1 When a party makes a factual concession or admission in cross-examination, is the court thereby bound to accept this position, regardless of the evidence? This question arose in Maintenance Summons No 1638 of 2025 (“MSS 1638”), an application for interim maintenance by a wife (the “Applicant”) against her husband (the “Respondent”). I found that the court was not so bound, and dismissed the application for interim maintenance on 30 June 2026 as I found that the Applicant had not shown that the Respondent neglected or refused to maintain her. The Applicant filed an appeal against my decision, and I set out my reasons in these grounds of decision.

2 The following documents were relied upon by the parties:

3 The parties were married in China on 18 January 2012, and they had been married for around 14 years. ¹ At the time of the hearing, the Applicant was 56 years old and lived in China, while the Respondent was 72 years old and lived in Singapore. There were no children to the marriage.

4 The Applicant applied for interim maintenance of a sum of S$10,000 per month, which she argued should be backdated to September 2023. ² She later submitted that the maintenance should be backdated to October 2024. ³ The Applicant sought maintenance of S$10,000 on the basis that that was the sum required for the standard of living she was accustomed to. The Applicant’s case was that the Respondent had, over time, reduced the sum of maintenance he provided her.

(a) The Applicant claimed that when she was living with the Respondent in Singapore on a visit pass, the Respondent would provide fully for her and they lived together in his parent’s large family home. However, after she was unable to obtain permanent residency status due to the Respondent’s inability to act as a guarantor for her, she returned to Shanghai. ⁴

(b) The Applicant alleged that from end-2013 to September 2023, ⁵ after the Applicant began living in Shanghai when her visit pass expired, the Respondent would transfer her S$3,000 a month, and he would provide her with approximately S$7,000 a month for shopping and holiday expenses whenever they travelled to see each other, ⁶ in the form of cash and payments for overseas travel. ⁷ The total spent on these transfers and expenses, “based on [their] normal living standard”, was more than S$10,000 a month. ⁸ The Applicant averred that the Respondent stopped making any in-person payments from September 2023, when the Respondent ceased travelling from Singapore to China to meet the Applicant, but he continued transferring S$3,000 to her every month. ⁹

(c) However, on the Applicant’s case, from October 2024 onwards, the Respondent reduced the amount he would transfer to the Applicant from S$3,000 to S$600 a month. ¹⁰ The Applicant confirmed that the Respondent continued to provide S$600 to her to date and any shortfall had been repaid. ¹¹

5 The Respondent resisted the application to pay interim maintenance on the basis that he had already been providing reasonable maintenance. ¹² The Respondent took a slightly different position as to how he provided maintenance to the Applicant:

(a) The Respondent denied that he gave her any allowance, cars, house or assets when the parties were first married. ¹³

(b) The Respondent agreed with the Applicant that he gave her S$3,000 every month during the COVID-19 period. ¹⁴ However, he denied giving the Applicant any hard cash, and also refuted that he would provide sums of around S$10,000 to the Applicant. ¹⁵

(c) The Respondent agreed with the Applicant that at the time of the hearing, he provided her with CN¥3,000 a month, which was approximately S$570, out of his monthly Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) payout of approximately S$1,600. ¹⁶

6 With the parties’ cases in mind, I first set out the law in relation to interim maintenance orders made in favour of spouses.

7 Under s 69(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”), the court may, on due proof that a husband has neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for his wife, order the husband to pay monthly sums or a lump sum for the maintenance of that wife.

8 It is well-established that interim spousal maintenance orders made under s 69 of the Women’s Charter and final spousal maintenance orders made under s 113 of the Women’s Charter serve distinct purposes and are driven by separate forces (XHG v XHH [2025] 2 SLR 501 (“XHG”) at [65]; Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow [2012] 2 SLR 506 (“Foo Ah Yan”) at [22]). The objective of interim spousal maintenance under s 69(1) is to “provide for the wife’s immediate needs subject to proof of neglect or refusal to maintain” whereas final spousal maintenance aims for “financial preservation”, ie, “to enable the former wife to continue to live at the level that she did immediately prior to the breakdown of the marriage so far as it is practicable” (XHG at [66], citing Foo Ah Yan at [13]). As explained by Professor Leong Wai Kum in Elements of Family Law in Singapore (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2007) at p 476 and cited in Foo Ah Yan at [22], interim maintenance aims “to provide modest maintenance, namely, to help [a wife] overcome her immediate financial need” [emphasis in bold and italics added].

9 In ordering maintenance for a wife under s 69(1) of the Women’s Charter, the court is to have regard to all the circumstances, including (a) the financial needs of the wife; (b) the wife’s income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources: (c) any physical or mental disability of the wife; (d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; (e) the contributions made by each of the parties to the marriage to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family; (f) the standard of living enjoyed by the wife before her husband neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for her; and (g) the conduct of each of the parties to the marriage, if the conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it (s 69(4) of the Women’s Charter).

10 Therefore, for the court to order the Respondent to pay interim maintenance for the Applicant, the following legal requirements must be satisfied:

(a) The Applicant must show that the Respondent has neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for the Applicant. This is a threshold requirement before the court makes any maintenance order as the courts do not intervene unless there is due proof of neglect or refusal to provide reasonable maintenance (see TCT v TCU [2015] SGHCF 3 at [29]). To determine this, the court will first assess what constitutes the Applicant’s reasonable expenses.

(b) The court must determine the appropriate quantum of maintenance to be paid, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, and other factors as listed in s 69(4) of the Women’s Charter. This involves an evaluation of both (i) the quantum of “reasonable maintenance” based on the facts of the case; and (ii) taking a practical approach to assess whether the parties have reasonably provided such maintenance (see UHA v UHB and another appeal [2020] 3 SLR 666 (“UHA”) at [45] and [36]).

11 The reasonableness of maintenance may be assessed in respect of the reasonableness of the expense itself, the reasonableness in communication of the expense or need and the reasonableness of the mode of provision (UHA at [46]–[50]). However, the court will not require applicants to reduce their living standards and to live with only bare necessities being provided for (UNZ v UNY [2018] SGFC 69 (“UNZ”) at [21]).

12 In seeking to quantify a person’s reasonable expenses, it is not necessary for receipts to be adduced to provide every single item of expenditure. While receipts are useful as an indication of a party’s accustomed standard of living, it may also not necessarily be conclusive of what a person’s reasonable expenses are. The mere fact that parties have been paying for certain items during the marriage does not automatically render such expenses reasonable for the purposes of determining maintenance. Instead, the parties may consider drawing up a budget whereby broad categories of a person’s estimated needs are identified and a corresponding reasonable sum is proposed for each category. However, the court will not be overly prescriptive in how the budgeted moneys are specifically applied to various detailed items of expenses (WBU v WBT [2023] SGHCF 3 (“WBU”) at [9]–[11]). While WBU pertained to child maintenance, the approach adopted is applicable to spousal maintenance by analogy.

13 With the applicable law in mind, the following issues fell to be determined in MSS 1638:

(a) whether the Respondent has neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for the Applicant, which required a determination of what the Applicant’s reasonable expenses were;

(b) if the Respondent had so neglected, what was an appropriate quantum of maintenance to be paid.

14 The Applicant submitted that a reasonable sum of maintenance would be S$10,000 as she enjoyed a high standard of living during the marriage, prior to the Respondent refusing to maintain her. The Applicant set out her list of expenses in A1 pp 203–206, which I examine in Table 1 below.

15 The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s expenses were exaggerated and exceeded “modest maintenance” for her immediate financial needs. He submitted that the Applicant’s reasonable expenses were S$1,497 a month, and set out his proposals of the Applicant’s reasonable expenses in RWS at pp 16–23.

16 Having considered the parties’ submissions and the evidence, I determined the Applicant’s reasonable monthly maintenance to be S$2,559. I explain my reasons in the table below. All calculations are rounded to whole numbers when the court is determining an appropriate reasonable sum. In making my determinations, I bore in mind that interim maintenance is only intended to provide a modest sum to help the Applicant overcome her immediate financial needs. In coming to these views, I considered that the Respondent’s main source of income was his monthly payout of S$1,629.99 from his CPF account. ¹⁷

17 In my view, this estimate of the Applicant’s reasonable expenses as S$2,559 was also consistent with her own position that she was able to survive on the allowance of S$3,000 a month from the Respondent from 2013 to September 2023. While the Applicant argued that the allowance of S$3,000 only provided her with basic living support, I bore in mind that this application for interim maintenance was only to provide for the Applicant’s necessities.

18 Having determined that the Applicant’s reasonable expenses were S$2,559, the next question was whether the Respondent had neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance to the Applicant to meet her immediate financial needs, having regard to the Applicant’s income, property and other financial resources.

19 As a preliminary point, the Applicant relied heavily on the Respondent’s concession at trial that CN¥3,000 “shouldn’t be” enough for the Applicant to establish that the maintenance provided to the Applicant was inadequate. I reproduce the transcript of this exchange between the Applicant’s counsel and the Respondent during cross-examination in full below: ⁴⁵

I will refer to this exchange as the “First Admission”.

20 The issue was also put to the Respondent on the stand under cross-examination, which I reproduce below: ⁴⁶

I will refer to this exchange as the “Second Admission”.

21 It may be argued that the Respondent’s First and Second Admissions constituted admissions, ie, “a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact” “made by a party to the proceeding” (s 17(1) read with s 18(1) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Evidence Act”)). In my view, the Respondent’s statements were admissions as they suggested the inference that he had failed to provide adequate maintenance for the Applicant. This went towards proving the element of neglect, which was a fact in issue. However, in my view, the Respondent’s admissions were not conclusive of the matter.

22 Section 31 of the Evidence Act provides that “[a]dmissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may operate as estoppels under the provisions in [the Evidence Act]”. This was considered by Justice Belinda Ang Saw Ean (as she then was) in Qingdao Bohai Construction Group Co, Ltd and others v Goh Teck Beng and another [2016] 4 SLR 977 (“Qingdao”), where the issue was whether a defendant had admitted to publishing a defamatory article. The defendant had, in a recorded conversation during an unannounced visit by the plaintiffs’ representatives, said that he had consented to an article being posted in his name. The plaintiffs relied on this admission to argue that the element of publication had been made out (at [77]–[79]).

23 In coming to her decision, Justice Ang cited Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 2015) (“Pinsler”) at paragraph 5.100 with approval for the proposition that the weight of an admission was a matter for the determination of the court, and was dependent on all the circumstances of a case (Qingdao at [82]):

24 Justice Ang held that the alleged admission must be clear and not ambiguous if they are to be used against their maker (Qingdao at [87]):

25 Justice Ang took the view that the admissions made by the defendant were ambiguous because it was equivocal about his role and the subject matter of the alleged admission, and she therefore found that no admission that the defendants had posted the defamatory articles on the Internet had been made (Qingdao at [85]–[97]).

26 Other factors to consider in determining the weight to be accorded to an admission or answer given under examination, other than the circumstances of its making and the ambiguity of the statement made, are also its consistency with the totality of the objective evidence, the demeanour and credibility of the witness (see Guy Carpenter & Co Pte Ltd v Choi Okmi and others [2026] 4 SLR 358 at [29]), and whether the maker of the statement subsequently sought to recant their concessions (for an example where the court rejected a witness’s subsequent attempt to recant her concessions under cross-examination, see Rita Kishinchand Bhojwani v HVS Properties Pte Ltd and others [2025] SGHC 80 at [36]–[59] and [132]–[137]). ⁴⁷

27 I turn to consider the admissions made by the Respondent in this case. Having considered the wording and context of the statements made by the Respondent, I was not of the view that it conclusively determined the threshold question of whether the Respondent had neglected or failed to provide reasonable maintenance to the Applicant.

(a) Read in context, the Respondent’s First Admission was that CN¥3,000 “shouldn’t be” enough, given his observation of “how much [the Applicant] spends”. A more accurate interpretation, in my view, was that the Respondent was assessing that CN¥3,000 was inadequate to provide for the Applicant’s actual spending habits, rather than her reasonable expenditures. This ambiguity prevented me from giving the First Admission substantial weight.

(b) The Respondent’s Second Admission was in response to the Applicant’s lawyer’s question of whether the Respondent agreed or disagreed that CN¥3,000 was wholly inadequate as maintenance for the Applicant. The Respondent’s first response was silence. His second response was “I agree, yah, that is---it is enough”, which was internally contradictory, as he both agreed that CN¥3,000 was inadequate and then said it was enough. His third response was that “Yah, it’s inadequate”. In my view, while the Respondent’s third answer was a clear admission, it was not conclusive proof of the matters submitted under s 31 of the Evidence Act.

(c) In any case, even if it was accepted that the Respondent had conceded that CN¥3,000 was wholly inadequate as maintenance for the Applicant, this nonetheless did not account for the Wife’s own financial resources, which are a necessary component of the court’s determination of reasonable maintenance: see s 69(4)(b) of the Women’s Charter.

28 Ultimately, the question of the quantum of the Applicant’s reasonable expenses, and whether the Respondent’s provided sum of maintenance was sufficient to satisfy her reasonable expenses, were issues which the court had to ascertain with reference to the evidence. An admission, made outside of court or under cross-examination in court, is only one factor forming part of the evidential record. Even if I had accepted the Respondent’s admissions at face value, the court would nonetheless have to undertake the judicial exercise of determining the Applicant’s reasonable expenses and what the shortfall was in order to make a maintenance order.

29 For the reasons above, I was not of the view that the Respondent’s admission under cross-examination at trial conclusively established that the Respondent had neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for the Applicant.

30 Having found that the Respondent’s admissions were not determinative, I turn to consider the parties’ submissions on whether the Respondent had neglected or refused to maintain the Applicant.

31 The Respondent submitted that he provided for the Applicant by transferring her CN¥3,000 a month, which was approximately S$570. ⁴⁸ The Applicant’s case was that the Respondent provided her with approximately S$600 a month, which was insufficient for her needs.

32 Having considered the evidence, I found that the Respondent had not neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for the Applicant.

33 It was undisputed that the Applicant (at the time of the hearing) received CN¥7,600 from renting out her property ⁴⁹ and CN¥2,947.90 from her pension. ⁵⁰ This total of CN¥10,547.90 was, as of June 2026, equivalent to approximately S$2,008. Where this sum of S$2,008 was added to the Respondent’s provided allowance of S$570, the Applicant received a total of S$2,578 to spend on her living expenses every month.

34 For the avoidance of doubt, the sum of CN¥10,547.90 was not inclusive of any rental income derived from the Applicant’s parents’ property or the pensions of the Applicant’s parents. ⁵¹

35 The sum of S$2,578 which the Applicant received every month, consisting of her rental income, pension and the Respondent’s allowance, exceeded her reasonable expenses of S$2,559 a month. Therefore, the Applicant had not succeeded in establishing that the Respondent neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for the Applicant. Accordingly, the threshold requirement for the court to make an interim maintenance order under s 69(1) of the Women’s Charter was not met. As such, I was unable to exercise the Court’s power to make an interim maintenance order and dismissed the application accordingly. It was therefore unnecessary for me to examine the further questions of the Respondent’s financial ability to satisfy the obligations of any maintenance order made, but I address this below for completeness.

36 Although I found that the threshold requirement for the Court’s power to make an interim maintenance order had not been yet and dismissed MSS 1638, I make a few additional observations for completeness.

37 A central thread running through the trial of MSS 1638 was whether the Respondent had hidden assets which would have enabled him to maintain the Applicant at a high standard of living, allegedly deriving from his wealthy family. For reasons which I set out below, I was not of the view that these allegations were made out.

38 The Applicant submitted that the Respondent had failed to disclose financial assets available to him, on top of the monthly payouts of S$1,629.99 from his CPF account, which were undisputed. ⁵² She therefore argued that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Respondent per UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 (“UZN”) at [18], as there was a substratum of evidence establishing a prima facie case of concealment and the respondent had particular access to the information he was said to be hiding. ⁵³

39 I first address the issue of the legal framing of the Applicant’s arguments. An adverse inference under UZN is made in the context of a party failing to make full and frank disclosure in ancillary matters proceedings (UZN at [18]). It may be drawn where there is a substratum of evidence establishing a prima facie case of concealment and where the respondent has access to the information that they are said to be concealing. The drawing of an adverse inference is to enable the court to reach a fair assessment of the total pool of matrimonial assets liable to be divided in divorce proceedings under s 112 of the Women’s Charter (at [20]). It may be given effect in one of two ways: (a) the court may make a finding on the value of the undisclosed assets and include the value in the matrimonial pool for division, or (b) the court may order a higher proportion of the known assets to be given to the other party (at [28]). However, the court’s power to make orders on the division of matrimonial assets under s 112 of the Women’s Charter is only engaged “when granting or subsequent to the grant of a judgment of divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage” (s 112 of the Women’s Charter). No such grant or judgment was made in these maintenance proceedings in MSS 1638. Therefore, the form of an adverse inference as described in UZN, and the two remedies arising from the drawing of an adverse inference under UZN, were not applicable in these proceedings.

40 Instead, the Applicant’s argument on adverse inference appeared to be better characterised as an argument on the drawing of an adverse inference in the civil context, ie, under illustration (g) of s 116 of the Evidence Act, which provides:

41 I thus characterised the Applicant’s “adverse inference” argument as this: the court should presume that the Respondent had hidden assets and financial resources, because he could have and did not produce evidence to show that he did not have financial resources, and he withheld such evidence because it would have been unfavourable to him if produced.

42 However, before an adverse inference could be drawn, there had to be some evidence which was adduced by the party seeking to draw the adverse inference on the issue in question, and if a reasonable and credible explanation is given (even if not wholly satisfactory), the potentially detrimental effect of the absent evidence could be reduced or annulled (Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141 at [20], cited in Lo Yew Seng v Astrawati Aluwi [2026] SGHC(A) 18 (“Lo Yew Seng”) at [49]).

43 Alternatively, the Applicant’s argument could also be that the court should make a finding of fact (rather than an adverse inference under illustration (g), which is a presumption of fact), based on the evidence, that the Respondent had hidden assets. If this was the argument advanced by the Applicant, the burden she would have had to satisfy was that on the balance of probabilities, the Respondent had hidden assets. In any case, the Appellate Division of the High Court has observed that the drawing of adverse inferences is simply one aspect of the fact-finding exercise (Lo Yew Seng at [48]):

44 The Applicant relied on five indicia to suggest that the Respondent had hidden financial resources: (a) an alleged sum of S$2 million that was held in a bank account on trust for him; (b) the Respondent’s expenses exceeding his allegedly limited means; (c) the Respondent’s allegedly inconsistent answers on his employment history and livelihood during cross-examination; (d) the Respondent’s alleged inability to substantiate the source of various funds he had received in his bank accounts; and (e) the fact that the Respondent was the owner of a property (the “Property”) but he had adduced suspicious documents relating to an alleged loan and will affecting the Property. ⁵⁴

45 The Respondent denied having any undisclosed financial resources. He argued that the Applicant had no contemporaneous evidence outside of several WeChat messages, that various deposits to his CPF account and the purchase of the Property were funded by his siblings, and that the Applicant had not pursued disclosure of further documents relating to his financial resources. ⁵⁵

46 Broadly, I was not of the view that the Respondent had undisclosed financial assets which he could draw upon to provide a high sum of maintenance for the Applicant. Rather, my impression was that the five indicia relied on by the Applicant could be explained by the Respondent being financially dependent on his family, such as his parents and/or siblings, to provide for his expenses.

47 With this background in mind, I turn to consider the indicia relied on by the Applicant.

48 The Applicant submitted that the Respondent had S$2 million in a bank account held on trust for his benefit by his siblings. ⁵⁶ In support of this, she relied on various WeChat messages on 13 November 2023 between the Applicant and the Respondent which refer to this S$2 million, which is reproduced below: ⁵⁷

49 One year later, on 1 December 2024, the parties had a further WeChat exchange where the Applicant urged the Respondent to get back the moneys he had allegedly entrusted to his siblings: ⁵⁸

50 When these messages were placed before the Respondent, he suggested that it was “not confirmed” that he had S$2 million, but he did not explain this further. His explanation appeared to be that he had assumed S$2 million would be his share and he had “fed” the Applicant false excuses that he could not access the money as it had not reached maturity. ⁵⁹ On re-examination, the Respondent explained that he had given the Applicant excuses because he had thought he would get a “fair share” of a property his parents had sold, but he later was informed that based on his late mother’s will, he had not been left any share of his late mother’s property. ⁶⁰

51 Weighing the evidence, I was unable to determine on the balance of probabilities whether the Respondent was the beneficial owner of S$2 million in a bank account. The Applicant had adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that the Respondent held S$2 million on trust. However, the Respondent had provided, in my view, a reasonable explanation that he had sent those messages under the impression that he was entitled to a fair share of an inheritance, which he later realised was a mistaken impression once his mother’s will was disclosed. Neither party disclosed a copy of this purported will or details relating to the alleged inheritance and the Applicant did not apply for disclosure of any such documents. I was unable to draw an adverse inference as the Respondent had offered a reasonable and credible (albeit not entirely satisfactory) explanation. Therefore, I found that this was a matter on which the Applicant had failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent had such a S$2m fund.

52 In any case, even on the Applicant’s case that S$2m was held on trust for the Respondent, the Respondent did not appear to have access to the alleged sum of S$2m. The parties’ exchanges suggested that the Respondent’s siblings had control over this money. It therefore did not appear that the Respondent had the ability to access such alleged funds, even if they existed, without first potentially engaging in litigation against the trustees of the fund for control of the moneys. I was therefore not of the view that the Respondent had access to the moneys in the alleged trust fund so as to provide for the Applicant’s maintenance.

53 The Applicant relied on three indicia to suggest that the Respondent’s expenses exceeded his means and income, and argued that the Respondent had to have hidden assets or income to sustain his high standard of living.

54 First, the Respondent had estimated his monthly living expenses to be S$848.49. ⁶¹ The Applicant highlighted the discrepancy between his alleged living expenses and the Respondent’s actual expenses to suggest that he had further financial resources. ⁶² She pointed out, for example, that the Respondent had withdrawn or spent a total of S$2,004.84 in August 2025, ⁶³ S$2,302.17 in September 2025 ⁶⁴ and S$2,225.66 in January 2026. ⁶⁵ The Respondent sought to explain that he was “using CDC vouchers”. ⁶⁶

55 Second, the Applicant argued that the Respondent’s alleged impoverishment was irreconcilable with his irregular employment history. ⁶⁷ She argued that the Respondent had conceded that he needed financial resources to ensure his livelihood under cross-examination, and therefore he had to have amassed financial resources to ensure his own livelihood after he decided to remain unemployed. ⁶⁸ The Respondent disagreed on the stand, instead saying that he was able to live “because of [his] family, we have a house fully paid” where he could live and his father would “help [him], small sum” when things were “really bad”. ⁶⁹

56 Third, the Applicant also relied on various deposits into the Respondent’s bank accounts to suggest that an adverse inference should be drawn. ⁷⁰ Various sums were transferred into the Respondent’s bank accounts, such as a deposit of S$500 on 12 August 2025, ⁷¹ a deposit of S$1,500 on 11 September 2025, ⁷² and a deposit of S$1,500 on 10 October 2025. ⁷³ The Respondent’s evidence was that these deposits were transfers of money from his siblings. ⁷⁴ The Applicant submitted that there was no evidence to suggest that these transfers were from the Respondent’s siblings other than his bare assertions on the stand. ⁷⁵ The Respondent similarly explained on the stand that he was unable to recall the source of a sum of S$8,000 which was “topped up” to his CPF Retirement account on 16 August 2025. ⁷⁶

57 Having considered the evidence, I agreed with the Applicant that based on the Respondent’s bank statements, his living expenses exceeded S$848.49 a month and he must have had an external source of funds to supplement his income from his CPF payouts. In my view, these external sources of funds were allowances or gifts from his family members. However, given that such gifts were entirely voluntary and gratuitous, I did not account for them in determining the Respondent’s income for the purposes of determining reasonable maintenance. I explain my reasons below.

58 Based on the evidence, it appeared to be undisputed that the Respondent was, to varying extents, dependent on his family for financial support. The Respondent’s evidence was that he was last formally employed as a cashier in a supermarket from 1985 to 1990 while being involved in a mail-order business. After returning to Singapore in 1991, he was self-employed in businesses relating to real estate, overseas trading, distributing wine and cigars until the 2010s. ⁷⁷ By his own account, his cigar business was successful enough for him to sell cigars to “top hotels” and have “cigar [parties]” in Shanghai and Beijing. ⁷⁸ However, it was undisputed that the cigar business had since been shut down.

59 After the 2010s, the Respondent claimed that he had been exploring business opportunities, but he received no income from there as he had not managed to secure any investors. ⁷⁹ This was supported by numerous messages from the Respondent to the Applicant, where he spoke about his “projects” and his plans to make videos to attract investors. ⁸⁰

60 The most telling evidence that the Respondent was reliant on his family for money was a message sent by the Applicant to the Respondent on 15 December 2024. I set out this message in full below (the “15 December Message”):

61 In the 15 December Message, the Applicant herself appeared to acknowledge that the Respondent was short on funds, lacked the money back in 2024 to fly to Shanghai to reunite with her, and had been “raised” by his parents for 70 years.

62 The suggestion that the Respondent had received allowances from his parents was also supported by a message he had sent the Applicant on 13 November 2023, where he had said his “monthly allowance” was CN¥15,000. ⁸¹ The Respondent had also given evidence that his siblings had “topped up a sum of $300,000 to [his] CPF Retirement Account, and a sum of $51,000 to [his] CPF Medisave Account” in October 2025. ⁸² Although the CPF statement ⁸³ exhibited did not state the identity of the person(s) who had made the top-ups to the Respondent, the Respondent’s evidence was that he was with his brother at the CPF office and his brother had done the transaction there. Overall, while there is no conclusive evidence as to the identity of the person who made the top-ups, I did not find it likely that the Respondent would amass substantial funds of his own, only to use them to top up his CPF accounts, which would constrain his ability to freely deal with the money. I therefore accepted the Respondent’s position that his siblings had provided the top-ups of S$300,000 and S$51,000 to his CPF accounts.

63 Overall, on a balance of probabilities, I found that the Respondent’s ability to sustain living expenses disproportionate to his income and assets was due to the financial support of his family members. I did not consider such voluntary financial assistance to form part of the Respondent’s income and earning capacity, as he had no legal entitlement to such allowances or gifts, which were dependent on the continued generosity and goodwill of his family members. To ascertain a maintenance sum for the Applicant based on the assumption that the Respondent’s family would assist in the payment would be extending the Respondent’s obligation to provide reasonable maintenance for his wife to his family members, which was not what s 69 of the Women’s Charter envisioned. I therefore declined to consider these voluntary sums as part of the Respondent’s monthly income or means.

64 The Applicant pointed to the suspicious circumstances surrounding a loan which the Respondent claimed he had used to acquire the Property to argue that the Respondent and his siblings had “concocted” “sham documents” to “present a false impression to this Honourable Court that the Respondent [had] limited or no financial means”. ⁸⁴

65 The Respondent was the legal owner of the Property, a private condominium which he estimated to be valued at S$657,000. ⁸⁵ He claimed that his acquisition of the property was entirely funded by a loan extended to him by his siblings, and that he had executed a will on 3 July 2025 bequeathing the Property to his nephews and nieces in equal shares. He therefore averred that he could not freely deal with the Property as his siblings would call upon the loan, and he could not rent out the Property as it was the only place he could stay in and was a one-bedroom apartment. ⁸⁶

66 The Applicant argued that the loan agreement dated 20 June 2025 ⁸⁷ and the will were sham documents. She pointed out various inconsistencies in the loan agreement. First, the loan amount of S$707,575 exceeded the current value of the Property of S$657,000. Second, the phrasing of the loan agreement obliged the Respondent to “repay to the Lenders the said sum of S$705,575 on demand by any one or more of the Lenders”, ⁸⁸ without any apportionment of the sums to be repaid to each of the Respondent’s siblings. Third, the loan agreement imposed an interest rate of 12% per annum if the Respondent defaulted on any payments demanded. ⁸⁹ The Respondent conceded on the stand that he would not have been able to afford the interest repayments if such a demand had been made. ⁹⁰ Fourth, the Applicant argued that it was inexplicable for the Respondent to take on a liability of S$707,575 to purchase the Property and then to execute a will to divest his interest in the Property. ⁹¹

67 Having considered the evidence before the Court, I was unable to find that the loan and/or will were sham documents.

(a) First, I was of the view that the Respondent’s explanation was reasonable: his siblings were willing to provide funds for him to acquire a place of his own to stay in, and in return, he would retain the Property and later bequeath it to his nephews and nieces. This was secured by a loan – interest-free unless the Respondent defaulted – to disincentivise the Respondent from selling the Property during his lifetime. While the Respondent has taken on the risk of his siblings calling upon the loan agreement, it is not an unreasonable risk for him to take, as he acquires a place to stay and does not need to pay the loan back as long as his siblings do not call upon it.

(b) Second, the Applicant had made a serious allegation that the Respondent had deliberately concocted sham documents to deceive the Court. The more serious an allegation, the more cogent the evidence the court will require before it is satisfied that the allegation is proven on a balance of probabilities (Tang Yoke Kheng (trading as Niklex Supply Co) v Lek Benedict [2005] 3 SLR(R) 263 at [14]). As explained by Justice Vinodh Coomaraswamy in Chong Jorina v Ritz Property Investimentos Imobiliarios Ltda and another [2026] SGHC 120 at [48], an allegation of fraud is an allegation of conscious dishonesty. It is a serious allegation, and the court will therefore require cogent evidence before finding it proved. The court will not lightly infer fraud. On the basis of the evidence before the Court, I was not able to infer that the loan documents and will were shams simply because of the inconsistencies pointed out by the Applicant. The allegedly suspicious circumstances surrounding the loan and the will were explicable by the fact that the loans were not arms-length transactions, but rather were intended to give effect to a familial arrangement of providing the Respondent with a home to stay in while restraining his ability to deal with the Property freely.

68 Overall, I was unable to conclude that the Respondent had deliberately enacted the loan agreement to mislead the Court as to his financial means. Broadly, I was not persuaded that the five indicia raised by the Applicant gave rise to sufficient cause for an adverse inference to be drawn against the Respondent that he was withholding evidence of his greater financial means. Therefore, in determining the means and assets available to the Respondent, I did not find that he had hidden assets or means which could be used to maintain the Applicant.

69 In conclusion, as the Applicant failed to establish that the Respondent had neglected or refused to provide her with reasonable maintenance, I dismissed the application in MSS 1638/2025. At the hearing before me on 30 June 2026, by consent, I ordered costs of S$1,000 (all-in) to be paid by the Applicant to the Director of Legal Aid.