[2026] SGFC 100

IN THE FAMILY JUSTICE COURTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

[2026] SGFC 100

FC/D 3679/2024

FC/SUM 79/2025

Between

XZE

… Plaintiff

And

XZF

… Defendant

JUDGMENT

[Family Law – Ancillary Matters – Maintenance for the Child]

[Family Law – Interim Maintenance]

This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.

XZE
v
XZF

[2026] SGFC 100

Family Justice Courts – Divorce No 3679 of 2024, Sum 79/2025

District Judge Lynette Yap

17 July 2026

4 August 2026 Judgment reserved.

District Judge Lynette Yap:

Introduction

1 The parties in this case were married in November 2011 in Singapore. The Plaintiff (“Mother”) is a Singaporean while the Defendant (“Father”) is a Singapore Permanent Resident. They have one child from this marriage (“Child”), who is 14 years old this year. It is not in dispute that the Child has been diagnosed with special needs. The parties resided overseas before the Mother and the Child moved to Singapore in 2024. The Mother filed for divorce in August 2024 and Interim Judgment was granted on 17 February 2025.

2 On 23 December 2024, the Mother filed a summons application under FC/SUM 79/2025 for interim maintenance for the Child. This was served on the Father in January 2025.

3 The parties then proceeded for mediation at the Family Justice Courts. Following mediation at the Family Justice Courts, the ancillary matters were resolved by consent, save for the issues of maintenance for the Child and costs of the divorce proceedings.

4 The Order of Court dated 4 August 2025 (the “Consent Order”) records the following:

1. Parties shall have joint custody of the child of the marriage, [name redacted] (BC No. [redacted]) (“the Child”), with care and control to the Plaintiff.

2. The Defendant shall have reasonable access to the Child, which shall include weekly video and/or audio calls with the Child. There shall be no overnight and/or overseas access for the Defendant at this juncture.

3. There shall be no maintenance for the Plaintiff, whether backdated or otherwise.

4. There shall be no division of the matrimonial home.

5. Each party shall retain all other assets in Singapore and overseas in their respective names.

6. Paragraphs 7(g) and 7(h) of the Statement of Claim shall be adjourned to be heard in chambers.

5 Much of the Father’s assets were accumulated before his marriage to the Mother. Pursuant to the Consent Order, the Father retained 3 immovable properties with a total net value in excess of S$3 million , namely a condominium in Singapore (the “Singapore Property”), a property in Australia and a property in Malaysia . Although the parties differed in their valuation of these immovable properties, I did not find it necessary to make a determination on the precise valuation of the properties as the only issue before the court was on child maintenance. Suffice to say, that there was no question that the value of the 3 immovable properties exceeded 3 million dollars, with the Father submitting that the total net value was S$3,029,188.94 and the Mother submitting that the total net value was S$3,385,225.13 .

6 With regards to the Father’s other assets, namely his car and his bank accounts in Singapore, Malaysia and Australia (excluding Commonwealth and Asgard superannuation accounts held in his name), I also did not find it necessary to make a specific finding on the valuation of these assets. The Mother submitted that the aforementioned assets amounted to S$982,997.90 while the Father submitted that they amounted to S$941,372.91. Either way, it was clear that the Father has substantial financial resources. Even before factoring in potential income from his Commonwealth and Asgard superannuation accounts, the Father’s total assets amounted to at least S$3,970,561.85 .

7 With regards to the Mother’s assets pursuant to the Consent Order, parties differed on the Mother’s bank account balances. The Father submitted that as at 17 February 2025, the date of the Interim Judgment, the Mother’s bank account balances amounted to S$963,659.59 (comprising Singapore bank account balances of S$123,763.31 and Australian bank account balances of $839,896.28) . The Mother submitted that as at October 2025, her bank account balances amounted only to S$707,738.24 (comprising Singapore bank account balances of S$33,257.56 and Australian bank account balances of S$674,480.68) .

8 The default position is that all matrimonial assets and liabilities should be identified at the time of the Interim Judgment and valued at the time of the Ancillary Matters hearing. However, balances in the parties’ bank accounts and CPF accounts are to be valued at the earlier juncture of the Interim Judgment, as the matrimonial assets are the moneys and not the bank and CPF accounts themselves (UYP v UYQ [2019] SGHCF 16 at [4]).

9 In the circumstances, the Mother’s bank account balances amounted to a total of S$963,659.59. Together with her CPF funds which amounted to a total of S$281,166.62 , the Mother’s total assets amounted to S$1,244,826.21 .

10 Following the recording of the Consent Order, the parties were directed by the Mediation Judge to file their Affidavit of Assets and Means (“AOM”). It was agreed that the Father would include his reply to the Mother’s summons for interim maintenance for the Child in FC/SUM 79/2025 in his AOM.

11 On 6 November 2025, the Mother filed a summons application under Rule 35 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 for the Child to be assessed by an expert and for the medical report(s) to be adduced as expert evidence. This application was heard by an Assistant Registrar and dismissed at first instance as the court did not find that the expert evidence sought by the Mother could only be answered by an expert. The Mother appealed against this order to the District Judge and this appeal was dismissed on 2 March 2026. The Mother then appealed to the Judge of the Family Division of The High Court and this appeal was dismissed on 26 May 2026.

12 The parties also went through the discovery process, with the Father filing one summons for discovery and the Mother filing four summonses for discovery and interrogatories.

13 On 26 March 2026, the Mother also filed an application to set aside and/or vary the Consent Order. This application was dismissed as the court did not find that the high threshold required to set aside the Consent Order was met.

14 The hearing of the Mother’s application for interim maintenance in FC/SUM 79/2025 and the ancillary hearing on the issue of maintenance for the Child took place on 17 July 2026 and I now set out the reasons for my decision.

Brief facts

15 The Child is 14 years old this year and has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder . Prior to the Mother and the Child’s unilateral move to Singapore in April 2024, they had been residing with the Father in Australia from 2019 . In Australia, the Child was supported by the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme which provided financial and medical support for his condition. His school fees and therapies were effectively free during that time .

16 The Mother is 51 years old this year. She has been a housewife for almost 15 years, starting after she was pregnant with the Child. She is the Child’s primary caregiver. When the Mother and the Child moved to Singapore in April 2024, they first stayed with the Mother’s parents . Subsequently, she rented an apartment for a period of 12 months from 11 October 2024, paying a rent of S$3,400 per month . She then moved to another apartment and has signed a tenancy agreement for a period of 24 months from 1 October 2025, for a rent of S$4,200 per month .

17 The Father is 63 years old this year. He retired more than 8 years ago in December 2017. He resides overseas.

Parties’ submissions

18 The parties’ estimates for the Child’s monthly expenses are markedly different. The Mother submitted that the total monthly expenses for the Child amounted to S$10,363 whereas the Father contended that the Child’s reasonable monthly expenses were S$970 (or S$820 if the Child’s medical and education expenses were excluded) .

19 The Mother contended that the Father should bear all the expenses of the Child whereas the Father submitted that the Mother should bear at least 30% of the Child’s expenses . He submitted that the Mother, being only 51 years old, could easily return to the workforce. He estimated that her last-drawn salary as an executive assistant was about $5,000 per month and hence she should be able to earn a similar amount if she returned to work, especially since the Child would be in school .

20 The Mother requested, on the basis that the Father is a foreign citizen and residing overseas, that the court order him to redeem the mortgage of the Singapore Property and transfer it to her as a one-time settlement of the Child’s maintenance. Alternatively, the Mother requested that the court order the Father to redeem the mortgage of the Singapore Property and for the Singapore Property to be held on trust for the Child’s benefit. In the further alternative, the Mother requested for the Father to pay her S$10,000 per month as maintenance for the Child, for the rest of the Child’s life .

21 The Father proposed to pay the Mother the sum of S$757 (being 70% of S$820) per month as maintenance for the Child and that he would bear, on a reimbursement basis, 70% of the Child’s education expenses, provided parties were agreed on the choice of school for the Child; and 70% of the Child’s medical/dental expenses and elective treatments and therapy sessions if parties were mutually agreed .

The applicable law

22 S 127(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (the “Charter”) provides that the court may order a parent to pay maintenance for the benefit of his or her child in a manner deemed appropriate by the court.

23 The principles that govern the determination of child maintenance are well established. The primary consideration is what a child reasonably needs, having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case. Parties must demonstrate the reasonableness of projected expenditures, including the child’s standard of living and the parents’ financial means and resources. This assessment should also factor in the change in circumstances occasioned by the divorce. (VZJ v VZK [2024] SGHCF 16 (“VZJ v VZK”) at [70], referring to s 69(4) of the Charter and WBU v WBT [2023] SGHCF 3 at [9]).

24 The High Court in XIK v XIL [2025] SGHCF 16 observed at [97] as follows:

Section 68 of the Women’s Charter establishes the duty of parents to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of their children. This includes providing reasonable accommodation, clothing, food and education, having regard to the parents’ means and station in life. This shared duty to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of the children does not necessarily translate to an equal mathematical division of financial responsibilities. The financial obligations of parents may vary depending on their respective means and capabilities (UHA v UHB and another appeal [2020] 3 SLR 666 at [36]). In assessing a parent’s financial capacity, the court adopts a holistic approach. As stipulated in s 69(4)(b) of the Women’s Charter, consideration extends beyond income to include earning capacities, property and other financial resources. The court would also consider significant liabilities and financial commitments, as well as the assets that would be received by the parties after the division of their matrimonial assets (WBU v WBT at [38]). This ensures a fair and comprehensive assessment of each parent’s ability to contribute to their children’s maintenance.

My decision

Whether the Mother should contribute to the Child’s maintenance

25 The Father is a retiree. He submitted that his current gross monthly income was S$11,878.63 per month, being S$6,378.63 from his superannuation payments and from interest earned from his Australian bank deposits, and S$5,500 from the rental of his Singapore Property. He submitted that his Australian income was subject to tax (resulting in a net amount of S$6,151.12) and his rental income from the Singapore Property was subject to 42% tax in Australia (resulting in a net income of S$3,190), and on that basis, he submitted that his net monthly income amounted to S$9,341.12 .

26 The Mother submitted that the Father’s current gross monthly income was approximately S$500 more at S$12,375.50. She did not factor in any tax deductions. She submitted that his income would increase by at least S$2,279.50 monthly from 2028 onwards when the payouts from the Asgard Superannuation account commenced, bringing his gross monthly income to at least S$14,655 .

27 The Mother’s evidence was that at this point in time, she was not able to return to work. She stated that the Child required ongoing care, supervision and support, and as his needs were not predictable, she had to adjust her day around his emotional state, school matters, medical appointments and general well-being. She stated that she needed to remain available as his condition could change quickly. She stated that she hoped to return to work when things became more stable .

28 I am not persuaded by the Father’s argument that the Mother is now obliged to return to the workforce, and that obtaining employment would be straightforward. The Mother left the workforce about 15 years ago when she was pregnant with the Child. Given the Child’s ongoing special needs, it is not unreasonable that she make herself available for his needs. It appears that during the marriage, this was what the parties had agreed on, since she has been the sole caregiver to the Child since his birth.

29 Furthermore, with her lack of working experience, it will likely be challenging to find a job that will give her flexibility to remain available for the Child, while picking up the necessary skills on the job, having been unemployed for so long. In the circumstances, I find the Mother’s earning capacity to be very limited.

30 Pursuant to the Consent Order, the Father will retain his 3 immovable properties and a substantial amount in his bank balances. His retention of these assets and his steady monthly income stream are relevant financial means and resources to take into consideration (TBC v TBD [2015] SGHC 130 at [18]).

31 I will add that the Father’s income stream can be increased if his Malaysian property is rented out (or alternatively the Australian property, if he chooses to stay in Malaysia), and in time to come, his payouts from the Asgard Superannuation account will commence, hence further increasing his income stream.

32 In any event, I recognise that the Father’s own position was that throughout their marriage, he was the one who paid for all the household expenses, utilities, renovations and all other expenses entirely , and it would be maintaining the status quo for him to continue to provide for the Child with his own resources.

33 I further note that in the Consent Order, the Mother had agreed not to claim any spousal maintenance from the Father. This means that with regards to the combined household expenses of herself and the Child (including rent), she will already need to bear her own half share and that is also a relevant factor for the court’s consideration under s 69(4) of the Charter.

34 Considering all the circumstances of the case, it is my view that the Father is to bear 100% of the Child’s reasonable expenses.

The Child’s monthly expenses

35 The Child’s monthly expenses may be classified under two broad categories: his share of the household expenses and his personal expenses.

Household expenses

36 I first set out parties’ position on the household expenses and my determination as to what is reasonable for each item of expense in the table below:

S/n	Household expenses (the Child’s half share)	The Mother’s position Foot Note 28 While the Mother had listed other items in para 12 of her 1st AOM, these were not stated in the updated list in para 17 of her 2nd AOM filed 8 months later. They were also not claimed for in para 42 of her written submissions filed for the purposes of this hearing.	The Father’s position	The court’s assessment
1	Housing (rent)	S$2,100	-	S$2,100
2	Utilities	S$70	S$70	Agreed at S$70
	Total			S$2,170

37 The main point of contention for the Child’s household expenses is on the issue of rent. The Father contends that the Mother’s decision to rent a property, instead of purchasing one, was financially imprudent. He also stated that it was unclear why the Mother rented a property in the central part of Singapore at a rent of S$4,200. The Father also submitted that the Mother should purchase her own HDB flat using the funds from the division of the matrimonial assets and her CPF balances .

38 There is no basis for the Father’s insistence that the Mother purchase her own HDB flat. There has been no evidence adduced of the Mother’s eligibility to purchase a HDB flat, resale or otherwise. I also note that the Mother’s CPF Ordinary Account’s balance at the time of the Interim Judgment was S$196,902.75. Even if the Mother is eligible to purchase a HDB flat, the monies in her CPF Ordinary Account would not be sufficient to pay fully for a HDB flat, and given that she would not be able to qualify for a housing loan as she is not working, that would mean she would have to utilise a large amount of her own monies to pay for the flat. It would not be reasonable to expect this, since this would mean the Mother would be solely providing for the Child’s accommodation, and taking over the Father’s responsibility to provide housing for the Child.

39 In the circumstances, I find that it is the Father’s responsibility to pay for the Child’s share of the rent, being S$2,100, which is half of the current rental of S$4,200. I do not find that this is an unreasonable sum considering the previous standard of living of the parties and the Father’s station in life. Taken together with half the Child’s share of the utilities at S$70, the Child’s household expenses amount to S$2,170.

Personal expenses

40 Next, I consider the reasonable personal expenses of the Child. The biggest contention between the parties lies in the choice of school for the Child. It is not disputed that the Child requires a special needs education and is unsuited for a mainstream school. The Mother submitted that the Child should be enrolled in a private special needs school where the monthly school fee is S$6,266.26. She had in fact already enrolled the Child at this private special needs school since early 2026 without the Father’s consent. The monthly school fee at this school is slated to increase by 5% in 2027 .

41 The Father instead submitted that the Child should be enrolled in a government-run special needs school in Singapore where the cost is about S$100 on average . The Father relied on the Ministry of Education’s recommendation to the Mother that the Child would benefit from a special school environment where class seizes were smaller and of a lower teacher-student ratio and where additional support like onsite therapy could be provided. The Ministry of Education had recommended that the Child be admitted to a government-run special needs school where his learning needs would be best supported and referred the Mother to a list of such schools .

42 In considering what should be the reasonable maintenance provided for the Child’s schooling expenses, I bore in mind that the paramount consideration in all proceedings involving children is the welfare of the child. This principle is the “golden thread” that runs through all proceedings directly affecting the interest of children: BNS v BNT [2015] 3 SLR 973 at [19]. The determination of child maintenance thus requires a careful balance between meeting the reasonable needs of the Child and respecting the boundaries of parental discretion.

43 In my view, the Mother’s claim for S$6,266.26 for the Child’s monthly fees at the private special needs school is not a reasonable expense.

44 The Mother has not shown how the private special needs school is superior to a government-run special needs school for the Child’s needs. Her own evidence on why the Child would benefit from the private special needs school is somewhat inconsistent. In her affidavit, she stated that at the Child’s previous school in Australia, the Child was exposed to both academic learning and interaction with other children and that this supported his confidence and his ability to engage with others. Thus, when she chose the current private special needs school, she was trying to give him a similar setting . This suggested that interacting with other children was an important factor in her choice of the private special needs school.

45 However, in paragraph 25 of her written submissions, she emphasised that the private special needs school provided the Child with a “dedicated 1:1 teacher support” when compared to the government-run special needs school. She then went on to list 8 different government-run special needs schools with teacher to student ratios ranging from 1:3 to 3:10 to substantiate her claim that these class sizes were too large and not suitable for the Child.

46 The Mother has adduced no evidence to show that the education offered by government-run special needs schools in Singapore could not offer the “academic learning and interaction with other children” that she sought. There was also no evidence that a 1:1 teacher-student ratio would produce superior results for the Child, or that it would better facilitate the aforesaid academic learning and interaction with other children.

47 In fact, the Mother herself acknowledged the advantages of sending the Child to a government-run special needs school. In paragraph 25 of her written submissions, she stated that one of the benefits of the government-run special needs school was that it followed the “National Curriculum (and it) taught with autism-friendly methods. The curriculum also integrates life readiness skills and includes a vocational track for older students”.

48 The only disadvantage listed by the Mother was that “the school (was) too far from the current residence” compared to the private special needs school which would provide flexibility if the Child was late. I note that the Mother is currently renting a place in the central area. It is entirely possible for the Mother to move and rent an apartment which is nearer to a government-run special needs school.

49 The Mother also does not seem to have attempted to give any of the government-run special needs schools a try , to see if such a school would have been beneficial for the Child. As early as September 2024, I note that the Ministry of Education had specifically recommended to the Mother that the Child should be admitted to a school offering a customised curriculum for students with autism spectrum disorder and referred the Mother to a list of government-run special needs schools . The Father’s evidence was that he had tried to get involved with the Child’s enrolment into the government-run special needs schools in March 2025, but the Mother did not cooperate, responding that she wanted the Child to attend a private special needs school .

50 In the absence of any objective evidence suggesting that the private special needs school has a utility or benefit above the government-run special needs schools, the court will be more circumspect in allowing such an expense to be claimed.

51 Orders for maintenance sought by a parent beyond the threshold of reasonableness in respect of spending on luxuries that the other parent does not agree to incur will usually not be granted (VZJ v VZK at [71]). As highlighted in WLE v WLF [2023] SGHCF 14 (“WLE v WLF”) at [29], the court is not the appropriate forum to endorse one parenting view over another:

… The court, in deciding the issue of child maintenance, is guided by the principles of the welfare of the child and of reasonableness. The court is not the correct forum to endorse one parenting view over another. Thus, careful consideration must be given when declaring expenses as reasonable in the circumstances, especially where such a declaration would essentially coerce one parent into accepting the other’s parenting approach.

52 The High Court has also held in VDT v VDU [2020] SGHCF (“VDT v VDU”) at [79] that education is a matter falling within a parent’s custodial power. There, the court ordered that parties would have joint custody of the children as a reminder that both parties had a say over the children’s education.

53 In the present case, the parties had agreed and recorded a consent order on 4 August 2025 that they would have joint custody of the Child. I accept the Father’s submissions that guidance may be drawn from the case of VDT v VDU. In that case, the wife insisted that the children continue their education in an international school in Singapore, stating the children were thriving and to transfer them elsewhere would be disruptive, while the husband argued that a local school would be more than sufficient given that they were as good as international schools but cheaper. The court held that regard had to be had to the reasonable views of the husband, who was also a custodial parent, and as a result, while the wife was entitled to continue enrolling the children in the international school, the husband would not be made to bear the financial burdens of such a decision . Similarly, in the present case, spending more than 60 times the fees on a private special needs school is a luxury that the court will not compel the Father to support.

54 I will now address the point that the Child has already been enrolled, against the Father’s wishes, in the private special needs school since January 2026, and the Mother has already been paying the school fees of S$6,266.26 monthly. The authorities are also clear that even when extraordinary expenses have already been incurred, they do not necessarily fall within the ambit of reasonableness. In WLE v WLF, the High Court remarked at [21]:

…The fact that an item of expenditure has been paid for does not necessarily mean that it is a reasonable expense for which maintenance must be ordered under the Charter: see WBU v WBT [2023] SGHCF 3 at [9]. Moreover, these payments were made post-divorce and the decision to incur this expenditure is, in my opinion, a unilateral decision of the husband based on his parenting style. The law does not hold back the husband from indulging the daughter, but it also cannot compel the wife to contribute to such indulgence. In the unfortunate breakdown of a family, the question of maintenance is a test of reasonableness. Accordingly, the court will only order divorcing parties to pay what is reasonable for the child, and no more.

55 Accordingly, while the Mother’s choice of sending the Child to a private special needs school may arise from the maternal instinct of wanting what she perceives is the best for the Child, and I appreciate that there is no pecuniary gain for her in seeking this for the Child, I find that the evidence shows that this is a discretionary expense that goes beyond what the Child reasonably needs and should be borne by the Mother if she chooses to continue to enrol the Child at this private special needs school.

56 The parties’ positions on the personal expenses of the Child and my determination as to what is reasonable for each item of expense is set out in the table below:

S/n	The Child’s personal expenses	The Mother’s position Foot Note 38 While the Mother had listed other items in para 12 of her 1st AOM, these were not stated in the updated list in para 17 of her 2nd AOM filed 8 months later. They were also not claimed for in para 42 of her written submissions filed for the purposes of this hearing.	The Father’s position Foot Note 39 The Father’s 2nd AOM, page 10.	The court’s assessment
1	Education	S$6,266.26	S$100	S$100
2	Medical	S$380	S$50	S$300 is reasonable, and should cover sessions with the psychiatrist, psychologist, therapy sessions, medication and dental expenses. While the Mother pays the yearly premiums for a PruShield policy for the Child Foot Note 40 The Mother’s 1st AOM, pages 116-126 shows it primarily covers inpatient hospitalisation expenses. , there is no evidence that she has been able to claim the abovementioned expenses from it.
3	Food and Groceries	S$500 Foot Note 41 While the Mother had listed a higher figure in her 2nd AOM, her updated claim in para 42 (serial no 4) of her written submissions was that the child’s 50% share of food and groceries was $500.	S$500	Agreed at S$500.
4	Supplements	S$55 Foot Note 42 While the Mother had listed a higher figure in her 2nd AOM, her updated claim in para 42 (serial no 7) of her written submissions was that the average monthly cost of the child’s supplements was $55.	S$50	S$55 is reasonable.
5	Transport	S$300 Foot Note 43 While the Mother had listed a higher figure in her 2nd AOM, her updated claim in para 42 (serial no 5) of her written submissions was that the child’s 50% share of transport was $300.	S$200	S$300 is reasonable at $10 a day.
6	Miscellaneous	S$300	-	S$300 is reasonable. This should cover school-related expenses, and other incidental expenses such as clothing, personal grooming, haircut, entertainment, books/uniform/stationery and toiletries.
6
	Total			S$1,555

57 I have found that the average monthly household expenses and personal expenses of the Child are S$2,170 and S$1,555 respectively. Therefore, the total monthly expenses of the Child add up to S$3,725. I will round this up to S$3,800 and order the Father to pay the sum of S$3,800 monthly as maintenance for the Child with effect from 1 September 2026. I am of the view that the Father has the financial means and capability to afford this level of maintenance for the Child.

58 For completeness, I will also address the Mother’s arguments that since the Father resided overseas, a lump sum maintenance order should be made for the Child.

59 I do not accept that such an order should be made and am guided by the following cases. In WNA v WNB [2023] SGFC 14 at [96], the court stated that an order for a lump sum payment for a child’s maintenance should be done sparingly as between a parent and a child, a clean break is generally not applicable. In TNM v TNN [2018] SGFC 103, the court also declined to order lump sum maintenance even though the father had been in default of a previous consent order on maintenance.

60 As there may be possible externalities and vicissitudes of life in the future, the law allows for the variation of maintenance orders when there are changes in the parties’ circumstances. This is especially so in the present case since the Child has special needs and his financial needs may change in the future. In the circumstances, an order for a lump sum maintenance for the Child in the present case is not appropriate.

Interim maintenance application in FC/SUM 79/2025

61 As a matter of case management, it was previously agreed by the parties that the interim maintenance application filed by the Mother would be heard together with the ancillary matters.

62 As the issue of interim maintenance has now become moot, at the hearing before me, the parties confirmed that this application would be pursued by way of backdated maintenance with the period of backdated maintenance commencing from February 2025 to August 2026 (amounting to 19 months).

63 Therefore, the Father is to pay the Mother backdated maintenance of S$3,800 for 19 months, amounting to S$72,200.

Conclusion

64 In conclusion, while I have ultimately not allowed the Mother to claim for the Child’s expenses for attending a private needs special school, I echo the words stated by the District Judge earlier in these proceedings , who, while dismissing the Mother’s appeal to adduce expert evidence under Rule 35(4) of the Family Justice Rules 2014, urged the Father to appreciate that the Mother’s request to maintain the Child in a private school was borne out of her view of the needs and best interest of the Child:

Parties still have many years where they have to work together to address the special needs of the child. It will be a long road ahead, along which they have to prioritise the best interest of the child, over their own personal interests if necessary. It will call for mutual trust and forbearance on the multitude of issues that will arise in the difficult task of handling a child with such special needs. Starting off post-divorce co-parenting by discrediting or disputing doctors’ recommendations would not auger well for the future relationship. For all intents and purposes, the Father has already had sight of the reports, even if they are not adduced before the hearing judge as a result of my order. In calibrating his position in the ancillary proceedings, he would do well to pay heed to the needs of the child as opined by the examining psychiatrists. He should also take cognisance of the difficulty the Mother has had in managing the child and appreciate that her request to maintain the child in a private school is ultimately borne out of her view of the needs and best interest of the child. This in my view should be the focus of a responsible parent, and should be uppermost in mind even if the medical reports are not formally adduced at the ancillary hearing.

65 I urge both the Father and the Mother to work together to address the special needs of the Child and prioritise the Child’s interest over their own personal interests. Despite the geographical distance and the emotional baggage, I hope the Father and the Mother can find a way to co-parent successfully.

Lynette Yap
District Judge

Remya Aravamuthan (High Street Chambers LLC) for the Plaintiff;

Tan Xuan Qi Dorothy and Lim Fang-Yu Mathea (DOT Chambers LLC) for the Defendant.