before) the date of commencement of section 21 of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2019). (emphasis added)
123 The amendments to s 139AA by the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2021 – specifically deleting the words “whether before” – militated against the argument that the sentencing court may take into account as an aggravating factor, any offence that has been compounded (including those before 1 November 2019).
124 In Public Prosecutor v Cheng Chang Tong [2023] SGHC 119 at [60], the High Court considered the offender’s compounded offences in the 1990s and 2012. However, neither the Prosecution nor the Defence appeared to have brought to the court’s attention the fact that the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2021 (Act 12 of 2021) had amended s 139AA of the Act.
125 In the present case, I placed little weight on his compounded offence, since he only had one compounded offence for failing to wear a seat belt.
(3) Cooperation with the Authorities
126 I gave due weight to the Accused’s cooperation with the authorities: Public Prosecutor v Siew Boon Loong [2005] 1 SLR(R) 611 at [16]-[18].
(4) Remorse
127 I gave due weight to the Accused’s remorse. He stayed on to render assistance and exchange particulars with the victim.
Foot Note 61
Mitigation at [22].
(5) Restitution
128 I gave due weight to the fact that the Accused made full restitution to the victim.
Foot Note 62
Mitigation at [22].
The fact that the offender offers restitution is one of the “ambient circumstances” that a court can and should take into account in assessing whether the plea of guilt itself indicates remorse and if the offender should accordingly receive a discount in the sentence: Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 653 at [76].
(6) Personal Circumstances
129 The Accused alluded to the fact that incarceration would bring hardship to the family, as he is the sole breadwinner.
130 He must provide for his wife, mother and young daughter, and he is the main caregiver to his wife (who is mostly bedridden and requires the aid of a wheelchair).
131 However, personal circumstances such as financial difficulties and hardship caused to family by their incarceration have no mitigating value save in the most exceptional cases: Lai Oei Mui Jenny v Public Prosecutor [1993] 2 SLR(R) 406 at [10]-[11] and Chua Ya Zi Sandy vPublic Prosecutor [2021] SGHC 204 at [11]-[14].
132 Hardship to the family is a natural consequence when a family’s breadwinner decides to commit an offence and is imprisoned for it: Kannan s/o Birasenggam v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 15 at [10]. In the present case, while I empathised with the Accused’s circumstances, I saw no cogent reasons to consider his personal financial and family circumstances as valid mitigating factors.
Guilty Plea
133 The SAP Guidelines for Guilty Pleas applied: Ng En You Jeremiah v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 395 at [110]-[111] and [115]-[117] (see also Edwin Lim Wei Keat, A Critical Analysis of the Application of Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas in Singapore, (2026) 38 SAcLJ 247 at [37]-[43]).
134 I gave full weight to the Accused’s guilty plea: Angliss Singapore Pte Ltd v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 653 at [77]. This saved the criminal justice system resources that would have been expended with a full trial. An offender’s early plea of guilt should also be considered in calibrating the length of a driving disqualification order to be imposed: Koh Yih Chian v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 213 at [53], [57] and [63].
135 Accordingly, I gave the Accused the full 30% discount (Stage 1) for his early plea of guilt.
136 The indicative starting point for the s 35 offence was about 2 weeks’ imprisonment.
137 All things considered, in the round, the custodial sentence for the offence under s 35(1) of the Act would be 1 week’s imprisonment.
Decision on sentence for s 3 of the MVA
138 The sentence I imposed for s 3(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks & Compensation) Act 1960 is the typical sentence given for first-time offenders — a fine of $600 in default 1 day’s imprisonment and the mandatory driving disqualification of 12 months.
139 There were no special reasons.
Decision on sentence for s 65 of the RTA
140 For driving without due care or attention causing hurt, the applicable case is Chen Song v Public Prosecutor[2025] 3 SLR 509.
Framework in Chen Song
141 A quantitative factors-based approach, where the indicative sentencing band is determined at the first step, based on the numberof offence-specific harm and culpability factors is especially useful: Chen Song at [123].
142 “Lesser harm” is caused, and the offender’s culpability is deemed as “lower culpability” where at most one harm or culpability factor applies in respect of each category: Chen Song at [123].
143 “Greater harm” would be caused and the offender’s culpability deemed as “higher culpability” where there are 2 or more harm and culpability factors respectively: Chen Song at [123].
144 This is a general guideline which is not to be applied mechanistically in every case. The foremost inquiry is to assess holistically whether the totality of the harm suffered by the victim should be classified as either “greater harm” or “lesser harm” and whether the offender’s culpability considered as a whole should be classified as either “lower culpability” or “higher culpability”: Chen Song at [123].
(1) Harm factors
145 Primary harm factors are factors which pertain directly to the bodily injury suffered by the victim(s) in each case. These factors include:
(a) the nature and location of the injuries;
(b) the degree of permanence of the injuries; and
(c) the impact of the injuries: Chen Song at [124].
146 The three broad primary harm factors are:
(a) Nature and location of the injury: This factor focuses on the precise nature and the location of the injury. This requires a consideration of:
(i) the nature and severity of injury (eg, simple or complex and extent of injury, etc);
(ii) the number of injuries;
(iii) whether surgical intervention was necessary (or whether the injuries were treated conservatively);
(iv) the disposition of the victim post-surgery (eg, general ward, high dependency or intensive care unit); and
(v) the location of the injury (eg, vulnerable location).
(b) Degree of permanence: This factor considers whether the injury or injuries caused to the victim are permanent or transient. Permanent injuries include loss of a limb or permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of either ear, etc.
(c) Impact of injury: This factor contemplates the impact of the injury on the victim’s quality of life. Here, considerations of:
(i) the duration of stay in the hospital/rehabilitation centre;
(ii) duration of any hospitalisation/medical leave;
(iii) ability to carry out daily tasks and maintain livelihood; and
(iv) duration of rehabilitation (if any), are relevant: Chen Song at [127].
147 There is an inevitable overlap between the factors of nature and location of injury on the one hand, and impact of injury on the other. The period and nature of hospitalisation may be an indicium of both the nature and severity of the injury and perhaps even the number of injuries suffered, and its impact on the victim’s quality of life. The period and nature of hospitalisation may be relevant to both factors:Habeeb Zaleena d/o Pallivilakam Kader Habeeb Mohamed v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 99 at [35].
148 As to whether an injury is at a vulnerable location, the High Court in Ling Zhao Bin v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 107 stated at [27]:
It seems to me that the parts of the body were regarded as vulnerable because the injuries were to, or in locations proximate to, vital organs. The common thread is that these locations are vulnerable because an injury suffered in any of these locations, may result in a risk to life or permanent or long-term loss of function that impairs the victim’s ability to live independently and without assistance (eg loss of cognitive ability or paralysis). Vulnerability is defined with the reference to the severity of the harm that could result from an injury in a location. Without being prescriptive and in any way comprehensive, this common thread could serve as a working definition of a vulnerable location. It is consistent with why an injury to a vulnerable location was identified in Chen Song as relevant to the harm analysis under the “nature and location” factor, and the purpose of the central inquiry in the harm analysis (which is to ascertain the extent of physical harm that is suffered by the victim as a result of the injury in question as stated at [22] above).
[emphasis added]
149 I bore in mind that there may be cases where even if two or more primary harm factors apply, if they present themselves to a limited degree, the court may nevertheless consider that “lesser harm” had been caused based on a holistic assessment of the harm caused: Chen Song at [127].
150 In making a holistic assessment, the court should have regard to the intensity of the relevant factors, as opposed to simply determining the binary question of whether the factor is engaged and adding them mechanically: Tan Kai Yuan v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 152 at [21].
151 This observation does no more than reiterate that there are two steps in the inquiry. The first step still requires the court to determine whether the relevant offence-specific factor is engaged in the first place. The intensity of the relevant factor involves an evaluative assessment which is engaged at the second step, i.e., to determine the appropriate weight to be accorded to the relevant factor: Public Prosecutor v Able Wang Ziyi [2026] SGHC 230 at [49].
152 With respect, insofar as the approach in Public Prosecutor v Tan Bee Sen Bernard [2025] SGDC 243 at [42] focuses the analysis on a holistic assessment of harm without expressly considering whether each harm factor is engaged (Tan Kai Yuan at [21]), this does not appear to sit easily with the 3-Judge Panel’s decision in Chen Song expressly stating that the court is to identifythe number of offence-specific factors under the broad categories of “harm” and “culpability” (at [134(a)] and [123]).
153 Secondary harm factors are unrelated to the physical injury suffered by the victim(s), but which nonetheless go towards the extent of harm caused in a particular case. These factors include:
(a) property damage; and
(b) potential harm: Chen Song at [125].
154 Consideration of actual harm focuses on the moment of a collision. Potential harm looks at the wider circumstances before and after a collision: Public Prosecutor v Cheng Chang Tong [2023] SGHC 119 at [57].
155 Potential harm refers to harm that was likely to have been caused to otherroad users but which ultimately did not eventuate: Chen Song at [129] and Public Prosecutor v Johnson Tan Wee Kiat [2026] SGHC 59 at [13].
156 The level of potential harm may be assessed against facts such as the condition of the road, the volume of traffic or number of pedestrians actually on or which might reasonably be expected to be on the road at the relevant time, the speed and manner of driving, visibility at the relevant time, the type of vehicle, and any particular vulnerabilities (eg, a truck or car colliding into a motorcycle or pedestrian). It was observed that these relate to the circumstances of driving that could increase the danger posed to road users (Wu Zhi Yong at [36(a)]): Chen Song at [129].
157 It would only be appropriate to have regard to potential harm if there was a sufficient likelihood of the harm arising and this in turn should be assessed in the light of the gravity of the harm risked (Neo Ah Luan v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 1153 at [67]): Chen Song at [129].
158 The potential for harm has to be assessed with reference not only to the actual distance travelled, but the distance which the offender intended to travel (Chan Chow Chuen v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGHC 294 at [24]). In Fan Lei v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGHC 278 at [10], travelling a distance of 17km was not enough to point to increased potential harm. In Fan Lei, there was no evidence that the offender was driving in a careless manner over that 17km.
159 I was mindful that in assessing the level of harm or potential harm, the sentencing court should be careful not to double-count any factors which may already have been taken into account in assessing the level of culpability: Ye Lin Myint v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1005 at [58] (see also Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (6th Ed, 2015, Cambridge University Press) at [4.3] and [4.5]).
160 Each primary harm factor would count as one offence-specific factor going towards harm. However, where a secondary harm factor presents itself in a significant manner, this should be considered in the determination of where the particular offence falls within the indicative sentencing band: Chen Song at [125].
(2) Culpability factors
161 A non-exhaustive list of factors which each constitute 1 offence-specific factor going towards culpability is as follows (Chen Song at [131]):
(a) Any form of dangerous driving behaviour. For instance:
(i) speeding;
(ii) driving against traffic;
(iii) driving when not fit to drive;
(iv) driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs;
(v) sleepy driving;
(vi) driving while using a mobile phone;
(vii) swerving in and out of lanes;
(viii) using a vehicle in a dangerous fashion; and
(ix) street racing.
(b) Flouting of traffic rules and regulations. For instance:
(i) failing to stop at a stop line;
(ii) failing to conform to traffic signal;
(iii) not forming up correctly to execute a turn;
(iv) changing lanes across a set of double white lines/chevron markings; and
(v) making an illegal U-turn/right turn.
(c) High degree of carelessness: This is demonstrated where there was a prolonged or sustained period of inattention (as opposed to a momentary lapse of attention), and where the offender was deliberately cavalier about certain mitigatable risks. As stated in Sue Chang v Public Prosecutor [2023] 3 SLR 440 at [95], it would also be relevant to consider the extent to which the offender’s distraction was avoidable and the extent to which the offender’s misjudgment was reasonable.
(3) Sentencing framework for driving offences causing hurt punishable under s 65(4)(a)
162 We turn to the sentencing framework for driving offences causing hurt punishable under s 65(4)(a) where the offender elects to claim trial: Chen Song at [139].
163 First, the court is to identify the number of offence-specific factors under the broad categories of “harm” and “culpability”: Chen Song at [134(a)].
164 Second, based on the numberof offence-specific factors present, the court is to determine whether the harm caused is “lesser harm” or “greater harm” and whether the culpability of the offender is “lower culpability” or “higher culpability” and thereafter arrive at the sentencing band the offence falls within: Chen Song at [134(b)].
165 “Lesser harm” is caused, and the offender’s culpability is deemed as “lower culpability” where there are 0–1 harm or culpability factors respectively. “Greater harm” is caused, and the offender’s culpability is deemed as “higher culpability” where there are 2 or more harm or culpability factors respectively: Chen Song at [134(b)].
Band
Circumstances
Sentencing range
Driving disqualification range
1
Lesser harm and lower culpability
Fine
Up to 12 months
2
Greater harm and lower culpability
Or
Lesser harm and higher culpability
Fine and/or up to 2 months’ imprisonment
12 to 24 months
3
Greater harm and higher culpability
Fine and/or up to 6 months’ imprisonment
24 to 48 months (or longer)
166 I paused here to note that in the table above, for Band 3, the sentencing range is a fine and/or up to 6 months’ imprisonment, while the prescribed punishment for causing hurt punishable under 65(4)(a) of the Act is a fine not exceeding $2,500 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both.
167 Third, after determining the indicative sentencing band that the offence falls within, the court should identify an indicative starting point sentence within that range, taking into account: (a) all the primary harm factors and the culpability factors identified; and (b) the secondary harm factors: Chen Song at [134(c)].
168 Fourth, the court is to make adjustments to the starting point to take into account the usual gamut of offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors: Chen Song at [134(d)].
169 For the proposed sentencing bands for s 65(4)(a), the custodial threshold would typically be crossed where there are 2 or more offence-specific harm and/or culpability factors present: Chen Song at [140].
170 The High Court recognised that in so stipulating, the custodial threshold is necessarilycrossed in both Bands 2 and 3 as both “greater harm” and “higher culpability” are established where there are 2 or more harm or culpability factors respectively: Chen Song at [140].
171 However, at the same time, Bands 2 and 3 also provide for the possibility of a fine being imposed. In the High Court’s view, it is entirely justifiable for the custodial threshold to be crossed where an offence falls within both Bands 2 and 3. Nonetheless, the court may consider imposing a fine instead where the seriousness of the harm and culpability factors as a whole are assessed not to warrant the imposition of a custodial sentence: Chen Song at [140].
172 In the present case:
(a) For harm, the nature and location of injury was engaged to a limited extent.
(b) There was no culpability factor.
(c) Given the lesser harm and lower culpability, the custodial threshold was not crossed.
173 To be clear, I was mindful that the damage to the Accused’s own vehicle should not be treated as an aggravating factor: Ching Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGHC 297 at [15].
174 Insofar as the Defence alluded to the victim’s contributory negligence,
Foot Note 63
Mitigation at [9]-[10].
this argument did not go very far as:
(a) It was trite that where the conduct of the victim or third parties, whether negligent or otherwise, has materially contributed to the outcome for which the offender is being charged, but has no bearing on the culpability of the offender, it should not affect the sentence to be imposed. This was because the outcome materiality principle trumps the control principle in the context of criminal negligence: Guay Seng Tiong Nickson v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 1079 at [70].
(b) In the present case, the Discharge and Acknowledgement document at [3] stated that “Teoh Kar Chiew admits that it is entirely his fault for not keeping a proper lookout and has personally apologised to me…” (emphasis added).
Foot Note 64
Mitigation at [30].
Totality principle
175 The totality principle has been expressed in Mohamed Shouffee bin Adam v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 998 at [54] and [57] as comprising two limbs. The first limb examines whether the aggregate sentence is substantially above the normal level of sentences for the most serious of the individual offences committed. The second limb considers whether the effect of the sentence on the offender is crushing and not in keeping with his past record and his future prospects.
176 In the present case, the sentence was in line with both limbs of the Totality principle: Mohamed Shouffee Bin Adam at [54]-[57] (see Public Prosecutor v ASR [2019] 1 SLR 941 at [150] where the Court of Appeal considered that the sentence sought by the Prosecution would have violated both limbs of the Totality principle).
Conclusion
177 The Accused was sentenced as follows:
Charge
Offence
Sentence
Status
DAC
908652 of 2026
s 65(1)(b)
p/u s 65(4)(a)
r/w s 42(1)(a)
RTA
$2,000 i/d 4 days
+
DQ 10 months
DQ to run concurrently
DAC
908653 of 2026
s 35(1)
p/u s 35(3)(a)
RTA
1 week’s imprisonment
+
DQ 24 months
DQ to run consecutively with s 3 MV(TPR&C)A
DAC
908654 of 2026
s 3(1)(a)
p/u s 3(2) and
3(3)
MV(TPR&C)A
$600 i/d 1 day
+
DQ 12 months
DQ to run consecutively with s 35 RTA
178 The total sentence was one week’s imprisonment, a fine of $2,600 in default 5 days, and a driving disqualification for all classes of driving licences for 36 months, pursuant to Garrick Eng at [62]-[64].
179 I am grateful for the hard work and excellent submissions of both sides.
Shawn Ho District Judge
Jasmin Kaur (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the Prosecution; Desmond Tan (Genesis Law Corporation) for the Defence.
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