1 The plaintiff wife (“Wife”) is a 38-year-old mortgage specialist with [O Ltd]. The defendant husband (“Husband”) is a 39-year-old global compliance monitoring manager with [SS Pte Ltd].

2 Parties were married on 9 November 2020. Less than 2 years later, they obtained a Judgment of Judicial Separation on 6 July 2022. The short marriage bore a child, [L], on xx August 2021.

3 Through mediation at the Family Justice Courts, both parties resolved all ancillary matters consequent on their judicial separation amicably and recorded a consent order (“JS Order”) on 27 July 2022 ¹ . The JS Order provided that the Wife shall have care and control of [L], with access to the Husband on a staggered basis, from supervised access at the date of the JS Order to unsupervised overnight access when [L] turns 28 months old.

4 On 26 January 2024, the Wife commenced divorce proceedings. On 11 July 2024, the Husband filed a counterclaim. On 7 August 2024, Interim Judgment for Divorce was granted on an uncontested basis on both the Wife’s claim and the Husband’s counterclaim.

5 On 30 August 2024, parties recorded a partial Consent Order (“PCO”) in the following terms:

6 Thus, when the ancillary matters came on for hearing before me on 10 October 2025, the only issues to be determined were the care and control of [L], access to [L], and [L]’s maintenance. I also heard the Wife’s application in FC/SUM 1904/2025 (“SUM 1904”) for the court’s leave to file a 4th ancillary matters affidavit (“AM affidavit”).

7 At the end of the hearing, I granted leave for the Wife to file a 4th AM affidavit on the narrow issue of [L]’s maintenance and allowed the Husband to reply to this affidavit. I also directed parties to file further submissions on the issue of whether this court had the power to determine the ancillary matters afresh, or it could only consider whether there are sufficient grounds to vary the JS Order (“Preliminary Issue”).

8 A further hearing was held on 13 November 2025, at the end of which I reserved my decision.

9 I delivered my decision on 12 December 2025, granting parties shared care and control of [L] and ordering them to each bear the daily expenses incurred by [L] under their respective care. The Wife has filed an appeal against my decision in HCF/DCA 163/2025. I now set out my full grounds of decision.

10 For ease of reference, I set out below the documents that I had considered before coming to my decision on 12 December 2025:

11 The issues that I had to determine were as follows:

12 It was not in dispute that this court had the power to make orders relating to the welfare and maintenance of [L]. Such power is clearly provided under ss 124 and 127 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC”):

13 The question is whether, in exercising such powers, the court could consider the ancillary matters afresh in the light of the JS Order. At the hearing, both parties’ counsel submitted that there was no case law that directly addressed this issue.

14 The Husband’s submission was that the above question should be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons:

15 The Wife, on the other hand, submitted that ss 72, 73, 118, 119, 128 and 129 of the WC provide that where there are existing ancillary orders, the court will not rehear the ancillary matters afresh, but exercise its discretion to vary the existing orders only where (i) there has been a material change in circumstances; and (ii) it is reasonable and in the welfare of the child to do so. This is because the said provisions refer broadly to “any subsisting order” or “any order”, and it would not be cost- or time-efficient for the court to consider matters afresh. ⁷

16  The Wife further submitted as follows:

17 At first glance, the Wife’s submissions appeared attractive. As the court’s power to make ancillary orders in both JS proceedings and divorce proceedings is derived from the same statutory provisions, it would seem that the observations of the High Court in ATZ, in respect of the broader powers conferred by the WC on the court to determine children issues in divorce proceedings as compared to the power to determine children issues under the GIA, are strictly not applicable to the present case.

18 However, the High Court also held (at [99]) that the court determining the ancillary matters in divorce proceedings would be in a better position to make orders relating to the welfare of the child as compared to the court hearing a GIA application, as:

19  This second point applies with similar force to the present scenario. A judgment for JS does not put an end to the marriage. When the court determines the ancillary matters following a judgment for JS, “there remains a chance that the marital relationship may resume” – see extract from Elements of Family Law at [14(a)] above. In contrast, when the court considers the ancillary matters pursuant to a divorce, the marriage is at an end. Once proceedings conclude, parties are free to enter into a new marriage. The considerations of the court in these 2 distinct scenarios are therefore not entirely the same. This is the point made by the learned Professor Leong when she commented that the ancillary powers of the court “may be used more modestly” in JS proceedings (although I noted in my brief decision on 12 December 2025 (“Decision”) that the comment was made in the context of division of matrimonial assets).

20 Conceptually, when the court determines the ancillary matters in JS proceedings, it does so pursuant to the separation of parties. Should parties subsequently file for divorce, as was the case here, ss 112, 113, 124 and 127 of the WC, which confer the power on the court to determine the issues of division of matrimonial assets, maintenance and the children’s welfare, are again engaged. In exercising such powers, the court does so pursuant to parties’ divorce, and as stated above, this entails different considerations in view of the dissolution of the marriage.

21 I further noted the following in my Decision:

22 For the above reasons, I held that this court had the power to consider the ancillary matters afresh regardless of whether the threshold requirements for a variation of the JS Order were met.

23 I would add that even if this court did not have the power to consider the ancillary matters afresh, I would have found that the threshold requirements for the variation of the JS Order were met on the present facts. s 128 of the WC provides that the court “may at any time vary or rescind any order for the custody, or the care and control, of a child… where it is satisfied that the order was based on any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any material change in the circumstances” [emphasis added]. As held by the Family Division of the High Court in AZB v AZC [2016] SGHCF 1 (at [32]) and endorsed by the Appellate Division in DDN v DDO [2024] SGHC(A) 2 (at [15]), “the court ought not to read s 128 of the [WC] too narrowly, but should take a principled and pragmatic approach to the determination of a material change in circumstances” [emphasis added].

24 The JS Order was made when [L] was merely 11 months old; he is turning 5 this year. His needs, routine, schedule and expenses would have substantially changed in the past 3 ¾ years. While the Wife submitted that these changes had been envisaged when parties recorded the JS Order, there were clear gaps in the JS Order, such as the terms relating to school holiday access, which merely state that “[p]arties are to share equally [L]’s school holidays” ¹¹ without any details. Some of the logistical challenges relating to access that parties subsequently faced were clearly not foreseen at the time when they recorded the JS Order. As will be shown below, even the Wife accepted that the timing of the Husband’s weekday access under the JS Order should be adjusted.

25 Further, s 129 of the WC provides that the court “may… vary the terms of any agreement relating to the custody, or the care and control, of a child… where it is satisfied that it is reasonable and for the welfare of the child to do so” [emphasis added]. Thus, if the court’s finding is that a variation of the JS Order would be for the welfare of [L] (which I did), there is no reason why it should not exercise its power to vary the JS Order.

26 Notwithstanding my above findings, I did not completely disregard the JS Order. The court would be slow to disturb longstanding arrangements, especially such arrangements that parties recorded in a consent order at a time when they would have considered their marriage to be effectively at an end. In fact, both parties agreed that the JS Order should only be departed from if there were good reasons to do so. The Wife’s submission was that save for a material change in circumstances, only a misrepresentation or mistake of fact would be considered “good reasons”. The Husband, on the other hand, submitted that “good reasons” could also mean that there is a better way of doing things. ¹²

27 In the context of the present case, I found that there would be good reasons to depart from the JS Order if to do so would be in the welfare of [L]. This would be in accordance with s 125(2) of the WC, cited by both parties ¹³ , which provides that “[i]n deciding in whose custody, or in whose care and control, a child shall be placed, the paramount consideration is to be the welfare of the child…” [emphasis added], as well as the long line of case authorities that affirms this principle (including the Court of Appeal’s judgment in BNS v BNT [2015] SGCA 23 (at [19]). It would also be applicable if this court was varying parties’ agreement relating to the care of [L] pursuant to s 129 of the WC – see [25] above.

28 In his affidavits, the Husband contended that the Wife should not continue to have sole care and control of [L], as her conduct “reveal[ed] patterns of gatekeeping, double standards, unilateral decision-making and... neglectful caregiving” ¹⁴ . Having reviewed the Husband’s affidavits, I found that these allegations were not borne out by the evidence. In fact, I found that the Husband had the propensity to embellish his case and/or overstate the Wife’s alleged misconduct. The following are but a few examples:

29 I did not find the Husband’s complaints, or the disagreements between parties cited by him, sufficient grounds to depart from the JS Order. While they illustrate the acrimony between parties and the often-unnecessary bickering between them, the evidence showed that, by and large, parties had been able to work together to give effect to the terms of the JS Order.

30 What did however concern me was how the Husband’s weekday access to [L] under the JS Order had panned out. Clause 2b of the JS Order provided that once [L] turns 20 months old, the Husband shall have unsupervised access on 2 weekdays, from 4pm to 7.30pm. Clause 2c required the Husband to inform the Wife at least 24 hours in advance of the days on which he wishes to exercise such access. ³⁴

31 According to the Husband, when he agreed to the above orders, he was unaware of how difficult it would be to travel between parties’ residences during after-work peak traffic hours. He subsequently realized that for each weekday access, he and [L] would spend up to 2 hours in transit and only have 1.5 hours at home, during which he would have to shower [L], take care of [L]’s dinner, revise [L]’s worksheets with [L] and spend time bonding with [L]. This was corroborated by the Google Map search results produced by the Husband, which shows that it takes 44 minutes to travel between parties’ residences by MRT, or close to 1 hour by bus ³⁵ . I also note from page 45 of H3 that the Husband had referred to “heavy traffic” as a reason for returning [L] late, which is consistent with his evidence that it is difficult to travel between parties’ residences during after-work peak traffic hours. The Husband claimed that he had repeatedly highlighted this issue to the Wife, but she had not been open to adjusting the schedule under the JS Order. ³⁶

32 The Wife’s evidence confirmed the problem. She alleged that the Husband had had a history of returning [L] late and produced a log to substantiate this ³⁷ . She also claimed that since the commencement of unsupervised access, [L] would be overstimulated at the end of the weekday access sessions and would take longer, sometimes up to midnight, to fall asleep. In response to the Husband’s video evidence showing [L]’s reluctance to return to her, the Wife said that “it is understandable that [L] would feel tired and cranky if on a day, he goes to school, then spend time with the [Husband] after school, then return to my residence after being out for almost 12 hours in a day”. Notably, she said, “I believe it is essential to consider adjustments to the current weekday visitation schedule to mitigate these challenges” [emphasis added]. ³⁸

33 It is clear from the evidence that the timing of [L]’s return to the Wife’s residence after access has been a recurring point of contention between the parties. It is not inconceivable that such conflict between parties would have affected [L] and caused him some stress. Traces of this could be seen from the video exhibited at Tab G(1) of H2, where [L] gave an example of what the Wife would say whenever he returned late, and covered the Husband’s mouth to stop the Husband from talking about it. While I was mindful that videos involving children are often staged and/or scripted, this video showed that the access arrangements under the JS Order, which were supposed to promote the relationship between father and son for [L]’s welfare, were causing unnecessary strife between parties, as well as stress to the child.

34 Having identified the problem, the next step would be to devise a solution. In this regard, the Husband’s proposed solution was for parties to have shared care and control of [L], so that [L] could stay overnight at the Husband’s residence without having to rush back to the Wife’s residence, and the Husband could then send [L] to school the next morning. The Husband submitted that this arrangement would materially reduce the risk of late handovers and the logistical friction between parties ³⁹ , and would be in line with [L]’s wishes to spend more time at his father’s home ⁴⁰ .

35 The Wife, on the other hand, took the position that the care and control orders under the JS Order should not change despite the problems faced by parties with weekday access. She submitted that the logistical friction highlighted by the Husband is a common feature of co-parenting and can be managed through reasonable cooperation and planning between parties. It did not, in itself, warrant a fundamental restructuring of [L]’s living arrangements. ⁴¹

36 Having considered the evidence, I found that granting parties shared care and control of [L] would go some way towards resolving the problem that was affecting [L]’s welfare. At the very least, it would cut down on the amount of time that [L] needs to spend on the commute at night, and remove the stress involved in having to rush back to the Wife’s residence before a deadline. It would also enable [L] to start his bedtime routine much earlier, and at a much more relaxed pace, which would help him fall asleep earlier. In a broader sense, allowing [L] to stay overnight at the Husband’s residence on weeknights would also substantially reduce the frequent conflict between parties over the timing of [L]’s return, which, the evidence suggested, was affecting [L] adversely to some extent.

37 In coming to this view, I noted that parties had made repeated attempts, but failed, to resolve the issue relating to [L]’s weekday access. As mentioned above, it is the Wife’s own evidence that adjustments were necessary given the toll that the access schedule was taking on [L].

38 In view of the above, I found that there were good reasons to depart from the terms of the JS Order that relate to [L]’s care and control.

39 The Wife raised various objections to an order for shared care and control.

40 The Wife cited the case of AUA v ATZ [2016] 4 SLR 674 ⁴² (“AUA”), where the Court of Appeal had held that a mere desire by a parent to play a larger role in a child’s life did not constitute sufficient grounds for a variation of sole care and control orders to one of shared care and control ⁴³ . I found AUA to be of limited application to the present facts. In that case, the Court of Appeal found that a shared care and control order would not make a substantive difference, as it would not give the husband any more time than he already had with the child given that parties lived very close to each other. In the present case, a shared care and control order would make a substantive difference to the Husband’s access to [L], given the significant distance between parties’ respective residences. It would also, as I have found above, reduce conflict between parties.

41 The Wife highlighted that [L] is at a formative age where stability is paramount, and he had in the past 3 ½ years established stable routines and strong emotional bonds. She argued that a shared care and control arrangement would be disruptive and not be in his best interests. She highlighted that [L] had expressed his preference to return to her residence to sleep at night ⁴⁴ , and cited the cases of AQL v AQM [2012] 1 SLR 840 (“AQL”) and XCQ v XCP [2025] SGHCF 26 ⁴⁵ (“XCQ”), where the court declined to order shared care and control on the ground that such an arrangement may be too disruptive. ⁴⁶

42 I accept that stability is important for a child of [L]’s age. However, it does not follow that changes cannot be made if the existing arrangement is no longer one that would best serve [L]’s welfare. I noted that in both AQL and XCQ, the father who was seeking shared care and control had not had to care for the child overnight alone – see [2] and [3] of AQL and [4] of XCQ. It is therefore natural for the courts in those cases to have concerns as to whether a shared care and control arrangement would be destabilising for the child. I noted that in the present case, [L] had effectively been shuttling between parties’ residences, and the Husband had already had overnight access to [L] for some time. I did not think that a shared care and control arrangement would be unfeasible or necessarily detrimental to [L]’s welfare.

43 As held by the court in AQL and TRQ v TRR [2016] SGFC 106 ⁴⁷ , a shared care and control arrangement may not be appropriate where the parents have different parenting styles or are unable to cooperate. In the present case, there is nothing to suggest that parties have differing parenting styles. The Wife’s submission was that parties are unable to cooperate or maintain a level of civility in their co-parenting relationship, and introducing a shared care and control arrangement under such strained circumstances would only create further grounds for conflict and expose [L] to emotional instability ⁴⁸ . The Husband’s position, on the other hand, was that the Wife’s arguments were self-serving, as she was the one who had made it difficult for the Husband to co-parent. Notwithstanding that, he submitted that the relationship between parties was not so bad that it would be impossible for them to work together.

44 I agreed with the Husband’s latter statement. As is common between parties in divorce proceedings, there was palpable acrimony between the parties, who frequently engaged in petty and unnecessary arguments. However, as I have observed above, they had by and large been able to work together in the interests of [L]. At the outset, the JS Order was recorded by consent. So was the PCO. After the PCO, parties had also managed to come to a compromise on various matters, such as the Wife’s enrolment of [L] in Artary at her own cost ⁴⁹ , her agreement for the Husband to accompany [L] on his school trip to Tayo Station in view of [L]’s preference ⁵⁰ , the Husband’s rescheduling of his trip to Bangkok with [L] in view of the clash of dates with the Wife’s planned trip to Johor Bahru with [L] ⁵¹ , and the Husband’s cutting short of his Saturday access voluntarily in view of [L]’s first overseas trip with the Wife the next day ⁵² . I had every confidence in parties that they would be able to find it in them to continue working together in the best interests of their child.

45 The Wife submitted that a shared care and control arrangement would put an even greater strain on [L] than the current arrangement under the JS Order. As the Husband and [L] both start their respective school day and workday at 9am ⁵³ , allowing [L] to stay overnight with the Husband would require [L] to wake up early at around 6.30am, get ready, and leave home by 8am, so as to allow the Husband sufficient time to reach his workplace by 9am. ⁵⁴

46 The Husband’s evidence is that he has flexibility to work remotely up to 4 days a week and to shift his hours around ⁵⁵ . His counsel confirmed at the hearing that even if the Husband had to go to the office after sending [L] to school, he would not need to start work at 9am. Based on the Google Map search submitted by the Husband and the Wife’s evidence that [L]’s school is a 10-minute walk from her residence, [L] would be able to reach school by 9am comfortably if he left the Husband’s home by 8am. I also noted that it is generally acceptable for [L] to arrive at school after 9am, as can be seen from his check-in log ⁵⁶ . In my view, it would not be unrealistic for the Husband to send [L] to school in the morning, and in any event, waking up earlier in the morning would be better than going to bed late for a child of [L]’s age.

47 The Wife submitted ⁵⁷ that the Husband had failed to account for his frequent work trips overseas, which would directly impact his ability to provide consistent care for [L]. She highlighted that the Husband had travelled for a total of 43 days in 2024 alone ⁵⁸ and would be going on 3 work trips in 2025 ⁵⁹ . While this is a valid concern, it does not, in my view, render a shared care and control arrangement unworkable per se. I noted the Husband’s position that when the Wife goes overseas, he should have care of [L] until her return ⁶⁰ . I was of the view that this should be made mutual, such that the Wife would have care of [L] during the Husband’s absence. This would address any concerns that the Husband would be unable to provide adequate care for [L] given his travelling schedule.

48 The Wife submitted that the Husband’s proposal, which would allow him the flexibility to choose the weekdays on which [L] stays overnight, lacked structure or consistent routine, and would place [L] in a state of uncertainty. ⁶¹ I agree. Unlike regular weekday access, having [L] stay overnight with the Husband requires more advance planning, including packing the necessary clothing and books for the next day. [L] would also have to be mentally prepared that he would be returning to a different home at night, and it would be quite unsettling if he did not have an idea as to which days he would be staying with each parent. I also found it unsatisfactory that a party seeking shared care and control of a child was unable to commit to the days on which he would be able to carry out his caregiving duties. However, I did not think that this rendered a shared care and control order unfeasible. Certainty could be introduced by fixing the days on which each party should have care of [L].

49 In coming to my decision in Issue 2, I noted that this was a case where the child appeared comfortable in both parents’ care. While both parties had raised allegations of parenting lapses against each other, on the whole, I did not see any major concerns in either parent’s care of [L]. What I did see was both parties’ commitment towards caring for and nurturing their child, as was evident from their agreement to own a set of [L]’s school reader books, so that [L] could revise his reading at home ⁶² . I also noted the Husband’s evidence that he had purchased essentials for [L] and made them available at his residence ⁶³ . That being the case, and given my earlier observations that parties should be able to continue to co-parent, I saw no reason why this court should not strive to achieve “the ideal state of affairs for the child, or the closest to it possible”, by making orders towards ensuring that he is cared for jointly by both parents – TAU v TAT [2018] SGHCF 11 ⁶⁴ , at [12].

50 To be clear, I considered the concerns raised by the Wife regarding the Husband’s alleged poor decision-making and dietary choices for [L] arising from [L]’s visit to the accident and emergency department of KK Hospital on 11 January 2025 ⁶⁵ . However, I noted that the doctor’s diagnosis of [L]’s symptoms was “colic constipation” (or possibly constipation colic), which was unlikely to have developed overnight. I also noted the Husband’s explanation that his decision to send [L] to a clinic first (and not directly to the hospital) was a considered one, given the urgency of the matter and the distance between his residence and KK Hospital ⁶⁶ . While the Husband’s dietary choices may have been questionable given the frequent fast-food meals reflected in his bank statements ⁶⁷ , I was of the view that this should be considered in the light of the limited time that he had with [L]. I was not satisfied that this, without more, showed that the Husband was unsuitable to be given shared care and control of [L].

51 To reduce the number of transitions that [L] had to go through during the week, I fixed the days on which the Husband would have care of him on Wednesdays to Saturdays. I made it clear to parties that this does not prevent them from mutually agreeing to other configurations of the shared care and control arrangement.

52 As it was likely that the Husband would require some time to set up his home in preparation for the shared care and control arrangement, I ordered the shared care and control arrangement to take effect from 2026 onwards.

53 Having determined that parties should have shared care and control of [L], I dealt with the finer details of such an arrangement. For ease of reference, I set out below the previous arrangement under the JS Order ⁶⁸ , parties’ positions as stated in the WFPS and HFPS, as well as my decision and reasons for each aspect of the arrangement.

54 The arrangement under the JS Order: The Husband had unsupervised access to [L] —

55 The Husband’s position: The Husband should be entitled to —

56 The Wife’s position: The arrangement under the JS Order should continue, save that the timing should be adjusted to end at 8pm each day and to start after school for each weekday.

57 My decision: In the absence of a mutual agreement to the contrary and subject to the care and control orders for specific occasions —

58 My reasons: I have ordered that the mid-week transition be carried out at school, instead of the Wife’s residence, so as to (i) save a trip for [L]; (ii) allow [L] to complete his daily curriculum at school; and (iii) avoid potential disputes over parties’ conduct during transitions. I have also adjusted the end-time of the Husband’s share of the week on Saturday to 8pm given the Wife’s agreement.

59 The arrangement under the JS Order: Nil.

60 The Husband’s position: If a school closure day falls on a weekday on which the Husband chooses to exercise care of [L], the Husband should have time with [L] from 9am on that day till 9am the next day. If [L]’s school closure day falls on a Friday, the Husband should have time with [L] from 9am on Friday to 9pm on Saturday.

61 The Wife’s position: [L]’s school is closed on 8 weekdays per year, of which 5 days fall on a Friday. The Husband should have access to [L] on 4 of such Fridays, from 9.30am to 8pm, while the Wife would spend time with [L] for the remaining school closure days. On the Fridays where the Wife would spend time with [L], the Husband’s access time should start from 7.30pm and end at 8pm on Saturday.

62 My decision: Subject to parties’ mutual agreement otherwise —

63 My reasons: The above orders were made in the interests of fairness and to ensure that [L] gets to spend almost equal time with both parents, while reducing the need for transitions.

64 The arrangement under the JS Order: The Husband had overnight access to [L] from 4pm on Chinese New Year (“CNY”) Eve to 7.30pm on the 1st day of CNY.

65 The Husband’s position: The Husband’s time with [L] should be extended to start at 9am on CNY Eve and end on 9pm on the 1st day of CNY.

66 The Wife’s position: The arrangement under the JS Order should continue, with a slight adjustment to the end-time from 7.30pm to 8pm.

67 My decision: The Husband shall have care of [L] from 4pm on CNY Eve to 8pm on the 1st day of CNY. The Wife shall have care of [L] from 8pm on the 1st day of CNY to 8pm on the 2nd day of CNY, following which [L]’s care arrangements shall revert to the usual weekday and weekend arrangements.

68 My reasons: During the hearing, the Husband’s counsel confirmed that there were no specific reasons as to why the Husband was seeking to extend his time with [L] during CNY. I therefore see no reason to depart from parties’ agreement under the JS Order, save as to extend the end-time to 8pm in view of the Wife’s agreement.

69 The arrangement under the JS Order: The Husband had unsupervised overnight access to [L] from 4.30pm on Christmas Eve to 7.30pm on Christmas Day on an alternating basis. I understood this to mean that parties would take turns to spend this period of time with [L].

70 The Husband’s position: The Husband should be allowed to spend time with [L] from 9am on Christmas Eve to 9pm on Christmas Day in even years (e.g. 2026).

71 The Wife’s position: The arrangement under the JS Order should continue, save that the timing should be extended to start at 4pm on Christmas Eve and end at 8pm on Christmas day.

72 My decision:

73 My reasons: The Husband argued that since the Wife had care and control of [L], he should be allowed to extend his time with [L] during Christmas to ensure fairness. In view of my decision that parties are to have shared care and control of [L], this argument would no longer be valid, and the arrangement under the JS Order should continue. I adjusted the timing in view of the Wife’s agreement.

74 The arrangement under the JS Order: The Husband had unsupervised access to [L] from 9.30am to 7.30pm for half of all public holidays, on an alternating basis.

75 The Husband’s position: The Husband’s time with [L] should be extended to start from after school on the eve of the relevant public holiday, to 9pm on the public holiday itself.

76 The Wife’s position: The arrangement under the JS Order should continue, save that the end-time should be adjusted to 8pm.

77 My decision: Parties shall have care of [L] on an alternating basis on all gazetted public holidays apart from CNY and Christmas, from 9.30am to 8pm.

78 My reasons: I saw no reason to depart from the arrangement under the JS Order, save as to adjust the end-time in view of the Wife’s agreement. I did not extend the end-time to 9pm, as I wanted to ensure that [L] would have sufficient rest.

79 The arrangement under the JS Order: No specific arrangements, save that parties shall spend [L]’s birthday and attend school events together.

80 The Husband’s position: The Husband shall have time with [L] from 9am to 9pm on [L]’s birthday in even years, and from 9am to 9pm on the eve of [L]’s birthday in odd years.

81 The Wife’s position: The arrangement under the JS Order should continue. In addition, in the year 2025 and every odd year thereafter, the Wife shall spend time with [L] on his birthday. In the year 2026 and every even year thereafter, the Husband shall have access to [L] on his birthday, subject to [L]’s school curriculum and/or schedule including his enrichment programmes.

82 My decision: Subject to their availability, parties shall attend [L]’s school birthday celebrations together. Subject to the above and [L]’s schedule, from 9.30am to 8pm on [L]’s birthday —

83 My reasons: Parties are largely in agreement on this issue. I fixed the timing for each party’s time with [L] for consistency across the board.

84 The arrangement under the JS Order: The Husband shall have unsupervised access to [L] from 9.30am to 7.30pm on the Husband’s birthday.

85 The Husband’s position: The Husband shall spend his birthday with [L] from 9am to 9pm every year.

86 The Wife’s position: The Husband shall have unsupervised access to [L] on his birthday on xx April every year from 9.30am to 8pm. The Wife shall spend time with [L] on her birthday on x August every year.

87 My decision:

88 My reasons: In view of the shared care and control arrangement, the order needs to provide for both parties’ birthdays, not just the Husband’s. The timing that I have ordered tracks what was provided in the JS Order, with an adjustment of the end-time to 8pm in view of the Wife’s agreement. To ensure that [L] would have sufficient rest, I declined to extend the end-time to 9pm.

89 The arrangement under the JS Order: Parties are to share equally [L]’s school holidays.

90 Parties’ agreement:

91 The Husband’s position: Parties shall have equal halves of school holidays and term breaks based on the calendar of the Ministry of Education (“MOE”). In the absence of mutual agreement, the Husband shall have the first half of each holiday in even years and the second half in odd years. For one-week school holidays, the Husband shall have the second half of the week.

92 The Wife’s position: Commencing 2028 when [L] commences primary school education, parties shall have half of [L]’s gazetted school holidays. The Husband shall have the second half in even years and the first half in odd years. The Wife shall have the first half in even years and second half in odd years.

93 My decision:

(i) In 2026 and every even year thereafter, the Wife shall have the 1st half of the school holidays and the Husband shall have the 2nd half.

(ii) In 2027 and every odd year thereafter, the Husband shall have the 1st half of the school holidays and the Wife the 2nd half.

(iii) For one-week school holidays (i.e. March and September), the Husband shall have the second half, from Wednesday, 12pm, to Saturday, 8pm, to coincide with his existing weekend overnight time with [L].

94 My reasons:

95 The arrangement under the JS Order: Parties were entitled to have overseas access with [L] subject to the following:

96 Parties’ agreement: Upon [L] commencing formal education in primary school, overseas access shall take place only during [L]’s gazetted school holidays as stipulated by the MOE calendar. Prior to [L] commencing formal education, parties are at liberty to bring [L] overseas, save that such overseas trips shall be limited to 10 days per trip. The restriction on the duration of such trips shall be lifted once [L] commences formal education.

97 The Husband’s position:

98 The Wife’s position: Save for the agreed terms as set out at [96] above, the terms of the JS Order should continue to apply.

99 My decision: The arrangement under the JS Order shall continue, save that:

100 My reasons:

(i) The Husband claimed that the 3-month notice period under the JS Order had become a tool of obstruction, as the Wife had applied it rigidly. He referred to an incident on 10 December 2024, where the Wife wrongfully rejected his request to travel with [L] from 9 to 12 February 2026, as she had misread the year of travel as 2025. He also claimed that the Wife had applied double standards, as she herself had also provided the itinerary for her 20 October 2024 trip with [L] only on 29 July 2024, short of 3 months. For these reasons, the Husband sought to reduce the amount of notice required. ⁷¹

(ii) In my view, a reduction of the notice period would not prevent the Wife from applying the notice period rigidly or from applying double standards. It was also not the Husband’s case that he had been unable to provide this 3-month notice. On the contrary, he had shown that he was able to provide notice more than 1 year in advance.

(iii) As the Husband himself conceded, advance planning is important ⁷² . This is especially so given the shared care and control arrangement that has been ordered. I found no cogent reasons to depart from what parties had agreed to under the JS Order.

(iv) However, I accept the Husband’s submission that for short getaways or day trips, which are typically planned on a more spontaneous basis, a 3-month notice period may not be practical. Maintaining such a long notice period would be prohibitive of such short trips and would not be in [L]’s interests. Balancing this consideration against the need for advance planning, I found that a 1-month notice period would be appropriate for such short trips.

(i) For the Husband’s first overseas trip with [L] in December 2024, the Wife only sent [L] to the airport with his passport 2 hours before the scheduled departure time. This resulted in [L] missing a lunch that the Husband had planned with his family, and, according to the Husband, caused undue stress to the travelling party. ⁷³

(ii) The Wife explained that [L] had just returned from a trip to Johor Bahru. She wanted to comfort [L] and ensure that he was sufficiently rested before he went on his first overseas trip with the Husband ⁷⁴ . While I noted the Wife’s explanation, her actions would have caused undue stress to the Husband and his family.

(iii) Further, it is not unreasonable for the travelling parent to want to share moments before an overseas trip with [L], as they both look forward to the trip together. It would make the whole experience richer and more memorable for [L] as well. It would also be beneficial for [L] to have some time upon returning from an overseas trip to rest and recover under the care of the parent with whom he has been travelling. In my view, this would help him reacclimatize himself to the home environment.

(iv) I therefore accepted the Husband’s proposal and extended the travelling party’s time with [L] by 1 day before the scheduled departure date and 1 day after the return.

(i) Based on the same incident in December 2024, the Husband sought to bring forward the handover time of [L]’s passport to 7 days before any scheduled trip.

(ii) As was the case for the notice period, I do not see how bringing forward the deadline for the Wife to hand over [L]’s passport would prevent her from breaching it. In the absence of cogent reasons, I saw no reason to depart from the timeframe that parties had agreed to under the JS Order.

101 The arrangement under the JS Order: Nil.

102 The Husband’s position: If the Husband is unable to exercise any of his stipulated care timings with [L], he will give the Wife at least 12 hours’ advance notice of the same. In such a situation as well as in other situations where access cannot take place, the Husband shall be entitled to make-up time on Sundays within 8 weeks from the initial access date.

103 The Wife’s position: Although the Wife did not state her position in the WFPS, she stated in her affidavits that she had been providing make-up access to the Husband purely out of goodwill. She disagreed that make-up access should be counted by the hour, as that may mean that she would not be able to spend quality time with [L] for the entire week. ⁷⁵

104 My decision: No order made.

105 My reasons: In view of my decision for parties to have shared care and control of [L], there was no longer the concept of access, let alone make-up access. I also found no basis for the Husband to be seeking make-up access if he is unable to care for [L] due to his own schedule.

106 The arrangement under the JS Order: Nil.

107 The Husband’s position: In the event that the Wife travels overseas without [L], or will not be with [L] for more than 24 hours continuously, she shall inform the Husband 14 days in advance. During this time, the Husband shall have care of [L]. The travelling party shall be entitled to at least 1 phone or video call with [L].

108 The Wife’s position: Nil.

109 My order: In the event that either party travels overseas without [L], the party shall inform the other party 14 days in advance, and the other party shall have care of [L] during the travelling period. The travelling party shall be entitled to at least 1 phone or video call with [L] during overseas time.

110 My reasons: As stated at [47] above, I am of the view that this term should be made mutual, so as to ensure that [L] will receive proper care from at least one of his parents at any given time.

111 The arrangement under the JS Order: Nil.

112 The Husband’s position: If [L] is ill during the Husband’s stipulated care time such that the Husband’s time with [L] cannot take place, the Wife shall provide [L]’s medical certificate, and the Husband shall be entitled to spend up to 1 hour in the Wife's residence to care for [L] and comfort [L].

113 The Wife’s position: Nil.

114 My order: No order made.

115 My reasons: Such orders are not necessary given that parties have shared care and control of [L]. Further, there is no evidence of the Wife denying the Husband access to [L] under the pretext that [L] was ill.

116 The arrangement under the JS Order: Nil.

117 The Husband’s position: The Husband shall be at liberty to bring [L] for company events, for which children are included.

118 The Wife’s position: Nil.

119 My decision: Both parties shall be at liberty to bring [L] for company events that are catered for children.

120 My reasons: As the parent with shared care and control, I found no reason why the Husband should be prohibited from bringing [L] to company events that cater for children. The same applies to the Wife.

121 The arrangement under the JS Order: Nil.

122 The Husband’s position: The Husband shall provide the Wife with 12 hours’ notice if he is unable to exercise stipulated care timings, except in unforeseen circumstances. The Wife shall provide the Husband with 1 week’s advance notice if she intends to schedule a weekday activity for [L] which may clash with the Husband’s time with [L].

123 The Wife’s position: For all access arrangements, the Husband shall provide the Wife 12 hours’ notice in the event he is not exercising access.

124 My decision: Any party who wishes to make changes or adjustments to [L]’s weekly care arrangements shall give the other party advance notice of at least 1 week.

125 My reasons: As parties have shared care and control, sufficient advance notice should be given of any intended change, to allow sufficient time for adjustments to be made.

126 The arrangement under the JS Order: The Husband shall pick up and drop off [L] at the void deck of the Wife’s residence.

127 The Husband’s position: The Husband will pick up and drop off [L] at the Wife’s residence unless otherwise mutually agreed. In respect of care timings falling on weekdays, the Husband will pick [L] up from school at the start of access, unless otherwise mutually agreed. The Husband is at liberty to designate his family members (e.g. his mother or sister) to help in pick-up or drop-off.

128 The Wife’s position: For all access arrangements, the Husband shall continue to pick up and drop off [L] at the Wife’s residence and/or from [L]’s school, unless mutually agreed upon by the parties.

129 My decision: Unless specifically provided above or otherwise mutually agreed, the Husband shall pick [L] up from and return [L] to the Wife’s residence. The Husband is at liberty to arrange for his mother to assist in the pick-up or drop-off of [L].

130 My reasons:

131 The arrangement under the JS Order: The Wife shall retain [L]’s important documents including passport, travelling documents and birth certificate. The Wife shall apply for [L]’s passport and she will extend certified true copies of the same to the Husband.

132 The Husband’s position: The parties shall alternate holding [L]’s passport and birth certificate, with the Wife holding such documents for the first half of each calendar year, and the Husband holding them for the second half.

133 The Wife’s position: The Wife shall continue to safekeep [L]’s important documents including passport, travelling documents and birth certificate. The Wife shall apply for [L]’s passport and extend a certified true copy to the Husband, along with a certified true copy of [L]’s birth certificate. If the Husband requires originals, the Wife shall provide them within 3 days of the request, and the Husband shall return them within 7 days after use.

134 My decision: I adopted the Wife’s position.

135 My reasons:

136 Under the JS Order, the Husband was to pay the Wife S$450 per month as [L]’s maintenance ⁷⁹ . The Wife’s position was that this should continue ⁸⁰ . The Husband, on the other hand, argued that each party should bear [L]’s daily expenses during their time with [L] ⁸¹ .

137 Given my decision that parties are to have shared care and control of [L], I accepted the Husband’s position and ordered parties to each bear the daily expenses incurred by [L] under his or her care.

138 The JS Order also provides for parties to share the following expenses: ⁸²

139 Save and except for emergency items to be incurred for [L] that are not covered by insurance, the JS Order provides that all the above expenses are to be mutually agreed upon between parties. The Husband is to pay his 50% share of such expenses into the Wife’s bank account within 7 days of receipt of documentary proof that they have been incurred. ⁸³

140 Parties were generally in agreement that such expenses should continue to be shared. I therefore made orders in this regard that mirror the terms of the JS Order.

141 Of the shared expenses listed above, the only items that were in dispute were the fees for the following enrichment classes that the Wife had enrolled [L] in ⁸⁴ . The Husband’s position was that these classes had not been agreed upon prior to [L]’s enrolment ⁸⁵ .

142 At the hearing, I asked the Husband’s counsel whether the Husband had any substantive objection to [L]’s participation in the above enrichment classes. Counsel replied that the Husband’s only substantive objection was the impact that these classes would have on his access time, and if the court grants parties shared care and control of [L], this substantive objection would fall away ⁸⁶ .

143 In view of counsel’s response and the shared care and control orders made herein, I ordered the Husband to bear 50% of the fees for the above enrichment classes.

144 Under the JS Order, the Husband was allowed to retain custody over [L]’s Child Development Account (“CDA”) and to utilise the monies therein for [L]’s tertiary education ⁸⁷ . The Wife’s position was that this order should remain, with an additional order requiring the Husband to extend a copy of [L]’s CDA annual statement of account to the Wife on the 1st of December every year ⁸⁸ . As the Husband did not object to this, I made the orders accordingly.

145 For the reasons given above, I ordered that parties are to have shared care and control of [L] in the terms set out under Issue 3 above with effect from 1 January 2026, and granted them liberty to apply.

146 At the decision hearing on 12 December 2025, the Husband’s counsel sought costs of S$5,000 from the Wife on the ground that the Husband had been the successful party, especially when it came to the issue of care and control. He highlighted that the proceedings had been protracted and voluminous documents were filed, such that the Husband’s disbursements alone added up to more than S$1,000. ⁸⁹

147 The Wife’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that no costs should be ordered. She submitted that the outcome of these proceedings was “not an all-win for the [Husband]”, and that a considerable number of the terms of the shared care and control arrangement were decided in favour of the Wife. ⁹⁰

148 As a general rule, costs follow the event. The Husband has been largely successful in the contested ancillary matters and would, under normal circumstances, be entitled to costs.

149 However, I made the following observations:

150  For the above reasons, I made no order as to costs.