1 Mr Lau Jian Hong (Liu Jianhong) (“Mr Lau”) has pleaded guilty to one charge under s 5(1) and punishable under s 5(3)(a) of the Payment Services Act 2019 (“PSA”), for carrying on a business of providing cross-border money transfer services without a licence between early 2021 and April 2023. The Prosecution seeks an imprisonment term between six and eight months’ imprisonment, and a disgorgement fine of S$84,000. The Defence submits for an imprisonment term of about 12 weeks but agrees that a disgorgement fine of S$84,000 is appropriate. I impose 20 weeks’ imprisonment and a fine of S$84,000, in default 84 days’ imprisonment. These are my reasons.

2 In early 2021, Mr Lau agreed to work for Edwin by collecting and delivering cash in Singapore for the purpose of transmitting, or arranging for the transmission of, monies to Cambodia in connection with Edwin’s money-changing and cryptocurrency businesses there. He was paid S$4,000 a month for this work and continued working for Edwin until April 2023, receiving at least S$84,000 over this period. It is not disputed that Mr Lau conducted transactions on at least one day in each month. On a day when transactions were conducted, he met different counterparties about ten times, with individual transactions ranging from S$10,000 to S$500,000.

3 Mr Lau did not hold a licence from the Monetary Authority of Singapore to provide the payment service and was not an exempt payment service provider. His responsibilities extended beyond collecting and delivering cash. He maintained records of the foreign currency transactions carried out for Edwin in Singapore and Cambodia, as well as Edwin’s commissions, on a daily basis between 2021 and 2022. He also recruited Chua Jinfeng to assist with the cash transactions and negotiated a monthly salary of S$2,500 for him.

4 The applicable sentencing framework is that laid down by the High Court in Vijay Kumar v Public Prosecutor [2023] 5 SLR 983 (“Vijay Kumar”). General deterrence is the dominant sentencing consideration for offences under s 5(3) of the PSA. For the archetypal offence involving an individual who provides unlicensed money transfer services, the claim-trial starting point is three weeks’ imprisonment. The court then adjusts that starting point to reflect the relevant offence-specific and offender-specific factors (Vijay Kumar at [76]–[77]).

5 I apply this framework to the present case.

6 The key aggravating factors going towards harm are the frequency and value of the cash transactions and the duration of the offending. Mr Lau met different counterparties about ten times a day to collect and hand over cash for the purpose of transmitting, or arranging for the transmission of, monies to Cambodia. He also dealt with a large amount of cash each time, with individual cash collections ranging from S$10,000 to about S$500,000. The offending conduct lasted from early 2021 to April 2023, for a lengthy period of about two years.

7 As for the aggregate value of the transactions, the evidence does not establish the precise amount handled by Mr Lau or that all the monies he handled were ultimately transferred to Cambodia. It is, however, undisputed that he conducted transactions on at least one day in each month. Construing the remaining evidence conservatively in his favour — ten transactions on each such day and S$10,000 per transaction — Mr Lau would have handled at least S$100,000 a month, or S$2.4 million over two years. Even on this conservative calculation, the aggregate value of the transactions was substantial and carries significant aggravating weight.

8 The Prosecution also relies on the transnational element as aggravating harm. However, I decline to give this separate aggravating weight. The charge concerns the provision of an unlicensed cross-border money transfer service, which by its nature involves arranging for money to be transmitted between Singapore and another country. The transnational element is therefore inherent in the payment service comprised in the charge and does not, in the circumstances, independently aggravate the offence.

9 Three factors materially increase Mr Lau’s culpability. First, Mr Lau derived substantial financial benefit from the offending. He was paid S$4,000 a month and received at least S$84,000 over the offending period. The substantial remuneration he received is a significant aggravating factor.

10 Second, Mr Lau played an integral operational role. Although Edwin directed the business from Cambodia, Mr Lau personally collected and distributed cash in Singapore, maintained transaction records and recruited another person to assist with the operations. His responsibilities therefore extended across several aspects of the day-to-day operations. The breadth of his role materially increases his culpability.

11 Third, Mr Lau took active steps to avoid detection by deleting his WhatsApp chats with Edwin concerning the cash transactions. The deletion removed records from which the unlicensed transactions could be traced or reconstructed, thereby making the offending more difficult to detect. Given the difficulty in detecting PSA offences, particularly those involving cash transactions, these steps to conceal the offending – even if taken under Edwin’s instructions – increase Mr Lau’s culpability (see, for example, Public Prosecutor v Su Jiqing Joel [2021] 3 SLR 1232 at [88]).

12 Beyond these three factors, the Prosecution relies on the sophistication of the modus operandi and Mr Lau’s failure to conduct due diligence as further grounds for increasing his culpability. I do not consider either factor to warrant any additional aggravating weight.

13 As regards sophistication, the use of cash-note serial numbers to authenticate counterparties reflects some degree of organisation, but there is nothing to suggest that the method was particularly sophisticated or that Mr Lau devised it. He used the system on Edwin’s instructions. To the extent that the modus operandi involved sophistication, it is more properly attributable to Edwin. I therefore make no further uplift on this account.

14 As regards due diligence, the Prosecution submits that Mr Lau’s failure to conduct checks on the counterparties, source of funds or legitimacy of the transactions further increases his culpability. The Defence relies in response on Mr Lau’s assertion that he believed his arrangement with Edwin to be legitimate. I do not accept that assertion. As the High Court observed in Vijay Kumar at [54], a person providing unlicensed money transfer services would typically know, or at least ought to know, that he does not possess the required licence. That observation carries particular force here: Mr Lau had previously worked as a manager in a remittance company and would have been familiar with the licensing requirements applicable to remittance businesses. His asserted belief that his arrangement with Edwin was lawful is therefore not credible, and I accord it no mitigating weight.

15 I do not, however, accept that Mr Lau’s failure to conduct due diligence warrants a further increase in culpability. Under the Vijay Kumar framework, the relevant consideration is the offender’s degree of suspicion, negligence, recklessness or wilful blindness as to the involvement of tainted monies, money laundering or terrorism financing. There is no evidence in the present case that the monies handled by Mr Lau were tainted or connected with any underlying criminal activity. In those circumstances, his failure to conduct further checks on the counterparties or source of funds does not, without more, establish the degree of negligence or recklessness that would justify an additional uplift. I therefore make no further uplift on this account.

16 I turn to the appropriate claim-trial sentence. Both parties accept that the offence-specific factors warrant an uplift from the three-week starting point in Vijay Kumar but differ substantially on its extent. The Prosecution submits for nine to 12 months’ imprisonment as the claim-trial sentence, while the Defence submits for a sentence slightly above the 12-week claim-trial sentence in Public Prosecutor v Saw Yu Wai [2023] SGMC 55 (“Saw Yu Wai”). In determining the appropriate uplift, I consider Vijay Kumar, Saw Yu Wai and Nur Diyanah bte Mohamed Ramdan v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 174 (“Nur Diyanah”) to provide useful reference points. The material sentencing factors are summarised in the following table.

17 These precedents demonstrate that the extent of the uplift is dependent on the gravity of the offence, as evidenced by the extent of harm and culpability in the particular case. The sentencing factors should therefore not be treated as attracting discrete uplifts. The task is to assess Mr Lau’s overall criminality against the precedents.

18 Vijay Kumar represents the archetypal offence for which the High Court prescribed a three-week claim-trial starting point. The transactions comprised in the charge amounted to S$10,123.20 and the offender obtained only S$80 from the remittance services that were carried out over four-and-a-half months. The present case is far removed from that paradigm. Mr Lau provided unlicensed payment services for approximately two years, handled transactions of substantial value and obtained at least S$84,000 in financial benefits. A substantial uplift from the starting point is plainly warranted.

19 Saw Yu Wai provides a more useful comparison for an unlicensed payment service conducted on a substantial scale. The offender there facilitated 1,004 remittances amounting to S$889,077 during the three-month offending period and played a pivotal managerial role. The court assessed the claim-trial sentence at about 12 weeks. The present case is more serious in terms of both harm and culpability.

20 As regards harm, the present offending was substantially greater in both scale and duration. Mr Lau offended for approximately two years, compared with three months in Saw Yu Wai. Even on the conservative calculation adopted above, he handled at least S$2.4 million, almost three times the S$889,077 involved in Saw Yu Wai. The markedly longer period of offending and substantially greater transaction value therefore place the present case at a higher level of harm.

21 As regards culpability, Mr Lau’s operational role was at least comparable in significance to that of the offender in Saw Yu Wai. Although the offender was described as occupying a managerial role, her functions included accepting monies from customers and managing an administrative staff member in the Singapore operations. Mr Lau personally met counterparties, collected and delivered monies, maintained transaction records for Edwin and recruited another person to assist with the operations. His responsibilities likewise extended across several aspects of the day-to-day operations.

22 There are also culpability-enhancing factors in the present case which were absent in Saw Yu Wai. Mr Lau obtained at least S$84,000 from the offending, whereas no direct financial benefit to the offender was identified in Saw Yu Wai. He also took deliberate steps to avoid detection by deleting transaction records. The substantially greater harm, coupled with these additional culpability factors, cannot adequately be reflected by a sentence only slightly above 12 weeks, as the Defence submits. A substantially greater uplift is required.

23 I therefore turn to Nur Diyanah, which provides a closer reference point for determining the extent of that uplift. The offender there conducted 48 transactions involving S$159,731.90 over about two months and received S$1,000. At least S$43,196 comprised scam proceeds, multiple victims were involved, and she continued offending after being informed that her bank account had been frozen because of suspected scam and money-laundering activities. The High Court assessed the appropriate claim-trial sentence at 21 weeks’ imprisonment.

24 The aggravating factors in Nur Diyanah and the present case differ in nature. In Nur Diyanah, the unlicensed payment services facilitated substantial scam proceeds affecting multiple victims, resulting in greater realised harm. The offender also persisted despite having been expressly alerted to suspected scam and money-laundering activities, which further increased her culpability. Neither feature is present here.

25 Conversely, the present offence was substantially greater in scale and duration and yielded significantly greater financial benefit. Mr Lau offended for approximately two years, compared with about two months in Nur Diyanah. Even on the conservative calculation adopted above, he handled at least S$2.4 million, compared with S$159,731.90. There were also significant culpability factors which were absent from Nur Diyanah or present to a substantially lesser extent. Mr Lau obtained at least S$84,000 from the offending, compared with S$1,000, and took deliberate steps to avoid detection.

26 The High Court’s treatment of the 11-month claim-trial sentence in Nur Diyanah is also relevant in assessing the extent of the uplift. The High Court considered 11 months disproportionate notwithstanding the substantial scam proceeds, multiple victims and persistence after an express warning of suspected criminal activity, and assessed the appropriate claim-trial sentence at 21 weeks. The greater scale and duration of the present offence, together with Mr Lau’s substantial financial benefit and efforts to avoid detection, justify a meaningful increase from 21 weeks. Assessed against the seriousness of the offending in Nur Diyanah, however, these factors do not justify the nine-to-12-month sentence sought by the Prosecution.

27 I therefore assess the appropriate claim-trial sentence at 30 weeks’ imprisonment. This gives due weight to the greater scale and duration of Mr Lau’s offending and the additional culpability factors present here, while recognising the greater realised harm and the distinct culpability factor present in Nur Diyanah. In my judgment, 30 weeks appropriately reflects the overall harm and culpability of Mr Lau’s offending conduct.

28 I turn to the offender-specific factors. Mr Lau has no antecedents. He indicated his intention to plead guilty at an early stage and cooperated with the Police. I accord mitigating weight to both his early plea and his cooperation. Mr Lau’s Stage 1 indication of plea would, under the Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas, attract a reduction of up to 30%. Taking into account his cooperation with the Police as an additional mitigating factor, I consider an overall reduction of one-third from the claim-trial sentence appropriate. Applying that reduction to 30 weeks results in 20 weeks’ imprisonment.

29 This approach is consistent with Vijay Kumar, where the High Court applied an overall reduction of one-third, from the claim-trial sentence of three weeks to two weeks, after taking into account both the offender’s plea of guilt and his cooperation with the authorities (Vijay Kumar at [86]). As Vijay Kumar pre-dated the present Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas and did not apportion the one-third reduction between these two mitigating factors, I do not treat it as establishing a fixed discount applicable to the present case. It nevertheless provides a useful reference point for assessing their combined mitigatory effect. Having regard to Mr Lau’s early plea and cooperation with the Police, I similarly consider an overall reduction of one-third appropriate in the present case.

30 Both parties accept that a disgorgement fine of S$84,000 is appropriate. I must also determine the appropriate term of imprisonment in default of payment of that fine.

31 I take guidance from the five-step framework laid down by the Court of Appeal in Chang Peng Hong Clarence v Public Prosecutor [2024] 2 SLR 722 (“Clarence Chang”) for calibrating imprisonment in default of payment of penalty orders. The Court of Appeal adopted S$1,000 for each day of in-default imprisonment as a working guide and starting point. The tentative term derived on that basis must then be checked against the statutory limits in s 319 of the CPC and adjusted, where necessary, to account for TIC charges. Finally, the court considers whether the resulting term is appropriate having regard to the totality principle, the need to provide a sufficient disincentive against non-payment and, where relevant, the offender’s ability to pay.

32 I consider the framework in Clarence Chang useful in determining the appropriate in-default term. Although Clarence Chang concerned penalty orders under s 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the considerations which informed the calibration of the in-default terms there apply equally in the present case. First, the S$84,000 fine, like the penalty orders in Clarence Chang, is intended to disgorge gains obtained from the offending. Second, imprisonment in default of payment is governed in both cases by s 319 of the CPC and serves to disincentivise non-payment of the amount to be disgorged. The Clarence Chang framework therefore provides an appropriate guide for calibrating the in-default term in the present case.

33 Applying the S$1,000 daily value to the S$84,000 fine produces a tentative in-default term of 84 days’ imprisonment. I next consider whether that term requires adjustment under the remaining steps of the framework.

34 First, s 319(1)(d)(i) of the CPC provides that, where an offence is punishable with imprisonment for 24 months or more, the in-default term must not exceed one-half of the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for the offence. The PSA offence carries a maximum term of three years’ imprisonment. The maximum permissible in-default term is therefore 18 months’ imprisonment. The tentative term of 84 days is well within that limit.

35 Second, s 319(1)(e) permits imprisonment in default of payment of a fine to be imposed in addition to the substantive term of imprisonment, provided that the total imprisonment imposed at one trial does not exceed the limits prescribed by s 306. Section 306 concerns an offender convicted of two or more distinct offences at one trial. As Mr Lau is convicted of only one offence, s 306 does not apply and no adjustment to the tentative term is required on this account.

36 Third, there are no TIC charges involving any further amount to be disgorged. No adjustment is required on that account.

37 I turn finally to whether 84 days is appropriate having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The purpose of the in-default term is to provide a sufficient disincentive against non-payment of the S$84,000 fine; it should not become a disproportionate additional punishment. The S$1,000 daily value is therefore only a starting point and may be adjusted if the resulting term is too lenient to incentivise payment or too harsh in the event of a genuine inability to pay.

38 I see no reason to adjust the tentative term in the present case. An in-default term of 84 days provides a meaningful disincentive against non-payment of the S$84,000 disgorgement fine. It is well within the statutory limit and, considered together with the substantive sentence of 21 weeks’ imprisonment, is not disproportionate. I therefore fix the in-default term at 84 days’ imprisonment.

39 I sentence Mr Lau to 20 weeks’ imprisonment and a disgorgement fine of S$84,000, in default 84 days’ imprisonment. The custodial term reflects the seriousness of his offending while giving due weight to his early indication of plea and cooperation with the Police. The fine ensures that he does not retain the financial benefit derived from the offence. The overall sentence is proportionate to Mr Lau’s criminality.