1 Mr Kang Choon Huaw was a regional marketing executive whose employment required regular overseas travel. He was adjudged bankrupt in 2021 and, as an undischarged bankrupt, was required to obtain the prior permission of his private trustee in bankruptcy (“PTIB”) before leaving Singapore. The present charges arose from occasions on which he travelled overseas for work without first obtaining that permission.

2 Mr Kang pleaded guilty to one amalgamated charge under s 401(1)(b) read with s 39(2) and punishable under s 401(3) of the Insolvency Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (“IRDA”), read with s 124(8)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”). The amalgamated charge comprises 16 instances of unauthorised travel between 16 January and 18 December 2024. He also consented to four other charges, involving 29 instances of unauthorised travel, being taken into consideration (“TIC”) for sentencing.

3 The Prosecution initially sought a sentence of at least two weeks’ imprisonment. At the hearing today, however, the Prosecution informed the Court that it had revised its position and sought instead the maximum fine of S$20,000. The Defence submitted that a fine was sufficient and left the quantum of fine to the Court’s discretion. Applying the framework in Prakash s/o Mathivanan v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2025] 4 SLR 1386 (“Prakash”), I impose a fine of S$12,600, in default two months’ imprisonment. I will explain my reasons below.

4 Mr Kang was adjudged bankrupt on 22 July 2021 following liabilities arising from a personal guarantee which he provided in respect of a company's obligations. At the material time, he was employed as a Regional Marketing Executive with Karlave Resolutions Pte Ltd, a role which required regular overseas travel.

5 Between 16 January and 18 December 2024, Mr Kang left Singapore on 16 occasions without first obtaining his PTIB’s permission. The 16 trips amounted to a total of 26 days outside Singapore. Eleven were single-day trips, three were two-day trips, and the remaining two trips lasted four and five days respectively. All were undertaken for work.

6 During the same period, Mr Kang separately applied for permission to travel on 16 occasions. All 16 applications were approved.

7 The unauthorised trips were subsequently discovered when Mr Kang sought to progress his discharge after meeting his target contribution in November 2024. His PTIB confirmed that he had generally been cooperative and responsive, that he met his target contribution in November 2024, and that a request for his discharge could not be submitted because the present proceedings were still pending at that time.

8 The proceeded charge is an amalgamated charge, to which the three-stage framework in Prakash applies. At the first stage, the Court identifies the punishment prescribed for the base offence. At the second stage, the Court determines the appropriate starting sentence for the amalgamated offence by assessing the entire course of conduct, including its frequency, duration and the offender’s overall culpability. At the third stage, the Court considers the offender-specific factors and makes any necessary adjustment to the starting sentence.

9 A single offence under s 401(3) of the IRDA is punishable with a fine not exceeding S$10,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or both. By reason of s 124(8)(a)(ii) of the CPC, the applicable punishment limits for the amalgamated charge are doubled.

10 The offence of unauthorised travel by a bankrupt was previously provided for in s 131(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed) (“BA”). This provision prohibited a bankrupt from leaving, remaining or residing outside Singapore without the previous permission of the Official Assignee. The offence was punishable under s 131(2) of the BA with a fine not exceeding S$10,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or both.

11 The corresponding prohibition is now found in s 401(1)(b) of the IRDA, in materially the same terms. Under the present regime, however, a bankruptcy estate may be administered by a PTIB. In Mr Kang’s case, Leow Quek Shiong of BDO Advisory Pte Ltd was appointed as the trustee of his estate in bankruptcy. Mr Kang was therefore required to obtain his PTIB’s permission before travelling overseas.

12 This difference in the administration of the bankruptcy estate does not affect the relevance of the earlier sentencing authorities. The underlying obligation remains the same: an undischarged bankrupt must obtain prior permission from the person administering his bankruptcy estate before travelling overseas. The sentencing principles developed under s 131(1)(b) of the BA therefore remain relevant to the corresponding offence under s 401(1)(b) of the IRDA.

13 In Public Prosecutor v Choong Kian Haw [2002] 2 SLR(R) 997 (“Choong Kian Haw”), the High Court explained that the requirement for prior permission enables the person administering the bankruptcy to monitor the bankrupt’s movements and properly administer his affairs for the benefit of creditors. Unauthorised travel gives the bankrupt the opportunity to conceal assets, earn income or acquire assets abroad without accounting for them. Every breach must therefore be treated seriously (Choong Kian Haw at [28]).

14 The seriousness with which such offences must be treated does not mean that imprisonment invariably follows. In Ganesh s/o M Sinnathamby v Public Prosecutor [2008] 1 SLR(R) 495 (“Ganesh”), the High Court emphasised that the statutory punishment permits both a fine and imprisonment, and that the appropriate sentence depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The number of unauthorised trips is relevant, particularly insofar as it reflects the offender’s degree of recalcitrance, but it is not by itself determinative (Ganesh at [25]–[27]).

15 Where a fine is contemplated, a further consideration is whether it would have sufficient punitive effect. The High Court in Choong Kian Haw observed that fines are generally less suitable for undischarged bankrupts because funds available to pay a fine ought ordinarily to be available to creditors, while payment by a third party would diminish the punitive effect of the sentence (Choong Kian Haw at [24]–[25]). As Ganesh subsequently made clear, however, this is not an inflexible rule. The Court must consider whether those concerns arise on the facts of the particular case and whether a fine would, in fact, have sufficient punitive effect.

16 Three principles therefore guide the sentencing exercise. First, every instance of unauthorised travel must be treated seriously, having regard to the supervisory and protective purpose of the requirement for prior permission. Second, the appropriate sentence depends on the nature and circumstances of the offending. Third, if a fine is contemplated, the Court must consider whether it would have real punitive effect, having regard in particular to the interests of creditors and the source from which the fine would be paid. I apply these principles within the Prakash framework below.

17 At the first stage of the Prakash framework, I determine the appropriate sentence for the base offence, comprising a single instance of unauthorised travel. The Prosecution submitted that the base offence should attract at least two weeks’ imprisonment. It relied on Public Prosecutor v Wendy Lim Peck Si [2013] SGMC 7 (“Wendy Lim”), where the offender received two weeks’ imprisonment for each of two unauthorised trips lasting 13 days and four days respectively, and three weeks’ imprisonment for a trip lasting 114 days. The Prosecution submitted that Wendy Lim demonstrates that a single instance of unauthorised travel would generally attract two weeks’ imprisonment unless the trip was exceptionally long. The Defence disagreed.

18 I do not accept that Wendy Lim supports the Prosecution’s position that a single instance of unauthorised travel would generally attract two weeks’ imprisonment unless the trip was exceptionally long. The sentences imposed there cannot be considered by reference to the duration of the trips alone. The offender had previously been warned after travelling without permission on approximately 31 occasions and had been expressly told that further offending would result in prosecution. She nevertheless travelled without permission again. In imposing imprisonment, the Court relied on these circumstances and found that she had “blatantly and deliberately” left Singapore without permission (Wendy Lim at [26]–[27]).

19 In Wendy Lim therefore does not establish two weeks’ imprisonment as the usual sentence for a single instance of unauthorised travel, subject only to an increase for an exceptionally long trip. As the High Court emphasised in Ganesh, the appropriate sentence depends on the circumstances of the particular offence. The Court must consider matters such as the duration and purpose of the travel, the harm or risk of harm arising from it, and the offender’s culpability in travelling without permission.

20 In the present case, the individual trips were brief: 11 of the 16 trips were completed within a day, and the longest lasted five days. They were undertaken for Mr Kang’s work, which required regular overseas travel. There is no evidence that the trips were undertaken to conceal assets or income, incur liabilities overseas, or otherwise frustrate the administration of the bankruptcy estate, or that they resulted in prejudice to creditors. The trips were undertaken for Mr Kang’s work, which required regular overseas travel. While the work-related purpose is not mitigating in itself (Choong Kian Haw at [29]), it forms part of the circumstances in which the trips were undertaken and is relevant to the assessment of culpability. Having regard to the brief duration and purpose of the trips, and the absence of any improper purpose or identified prejudice to creditors, I assess the base offence as involving relatively low culpability and limited harm. I therefore find that a fine is appropriate.

21 At the second stage of the Prakash framework, I consider Mr Kang’s entire course of conduct. The amalgamated charge comprises 16 instances of unauthorised travel over about 11 months. In its written submissions, the Prosecution submitted that the frequency and duration of the offending increased Mr Kang’s culpability and warranted a sentence of at least four weeks’ imprisonment. As noted above, the Prosecution subsequently revised its sentencing position at the hearing and sought the maximum fine of S$20,000. As the Prosecution’s original submissions raise the question whether Mr Kang’s course of offending crosses the custodial threshold, I address that question before considering its revised position on the appropriate fine.

22 I first consider whether Mr Kang’s repeated offending warrants imprisonment. I accept that the 16 unauthorised trips increase his overall criminality. Their number alone, however, does not determine whether imprisonment is warranted. As the High Court explained in Ganesh, the number of unauthorised trips is relevant insofar as repeated offending may demonstrate recalcitrance and, in turn, greater culpability. Whether that inference should be drawn depends on the circumstances in which the repeated offending occurred. I therefore assess Mr Kang’s overall culpability by considering both the extent of the repeated offending and the circumstances in which it occurred.

23 The sentencing precedents concerning unauthorised travel by bankrupts provide useful points of comparison. Each of these cases involved an offender with no prior convictions who pleaded guilty, as Mr Kang did. The cases therefore assist in assessing how the number and duration of unauthorised trips, the circumstances bearing on culpability, and the punitive effect of a fine have affected the choice between a fine and imprisonment. Their material features are summarised below.

24 The precedents show that the number and duration of unauthorised trips are important sentencing considerations, but do not by themselves determine whether imprisonment is warranted. The circumstances in which the repeated offending occurred are also relevant to culpability. In Choong Kian Haw, Yap Rogers, Remesh and Wendy Lim, the offenders continued travelling without permission despite having been formally warned for earlier instances of unauthorised travel. In Sukhmit, the offender continued travelling after permission had expressly been refused and thereafter ceased making fresh applications. Their persistence in offending despite the warnings or refusal of permission reflected a higher degree of culpability.

25 The precedents also show that the suitability of a fine depends on whether it would have sufficient punitive effect. In Bala Subramaniam, the offender had paid only S$500 towards his bankruptcy estate despite having 11 creditors. The Court found that a fine would be paid by a third party and would therefore have diminished punitive effect. In contrast, in Ganesh, the High Court considered a substantial fine appropriate because it would be borne personally by the offender.

26 The precedents must therefore be considered in their factual context. The fact that most of these cases resulted in custodial sentences does not establish imprisonment as the default sentence for repeated unauthorised travel (Ganesh at [25]). In Yang Suan Piau v Public Prosecutor [2013] 1 SLR 809 (“Yang Suan Piau”) at [28], the High Court observed that even an unusually consistent line of sentencing precedents does not necessarily establish that the sentences reflected in those precedents are correct. The High Court therefore cautioned against applying sentencing precedents mechanically merely to achieve consistency, observing that consistency is not the sole consideration in sentencing. The Court must instead consider the circumstances of the case and the full range of sentences available under the law. In this case, s 401(3) of the IRDA expressly permits a fine, imprisonment, or both. I therefore turn to the circumstances of Mr Kang’s offending to determine the appropriate type of sentence.

27 The Defence submitted that Mr Kang’s course of offending involved a lower degree of culpability than that of the offenders in the precedents where custodial sentences were imposed. It relied principally on two matters. First, Mr Kang had never previously been warned or subjected to enforcement action for unauthorised travel. Second, during the same 11-month period in which the 16 unauthorised trips occurred, he separately sought permission to travel on 16 occasions and obtained approval on every occasion.

28 In my assessment, the successful applications do not excuse the unauthorised trips. On the contrary, they confirm that Mr Kang knew that prior permission was required. He remained responsible for obtaining permission before each trip. The 16 unauthorised trips over about 11 months therefore constitute substantial repeated offending.

29 The successful applications are nevertheless relevant in assessing what the repeated offending reveals about Mr Kang’s culpability. He had not previously been warned and then reoffended, had not travelled after permission was refused, and had not ceased seeking permission. Instead, throughout the offending period, he continued to seek and obtain permission for other trips. His repeated offending therefore did not demonstrate the same persistence in non-compliance seen in several of the cases where imprisonment was imposed.

30 I therefore assess Mr Kang’s course of offending as involving a lower degree of culpability. The number of unauthorised trips is substantial, but the circumstances in which they occurred do not demonstrate persistent non-compliance in the face of prior warnings or refusals of permission. Viewed as a whole, Mr Kang’s course of offending does not warrant imprisonment or the maximum fine.

31 The Prosecution relied principally on general deterrence in support of its sentencing position. I accept that general deterrence is an important sentencing consideration. General deterrence does not, however, invariably warrant a custodial sentence or the maximum fine. In Yang Suan Piau at [31]–[34], the High Court recognised that a substantial fine may provide effective deterrence where the circumstances justify a non-custodial sentence. In the present case, a substantial fine will make clear that repeated non-compliance with the requirement for prior permission attracts a significant penalty, while remaining proportionate to the seriousness of Mr Kang’s offending. I am therefore satisfied that general deterrence can be adequately served without imposing either a custodial term or the maximum fine.

32 I also consider the need for specific deterrence. Mr Kang has no antecedents, had never previously been warned or subjected to enforcement action for unauthorised travel, and has not reoffended since February 2025. He has also met the target contribution determined by his PTIB, though his discharge could not be progressed while these proceedings remained outstanding. These circumstances indicate that the need for specific deterrence is limited. I therefore do not consider specific deterrence to justify either imprisonment or the maximum fine.

33 It remains necessary to consider whether a fine would have sufficient punitive effect. In Choong Kian Haw, the High Court identified two concerns with imposing a fine on an undischarged bankrupt. If the bankrupt has funds to pay the fine, those funds might properly be available to his creditors. If the fine is instead paid by a third party, its punitive effect on the bankrupt is diminished.

34 The Defence submitted that neither concern arises with the same force here because Mr Kang met the target contribution determined by his PTIB in November 2024, remains gainfully employed, and is able to pay a substantial fine from his own resources. I accept this submission. Although Mr Kang remains an undischarged bankrupt, he has met his target contribution. Payment of a fine would therefore not divert monies otherwise required to meet that contribution. Further, Mr Kang voluntarily contributed an additional S$10,000 from his salary savings to the bankruptcy estate. That payment demonstrates his ability to make a substantial payment from his own resources. As the fine will likewise be borne personally by him, it will have a direct punitive effect. The concerns identified in Choong Kian Haw therefore carry substantially less weight in the present case. I am satisfied that a substantial fine would provide meaningful punishment.

35 For the reasons above, I find that a fine is the appropriate type of sentence. The 16 instances of unauthorised travel comprised in the amalgamated charge nevertheless increase the overall criminality and warrant a higher fine than would be appropriate for a single offence. The maximum fine for a single offence is S$10,000, while the maximum for the amalgamated offence is S$20,000. The enhanced maximum enables the Court to account for the greater criminality of multiple instances of offending within a single charge.

36 At the hearing, the Prosecution revised its sentencing position and sought the maximum fine of S$20,000. The Defence did not propose a specific quantum of fine and left the matter to the Court’s discretion. I do not accept that the extent of Mr Kang’s repeated offending justifies the statutory maximum. The fact that an amalgamated charge comprises multiple instances of offending does not, by itself, justify the maximum fine. The fine must ultimately be commensurate with the overall criminality of the offending.

37 Ganesh and Remesh provide useful points of comparison in determining the appropriate fine. In Ganesh, the High Court imposed a fine of S$8,000 on each of three proceeded charges, with 52 further charges taken into consideration, and considered that the large number of contraventions warranted a fine near the upper end of the applicable range. In Remesh, the offender received on appeal a fine of S$6,000 on each of two proceeded charges, together with a nominal custodial term, despite having previously received a stern warning for 44 earlier instances of unauthorised travel.

38 The sentences in Ganesh and Remesh cannot be applied arithmetically because those cases involved multiple proceeded charges rather than an amalgamated charge. They nevertheless show that substantial repeated offending may appropriately attract a substantial fine. Here, the 16 unauthorised trips over about 11 months warrant a substantial increase from the sentence appropriate for a single offence. They do not, however, place Mr Kang’s offending at the highest end of the sentencing range. Eleven trips were completed within a day and none exceeded five days. There was no improper purpose or identified prejudice to creditors, and the circumstances of the repeated offending did not demonstrate a high degree of culpability. Balancing the extent of the repeated offending against these circumstances, and having regard to Ganesh and Remesh, I assess the starting fine for the amalgamated offence at S$15,000.

39 At the third stage, I consider the offender-specific factors. The four TIC charges involve a further 29 instances of unauthorised travel. They materially increase the extent of Mr Kang’s offending and warrant an uplift from the S$15,000 starting fine to S$18,000. Even after taking these additional instances into consideration, I do not consider the maximum fine warranted, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offending discussed above.

40 Against this, I give substantial mitigating weight to Mr Kang’s genuine remorse. He indicated his intention to plead guilty at an early stage and followed through with that indication, thereby accepting responsibility for his offending. His subsequent conduct reinforces this. After meeting the target contribution determined by his PTIB, he voluntarily contributed a further S$10,000 from his salary savings to the bankruptcy estate to improve the return to his creditors. As the Prosecution candidly acknowledged, this demonstrated his good faith towards his creditors and his willingness to make amends. Taken together, his early plea and subsequent conduct demonstrate genuine remorse. I therefore consider a reduction of 30% from the adjusted fine of S$18,000 appropriate, resulting in a fine of S$12,600.

41 Mr Kang is a first offender who had never previously been warned or subjected to enforcement action for unauthorised travel. His offending did not display the persistence seen in the cases where imprisonment was imposed, and the need for specific deterrence is limited. He has also demonstrated genuine remorse through his early plea of guilt and voluntary contribution to the bankruptcy estate. A fine of S$12,600, borne personally by Mr Kang, provides meaningful punishment and sufficient deterrence. I therefore impose a fine of S$12,600, in default two months’ imprisonment.