1 This is a case of a real estate salesperson (“RES”) perpetrating a slew of cheating and forgery offences to acquire a share of advance commission submitted by his co-brokers whom he had deceived.

2 The accused, Cheong En Kiong (“Mr Cheong”), a 51-year-old Singaporean, an RES at the time of the offences, cheated a fellow RES in June 2022 into being a co-broker by deceiving her into believing on forged transactional documents that there was a genuine property sale, causing her to submit the documents for an advance commission from a major payment institution (“MPI”). He then acquired a share of the commission. On a separate occasion in October 2025, he cheated a property owner for whom he had acted previously by deceiving him into believing that he had a buyer for his commercial unit and dishonestly induced him to sign and deliver transactional documents purportedly for the sale and purchase of the unit. Using the same ruse he had practised on the first RES, he cheated a second into being a co-broker for that unit on forged transactional documents and submitting the documents for advance commission, for which he acquired a share. Earlier in July 2025, he perpetrated the same ruse on the same RES using another commercial unit.

3 Mr Cheong faces 13 charges in respect of three sets of offences:

(a) in June 2022 – four charges involving the first RES, namely a charge of cheating under section 420 of the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) (“PC”), a charge of forgery for the purpose of cheating under section 468 PC, a charge of abetting the offence under section 4(1) of the Computer Misuse Act 1993 (“CMA”) of access with the intent to commit a cheating offence (in relation to the submission of and eventual delivery of advance commission via the MPI’s system), and a charge of acquiring benefits from criminal conduct under section 54(1)(c) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (“CDSA”);

(b) in July and October 2025 – eight similar charges involving the second RES, namely two section 420 PC charges, two section 468 PC charges, two section 4(1) CMA charges, and two section 54(1)(c) CDSA charges; and

(c) in October 2025 – an additional charge of cheating the commercial property owner under section 420 PC.

4 Mr Cheong has pleaded guilty to four charges, namely the forgery, CMA and CDSA charges in respect of the set of offences in June 2022 against the first RES, as well as the cheating charge involving the commercial property owner. He has also consented to have the remaining nine charges taken into consideration for the purpose of sentence (“TIC”).

5 Mr Cheong has no criminal antecedents. The prosecution has sought to impose a global sentence of 24.5 to 28 months’ imprisonment and the defence 18.5 to 21.5 months’ imprisonment, with the parties agreeing that only two sentences on the forgery and CDSA charges need run consecutively:

6 Having convicted Mr Cheong on 8 September 2026 and reserving my judgment on sentence, I now sentence him to 26 months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment. I set out the reasons for my decision on the individual sentence for each charge proceeded against Mr Cheong in turn.

7 Mr Cheong forged documents relating to the purported sale of a commercial unit worth about S$11m, by forging on the option to purchase and seller’s commission agreement the signature of an agent he previously dealt with, who acted in the sale of a property unit and signed the relevant transactional documents. Mr Cheong therefore knew the agent’s name, NRIC number and signature and used them in the two documents as such. He also forged the signature of the first RES on the internal co-broking agreement with intent to deceive the MPI into believing that these forged documents and the signatures they contain were genuine.

8 For the offence of forgery, Mr Cheong must be imprisoned for a term which may extend to ten years that can be coupled with a fine. The prosecution has sought an imprisonment term of 12 to 14 months’ imprisonment to be imposed on him, whereas the defence 11 to 12 months’ imprisonment.

9 I adopt the sentencing approach laid down in Toh Suat Leng Jennifer v PP [2022] 5 SLR 1075 (“Jennifer Toh”) at [60] and [61], which is to consider the relevant offence-specific and offender-specific factors, namely:

(a) amount involved;

(b) impact on delivery and integrity of key services in Singapore,

(c) abuse of trust vis-à-vis the victims,

(d) premediated nature of the offences;

(e) difficulty of detecting the offences;

(f) period of offending;

(g) restitution made; and

(h) plea of guilt and cooperation with the authorities.

10 The parties submitted Jennifer Toh and Choy Yut Hong [2017] SGDC 132 (that was referred to in Jennifer Toh) for the sentences passed in those cases as guidance for present purposes. As I observed in PP v Ward Dulce Plaza [2026] SGDC 110 at [13], I found the cases to be of limited guidance in this specific regard because they relate to offences committed in contexts by accused persons in capacities – namely the forgery of insurance policies and tenancy agreements by insurance and property agents respectively – with a very different complexion from the present case. Rather than comparing and contrasting their particular facts to ascertain the effects on sentencing, the principles they stand for are far more helpful.

11 I consider the factors applicable in Mr Cheong’s case.

12 The primary yardstick in sentencing for an economic offence would be the value of the property involved: Jennifer Toh at [62]. The amount involved in this case is S$91,653.39. The guideline sentence that can be extrapolated for cases where the amount cheated is between S$50,000 to S$100,000 is 15 to 24 months’ imprisonment: PP v Husniyati binte Omar [2018] SGDC 255 at [81(iii)]. But sentences do not always bear a relationship of linear proportionality with the sum involved and an unquestioning mathematical extrapolation would not account for other relevant offence-specific and offender-specific factors considered in the calibration of the individual sentences in the cases: Jennifer Toh at [62], which I proceed to consider in the round in arriving at the appropriate sentence.

13 Mr Cheong’s offence affected the delivery of payment service by an MPI licensed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which provides a convenient service of disbursing advance commissions to real estate salespersons in exchange for a processing fee on a documents-only basis. Such incidents of offending may result in increased efforts and costs on the part of the payment service industry in general as MPIs seek to step up scrutiny and verification measures to prevent the recurrence of similar scams: Jennifer Toh at [64].

14 The prosecution has submitted that there was an abuse of trust vis-à-vis the MPI because it provided a payment service on a documents-only basis and relied on the first RES, who submitted the claim for advance commission and/or Mr Cheong who dealt with her, to verify the documents submitted in support of the claim for advance commission. The defence has argued that as an MPI, it could not have reposed any trust in Mr Cheong and in any event, Mr Cheong did not deal with the MPI directly. The MPI was neither vulnerable nor did Mr Cheong specifically target it.

15 I agree that there is no direct relationship between Mr Cheong and the MPI to found the basis for arguing any repose of trust. It is also a stretch to say that the MPI relied on the first RES and/or Mr Cheong in good faith because it is expected to perform reasonable due diligence as a payment service provider, the verification of documents being an essential part of that due diligence process when scrutinising claims. The better argument is to frame Mr Cheong’s conduct as undermining the integrity and delivery of the payment service provided by the MPI: see [12], above. I am, however, prepared to accept that Mr Cheong opportunistically preyed on the MPI not verifying every single document and scrutinising every claim submitted.

16 The offence was premediated. Mr Cheong had populated the option to purchase and seller’s commission agreement with the information of the agent he had previously dealt with and forged the agent’s signature. He had retrieved the information from past transactional documents that the agent had signed and used the information to forge the two documents.

17 On the pretext of preparing the documents for her to submit to the MPI for advance commission because she had no prior experience with such a large sale and had believed that he was extending a genuine co-broking opportunity to her in good faith, Mr Cheong also forged the first RES’ signature on the internal co-broking agreement.

18 That both were none the wiser about the documents that were forged in their names until the police contacted them is telling of the extent of Mr Cheong’s planning in this regard.

19 As for the difficulty in detecting the offence, I agree with the defence that the aggravating weight to be put on this factor is somewhat attenuated, as it was only a matter of time before Mr Cheong’s offence would come to light: Jennifer Toh at [67]. Though the MPI, the first RES and the agent were unaware of the true nature of the forged documents, things quickly fell apart for Mr Cheong after six months when buyer commission was not forthcoming to his property agency which led to an internal investigation uncovering Mr Cheong’s fraudulent actions.

20 The duration of offending was not lengthy or protracted, confined to a short period sometime in June 2022.

21 Partial restitution of S$10,000 to S$12,000 was made which represented 11% to 13% of the S$91,653.39 involved. As the restitution made was merely a fraction of the total sum involved, I do not accord significant mitigating weight to this factor.

22 The presence of two TIC charges relating to not one but two similar offences against the same MPI barely two months apart in July 2025 and October 2025 is aggravating. This is despite the fact that Mr Cheong had been warned by his property agency for his offence in 2022. This is taken against him to enhance the sentence on the proceeded forgery charge because it evinces a deliberate rather than casual involvement in crime: PP v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500 at [37].

23 Although Mr Cheong does not have criminal antecedents, I do not regard him as a first-time offender because of the multiplicity of his offences: Chen Weixiong Jerriek v PP [2003] 2 SLR(R) 334 at [17]. In any event, the absence of antecedents is at best a neutral factor: BPH v PP [2019] 2 SLR 764 at [85], and it could not be seriously argued that Mr Cheong’s offending behaviour was an aberration and out of character for him in the light of the multiple offences he had committed: PP v BWJ [2023] 1 SLR 477 at [102]. He had also been previously warned.

24 The starting point sentence is 20 months’ imprisonment based on the amount involved. Balancing the aggravating offence-specific factors, chiefly undermining the delivery and integrity of the payment service provided by the MDI as well as the premediated nature of the offence, coupled with the personal aggravating factor of the presence of the TIC charges, against the limited personal mitigating factor of partial restitution together with Mr Cheong’s early indication of guilty plea, for which I accord to him the full 30% reduction in sentence, a sentence at the upper end of the prosecution’s proposed range is more than fair. I therefore sentence Mr Cheong to 14 months’ imprisonment on the forgery charge.

25 With the forged documents that he had provided, Mr Cheong abetted the first RES in submitting a false claim for advance commission via the MPI’s computer server system with the intention to cheat the MPI into delivering the commission.

26 For the CMA offence, Mr Cheong faces a fine not exceeding S$50,000 and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years by virtue of section 4(3) CMA. The prosecution has sought an imprisonment term of three to four months’ imprisonment to be imposed on Mr Cheong whereas the defence two to three months’ imprisonment.

27 The parties have relied on the sentencing considerations enumerated in PP v Law Aik Meng [2007] 2 SLR(R) 814 at [41]. Although the section 4(1) Computer Misuse Act (Cap 50A, 1998 Rev Ed) offences in that case relate specifically to ATM card fraud involving skimming data from genuine ATM cards and transferring the skimmed data to cloned ATM cards, the sentencing considerations identified by the court for credit card cheating offences and ATM card frauds are of general application when ascertaining the level of harm caused by Mr Cheong’s offence and the level of his culpability.

28 I do not find PP v Liu Meiying [2023] SGDC 275 cited by the defence to be particularly helpful for the sentences it has passed as guidance for present purposes because it involved far more egregious facts with a different complexion where the court found that the accused was at the of centre of an elaborate web of fraud comprising fictitious employees and fraudulent documentation to create the impression of genuine employment including making central provident fund contributions for these fictitious employees; trainees who were asked to sign false attendance records; and the accused person’s genuine employees who facilitated the falsification of such records and the submission of false information to the Workforce Development Agency.

29 I consider the applicable harm and culpability factors in Mr Cheong’s case.

30  In ascertaining the level of harm caused by Mr Cheong’s, I consider the sum involved, the extent of loss caused, the nature of the offence which was intended to be committed, the impact on public confidence in commercial or financial institutions and whether Singapore’s integrity or reputation is affected.

31 The sum involved is S$91,653.99. The MPI has deducted the first RES’ commission pertaining to her other properties sold to offset the amount owed. Full recompense had since been made, although the MPI continued to shoulder loss from the time the advance commission was disbursed till the first RES made good the entire loss in December 2025.

32 Access to the MPI’s system was secured in order to submit the forged documents to cheat the MPI into delivering the advance commission. While the integrity and delivery of the payment service provided by the MPI had been undermined, I would not go so far as to say that public confidence was impacted or that Singapore’s integrity or reputation affected. The harm in this regard is the attendant costs in stepped-up vigilance of enhanced verification and scrutiny that will be passed on to other users of the MPI’s service and the ultimate property market consumers downstream.

33  In determining the degree of culpability, I consider the motive of the offender in committing the offence, whether the offender was in a position of trust, the level of sophistication and extent of organisation and planning involved, degree of persistence of securing access to commit offences, as well as the monetary gain or benefit derived from the commission of the offences.

34 At the time, the accused was an undischarged bankrupt and obligated to make monthly payments to his creditors. He also owed money to unlicensed moneylenders and friends. He indicated as much to the first RES that he needed money urgently.

35 The offence was premeditated in that forged documents were prepared in order for the first RES to make false submissions via the MPI’s system, though unsophisticated because the offence would have come to light if the first RES or the MPI buyer discovered the falsity of the documents, and eventually came to light when buyer commission to Mr Cheong’s property agency was not forthcoming.

36 The benefit derived from the offence was substantial in the sum of S$83,554. I do not accord significant weight to the partial disgorgement of S$10,000 to S$12,000 in the form of voluntary restitution made because it was only a fraction of the benefit that he had received.

37 Mr Cheong would later abet two other similar CMA offences against the same MPI, evincing his persistence of securing access to commit the cheating offences against the MPI, but this is better taken into account as a personal aggravating factor as these offences form the subject-matter of TIC charges.

38 The presence of two similar TIC charges is aggravating and taken against Mr Cheong, especially when he had already been warned by his property agency in 2022: see [37], above. Mr Cheong is not regarded as a first offender because of the multiplicity of his offences and that he had also been previously warned: see [23], above.

39 As this was not a non-aggravated offence for which no harmful consequences resulted or the breach was detected before the offence was committed, it has crossed the custodial threshold and the starting point sentence ought to be four months’ imprisonment. Considering the harm and culpability factors, as well as balancing the personal aggravating factor of the presence of the TIC charges against the partial disgorgement of Mr Lim’s criminal benefits and his early indication of guilty plea, the parties’ common-ground sentence of three months’ imprisonment is also more than fair.  

40 The first RES subsequently transferred S$83,554 to Mr Cheong after she submitted for and received the advance commission from the MPI. Mr Cheong therefore acquired this sum which represented benefits from his criminal conduct.

41 For his CDSA offence, Mr Cheong faces a fine not exceeding S$500,000 and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years by virtue of section 54(5) CDSA. The prosecution has sought an imprisonment term of 12.5 months to 14 months’ imprisonment to be imposed on him whereas the defence 7.5 to 9.5 months’ imprisonment.

42 I agree with the parties that following Lian Hoe Leng [2026] SGCA 25 at [102], the sentencing framework laid down in Huang Ying-Chun v PP [2019] 3 SLR 606 applies to Mr Cheong’s section 54(1) CDSA offence.

43 I apply the Huang framework to Mr Cheong’s case.

44 The first step is to identify the level of harm and culpability having regard to the offence-specific factors: Huang at [98] and [101].

45 I agree with the parties that the level of harm in Mr Cheong’s case is slight. I also agree with the prosecution that the level should be pegged at the upper end of slight harm.

46 Though the offence was non-syndicated, did not involve a transnational element and public administration was not implicated, the amount cheated was significant, being S$91,653.39, with only partial restitution of S$10,000 to S$12,000 made. The MPI has since been fully recompensed by the first RES but suffered loss from the time it disbursed the advance commission till such full recompense in December 2025, whereas the first RES had suffered a loss of between S479,653.39 and S$81,653.39. The predicate offence of cheating was serious as evident from the harsh penalties it carries of a maximum imprisonment term of ten years’ imprisonment that can be coupled with a fine up to the maximum sentencing jurisdiction of the district court. The integrity and delivery of the MPI’s payment service was affected with attendant costs of increased vigilance with stepped-up verification and scrutiny to prevent the recurrence of future scams.

47 Pegging the level of harm at the upper end of slight harm is consistent with the assessment of harm in Lian at [110] pegged at the moderate level for sums ranging from S$101,700 to S$160,000 and at the severe level for a sum of S$714,180.

48 As for Mr Cheong’s culpability, I agree with the parties’ that it should be at the medium level. The defence has submitted that this ought to be at the lower end of medium culpability.

49 Mr Cheong’s culpability was closer to the midpoint of medium level of culpability:

(a) There was planning and premeditation involved. Mr Cheong used the first RES as a front to submit a claim for advance commission with forged documents that he prepared by telling her that he was unable to submit the claim himself and enticed her with a S$5,000 co-broking commission, along with coverage and inclusion of her Medisave and income tax for the sale. The sum was disbursed to the first RES, and she duly transferred S$83,554 to Mr Cheong thereafter, enabling him to acquire the criminal proceeds of cheating the MPI by such subterfuge,

(b)  The level of sophistication, however, was low. He opportunistically preyed on the MPI not scrutinising every claim and verifying every document. While his gamble paid off in this regard as the first RES’ claim was successfully processed and the MPI successfully duped, it was only a matter of time that his property agency discovered his ruse when the payment of buyer commission was not forthcoming,

(c) The duration of offending was not protracted and was kept to a confined period of sometime in June 2022,

(d) Mr Cheong masterminded the entire scheme. The first RES, MPI and his property agency were none the wiser that the sale for which advance commission was paid to the first RES was in fact bogus,

(e)  Mr Cheong had knowledge of the underlying predicate offence, which was to cheat the MPI into disbursing the advance commission, and

(f) There was also the prospect of a large reward to the tune of S$83,554, which was the share of the commission that he acquired.

50 A slight harm, medium culpability assessment corresponds to an indicative sentencing range of ten to 30 months’ imprisonment: Huang at [102].

51 Given that the level of harm is pegged at the upper end of slight harm and culpability closer to the midpoint of medium level of culpability, the starting point sentence ought to be 18 months’ imprisonment: Huang at [103].

52 I gave limited weight to Mr Cheong’s partial restitution, considering that it was only a fraction (11-13%) of the total sum involved. Against this was the aggravating presence of two other similar TIC charges in relation to two similar ruses involving the sums of S$48,770 and S$7,955 for which no restitution was made, despite being warned in 2022. Mr Cheong is not regarded as a first offender because of the multiplicity of his offences and that he had also been previously warned: see [23], above. Decidedly in Mr Cheong’s favour is his early indication of guilty plea which I accord to him the full 30% reduction in sentence.

53 The lower end of the prosecution’s proposed sentencing range is again more than fair and I therefore impose a sentence of 12 months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment on Mr Cheong’s CDSA charge.

54 On a later occasion in October 2025, Mr Cheong cheated a property owner and deceived him into believing that he had a buyer for his commercial unit and dishonestly induced him to sign and deliver documents purportedly for the sale and purchase of that unit.

55 For his cheating offence, Mr Cheong must be imprisoned for a term which may extend to ten years that can be coupled with a fine. The prosecution has sought an imprisonment term of two to four months’ imprisonment to be imposed on him whereas the defence one month’s imprisonment.

56 While the property owner did not suffer actual loss, the harm caused to him was that he was needlessly implicated in Mr Cheong’s offence of cheating the MPI and no doubt had to expend efforts to rid himself of any complicity. It was fortuitous that the harm was only limited to that extent of inconvenience posed by investigations. Mr Cheong had dishonestly induced the property owner to sign blank copies of transactional documents that could be used for more and a wide variety of nefarious purposes.

57 As for Mr Cheong’s culpability, he preyed on the owner’s goodwill, then 69 years old, for whom he had previously acted in the sale of one of the owner’s other property. He actively sought out and deliberately deceived the property owner that he had found a buyer for the owner’s property. He abused the trust that the property owner reposed in him as evident from the fact that the property owner was actually prepared to sign and hand over blank copies of the transactional documents. Mr Cheong also committed the offence for gain.

58 The aggravating presence of three similar TIC charges of cheating two real estate salespersons, first in June 2022, then in July 2025 and subsequently in October 2025 using two properties is taken against Mr Cheong. Against this is his cooperation during investigations and his early indication of guilty plea. Mr Cheong is not regarded as a first offender because of the multiplicity of his offences and that he had also been previously warned: see [23], above.

59 I therefore impose a sentence of two months’ imprisonment on Mr Cheong’s cheating charge.

60 The individual sentences I impose on the proceeded charges against Mr Cheong are:

61 As Mr Cheong has been convicted of three or more distinct offences, the sentences on at least two of the offences must run consecutively. I agree with the parties that his overall criminality can be encompassed by two consecutive sentences and I order the sentences on his forgery (DAC 905570 of 2026) and CDSA (DAC 905572 of 2026) charges to run consecutively. The remaining two sentences are to run concurrently.

62 I therefore sentence Mr Cheong to an aggregate term of 26 months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment. The aggregate sentence is sufficient. It is also not crushing and it is proportionate considering his overall criminality. I backdate the sentence to 2 April 2026 when he was first charged in court. He has since been in remand.