1 SSP 2434 of 2025 (“SSP 2434”) was the Husband’s application against the Wife. He sought a Personal Protection Order (“PPO”) for himself as well as his son and two daughters. In addition, he also sought a counselling order, as well as a Mandatory Treatment Order (“MTO”) against the Wife.

2 At the trial, the Husband was self-represented. The Wife was represented by Mr Sean Marican (“Mr Marican”). After considering the written submissions that were filed, I handed down judgment on 12 August 2026, giving the following reasons for my decision.

3 For the Husband to succeed in his application, the relevant provisions in Part 7 of the Women’s Charter 1961 tell us that he must prove the following two elements on a balance of probabilities. First, that the Wife had committed, or was likely to commit, family violence on himself and the children. Second, the Husband must prove that it is necessary for the court to make these protective orders for their protection or personal safety.

4 Quite apart from what the Husband had to prove to obtain these court issued protective orders, it goes without saying that these orders are meant to protect, and not to punish a respondent for past acts: WSD v WSE and another matter [2024] SGFC 1 at [1].

5 To this, I would also add that it is important to set these protective orders within their proper context in order to appreciate how such court ordered protection works. The statutory provisions under Part 7 make clear that the breach of a PPO is an arrestable offence, and that penalties upon conviction for breach of a PPO can include either a jail term, a fine, or both a jail term and a fine. To illustrate, if a respondent breaches a PPO by physically assaulting the person protected under the order, they may be arrested by the police. This in turn, ensures the safety of the person protected by the PPO: XFL v XFM [2024] SGFC 103 at [23].

6 Viewed in this light, the PPO is, in other words, a tool of last resort meant only for the sort of cases where other measures taken to ensure the protection or personal safety of the person concerned have all been tried, to no avail. That is why the statutory wording demands that the court must also be satisfied as to the necessity of granting the order for the protection or personal safety of the person sought to be protected under the order: s 60A(1)(b) of the Women’s Charter 1961.

7 Our jurisprudence tells us that this assessment of necessity is to be done through a risk-based approach, where the court considers the likelihood of further family violence being committed: XFL v XFM [2024] SGFC 103 at [19]. To that, I would add that in this consideration, the court will also bear in mind what I have mentioned above: that the PPO is a tool of last resort, and in deciding the necessity of granting such an order the court must also consider whether the risk of further family violence being inflicted is so great as to warrant intervention into the private affairs of parties.

8 Having considered the evidence before me against the relevant legal principles I have outlined, I was not satisfied that the Husband had established the necessity of the PPO for himself and the children.

9 For one, the Husband had told me that he had filed for divorce and that he did not intend to keep in touch with the Wife unless he had to discuss matters in relation to the children and to facilitate co-parenting arrangements. It was thus clear that the Husband had set his mind on going his own separate way from the Wife post-divorce. He, however, had not pointed to any risk factors (see XFL v XFM [2024] SGFC 103 at [21]) which suggested that the Wife was likely to continue inflicting family violence on him post-divorce.

10 I pause here to note that the Husband pointed to the fear he had felt in the incident that had taken place in February 2025 where the Wife had allegedly pointed a knife at him. The Husband had also stated that there were also several other incidents of a similar nature in which the Wife had pointed a knife at him and the children.

11 In relation to these specific allegations of family violence that the Husband had made, I was not satisfied that he had proven them on a balance of probabilities. For one, apart from a single police report which was made on the 24 of April 2025, there was no other evidence the Husband had adduced to corroborate his account that the Wife had pointed a knife at him and the children on various occasions.

12 Further to that, I also found it rather curious that the Husband had only filed a police report in relation to this incident which had taken place in February 2025 some two months after the fact. This was, after all, a serious incident that had allegedly occurred on more than one occasion, and as I understood it, the Husband was fearful of what the Wife might do. It was not beyond the realm of reason to expect the Husband to seek help from the authorities with more haste.

13 Given these circumstances, and the Husband’s allegation that this was not the first time such an incident had occurred, one would also expect there to be some form of corroborative evidence, either in the form of police reports made in the wake of previous incidents or text messages. There was, however, none placed before me, and so I had no basis to conclude that the Husband had proven his allegation that the Wife had pointed a knife at him and the children on these occasions as he had alleged.

14 Returning to my reasons for concluding that it was not necessary to grant the PPO for the Husband and the children, while I noted that relations between the Husband and the Wife were acrimonious, that was not, in of itself, conclusive of the need to grant a PPO. After all, the breakdown of any relationship is never a happy affair. In any event, as I have already noted, the Husband had quite made up his mind to set his life on a different path from the Wife after the divorce. This, in my judgment, would significantly reduce the risk of him suffering any future family violence at the hands of the Wife.

15 As for the children, the Husband had told me that he had sought sole custody of them. While I note that the divorce had yet to conclude, the Husband had not established that the children would likely suffer family violence at the hands of the Wife post-divorce.

16 Further to this, as I have noted above, the PPO is a tool of last resort. In my judgment, the assessment of necessity, especially in the context of applications made on behalf of children whilst divorce proceedings are underway, must take into account, amongst other things, any orders the court can make in relation to the children as well as the present stage of the pending divorce proceedings. To give an example, assuming it is established that there are legitimate safety concerns in relation to the children, an applicant seeking a PPO on behalf of the children should explain why these safety concerns cannot be adequately addressed by any order that the court may make in divorce proceedings in relation to the children.

17 In any event, I also noted that the Wife displayed a degree of self-awareness which, in my judgment, demonstrated that there was a low risk of her committing any further family violence on the children. She admitted that she had vented her frustration on the son. She reflected on what she had done and realized that she had reacted in that way because she was stressed over how the Husband had failed to act when the children were misbehaving. That the Wife had reflected on her actions, realised that she had gone overboard and identified the relevant emotional trigger that had led to her lashing out at the son, suggested to me that she was determined to do better for the sake of the children and that there was a low risk of her committing family violence on them.

18 To conclude, for the reasons I have set out above – I did not find it necessary to grant these orders for the protection or personal safety of the Husband or the children. Consequently, the Husband’s application in SSP 2434 must fail.

19 Finally, on the issue of costs, Mr Marican sought costs of $5000 (all-in) pointing to the length of the hearing, the volume of documents which had been filed and the fact that the Husband had asked for written (as opposed to oral) submissions.

20 The Husband, on the other hand, said that he could not afford to pay costs. He said he was the sole breadwinner and could not afford to pay costs.

21 The Family Justice (General) Rules (“FJ(G)R”) make clear that costs must follow the event unless the circumstances of the case warrant a departure from this rule: P 22 r 3(2) of the FJ(G)R. In the present case, I saw no reason to depart from this rule. Having regard to the length of the trial as well as the volume of documents which were filed, I fixed costs at $2500 (all-in). This sum was to be paid by the Husband to the Wife by 31 October 2026.

Soh Kian Peng

Magistrate