1 FC/OADV 88/2026 (“OADV 88”) is the applicant-mother’s application for an order that the respondent-father pay her a sum of $3964 per month as child maintenance for the child of the marriage. Further, the mother also prayed that such maintenance be backdated to the date when parties’ interim judgment had been amended, by consent, to specifically provide that it was the mother who would maintain the child of the marriage solely.

2 Put another way, in OADV 88, the mother now wishes to revisit her previous agreement to maintain the child solely.

3 After hearing parties and considering the materials submitted, I was not inclined to accept, on the wife’s contentions, why such a maintenance order ought to be made. Nevertheless, in the exercise of the court’s powers pursuant to sections 127 read with 72 and 73 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“WC”), I did order that the father provide some maintenance for the child, but not to the extent claimed by the mother. In making this order, I was not inclined to backdate the maintenance order to the date when the interim judgment was amended.

4 Dissatisfied, the mother has appealed against my decision. After the hearing, I provided parties with brief grounds for my decision. ¹ I now provide fuller grounds of my decision.

5 I first provide a background to the dispute leading up to the commencement of OADV 88.

6 By way of contextual background, OADV 88 was heard together with the following applications:

(a) First, FC/OADV 147/xxx (“OADV 147”) - the father’s application to vary to two court orders made in respect of parties’ earlier divorce proceedings in FC/D 5629/xxx (“D 5629”). The first order is the interim judgment granted on 20 December 2023 (i.e., FC/IJ 5893/xxx, or the “IJ”), while the second order is one made on 6 September 2024 (i.e., FC/ORC 4101/xxx, or “ORC 4101”). The variations sought by the father relate to the child of the marriage (particularly custody, care and control, access, and maintenance) and the matrimonial home. I pause here and note that ORC 4101 was the specific order which provided that the wife would solely maintain the child of the marriage.

(b) Second, FC/SUM 2326/xxx (“SUM 2326”) - the mother’s application within OADV 147 against the father for child maintenance for the sum of $3,964 per month (hereinafter known as the “Child Maintenance Prayer” or “CMP”).

7 While OADV 147 and SUM 2326 are not directly relevant to the wife’s present appeal, I will, where appropriate, refer to these proceedings. This is because these proceedings were heard together with OADV 88, and the materials in those proceedings provide context to OADV 88.

8 The father commenced OADV 147 in March 2025. The mother commenced SUM 2326 in September 2025. The mother then commenced OADV 88 in February 2026.

9 As regards SUM 2326, a perusal of the prayers therein and OADV 88 will show that the prayer for the CMP in both applications is identical. ² The only difference in OADV 88 is that it formally included a prayer for the backdating of any maintenance order made to the date ORC 4101 was made (and correspondingly for the repayment of any arrears accrued as a result of backdating). I pause here and found it apposite to make the observation that insofar as the wife may have felt the need to commence OADV 88 to formally include a claim for backdated maintenance, this would not have been necessary. As noted in the High Court decision in AMW v AMZ [2011] 3 SLR 955 (at [13]), the court has a wide power to order maintenance to commence from whichever date the court considers fair.

10 Separately, when queried by the learned assistant registrar as to the duplication of applications at a case conference for OADV 88 on 12 March 2026, the mother highlighted that whilst she had engaged counsel for OADV 147 and SUM 2326, she had chosen to represent herself moving forward. She also mentioned that she needed interim maintenance urgently because the husband was not paying child maintenance (which, on the face of ORC 4101, he was entitled not to). What can be surmised is that the mother commenced OADV 88 as a self-represented person under the belief that OADV 88 could be resolved before OADV 147 and SUM 2326.

11 In my view, this was incorrect.

12 At the time the mother commenced OADV 88, all affidavits for OADV 147 and SUM 2326 had been filed, with a hearing date already fixed at a case conference on 12 February 2026. The only outstanding document to be filed by the time the wife commenced OADV 88 was parties’ written submissions for OADV 147 and SUM 2326.

13 At the hearing of OADV 147 and SUM 2326, I determined that all the three matters could be considered together. This is to save time and costs for parties. As noted earlier, the evidence and materials for SUM 2326 (which, in substance, was identical to OADV 88) had already been filed. To my mind, the core materials which the mother wanted to rely on to say why she could go back on the agreement reached in ORC 4101 were already before the court. Had I not consolidated OADV 88 with the other two matters, OADV 147 and SUM 2326 would be heard separately from OADV 88. This, in my view, would have been an odd approach to take, especially since the determination of SUM 2326 would have rendered OADV 88 effectively otiose.

14 I now turn to a brief introduction of the parties and the child of the marriage.

15 Parties were married in December 2015. There is one child to the marriage, a boy, born in March 2016 (the “Child”).

16 I turn next to the divorce proceedings.

17 The mother commenced divorce proceedings vide FC/D 5629/xxx (“D 5629”) in November 2023. As noted earlier, IJ was granted on 20 December 2023. Final judgment was granted on 21 March 2024.

18 Apart from the pronouncement of the dissolution of the marriage, the IJ also provided, by consent, several ancillary orders. For the purposes of this appeal, the relevant terms of the IJ ³ are as follows:

19 As can be seen from the extract above, parties reached, among others, the following agreements:

(a) First, the mother would have sole custody of the Child;

(b) Second, the matrimonial home would be transferred to the mother. In consideration for this transfer, the mother would make the necessary refunds to the father’s CPF account on his behalf; and

(c) Third, the father would pay monthly child maintenance of $600.

20 I pause here and note that at the point when these consent terms in the IJ were being prepared, the mother was represented. On the other hand, the husband was self-represented.

21 On 23 August 2024 (less than 6 months after IJ was granted), the mother commenced FC/SUM 2694/xxx (“SUM 2694”). In SUM 2694, the mother sought to amend the IJ as follows:

(a) First, as regards the transfer of the matrimonial home, the mother would no longer be required to make the necessary refunds into the father’s CPF account. In addition to and related to this prayer, the mother sought an extension of time to complete the transfer of the matrimonial home to her.

(b) Second, the wife would now solely maintain the Child.

22 From the court’s records and on the mother’s own documents in support of SUM 2694, it is not in dispute that at the material time (and also presently), the mother was an undischarged bankrupt. She did not have the funds to make the relevant CPF refunds into the father’s account. On that basis, and in exchange for the mother not being required to make the refunds into the father’s CPF account, the mother would solely bear the Child’s maintenance (save that the father will continue paying for the Child’s insurance policies).

23 On 6 September 2024, this court made orders for SUM 2694 along the agreements stated above (i.e., ORC 4101). For ease of reference the relevant amendment to the clause 3(e) IJ is as follows:

24 After ORC 4101, parties proceeded to amend the IJ to reflect the above amendments. The amended IJ was filed on 13 September 2024.

25 As a result of the foregoing, clause 3(e) IJ now reads as such:

26 I pause here and make the following observations:

(a) First, SUM 2694 was a by-consent application commenced by the mother to vary the terms of the IJ. Correspondingly, ORC 4101 was a consent order.

(b) Second, the mother was represented for SUM 2694. On the other hand, the husband was self-represented. As such, the wife had the benefit of legal counsel when she drafted the terms of ORC 4101. She would also have had the benefit of legal advice on the consequences of the variation. I note from the mother’s documents where she suggests that the eventual language adopted in the amended clause 3(e) was “a matter of drafting language in the context of negotiations” ⁴ .

27 As noted earlier, on 25 March 2025, the father commenced OADV 147. On 30 September 2025, the mother commenced SUM 2326.

28 In OAD 147, the father essentially sought for the following orders:

(a) the IJ be varied to provide that parties have joint custody of the Child, and that he be granted sole care and control;

(b) revised access terms on the basis that his prayer for sole custody and care and control were granted;

(c) that the mother pay the father for child maintenance; and

(d) instead of a transfer, the matrimonial home be sold in the open market.

29 In SUM 2326, the mother claimed for the CMP against the father.

30 Parties were directed to mediation for OADV 147 and SUM 2326. On 12 January 2026, parties were able to reach a partial resolution of their dispute, particularly in respect of OADV 147. In essence, there was an extension of time for parties to complete the transfer of the matrimonial home, and the father would have supervised access for the Child. Notably, the clause which provides for CPF refunds to be born solely by the father remained. The necessary inference is that whatever problems parties previously had in effecting the transfer which related to the CPF refunds would have been resolved.

31 In light of those agreements, the father no longer pursued his prayer for sole care and control, leaving custody the principal issue which remained to be adjudicated.

32 On 26 February 2026, the mother commenced OADV 88.

33 As noted earlier, the mother had, in both SUM 2326 and OADV 88, sought the CMP. ⁵

34 In OADV 88, she additionally sought an order that the CMP be backdated to the date of ORC 4101 (i.e., 6 September 2024). At the time of the Decision, the mother was seeking backdated maintenance amounting to approximately 18 months, or $71,352 (i.e., $3964 x 18).

35 OADV 147, SUM 2326, and OADV 88 were heard on 24 March 2026.

36 After the hearing, I directed the father to provide further proposals in respect of access with the Child as well as maintenance. These proposals were provided by way of the father’s solicitor’s letters dated 7 and 8 April 2026. The mother provided her response to these proposals on 9 April 2026.

37 Against the backdrop of the foregoing, I now turn to summarise parties’ respective cases.

38 In support of her claim for CMP, the mother makes, among others, the following points:

(a) Sometime between July 2024 and August 2024, after IJ was granted, the father approached the mother saying that his current partner was expecting (and due to give birth in December 2024). Against that backdrop, he wanted to “relive himself of his maintenance obligations” ⁷ .

(b) In this regard, it was the father who proposed that in exchange from relieving his maintenance obligations, the mother need not make any CPF refunds to the father for the transfer of the matrimonial home. ⁸ The father had apparently assured the mother that he would support the Child when his needs grew or when his own financial position improves. ⁹

(c) In reliance of these assurances, the mother agreed to the terms in ORC 4101 insofar as the father’s maintenance obligation was removed and that she would maintain the Child solely. Put another way, the mother’s agreement in ORC 4101 for the father to be relieved of his $600 maintenance obligation for the Child was predicated on the implied understanding that he would continue to support the Child financially.

(d) I pause here and note that what can be discerned from this is the mother’s initial contention that the agreement to remove the father’s maintenance obligation was on the conditional basis that he would subsequently commit to maintain the Child when the Child’s needs grew and/or when the father’s financial circumstances improve. Put another way, the mother’s agreement was predicated on the father’s representation that he will nevertheless financially support the Child even though there will be no order to such an effect.

(e) The mother relies on the following representations made by the father: ¹⁰

(f) Based on the mother’s documents, the above conversation took place sometime in June 2024.

(g) However, the mother contends that after ORC 4101 was made, the father failed to keep up his end of the bargain to provide any form of maintenance for the Child after ORC 4101. In her words, the father’s contributions since ORC 4101 were “partial and inadequate” ¹¹ . What made things worse was that even though the father was not honouring his end of the bargain, he goes and commences OADV 147 against the mother. ¹²

(h) I pause here and reiterate that this was the mother’s initial position in her first affidavit in support of SUM 2326. This is because in her further affidavit for SUM 2326 (i.e., M3 ¹³ ), the mother sought to refine her position as follows:

(i)  As can be seen from the above, in M3, the mother now characterises (or seeks to imply that) the removal of the father’s maintenance obligation in ORC 4101 was one which was “expressly understood” to be “time-specific” and “conditional” upon the Child “gr[owing] older and his needs increased”. She goes on further to stay the father’s contribution would resume when the Child grew older when his needs increased. Additionally, the mother contended that the original maintenance order of $600 was “outdated and unworkable”.

(j) Separately, the mother contends that there has been a material change in her circumstances insofar as there has been a reduction in her income, a significant increase in the Child’s “educational, developmental, and nutritional needs”, and the father’s improved financial capacity. ¹⁴

(k) As regards her income, the mother highlights how there was a loss of one of her rental streams. ¹⁵ Prior to the loss of her rental stream, she was earning rental income of about $2700. After the loss of one rental stream, her monthly rental income has dropped to $1500. ¹⁶

(l) As regards expenses, the mother highlights how the Child’s monthly expenses have increased to approximately $5115 per month. ¹⁷ I pause here and note that in M3, the mother recalculated the Child’s monthly expenses to be approximately $6800. ¹⁸

(m) As regards the father’s financial position, the mother relies on the father’s own evidence in OADV 147 in connection with the father’s prayer for sole care and control where he contends, among other things, how he has a “stable income” ¹⁹ , is able to go on staycations ²⁰ and support his emotional needs and social development of the Child.

(n) On those averments, the mother extrapolated what the father’s commitment would cost (based on the averments made in OADV 147 when he wished to have custody and care and control of the Child, and using her own expense figures) to arrive at a value of $3964. ²¹

39 The mother broadly makes the same contentions in her affidavit in support of OADV 88 ²² as those I have summarised above.

40 As regards the agreement to remove the father’s maintenance obligation in the IJ under ORC 4101, the mother additionally contends, in her papers in OADV 88, that it was predicated on another representation that he would contribute his year-end bonus towards supporting the Child’s expenses. ²³ However, the mother provides no evidence of this, and simply states that it was “an understanding that was reached privately and was not recorded” ²⁴ .

41 In essence, the mother complains that the arrangement under ORC 4101 (i.e., where she must solely maintain the Child), an arrangement which she herself agreed to, “has created a clear imbalance” ²⁵ . To her mind, the arrangement under ORC 4101 is neither fair nor consistent with the principle that both parents should support the child according to their means. ²⁶

42 For completeness, in her affidavit for OADV 88, the mother makes other ancillary prayers in her affidavit for an account and return of certain red packet and birthday monies the Child received as well as an account of the insurance policies under the Child’s name. ²⁷ However, these were not prayed for as part of her formal prayers in either OADV 88 or SUM 2326. It is well established that the court’s powers are only initiated through legal proceedings by means of an originating process (see Principles of Civil Procedure (Pinsler SC, 2013 Academy Publishing (at page 82)). An affidavit is not an originating process.

43 I turn next to the father.

44 The father objects to the mother contentions. In response to her application, the father makes, among others, the following points:

(a) The father highlighted how the wife did not act promptly to effect the transfer of the matrimonial home. When pressed, the mother then indicated that she wishes to increase the amount of maintenance. ²⁸

(b) Thinking that the mother was tight on funds (given that she would have had to pay a fairly substantial amount of CPF refunds and wanted to angle herself for more maintenance monies), the father then proposed that the mother did not need to make any CPF refunds, in exchange for the mother to solely maintain the Child. ²⁹ In this connection, the father considered that the mother could rent the rooms in the matrimonial home for additional income. ³⁰

(c) The father seeks to characteries ORC 4101 as still providing for the Child insofar as his agreement to transfer the matrimonial home to the mother without CPF refunds “helped to provide a roof” over the Child’s head. ³¹ Further, on the father’s calculation, the amount of CPF funds required would mathematically amount to a monthly sum of approximately $1400 till the time the Child turns 21, which was more than the original sum in the IJ. ³²

(d) Insofar as the mother contends that her earning capacity has reduced because of the loss of a tenant, the father contends that the mother is able to get gainful employment to supplement her rental income. In other words, the father contends that the mother’s reduced income capacity in support of the CMP is self-induced. ³³

(e) As regards the Child’s expenses, the father’s broad objection is that the expenses listed by the mother are unnecessary and/or excessive. ³⁴ That said, for some expenses, he is prepared to contribute on a reimbursement basis. ³⁵

(f) As regards his financial standing, the father explains that the increase in his IRAS Notice of Assessment 2024 is because of a one-off gratuity payout, and not a marked increased in his monthly salary. ³⁶

(g) For completeness, as regards the birthday and red packet monies, the father objects to the mother’s quantification of such monies as being in the region of $13,000. In this regard, the father exhibited a bank statement of such monies collected, which is approximately $3000. ³⁷

(h) Insofar as the mother alleged that the father still has not completed the transfer of the matrimonial home, the father initially mentioned that he ran into some issues with affording to make full payment of the CPF refunds. ³⁸ In any case, this issue was now moot because as noted earlier, parties had reached a partial resolution of OADV 147 insofar as there would be a further extension of time for parties to complete the transfer of the matrimonial home on the basis that no CPF refunds would need to be made by the mother.

(i) Against the backdrop of his contentions, the father’s position is that ORC 4101 was a “carefully considered trade-off between the parties” ³⁹ , and that the mother has not established any material change in circumstances justifying her claim for the CMP.

45 Against the backdrop of the foregoing, I now provide my analysis and findings.

46 As a preliminary point and for completeness, I note that the specific prayers in OADV 88 do not use the language of a conventional variation application. It simply seeks an order that the father pay child maintenance, and for such maintenance to commence on a particular date (i.e., the date when ORC 4101 was made). This would suggest that OADV 88 was simply a claim for maintenance simpliciter.

47 However, there can be little dispute that the substance of OADV 88 is a variation application, specifically an application to vary the ‘new’ clause 3(e) IJ to a clause which now provides that the father is to, one again, pay the mother child maintenance (as opposed to the mother solely maintaining the Child).

48 On that basis, I start with a brief restatement of the applicable legal principles. In this regard:

(a) As noted in the father’s submission, the court’s power to vary orders on child maintenance is provided for in section 127 read with 72 and 73 Women’s Charter 1961 (“WC”). ⁴⁰

(b) In a variation application, the central inquiry to be assessed by the court is the existence of a material change of circumstances since the time the original order was made (in this case, ORC 4101) which warrants curial intervention.

(c) To this end, it is well-established that not all changes warrant curial intervention. The change must be sufficiently material such that it is no longer fair to expect the status quo to remain without changing the order (see BZD v BZE [2020] SGCA 1 at [14]). Even if a change is considered to be material, that, in itself, does not automatically attract curial intervention of an earlier court order. As noted by the Court of Appeal in AYM v AYL [2012] SGCA 68 (“AYM”) (at [25]), it would only be in a situation where new circumstances have emerged since the order was made which “so radically” change the situation such that to implement the order as originally made would be to implement something which is radically different from what was originally intended.

(d) Against the backdrop of these overarching principles, I also found it apposite to make the following supplementary observations:

(i) It is worth reiterating that ORC 4101 was a consent orders. In other words, the current clause 3(e) IJ arose from parties’ own agreement. Parties were satisfied at the compromises and concessions they were prepared to make in arriving at their own amicable resolution.

(ii) As noted by the High Court in VWQ v VWR [2022] SGHCF, such agreements are to be respected and not lightly changed. It is only in exceptional circumstances where this court ought to depart from the compromises and concessions they have made (see TGZ v THA [2019] SGFC 97 at [46(b)]). Such circumstances (without being exhaustive) would include those which either attack the underlying workability of the agreement, or one which was not reasonably contemplated by parties at the time the original agreement was made. Reiterating the words of the Court of Appeal in AYM, something so material and unforeseeable must have taken place such that implementing the order as originally made would be to implement something radically different than what was originally intended.

(iii) What necessary flows from the above is that it is not this court’s function to rewrite parties’ bargain, or to assist parties to unravel what was, on hindsight, a bad deal.

(iv) Lastly, OADV 88 essentially relates to the Child. In this regard, it is not disputed that the welfare of a child is of paramount importance above any other factor. To that extent, section 73 WC expressly provides for the variation of child maintenance agreements on the basis of the child’s welfare, even if such variation runs counter to the agreements reached by parties. While the court is mindful of the sanctity of parties’ negotiated agreements, this power preserves the court’s right to intervene when parties’ own agreement would detrimentally affect a child’s welfare.

49 With the above principles in mind, I come back to the mother’s substantive application in OADV 88, which is to vary clause 3(e) IJ.

50 I start with a restatement of clause 3(e) IJ (as amended pursuant to ORC 4101).

51 The first part of clause 3(e) IJ plainly and clearly states that the mother is to solely maintain the child. Pursuant to ORC 4101, clause 3(e) was varied to remove the father’s child maintenance obligations simpliciter. In the original clause 3(e), the father’s obligation was two-fold. First is the monthly payment of $600, and second, that he will additionally cover for the Child’s existing insurance policies. Pursuant to ORC 4101, clause 3(e) IJ was amended to only provide that the father will cover for the Child’s existing policies.

52 In my judgment, there is no ambiguity in clause 3(e). That is also nothing in the express language of clause 3(e) which, on the mother’s case, expressly or impliedly shows that this clause was conditional, temporal, or would change if the Child’s needs increase.

53 If clause 3(e) were truly intended to be temporal or conditional as the mother contends (or that it was predicated on the father’s representations and/or parties’ alleged understanding that the father would still provide maintenance), there was nothing preventing the mother from including language to that effect in her prayers for SUM 2694.

54 However, the mother agreed to clause 3(e), as worded, with the benefit of counsel.

55 Insofar as the wife relies on parties’ discussions (or negotiations) leading up to SUM 2694 (and correspondingly ORC 4101 amending clause 3(e) IJ), I was not inclined to place much weight on such pre-contractual negotiations. Such extrinsic evidence, as discussed by the High Court in HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Lucky Realty Co Pte Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 885 (at [50]) is, by their nature, highly susceptible to being shaped towards self-serving ends with the benefit of hindsight, and provide marginal assistance in construing the terms of parties’ agreement. This is especially so when in this case, the language of clause 3(e) is clear and beyond reproach.

56 Even if I am wrong, and such extrinsic evidence may be taken into consideration to imply into clause 3(e) the fact that it was only meant to be temporal and conditional on the terms the mother contends, I had reservations with this for the following reasons:

(a) First, from the WhatsApp screenshots the mother exhibited to suggest an understanding of this implied fact, I was not inclined to accept that those conversations amounted to any particular binding position.

(b) Second, insofar as parties may rely on extrinsic evidence pre-agreement discussions, it bears mentioning that that since clause 3(e) IJ was amended, there was no evidence of parties’ conduct after ORC 4101. At no point after clause 3(e) IJ was amended did the mother raise any issue with the “partial and inadequate” maintenance by contributed by the father as being contrary to parties understanding on why clause 3(e) IJ was varied in the first place.

(c) Third, and insofar as the mother seeks to rely on the contextual matrix leading up to the agreement made in ORC 4101 relating to the father’s supposed representations, I was of the view that the mother has omitted to recognise the pink elephant in the room – that by agreeing to the terms in ORC 4101, the mother herself would be relieved of the burden of paying the father in excess of $200,000 of CPF refunds. While that, strictly speaking, pertains to the issue of division, it is nevertheless relevant insofar as it indicates a significant financial benefit which the mother would enjoy following from ORC 4101, with the quid pro quo being that the father is no longer required, at least as a formal order, to provide fixed monthly payments of child maintenance to the mother. For clarity, this does not necessarily mean that he does not have to provide for the Child absolutely – it simply means that the father’s contribution is no longer formalised by way of a court order. That was the concession (and consequence) which the mother must have contemplated, with the benefit of counsel, when she agreed to the terms in ORC 4101.

57 For those reasons, I was of the view that clause 3(e) expressly and plainly provides that the mother would solely maintain the child, without any exception or condition.

58 As a supplementary observation - was this a fair deal? It really depends on which party you are asking. However, whether ORC 4101 was a fair deal or not is, to my mind, irrelevant. Ultimately, this was an arrangement which parties themselves had agreed to.

59 Insofar as the mother complains that clause 3(e) IJ is neither fair nor consistent with the principle that both parents should support their child, I was not inclined to accept this argument. To be clear, there is nothing in law preventing one parent from solely maintaining the child of the marriage. There is also nothing inconsistent with one parent solely maintaining the child, with both parents meaningfully co-parenting in other aspects of a child’s life. Put simply, there is no general presumption that co-parenting must require both parents to be involved in every aspect of a child’s life. The more crucial aspect of co-parenting is how both parents can meaningfully and civilly work together in their collective and collaborative effort towards the child’s welfare.

60 As such, I was not inclined to accept the mother’s complaint that the current version of clause 3(e) creates a “clear imbalance”, which in turn, without more, justifies or entitles her to vary the provision. In my judgment, the mother made a considered decision to waive the father’s obligation to provide fixed monthly child maintenance payments, in exchange for her not having to pay the sum of approximately $200,000 (being the sum which the father had to refund into his CPF account).

61 Further to my assessment on how clause 3(e) FJ operates, I turn next to assess whether any of the reasons cited by the mother constitutes a good cause to vary clause 3(e) IJ.

62 After considering the matter and reviewing that’ documents, I make the following findings:

(a) First, insofar as the mother contends that the father failed to keep up with his bargain of continuing to provide maintenance, I was not inclined to accept this. As I noted earlier, the bargain was for the father not to pay any further child maintenance except for the existing insurance policies. Even if the father was not adhering to this, it does not follow that clause 3(e) IJ be varied. There are over available means of recourse for the mother.

(b) Second, insofar as the mother suggests that clause 3(e) IJ was considered unworkable because of the problems transferring the matrimonial home to her, this issue is now moot in light of the agreements reached in OADV 147 (see [30] above).

(c) Third, insofar as the mother claims that she has suffered a reduction in rental income, I was not persuaded that this, in itself, amounted to a material change to reverse the agreements made in ORC 4101. In her evidence, ⁴¹ the mother contends that the tenant left due to the oversupply of the rental market. However, there is nothing to suggest that because of this contended oversupply, the mother is simply unable to find any replacement tenant. Additionally, and whilst I empathise with the mother, issues and projections relating to her financial position (and adjustments she would need to potentially make) would have been within her reasonable contemplation at the time she consented to ORC 4101. As noted earlier, if there was a need to provide for certain contingencies, that could easily have been included as part of the agreed terms in ORC 4101.

(d) Fourth, insofar as the mother contends that the Child is in primary school has “significantly higher expenses” ⁴² , this, again, is not wholly unforeseeable. At the time when ORC 4101 was made, the Child was already in primary school. From her list of expenses in SUM 2326 ⁴³ and OADV 88 ⁴⁴ , a reasonable inference which can be made is that at the time parties were discussing terms leading up to ORC 4101, the child’s expenses (on the mother’s calculations) ⁴⁵ , which the mother was paying for, was around $3000. If you were to include her calculation of personal expenses at about $1300, that is a monthly outlay of $4300. In my view, it would have been reasonable (given the new pursuits the Child has) at the time ORC 4101 was made, for the mother to have anticipated her present and future financial exposure in relation to the Child’s commitments. The fact that the Child’s expenses did in fact increase, in itself, does not connote the type of material change which allows the mother to go back on the agreement made in ORC 4101. Indeed, on the mother’s figures, over a course of 2 years, the child’s monthly expenses had increased to approximately $6800. Whilst I have some reservations with the figures listed by the wife (which I address later), it does appear to me that the mother has, in essence, overleveraged herself.

(e) Fifth, insofar as the mother contends that the father is in a healthy financial position, this was a neutral factor. Short of asserting a fraudulent misrepresentation or a deliberate failure to give and frank disclosure (all of which could conceivably render ORC 4101, including the clause for the transfer of the matrimonial home, void), whether or not the father would, in the future, be doing financially well, would not have had a material bearing in the mother agreeing to ORC 4101. Even if it was, there was nothing preventing the mother from incorporating these terms when drafting the relevant consent terms in SUM 2694.

(f) When viewed in this light, I was not inclined to find that the “material and substantial changes in circumstances” ⁴⁶ contended by the mother warranted curial intervention. The possibility of the mother’s income being affected, the increase costs of the Child as well as the father’s improved financial were not changes in circumstances which were “radical” which warrants curial intervention of parties’ consent agreement in ORC 4101.

63 For the above reasons, I was unable to agree with the mother’s bases for seeking a variation of the IJ to now include the CMP.

64 However, that is not the end of the matter.

65 To recap, section 73 WC provides that:

66 As noted earlier, section 73 WC empowers this court to vary an agreement on child maintenance even if it departs from the terms of that agreement, so long as it is in the welfare of the child.

67 While I had highlighted how the mother was unable to satisfy this court, on her contentions, to vary ORC 4101, I appreciate the practical effect of this is that the mother will continue to be left to rely on herself for the financial upkeep of the Child. This was the precise agreement she entered in ORC 4101. She cannot claim to feel disadvantaged for an outcome she was the architect of.

68 That being said, I had also alluded to the fact that on the mother’s own figures of the Child’s expenses and her apparent financial position, the mother is currently overleveraged. Her income is demonstrably dwarfed by the Child’s expenses (as listed by her). Put simply, if left as is, the trajectory which the mother is on is unsustainable. More crucially, the mother’s constraints in managing this (and the associated emotions that come with it) may transmit itself to the Child, which would then affect the Child’s well-being.

69 It is at this juncture where the court is now placed in the unenviable position of making two ‘imperfect’ choices – on one hand, to strictly hold the mother to her own bargain, which would further entrench her distrust and lack of faith in the father, which will ultimately affect the Child’s relationship with the father (which, as it stands, leaves much to be desired). On the other hand, allowing the mother to re-open the issues of child maintenance, at least on her reasons, which may be construed as a tactic of reneging from one’s agreement in the name of a child’s welfare.

70 After considering the matter, and not without difficulty, I was minded to vary clause 3(e) IJ to provide that the father formally provide some fix monthly maintenance to the mother.

71 To be clear, it is not my view any agreement made by a party to solely maintain a child is inherently antithetical to co-parenting. However, in the present case, there is something to be said when the father, in OADV 147, in expounding the ideals of co-parenting and joint responsibility for the purposes of his original claim to custody and care and control of the Child, but in OADV 88, shies away from some responsibility to provide financial contribution. Additionally, it bears mentioning that in OADV 147, he was also seeking a maintenance order against the mother in the event he had been granted care and control of the Child.

72 It is against that backdrop where I asked the father’s counsel to provide the father’s position on what he was prepared to contribute moving forward. In the subsequent submissions after the hearing, the father takes the following position: ⁴⁷

73 Using the mother’s list of expenses as a reference ⁴⁸ , the value of the father’s contribution would broadly be as follows:

(a) 50% of Chinese Tuition = $235.44 x 50% ≈ ($120)

(b) Rugby fees = $50

(c) Sports gear = $74

74 The above adds up to a monthly sum of approximately $245.

75 After considering the matter and the materials before me, I found this amount to be deficient. This is especially so when on the father’s own documents ⁴⁹ , the amount he seeks to contribute to the Child is half that he says he is spending on the child from his new marriage. ⁵⁰ While it is trite that the law does not prevent a party from moving on a having a new family, that conscious decision cannot be at the expense and detriment of the Child (i.e., the child of the previous marriage). As noted by the High Court in George Sapooran Singh v Gordip d/o MD Garsingh [2016] SGHC 17 (at [40]):

76 Separately, I also found the husband’s estimate that the monthly expenses of the Child being between $770 ⁵¹ to $850 ⁵² to be on the low side. That being said, I found the wife’s itemisation of the Childs expenses to be high (especially for the mother who only earns a small fraction of her listed expenses for the Child).

77 For the above reasons, and in the exercise of the court’s powers under section 127 read with 72 and 73 WC, I was inclined to reinstate the original obligation of $600. In making this order, I make the following observations:

(a) First, I was not inclined to wholly accept the mother’s listing of the Child’s expenses when arriving at her figures. Insofar as the mother claims that her income has dropped to $1500 per month, the expenses she has listed far exceeds her income. This means that either her expenses are inflated, she is receiving separate financial assistance, or that she is under declaring her income. In either case, and as much as the mother wishes the best for the Child, to my mind, she is spending beyond her reasonable means.

(b) Second, insofar as she was seeking the sum in the CMP, this presupposes that the mother’s financial capability is only limited to the $1500 she is earning. Whilst I can empathise with her having to juggle earning and income and caring for the Child, I was not inclined to accept that this meant that the heavier burden be shifted to the father. This is especially given the overarching context that the mother had originally agreed to shoulder the Child’s maintenance solely. At this point, I note how the wife had, relying on the supposed concessions which the husband has said that he would provide in OADV 147, then extrapolated those concessions into the table of the Child’s expenses to come up with a figure of $3964. This figure presupposes that I fully accept the calculated mother’s figures, which I do not (both in terms of fact and/or extent). Even if I were inclined to agree that the mother spent approximately $6000 on the Child’s expenses, I found this to be an excessive sum devoid of any meaningful connection to the wife’s own means. Finally, on the father’s own figures, ⁵³ I was of the view that he would not be able to pay a monthly sum of $3964 (even if some of his expenses were moderated).

(c) Third, and in connection with the father’s financial position, this sum was something he was able to provide. In other words, it was not an insurmountable sum.

(d) Fourth, in the larger scheme of things, this contribution is for his son.

78 After determining the quantum of contribution, I turn to the next question on when the maintenance order would commence. Even if I were wrong on the quantum of maintenance, I am of the view that insofar as the mother seeks for it to be backdated all the way at the time of ORC 4101, such a proposition is without merit. I saw no basis for such maintenance order to start from the date the mother agreed to waive child maintenance under ORC 4101. In the Decision, I provided that maintenance be payable from the month the applications were heard (i.e., from March 2026 onwards).