1 The accused person, Ms De Villar Rizalyn Panganiban (“the Accused”), a Filipino national, faced two charges in relation to activities she was allegedly involved in between 29 March and 24 April 2025 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

2 I convicted the Accused on both charges and sentenced her to a total of twenty-five (25) months’ imprisonment. The Accused has appealed against my decision. I now set out the full grounds of my decision.

3 The Accused used to work as a financial advisor and later as a performing artist in the Philippines ¹ . She is unmarried with three children who were being taken care of by her parents in the Philippines at the relevant time ² .

4 Sometime in March 2025, one of her friends whom she referred to as “Demi Moor” (“Demi”) approached her to take on a job in Cambodia. At that point in time, the Accused thought that she was going to be employed as an office worker for an online gambling company in Cambodia at a monthly salary of USD1,500 ³ . The Accused took up the offer and went to Phnom Penh, Cambodia together with Demi via Malaysia. She arrived in Phnom Penh on 29 March 2025 and stayed on the premises from which the Group operated from 29 March to 24 April 2025 ⁴ . The premises were referred to in the Statement of Agreed Facts (“ASOF”) as the “Cambodia call centre” and as a “scam centre” by the Accused in her statements which were recorded during the course of the police investigations. At the heart of the charges which the Accused faced concerned her activities on the premises during this period, which would be referred to in this judgment as “the Call Centre” for ease of reference.

5 The Accused was sent by the Group to Vientiane, Laos on 24 Appril 2025. The next day, she was driven to a location in Vientiane from which a criminal group operated and stayed in that place, which was referred to as “the Laos call centre” in the ASOF, from that day to 7 June 2025. According to the Acccused, a man whom she called “Lexus” informed her that the Group was sending her to Laos to take on another job.

6 While at the Laos call centre, the Accused made two separate requests to Lexus to return to the Philippines. In response to her first request on 26 May 2025, Lexus told her that she would be given an advance salary of USD1,000 on the condition that she continued working at the Laos call centre for one month. She agreed, pursuant to which the advance salary was transferred in Philippines pesos to her bank account. She made the second request a few days later on 1 June 2025. On that occasion, upon discussion with the Group, Lexus purchased an air ticket for her to fly back to the Philippines. To this end, on 7 June 2025, she took a boat from Vientiane to the airport in Chiang Rai, Thailand, and from there flew back to the Philippines via Bangkok. The Group also transferred SGD300 in Philippines pesos to her after she left Laos ⁵ .

7 The Accused was arrested in Singapore on 9 September 2025 on suspicion of having committed offences under the OCA. The Investigating Officer (“IO”), ASP Soh Ai Sim, recorded the following 12 statements from the Accused between 9 September and 5 November 2025. ⁶ :

8 Out of the 12 occasions on which the statements were recorded, a Tagalog interpreter, Ms Nur Seleena Abdullah (“PW1”), was present on three occasions. The Accused chose to speak in Tagalog on two of those occasions, and chose to speak in English on the remaining 10 occasions. Through these statements, the Accused gave a detailed account of the series of events which formed the basis of the two charges against her. As the bone of contention between the Prosecution and the Defence was the accuracy of and weight to be accorded to the statements, it would hence be important to lay out the narrative in these statements.

9 The Accused confirmed that she saw the following 14 people during her time at the Call Centre ¹⁹ and pointed them out from a series of 55 mugshots ²⁰ which the IO showed her:

10 During her time at the Call Centre, the Accused also met a person who worked in Line 1 called “King”, whom she described as a Malaysian man in his late 50s and who “(seemed) to know a lot about the scam operation” ²⁵ .

11 According to the Accused, upon their arrival in Phnom Penh in the afternoon on 29 March 2025, a male Cambodian took their passports, after which they were driven to the Call Centre ²⁶ . In the car on the way to the Call Centre, a male Chinese asked the Accused if she was Indonesian and she replied that she was a Filippino. Upon her query, the male Chinese said that “he is a Singaporean” ²⁷ .

12 When they arrived at the Call Centre, which was an eight-storey building, Lexus, whom the Accused referred to as her “team leader” ²⁸ , met them and brought them to one of the rooms on Level 6. The room contained a living hall, a kitchen, a bedroom and a balcony. The Accused and Demi shared a bedroom together with a female Indonesian known as “Ford” ²⁹ . All meals were provided ³⁰ .

13 Am hour later, the three of them went to the training room on Level 1 to have dinner. They were also given scripts and other information to go through. As what transpired in the training room that evening was critical in determining if the Accused had the requisite knowledge of the activities of the Group and if she did engage in a criminal conspiracy, it would be important to reproduce the description of what took place in the training room that day in her own words in the 3rd Statement:

14 In the 8th Statement, which she gave in Tagalog and interpreted by the interpreter in English to the IO, the Accused amended a portion of paragraph 11 of the 3rd Statement cited in [13] above. It would be important to set out in full what she amended as she sought to reframe what she stated in the 3rd Statement in relation to the commission coming from “the money (they) had to steal from the customers”, which was a critical piece of evidence which the Prosecution relied on to show that she knew the true nature of the Group’s activities from the very first day she arrived at the Call Centre:

15 After the three-hour training session, Howard drove the Accused and Demi to a restaurant for a meal, together with a few others. The Accused returned to the Call Centre at about 9 pm while Demi returned at about 11 pm.

16 The Accused wrote down from memory the script which she confirmed at the trial was given to her on 29 March 2025 ³¹ , and asked to memorise as part of her training (“the handwritten script”) ³² . She said that she could remember the script as she “memorised it almost every day” at the Call Centre and when in Laos ³³ . As the content of the script as conveyed by the Accused herself detailed what the Accused was tasked to do as part of her proposed job duties as a Line 1 caller, which in turn shed light on the role she played during the material time in Phnom Penh, it would be useful to set it out in full:

17 The following day on 30 March 2025, Lexus added the Accused to a chat group on Telegram and was given the nickname, “Chrysler”, in the chat group. According to the Accused, the chat group was created by one “Bao Bao”, Demi’s boyfriend ³⁴ and a Malaysian whom she first met in Kuala Lumpur while in transit from the Philippines to Phnom Penh and who introduced himself by that name ³⁵ . She added that she communicated with Lexus, King, Bao Bao and Chris in the chat group, and continued to do so occasionally when she was in Laos ³⁶ .

18 The Accused described in detail in the 4th Statement how she was added to the chat group and what the purpose of the chat group was:

19 The Accused said that she remembered that the daily amount scammed was between SGD20,000 and SGD600,000 and that “(t)he announcing of killed bills was only done in the groupchat” ³⁷ . She later explained in the 7th Statement that to “kill bills”, the Line 3 callers at both call centres in Phnom Penh and Laos would “tell the customer to transfer all their account balances to a ‘new set up bank account’ to safekeep his money until investigation against him is concluded. So if the customer believed, all his money would be scammed" ³⁸ .

20 The Accused said that there was nothing much to do that day. She accompanied Demi to the training room and “only play (sic) with my mobile phone and did not read the script” ³⁹ .

21 Over the next few days from 31 March to 2 April 2025, the Accused and Demi spent their time memorising the scripts and doing role plays. According to the Accused, their trainers, Chris and Michael, did not tell them the purpose of reading the scripts, which they did repeatedly. Michael also told them during the training session on 1 April 2025 that they had “strong Filipino accents and wanted (them) to change a bit towards Singaporean English” ⁴⁰ .

22 The Accused described in detail in the 7th Statement what she was trained to do in both Phnom Penh and Laos:

23 In her answers to the IO’s questions during the recording of the 6th Statement, she also explained that Chris told her that when conversing with the customers, she needed to exert pressure on them:

24 In the afternoon of 2 April 2025, Chris and Michael brought the Accused, Demi and three other trainees, including two Malaysians, to what the Accused referred to as “the Line 1 operation centre” ⁴¹ on Level 8 of the Call Centre. She drew a detailed sketch of the Line 1 operations centre ⁴² . In the 3rd Statement, she made the following observations about the operations which she witnessed during the two hours which she spent there:

25 When the IO asked the Accused why she thought that she was not in an online gambling company but in a scam centre after listening to one of the Line 1 callers as stated in paragraph 18 of her 3rd Statement (as cited above), she explained thus in the 9th Statement:

26 In the 12th Statement, the Accused added that after she listened to the Line 1 caller’s conversation on that occasion, she felt that she was in a scam centre “because of the script content, the way the caller forcing (sic) the customer and the callers were not wearing proper office attire to work” ⁴³ .

27 On that same day, Chris and Michael also brought the Accused, Demi, the three other trainees and another Indonesian female called “Ford” to another Line 1 operations centre on Level 7 of the Call Centre. The Accused drew a sketch plan of the layout of the operations centre, which showed a staircase connecting Levels 7 and 8 ⁴⁴ .

28 There was no training conducted on 3 and 4 April 2025, although Lexus told the trainees on 4 April 2025 that a test would be conducted on 7 April 2025 to see “if we were qualified to start job” ⁴⁵ . Over the weekend on 5 to 6 April 2025, the Accused “(focused) on my revision hoping to pass the test” ⁴⁶ .

29 On 7 April 2025, the day of the test, Chris and Michael brought the Accused and three other trainees to a training room on Level 7 for a final practice session before the test. Demi was not with them. The trainees were called in to the room individually to take the test, with the Accused being the last one to be tested. It was not disputed that the Accused failed the test. In the 4th Statement, the Accused explained how Chris and Michael administered the test:

30 The Accused added that after the test, she approached Lexus to tell him that she chose “the 8% commission instead of having the basic pay + 3% commission” ⁴⁷ , which Lexus agreed to.

31 On 8 April 2025, Demi was sent back to the Philippines. The Accused asked Lexus if she too would be sent back. Lexus told her that “the company would find a new workplace for (her)" ⁴⁸ . He added that she would need to pay USD1,000 – USD2,000 if she wanted to return to the Philippines.

32 Aside from the Line 1 operations centres on Levels 7 and 8, the Accused said that she also went to the Lines 2 and 3 operations centres on two occasions when she went to collect her meals, and drew a detailed sketch plan of its layout ⁴⁹ . While she did not know “how the customer was managed at Line 2 in Phnom Penh ⁵⁰ ”, she was able to explain how the Line 3 callers at the Call Centre operated (see [19] above).

33 The Accused said that they had “all the freedom while staying (at the Call Centre)”, that she could “go anywhere we want” and that there was “no restriction or curfew”. She went out for meals on two to three occasions with her “Car Team” members, Lexus, Land Rover, Ford and one “Aston Martin”, which were paid for by Lexus ⁵¹ . She and Ford also went to get their nails done together at a salon, which Ford paid for as a treat as the latter had earned a commission of USD7,000 from “ “killing” one customer” ⁵² .

34 On 20 April 2025, Lexus informed the Accused that she would be sent to Laos to work. He informed her that she would be paid USD1,000 + 3% commission, as well as free meals and accommodation when she worked in Laos. The Accused said that she took up the job “due to the good benefits given and “Ford” was transferred to Laos to work too” ⁵³ . She said that she agreed to go to Laos to work even though she was fearful of the members of the Group as she “(didn’t) know what kind of job (she had) over there”. She explained that she needed to work because of her family in the Philippines and that her intention was to continue to stay in Laos “to earn money before asking them to send (her) back home”. She left for Vientiane on 24 April 2025 and, as stated in [5] above, stayed at the Laos call centre till 7 June 2025.

35 During her time there, the Accused worked as a Line 1 caller once again, this time targeting Australians. After a week making such telephone calls, she was told to send out unsolicited emails instead as the calls “weren’t productive” ⁵⁴ . As it turned out, this alternative modus operandi was similarly not effective. She added that she “purposely did not perform” ⁵⁵ and that she believed that the Group agreed to let her go back to the Philippines as “they deemed (her) as a poor performance worker" ⁵⁶ .

36 After she left Laos, Lexus kept sending her text messages to tell her that she had to go back to Cambodia to work for him as she had not fulfilled the condition of working in Laos for one month despite receiving the advance salary of USD1,000 ⁵⁷ . He also tried to track her down through her friend, Demi, whom she also referred to as “Mi Mi” in the 10th Statement ⁵⁸ . The Accused later told Demi or “Mi Mi” to inform those who were looking for her that they were no longer in contact ⁵⁹ .

37 According to the Accused, she came to Singapore on 14 July 2025 ⁶⁰ . She was arrested on 9 September 2025 ⁶¹ .

38 The Prosecution’s case relied primarily on the 12 statements, the material parts of which were detailed in [9] to [36] above. While the statements were admitted by consent ⁶² , the position of the Defence was that some parts of the statements were inaccurately recorded by the IO, particularly the admissions she made which went to show that she had actual knowledge of the locally-linked OCG’s nefarious activities targeting victims in Singapore while she was in Cambodia. The Prosecution submitted that the Accused made baseless allegations about the inaccuracy of the statements as recorded by the IO in order to “recant what she has come to realise are damning admissions” ⁶³ .

39 To establish the 1st Charge, the Prosecution had to show both that when she was in Phnom Penh, the Accused knew of the true nature of the Group as a scam syndicate which targeted victims in Singapore, and that she was a willing member of the Group

40 The Prosecution contended that the Accused knew from the day she arrived at the Call Centre on 29 March 2025 that the Accused knew that the Group was a locally-linked OCG which obtained financial benefit from cheating victims in Singapore of their money.

41 To prove this, the Prosecution relied on the following pieces of information which were contained in the various statements to the IO:

(a) The handwritten script, which contained phrases and words such as “fake” which showed that the Accused knew that she was to give false information to victims, as well as references to the fact that the Group targeted victims in Singapore.

(b) During the period of training, the Accused was told to speak with a more “Singaporean English” accent ⁶⁴ .

(c) On 30 March 2025, the Accused was added to the Telegram chat group which contained messages about the operations of the Group.

(d) The Accused knew the hierarchy of the callers from Lines 1 to 3 as evidenced by the fact that she was able to identify individuals as Line 1, Line 2 or Line 3 callers from mugshots shown to her by the IO.

(e) The Accused witnessed the operations for Line 1 and Line 2 callers, including the Line 1 callers pretending to type using spoiled keyboards and pressurising those whom they were speaking to into agreeing to have their calls transferred to Line 2.

42 To show that the Accused was a willing member of the Group in the hope of earning money as a scammer, the Prosecution pointed to the following evidence:

(a) On 2 April 2025, after observing what the Line 1 callers did, while the Accused shared her suspicion with her friend that they were in a scam centre, both of them decided to stay on nevertheless to earn “good money”. ⁶⁵

(b) On 7 April 2025, the Accused took a test to be a Line 1 caller.

(c) The Accused admitted that between the option of a guaranteed basic salary of USD1,500 coupled with a 3% commission and an 8% commission only, she informed her supervisor that she wanted the latter payment scheme as she could make more money. She hence stayed on at the Call Centre for pecuniary reasons.

(d) The fact that the Accused could travel in and out of the Call Centre and within the compound freely showed that she stayed on at the Call Centre voluntarily. She also had a mobile phone with her with access to the Internet throughout her stay in Phom Penh.

(e) Another indicator that the Accused voluntarily stayed at the Call Centre as a member of the Group was the fact that she agreed to and did travel to Laos thereafter on 24 April 2025 in order to earn money as a scammer. When she decided to leave the Laos call centre in June 2025, she was able to do so without difficulty – the Group agreed to release her early and paid her a salary as well.

43 The Prosecution’s position was that the Accused was a party to a criminal conspiracy with other members of the Group from the first day when she arrived in Phnom Penh on 29 March 2025 or alternatively, by the end of her visit to the Line 1 Operations Centre on 2 April 2025. The contention between the Prosecution and the Defence was whether there was indeed an agreement between the Accused and other members of the Group to cheat victims in Singapore of their money during the period of time when the Accused was in Phnom Penh.

44 The Prosecution pointed to much of the same evidence which was tendered to support the 1st Charge to prove that there was an agreement between the Accused and four other members of the Group, namely, Lexus, Chris, Michael and Bao Bao, including:

(a) The handwritten script which the Accused was provided with on 29 March 2026, and her being told that day by the trainer about earning a commission from the money that they “had to steal” from customers ⁶⁶ , after which she agreed to undergo training as a Line 1 caller.

(b) The two-hour long visit the Accused paid to the Line 1 Operations Centre on 2 April 2025, after which she and her friend decided to stay on to earn “good money” despite her suspicion about the true nature of the operations.

(c) The Accused making known to her supervisor that she would prefer a remuneration based on a commission of 8% after she took the test on 7 April 2025.

(d) The fact that the Accused stayed on at the Call Centre voluntarily after she took the test.

45 The Accused’s position was that she did not know that the Group was a locally-linked OCG targeting victims in Singapore through their scam activities while she was in Phnom Penh, and that any knowledge she had about the true nature of the Group as a locally-linked OCG, and which was reflected in the statements to the IO, was gained after she left Phnom Penh when she was in Laos. She was also not a willing member of the Group. In any event, the Group did not want her as a member.

46 Defence Counsel submitted that the following points in the Accused’s testimony showed that she did not have actual knowledge that the Group was a locally-linked OCG when she was in Phom Penh:

(a) Before she arrived in Phnom Penh, she thought that she was going to be an employee in an online gambling company and did not know that she was going to join a scam syndicate.

(b) She had never travelled out of the Philippines and thought Singapore was in China. This showed she did not know what or where Singapore was. She also did not know any other characteristics of Singapore, e.g. the currency, the banks operating in Singapore and what “MAS” stood for.

(c) When she was in Phnom Penh, she was not told by any member of the Group that its activities related to Singapore.

(d)  She only learnt what the Lines 2 and 3 operations entailed when she was in Laos.

47  As for membership in the Group, Defence Counsel submitted that there was inadequate evidence that the Accused was a member for the following reasons:

The Prosecution’s case was based entirely on her physical presence at the Call Centre, which was insufficient. None of the factors set out in sections 5(2)(a) – (k) of the OCA to help determine if a person was a member under section 5(1) applied in relation to the Accused.

(a) The Group did not accept the Accused as a member given that they only accepted as a member those who passed the test to qualify as a caller. In this case, the Accused failed the test to be a Line 1 caller on 7 April 2025, upon which she had to leave the Call Centre. As a result, she was also not given a work phone which had been prepared for her.

(b) The Accused herself did not want to be a member of the Group.

(i) Before she travelled to Phnom Penh, she was told that she would be working for an online gambling company.

(ii) After she arrived, aside from being told to memorise a script which she did not understand, nobody explained to her the details of the operations of the scam syndicate or how the entire scam was supposed to work.

(iii) She never wanted to make any scam calls, and did not do so.

(iv) After she started to suspect that she was in a scam centre, nobody was willing to tell her anything when she raised queries.

(v) She remained at the Call Centre against her will. She did not have her passport with her and had no money to take a flight back to the Philippines. She hence had to make multiple attempts “to engineer her escape from the group” ⁶⁷ .

48 As such, both the mens rea of knowledge and actus reus of membership were not established.

49 Defence Counsel submitted that all the evidence which the Prosecution relied upon only related to whether the Accused had knowledge of the locally-linked OCG’s criminal activities. Knowledge alone was insufficient and should not be conflated with the issue of whether there was an agreement between the Accused and other members of the Group. The Prosecution’s selection of the four people identified as the co-conspirators was also arbitrary and not supported by the evidence.

50 In addition, it was submitted that it was not shown that the Accused had any knowledge of the “Government Official Impersonation Scam” as framed in the 2nd Charge. The Prosecution was also unable to properly articulate the date on which the Accused entered into the criminal conspiracy.

51 The Prosecution relied on acts which occurred in Cambodia to form the foundation of the two charges. This raised two related but distinct considerations: first, whether this court had the jurisdiction or authority to try the offences in the two charges; and second, whether the relevant statutory provisions which formed the bases of the offences criminalised acts which were committed outside the territory of Singapore.

52 In Ng Kok Wai v PP [2024] 3 SLR 1516 (“Ng Kok Wai”), the General Division of the High Court held that an accused person may be tried and convicted in Singapore for acts committed outside Singapore if two requirements are met (see [16] and [17] of the Judgment):

(a) Where there is an applicable statutory provision that renders an act committed by the accused person outside Singapore an offence under a Singapore law (the extraterritorial application provision); and

(b) Where there is an applicable statutory provision that confers authority on the Singapore courts to try the accused person for the offence in question (the jurisdictional provision).

53 While Defence Counsel did not disagree with the Prosecution’s position that the offences under section 5(1) OCA and section 120B read with section 420 of the PC applied to acts committed outside Singapore, and that the District Court had jurisdiction to try the offences in question ⁶⁸ , this court still needed to be satisfied that the two requirements were met in respect of both charges as they went to the heart of the court’s authority to try the case, as well as whether the Accused could be held criminally liable before the District Court for acts which took place outside of Singapore.

54 Taking the second requirement first, the criminal jurisdiction of the District Court is provided for in section 50 of the State Courts Act 1970 (“SCA”):

55 In relation to the 2nd Charge, section 4B(1)(c) of the PC provides that a specified offence is deemed to have been committed in Singapore where the specified offence “involved an intention to make a gain or cause a loss or exposure to a risk of loss or to cause harm to an person in body, mind, reputation or property, and that gain, loss or harm occurs in Singapore”. Section 4B(2) states that a specified offence “means an offence specified in the Schedule and includes … a criminal conspiracy to commit the offence”. Paragraph 9 of the Schedule in the PC lists the offence of cheating under section 420 as a specified offence deemed to be committed in Singapore. Hence, the District Court has jurisdiction to try the 2nd Charge as an offence committed within Singapore under section 50(2)(a) of the SCA. The first requirement stipulated in Ng Kok Wai was not engaged in the first place since the offence under the 2nd Charge was deemed to have been committed in Singapore given that the charge as framed involved cheating victims of their money in Singapore.

56 In relation to the 1st Charge, section 50(2)(d) of the SCA clothes the District Court with the jurisdiction to try an offence committed in any place or by any person if it is provided in any written law that the offence is triable in Singapore. This means that if the OCA empowers the District Court to try the Accused for acts committed in Cambodia, the jurisdictional requirement is met. Section 78 of the OCA provides that the District Court has jurisdiction to “try any offence punishable under (the OCA), other than an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life” [emphasis added]. An offence under section 5(1) of the OCA carries a prescribed maximum punishment of a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment not exceeding five years or both. The District Court thus has the jurisdiction to try the 1st Charge pursuant to section 78 of the OCA.

57 As explained in [24] of Ng Kok Wai:

58 As such, in relation to the 1st Charge, it was necessary to determine if section 5(1) of the OCA applies extraterritorially.

59 Section 5(1) of the OCA provides as follows:

60 The key terms used in section 5(1) are defined in section 2(1) of the OCA:

61 The term “serious offence” is defined in section 2(1) to mean an offence specified in Part 1 of the Schedule to the OCA. One such offence is section 420 of the PC. It is further noted that the list of offences in Part 1 of the Schedule would generally involve only acts committed within Singapore given the presumption of territoriality, viz the well-established principle that a domestic statute will not have extraterritorial effect unless it is expressed to have such effect, and as such, acts committed outside the jurisdiction are presumed not to constitute an offence: see [25] – [28] of Ng Kok Wai.

62 The question before me was whether section 5(1) applied to a person who was a member of a locally-linked OCG regardless of whether he was within or outside Singapore, or whether section 5(1) required the person to be in Singapore at the material time. The Accused could be tried for an offence under section 5(1) only if the former interpretation was adopted given that at the relevant time, she was in Cambodia.

63 Section 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act 1965 (“IA”) provides that statutory provisions should be interpreted purposively. An interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) is to be preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpose or object. To that end, extraneous materials may be considered to confirm or to ascertain the meaning given to a statutory provision: sections 9A(2) and (3) of the IA.

64 In Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 373 at [59] (“Ting Choon Meng”), the Court of Appeal laid down the three steps when undertaking the process of purposive statutory interpretation, which was affirmed in the later decision of the Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37].

65 The three-step process in statutory interpretation has been cited and applied by the courts in numerous cases. The application of this process was explained by Sundaresh Menon CJ in Ng Kok Wai at [14]:

66 Applying the principles of statutory interpretation in [65] above, it was clear that section 5(1) applies to persons who are members of a locally-linked organised criminal group regardless of whether they were within or outside Singapore at the material time. My reasoning is elaborated on below.

67 The first step of the inquiry is to ascertain the possible interpretations of the words “any person” in section 5(1), having regard to section 5(1) itself and the context of the legislative text within the OCA as a whole.

68 Section 5(1) states that “(a)ny person” who is or acts as a member of a locally-linked OCG commits an offence. It does not place a limit on the geographical location of the person who is alleged to be a member. This is in contrast with all the other offence-creating provisions in Part 2 of the OCA which have separate provisions for offences committed by a person “in Singapore” and a person “outside Singapore”. For example, section 6, which criminalises the recruiting of members for an OCG, distinguishes between an offence committed by “a person in Singapore” (see section 6(1)) and an offence committed by “a person outside Singapore” (see section 6(2)). Similarly, sections 7(1), 8(1), 9(1), 10(1), 11(1) and 12(1) criminalise various types of acts committed by a “person in Singapore” in relation to an “organised criminal group” as defined in section 2(1). On the other hand, sections 7(2), 8(2), 9(2) 10(2), 11(2) and 12(2) criminalise these same types of acts committed by a “person outside Singapore” in situations which are linked to the activities of a “locally-linked organised criminal group” as defined in section 2(1).

69 In addition, section 5(1) criminalises membership only in a “locally-linked” OCG, not any OCG. Again, this is in contrast to the other offences in part 2 of the OCA, which criminalise acts in connection with both a “locally-linked organised criminal group” and an “organised criminal group”. Section 2(1) defines an “organised criminal group” to mean:

70 As can be seen, the ambit of an OCG is broader than that of a locally-linked OCG. The former includes groups which commit both serious offences committed within Singapore (see section 2(1)(a)) and offences committed outside Singapore (see section 2(1)(b)), while the latter only includes groups which obtain a financial or other material benefit from serious offences committed in Singapore, subject to specific exceptions (see [61] above].

71 Within the context of the narrower scope of a locally-linked OCG in section 5(1), which is in effect a subset of the definition of an OCG, membership of that locally-linked OCG includes any person “who is or acts as a member of a group” [emphasis added]. Section 2(1) defines “group” to mean “a group of 3 or more individuals (whether or not ordinarily resident in Singapore)”, including a body of persons “based within or outside Singapore”. On a plain reading of the text, section 5(1) provides that a group of three or more individuals who are all outside Singapore can be members of a locally-linked OCG which obtains a financial or other material benefit from criminal acts committed in Singapore as specified in Part 1 of the Schedule to the OCA. A fortiori, “any person” of that group qua member can be outside Singapore at the material time.

72 This interpretation of the words “any person” in section 5(1) as applicable to persons situated both within Singapore and outside Singapore is consistent with the legislative purpose of the provision, and on this note, I turn to consider the second step of the three-step framework, viz to ascertain the legislative purpose or object of section 5(1) and the OCA itself. Pursuant to that approach, extraneous materials such as the records of parliamentary debates may be used to shed light on the objects or purposes, and meaning of section 5(1): also see sections 9A(3)(c) – (d) of the IA.

73 During the Second Reading of the OCA (see the Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (17 August 2015), vol 93), the Second Minister for Home Affairs explained that with the transnational reach of organised criminal groups, the OCA needed to be enacted “to enhance our ability to disrupt the activities of (organised criminal groups) at various levels of their hierarchy so as to prevent them from establishing a foothold to perpetrate serious crimes”. The Minister elaborated on how these groups often operated across jurisdictions, and the attendant difficulties in detecting and successfully prosecuting such crimes:

74 The Minister also explained the key provisions in the OCA. In respect of the definition of an OCG in section 2(1), which must comprise at least three persons, the focus was “on groups that pose an organised crime threat to Singapore”. The provisions in Part 2 of the OCA, which set out the general offences relating to the activities of an OCG, were meant to:

75 Having regard to the Hansard above, an interpretation of section 5(1) which includes within the locally-linked OCG’s membership ranks a person who is situated outside Singapore is consistent with the parliamentary intention to capture offending acts committed outside Singapore through the enactment of Part 2 offences, including section 5.

76 Following from this, it is also clear that pursuant to the third step of the inquiry in statutory interpretation, this interpretation advances the purpose or object of the OCA. As explained by the Minister, the OCA was introduced to more effectively tackle and disrupt the pernicious activities of OCGs which operate across borders, and hence acts committed outside Singapore, including membership of such groups, must be captured within the ambit of the legislation to further the legislative objective.

77 In the circumstances, the two requirements in Ng Kok Wai were satisfied and the Accused could be tried and convicted in Singapore if the 1st Charge under section 5(1) of the OCA was made out.

78 The burden was on the Prosecution to prove the following against the Accused beyond a reasonable doubt:

(a) For the 1st Charge: (i) that the Group was a locally-linked OCG; (ii) that the Accused knew that the Group was a locally-linked OCG; and (iii) that the Accused was a member of the Group;

(b) For the 2nd Charge: (i) that the Accused was a party to a criminal conspiracy with other members of the Group, which was a locally-linked OCG; (ii) that the conspiracy was to commit the offence of cheating under section 420 of the PC by way of a Government Official Impersonation Scam; and (iii) that it was intended through the criminal conspiracy of the Group, of which the Accused was a part, that the victims of the cheating offence would suffer harm to property in Singapore.

79 In determining if the 1st and 2nd Charges were made out, I considered the following issues:

80 While the Accused did not challenge the voluntariness of the statements which were recorded by the IO, the Accused testified that her statements were inaccurately recorded in the following material aspects:

(a) In paragraph 4 of the 1st Statement and paragraph 11 of the 3rd Statement, she did not use the words “enticed by the good money” ⁶⁹ .

(b) In respect of sentence about Michael telling Demi and the Accused to “change a bit towards Singaporean English” in paragraph 14 of the 3rd Statement, they were never told to use a “Singaporean” accent but to speak in an accent similar to how the trainers spoke. It was the IO who used the words which were reflected in the statement ⁷⁰ .

(c) In respect of paragraph 19 of the 3rd Statement, she initially told the IO that she did not know why she stayed on and upon the IO asking her again, she said that she decided to stay on at the Call Centre despite her suspicion that it was a scam centre because she was scared that she would be tortured or hurt and feared for her own safety. She only told the IO later that she stayed on “because of money?” because she felt that her earlier answers were not good enough for the IO. She added that she did not tell the IO that she decided to stay on because of the money ⁷¹ .

(d) In respect of paragraph 22 of the 4th Statement, she did not state that she “did prepare some pointers for the test, and I brought it along trying to pass the test”. All she told the IO was that she brought the script ⁷² .

(e) In respect of her answer in [51(e)] in the 7th Statement as to the mode of receiving the money from the victims, she did not state that someone in Singapore would receive the money once the customer withdrew it from the ATM, and that it was the IO who inserted the word “Singapore” ⁷³ .

81 Defence Counsel also submitted that in relation to Annex P to the 10th Statement, the Accused told the IO that there were other messages on Facebook and Instagram between her friend, Demi or “Mi Mi”, and her which were available and relevant ⁷⁴ .

82 I accepted the Prosecution’s position that there was no material inaccuracy in the recording of the statements, and that what was in the statements accurately reflected what she told the IO.

83 In respect of nine out of the 12 statements which were recorded by the IO during the sessions when no interpreter was present and the Accused chose to speak in English, the statement concerned was read to her in English on each of those occasions after the statement was recorded and before she signed it so that she could review and verify its truth and accuracy, and make the necessary amendments. At the end of each statement, it was stated that “(t)he statement was read over to (her) in English and (she) affirmed it to be true and correct” ⁷⁵ . The Accused accepted during cross-examination that the IO went through each statement with her paragraph by paragraph, and that she was given two opportunities to amend it, first on the day of the recording of the statement, and again on another day in the presence of PW1, the Tagalog interpreter who was present at the recording of the statements on three occasions ⁷⁶ (see [88] below):

84 As a matter of fact, she made amendments to passages in the 1st Statement, 3rd Statement, 4th Statement, 5th Statement, 6th Statement, 7th Statement and 9th Statement and initialled against those amendments, as can be seen from the respective statements in the Agreed Bundle.

85 In this regard, there was clear evidence that the Accused was conversant in English and had the requisite command of English to read and understand what was written in those statements. First, PW1 testified that from her observation, the Accused was able to speak and converse in English very well ⁷⁷ . According to PW1, even on the occasion of the recording of the 8th Statement on 17 September 2025 when PW1 was present and it was stated that the Accused chose to speak in Tagalog, the Accused used a “(m)ixture of English and Tagalog” ⁷⁸ , spoke in English most of the time and was able to answer the IO’s questions in English straightaway. PW1 confirmed that the Accused explained to the IO what “killed bills” meant in the 8th Statement (see [14] above) in English ⁷⁹ . PW1 also said that the Accused herself explained to the IO what the messages between her and Mi Mi which were written in Tagalog (and reproduced in Annex P of the 10th Statement ⁸⁰ ) meant in English and would only ask PW1 to help interpret certain words in English if she was unable to do so ⁸¹ . PW1’s testimony as to the Accused’s command in English was consistent with the IO’s, who testified that based on her observation, the Accused was very fluent in English, and that the Accused also informed her that she could speak good English ⁸² . The Accused herself acknowledged during cross-examination that she could understand, speak and read English ⁸³ .

86 Second, that she had a good command of English was evident during the trial before this court. I observed that the Accused was able to understand and follow the proceedings without much difficulty, and noted that she could read and understand the relevant passages of the statements and other documents in the Agreed Bundle which were read out to her by Defence Counsel or which she was asked to read without requiring the Tagalog interpreter (“the interpreter”), who was present throughout the trial, to translate them for her.

(a) She testified that she was able to follow the testimony of PW1 and the IO in the main and only required the interpreter to interpret a few of the more complicated words ⁸⁴ .

(b) During the examination-in-chief of the Accused, upon the court’s query, the interpreter replied that the Accused had been reading the statements in the Agreed Bundle and that the Accused confirmed that she could understand what she had been reading ⁸⁵ . The interpreter informed the court that she did not translate the passages referred to by counsel as the Accused confirmed to her that she could understand the passages. The interpreter would only interpret the questions posed to the Accused by counsel. The Accused also confirmed to her counsel that she could read and understand the statements and that she would ask the interpreter to translate the words which she did not understand:

(c) The Accused also confirmed to the court that she could read the words in the passages in the statements, and could also understand what those words meant, and that whenever she did not understand the meaning of those words, she would ask the interpreter to translate them for her. She further confirmed that she answered the questions posed only after she understood all the words in the relevant passages which were the subject of the questions ⁸⁶ . During cross-examination, the Accused sought to explain how she built up her command of English, stating that while in prison, she read books, studied English and asked a cellmate to teach her English ⁸⁷ . I was sceptical of the Accused’s explanation as it was evident that even at the point in time of her arrest in September 2025 when 11 out of 12 of her statements were recorded, she was able to understand, read and write in English, including writing by hand (i) the script she was asked to memorise and (ii) a description of the duties of the callers in Lines 1, 2 and 3 (reproduced in [99] below.

(d)  At various points in time, as was reflected in the transcript of these proceedings, she answered the questions posed to her in English without necessitating the assistance of the interpreter to interpret the exchanges to her ⁸⁸ .

87 Third, the Accused was able to communicate with the people she met at the Call Centre in English. She testified that at the Call Centre, she spoke to Ford, Lexus, Chris and Michael in English ⁸⁹ .

88 In addition to being able to go through the statements at the end of each statement-recording session, the Accused was given another opportunity to review the nine statements taken when there was no interpreter present - the relevant statements were interpreted in Tagalog to her on each of the three occasions when PW1 was in attendance, i.e. on 10 September 2025 for the recording of the 2nd Statement, 17 September 2025 for the recording of the 8th Statement and 23 September 2025 for the recording of the 10th Statement:

(a) During the recording of the 2nd Statement on 10 September 2025, in addition to interpreting the 2nd Statement itself to her in Tagalog even though the Accused had chosen to speak in English ⁹⁰ , PW1 also interpreted the 1st Statement, upon which the Accused made changes to what she had stated in paragraph 2 of the 1st Statement ⁹¹ .

(b) During the recording of the 8th Statement on 17 September 2025, in addition to interpreting the 8th Statement itself in Tagalog ⁹² , PW1 also interpreted the 3rd to 7th Statements recorded between 11 and 16 September 2025 from 2:55 pm to 4:55 pm, pursuant to which some spelling errors were corrected ⁹³ . In this regard, the court noted that while it was stated in the 8th Statement that the previous statements recorded on 12 to 16 September 2025 were so interpreted ⁹⁴ , Defence Counsel accepted that the 3rd Statement recorded on 11 September 2025 was in fact interpreted to the Accused ⁹⁵ . I had no doubt that the 3rd Statement was interpreted to the Accused as she made substantial amendments to paragraph 11 of that statement as set out in [14] above.

(c) During the recording of the 10th Statement on 23 September 2025, aside from interpreting the 10th Statement itself in Tagalog ⁹⁶ , PW1 also interpreted the 9th Statement recorded on 22 September 2025, which the Accused did not make changes to ⁹⁷ . While it was stated in paragraph 58 of the 10th Statement that the previous statement recorded on 17 September 2025 was interpreted, it was clear to me that there was a typographical error and that the statement which PW1 interpreted was the 9th Statement recorded on the previous day and not the 8th Statement dated 17 September 2025 as PW1 was present for the recording of the 8th Statement and had already duly interpreted that statement on that day itself. There was no reason to re-interpret it to the Accused again. I also accepted the IO’s testimony that it was the 9th Statement which was interpreted and not the 8th Statement by virtue of the amount of time taken to interpret the statemen ⁹⁸ t. It was stated in the 10th Statement that the interpretation took 21 minutes from 2:30 pm to 2:51 pm ⁹⁹ , which would correspond more to the length of the 9th Statement which was four pages long, compared to the 8th Statement which was shorter at about one and a half pages.

89 Pursuant to my assessment above, I found that the Accused was sufficiently competent in both her oral and written English to be able to express herself in English effectively and convey her answers adequately in English to the IO during the recording of the statements, and to read and understand the nine statements recorded in English so as to review them effectively. In arriving at my finding as to the command of the Accused’s English, I took into account the fact that she communicated with others at the Call Centre in English, that she could write down in English the script she was asked to memorise and other descriptions of what she saw and was told, that she could follow the present trial proceedings and the statements read out in English well, and that she could read the passages in the statements in English without much difficulty. She also had two opportunities to go through the nine statements which were recorded in the absence of PW1 and did in fact make amendments to those statements, some of them substantive.

90 As such, if there were indeed material omissions or inaccuracies as she had described in [80] above, she would have asked the IO to insert the missing portions or correct the inaccuracies, which the IO did. For instance, she testified that she told the IO to correct the gender of her youngest child in paragraph 3 of the 1st Statement from “boy” to “girl”, which was duly amended ¹⁰⁰ . The Accused did not give any cogent explanation as to why she corrected some parts of her statements but not others. Crucially, I did not accept her evidence that in respect of paragraph 19 of the 3rd Statement, she had told the IO that she was scared that the Group might torture her if she tried to leave but that this explanation, including her use of the specific word, “torture”, was not reflected in that part of the statement. The Accused admitted that she did not highlight this alleged omission on the part of the IO to either the IO herself on the date the statement was recorded on 11 September 2025 or to PW1 on 17 September 2025 during the taking of the 8th Statement. She agreed that if she had told PW1 that she had used the word “torture”, the IO would have had no choice but to reflect that in the 3rd Statement as PW1 would have insisted on it ¹⁰¹ . I did not believe the Accused’s explanation that she did not know that her statements should contain the exact words she had used as she thought the IO would “just choose what she wanted to put in (her) statement, and that she omitted to ask PW1 to add her explanation that she feared that she would be tortured as she had forgotten to do so. The Accused said that she did not pay attention to it since her focus was to finish recording her statements so that she could go home and start working ¹⁰² . The Accused had made a number of amendments to a number of passages in the statements as highlighted above, some of which were substantial, and there was no reason why she could not make amendments to paragraph 19 as well. The Accused’s assertion that she forgot to ask PW1 to add the point about her fear of being tortured also beggared belief given that this went to the heart of her defence that she was not a member of the Group and that she remained with the Group because she was scared of being tortured.

91 In the circumstances, I found no reason to doubt that the statements contained a reliable and accurate account of what the Accused told the IO during the 12 sessions when her statements were taken, and hence accorded the statements due weight when assessing the evidence to determine if the Prosecution had proven its case.

92 I would hasten to emphasise that whether the elements of the two charges were made out was dependent on whether the totality of the evidence before me, including but not limited to the Accused’s statements recorded by the IO and her testimony in court, was sufficient to meet the criminal standard of proof. It was to the assessment of the factual evidence before me that I next turned.

93 To establish the 1st Charge, the following three elements of the charge had to be shown: that the Group was a locally-linked OCG, that the Accused knew that the Group was such when she was in Phnom Penh, and that her actions and the activities she partook in during her stay at the Call Centre showed that she was a member of the Group.

94 It was not disputed that the Group was a criminal group operating in Cambodia ¹⁰³ . The first element required that the Group be a locally-linked OCG, which in turn required that the Group had the purpose of obtaining financial benefit from serious offences in Singapore. The question was whether one of the purposes of the Group was the obtaining of financial benefit from cheating victims in Singapore of their money under section 420 of the PC, and was thereby a “locally-linked” OCG.

95 In my assessment, there was more than sufficient evidence to establish that the Group was seeking financial gains from cheating in Singapore through the set-up of the syndicated scam, impersonating Singapore government officials and targeting victims in Singapore. This was drawn from the Accused’s own evidence through her statements and testimony in court. At this juncture, I would note that while the Accused emphasised repeatedly in her testimony that she had no choice but to stay with the Group in Phnom Penh, and only had actual knowledge of the true nature of the Group and came to the realisation that the Group operated a scam targeting victims in Singapore after she left Phnom Penh when she was in Laos or thereafter, she did not deny or retract what she had observed at the Call Centre, the content of the conversations with the various people involved in the Group, the contents of the handwritten script (at [16] above) and other handwritten notes which were annexed to the statements. For the purposes of determining if the Group had one of its purposes the obtaining financial benefit from the commission of serious offences in Singapore as a matter of fact, the time period within which the Accused derived her knowledge was immaterial [emphasis added)].

96 I would now delve into the evidence from the Accused on the mechanics of the syndicated scam and how the Group implemented it. I accepted that her observations of what she saw at the Call Centre and the descriptions of her conversations with the various people were true and accurate, and were supported by the content of the handwritten script, her evidence in court, and documents seized from the Group’s warehouse in Phnom Penh during a raid in September 2025.

97 Through her statements, the Accused described in detail the organisational structure and mechanics of the scam, from the key players in the Group, the roles of the different people involved, including the roles of the callers in Lines 1, 2 and 3, and how the money which the victims were deceived into handing over to the Group was received.

98 The Group was a relatively huge and sophisticated set-up operating in an eight-storey building in Phnom Penh, with a proper hierarchy and demarcation of responsibilities and duties. The people involved in the Group were from different countries, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore.

(a) The “boss” of the operations was Howard, from whom all the instructions for the Group came ¹⁰⁴ . The Accused had seen him on Level 2 of the Call Centre counting US dollar notes ¹⁰⁵ .

(b) Bao Bao, Demi’s boyfriend at the relevant time who introduced both of them to this job at the Call Centre, was a senior member of the Group. He created the Telegram chat group for members of “Car Team” which the Accused was added to on 30 March 2025. According to the Accused, the chat group was created so that Bao Bao could monitor the performance of the callers in Lines 1 to 3 ¹⁰⁶ . Bao Bao was Lexus’ boss and from whom the latter took instructions ¹⁰⁷ .

(c) Lexus was the team leader of “Car Team” which the Accused was part of ¹⁰⁸ . He was the one who added the Accused to Car Team’s Telegram chat group ¹⁰⁹ and whom the Accused spoke to about the commission she chose on the day of her test on 7 April 2025 ¹¹⁰ .

(d) Chris and Michael were the coaches or trainers of new recruits, including the Accused, and administered the test to the Accused and a few others.

(e) There was also at least one person who “work(ed) as an operator who’s handling the list of leads (customer names), cell phones to use to call the customer and he is the one throwing the cueing call to Line 2 and Line 3 (meaning to transfer Line 1 to Line 2 and Line 2 to Line 3)” ¹¹¹ . This operator would print the lists and distribute them to the Line 1 callers and assist to transfer the calls from Line 1 to Line 2 and from Line 2 to Line 3 ¹¹² .

(f) Then, there were the callers for Lines 1 to 3, a number of whom the Accused met at the Call Centre and identified from the mugshots (see [9] above). There were about 20 Line 1 callers at the Line 1 operations centre, which was on Levels 7 and 8 of the Call Centre. The Lines 2 and 3 operations were on another floor.

99 The Accused succinctly explained how the Group cheated victims of their money through the coordinated efforts of the Line 1, Line 2 and Line 3 callers, which she wrote down for the IO during the recording of the 3rd Statement ¹¹³ :

100 The Accused also explained the role of the Line 1 caller in the 7th Statement (see [22] above). The handwritten script also showed what Line 1 callers, who pretended to be customer service officers of banks, had to say to convince the victims, whom they called based on the name list of “customers” provided to them by the operator, that a credit card had been applied for in his name (when in reality he had not) and that transactions had been made on that card (without the victim’s authorisation) for which he was liable unless he lodged a report with MAS. Once it could be proved to MAS that he did not apply for the card, the victim would then not be liable for the charges on the credit card. The aim was to deceive the victim into believing that his credit card or bank account had indeed been compromised so that he would agree for the call to be transferred to Line 2. Line 2 callers would impersonate as MAS officers to help the victim lodge what were in reality fictitious reports to MAS. If the victim continued to believe in the deception, he would be transferred to Line 3 callers, who would “tell the customer to transfer all their account balances to a ‘new set up bank account’ to safekeep his money until investigation against him is concluded. So if the customer believed, all his money would be scammed” ¹¹⁴ .

101 In the 7th Statement at [51(e)], when explaining how the Group received the victims’ money after the Line 3 callers managed to convince them to do so, the Accused said that aside from a direct transfer to the Group’s bank account, she learnt from Chris that another method was that “if the customer withdraws the money from the ATM, the syndicate will get someone in Singapore to receive the money from the customer…. I heard this information from “Chris”. This method only used in Phnom Penh but not at Laos” [emphasis added].  

102 Based on the above account by the Accused, it was clear that the Group, through the deception orchestrated collectively by the callers from Lines 1 to 3, dishonestly induced victims to transfer money from their own bank accounts to the Group.

103 From the evidence adduced, that the Group targeted victims in Singapore was, to my mind, also not in doubt. The handwritten script contained sufficient indicia of Singapore, including references to the Singapore currency, “SGD”, the Singapore personal identify number, “NRIC”, Singapore addresses and banks with presence in Singapore such as Citibank, Maybank and OCBC. The money withdrawn by victims who were successfully scammed was also collected by “someone in Singapore”. It was also clear from the role of the Line 2 caller that a key component of the scam involved the impersonation of officers from the Monetary Authority of Singapore or “MAS”. While the Accused denied knowing what “MAS” referred to at the material time, it was not disputed that in fact, MAS referred to the Monetary Authority of Singapore, an agency of the Singapore government.

104 The Accused’s evidence as to the nature of the Group was reinforced by the two sets of documents which were seized during a raid of the Group’s warehouse conducted by the Cambodian National Police at which the IO’s colleague involved in the investigations into the Group, DSP William Tay, was present. It was not disputed before me that the warehouse was used by the Group ¹¹⁵ .

(a) The first was a set of two typewritten scripts which the court admitted into evidence pursuant to sections 63 and 64 of the Evidence Act 1893 ¹¹⁶ . The content of one of the scripts was very similar to the handwritten script itself. It contained the same key points which the caller had to convey to convince the victim that his credit card or bank account had been compromised and to encourage the victim to make a report to the Monetary Authority of Singapore or MAS. Crucially, this script contained even more indicators than the handwritten script which clearly pointed to the fact that the target victims were from Singapore. This included asking the victim to verify his “Singpass Activity” and if the victim had “travelled outside Singapore”. In this script, it was clearly stated that the caller was to suggest that the victim was to lodge a report with “the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)”, and to add that the MAS was working with the “Commercial Affairs Department (CAD)” to “fight against all fraud cases”. All this clearly showed that this scam was set up to cheat victims in Singapore through the impersonation of Singapore government officials such as officers from the MAS and the CAD. The other script was in the form of answers to a series of questions which the intended victim may ask. This script contained other indicators pointing to victims in Singapore being the target group, such as references to the caller calling from “Maybank Singapore’s Anti-Fraud Department” with an official hotline at “1 800-629 2265 (from Singapore)” and an MAS webpage, eservices.mas.gov.sg/rr [emphasis added].

(b) The second was a set of invoices dated between 10 May 2025 and 15 July 2025 which the court admitted under section 11 of the Evidence Act ¹¹⁷ . These invoices related to orders placed for the making of certain signages. In the “Description” of the signages, the images of the logos of “Ministry of Manpower”, “Ministry of Law Singapore”, “Immigration and Checkpoints Authority Singapore” and the “National Crime Prevention Council” were included, with the names of these entities clearly imprinted. This added to the evidence that the Group’s modus operandi involved the impersonation of Singapore government officials as the clear inference could be drawn that these were backdrops against which Line 2 callers would make their video calls to trick unsuspecting victims in Singapore into believing that they were dealing with officials from these government ministries and other government-related agencies. This was consistent with the Accused’s testimony in court ¹¹⁸ and in paragraph 45 of the 6th Statement that behind where Howard was sitting on Level 2 of the Call Centre was a wall with a big backdrop depicting the “MAS logo”, similar to the backdrop in the courtroom behind where this court sat.

105 For the avoidance of doubt, in assessing the evidence to determine if the Group was a locally-linked OCG, I did not have regard to the IO’s testimony on the Group’s operations, particularly in relation to the hierarchy of the Group, its standard operating procedures and the detailed mechanics of the work of the callers in Lines 1 to 3 as she did not have direct knowledge of this. The IO acknowledged in her testimony that her account to the court was based on her interpretation of the handwritten script and the collective findings of the investigation team comprising 17 officers which investigated the activities of the Group ¹¹⁹ .

106 Having determined that the Group was a locally-linked OCG as a matter of fact, the next question I turned to was whether the Accused herself had actual knowledge that the Group was a locally-linked OCG at the material time, i.e. when she was in Phnom Penh. The key question here was whether the Accused knew that the Group was a locally-linked OCG while she was at the Call Centre in Phnom Penh between 29 March and 24 April 2025, and not after that. If the Accused only knew the true nature of the Group’s activities after 24 April 2025, the second element of the 1st Charge would not be made out.

107 Defence Counsel submitted that the time period covered by the 1st Charge was overly broad as it was based purely on the Accused’s physical presence at the Call Centre without regard to her evolving state of knowledge about or her actual level of participation in the Group’s activities. I did not think that the time period stated in the 1st Charge, which was “between 29 March 2025 and 24 April 2025” was too broad. It merely stipulated the period of time within which the Prosecution contended that the offence under section 5(1) OCA was committed. On a plain reading of the charge, what had to be shown was that at any particular time or periods of time between 29 March and 24 April 2025, the Accused had the requisite knowledge of the Group’s activities as a locally-linked OCG and that she was a willing member of the Group within that period. The charge as framed was not that she committed this offence from 29 March 2025 all the way to 24 April 2025, but that she committed it within this period. It was also not practicable or reasonable to expect the Prosecution to prove that the Accused had both the knowledge and was a member of the locally-organised OCG every single day within this period before the charge could be made out. To put it in another way, it was not necessary for the Prosecution to prove that the elements of the charge were made out on every single day during this period as that was simply not within the parameters of the charge as framed.

108 Having regard to the handwritten script, the observations she made about the operations of the Call Centre and her interactions with others there during the period of her stay, I was satisfied that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused had actual knowledge that the Group ran a scam syndicate at the Call Centre to cheat victims of their money from the first day she arrived at the Call Centre.

109 First, the script given to the Accused on the day she arrived at the Call Centre on 29 March 2025 set out a fictitious narrative which revolved around a bank officer trying to help a bank customer whose credit card, which was in reality never applied for, was used for transactions which the victim never made, and contained fabricated details which clearly pointed to fraudulent activities being perpetrated. I had pointed out the key details in the handwritten script in [100] above. In addition, the script referred to the Line 1 caller informing the victim that the credit card was delivered to an address which was expressly referred to as a “fake address”, and giving the victim “fake” credit card details and “fake” reference numbers to convince the victim of the authenticity of the narrative to convince the victim to lodge a report with the relevant authorities.

110 I did not accept the Accused’s testimony that she did not understand the script she was given that day and that nobody explained the contents of the script to her ¹²⁰ . The script was not a complicated one and the words used were neither uncommon nor technical in nature which required specific domain expertise to understand. A person with the Accused’s level of competency in English should and would have had no trouble understanding and appreciating the content of the script. It would also have been clear from the face of the script that the caller was making the call in his or capacity as a customer service officer of a bank, and that it had nothing to do with calling a customer to pay an outstanding bill to an online gambling company as there was nothing in the script which made reference to online gambling or outstanding bills arising out of online gambling transactions. The script clearly pointed to credit cards being issued and sent by the bank, bank details, termination of credit cards and lodging a report with “MAS”. The Accused also acknowledged on the stand that when she memorised the script in Cambodia, she knew that there were references to credit cards and banks ¹²¹ , and that she knew on 29 March 2025 itself that the script was to be used when she started making calls at the Call Centre ¹²² . If it was indeed about the payment of an outstanding online gambling bill, all the information in the script would not have been relevant. In other words, the content of the script did not square with the collection of bills for an online gambling company. In this regard, I agreed with the Prosecution’s submission that the Accused “was not somebody who needed the script to be explained to her, given her proficiency in English … ”. ¹²³ I also noted that on that same day, she not only received the script but also had a three-hour training session which comprised of “reading through the copies, and going through questions and answers” ¹²⁴ , during which she would have had the opportunity to read and absorb the content of the script.

111 In these circumstances, bearing in mind that the script was clearly written for a customer service officer from a bank, and that it had nothing to do with collecting outstanding monies owed to an online gambling company, coupled with the Accused’s knowledge on the day she received the script that it would be used when she made calls at the Call Centre, I was not convinced by the Accused’s assertion that, despite reading the script and undergoing the three-hour training session on 29 March 2025, she still thought that she was working for an online gaming company and that she did not know on that day that the content of the script was meant to trick the supposed customer into believing that there were fraudulent credit card-related activities relating to these bank-issued cards being committed. It was pertinent to note that the Accused acknowledged that on 29 March 2025, she knew that she was not working for a bank. In that case, it would have been clear to her that the script she was asked to use to call the customers was one which required her to pretend that she was a bank officer, which would or should have alerted her to the fact that what she was asked to do was to deceive people into believing that she was a bank officer who was assisting them to resolve the issue of fraudulent credit card transactions made in their name.

112 Second, according to paragraph 11 of the 3rd Statement, on the same day, while in the training room after she was given the script and had dinner, a Malaysian man told her, Demi and Ford that “the commission came from the money we had to steal from the customers”. In the 8th Statement which was recorded several days later, the Accused corrected that part of the 3rd Statement, stating that what the gentleman actually said was that they would “get the commission after (they) ‘killed bills’” and that she understood from him that “it was about the customer having outstanding bill to pay to the online gambling company. So my job was to call the customer for payment and to ‘kill bill’”. I had already explained why I did not believe that the Accused would have thought that her role was to ask for repayment of outstanding online gambling bills. Even if the Malaysian man used the term “kill bill” or “killed bill” when explaining to her what her role was and how she would be remunerated, given the content of the script and the modus operandi of the scam syndicate, it would not have made sense for him to say to the Accused that her commission was based on the amount of online gambling monies which the customers repaid as nothing in the script or the operations of the Group related to the business of online gambling. The only conclusion which could be drawn from the evidence was that what the Accused stated in paragraph 11 of the 3rd Statement was accurate and contained the truth as to what she was told – that her remuneration or commission came from the money she had to “steal” from the victims. To put it in another way, she would get paid if the victims were successfully deceived and cheated of their money. Her explanation about “killed bills” in the 8th Statement was an afterthought to seek to rectify what the Prosecution described as a “very damning admission”.

113 The Accused said on several occasions during her testimony that when she used the word “scam” (or its variants) in the statements or recounted to the IO about the scamming activities of the Group, e.g. in paragraph 47(e) of the 6th Statement and paragraph 57(a) of the 9th Statement, she referred to the word “scam” in describing the activities as she already knew by the time she was arrested that the Group was involved in scam-related activities, but that she did not know that they were running a scam when she was in Phnom Penh. The Accused’s consistent stance during the trial was that while her statements were littered with indications that she knew that the Group’s operated a scam, she did not have actual knowledge at the time she was at the Call Centre from 29 March to 24 April 2025 but only later after she left Phnom Penh for Laos. Even if I took the Accused’s explanation at face value and that certain aspects of her knowledge as to the true nature of the Gorup’s activities were derived only after she left the Call Centre, e.g. Chris telling her about how someone in Singapore would receive the money from the victim after it was withdrawn from the ATM (see paragraph 51(e) in the 7th Statement), aside from what I had detailed above, there was a lot of other evidence which led the court to draw the irresistible inference that what she knew from the first day of her stay at the Call Centre as to the true nature of the Group’s activities was reinforced by what she observed, the training she went through and what she was told by others during her time at the Call Centre. Let me elaborate.

114 The Accused visited the Line 1 operations centre on Levels 7 and 8 on 2 April 2025 and visited the operations for Lines 2 and 3 as well on two occasions. She drew a detailed sketch plan of the layout of the Line 1 operations centre and was able to describe the operations of Line 1 in detail based on her observations at the Call Centre, as set out in [24] – [27] above. This included her seeing Line 1 callers using spoilt keyboards and them pressuring victims to lodge an MAS report. She even talked about how she “saw this Styrofoam box being used (at the Call Centre) for Line 1 caller” ¹²⁵ and how she “saw the callers putting their head inside the Styrofoam box to cut noise coming from the surrounding” ¹²⁶ . She was able to draw a sketch plan of the layout of the Lines 2 and 3 operations centre and to describe how Line 2 callers were attired. She also described based on her observation that Line 3 callers in Phnom Penh would “tell the customer to transfer all their account balances to a ‘new set up bank account’ to safekeep his money until investigation against him is concluded”. These observations that she made while at the Call Centre would have reinforced her knowledge and belief that the Group operated a scam even without asking the callers and trainers, whom she claimed in the 9th Statement refused to tell her anything.

115 The Accused’s training regimen would also have revealed to her that her role as a Line 1 caller was to deceive potential victims into believing the false narrative as set out in the script so that they would agree to be transferred to Line 2 and ultimately be dishonestly induced to part with their money and deliver them to the Group through pressure tactics. Aside from what she would have learnt from the content of the script, she was also trained to “push” the customer to “make a police report”, impersonating as a “bank staff’ (see [22] above). The Accused also stated that when she was in Cambodia, she was taught by Chris to pressurise the victims and not to be “soft-hearted towards the customers” and that if they allowed the victim to end the call and “call the customer another day he might be (sic) ‘wake up’ and know that we are scammer” ¹²⁷ .

116 The Accused’s conversations with others whom she met at the Call Centre, including through the exchanges during the training sessions, would also have reinforced her knowledge that the Group ran a scam syndicate. One of the persons she spoke to was King, whom she described as someone who worked as a Line 1 caller but who was familiar with the work of Lines 2 and 3 callers, and told her that “he could do all”. She stated in the 6th Statement that:

117 At the trial, the Accused said that she spoke to King on only one occasion on 7 April 2025 but agreed under cross-examination that after she spoke to King, she “knew that the centre made money by scamming people because King told (her) that he (would) not stop working as a scammer” ¹²⁸ .

118 There was other evidence which showed that the Accused knew that the Group ran a scam syndicate while she was still at the Call Centre. She testified during her examination-in-chief that around the time when she had a few conversations with Lexus between 14 and 20 April 2026 about her status and whether she would be sent back to the Philippines, she did not try to ask for her passport because “It’s already in my mind that I think … that I am inside a scam kind of work …” ¹²⁹ . She also stated in paragraph 32 of the 5th Statement that she knew that the Laos call centre was yet another scam outfit as “after hearing their conversation, I knew I am in a scam centre again to scam customers” [emphasis added]. All this pointed not merely to her suspicion but to her actual knowledge of the Group’s scam-related activities at the point in time when she was still in Phnom Penh.

119 I was also satisfied that the Accused not only knew that the Group was a scam syndicate at the Call Centre to cheat victims of their money but also that the Group specifically targeted victims who were in Singapore.

120 The Defence took issue with the Accused’s knowledge of Singapore. She denied knowing where Singapore was located, and testified that she thought Singapore was in China ¹³⁰ . She also depicted herself as ignorant of Singapore as she had never left the Philippines previously ¹³¹ . In contrast, the Prosecution pointed to evidence showing that the Accused knew that the target area of activity was in Singapore through references to Singapore addresses, to the Singapore currency, and to Singapore institutions, particularly the MAS. She was also told to have a Singaporean English accent.

121 In my view, the requirement of knowledge of a locally-linked OCG did not require that the Accused knew of Singapore’s characteristics, that it is in South-East Asia, or that it is an independent country. What must be shown was that she knew that Singapore is a locality or a place and that criminal activities were being committed that were linked to this particular location, even if her mental map was hazy or that she was ignorant about where Singapore was. In any event, I accepted that the evidence showed that she knew that Singapore was a specific location outside the Philippines, even if she did not know where exactly Singapore was located. This could be gleaned from paragraph 9 of the 3rd Statement, in which she stated that a male Chinese who was in the car with her and Demi told her that “he is a Singaporean” while she said that she was not an Indonesian but a Filippino. She would hence have known at the very least that Singapore was a place where Singaporeans came from, just like Filipinos were from the Philippines and Indonesians were from another place.

122 I also found that the Accused knew that the scam activities were occurring or intended to occur in Singapore. The script given to the Accused contained references to Singapore such as the Ubi address being in Singapore – the Accused accepted at the trial that the script she was given on 29 March 2025 contained the word “Singapore” in the address ¹³² . She also stated in paragraph 14 of the 3rd Statement that she was told by her trainer, Michael, to speak English with a Singapore accent. Although the Accused said in court that she and Demi were never told to use a “Singaporean” accent but to speak in an accent similar to how the trainers spoke, this was a bare assertion which I rejected in light of my finding that the statements recorded by the IO accurately reflected what the Accused told her. She had the opportunity to correct that part of the statement twice but did not do so – if the statement was erroneous or inaccurate, she would have corrected it, just like she did in relation to other parts of that statement. As seen from the script, which contained a reference to a Singapore address and the instruction to her to “change a bit towards Singaporean English”, she knew that the prospective victims were in Singapore. The clear and inexorable inference was that the Accused knew that this was a locally-linked OCG.

123 For completeness, I should add that I was not convinced that the Accused knew at the material time when she was in Phnom Penh that the acronym, “MAS”, referred to the “Monetary Authority of Singapore”. The Accused’s testimony, which I accepted, was that the logo she saw on a wall on Level 2 of the Call Centre behind where Howard was sitting contained only the letters “MAS” and not the full name of the organisation, and that it was the IO who suggested what MAS meant and put the full name of the organisation in brackets in paragraph 45 of the 6th Statement ¹³³ . During re-examination, the IO testified that she was the one who showed the words “Monetary Authority of Singapore” to the Accused from a Google search result and asked her to confirm if she was referring to those words.

124 The Defence argued that it was not shown that the Accused was a member. She had not passed the prescribed test, and she did not carry out any activities for the Group, such as recruitment of others. The Group also did not accept her as a member. Her presence at the Call Centre was not enough.

125 Against this the Prosecution pointed to her presence at the Call Centre, which she could leave, that she had undergone training and prepared for the test, and that she had agreed to travel to Laos after her stint in Phnom Penh to earn money as a scammer.

126 There was clear evidence that the Accused’s actions and the activities she partook in showed that she was a member of the Group voluntarily:

(a) She put in a lot of effort into passing the test to be a Line 1 caller. She spent days memorising the script and doing role plays. She stated that over the weekend before the test on 7 April 2025, she focused on her revision, hoping to pass the test. She also prepared some pointers for the test. If she had wanted to leave the Call Centre and return to the Philippines after she found out that it ran a scam-related operation, she would not have studied hard and put in the effort to pass the test.

(b) After she took her test, on that very day, she informed Lexus, her team leader, that she between the option of a basic salary + 3% commission and an 8% commission, she wanted the latter remuneration package. This showed that despite her knowing that the Group operated a scam, she wanted to stay on and take up the job as a Line 1 caller because of the pecuniary benefits.

(c) The fact that her passport was taken from her did not, in and of itself, mean that she was held against her will. In this regard, the Accused acknowledged that she had freedom of movement in Phnom Penh (see [33]). She went out for meals with her team members and took a Grab car with Ford to get their nails done at a salon. Throughout her time at the Call Centre, she had her mobile phone with her with Internet access. While her passport was kept away, she could have obtained help or could have tried to at least leave the compound. The failure to do any of these things pointed to her remaining with the Group consensually.

(d) By extension, I found that the Accused’s actions at the Call Centre were not a result of coercion of force, e.g. training and taking the test to be a Line 1 caller. While there were some limits on what she could do while in Phnom Penh, she had a substantial amount of freedom and could have left the Group’s premises or obtained help had she wanted. This pointed against any form of imprisonment or anything else that could have been seen as coercion and negating particularly any participation or membership in the Group.

(e) The fact that she agreed to go to Laos and did stay on at the Laos call centre to work as a Line 1 caller for more than a month despite her knowledge of the true nature of the Group’s activities in Phnom Penh further showed that she was a part of the Group voluntarily while she was at the Call Centre and decided to continue her association with the scam-related operation in Laos. If she was held against her will at the Call Centre and did not want to be a part of the Group, she would not have gone to Laos to work as a Line 1 caller.

(f)  While this point was not necessary on the court’s analysis to show membership in light of the other evidence, on 2 April 2025 after returning from visiting the Line 1 operations centre for two hours, she and Demi decided to stay on despite their suspicion that the Line 1 callers were working in a scam centre as they wanted “to earn the good money”. This indicated that the Accused chose to stay on voluntarily for financial reasons.

127 There was also evidence that the Group itself regarded the Accused as a member when she was at the Call Centre:

(a) She was assigned to the team called “Car Team” led by Lexus, who added her to a Telegram chat group. She was given the moniker, “Chrysler”. She also communicated with her team members in the chat group occasionally.

(b) The Group let her stay on at the Call Centre for more than two weeks after she failed the test, provided her with accommodation and meals, and offered her a job at the Laos call centre despite her failing her test to be a Line 1 caller in Phnom Penh. There was no reason for the Group to let her stay at the Call Centre on their account and to find another job for her unless they treated her as a member of the Group. It was not the case, as the Defence tried to argue, that the Accused was just at the Call Centre waiting to be sent back to the Philippines, as Lexus had informed her that the Group was looking for a place for her to work in.

128 The Defence also pointed to the criteria for membership listed in s 5(2) of the OCA. This came into force after the period when the Accused was said to have committed the offence. In any event, the Prosecution took the position that the court could use these factors as a guide. Taking as an example the test that was administered to her, Defence Counsel argued that she had not undergone any initiation ceremony (see section 5(2)(k)), as she had in fact failed the test, which was akin to such a ceremony. The Prosecution pointed to the taking of the test itself as being the initiation. I did not find that the test was an initiation: the purpose was different, being primarily to see if the Accused could be unleashed on actual scam targets. She may not have been found ready, but that did not mean she was not a member of the Group; all the factors that I set out above pointed the other way. Similarly, as regards the other factors relied upon by the Defence, they could not overcome the effect of the other evidence that pointed to her membership.

129 For the foregoing reasons, I found that the 1st Charge against the Accused was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

130 Section 120A of the PC defines criminal conspiracy as follows:

131 In determining whether the Accused “agreed” with another person to commit an offence in Singapore under section 120A of the PC, it is not necessary to prove the agreement in the form of an express agreement. Such an agreement can be inferred from the Accused’s conduct and other circumstantial evidence: see PP v Yeo Choon Poh [1993] 3 SLR(R) 302 (“Yeo Choon Poh”) at [19] and Er Joo Nguang and anor v PP [2000] 1 SLR(R) 756 (“Er Joo Nguang”) at [35], both of which were cited with approval in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Soh Chee Wen v PP [2025] 2 SLR 176 (“Soh Chee Wen”) at [21]. As the Court reasoned in Soh Chee Wen, the nature of the offence of criminal conspiracy is such that:

132 In determining if an inference of criminal conspiracy could be drawn, the High Court in Er Joo Nguang stressed that such an inference “would be justified only if it is inexorable and irresistible, and accounts for all the facts of the case”: at [35] of the judgment. To this end, the Court stated at [35] that “(b)oth the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties before and after the alleged commission of the crime will be useful in drawing an inference of conspiracy”. Similarly, in Yeo Choon Poh, the Court of Appeal opined that one method of proving a conspiracy:

133 It was also not disputed that for a charge of criminal conspiracy to be made out against the Accused, what was needed to be established was an agreement between the Accused and the “other members of a locally-linked organised criminal group" to commit an offence in Singapore, and that there was no need for them to have taken steps to carry out that agreement. That this was so was made clear in Soh Chee Wen at [26]:

134  It was also made clear in Soh Chee Wen that the offence of criminal conspiracy under section 120B is in relation to the period when the agreement was subsisting and not just when the agreement was entered into between the parties to the conspiracy. This is because the offence under section 120B continues for as long as the offender remains a party to the criminal conspiracy. The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

135 Guided by the above legal principles, I considered if the 2nd Charge under section 120B was made out against the Accused. To establish the 2nd charge, the following elements had to be shown: (1) that the Accused was a party to a criminal conspiracy with other members of the locally-linked OCG to commit the offence of cheating under section 420 of the PC by way of a Government Official Impersonation Scam; and (iii) that it was intended through the criminal conspiracy of the Group which the Accused was part of that the victims of the cheating offence would suffer harm to property in Singapore.

136 I had found on the evidence as elaborated on in [95] – [104] that the Group intended to cheat victims in Singapore of their money through the sophisticated scam set-up, thereby dishonestly inducing victims to transfer money to the Group and causing them to suffer harm to property in Singapore.

137 The crux of the dispute between the Prosecution and the Defence was as to whether there was in fact an agreement between the Accused and other persons in the Group to commit an offence under section 420 as particularised in the 2nd Charge, viz, to cheat persons in Singapore by way of a Government Official Impersonation Scam.

138 I found on the evidence before me that the surrounding circumstances, together with the actions and conduct of the Accused and other members of the Group gave rise to the inexorable and irresistible inference of a conspiracy among them. In this regard, I considered the following issues:

139 These issues would be dealt with in turn.

140 I had already found that the Accused knew on the day she arrived at the Call Centre on 29 March 2025 that the Group ran a scam syndicate at the Call Centre to cheat victims of their money, and that the Group targeted victims in Singapore – see [108] – [122] above. The unresolved question was whether she knew that the modus operandi of the Group involved people impersonating government officials to trick victims into handing over their money to the Group, and if so, when she was first clothed with that knowledge.

141 The script which the Malaysian man gave the Accused in the training room on 29 March 2025, after which the Accused underwent a three-hour training session that very day, contained a reference to the customer needing to “lodge a report to” to MAS, to report credit card details to MAS, and for the customer’s call to be transferred to MAS. Although the Accused may not have known that MAS stood for the Monetary Authority of Singapore on that day itself, the context in which the victim was asked to lodge a report would have made it clear in the Accused’s mind that the aim of the Line 1 caller, as was apparent from the script itself, was to persuade the victim to lodge a report of the fraudulent card transactions to a government authority to investigate, and then be transferred to a Line 2 caller, who would impersonate that government official.

142 That the Accused knew that the scam involved the impersonation of government officials when she was at the Call Centre was reinforced by her acknowledgment under cross-examination that while she did not know what MAS stood for, she knew that the person manning Line 2 was to act as a government officer:

143 Even if I were wrong about the Accused having knowledge that this was a scam involving the impersonation of government officials on the first day when she arrived at the Call Centre on 29 March 2025, she would have known of this at the very latest by the time she took the test on 7 April 2025 given that she stated that she was trained while she was at the Call Centre to make the customer believe that his credit card details had been misused and to “push him to make a police report”, as well as to tell the customer that she could assist by “transferring the call to MAS’ should the customer say that he could “(call) the police or (go) to the police station” himself, and that once the customer agreed “to allow MAS to handle his case”, the line would be transferred to Line 2 ¹³⁴ . This showed that during her training sessions, the Accused would have learnt that the making of a police report and the transfer of calls to an MAS officer, within the context of the scam set-up, would have entailed an operation which comprised of impersonation of government officials such as the police and MAS officers, the latter which she admitted she knew referred to a government officer.

144 The Accused also stated in paragraph 48(f) of the 6th Statement that when she was in the training room on the day of the test, she saw a Line 2 caller “wearing a long sleeve light blue shirt with shorts. He combs his hair neatly and I know that was the attire for Line 2. The caller for Line 2 needs to wear smartly to impersonate as the MAS officer” (emphasis added). This was another clear indication that she knew by then that the syndicated scam involved the impersonation of government officials.

145 The inexorable inference drawn from the above observations made by the Accused and what she was told to do was that on 29 March 2025 or at the very latest by 7 April 2025, she knew that the Group’s syndicated scam to commit cheating was by way of a Government Official Impersonation.

146 The intention of the Group to cause harm to property in Singapore and the conspiracy being to commit cheating were not in real issue in relation to the 2nd Charge. This was made out on the evidence showing that the Group intended to convince people in Singapore that their money in Singapore was at risk and that the Monetary Authority of Singapore or MAS in Singapore was involved in the effort to protect their money. The clear inference was that there was an intention to obtain the unlawful transfer of property in Singapore. That would mean that there was intention to cause harm to property in Singapore.

147 The focus of the Defence was on whether the Accused was party to the criminal conspiracy. I accepted the Prosecution’s argument that the evidence showed that there was agreement, and a meeting of minds. Having been given the script on the day she arrived at the Call Centre, and having been told by the Malaysian man even on that day that they would be “stealing” from those they were calling, her continued presence and involvement was sufficient to show agreement with the conspiracy. As I explained earlier, her version of events, that she thought she was involved in bill collection for an online gambling company, defied belief. As I had noted at [126(c)] above, she continued to be present there, though there was at least ample opportunity to get help if she was not part of the conspiracy. Her failure to do so spoke volumes and clearly implicated her.

148 Given the Accused’s knowledge on 29 March 2025 that the Group ran a scam syndicate to cheat victims in Singapore of their money, her knowledge on that day that it involved the impersonation of government officials, as inferred from the content of the script, as well as her other actions and conduct such as her interaction with the Malaysian man and the three-hour training session, there was an irresistible inference that there was an agreement between her and other members of the Group to commit the offence of cheating under section 420 targeting victims in Singapore on her first stay at the Call Centre. Again, even if I was wrong in finding that she knew that the impersonation of government officials was a component of the scam on 29 March 2025, she certainly had that knowledge by the date of the test on 7 April 2025, in which case the agreement would have been reached at the very latest on that date .

149 The Prosecution put forward an alternative basis in their further written submissions that the agreement would have been formed at the latest by 2 April 2025, when she said that she agreed to stay for the “good money”. The Defence contended that the reliance on this date was not advanced at trial. I could not accept this reason. The date was within the period reflected in the 2nd Charge, and the evidence did in fact come out, from the Accused herself in paragraph 19 of the 3rd Statement, which was adduced at trial, and which I accept as being accurate. In any event, as I had found that the agreement was reached on 29 March 2025 or at the very latest by 7 April 2025, it was not necessary for me to go further into the Prosecution’s alternative argument.

150 Neither was any reasonable doubt raised through the Accused failing to meet the test requirement. I had found that she was a willing member of the Group when in Phnom Penh, and those indicators which went to prove membership were also relevant to my drawing the irresistible inference that she was party to the criminal conspiracy – see [126] – [127] above. Her participation in the activities, such as being put through the training and taking the test, and her being added to the Telegram chat group of “Car Team”, meant that she was fully part of the conspiracy, even if she was at risk of being dropped through her failure. As noted by the Prosecution, she remained at the Call Centre, on funding from the Group, and then proceeded to go to Laos at the Group’s instructions. All this went beyond mere knowledge of the activities of others and pointed strongly and beyond any reasonable doubt to actual agreement with the conspiracy.

151 There was also a question raised about who the co-conspirators were. Taking into account the charge as framed, which referred to “other members” of the Group and not named individuals, it was not necessary to identify specific individuals although the Prosecution did so in the further arguments. The evidence did show, by the Accused’s own statements, that her team leader was Lexus, that Chris and Michael provided the training, and that Howard, whom she had dinner with on her first day at the Call Centre, was the boss of the entire operations and implicitly would have provided the funding to pay for her accommodation and meals. All this was enough to show the existence of others with whom the agreement or meeting of minds would have been made. In any event, looking at the factual circumstances, her observations and interactions from 29 March 2025, the identified co-conspirators would at the very least have included Lexus, Chris, Michael, the Malaysian man and Howard.

152 I also did not find that there should be any adverse inference from the Prosecution not calling witnesses who could give evidence on the conspiracy. The prosecution could choose how to present its case; on its evidence, it had been it made out sufficiently.

153 For completeness, I should add that in light of the actions and conduct of the Accused during her time at the Call Centre, as seen against the backdrop of the active operations of the Group in the operations centres for Lines 1, 2 and 3, the inevitable and irresistible inference to be drawn was that she was party to that conspiracy up to the point in time when she left the Call Centre for Laos on 24 April 2025.

154 For the foregoing reasons, I found that the 2nd Charge against the Accused was similarly proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

155 I imposed a global sentence of 25 months’ imprisonment on the Accused, who was untraced, with a sentence of 25 months’ imprisonment for the 1st Charge and 16 months’ imprisonment on the 2nd Charge, both to run concurrently and backdated to the date of arrest on 9 September 2025.

156 The Prosecution argued for a sentence of not less than 27 months’ imprisonment on the 1st Charge, and between 16 and 18 months’ imprisonment on the 2nd charge, with the two sentences running concurrently.

157 It was submitted that general deterrence was the overriding consideration, given the prevalence and escalating financial harm of scam-related offences in Singapore. The Prosecution relied on a figure for losses of S$913.1 million in 2025, the transnational nature of the syndicate, and Parliament's progressive legislative response to organised scam crime.

158 Against that backdrop, the Prosecution argued for substantial sentences for each of the two charges.

159 For the 1st Charge, the Prosecution sought at least 27 months’ imprisonment, and referred to the framework from the case of PP v Hermanto bin Abdul Talib [2021] SGDC 205 (“Hermanto”) which laid out a three-step analysis, looking at harm and culpability, with an indicative range, and then personal aggravating and mitigating factors.

160 It was argued that the level of harm was high. The Prosecution asserted that the syndicate of which the Accused was a part was involved in at least 528 reported scam cases with losses of S$52.5 million; it comprised 78 members with a sophisticated four-tier hierarchy; it employed AI rendering, uniforms and a separate money-laundering cell. At least 90 victims were aged 65 and above, with losses of about S$11.8 million attributed to the Group. The court in PP v Yip Chee Ming (DAC-918045-2025) (“Yip Chee Ming”), which according to the Prosecution, involved the same group, had already placed harm at the higher end of the high-harm band.

161 The Prosecution accepted that the culpability was low. However, the Accused was financially motivated, as she chose the pure commission pay package, which gave a higher payout to her. She also knew from the very first day that she was participating in scams. She had remained at the Call Centre for about four weeks, leaving only to go to Laos, following instructions from the Group.

162 On the Hermanto framework, the starting point would be at least 30 months’ imprisonment on the basis of high level of harm and low culpability. The band ranged from 24 to 36 months. The sentence should also be calibrated upwards from the starting point of 28 months in Yip Chee Ming, in view of the Accused’s offending over a longer period. A three-month reduction would then be applied to reflect cooperation with the police, bringing the sentence to 27 months’ imprisonment.

163 The Prosecution sought between 16 and 18 month’s imprisonment, using PP v Chua Zi Huang and others [2025] SGDC 100 (“Chua Zi Huang”) as a reference. That case involved transnational scam callers, with sentences of 42 to 55 months’ imprisonment on their pleas of guilt. That case concerned successful scam calls. The Prosecution accepted that a substantial downward reduction should thus be applied as the Accused did not successfully cheat any victim, and she did not face amalgamated charges.

164 The Prosecution submitted for both sentences to run concurrently given the significant overlap between the two charges, and to avoid any double-counting, with the date of the sentence to be backdated to the date of arrest.

165 In terms of harm for the 1st Charge, the Defence argued that the Hermanto framework was not binding, and was not endorsed by the High Court. The court should thus approach the case on its own facts. All the cases that had applied Hermanto involved accused persons who had committed further physical acts, such as actual scam calls or providing SIM cards. The Accused’s only other charge was a conspiracy charge, with no physical act on her part.

166 Her culpability was, it was submitted, lower than that in Yip Chee Ming. The offender there had visited the scam centre previously, deliberately decided to return and actually made scam phone calls, although he was unsuccessful. The Accused here only discovered the criminal nature of the scam operation when she arrived. She had not made any calls at all. Her being at the Call Centre did not contribute anything in operational terms to the syndicate.

167 The Defence took issue with the reliance by the Prosecution on the figure of S$52.5 million being taken as well as the size of the group, of at least 78 members, describing it as hearsay, as it was based only on the IO’s testimony, which was not supported by any primary documentation, and which had been objected to at the trial. No witnesses or documents substantiated it. In any event, not all of the losses should be attributed to the Accused, who was a member for less than a month, and there was no evidence allocating losses during her period of membership. It was also submitted that financial motivation should not be treated as an aggravating factor, citing Huang Ying-Chun v PP [2019] 3 SLR 606 (“Huang Ying-Chun”). Only a very large reward should be an aggravating factor, as opposed to just a promise of a reward. Here the Accused had received no actual commission, and had no realistic prospect of receiving any since she had failed the test to be deployed as a Line 1 caller, and had not actually been assigned to do so.

168 Thus for the 1st Charge, the starting point should be 18 months’ imprisonment, with a three-month reduction for her cooperation, giving 15 months. For the 2nd Charge, a sentence of not more than 12 months should be imposed. Both sentences should run concurrently, for a total of 15 months’ imprisonment.

169 Considering the facts of the case, I was in general agreement with the arguments of the Prosecution, save in relation to the scope of the Group’s operations, but because of the need for deterrence, I concluded that a sentence duration close to what was sought by the Prosecution should be imposed nonetheless.

170 I accepted the arguments of the Prosecution that general deterrence was the primary sentencing consideration.

171 As noted by VK Rajah JA in in ADF v PP [2009] SGCA 57 at [54]:

Andrew Phang JA noted in his judgment in that case as well at [218] (emphasis in the original):

What both passages point to is the fact that the sentencing considerations are important in guiding the overall approach but should always be informed by the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

172 In this case, as was submitted by the Prosecution, the overriding sentencing consideration was general deterrence. Defence Counsel did not take issue with this characterisation in his oral arguments, especially as regards the need to combat scams, primarily focusing on the low culpability and involvement of the Accused, as well as taking issue with the evidence relied on by the Prosecution, which would be dealt with below.

173 The first factor relied upon by the Prosecution as calling for a deterrent response is the prevalence and scale of scam offences in Singapore. The Prosecution referred to S$913.1 million in losses for 2025 alone, indicating that scams are serious and an increasing problem in Singapore. Reference was also made to the Guidelines for Scams-Related Offences issued by the Sentencing Advisory Panel (“Scams Guidelines”) for the proposition that scam-related offences are prevalent, require deliberation and involve organised criminal groups. In my view, judicial notice under the common law may be taken of the extent generally of scams and their effect in Singapore as these are facts which are so notorious or so clearly established that they are beyond the subject of reasonable dispute: see Zheng Yu Shan v Lian Beng Construction Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 6 at [25] – [27]. The Scams Guidelines, while dealing with related offences rather than the scams directly, are also persuasive, being issued by the Sentencing Advisory Panel, and underline the severity of the problem of scams and fraud generally. That severe problem, involving a large amount of financial harm and a wide reach, endangering a large segment of the public, requires a deterrent response in order to protect the members of the public.

174 The threat requiring a protective response from the court is also seen in the second factor invoked by the Prosecution, namely the severity of harm to the victims. The Prosecution pointed to the fact that the losses suffered by the victims would be debilitating, losing retirement or life savings, and would also often leave severe psychological scars. Such effects are self-evident, and would also point to the need for a heavy response. This factor also points to a retributive element coming into play as the Scams Guidelines point to the need for punitive sentences commensurate with the harm caused.

175 The Prosecution pointed to the targeting of organised criminal groups operating across jurisdictions by Parliament: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (17 August 2015) vol 93. The transnational nature of many scam operations, such as the one in the present case, calls for deterrence as well given that there is a deliberate reliance on the obstacles to investigation and capture that are inherent in international criminal activities. Hiding behind foreign borders hinders investigation and enforcement, and facilitates criminal activities. It also points to planning and organisation, which is another factor pointing towards a substantial deterrent response. These entail a high level of criminal responsibility, pose a great threat to the public, as sophistication, preparation and meticulousness increase the likely effectiveness of criminal activity. A robust response must follow. As supported by evidence at trial, the Group was a huge and relatively sophisticated set-up, with a clear hierarchy and demarcation of responsibilities and duties among different groups of people (see [98] above. Such similar organisation and planning by other syndicates would be a grave threat to the public and ought to be strongly curtailed and protected against through a hefty sentence.

176 The legislative response also points to deterrence as the legislative framework has been progressively strengthened from 2023 to 2025. In particular, the legislative amendments introducing caning pointed to the need to dismantle those enabling or facilitating scams by acting as mules. The Prosecution submitted that all of this pointed to a parliamentary call for increased deterrence. I accepted that there is an underlying recognition by Parliament that there needs to be a deterrent response to scams.

177 That many victims are vulnerable points to deterrence being necessary to protect them. The Prosecution argued that at least 90 victims were affected by the criminal organisation here, and losses of S$11.8 million were attributable to such elderly victims. I was unable to accept that there was such loss in this specific case as it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt against the Accused: this will be elaborated on below. Rather, a deterrent sentence in this case was called for because it would be clear that vulnerable victims, including the elderly, would be prone to such scams, as they prey on anxieties about losing money, and about cooperating with the authorities such as the police and the MAS. These concerns would clearly be uppermost in the minds of many of those who are older, who are thus prime candidates to be the targets of such operations, and who thus need to be protected by deterrent responses.

178 This is particularly important given the transnational reach of organised criminal groups such as the one which operated here, where the criminal activities which target victims in Singapore are conducted from abroad, making them difficult to track down, unravel and disrupt, while at the same time making it easier for the perpetrators and others connected with such scam-related syndicated offences to evade detection, arrest and prosecution.

179 As such, the sentences imposed for these offences must be substantial to deter those tempted to be involved in such activities, which cause significant harm to and have a devastating impact on innocent individuals financially and psychologically. The losses suffered through such scam-related offences often represent the life savings and retirement funds of the victims and their families. The modus operandi of these elaborate and insidious scams also undermine the confidence in payment and financial systems. Heavy sentences are also warranted because of the prevalence of scam-related offences being committed, and the substantial amounts of money which have been wrongfully obtained from victims.

180 In this regard, I agreed with the Prosecution that a deterrent sentence was required to be imposed to send a clear message to both those in Singapore and outside Singapore that they will be met with severe consequences should they decide to join syndicates that target our country, particularly those who try to do so from abroad.

181 I found the Accused guilty on the charge of knowingly being a member of a locally-linked OCG having a purpose of obtaining financial benefit from members committing cheating under section 5(1) of the OCA. The range of punishments prescribed is a fine up to $100,000 or imprisonment up to five years or both.

182 The Prosecution sought a sentence of at least 27 months’ imprisonment, applying the sentencing framework in Hermanto, under which harm and culpability were to be assessed with a matrix indicating different sentence ranges. The indicative sentence was then to be calibrated further by taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors. In the present case, it was argued that there was a high level of harm and low culpability.

183 The Accused argued against the application of the framework, which was said not to have been endorsed by the High Court and hence not binding on this court.

184 It was not clear to me how the Defence arrived at a figure of 18 months’ imprisonment as the starting point for this charge, before applying a three-month reduction. The sentence in Yip Chee Ming appears to have been taken as a ceiling given their different levels of culpability. But beyond that I could not see a systematic calibration for the figure put forth by the Defence. The need for some structure in considering the sentence pointed to the need to adopt a framework of the sort in Hermanto, even if there has been no endorsement or adoption by the High Court.

185 The three-step sentencing framework in Hermanto, which too was a case involving section 5(1) of the OCA is admittedly not binding. The District Court in Hermanto itself at [34] recognised that it could not lay down a framework as such; rather, as noted in [33] of its judgment, the court took reference from the position put forward by the prosecution, finding it useful in determining the appropriate sentence as it was principled and structured.

186 Having said that, I also found that the framework in Hermanto was a useful reference, guiding my sentencing decision to be taken. The distribution of possible sentence ranges by way of different levels of harm and culpability was sound and appropriate, and accounted for the full spectrum of the length of imprisonment permitted under the law.

187 The framework that guided the District Judge in Hermanto was proposed by the prosecution, which had taken the same position in two other cases. This was a three-step framework, in which the court assessed the degree of harm caused by the organised criminal group, then the offender’s culpability and considered an indicative sentence applying the following matrix (at [11]):

188 In determining harm, the factors argued to be relevant by the prosecution there (at [12]), and which the judge accepted as useful in the deliberation in that case (at [33]), were:

(a) The illegal purpose: the more dangerous or serious, the greater the harm;

(b) The organisation and scale, including the number of levels, the territorial reach including transnational links, the scale of the activities, the complexity of the operation, the difficulty of detection and the number of members in the organised criminal group; and

(c) the negative impact on society, including the concrete harms and how organised criminal groups in general would affect society. It was intended that the factors would be considered holistically.

189 As for culpability, the relevant considerations included:

(a) The position in the hierarchy of the organised criminal group, and the control or power exercised;

(b) The duration of the association with the organised criminal group;

(c) The functions performed by the offender for the organised criminal group;

(d) The motive in joining the organised criminal group; and

(e) The offender’s knowledge of the purpose, scale and activities of the organised criminal group.

190 Having identified the level of harm and culpability, and having arrived at an indictive starting point, the sentence would then be calibrated further by taking into account offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors: at [16].

191 The Defence could not point out anything in the Hermanto framework that went against principle. To my mind, none of the considerations in the Hermanto framework were without foundation. Indeed, the factors identified by the prosecution in Hermanto, and which were accepted as useful by the judge in that case, were relevant and would readily come to mind when considering the activities of organised criminal groups and calibrating the appropriate sentence. The scale and range, and complexity of the criminal organisation, as well as the activities, would all have a direct connection to the harm caused by the crime. The length of involvement, the position or role played by the offender and the offender’s knowledge would determine the criminal responsibility or culpability of the offender. Thus, there was nothing in the framework that went against principle. The distribution of sentence ranges within the table in Hermanto made sense, using the full breadth of the sentence duration specified under section 5(1), and distributing the span of sentences sensibly and equally across the different levels of harm and culpability. Importantly, the framework also made it clear that these were starting points only, with sufficient leeway given to account for the specific circumstances of each offender in each case.

192 I concluded that the Hermanto framework provided an appropriate guide to determining the sentence for the Accused on the 1st Charge. I thus considered the harm and the culpability, determining the indicative sentence against the matrix, with modification to account for the aggravating and mitigating factors.

193 Turning then to the current case, the Prosecution submitted that the level of harm was high, pointing to the activities of the scam syndicate, which was responsible for 528 reported cases, and total losses of S$52.5 million, comprising at least 78 members in a four-level hierarchy, indicating a high degree of sophistication. Various sophisticated tools were used including AI rendering and fake uniforms. There was also a dedicated money-laundering cell. At least 90 victims aged 65 and above were hit, with losses of about S$11.8 million. The Prosecution also relied on the fact that the court in Yip Chee Ming, which involved an offender in the same syndicate, already placed harm at the higher end.

194 The Defence argued that the figure of S$52.5 million, with 78 members, was hearsay, which based on the IO’s testimony without any documentary evidence. At the trial, an objection that this was hearsay was already made, and supporting or rebuttal evidence was not called. Therefore, the figures cited by the Prosecution could not be considered in sentencing. Furthermore, even if these figures were accepted by the court, the full loss for the year could not be attributed to the Accused, as she was only a member of the organisation for less than a month. The Prosecution had not identified what losses could be placed against the Accused.

195 I concluded that there was a high level of harm, but not on the basis of the evidence relating to the specific scope and effect of the Group’s activities relied upon by the Prosecution. Rather, what pointed to great harm was what could be inferred from the activities of the Accused as proven, as well as the general matters alluded to by the Prosecution in arguing for deterrence, namely the general extent of scams and their effects, which the court could take into account through judicial notice.

196 As I had stated earlier in [105], the evidence of the IO relied upon by the Prosecution as to the Group’s operations and its scale of activities was not used in the determination of conviction on the charges as I was not satisfied that the IO had direct knowledge of these matters. As for sentencing I found that the objection of Defence Counsel to reliance on the figures attributed by the Prosecution to the Group in the present case was well-founded. Firstly, it was hearsay, and secondly, even if such evidence was admitted, it was not proven.

197 The Prosecution denied that this was hearsay, but did not make arguments supporting the admissibility of the evidence, either as not being hearsay or through some hearsay exception. There was no evidence that could have allowed me to conclude in the present case that there were at least 528 reported cases ¹³⁵ , with losses of S$52.5 million, ¹³⁶ and at least 78 members ¹³⁷ . While the IO mentioned these figures in her testimony, this was not because of her personal knowledge – she said that the information was “based on our investigation” ¹³⁸ or “based on intel” ¹³⁹ . These figures mentioned by the IO were out of court statements.

198 An out of court statement is hearsay evidence when it is adduced to prove the truth of the facts stated: Subramaniam v PP [1956] 1 WLR 965, at 970. Section 62(1) of the Evidence Act, which specifies that oral evidence must be direct, is usually taken as the expression of the rule against hearsay evidence (though see Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] SGCA 20, which warns against using section 62 as providing a complete code on hearsay). The general position is that hearsay statements are inadmissible, unless they fall within a recognised exception, such as those in section 32(1) Evidence Act, or sections 258, 259 and 268 the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”).

199 At the trial, what the IO testified about was a recounting of out of court statements made by others about the scale and activities of the syndicate: she did not perceive such information herself. There was no evidence to suggest that she totalled up the losses, identified and collated the complaints from the various victims, or examined the necessary documentary evidence herself. No evidence was adduced by the Prosecution to support their assertions made through the IO in this regard. The assertions of the Prosecution were not accepted or admitted by the Accused. The Prosecution did not invoke any possible hearsay exception. What the IO testified to thus remained inadmissible as hearsay.

200 The fact that these figures were accepted in the case of Yip Chee Ming, which was a guilty plea case, to which facts were admitted by the offender there, did not mean that these very same figures could be used against the Accused here. The Accused here did not admit to anything, and the Defence argued against the figures relied upon by the Prosecution. These figures from Yip Chee Ming could not therefore be taken as facts to be used against the Accused unless I found that they were proven true. There was no evidence before me that could allow such a finding to be made: there was no evidence from other officers, from the intelligence unit, or otherwise, nor any documents supporting these assertions by the Prosecution.

201 Furthermore, even if the above information adduced by the IO were not inadmissible as hearsay, they remained unproven to the required standard, i.e. beyond any reasonable doubt. The Prosecution only relied on what the IO testified that she had learnt through “intel” or from other colleagues involved in the investigation. This was not enough to discharge the Prosecution’s burden.

202 Despite my finding above that the Prosecution was relying in part on inadmissible evidence of harm, there was more than sufficient other evidence to point to substantial harm having been caused by the offence committed by the Accused. Firstly, judicial notice could be taken of the general threat and extent of scams. Secondly, there were also the findings that were in fact made in the course of her conviction.

203 Taking first, judicial notice of the general extent of scams. The Prosecution referred to the general situation in its submissions on the need for deterrence, pointing to the prevalence and scale of scam offences, with a figure of S$913.1 million in losses for 2025. Such prevalence and threat was underlined by the Scams Guidelines and the parliamentary response. The need for deterrence translated in the context of the 1st Charge to the conclusion that the harm of the offence committed by the Accused was very high: she was involved in a Government Official Impersonation Scam that was based overseas, targeting individuals in Singapore, some of whom at least would probably be vulnerable, with potentially large sums of money being defrauded from victims. Thus, even if the hearsay figures relied upon by the Prosecution were not referred to, the conclusion would still be reached that the harm caused by the Accused’s offence was substantial and high.

204 This was further reinforced by decisions in other cases such as Chua Zi Huang, cited in relation to the 2nd Charge, which exemplified an instance of cheating through online scams, in that case by scammers posing as friends of the victims. There, at least 70 known victims suffered loses of close to S$165,000: see [6] of the judgment. These show the prevalence and ubiquity of such scams or fraud, again underlining the significant amount of harm caused.

205 As noted above, the Prosecution referred to the fact that the court in Yip Chee Ming found that the harm caused by this same group fell at the higher end of the band. Such a finding in a separate case could not determine the conclusion on this issue before me. The Accused could not refute and argue against that finding. Any fact or finding from Yip Chee Ming that was to be used against the Accused would have had to be proven as well.

206 Reference was also made by the Prosecution to the sentence imposed in PP v Tan Shay Howe [2026] 3 SLR 1304 (“Tan Shay Howe”) in which the offender was part of an organised crime group that obtained SIM cards for overseas syndicates. A starting point of 38 months’ imprisonment was applied, taking into account the high level of harm and medium culpability. This was reduced on the plea of guilt to 26 months and 2 weeks’ imprisonment. The Prosecution in the present case argued that the harm here was higher because the present case involved direct scamming. It was also argued that the Group in the present case was more sophisticated and larger.

207 I did not find that this comparison with Tan Shay Howe useful as the overall fixing of the starting point would have to take into account both harm and culpability.

208 The conclusion was thus that organised criminal scams of the type highlighted do have a significant impact on Singapore, causing great harm.

209 In convicting the Accused, the evidence against her reinforced the conclusion that the activities of the OCG she was involved with caused substantial harm. Her statements, which had been ruled reliable and accurate, and which were used in her conviction, showed that there was a transnational OCG carrying out scams targeting persons in Singapore, using a sophisticated ruse, faking government or official links, and preying clearly on the fear of official sanction or investigation to get victims in Singapore to move their funds. Her statements also showed that the operation was large and extensive.

210 The only conclusion that could be reached, and which the Defence could not refute, was that the level of harm caused was indeed high.

211 As to culpability, the Prosecution accepted that the Accused had low culpability, but that she was finically motivated, knowing from Day 1 that she was participating in a scam, and remained at the Call Centre for about four weeks, and left only because she was told to go to Laos.

212 The Defence argued that the Accused’s culpability was lower than that in Yip Chee Ming, given that there was greater premeditation by the offender in the latter case, having made a deliberate decision to return and making actual scam calls. The Accused in comparison only discovered the criminal nature of the Group upon arrival. The Accused had made no scam calls, and did not contribute to the syndicate, and the financial motivation was not large. She had in fact failed the test and not been deployed. The case of Huang Ying-Chun pointed to this not being a significant aggravating factor, unless the reward was every large.

213 In any event, the two sides were not far apart on culpability, and it was clear on the evidence that the culpability of the Accused was indeed at the low end. The duration of her involvement was not long, being about four weeks, though not as short as that in Yip Chee Ming. She had also not participated in an actual scam call, as she had not passed the test required by the Group. Nonetheless, her culpability was not negligible – she was part of the Group, and had undergone the training expected of those who were to be deployed to defraud victims. She had also sought to obtain the monetary rewards held out to her. Whether or not the hope of reward was a significant factor did not make a difference on the facts of the present case since the culpability was assessed to be low. It was therefore not necessary for me to delve into Huang Ying-Chun.

214 Considering a high level of harm and low culpability, the range under the matrix was therefore between two and three years’ imprisonment, or between 24 and 36 months’ imprisonment. Bearing in mind the relatively short period of involvement, although it was still higher than that in Yip Chee Ming, and the fact that she had not done much herself, I was of the view that a sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment would be the appropriate starting point. A starting point of 30 months’ imprisonment to my mind would be too high as not to adequately address the low culpability of the Accused. This low culpability would also be a reason to differentiate the present case from Tan Shay Howe above.

215 From that indicative sentence, taking into account the cooperation with the police exhibited by the Accused, a reduction of about three months would be in order, as was the case in Yip Chee Ming, giving a final sentence of 25 months’ imprisonment. In Yip Chee Ming, the offender there was sentenced to 16 months and 2 weeks’ imprisonment on his plea of guilt. The comparable sentence after trial, i.e. without a 30% reduction for a plea of guilt, would have been about 23.5 months’ imprisonment. As the Accused here was involved with the Group for a slightly longer period compared to Yip Chee Ming, a slightly longer sentence imposed on the Accused would be sufficient to account for that relatively small difference.

216 The 2nd Charge was for engaging in a criminal conspiracy with other members of a locally-linked OCG to commit an offence of cheating in Singapore, punishable under section 120B read with section 420 of the PC. The punishment prescribed is specified to be that of abetment of section 420, which is up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

217 The Prosecution sought 16 to 18 months’ imprisonment on the 2nd Charge, citing Chua Zi Huang as a relevant precedent. In that case the offenders, who were involved in transnational scams, received between 42 and 55 months’ imprisonment terms, with 30% discounts for their pleas of guilt. Giving what was termed a generous downward calibration to take into account that the Accused here did not successfully defraud any victim, and that there was only a single conspiracy charge rather than multiple charges, the sentence of 16 to 18 months’ imprisonment was argued to be appropriate.

218 The Defence argued for not more than 12 months’ imprisonment, justifying that duration on the basis of her minor role, as she had not made any actual scam call, did not contribute to the operations of the Group and was never deployed as a caller since she had failed the required test. No physical act was done by her, compared to other cases. The Accused was just present and undergoing training.

219 I imposed 16 months’ imprisonment, given her relatively minor role and actions, and weighing that against the seriousness of the offence, and the need for deterrence.

220 In Chua Zi Huang, five Malaysians were convicted on their pleas of guilt to offences of conspiring to cheat victims under section 420 read with section 108B of the PC in a scam in which the victims were misled that the scammers were friends of theirs and were hence defrauded of their funds. Sentences of between 42 and 55 months’ imprisonment and fines were imposed.

221 Just as in the present case, the scam outfit there involved sophisticated arrangements, being based in Johor Bahru, Malaysia, with assigned phone lists, and provided food, lodging and remuneration, with assigned working hours six days a week. The offenders worked for the syndicate for various periods of time, ranging from four to seven months.

222 The Prosecution sought sentences of between 63 and 75 months’ imprisonment for each of the accused persons, relying on parallels from sentences imposed in cases such as PP v Fernando Payagala Waduge Malitaha Kumar [2007] 2 SLR (R) 334 for credit card cheating. That case laid down a benchmark of between 24 and 36 months’ imprisonment. It was argued that based on the factors present in Chua Zi Huang¸ such as the transnational nature and sophistication of the operation, for each amalgamated charge, the sentence should be 30 to 36 month’s imprisonment, with global sentences, taking into account the number of victims, at between 90 and 108 months’ imprisonment if the offenders had claimed trial. Applying a discount of 30% would give sentences of between 63 and 75 months’ imprisonment.

223  The defence in that case argued for imprisonment between 33 and 42 months’ imprisonment. While there was syndication, transnational offences and difficulty in detection, it was argued that the culpability was low as the offenders were only salaried employees acting on the ringleaders’ instructions. A parallel was drawn with the case of PP v Benjamin Song Junde [2024] SGDC 261, in which sentences of between 7 months’ 2 weeks and 11 month’s imprisonment were imposed for cheating of between $164156, and $307,160.

224 The court in Chua Zi Huang, starting at [51], weighed the need for deterrence, factors going to harm, such as the amounts cheated, the involvement of a syndicate, the presence of a transnational element and the causing of public disquiet, as well as difficulties in enforcement. The relevant factors going to culpability included the sophistication and premeditation, duration of offending and the roles played in the syndicate. It was also material that each of the offenders committed the offences for financial gain, as was the fact that many of the victims were above the age of 65. Reference was made to the Scams Guidelines.

225 There were substantial differences between the facts surrounding the conviction of the present Accused on the 2nd Charge and those of the offenders in Chua Zi Huang. The offenders in Chua Zi Huang carried out actual calls over a period of several months, cheating the victims of between $47,000 and $117,500. The Accused in contrast was not let loose on victims as she had failed the Group’s test. Her period of involvement was also limited to around four weeks. Given these significant differences, it would not be appropriate to use Chua Zi Huang as a reference, save for assistance in relation to general principles.

226 The most appropriate approach was, in the absence of any framework that has been laid down by the High Court, to calibrate the sentence bearing in mind harm and culpability.

227 For the reasons noted above in relation to the 1st Charge, the level of harm was significant. Cheating in the context of scams are offences that require strong and robust deterrence in order to protect members of society from exploitation by others.

228 As for culpability, the activity of the Accused was quite limited. Unlike the offenders in Chua Zi Huang, she was only involved in the conspiracy for a relatively short period of about four weeks, with limited gains. The fact that she was not actually deployed to make actual calls, and did not in fact make any actual scam calls, also meant that her level of criminal responsibility was not very high.

229 The need for deterrence called for a substantial sentence, above the 12 months sought by the Defence. A sentence of that duration, even in respect of a low level of culpability or responsibility, would not adequately deter, especially given the potential rewards that could be obtained. A 12-month sentence would also not reflect the substantial harm that is caused by such criminal conduct. Conversely, an 18-month sentence would seem to be very high given her limited role and relatively short duration with the Group. Balancing both the great harm and limited culpability, I concluded that a sentence at the lower range of what the Prosecution sought, i.e. 16 months’ imprisonment, would be appropriate.

230 I ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

231 The Prosecution and Defence both took the position that it was appropriate to order concurrent sentences.

232 Section 307(1) of the CPC requires at least two out of three or more sentences of imprisonment to run consecutively. As there were only two imprisonment sentences here, they were not required to be run consecutively. Furthermore, the discretion of the Court need not be exercised to order the sentences to be run consecutively as the offences were a single breach of the same legally protected interest, within the meaning of PP v Raveeen Balakrishnan [2018] SGHC 148.

233 Considering the overall sentence, it was to my mind proportionate to the Accused’s overall criminality within the meaning of the guidance in Mohammed Shoufee bin Adam v PP [2014] SGHC 34, given the need for deterrence for transnational scams of this nature, perpetrated by organised syndicates.

234 To recap, the Accused was sentenced as follows:

235 The sentences in DAC-918031-2025 and DAC-924740-25 were ordered to run concurrently. The total sentence imposed on the Accused was thus twenty-five (25) months’ imprisonment. The sentence was backdated to the date of arrest on 9 September 2025.