1 This judgment deals with the costs of the ancillary matters proceeding in FC/D 2690/2024 ("FC/D 2690"). My decision at the end of that proceeding is reported in YEV v YEW [2026] SGFC 83 ("Judgment").

2 The Wife submits that she should be awarded costs of $30,348.01, assessed on an indemnity basis. She gives the following reasons for taking this position.

(a) She succeeded in FC/D 2690 given that the divorce was granted based on her claim of the Husband's unreasonable behaviour. Further, she succeeded in clawing back to the matrimonial pool funds that he had dissipated and, on her characterisation, was awarded 62% of the matrimonial assets. ¹

(b) The parties went through nine sessions of mediation. She had made genuine efforts to resolve the ancillary matters amicably. At the final session however, the Husband decided to resile from the “agreed” list of matrimonial assets for division. This resulted in a contested hearing and additional costs being incurred. ²

(c) She had borrowed money from her brother for her legal costs and expenses. ³

3 The Husband takes the following position on costs.

(a) The Wife is not the successful party in FC/D 2690 for three reasons. One, the court had rejected her proposal that child access be subject to the son's wishes and availability. Two, the court's order on child maintenance is closer to his position than hers. Three, she did not succeed on the entirety of her financial claim for the division of matrimonial assets. ⁴

(b) He seeks $5,000 in costs because the Wife had unreasonably increased the costs of FC/D 2690. One, by claiming that he had dissipated and concealed matrimonial assets. Two, by challenging various financial transactions that he had made regarding these assets. Such claims and challenges had resulted in him having to make extensive documentary disclosure and to explain financial transactions spanning several years. She ultimately succeeded only on a limited number of her claims. ⁵

(c) Alternatively, if the court is not minded to award him costs, each party should bear his or her own costs. Such an order would avoid further exacerbating the acrimony between the parties, who must continue to co-parent the son after the proceeding ends. ⁶

4 FC/D 2690 was commenced in June 2024. The costs of the proceeding are accordingly governed by rr 850 to 887 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (“2014 Rules”). As an aside, I note that in the context of this case, there is no material difference in the provisions governing costs under these Rules and those under Part 22 of the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 (“2024 Rules”).

5 In deciding whether to order costs, a court asks – What is the fairest way to allocate costs between the parties: JBB v JBA [2015] 5 SLR 153 ("JBB") at [5]. In answering this question, the court considers three things. One, the substantive outcome of the proceeding. Two, the conduct of the parties before and during the proceeding. Three, the nature of the issues at the proceeding and the wider family context in which the costs order will operate. Let me elaborate.

6 The starting positions are as follows.

(a) Where one party succeeded. Costs are awarded to the party who has substantially succeeded in the proceeding. The purpose of the award is to compensate the successful party for the expenses reasonably incurred to secure the substantive outcome that he or she has achieved at the proceeding: r 852(2) of the 2014 Rules; P 22, r 3(2) of the 2024 Rules; JBB at [7] to [9]; YER v YES [2026] SGFC 97 at [11].

(b) Where neither party succeeded. If neither party can fairly be regarded as the overall successful party, the ordinary order is that each party bears his or her own costs. This follows from the compensatory purpose of costs described above.

7 The starting positions are not inflexible rules. The court may depart from them where the circumstances show that another order would represent a fairer allocation of costs: r 852(2) of the 2014 Rules; P 22, r 3(2) of the 2024 Rules. The principal considerations include the following.

(a) Conduct of the parties. If a party has conducted his or her case unreasonably, the court is entitled to depart from the starting positions. (This includes depriving a successful party of costs or even ordering him or her to pay the other party's costs.) A party may be considered to have conducted his or her case unreasonably, for instance, by pursuing unnecessary or unmeritorious issues, increasing the time, cost or complexity of the proceeding, failing to engage properly in amicable resolution, or failing to comply with court orders or directions: rr 854, 856 and 857 of the 2014 Rules; P 22, r 5 of the 2024 Rules; P 1, r 5(6)(f) read with P 1, r 4 of the 2024 Rules. For further examples of conduct-based costs orders, see Annex A.

(b) Effect on the family relationship. A costs order may be withheld or reduced where there is a real likelihood that it will materially aggravate existing acrimony, impair future co-parenting, or expose the children to further parental conflict: JBB at [23], [26] and [32]. In my view, a party seeking a favourable costs order must identify the existing acrimony and explain how the proposed costs order is likely to worsen it. The mere existence of hostility between former spouses is insufficient. A party should not be permitted to create or escalate the hostility and then rely on it to escape an otherwise appropriate costs order.

(c) Nature of the disputed issue. In my view, even where one party has obtained the more favourable outcome, the court may withhold or reduce costs if the dispute required the exercise of evaluative judgment or discretion and both parties had advanced reasonably arguable positions. For instance, many issues in AM proceedings do not come with a single right answer. Reasonable parties may legitimately hold different views on what division of assets is "just and equitable", what maintenance is "reasonable", and what arrangements best serve a child's welfare. It is precisely because there can be a range of reasonable answers that the law entrusts the courts with broad powers to resolve such issues based on judgment and discretion. Where one party advances a position within the range of legally permissible outcomes, it may be unfair to impose a costs order on that party merely because the court, in the exercise of its discretion, ultimately comes to a different decision.

8 The Wife claims that she is the successful party in FC/D 2690 because the court accepted her case that the Husband had behaved unreasonably and thus granted her a divorce.

9 I am unable to agree with the Wife's claim. It provides an incomplete picture of why the divorce was granted. She omits stating the following. One, the Husband and her had each applied for divorce – on the ground that the other party had behaved in such a way that he or she could not reasonably be expected to continue living with that party. Two, both parties succeeded on their respective cross-applications: see FC/IJ 2279/2025. In the circumstances, the Wife cannot be described as the successful party in FC/D 2690. The Husband had also succeeded in obtaining a divorce.

10 Accordingly, I find that the Wife is not entitled to costs simply on the basis upon which the divorce was granted

11 Next, I turn to the Wife's claim that she is the successful party because she had managed to claw back matrimonial assets dissipated by the Husband and was awarded 62% of the matrimonial assets.

12 At the outset, I note that the Wife’s claim is factually flawed.

(a) First, the Wife was not awarded 62% of the matrimonial assets. She was awarded only 35%: see the Judgment at [98]. The figure of about 62% appears in the Judgment in one place only – the share of the net value of the matrimonial home awarded to the Wife. ⁷ This award was necessary to give her 35% of the total matrimonial pool, given that each party was allowed to retain the assets in his or her own name: see the Judgment at [99] and [100].

(b) Second, the Wife's claim assumes that she had been awarded 35% of the total matrimonial pool because of the Husband's dissipation of the matrimonial assets. This assumption is incorrect. The award was based on a broad-brush assessment of the parties' direct and indirect contributions over a 14½-year single-income marriage: see the Judgment at [88] to [98]. No adverse inference was drawn against the Husband, and no uplift was given to the Wife on account of the dissipation

13 I turn to the Wife's substantive contention – which appears to be that by successfully clawing back the dissipated matrimonial assets, she should be treated as the successful party and should thus be entitled to costs. I disagree with this contention.

(a) First, costs are compensation for the expense of litigation: JBB at [7] to [9]. They are not a remedy or punishment for the dissipation of matrimonial assets. Where a party improperly deals with such assets, the law responds by notionally restoring those sums to the matrimonial pool to ensure a fair division of assets. This was done in the present case. A party who seeks costs after the dissipated assets have been restored to the pool must show that the other party's conduct of the litigation itself has unnecessarily increased its expense.

(b) Second, the Wife, too, was found to have dissipated matrimonial assets ($80,353.38): see the Judgment at [50] to [56]. On her approach, the Husband would equally be a "successful party" for having those sums restored to the matrimonial pool and would equally be entitled to ask for costs.

14 For these reasons, the mere fact that the Wife had successfully clawed back dissipated matrimonial assets does not justify a costs order in her favour.

16 To properly address these questions, I prepared Annex B, which sets out (a) the contested issues in the AM proceeding, (b) the parties' positions regarding these issues, and (c) my eventual ruling on them.

17 Assessing the factors in [15] holistically, I find that the Wife cannot be said to be the successful party in the AM proceeding. Each party prevailed on some issues and failed on others. In making this assessment, I have not simply counted the issues won and lost. Consistent with the approach described at [15] above, I have had regard to the importance of each issue – measured by its financial and practical significance and the resources the parties devoted to contesting it – and to how far the court's decision departed from each party's position. Let me explain.

(a) The Wife succeeded fully on only two of her contested claims. These are her claim for (i) a 35% share of the matrimonial assets and (ii) spousal maintenance at $1,800/month for four years. In contrast, the Husband succeeded fully on the following three issues. One, the terms of child access. Two, that spousal maintenance should be paid by monthly instalments (instead of a lump sum payment as claimed by the Wife). Three, that there should be no backdating of spousal maintenance.

(b) The Wife's position (when compared against the Husband's position) is closer to the court's decision on two issues. One, the amount of the Husband's pre-marital CPF funds to be restored to the matrimonial pool. Two, the amount of matrimonial assets that he had dissipated. On the other hand, the Husband's position (when compared against the Wife's position) is closer to the court's decision on two other issues. One, the amount of child maintenance to be ordered. Two, the amount of matrimonial assets that the Wife had dissipated.

(c) The contested issues to which the parties devoted the most effort were the financial matters – namely, the division of matrimonial assets, child maintenance and spousal maintenance. In my view, neither the Wife nor the Husband can be said to have clearly succeeded on the principal grounds of their respective cases.

(d) I have considered the strongest argument in the Wife's favour – that her two complete successes (the division of assets and spousal maintenance) were the issues of greatest financial value, while the Husband's complete successes carried less financial weight. This argument does not persuade me. These are my reasons.

(i) One, on the division of assets, the significance of the Wife's success must be measured against the distance between the parties' positions: the Wife sought 35%, while the Husband proposed 30%. The gap between the two positions (5%) is modest. In the circumstances, the award of 35% represents only a limited measure of success over the Husband's own position.

(ii) Two, on child maintenance – an issue vigorously contested – the outcome was closer to the Husband's position.

(iii) Three, a substantial portion of the contested hearing was taken up by the Wife's dissipation case. She succeeded only in part: see Judgment from [62] to [84].

(e) The Wife has obtained court orders “compelling” the Husband to pay (i) $800/month in general child maintenance, (ii) direct payment of the son's core expenses, and (iii) $1,800/month in spousal maintenance for four years. This fact, in my view, is a neutral factor and does not prove that she has succeeded in the AM proceeding. First, the Husband never denied his duty to maintain the son – the dispute was over quantum of the maintenance, and the quantum ordered is closer to his figure than hers. Second, to provide certainty and clarity, it is typical for the parents’ maintenance obligations to be addressed by way of court orders. Third, the compulsion is not one-sided – the Wife, too, has been ordered to bear the son's discretionary expenses: Judgement at [23(c)].

18 Given that the Wife cannot be said to have succeeded in the AM proceeding, it would be unfair, on this basis, to make a costs order against the Husband for the entire proceeding.

19 Since neither the Wife nor the Husband can be said to have succeeded in FC/D 2690, it would be fair for each of them to bear his or her own costs – unless either one of them has conducted his or her case unreasonably.

20 On this point, the Wife and the Husband have accused each other of unreasonable conduct in FC/D 2690. It is to this issue that I now turn.

21 I begin with the Wife's claim. She submits that the Husband acted unreasonably by refusing, during mediation, to consent to a proposed agreed list of matrimonial assets. She further submits that his refusal caused the AM proceeding to continue on a contested basis and that he should therefore pay her costs.

22 Based on her case, the Wife must prove the following to succeed in obtaining a costs order in her favour. One, the precise nature of the Husband's disagreement. Two, that the disagreement was objectively unreasonable. Three, that the disagreement materially caused identifiable additional costs to be incurred. A costs order would ordinarily be confined to those additional costs: see [23(c)] below.

23 The Wife has failed to prove her case.

(a) Unclear what the nature of the disagreement was. The court must determine whether the Husband had an objectively reasonable basis for disputing any item. A disagreement may properly arise, for instance, over an item's existence, ownership, character, or value. In this case, it is unclear to me exactly what the nature of the disagreement over the "agreed" list of assets was.

(b) Unclear that the disagreement was unreasonable. Mediation conducted by the Family Justice Courts is without prejudice. Communications made during mediation are confidential and inadmissible unless the law otherwise provides. A court determining costs should therefore not reconstruct the parties' negotiations or decide which of them was responsible for the failure of mediation. I have recited the Wife's account of the mediation at [2(b)] and [21] only to explain why I cannot act on it. The Wife may rely only on admissible material, such as a formal offer carrying costs consequences, an agreement recorded by the Judge-Mediator, or the parties' filed positions. She has not produced any such evidence to show that the Husband's refusal to agree to the list of matrimonial assets was unreasonable.

(c) Unclear what additional costs the disagreement caused. The Wife must establish that the Husband's disagreement over the "agreed" list of assets materially caused identifiable additional costs. It is insufficient for her to claim simply that, because no agreement was reached, the entire AM proceeding became necessary. The court should ask what issues would have remained contested even if the asset list had been accepted, and what additional work was caused specifically by the Husband's objections. Any costs order should ordinarily be confined to that additional work.

24 The applicable rules permit the court to consider the parties' efforts to resolve their dispute amicably and to impose costs consequences where a party acts unreasonably: see [7(a)] above. These rules impose a duty to engage constructively in amicable resolution. They do not impose a duty to agree. Mediation must remain a process of voluntary agreement; it cannot become a means of compelling a party to concede on a matter which he reasonably wishes the court to determine.

25 At the risk of stating the obvious – the failure of mediation proves that the parties did not agree. It does not, without more, prove that either party had behaved unreasonably. In the absence of admissible evidence showing that the Husband's objections were objectively untenable and caused identifiable unnecessary costs, I decline to award costs to the Wife on this ground.

26 Next, I turn to the Husband's contention that the Wife had increased the costs of the AM proceeding by requiring extensive disclosure of financial documents and transactions spanning several years and challenging his disposition of numerous assets. He emphasises that she ultimately established only a limited number of her allegations.

27 In my view, a court should not assess the reasonableness of a party's request for disclosure of documents and information at the end of the AM proceeding with the benefit of hindsight.

(a) At the time of the request, the requesting party may have little direct knowledge of assets and transactions controlled by the requested party and thus has a legitimate interest in obtaining the relevant document or information.

(b) If the requested party accedes to the request, then the issue of whether it is reasonable or not is rendered moot. This is because by agreeing to provide the requested document or information, the requested party has accepted that the request is justified.

(c)  If the requested party finds the request to be unreasonable, then he or she can refuse to comply with it, and the issue may be determined by a court.

(d) If the court orders disclosure, this means that the request has been found to be legitimate and reasonable.

28 In the present case, besides making a generic and bare assertion, the Husband did not go on to provide any particulars as to what document or information he had been unreasonably compelled to provide by the Wife.

29 As for the Husband’s contention that the Wife had unreasonably challenged his disposition of the assets, I am not impressed by this argument. While I have disagreed with these challenges, I do not find them to have been entirely baseless.

30 To sum-up, the mere fact that the Wife's inquiries may have been extensive and that she did not succeed on all her claims of dissipation do not, without more, prove that she had conducted her case unreasonably. It follows that his claim for $5,000 in costs fails.

31 Finally, I turn to the Wife's submission for costs on the ground that she had to borrow money from her brother to meet her legal fees and expenses.

32 I am not persuaded by this submission.

(a) The mere fact that the Wife had to obtain a loan to fund the divorce and AM proceedings does not, by itself, provide a proper basis for ordering the Husband to pay her costs.

(b) The purpose of, and considerations for, awarding costs have already been set out above: see [5] to [7]. These do not include relieving a party of financial hardship. I therefore do not treat the Wife's borrowing from her brother as an independent reason for awarding her costs. Her application for costs must instead be determined by reference to the nature of the disputed issues in FC/D 2690, whether she substantially succeeded in the proceeding, whether the Husband's conduct caused unnecessary expense to be incurred, and the effect of a costs order on the relationship between the parties and their son.

33 To sum up, I find that –

(a) The Wife is not, in substance and in reality, the successful party in FC/D 2690.

(b) Neither the Wife nor the Husband can be said to have acted unreasonably such that an adverse costs order should be made against either of them.

34 In the circumstances, the fairest allocation of costs in FC/D 2690 is that each party bears his or her own costs. I note that this order coincides with the Husband's alternative position: see [3(c)] above.

   

(a) Made extensive or disproportionate disclosure requests that caused substantial work and expense but yielded no meaningful result: WTU v WTV [2025] SGHCF 8 at [84].

(b) Failed to give full and frank disclosure despite repeated requests, concealed or dissipated assets: JBB at [33]; UTN v UTO [2019] SGHCF 18 at [107]; WUI v WUJ [2024] 5 SLR 979 (“WUI”) at [78].

(c) Missed filing deadlines, gave inadequate or evasive interrogatory answers, or using provocative, sarcastic or insulting language in those answers: XBG v XBH [2024] SGFC 81 at [6], [7], [10] and [11].

(d) Failed to attend hearings or comply with enforcement procedures and thereby caused delay or additional expense: WYM v WYN [2024] SGFC 42 at [14] to [23].

(e) Filed unnecessary, repetitive or disproportionate applications, adopting an unreasonably adversarial approach, or causing an avoidable late adjournment: VVB at [21], [24] to [26]; Chan Choy Ling v Chua Che Teck [1995] 3 SLR(R) 310 at [22]; WLR v WLT [2024] SGHCF 20 at [14] and [15].

(f) Filed excessive affidavits or irrelevant material, including images or recordings of children that may harm the parent–child relationship: CLC v CLB [2022] SGHCF 3 at [41].

(g) Used the court process to make irrelevant personal attacks or insults against the other party: see, e.g., GHI v Public Prosecutor [2024] 5 SLR 607 at [73] and [74].

(h) Made materially false allegations or pursued an application founded on an obvious factual misunderstanding without first seeking clarification from the other party: XER at [14], [15], [18], [19], [24], and [25].

(i) Pursued issues that are unreasonable or immaterial, or insisting that the court determine every point regardless of its significance or merit: ET v ES [2007] SGHC 152 (“ET”) at [24]; VDX v VDY [2021] SGHCF 2 at [39] and [40]; BOI v BOJ [2018] 2 SLR 1156 at [3].

(j) Unreasonably rejected a reasonable settlement offer, particularly where the eventual outcome is no more favourable than the offer: WLL v WLM [2023] SGHCF 30 at [7] and [8]; XER at [18], [19], [24] and [25].

(k) Abandoned a sufficiently definite agreed resolution without proper justification and thereby forced the other party into unnecessary litigation: XNG v XNH [2026] SGHCF 4 at [9] and [10].

(Note. The party whose position has been accepted in its entirety by the court, or is closer to the court’s ruling, is highlighted in grey.)