1 This is an application brought by the defendant in DC/OC 2227/2024 (“OC 2227”), Mr Andrew Layton Perkins (“the Applicant”), for the following unless orders against the claimant, Mr Carlson Clark Smith (“Mr Smith”):

2 Prayer 1 has been sought in response to Mr Smith’s failure to furnish $15,000 in security for costs within 21 days, as previously ordered against him in DC/SUM 677/2026 (“SUM 677”), while Prayer 2 has been sought in view of Mr Smith’s failure to satisfy outstanding costs orders made against him in favour of the Applicant.

3 For the reasons that follow, I allow the application in part. I grant an order in terms of Prayer 1. For Prayer 2, while I am satisfied that Mr Smith has “refused or neglected” to satisfy the outstanding costs orders against him, I am of the view that the consequence should be that of a stay rather than an unless order with the consequence of dismissal. I therefore make no separate order as to Prayer 3.

4 The dispute between the parties can be traced to DC/OC 1073/2022 (“OC 1073”), an action filed by the Applicant against Mr Smith on 29 November 2022. Similar to the present proceedings, Mr Smith has been unrepresented and acting in person while the Applicant has been represented by Mr Chong Yew Meng, Luke (“Mr Chong”) of Anglo Law Chambers LLC.

5 OC 1073 was a landlord and tenant dispute over an apartment owned by the Applicant where the Applicant claimed, among other things, repossession of the apartment from Mr Smith, the sum of $50,499.99 in rental arrears, double rent, and monthly rent at $5,000.00 until the delivery of possession of the apartment. In response, Mr Smith filed a counterclaim against the Applicant, relying on the following “causes of action” that arose when the Applicant purportedly broke into the apartment in question on 21 November 2022:

(a) The violation of ss 442, 453(1)(c), 459 and 461 of the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) by “breaking and entering [Mr Smith]’s place of residence and attempting to cause him grievous hurt”.

(b) The violation of ss 3(1)(a), 7(3)(d), and 8A(1)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed) by, among other things, violently confronting Mr Smith, shouting the untrue allegation that Mr Smith was 18 months behind on his rent within earshot of the building duty manager which caused considerable embarrassment to Mr Smith, and accusing Mr Smith of lying about his severe back problems.

(c) The violation of ss 13 and 14 of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (2020 Rev Ed) by filming Mr Smith without permission when “[Mr Smith] had not even had time to get dressed and was still in his underwear”.

For these alleged statutory violations, Mr Smith counterclaimed the sum of $60,000.00 from the Applicant.

6 On 26 June 2023, following a conciliation session in the State Courts before a District Judge, the parties entered into an agreement in full and final settlement of the dispute. Among other things, the agreement provided that Mr Smith shall pay the sums of $10,000.00 and $70,000.00 respectively in two tranches to the Applicant.

7 Thereafter, Mr Smith filed a Notice of Discontinuance of his counterclaim on 7 July 2023. On 7 September 2023, Mr Chong informed the deputy registrar that Mr Smith had defaulted on making the second tranche of payments to the Applicant. Accordingly, Mr Chong sought to file a consent final judgment.

8 On 11 December 2023, Mr Chong, who mentioned on behalf of Mr Smith, successfully filed a request to record a consent final judgment asynchronously before a duty registrar of the State Courts. The consent final judgment vide DC/JUD 2012/2023 (“JUD 2012”) reads:

Notably, the request annexed the settlement agreement between the parties and a draft consent final judgment, both of which stated the interest rate at 5.33% per month. Mr Smith initialled each page of the settlement agreement and replied via email to Mr Chong with his express confirmation of the draft consent final judgment. The settlement agreement was further witnessed by Mr Smith’s wife, who appended her signature below the signature of Mr Smith at the last page of the settlement agreement.

9 Thereafter, on 31 July 2024, Mr Smith took out DC/SUM 1414/2024 in OC 1073 for an “[e]xtension of time to Appeal Consent Judgment DC/JUD 2012/2023”. SUM 1414 was dismissed by a Deputy Registrar on 30 September 2024 with costs fixed at $1,200 (all in) in favour of the Applicant, on the basis that Mr Smith ought to have filed an application to set aside JUD 2012 rather than to appeal it.

10 However, no such application was subsequently filed. Instead, Mr Smith filed OC 2227 on 27 December 2024 to set aside JUD 2012 on the ground that he is unilaterally mistaken as to the interest rate on the settlement sum of $70,000.00. Mr Smith contends that the interest rate of 5.33% should be calculated on an annual rather than monthly basis.

11 On 7 April 2026, the Applicant took out SUM 677 against Mr Smith, seeking security for costs in the sum of $30,000.00. SUM 677 was granted by Deputy Registrar Teo Guan Kee (“DR Teo”) on 22 July 2026 who ordered Mr Smith to furnish $15,000 in security for costs within 21 days. As revealed in his oral judgment, security for costs was ordered as DR Teo found that Mr Smith was ordinarily resident outside Singapore and that the circumstances justified the making of an order for security for costs. This was for the following reasons:

(a) First, Mr Smith had not adduced evidence of any assets in Singapore from which a costs order could be satisfied. The invoices pertaining to the purported storage of household goods did not demonstrate the nature or value of those goods.

(b) Second, DR Teo was not satisfied that the order would stifle Mr Smith’s claim. Mr Smith had not substantiated his assertion that he was of limited financial means, and his claim that he was not earning a regular income was difficult to reconcile with his earlier affidavit evidence that he was employed as an executive director.

(c) Third, Mr Smith had previously failed to satisfy a costs order of $1,200 made in proceedings involving the same parties, notwithstanding that he was present when the order was made

(d) Fourth, Mr Smith’s failure to pay the second tranche under the settlement agreement (see [7] above) preceded his alleged discovery of the mistake in the interest rate, and Mr Smith himself had not taken steps to prosecute the proceedings expeditiously.

(e) Finally, while DR Teo did not think that the merits of the parties’ respective cases would affect his decision, he observed that Mr Smith’s case could not be characterised as having a very high chance of success, given his participation in the process leading to the settlement agreement and the consent judgment which he now sought to set aside.

12 Although the Applicant had also sought for all further proceedings in OC 2227 to be stayed pending the provision of the security for costs and an unless order that OC 2227 shall be dismissed if Mr Smith failed to furnish security for costs within 21 days, these were not granted by DR Teo as he was of the view that such peremptory orders would be inappropriate at that time. DR Teo instead observed that the Applicant was at liberty to take further steps as it deems fit upon such failure. Costs of $2,300 (inclusive of disbursements) were ordered against Mr Smith.

13 Separately, on 12 June 2026, the Applicant took out DC/SUM 1117/2026 (“SUM 1117”) to strike out a portion of Mr Smith’s supporting affidavit in SUM 677. This was dismissed by DR Teo on 8 July 2026 who ordered costs of $350 (inclusive of disbursements) in favour of Mr Smith.

14 Thereafter, on 17 September 2026, the Applicant filed the present application. I heard the parties on 29 October 2026 and reserved judgment.

15 For Prayer 1, being the prayer for an unless order against Mr Smith for his failure to furnish security for costs, the Applicant argues that Mr Smith has not demonstrated a genuine inability to furnish security. The bank statements exhibited by Mr Smith in his supporting affidavit only disclose the balances in five Singapore bank accounts and do not provide a complete picture of his financial circumstances. In particular, Mr Smith has not made full and frank disclosure of his financial position, including how he funds his living expenses in Vietnam and the various legal proceedings which he has commenced. Mr Smith was also able to hire a filing agent in Singapore to file various court documents.

16 As for Prayer 2, being an application under O 21 r 2(6) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC”) for Mr Smith’s failure to satisfy the various outstanding costs orders, the Applicant argues that Mr Smith’s persistent non-payment, coupled with his failure to provide satisfactory evidence of his financial circumstances or any indication of when payment can be made, justifies striking out the claim under O 21 r 2(6). The Applicant further contends that the present case involves not merely unpaid costs, but also non-compliance with a security for costs order and a failure to make full and frank disclosure of Mr Smith’s financial circumstances.

17 The Applicant maintains that both grounds independently justify striking out the claim on an unless order basis.

18 Mr Smith opposes the application in its entirety. He acknowledges his failure to comply with the security for costs order and the outstanding costs orders, but maintains that this is due to a genuine inability to pay, rather than any deliberate refusal. He relies on his bank statements and IRAS records to demonstrate his limited financial means, explaining that his Singapore bank accounts are dormant or contain negligible balances. At the hearing, Mr Smith further explained that he resides with his wife and relatives in Vietnam, who support his living expenses and provide him with limited financial assistance for court filings. He denies having undisclosed bank accounts or financial resources, and argues that his ability to meet basic living expenses and incur modest filing expenses does not establish an ability to furnish $15,000 in security. He further explains that he has not disclosed his precise whereabouts in Vietnam because of security concerns.

19 Mr Smith submits that an unless order or striking out of his claim would be disproportionate, particularly given his financial circumstances and the fact that the merits of his claim have yet to be judicially determined. He maintains that his claim raises a genuine issue concerning an alleged mistake in the interest rate under the Settlement Agreement, which he understands to be 5.33% per annum rather than 5.33% per month. He also disputes the Applicant’s characterisation of his conduct as contumelious, explaining that his failure to satisfy the earlier costs order is attributable to his lack of funds, and that the Applicant only raised the outstanding order with him in April 2026. In the circumstances, he submits that striking out the claim would unjustly deprive him of the opportunity to challenge the consent judgment.

20 I shall deal first with Prayer 1 which seeks an unless order with the consequences of the dismissal of OC 2227.

21 In Mitora Pte Ltd v Agritrade International (Pte) Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 1179 (“Mitora”), the Court of Appeal observed at [45(a)] that an unless order stipulating the consequence of dismissal should not be given as a matter of course, but as a last resort when the defaulter’s conduct is inexcusable. The Court of Appeal further cautioned at [46] against the indiscriminate issuance of unless orders carrying the consequence of striking out a litigant’s claim or defence in its entirety, as this would effectively deprive a litigant of his substantive rights on account of a procedural fault.

22 However, these observations must be understood in their proper context. Indeed, the need to read Mitora in its factual context was subsequently emphasised by the General Division of the High Court (“High Court”) in Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Ltd Partnership) v Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co, Ltd and another [2025] 4 SLR 1262 (“Wuhu Ruyi (HC)”) at [161]–[162], and expressly endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Ltd Partnership) v European Topsoho Sàrl [2025] 2 SLR 383 (“Wuhu Ruyi (CA)”) at [37]–[38]. Mitora concerned the striking out of the appellant’s statement of claim following its failure to comply with two unless orders for the discovery of documents. Although the appellant had failed to comply with the initial deadlines, it had subsequently disclosed substantially all the documents required. In particular, the respondent sought to rely on the appellant’s failure to disclose monthly bank statements, notwithstanding that the appellant had already disclosed bank passbooks relating to the relevant period. This objection was raised belatedly, after the respondent had sight of the bank passbooks for several months (Mitora at [21]–[23]). The Court of Appeal also found that the appellant’s initial difficulty in complying with the discovery orders was attributable in part to extraneous circumstances, namely the reluctance of a third party to provide the documents. Further, the respondent had suffered no irremediable prejudice from the delayed disclosure (Mitora at [41]). The Court of Appeal also expressed concern that the appellant had been afforded only five days, including a weekend, to comply with the unless orders (Mitora at [46]). In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that it was disproportionate to strike out the appellant’s claim for what was, in substance, a technical breach of the unless orders (Mitora at [25]–[26] and [41]).

23 In my respectful view, Mitora should not be read as laying down an inflexible rule that an unless order carrying the consequence of dismissal may only be imposed where there is a positive finding of deliberate or contumelious conduct on the part of the defaulter. While the Court of Appeal observed at [45(a)] that such an order should only be made as a last resort when the defaulter’s conduct is inexcusable, it does not necessarily follow that inexcusable conduct must amount to deliberate or contumelious non-compliance. The question is whether the defaulter’s conduct, viewed in all the circumstances, is sufficiently inexcusable to warrant the imposition of an unless order carrying such a consequence.

24 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Mitora acknowledged at [42] that unless orders remain a potent tool for the efficient and prompt administration of justice. The observations at [45]–[46] must therefore be understood as guidelines governing the proportionate exercise of the court’s discretion, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case. In Energy & Commodity Pte Ltd and others v BTS Tankers Pte Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 877 (“Energy & Commodity”) at [20]–[22], the Court of Appeal affirmed that the guiding principle in deciding whether to impose an unless order is proportionality, and distinguished Mitora on its facts. More recently, in Tan Tse Haw v Peh Tian Swee and another [2025] SGHCR 9 (“Tan Tse Haw”) at [41], AR Chong Fu Shan observed that the court is not invariably bound to impose the least onerous possible sanction, provided that an unless order carrying the consequence of striking out is not wholly disproportionate to the default. I wholeheartedly agree with AR Chong’s observation.

25 The distinction between the imposition and enforcement of an unless order is therefore important. In the present application, I am concerned with the former. In my view, the authorities establish that an unless order carrying the consequence of dismissal or striking out should only be imposed as a last resort, where the defaulter’s conduct is sufficiently inexcusable and such a consequence is justified and proportionate in the circumstances: Mitora at [45]–[46]; Energy & Commodity at [20]–[22]. In Oro Negro Drilling Pte Ltd and others v Integradora de Servicios Petroleros Oro Negro SAPI de CV and others [2025] SGHCR 28 (“Oro Negro Drilling”), AR Perry Peh identified two considerations in determining whether an unless order carrying the consequence of dismissal is warranted. The first concerns whether the defaulting party’s conduct is sufficiently inexcusable to warrant the imposition of such a sanction. The second concerns the subject matter of the order breached, and whether further non-compliance would risk prejudicing a fair adjudication of the matter, such that an unless order is necessary to secure compliance (Oro Negro Drilling at [73]).

26 In my view, the authorities are clear that while deliberate or contumelious non-compliance would weigh strongly in favour of such an order, it is not necessarily a prerequisite. The court must consider the nature and circumstances of the non-compliance, the purpose of the order breached, the prejudice to the parties, and whether a less drastic order would suffice. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Wuhu Ruyi (CA) at [36]–[40], this assessment must be undertaken when the unless order is first imposed, since its stipulated consequences would ordinarily take effect upon non-compliance without a fresh assessment of proportionality.

27 Having set out the general principles surrounding the imposition of an unless order, I now turn to the specific principles that apply when the court is asked to impose an unless order with the consequence of dismissing a claim after the claimant is found to have breached an order to furnish security for costs. These principles can be gleaned from several cases.

28 In Sun Electric Pte Ltd v Sunseap Group Pte Ltd and others and another suit [2020] SGHCR 1 (“Sun Electric”) at [52]–[55], AR Justin Yeo, having ordered the plaintiff to furnish security for the defendants’ costs, declined to impose an unless order for the plaintiff’s claims to be struck out without further order in the event that the plaintiff failed to furnish security. Instead, AR Yeo ordered the proceedings to be stayed, with the defendants having liberty to apply to strike out the plaintiff’s claims if security was not furnished within 21 days. In reaching his decision, AR Yeo referred to the English Court of Appeal’s observation in Radu v Houston and Another [2007] 5 Costs LR 671 (“Radu”) at [18] that an order for large sums of security should not be made subject to an unless sanction until a real opportunity has been given to the claimant to find the money.

29 It is evident that Sun Electric does not stand for the proposition that an unless order is inappropriate where a claimant has failed to furnish security for costs. Instead, the concern was that the plaintiff should first be afforded a real opportunity to furnish security. Indeed, the AR expressly contemplated that the defendants could subsequently apply to strike out the plaintiff’s claims if security was not furnished.

30 Turning to the case of Radu, the claimant there was ordered by a Senior Master to furnish £125,000 in security for costs, failing which his claim would stand struck out. Although the Senior Master granted permission to appeal against the security for costs order, he refused a stay pending appeal. The claimant failed to furnish security and his claim was accordingly dismissed (Radu at [3]–[9]). On appeal to the High Court, Eady J found that the hearing before the Senior Master had been procedurally unfair and that the amount of security ordered was excessive. However, Eady J declined to set aside the judgment dismissing the claim, notwithstanding that the claimant had by then secured the funds necessary to furnish security (Radu at [10]–[15]). On further appeal, the English Court of Appeal (per Waller LJ) observed that a security for costs order was intended to give the claimant a “proper choice” between furnishing security and withdrawing his claim, and that the claimant should be afforded a real opportunity to find the money (Radu at [18]). Waller LJ considered it unfair for the sanction of striking out to take effect before the claimant’s appeal could be heard (Radu at [18]–[19]). In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the claimant’s action upon the provision of £80,000 in security for costs (Radu at [25]–[26]).

31 That being said, the English Court of Appeal expressly contemplated at [18] that an unless order could be imposed together with the initial security for costs order, provided that “the period for complying should on any view be generous”. Accordingly, Radu does not preclude the imposition of an unless order carrying the consequence of striking out. Rather, whether such an order should be imposed depends on whether the claimant has been afforded a real opportunity to furnish security and all the circumstances of the case.

32 The decision of the Singapore International Commercial Court in DWJ v DWK [2026] SGHC(I) 10 (“DWJ”) is also instructive. In that case, the court ordered the claimant to furnish $100,000 in security for costs within 28 days, failing which its claim to set aside an arbitration award would be struck out (DWJ at [50]). Although the defendant had sought a shorter period of 14 days, the court considered it appropriate to allow 28 days having regard to the serious consequence of striking out the claim if security was not furnished (DWJ at [51]). This decision shows that an unless order carrying the consequence of striking out may even be imposed together with an initial order for security for costs, provided that the claimant is afforded a reasonable period to comply. A fortiori, such an unless order may be an appropriate remedy after a claimant has breached a prior order to furnish security.

33 In SC DG Petrol SRL & Ors v Vitol Broking Ltd [2013] EWHC 3920 (Comm) (“SC DG Petrol”), Robin Knowles CBE QC (“Knowles QC”), sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, considered a case where the claimant had initially been ordered to furnish security for costs within 28 days but failed to do so. The defendants subsequently applied to strike out the claim. At a further hearing, Eder J declined to strike out the claim immediately, but instead granted the claimant a further period to furnish security, stayed the proceedings, and imposed an unless order that the claim would stand automatically struck out if security was not furnished within the extended period (SC DG Petrol at [3]–[6]). When the claimant failed to comply with the unless order, the claim stood struck out.

34 Knowles QC subsequently refused to grant a further extension of time or relief from sanctions, having regard to, among other things, the claimant’s continued failure to furnish security despite the opportunities afforded to it and the absence of a satisfactory explanation for its non-compliance (SC DG Petrol at [24]–[25]). Notably, Knowles QC observed at [12] that while practices varied as to whether proceedings should be stayed pending the provision of security or made subject to an unless order, the practice in the English Commercial Court was ultimately to dismiss a claim if security was ordered but not furnished.

35 In Exporien Mining Private Limited Company v Aggreko International Projects Ltd [2024] EWHC 1463 (Comm) (“Exporien Mining”), the claimant had similarly failed to comply with an earlier order to furnish security for costs, notwithstanding that it had been afforded approximately three months to do so (Exporien Mining at [3] and [8]). The defendant applied to strike out the claim (Exporien Mining at [1] and [11]). The English High Court declined to strike out the claim immediately, particularly as the claimant had applied for further time before the expiry of the original deadline for compliance (Exporien Mining at [29]). Instead, the court imposed an unless order requiring the claimant to furnish security, whether by payment into court or by providing satisfactory alternative security in the form of an insurance policy, within a further 21 days. In reaching this decision, the court emphasised the importance of bringing the interlocutory dispute over security for costs to an end (Exporien Mining at [29]–[30]). This decision therefore demonstrates that the court may impose an unless order following an earlier default, while at the same time affording the claimant a further and final opportunity to furnish security before the consequence of striking out takes effect.

36 Lastly, and of particular relevance, is the English High Court’s decision in Craft Development SCI v Actis LLP and others [2025] EWHC 2744 (KB) (“Craft Development”). In that case, the claimant had failed to furnish security for costs in accordance with an earlier order which required security to be provided in three tranches (Craft Development at [2] and [4]). Although the earlier order expressly contemplated that the defendants could apply for a stay in the event of non-compliance, the defendants subsequently sought an unless order for the claim to be struck out (Craft Development at [2] and [8]). The claimant resisted this application, arguing that a stay would afford it greater flexibility to raise the necessary funds, particularly as efforts were being made to sell a property to raise money (Craft Development at [69]). The court rejected this argument. At [71], it observed that an earlier order permitting the defendants to apply for a stay did not preclude the subsequent imposition of an unless order. The court further observed that a stay could be combined with an unless order, citing SC DG Petrol as an example (Craft Development at [71]). More importantly, the court considered that a stay would be inappropriate and unsatisfactory as it would merely leave the litigation in abeyance and prolong the uncertainty faced by the defendants (Craft Development at [72]).

37 Nevertheless, the court in Craft Development recognised at [73] that an unless order should not be imposed unless its consequences could be justified, and that the court must be satisfied that striking out would be a proportionate consequence of continued non-compliance. In assessing proportionality, the court considered the period to be afforded for compliance as an important factor (Craft Development at [74]). Although the claimant had made some attempts to raise funds, including exploring insurance arrangements and the sale of a property, no security had been furnished for more than three months after the first payment had fallen due (Craft Development at [74]). In the circumstances, the court imposed an unless order requiring the claimant to furnish security in the sum of £226,000 within a further six weeks, failing which the claim would stand struck out (Craft Development at [75]).

38 In my judgment, the following principles may be distilled from the authorities to guide the court in determining whether an unless order with the consequence of the dismissal of a claim following a claimant’s failure to obey an order to furnish security for costs. Although not the case here, I think these principles should likewise apply in a situation where an unless order is sought together with an order for security for costs, as was the situation in DWJ.

39 First, an unless order carrying the consequence of dismissal or striking out should not be imposed as a matter of course, but as a last resort where the defaulter’s conduct is sufficiently inexcusable and the stipulated consequence is justified and proportionate in the circumstances: Mitora at [45]–[46]; Energy & Commodity at [20]–[22]. While deliberate or contumelious non-compliance would weigh strongly in favour of imposing such an order, it is not necessarily a prerequisite. In determining whether such an order is warranted, the court should consider not only the nature and circumstances of the non-compliance, but also the subject matter of the order breached and the consequences of further non-compliance (Oro Negro Drilling at [73]). In particular, the court should consider whether further non-compliance would prejudice the proper administration or adjudication of the proceedings, having regard to the purpose of the order breached (see [25]–[26] above). Moreover, the court is not invariably bound to impose the least onerous possible sanction in an unless order (Tan Tse Haw at [41]).

40 Second, specifically in the context of security for costs, a claimant should be afforded a real opportunity to furnish security before being exposed to the consequence of striking out: Radu at [18]; Sun Electric at [52]–[55]. However, once that opportunity has been afforded and the claimant remains in default, the court may properly impose an unless order requiring compliance within a further specified period, failing which the claim would stand struck out: SC DG Petrol at [3]–[6]; Exporien Mining at [27]–[30]; Craft Development at [70]–[75].

41 Third, whether such an order is appropriate depends on all the circumstances, including the duration of the non-compliance, the claimant’s explanation for it, the efforts made to furnish security, and the prejudice to the parties. The court should also consider whether a less drastic order, such as a stay, would adequately address the non-compliance, or merely prolong the proceedings and require the defendant to incur further costs in seeking to bring the claim to an end: Craft Development at [71]–[74]. Where an unless order is appropriate, the claimant should be afforded a reasonable and sufficiently generous period to comply, bearing in mind the serious consequences of non-compliance: Radu at [18]; Craft Development at [73]–[75]; DWJ at [50]–[51].

42 Finally, the above principles must be applied consistently with the Ideals under O 3 r 1(2) of the ROC, namely fair access to justice, expeditious proceedings, cost-effective work, efficient use of court resources, and fair and practical results suited to the needs of the parties. Under O 3 r 1(3)–(4), the court must seek to achieve the Ideals in all its orders or directions, while parties have a corresponding duty to assist the court in achieving them. Indeed, the Ideals are “akin to constitutional principles by which the parties and the Court are guided in conducting civil proceedings” (Civil Justice Commission, Civil Justice Commission Report, 29 December 2017 at p 6; see also Dai Yi Ting v Chuang Fu Yuan (Grabcycle (SG) Pte Ltd and another, third parties) [2023] 3 SLR 1574 at [13]). Further, O 3 r 2(4)(d) of the ROC expressly empowers the court to dismiss, stay or set aside proceedings for non-compliance with a court order, even where the non-compliance could be compensated by costs, if it is materially inconsistent with any of the Ideals. As Mohan J observed in Wuhu Ruyi (HC) at [163], in determining whether an unless order should be imposed, what might previously have been considered disproportionate could well be considered proportionate under the present procedural regime.

43 In my view, while the court must be mindful that an unless order carrying the consequence of striking out may deprive a claimant of having his claim determined on its merits, it must also consider the defendant’s legitimate interest in finality and the costs and delays occasioned by continued non-compliance. In particular, an indefinite stay or successive applications to secure compliance may undermine the Ideals of expeditious proceedings, cost-effective work and efficient use of court resources. An unless order, imposed only after careful consideration of whether its stipulated consequence is proportionate and coupled with a reasonable further period for compliance, may therefore strike an appropriate balance between the parties’ interests.

44 In determining Prayer 1, I am reminded that I am here dealing with the consequences of Mr Smith’s failure to furnish the $15,000 in security for costs within 21 days, as ordered by DR Teo in SUM 677. In this regard, it is inappropriate for me to go behind DR Teo’s decision and findings since neither side has appealed against it. Put simply, the findings made by DR Teo (as outlined at [11] above) in allowing SUM 677 must be taken to be final and conclusive.

45 In my judgment, Mr Smith’s allegations of financial impecuniosity, even if true, do not mean that no consequences should follow from his failure to furnish security for costs. That would defeat the very purpose of an order for security for costs, which is to protect the Applicant, who cannot avoid being sued, by enabling him to recover costs from Mr Smith out of a fund within the jurisdiction in the event that Mr Smith’s claim in OC 2227 proves to be unsuccessful: see SW Trustees Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and another v Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma and others (Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma, third party) [2023] 5 SLR 1484 at [19]. If no consequences were to follow from Mr Smith’s failure to furnish security, DR Teo’s order would be all bark and no bite. That clearly cannot be the case.

46 In the present case, Mr Smith has already been afforded a real opportunity to furnish security. DR Teo made the order on 22 July 2026, ordering Mr Smith to furnish $15,000 in security within 21 days. However, Mr Smith has failed to do so notwithstanding that more than three months have passed since the order was made. The Applicant only took out the present application on 17 September 2026, after the deadline for compliance had expired. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that Mr Smith has not been afforded a real opportunity to furnish security. As correctly submitted by the Applicant, this clearly distinguishes the present situation from Sun Electric, where the AR considered it appropriate to first afford the plaintiff an opportunity to furnish security before imposing an unless order. Instead, the present application is consistent with the course contemplated by the AR, namely that the defendant may subsequently apply to strike out the claim if the claimant fails to furnish security within the stipulated period.

47 I am also not satisfied that Mr Smith has provided a satisfactory explanation for his continued failure to furnish security. Mr Smith relies on his bank statements and IRAS records to demonstrate his limited financial means. However, as the Applicant points out, the bank statements only disclose the balances in five Singapore bank accounts and do not provide a complete picture of his financial circumstances. Several matters in Mr Smith’s own affidavits reinforce this concern:

(a) First, Mr Smith states that in early February 2026, he made at least 13 enquiries about possible apartment rentals in Singapore, identifying a variety of properties in different parts of Singapore, including AMO Residence, Normanton Park, Q Bay Residences and The Poiz Residences. It is curious how he could afford the rent in these condominiums if he is truly impecunious as claimed.

(b) Second, although Mr Smith states that his stay in Vietnam is a temporary measure to manage his limited resources, and that medical costs there are approximately one third of those in Singapore, he provides no satisfactory account of how he funds his living expenses there.

(c) Third, Mr Smith states that he remains employed as the Executive Director of Saugeen Consulting Pte Ltd, but claims that he has drawn no salary or other employment income since 1 January 2025. However, he has not provided any confirmation from the company or other documentary evidence to substantiate this assertion.

48 During the hearing, Mr Smith also explained that he now primarily resides with his wife and relatives in Vietnam, who support his living expenses and provide him with limited financial assistance for court filings. However, this explanation was not averred in his affidavit. In any event, even accepting that his ability to meet his basic living expenses and incur modest filing expenses does not necessarily establish an ability to furnish $15,000 in security, Mr Smith has still not satisfactorily substantiated his overall financial position. In particular, he has not demonstrated what concrete steps he has taken to raise the necessary security or when he expects to be able to comply. I also bear in mind that DR Teo had previously considered Mr Smith’s assertion that he was of limited financial means and was not satisfied that the security for costs order would stifle his claim. Mr Smith’s further evidence does not, in my view, adequately address these concerns.

49 I accept that Mr Smith’s failure to furnish security may be attributable to his financial circumstances rather than a deliberate refusal to comply with DR Teo’s order. However, this does not, without more, render his continued non-compliance excusable. Mr Smith has failed to furnish any security despite having been afforded considerable time to do so, and his explanation for his inability to comply remains inadequately substantiated. This must also be considered against his previous failure to satisfy the costs order of $1,200 made in SUM 1414, as well as his failure to pay the second tranche of the settlement sum in the earlier proceedings. I also note DR Teo’s observation that Mr Smith had not taken steps to prosecute OC 2227 expeditiously. In my judgment, these circumstances, viewed cumulatively, render Mr Smith’s continued failure to furnish security sufficiently inexcusable to warrant an unless order. This is not a case of a minor or technical breach, as was the case in Mitora. Mr Smith has not furnished any part of the security ordered, and the purpose of DR Teo’s order remains wholly unfulfilled.

50 I have considered whether it would suffice to stay OC 2227 pending Mr Smith’s furnishing of security, rather than to impose an unless order with the consequence of dismissal. However, I do not regard this to be an appropriate course in the circumstances. Whilst a stay would prevent Mr Smith from taking further steps in OC 2227 without first furnishing security, it would not provide the Applicant with the fund within the jurisdiction which DR Teo’s order was intended to secure. It would also leave the proceedings unresolved. In particular, given Mr Smith's prolonged failure to comply with DR Teo's order, a further stay would merely defer the question of whether his continued non-compliance should result in the dismissal of his claim. The Applicant would then have to return to court to seek a further order to strike out OC 2227 should Mr Smith continue to fail to furnish security. This would occasion further costs to the Applicant and require further deployment of judicial resources. As observed in Craft Development at [71]–[72], a stay may merely leave the litigation in abeyance and prolong the uncertainty faced by the defendant. I agree with this observation. In the present case, the Applicant has already had to take out the present application because of Mr Smith’s failure to comply with DR Teo’s order. It would not be appropriate to require the Applicant to make yet another application to bring OC 2227 to an end if Mr Smith continues to default. This would also be inconsistent with the Ideals of civil proceedings as declared in the ROC.

51 It does not escape me that an unless order carrying the consequence of striking out OC 2227 would deprive Mr Smith of the opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits. However, I note that OC 2227 concerns Mr Smith’s attempt to set aside a consent final judgment which requires him to pay interest at the rate of 5.33% per month on the settlement sum of $70,000. I also bear in mind DR Teo’s observation that Mr Smith’s claim cannot be characterised as having a very high chance of success, particularly given his participation in the process leading to the settlement agreement and the consent final judgment, both of which expressly provided for interest at the rate of 5.33% per month. I do not propose to make any findings on the merits of OC 2227 in the present application. Nevertheless, having regard to the circumstances in which the consent final judgment was entered and the observations made by DR Teo, I do not consider the potential prejudice to Mr Smith to outweigh the need to give effect to the security for costs order and bring the proceedings to an end should he continue to fail to comply with it.

52 As for the period to be given to Mr Smith to comply, I see no reason to afford Mr Smith any further period beyond the 21 days in Prayer 1. DR Teo had already ordered Mr Smith to furnish security within 21 days on 22 July 2026. Mr Smith has therefore had more than three months to make arrangements to furnish the $15,000 in security, but has failed to do so. In these circumstances, a further period of 21 days is evidently sufficient to afford Mr Smith a final opportunity to comply with DR Teo’s order. This is consistent with the approach in DWJ at [50]–[51], where the court allowed 28 days for compliance with an initial security for costs order on an unless order basis. In my view, a further period of 21 days strikes an appropriate balance between giving Mr Smith a further opportunity to furnish security and bringing OC 2227 to an end should he continue to default.

53 For the foregoing reasons, I grant an order in terms of Prayer 1.

54 I now turn to Prayer 2, where the Applicant seeks another unless order in response to Mr Smith’s failure to satisfy various outstanding costs orders totalling $3,150.00. For clarity, the $3,150 sought under Prayer 2 represents the net amount after deducting the $350 costs ordered in Mr Smith’s favour in SUM 1117.

55 O 21 r 2(6) of the ROC provides that the court may “stay or dismiss any application, action or appeal or make any other order as the Court deems fit if a party refuses or neglects to pay any costs ordered within the specified time, whether the costs were ordered in the present proceedings or in some related proceedings”. In H M Luqman Al Hakim Ang and another v Wonderz Pty Ltd and others [2026] SGDC 295 (“H M Luqman”) at [53], I explained that the inquiry proceeds in two stages: first, whether the defaulting party has “refused or neglected” to pay the outstanding costs; and second, if that threshold is crossed, whether an adverse order should be made and, if so, what form that order should take.

56 As for the first stage, the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in Owner of the vessel(s) “CHLOE V” v UBS AG [2026] 1 SLR 107 (“Chloe V”) apply. The Applicant must show, on a prima facie basis, that Mr Smith has “refused or neglected” to pay the outstanding costs. The fact that Mr Smith has failed or omitted to pay the outstanding costs is sufficient to establish such a prima facie case: Chloe V at [31].

57 The burden then falls on Mr Smith to explain why the outstanding costs order has not been satisfied (Chloe V at [32]). As to what constitutes “neglect”, the “[m]ere omission to pay a debt on demand does not of itself constitute neglect to do so within the meaning of that provision”: Chloe V at [35], citing with approval Ng Tai Tuan v Chng Gim Huat Pte Ltd [1990] 2 SLR(R) 231 at [14]. Accordingly, “neglect” requires an omission to pay without reasonable excuse: Chloe V at [35].

58 If Mr Smith genuinely lacks the financial resources to pay, he may not be considered to have “refused or neglected” to pay the outstanding costs (Chloe V at [33] and [35]). However, it is incumbent upon him to explain his financial position, including the provenance of the funds used to fund the litigation (Chloe V at [33]). Further, it does not lie in Mr Smith’s mouth to contend that the Applicant should take steps to enforce the outstanding costs order. The Applicant should not have to incur further costs and expenses to recover the outstanding costs (Chloe V at [34]).

59 In H M Luqman Al Hakim Ang and another v Wonderz Pty Ltd and others [2026] SGDC 295 (“H M Luqman”), I held that the “extremely limited” standard articulated by the Court of Appeal in Chloe V was inappropriate in determining the appropriate consequences where a defendant had failed to comply with outstanding costs orders made against it. This was principally because the test in Chloe V was fashioned in the context of an appellant who had failed to pay outstanding costs ordered below. A defendant at first instance stood in a vastly different position from an appellant: see H M Luqman at [4] and [40]–[47]. Accordingly, I held that a more flexible approach should guide the exercise of the court’s discretion at the second stage, underpinned by proportionality and the recognition that, save in exceptional cases, a defendant should not be deprived of the opportunity to defend a claim on its merits solely because of a failure to pay outstanding costs: H M Luqman at [4] and [63]–[64].

60 The present case, however, concerns a defaulting claimant, rather than a defendant. In my view, this distinction is material. Unlike a defendant, a claimant voluntarily invokes the court’s jurisdiction and elects to commence proceedings to obtain relief against the defendant. The defendant, on the other hand, has no choice but to defend the proceedings brought against him. Accordingly, the considerations which militated against the application of the “extremely limited” standard in H M Luqman to a defaulting defendant do not apply with the same force where the defaulting party is the claimant. A claimant who elects to pursue proceedings must also bear the costs consequences arising from the conduct of those proceedings. It would not ordinarily be fair to require a defendant to continue incurring costs in defending a claim while the claimant remains in default of outstanding costs orders made in the defendant’s favour.

61 That said, I do not consider that the “extremely limited” standard in Chloe V should automatically be transposed to the present context either. Unlike an appellant in Chloe V, Mr Smith’s claim in OC 2227 has not yet been substantively determined. Striking out his claim would therefore deprive him of the opportunity to obtain a determination of his substantive rights in the first instance. This is materially different from an appellant seeking to overturn an existing judgment following an unsuccessful determination below. Accordingly, while the fact that Mr Smith voluntarily commenced OC 2227 weighs in favour of a more robust response to his non-payment of outstanding costs, the court must still exercise its discretion having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the prejudice to Mr Smith if his claim were struck out.

62 The English authorities also provide useful guidance on the exercise of the court’s discretion where a claimant fails to satisfy outstanding costs orders. In Siddiqi v Aidiniantz [2020] EWHC 699 (QB) (“Siddiqi”), Saini J observed that the “working” or “default rule” is that a claimant should not be able to continue with his claim without satisfying an existing and unappealed final costs order, and that the court should impose a condition requiring compliance. However, this is not an inflexible rule. Where the claimant establishes that he cannot pay the outstanding costs and that the claim would thereby be stifled, this is a material, although not necessarily conclusive, consideration against imposing such a condition. The court must also take into account all other circumstances of the case, including the procedural conduct of the defaulting party (Siddiqi at [30]).

63 In J Robbins Capital Partners Ltd v Zamsort Ltd & Ors [2024] EWHC 1990 (Comm) (“J Robbins Capital”) at [26]–[32], Paul Stanley KC reviewed the English authorities and summarised the principles governing orders made against a claimant for failure to satisfy outstanding costs orders. The court emphasised that the decision is ultimately one of discretion, and that the underlying policy of ensuring compliance with costs orders weighs in favour of imposing an appropriate condition on a claimant who seeks to continue the proceedings (J Robbins Capital at [27]–[30]). However, the court must consider whether the claimant has established, on the balance of probabilities, that it does not have and cannot raise the funds necessary to satisfy the outstanding costs orders, such that a stay or other condition would stifle its claim (J Robbins Capital at [21]–[24] and [31]). The court must also consider all the circumstances, including the claimant’s procedural conduct (J Robbins Capital at [25] and [32]). On the facts, the court declined to impose a condition requiring payment of the outstanding costs or to stay the proceedings, as it was satisfied that the claimant genuinely lacked and could not raise the necessary funds (J Robbins Capital at [46]–[48] and [64]).

64 In my view, the relevant principles to be followed may be stated as such. The default rule is that a claimant should not be able to continue with his claim without satisfying an existing final costs order, and that the court should impose a condition requiring compliance (Siddiqi at [30]). However, this is not an inflexible rule and the approach adopted in H M Luqman at [63]–[64] may be adapted to the present context, having regard to the English authorities discussed above. In exercising its discretion at the second stage in determining whether an adverse consequence should be imposed and, if so, the type of order, the court should have regard to all the circumstances, including the following non-exhaustive factors:

(a) The reasons why the outstanding costs orders were made. Where the costs were occasioned by the claimant’s unsuccessful applications, breach of court orders, abuse of process or other misconduct during the litigation, this may weigh in favour of a more serious sanction (H M Luqman at [63(a)]; Beech Hill Capital Limited v Lucas Duplan & Ors [2026] EWHC 1390 (Comm) (“Beech Hill”) at [33(iv)(a)–(b)]).

(b) The amount of the outstanding costs relative to the value and nature of the claim. Where the outstanding costs are substantial in comparison with the value of the claim, this may weigh in favour of imposing an order that the claimant satisfy the outstanding costs as a condition of continuing the proceedings (H M Luqman at [63(b)]).

(c) The degree of the claimant’s culpability in failing to satisfy the costs orders. In this regard, the court should consider the reasons for the non-payment, whether the claimant has provided a satisfactory explanation, and whether his conduct demonstrates a deliberate or contumelious disregard of the court’s orders (H M Luqman at [63(c)]; Beech Hill at [33(iv)(d)] and [33(vi)]).

(d) Whether the claimant has satisfactorily substantiated any assertion that he lacks the financial means to satisfy the outstanding costs orders. In this regard, the claimant should provide detailed, cogent and full and frank disclosure of his financial position and his prospects of raising the necessary funds (Siddiqi at [30(iii)]; J Robbins Capital at [21]–[24] and [31]; Beech Hill at [33(iv)(e)]).

(e) The prejudice to the defendant arising from the non-payment, including the unfairness of requiring the defendant to continue incurring costs in defending the claim while the claimant remains in default (H M Luqman at [63(d)]).

(f) Whether the claimant has made genuine efforts to satisfy the costs orders, including by making partial payment, offering instalments or proposing other reasonable arrangements (H M Luqman at [63(e)]).

(g) The degree of connection between the outstanding costs orders and the claim which the claimant seeks to pursue. Where the costs orders arose from the same proceedings or related proceedings involving the same parties, this would weigh in favour of imposing an appropriate condition on the claimant’s continued prosecution of the claim (Beech Hill at [33(iv)(f)]).

65 Finally, the court should consider whether a less intrusive measure (rather than striking out the claim) would adequately secure compliance with the outstanding costs orders. These may include staying the claim pending payment, staying any outstanding interlocutory applications that have been filed by the claimant until outstanding costs have been paid, precluding the claimant from filing any interlocutory applications, or awarding costs of the O 21 r 2(6) application in favour of the defendant on an indemnity basis (H M Luqman at [64]). Where a striking out order is appropriate, the court should ordinarily afford the claimant a reasonable opportunity to comply before the sanction of striking out takes effect (J Robbins Capital at [13] and [30]; Beech Hill at [33(vii)]).

66 The Applicant has established, on a prima facie basis, that Mr Smith has “refused or neglected” to pay the outstanding costs. It is undisputed that the costs orders remain unsatisfied. The burden therefore falls on Mr Smith to explain why those orders have not been satisfied.

67 In my judgment, Mr Smith has not discharged this burden. As the Applicant argues (see [16] above), Mr Smith has failed to provide satisfactory evidence of his financial circumstances or any indication of when he would be able to satisfy the outstanding costs orders. For the reasons I have explained at [47]–[49] above, I am not satisfied that Mr Smith has provided a complete and satisfactory account of his financial position, including the provenance of the funds used to finance his litigation. Nor has he demonstrated any genuine efforts to satisfy the outstanding costs orders, whether by making partial payment or proposing a reasonable arrangement for payment.

68 I accept that Mr Smith’s ability to meet his basic living expenses and incur modest filing expenses does not, without more, establish that he has the financial means to satisfy the outstanding costs orders. However, as the Court of Appeal observed in Chloe V at [33], where a party relies on impecuniosity, it is incumbent upon that party to explain his financial position, including the provenance of the funds used to finance the litigation. Mr Smith has not satisfactorily done so.

69 In the premises, I am not satisfied that Mr Smith has a reasonable excuse for his failure to pay the outstanding costs. I therefore find that he has failed to rebut the prima facie position that he has “refused or neglected” to pay the outstanding costs.

70 Having found that Mr Smith has refused or neglected to pay the outstanding costs, I now consider the appropriate consequences. I recognise that Mr Smith is the claimant in OC 2227, and that this is a relevant consideration in the exercise of the court’s discretion. Unlike a defendant, who is brought before the court at the claimant’s election, Mr Smith voluntarily commenced OC 2227. The Applicant, on the other hand, has no choice but to defend the claim brought against him. The claim was an attempt to set aside a consent final judgment that was entered into for a prior claim between the parties. It would therefore be unfair to require the Applicant to continue incurring costs in defending OC 2227 while Mr Smith leaves the outstanding costs orders unsatisfied. This consideration weighs in favour of making an adverse order against Mr Smith and indeed is the default approach identified in Siddiqi at [30].

71 Nevertheless, the fact that Mr Smith is the claimant does not mean that his claim should automatically be stayed or dismissed. I must still accord due consideration to all the circumstances. In this regard, I note that the outstanding costs orders arose from applications in the present and related proceedings involving the same parties. I also take into account that Mr Smith has not made any partial payment or proposed any arrangement for payment, notwithstanding the time that has elapsed since the costs orders were made.

72 On the other hand, I am not satisfied that the circumstances warrant striking out OC 2227, whether immediately or on an unless order basis. Although Mr Smith has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for his non-payment, I am unable to conclude that he has deliberately refused to pay the outstanding costs despite having the requisite financial resources. His financial evidence is inadequate, but this does not necessarily imply that he has the means to satisfy the outstanding costs. Further, the outstanding costs of $3,150.00 are relatively small when compared with the value of OC 2227, which concerns his attempt to set aside a consent final judgment, comprising the principal sum of $70,000 and interest accruing at 5.33% per month. I am mindful that striking out OC 2227 would deprive Mr Smith of the opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits. While DR Teo had observed that Mr Smith’s claim could not be characterised as having a very high chance of success, this does not mean that the claim is plainly hopeless or bound to fail. The merits of OC 2227 have not been determined as the matter has not proceeded to trial.

73 In my view, a stay of OC 2227 pending satisfaction of the outstanding costs orders would adequately protect the Applicant’s interests without immediately depriving Mr Smith of the opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits. Such an order would prevent Mr Smith from taking further steps to prosecute OC 2227 until the outstanding costs are paid. I acknowledge that this would leave OC 2227 unresolved and potentially prolong the proceedings. However, as the Applicant correctly points out, Prayer 2 is distinct from Prayer 1: the former concerns outstanding costs already ordered, whereas the latter concerns security for the Applicant’s future costs of defending OC 2227. I also consider that the circumstances of the two prayers warrant different consequences. Unlike Prayer 1, where Mr Smith had already been afforded more than three months to furnish security and the purpose of the security order remained wholly unfulfilled, the outstanding costs under Prayer 2 amount to $3,150, which is relatively small when compared with the value of OC 2227. In the circumstances, I consider that the prejudice occasioned to the Applicant by the continued pendency of OC 2227 is outweighed by the prejudice to Mr Smith if his claim were struck out. A stay is therefore an appropriate and proportionate consequence.

74 Therefore, while I find that Mr Smith has refused or neglected to pay the outstanding costs within the meaning of O 21 r 2(6) of the ROC, I do not consider that striking out OC 2227 is warranted either immediately or on an unless basis. I instead order that all further proceedings in OC 2227 be stayed until the outstanding costs referred to in Prayer 2 have been paid in full.

75 For the foregoing reasons, I allow the application in part. In sum, unless Mr Smith furnishes the $15,000 in security for costs within 21 days from today, his claim in OC 2227 shall be dismissed without further order. Even if he furnishes the security within the stipulated period, the claim will remain stayed pursuant to my order on Prayer 2 until the outstanding costs orders have been satisfied in full. There is no order as to Prayer 3. Parties are to file costs submissions limited to five pages each within two weeks if they are unable to agree on costs.

76 It remains for me to commend both Mr Smith and counsel for the Applicant, Mr Chong, for their clear and measured submissions despite the protracted dispute between both sides.