1 Prayer 1 of FC/OAG 154/2025 (“OAG 154”) is an application under section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1934 (2020 Rev Ed) (“GIA”) for the payment of a monthly sum of $8,926, or a lump sum of $1,071,120, towards the maintenance of a child (the “Child”). The Applicant in OAG 154 is the mother of the Child. The Respondent in OAG 154 is a man whom the Applicant alleges is the biological father of the Child.

2 Prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154 are applications for the following reliefs:

(a) an order that the Respondent, the Applicant and the Child submit to a DNA paternity test, to be conducted by a laboratory accredited by the Health Sciences Authority, or approved by the Court, within such time and on such terms as the Court directs;

(b) a declaration that the Respondent is the biological father of the Child, if the DNA paternity test establishes that the Respondent is the biological father of the Child;

(c) an order that the Respondent bear and pay the costs of the paternity testing for both the Applicant and the Respondent.

3 The Respondent applied by FC/SUM 2950/2025 (“SUM 2950”) to strike out OAG 154. SUM 2950 was dismissed with costs by an Assistant Registrar of the Family Justice Courts (see YCD v YCE [2026] SGFC 58).

4 The Respondent also applied by FC/SUM 1162/2026 (“SUM 1162”) to strike out an affidavit filed by the Applicant on 4 May 2026 for OAG 154.

5 At a Case Conference conducted by an Assistant Registrar of the Family Justice Courts on 8 April 2026, the parties agreed that OAG 154 should be bifurcated, and that prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154 should be dealt with first.

6 The matter then proceeded as follows:

(a) I heard arguments on SUM 1162 and prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154 on 7 May 2026. The Applicant’s solicitors filed supplemental written submissions soon after the hearing ended that day. On 11 May 2026, the Respondent’s solicitors filed a letter objecting to the supplemental written submissions.

(b) On 13 July 2026, I issued a written judgment, in relation to SUM 1162 and prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154, under Part 15, Rule 10(1)(b) of the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 (G.N. No. S 720/2024) (“FJGR”) without the parties present. Paragraphs 54 to 57 of the written judgment, which set out my conclusions and further directions, are reproduced for ease of reference:

(c) On 20 July 2026, the Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal against the whole of my decision that prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154 be dismissed. The Applicant’s appeal was assigned the case number HCF/DCA 52/2026 (“DCA 52”).

(d) On 27 July 2026, the parties filed their written submissions on how prayer 1 of OAG 154 should be dealt with, and on the costs for prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154. On 28 July 2026, I made the following orders:

(i) Prayer 1 of OAG 154 is stayed pending the disposal of DCA 52.

(ii) Either party may apply, within 1 month after the date on which DCA 52 is disposed of, for prayer 1 of OAG 154 to be restored and dealt with.

(iii) The Applicant is to pay the Respondent costs (all-in) fixed at $1,800 for prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154.

7 The parties filed a total of 5 affidavits in OAG 154. These included the affidavits filed in relation to SUM 2950 and the Respondent’s affidavit filed in support of SUM 1162. All 5 affidavits were relied on at the hearing before me. These were (in the sequence in which the affidavits were filed):

(a) the Applicant’s first affidavit filed on 8 October 2025 (“AA1”);

(b) the Respondent’s first affidavit filed on 9 December 2025 (“RA1”);

(c) the Applicant’s second affidavit filed on 23 December 2025 (“AA2”);

(d) the Applicant’s third affidavit filed on 4 May 2026 (“AA3”); and

(e) the Respondent’s second affidavit filed on 5 May 2026 (“RA2”).

8 The following facts are not disputed:

(a) The Applicant married another man (“M”) on 31 August 2013.

(b) The Applicant gave birth to the Child on 26 May 2014. M was named as the father of the Child on the Child’s birth certificate. The Child’s birth certificate, which was exhibited at page 14 of AA1, indicates that M was the informant of the Child’s birth.

(c) On 8 January 2020, the Applicant and M were granted an Interim Judgment for divorce in FC/D 6091/2019. The Applicant was the Plaintiff in FC/D 6091/2019. Under the Interim Judgment, the following orders were made by consent of the Applicant and M:

(i) The Applicant and M were granted joint custody of the Child and another child (“C2”), with care and control to the Applicant. M was granted reasonable access to the Child and C2.

(ii) M was to solely maintain the Child and C2. The expenses of the Child and C2 were to be paid by M to the vendors/institutions directly and, where applicable, on a reimbursement basis to the Applicant within 7 days after the Applicant produced the relevant receipt/invoice.

9 In AA1 and AA2, the Applicant gave 2 slightly different versions of what had transpired. AA1 was filed in support of OAG 154. AA2 was filed in response to RA1.

10 According to AA1, the Applicant first met the Respondent “in or around 2013” through a marriage and friendship introduction agency. The Applicant agreed to have pre-marital sexual intercourse with the Respondent on the basis of the Respondent’s representation that he was unmarried. The parties developed a relationship and had sexual intercourse at the Respondent’s home. At the material time, the Respondent was the Applicant’s only boyfriend.

11 After the Applicant became pregnant, she informed the Respondent, expecting that he would support her and the unborn child. However, the Respondent denied responsibility stating that it was not possible for the child to be his, and subsequently cut off all contact with the Applicant.

12 During the Applicant’s first trimester, M (whom the Applicant described as her “prospective husband”) was kind enough to give the Applicant support (during her pregnancy). M’s kindness and support led the Applicant to marry M on 31 August 2013.

13 The Applicant decided to “put” M as the father in the Child’s birth certificate because she could not “put” the Respondent as the father on account of his refusal to acknowledge that he was the biological father and because, at that time, she was in a state of emotional distress, struggling with the pregnancy and conception and forming a rapport with M to get him to agree to being named as a father.

14 As the Respondent had denied paternity, the Applicant required a DNA paternity test to be ordered by the Court to confirm the Respondent’s parentage of the Child, after which the Respondent can be made to contribute appropriately towards the Child’s upbringing and welfare.

15 According to AA2, the Applicant met the Respondent through a marriage and friendship introduction agency “in late 2012”. Before the Applicant was introduced to the Respondent, she had broken up with M, who was her former boyfriend. After the introduction, the Respondent and the Applicant went for several dates from late 2012 to August 2013.

16 The Respondent and the Applicant developed a relationship and had sexual intercourse on about 4 occasions in 2013 at the Respondent’s home. The last time they had sexual intercourse was in August 2013. At the material time, the Respondent was the Applicant’s only boyfriend.

17 The Applicant agreed to have sexual intercourse with the Respondent because he represented that he was unmarried and gave the Applicant the impression that he was serious about marrying and settling down with her. In August 2013, the Applicant discovered that she was pregnant and informed the Respondent. The Respondent denied responsibility, said the Child could not be his, and cut off all contact with the Applicant. At the material time, the Respondent was the only man with whom the Applicant had sexual intercourse before she discovered that she was pregnant with the Child. The Applicant did not have sexual relations with any other man at that time.

18 As the Applicant was upset and disappointed by the Respondent’s conduct, she got back together with M. M was kind enough to support the Applicant during her first trimester. The Applicant later married M on 31 August 2013. The Applicant was emotionally distressed and trying to cope with her pregnancy. As the Respondent refused to acknowledge paternity, the Applicant decided to name M as the father on the Child’s birth certificate. M was not the Child’s biological father.

19 The Applicant has been the Child’s primary caregiver, and the one who bears, arranges and manages the costs of the Child’s upbringing, even though there is an interim judgment in her divorce proceedings against M, which provides that M shall solely maintain the Child and C2.

20 The Applicant specifically denied certain allegations made by the Respondent in RA1. The Applicant also claimed that the Respondent did not use condoms during the parties’ sexual intercourse.

21 The Applicant also sought to introduce, through AA3, additional material to show that M was not the biological father of the Child. The material consisted of what purports to be a “DNA Paternity Report” from “Endeavor DNA Laboratories” stating that:

(a) samples were collected from M (described in the Report as the “alleged father”) and the Child (described in the Report as the “tested child”) on 13 April 2026 and 14 April 2026, respectively; and

(b) “The alleged father is excluded as the biological father of the tested child.”

22 The Applicant admitted that the “samples were not collected under a strict chain of custody”. In fact, the “DNA Paternity Report” exhibited at page 10 of AA3 contained the following caveat:

23 In RA1, the Respondent denied the Applicant’s allegations that he was the biological father of the Child, and that there was a relationship between the Applicant and him. The Respondent claimed that he and the Applicant engaged in sexual intercourse “on a single occasion in or about Q1 2013 only”.

24 Earlier that evening, the Respondent initiated a conversation with the Applicant. Through the course of small talk, the Applicant mentioned she just had a quarrel with her then boyfriend. The Applicant then suggested going to the Respondent’s residence for tea, and subsequently, they engaged in sexual intercourse. The Respondent claimed that it was a one-night stand, and that contraception in the form of condoms had been utilised.

25 After the encounter, the Applicant requested payment for the sexual intercourse. As the Respondent was uncertain about the Applicant’s intentions and concerned that she might make false allegations against him if he did not comply, the Respondent gave the Applicant $150. The Applicant accepted the money and took a cab back to her residence.

26 The Applicant’s focus on money reinforced the Respondent’s decision not to maintain any further contact with her. There was no subsequent communication between the parties after the incident. The Respondent was never informed of the Applicant’s pregnancy.

27 The Respondent claimed that the Court does not have power to compel a person to take a paternity test. The Respondent also took the position that as the Applicant has not, prima facie, established any case that the Respondent was the Child’s father, there was no basis for him to be compelled to undergo a paternity test.

28 The Respondent claimed that a normal pregnancy gestational period is 38 weeks, and that 38 weeks before 26 May 2014 would be 2 September 2013, after the Applicant had married M.

29 In RA2, the Respondent objected to the filing of AA3 on the following grounds:

(a) The filing of AA3, after the Respondent’s solicitors had filed their written submissions for OAG 154, was an abuse of process.

(b) The Applicant had no right to file AA3. AA3 was filed without the Court’s permission in contravention of Part 5, Rule 12 of the FJGR.

(c) AA3 did not comply with the Part 10, Rules 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the FJGR. In particular:

(i) No prior leave of Court to adduce the “DNA Paternity Report” was obtained.

(ii) No attempt was made by the Applicant to seek the Respondent’s consent on the appointment or identity of the supposed expert beforehand.

(iii) No attempt was made by the Applicant to agree on the list of issues to be referred for expert evidence, and the common set of agreed or assumed facts.

(iv) The “DNA Paternity Report” was not contained in an affidavit affirmed by the expert who gave the Report. The expert’s qualifications were not stated. There was no statement by the expert that the expert’s duty is to assist the Court, and that this duty overrides any obligation to the person paying the expert’s fees. There was no explanation as to the materials relied on, or how the conclusions were reached, by the expert.

(d) The “DNA Paternity Report” was prepared by an entity or persons not based in Singapore but in New Mexico, USA, raising questions about compellability and competence.

(e) The “DNA Paternity Report” was unreliable and lacked credibility. As per the caveat in the Report, the person preparing the report accepted and admitted that the Report was not sufficient for Court purposes. There was no chain of custody or proof that the sample sent to the lab for the purposes of the Report was even that of M or the Child. There was no certainty that the Applicant had not submitted the sample of another male person or child.

30 Dealing first with SUM 1162, I agree that no weight can be given to the “DNA Paternity Report” exhibited in AA3. In particular, as there was no evidence of a chain of custody of the samples from the time of their collection to the time of their use for DNA analysis, there was no proof that the samples used for the purposes of the Report were in fact samples obtained from M and the Child. The “DNA Paternity Report” lacked credibility and could not be relied on.

31 I also agree that the Applicant failed to comply with Part 10, Rules 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the FJGR, when she filed AA3. Those Rules seek to ensure that costs are not unnecessarily incurred in adducing expert evidence, and that any expert evidence tendered in Court is relevant and reliable. In this case, the Applicant did not seek the Court’s prior approval to use expert evidence in the form of the “DNA Paternity Report”. The Applicant also did not consult the Respondent on who to be appointed to conduct the DNA analysis, or on the issues to be referred for expert evidence and the facts that the expert is to rely on. The “DNA Paternity Report” was not exhibited in an affidavit made by the expert who conducted the DNA analysis, and did not set out the expert’s qualifications or any of the other matters mentioned in Part 10, Rule 7(2)(b) to (h) of the FJGR that an expert’s report must include. As the Applicant has failed to observe the basic procedural safeguards contained in Part 10, Rules 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the FJGR, the Court could not approve the use of the “DNA Paternity Report”.

32 However, it does not necessarily follow from these matters that AA3 should be struck out. Under Part 10, Rule 3(1) of the FJGR, the appropriate sanction for the Applicant’s non-compliance with Part 10, Rules 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the FJGR is the Court’s refusal to approve the use of the “DNA Paternity Report”. Further, AA3 shows that the Applicant made some effort to corroborate her allegation that M was not the biological father of the Child, and that should remain on record. It was unnecessary for the Respondent to apply to strike out AA3. It would have been sufficient for the Respondent’s solicitors to make the appropriate submissions on why the Court should not rely on the “DNA Paternity Report” that the Applicant sought to introduce through AA3.

33 All things considered, I make no order on SUM 1162. As I was of the view that the Respondent had made an unnecessary application, but also noted that the application was prompted by the tendering of an inherently unreliable “DNA Paternity Report” by the Applicant, I direct that each party bears his or her own costs for SUM 1162.

34 I am of the view that on the facts of this case, the Court had jurisdiction to deal with prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154, even though they were not on their own applications for relief under the GIA.

35 In so deciding, I am mindful that the Family Division of the High Court (“Family Division”) observed in VLI v VLJ [2021] SGHCF 27, [2021] 5 SLR 1469, that the application in that case, which was not in itself an application on the custody, access or maintenance of a child, fell outside the ambit of the Court’s powers under section 5 of the GIA. However, at [13], the Family Division also observed that it was for a party in that case to show how the order sought in that case was “related” to the application under section 5 of the GIA in that case, “such that the order sought is also an appropriate order that is in the child’s welfare”.

36 Prayer 1 of OAG 154 was clearly a type of “family proceedings” as defined in section 2(1) of the Family Justice Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed) (“FJA”), as it fell within paragraph (c) of that definition. A Family Court has jurisdiction to deal with prayer 1 of OAG 154 by virtue of section 26(2)(a) and (c) of the FJA read with section 22(1) of the FJA, section 17(1)(d) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”) and sections 2 and 5 of the GIA.

37 Under section 68 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed), the biological father of a child has a duty to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. The Respondent is not liable to maintain the Child unless the Respondent is the biological father of the Child. In order to decide prayer 1 of OAG 154, the Court has to make a finding as to whether the Respondent is in fact the biological father of the Child.

38 The Respondent also submitted that M was the biological father of the Child. Under section 114(1) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EA”), where a person is born during the continuance of a valid marriage between the person’s mother and any man, the person is presumed to be the legitimate child of that man, unless the contrary is proved. As the Child was born while the Applicant was married to M, the Child is presumed to be the legitimate child of M. However, this presumption is rebuttable by proof to the contrary. Such proof may take 2 forms. First, the results of a DNA paternity test conducted using samples from M and the Child may establish that M is not the biological father of the Child. Second, the results of a DNA paternity test conducted using samples from a man other than M and the Child may establish that the other man is the biological father of the Child.

39 The results of a DNA paternity test conducted using samples from the Respondent and the Child to determine whether the Respondent is the biological father of the Child would therefore be relevant not only to the issue of whether the Respondent was liable to maintain the Child, but also to rebutting the presumption under section 114(1) of the EA. Prayer 2 of OAG 154 seeks to obtain evidence that would assist the Court in determining matters relevant to prayer 1 of OAG 154 (namely, the parentage of the Child) by requiring the Respondent to submit to a DNA paternity test. Prayer 3 of OAG 154 concerned the consequence of a finding that the Court would have to make in order to decide prayer 1 of OAG 154 in the Applicant’s favour. Prayers 2 and 3 of OAG 154 were therefore related to the issue of whether the Respondent was liable (under prayer 1 of OAG 154) to maintain the Child, and as such concerned reliefs that may be appropriate and in the Child’s welfare. As prayers 2 and 3 of OAG 154 were ancillary to prayer 1 of OAG 154, the Court had jurisdiction to deal with prayers 2 and 3 of OAG 154 on account of prayer 1 of OAG 154. As the issue of who should bear the costs of the DNA paternity testing would arise if the Court orders the Respondent to submit to DNA paternity testing pursuant to its decision on prayer 2 of OAG 154, prayer 4 of OAG 154 was ancillary to prayer 2 of OAG 154; consequently, the Court also had jurisdiction to deal with prayer 4 of OAG 154 on the facts of this case, on account of prayers 1 and 2 of OAG 154.

40 I am of the view that a Family Court has power to order the Respondent to submit to DNA paternity testing. There are 2 possible bases for such power. The first lies in section 26(2)(b) of the FJA read with section 18(2) of, and paragraph 19 of the First Schedule to, the SCJA. The second lies in the inherent power of the Court to “do whatever it considers necessary on the facts of the case before it to ensure that justice is done or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court”. I elaborate.

41 Under section 26(2)(b) of the FJA, a Family Court, when exercising any jurisdiction mentioned in section 22(1)(a) or (b) of that Act, has all the powers of the General Division of the High Court (the “General Division”) in the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction of the General Division. Under section 18(2) of the SCJA, these include the powers set out in the First Schedule to the SCJA.

42 Under paragraph 19 of the First Schedule to the SCJA (read with section 18(2) of the SCJA), the General Division has power to order the medical examination of a person who is a party to any proceedings where the physical condition of the person is relevant to any matter in question in the proceedings. It is arguable that a medical examination of a person includes a forensic medical examination involving the taking from the person of a body sample (such as a sample of blood, a sample of head hair with hair roots, a sample of saliva, or a sample taken from any body part by way of a swab or other sampling means) for DNA analysis, ¹ and that the physical condition of a person includes the person’s DNA information (i.e. genetic information derived from a DNA analysis of a body sample). ² It is therefore arguable that the power under paragraph 19 of the First Schedule to the SCJA extends to ordering a person to submit to a DNA paternity test (which involves a forensic medical examination where a body sample is taken for DNA analysis) where the person’s DNA information is relevant to an issue in the proceedings, such as whether the person is a biological parent of a child.

43 Part 1, Rule 5(2) of the FJGR recognises that where there is no express provision in any written law on a matter, a Family Court has inherent power to “do whatever it considers necessary on the facts of the case before it to ensure that justice is done or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court, so long as it is not prohibited by law and is consistent with the Objectives”. A Court has inherent power under Part 1, Rule 5(2) of the FJGR 2024 to order the parties in a case before the Court to provide evidence relevant to an issue before the Court. An order for a party to submit to a DNA paternity test is in substance an order for a party to provide relevant evidence. Where the issue before the Court is whether a party is a biological parent of a child, the making of an order for the party to submit to a DNA paternity test may be necessary on the facts of the case to enable the Court to determine the issue and ensure that justice is done. The Respondent did not suggest that the making of such an order is prohibited by law. The making of such an order is consistent with the Objectives under Part 1, Rule 4(2) of the FJGR 2024, in particular, of expeditious proceedings and fair results for parties.

44 A similar conclusion was reached by a Family Court in WGM v WGN [2022] SGFC 71, [2025] SLR(FC) 151, where the Court granted a father’s application for an order that the parties’ children undergo a paternity test. The Family Court observed that it was unsatisfactory to say that the Court, as the master of its own process, cannot, as a matter of procedure, invoke its inherent powers to call for the relevant evidence to be placed before it to ensure the proper protection and enforcement of the parties’ rights (see WGM v WGN at [31(e)(xv)]).

45 While a Family Court has power to order a party to submit to DNA paternity testing, that power should be exercised sparingly, as a person may have legitimate privacy concerns when asked to provide a body sample for DNA analysis. There is implicit recognition of such privacy concerns in Singapore legislation. ³ Where the party agrees to submit to DNA paternity testing, the Court may readily make the order with the consent of the party. However, where the party does not agree to submit to DNA paternity testing, the Court must first be satisfied there is credible evidence that the party may be a biological parent of the child concerned. In particular, at the very least, the Court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the parties had sexual intercourse during a period when the child concerned may have been conceived. In my view, this strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of justice, in obtaining evidence relevant to the issue of paternity before the Court, and any legitimate privacy concerns that the person asked to provide a body sample for DNA analysis may have.

46 The Respondent’s solicitors gave the following reasons for why the Court should not order a DNA paternity test:

(a) M was named as the Child’s father on the Child’s birth certificate, and continues to bear 100% of the Child’s expenses, according to a Court order (on the Child’s maintenance contained in the Interim Judgment) following the Applicant’s divorce from M.

(b) The Applicant has not shown a prima facie case that the Respondent is the Child’s father. Based on the birth date of 26 May 2014, the Respondent claimed that the Child would have been conceived on or about September 2013, after the Applicant’s marriage to M.

(c) The Applicant has not rebutted the presumption under section 114(1) of the EA.

(d) The Child was born on 26 May 2014. The Respondent claims that the parties had sexual intercourse on one occasion sometime in the first quarter of 2013. The Applicant’s claim that the parties had sexual intercourse multiple times, with the last incident being sometime in August 2013, was a bare assertion. The Applicant had not adduced any evidence to prove that she had sexual intercourse with the Respondent during the period of conception, which the Respondent claimed was September 2013. Minimally, the Applicant should have adduced WhatsApp messages, text messages and emails to demonstrate some sort of romantic or physical relationship. The Respondent claimed that the Applicant failed to establish a prima facie basis to assert that the Respondent could be the gestational father.

(e) Any claim that the Applicant was unable to find documents due to the passage of time was without merit. The Applicant chose to commence OAG 154 only in 2025, instead of 2013, when such documents would have been easily obtainable.

(f) The doctrine of laches and/or acquiescence applied to bar the Applicant’s claim. The Applicant delayed some 14 years in bringing this claim, during which paternity was neither asserted nor pursued, and the Respondent arranged his affairs on that basis. Given that Applicant has not put forward any good reason for this delay, which has prejudiced the Respondent significantly, the Applicant’s claim must be dismissed.

(g) The Applicant clarified in AA2 that the man that she had previously been with (before having sexual intercourse with the Respondent) was M. The Applicant claimed to have broken up with M in 2012. It is difficult to understand how she could then marry M almost immediately after her last alleged encounter with the Respondent. The Applicant’s own evidence suggests that there was, at the very least, an overlap of relationships, which undermines the reliability of her story.

(h) The Applicant’s inconsistency is further demonstrated by the fact that she claimed in AA1 to have met the Respondent in 2013, but claimed in AA2 to have been introduced to the Respondent in late 2012.

(i) The sequence of events described by the Applicant was highly questionable. The Applicant claimed that in her first trimester with the Child, M provided her support despite not being the biological father of the Child. She also stated that her last sexual encounter with the Respondent was in August 2013, and that she married M on 31 August 2013. However, most individuals do not become aware of pregnancy symptoms until several weeks after conception. If the Applicant last had sexual intercourse with the Respondent in August 2013, it is unlikely that she would have discovered her pregnancy, informed the Respondent, had her contact with the Respondent cut off, and received support from and reconciled with M, all within the very short period before her marriage to M at the end of August 2013. The Applicant’s timeline is not plausible and casts serious doubt on the credibility of the Applicant’s version of events.

(j) It was only in 2025 that the Applicant approached the Respondent for maintenance for the Child. This was 5 years after her divorce from M had already been finalised. If the Applicant had genuinely believed all along that the Respondent was the father of the Child, it was difficult to understand why she remained silent. At the very least, she would have been expected to notify the Respondent of the Child’s existence and to raise the issue of his alleged maintenance obligations at or around the time her divorce was being finalised, so that the proper party would bear the Child’s expenses.

(k) A paternity test constitutes a physical intrusion, which violates personal autonomy and bodily integrity. It forces disclosure of genetic information, which engages privacy interests, including loss of control over intimate personal data. There must be cogent reasons before it is justifiable to order a party to submit to a paternity test against the party’s will. A mere allegation is insufficient.

(l) The Applicant’s attempt to have the Respondent bear the Child’s maintenance, when M was fully responsible for the Child’s maintenance under an existing Court order, appears to be an effort to obtain a further source of maintenance on top of what is already being provided. This would amount to unfair enrichment and was made in bad faith.

(m) The Applicant misrepresented that she was bearing all costs of the Child’s upbringing, education, enrichment classes, travel and medical care, when pursuant to the consent Court order, it was actually M who was bearing all the expenses associated with the Child.

47 I do not agree with the Respondent’s submission that the Applicant had not adduced any evidence to show that the parties had sexual intercourse during the period of the Child’s conception. Leaving aside the discrepancies in the Applicant’s evidence, the Applicant did allege in AA2 that:

(a) she had sexual intercourse with the Respondent in August 2013 and subsequently conceived the Child; and

(b) she did not have sexual intercourse with any other man (including M) in that period.

48 The Respondent did not provide any basis for his claim that a normal pregnancy gestation period is 38 weeks. For the purposes of presuming legitimacy, section 114(1)(b) of the EA treats a pregnancy as lasting 280 days (or 40 weeks). There is also scientific literature indicating that the duration of a normal pregnancy may range from 38 to 42 weeks. ⁴ Working backwards from the Child’s date of birth on 26 May 2014, the Child may have been conceived as early as 5 August 2013 or as late as 2 September 2013. It was therefore possible that the Child was conceived before the Applicant married M on 31 August 2013. If the Applicant’s allegations that she had sexual intercourse with the Respondent in August 2013, and did not have sexual intercourse with any other man (including M) in the period when the Child was conceived, are true, then it is possible that the Respondent may be the biological father of the Child.

49 I also do not think that the Applicant’s failure to rebut the presumption under section 114(1) of the EA that the Child is the legitimate child of M, before applying for an order that the Respondent submit to a DNA paternity test, is fatal to her application for that order. Section 114(1) of the EA does not give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the Child is the biological child of M. As the High Court observed in WX v WW [2009] SGHC 70, [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [11], section 114(1) of the EA is a presumption of legitimacy (i.e. a presumption that the child has the status of being a legitimate child), and not a presumption that the legitimate child of a person is the person’s issue (or biological child).

50 However, I agree with the Respondent that the Applicant lacked credibility on certain material matters. This calls into question the veracity of the Applicant’s allegation that she had sexual intercourse with the Respondent, and no other man (including M), in August 2013. The following matters are relevant.

(a) The Applicant claimed in AA1 that she decided to “put” M as the father in the Child’s birth certificate because she could not “put” the Respondent as the father on account of his refusal to acknowledge that he was the biological father, and because she was “forming a rapport with [M] to get him to agree to being named as a father even though he is not the Child’s biological father”. The Applicant claimed in AA2 that she decided to “name” M as the father on the Child’s birth certificate because the Respondent refused to acknowledge paternity. However, the Child’s birth certificate lists M, and not the Applicant, as the informant of the Child’s birth particulars when the Child’s birth was registered. The Child was also born after the Applicant married M on 31 August 2013. Given these circumstances, the Applicant’s explanations for how M came to be named as the father on the Child’s birth certificate were clearly contrived.

(b) The naming of M as the Child’s father on the Child’s birth certificate, and the fact that M was the informant of the Child’s birth particulars, indicate that M represented himself to be the Child’s biological father when he registered the Child’s birth. Under section 27(1) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act (Cap. 267, 1985 Rev Ed) as in force when the Child’s birth was registered on 5 June 2014, it would have been an offence for M to wilfully make a false statement for the purposes of registration of the Child’s birth, or to wilfully or knowingly furnish any false information touching any of the Child’s birth particulars. M’s representation, when he registered the Child’s birth, suggests that he believed, at that time, that he was the biological father of the Child. While the Applicant alleged in AA1 that she had to “[form] a rapport with [M] to get him to agree to being named as a father even though he is not the Child’s biological father”, she did not explain how she got M to agree to being named as the Child’s father. The Applicant was also careful not to state, anywhere in her affidavits, that M knew that he was not the Child’s biological father, although she used phrasing that, if not read carefully, may give such an impression. If M believed that he was the Child’s biological father, it can only have been because M had sexual intercourse with the Applicant during the period when the Child may have been conceived. This would also explain why M agreed to marry the Applicant on 31 August 2013. This leads to the inference that the Applicant was not telling the truth when she alleged in AA2 that “the Respondent was the only man with whom [she] had sexual intercourse before [she] discovered [she] was pregnant with the Child”.

(c) The Applicant’s account of the events in August 2013 was also improbable. If the Applicant is to be believed, then one would have to accept as true the following account, however implausible:

(i) The Applicant had broken up with M before she met the Respondent in late 2012.

(ii) From late 2012 until the Applicant discovered in August 2013 that she was pregnant with the Child, the Respondent was her only boyfriend and the only man with whom she had sexual intercourse.

(iii) The Applicant had sexual intercourse with the Respondent in August 2013. When the Applicant discovered later that she was pregnant, she informed the Respondent, and he denied responsibility and cut off all contact with her.

(iv) The Applicant then reconciled with M, formed a rapport with him, received his support for her pregnancy, got him to agree to be named as the Child’s father, and married him on 31 August 2013.

(v) Given that there would have been an interval of time between the Child’s conception (which would likely have been on or after 5 August 2013, based on the date the Child was born) and the Applicant’s discovery of her pregnancy, the interval within which the Applicant broke up with the Respondent, reconciled with M (after a break up of more than 7 months), formed a rapport with M, received M’s support for her pregnancy, got M to agree to be named as the Child’s father, and married M, would have been very short indeed.

51 I also declined to approve the Applicant’s use of the “DNA Paternity Report” exhibited in AA3. As explained earlier, the “DNA Paternity Report” lacked credibility and could not be relied on. To begin with, there was no evidence that the samples used for the purposes of the Report were in fact samples obtained from M and the Child (there being no evidence of a chain of custody of the samples from the time of their collection to the time of their use for DNA analysis). Further, the “DNA Paternity Report” was not exhibited in an affidavit made by the expert who conducted the DNA analysis, and did not set out the expert’s qualifications or any of the other matters mentioned in Part 10, Rule 7(2)(b) to (h) of the FJGR that an expert’s report must include. There was therefore no admissible scientific evidence that M was not the biological father of the Child.

52 In the circumstances, I am of the view that the Applicant has not met the evidential threshold for obtaining an order that the Respondent submit to a DNA paternity test. If the Applicant’s allegation that she had sexual intercourse with the Respondent in August 2013 had been credible, then it is possible that the Respondent may be the biological father of the Child. However, the Applicant’s contrived explanation for why M was named as the Child’s father in the Child’s birth certificate, M’s conduct in relation to the registration of the Child’s birth, and the Applicant’s improbable account of what transpired in August 2013, cast doubt on the Applicant’s credibility as a witness, and on the veracity of her claim the Respondent was the only man with whom she had sexual intercourse when the Child was conceived. As I had serious reservations about the Applicant’s credibility on matters material to the Child’s conception and birth, I could not find that her bare allegation that the parties had sexual intercourse in August 2013 was more probable than the Respondent’s denial that the parties had sexual intercourse in August 2013, and I was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the parties had sexual intercourse in August 2013. There was also no admissible scientific evidence that M was not the biological father of the Child. The Applicant has therefore failed to satisfy me, on the evidence, that the Respondent may be a biological parent of the Child.

53 To be clear, I do not agree with the Applicant’s solicitors’ submission on the evidential threshold required to order a party to submit to DNA paternity testing. The Applicant’s solicitors suggested that it is sufficient that the parties know each other, and had sexual relations at some point in time. This cannot be right. Otherwise, a promiscuous woman who conceives a child can, on the pretext of seeking maintenance for the child, apply to the Court to order any man whom she has ever had sexual relations with to submit to DNA paternity testing, simply by making a bare allegation that she had sexual intercourse with that man around the time the child was conceived. The Court must surely, at the very least, be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the woman and the man did in fact engage in sexual intercourse around the time the child was conceived before ordering the man to submit to a DNA paternity test.

54 As the Applicant failed to meet the evidential threshold for obtaining an order that the Respondent submit to a DNA paternity test, I dismissed prayer 2 of OAG 154. As the Applicant’s entitlement to relief under prayers 3 and 4 of OAG 154 was contingent on the Applicant succeeding in prayer 2 of OAG 154, I also dismissed prayers 3 and 4 of OAG 154.

55 The dismissal of prayer 2 of OAG 154 called into question the Applicant’s ability to prove, for the purposes of prayer 1 of OAG 154, that the Respondent was the biological father of the Child. Therefore, the parties were directed to tender written submissions on how prayer 1 of OAG 154 was to be dealt with in light of the dismissal of prayers 2 and 3 of OAG 154. The parties’ written submissions were filed on 27 July 2026.

56 The Respondent submitted that prayer 1 of OAG 154 should be dismissed. The Respondent reasoned as follows:

(a) The Applicant bore the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the Respondent was the Child’s biological father before any maintenance obligation can arise.

(b) Given the findings that the Court had made, prayer 1 of OAG 154 was incapable of succeeding.

57 The Applicant submitted that prayer 1 of OAG 154 should be adjourned, and all further proceedings on the prayer should be stayed, pending the disposal of DCA 52. The Applicant reasoned as follows:

(a) This would allow prayer 1 of OAG 154 to be determined on its merits should the Applicant succeed in her appeal in DCA 52. If prayer 1 of OAG 154 was dismissed now, additional costs would have to be incurred in applying to restore the prayer, or in commencing fresh proceedings, if the appeal is allowed.

(b) A stay would avoid inconsistent outcomes (if fresh proceedings are commenced), and preserve the Child’s claim for maintenance, pending the appellate decision on the appropriate evidential threshold.

(c) A stay also caused no irremediable prejudice to the Respondent.

58 Part 1, Rule 4(2) of the FJGR sets out the Objectives that the Court seeks to achieve in any proceedings conducted under the FJGR. These include expeditious proceedings, cost-effective resolution of cases, placing the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration, fair and practical results for parties, and the efficient use of court resources. As DCA 52 was filed before I could deal with prayer 1 of OAG 154, it is unclear whether a subsequent dismissal of that prayer can also be dealt with in DCA 52. The parties may have to incur additional costs to resurrect prayer 1 of OAG 154, if it is dismissed, and the Applicant subsequently succeeds in her appeal in DCA 52. All things considered, I took the view that it would be more consistent with the Objectives under Part 1, Rule 4(2) of the FJGR to grant a stay of prayer 1 of OAG 154 than to dismiss that prayer. I therefore made the following orders:

(a) Prayer 1 of OAG 154 is stayed pending the disposal of DCA 52.

(b) Either party may apply, within 1 month after the date on which DCA 52 is disposed of, for prayer 1 of OAG 154 to be restored and dealt with.

59 The parties were also directed to deal with the issue of costs in their written submissions. In this regard, the parties were directed to specifically address how any costs incurred in relation to the preparation of affidavits that were used both in relation to OAG 154, and in relation to SUM 2950 or SUM 1162, are to be dealt with. The parties were also directed to quantify any disbursements claimed, and try to agree on those disbursements, before filing their written submissions.

60 The Applicant submitted that each party should bear his or her own costs of OAG 154 (including the hearing of prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154). The Applicant submitted in the alternative that the Respondent should pay such proportion of the Applicant’s costs as the Court considers appropriate for the jurisdictional and power issues, or that any costs awarded to the Respondent be fixed at a sum not exceeding $1,000 (excluding only reasonable and proven disbursements). The Applicant also submitted that the existing costs orders in SUM 2950 and SUM 1162 should remain undisturbed, and no further order should be made on disbursements (apart from the $150 awarded to the Applicant in SUM 2950).

61 The Respondent submitted that costs of $2,000 should be awarded to the Respondent for the work undertaken in successfully resisting the relief sought by the Applicant in prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154. The Respondent submitted that this was a modest and proportionate quantum for the work undertaken in relation to those prayers, considering the affidavits relied on at the hearing of those prayers, and excluding any costs of SUM 2950 and SUM 1162 that were previously dealt with separately by the Court.

62 Under Part 22, Rule 3(2) of the FJGR, the Court must, subject to Part 22 of the FJGR, order the costs of any proceedings in favour of a successful party, except when it appears to the Court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs. None of the exceptions to this general rule, which were contained in Part 22 of the FJGR, applied to OAG 154. I also saw no reason to depart from the principle, enshrined in Part 22, Rule 3(2) of the FJGR, that costs should follow the event. OAG 154 did not concern matrimonial proceedings, where there are usually good reasons to depart from that principle, such as where the Court is of the view that “an order of costs would aggravate the acrimony between the parties and it is important in the circumstances to reduce the risk of increasing hostility” (see the decision of the Family Division in JBB v JBA [2015] SGHCF 6; [2015] 5 SLR 153 at [32]). The parties were unrelated, and have not maintained any relationship since 2013. The main focus, in the proceedings before me, was on whether the Court should order the Respondent to submit to a DNA paternity test.

63 In deciding on the quantum of costs to be awarded to the Respondent, I was satisfied that the substantive issues in OAG 154 were sufficiently distinct from those in SUM 2950 and SUM 1162 to justify a separate costs order, even though there was some overlap in the arguments raised. I also noted the following matters:

(a) The Applicant was granted costs of $2,000 and disbursements of $150 for SUM 2950. Those costs would have included the costs of preparing AA2, which was the Applicant’s affidavit prepared for the defence of SUM 2950. As SUM 2950 was an application to strike out OAG 154, the work done for that application would have been comparable to the work done for OAG 154 itself.

(b) The Respondent’s costs of preparing the Respondent’s affidavits, RA1 and RA2, were arguably already dealt with in the costs orders for SUM 2950 and SUM 1162, respectively.

64 All things considered, I ordered the Applicant to pay the Respondent costs (all-in) fixed at $1,800 for prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154.

65 In the circumstances:

(a) I dismissed prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154 on 13 July 2026; and

(b) I made the following orders on 28 July 2026:

(i) Prayer 1 of OAG 154 is stayed pending the disposal of DCA 52.

(ii) Either party may apply, within 1 month after the date on which DCA 52 is disposed of, for prayer 1 of OAG 154 to be restored and dealt with.

(iii) The Applicant is to pay the Respondent costs (all-in) fixed at $1,800 for prayers 2, 3 and 4 of OAG 154.