This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports. |
NPS International School Pte Ltd
v
Raffles Assets (Singapore) Pte Ltd
[2026] SGHC(A) 30
Appellate Division of the High Court — Originating Application No 32 of 2026
Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD and See Kee Oon JAD
22 September, 14 October 2026
16 November 2026
See Kee Oon JAD (delivering the grounds of decision of the court):
Introduction
1 In AD/OA 32/2026 (“OA 32”), the applicant sought permission to appeal against a judge’s refusal to stay ongoing proceedings. We dismissed the application and awarded costs of $6,000 to the respondent. We also directed the applicant’s solicitors to file submissions on whether they should be made to bear the costs of the application personally. Having considered those submissions, we ordered the applicant’s solicitors to personally bear $2,000 of the costs of OA 32. We now set out the grounds of our decision.
Facts
The parties
2 The respondent, Raffles Assets (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Raffles”), owned a property which the applicant, NPS International School Pte Ltd (“NPS”), expressed an intention to rent. The parties signed a letter of intent (“LOI”) regarding the property with the stated intention of eventually entering into a tenancy agreement for the property once certain steps were taken.
Procedural history
HC/OC 32/2024 – the main action
3 In HC/OC 32/2024 (“OC 32”), NPS claimed against Raffles for, among other things, the return of a deposit that NPS had paid Raffles. Raffles counterclaimed for, among other things, a declaration that NPS had breached the LOI and damages to be assessed. The trial was bifurcated by consent, with the issues on liability to be tried separately from, and before, the issues on assessment of damages.
4 On 20 May 2026, the judge hearing OC 32 (“Judge”) decided the issues tried in the first tranche of the trial. He dismissed NPS’s claim and granted Raffles’ counterclaim in part. On 16 June 2026, NPS appealed against the Judge’s decision by filing AD/CA 39/2026 (“AD 39”), which is pending determination. Subsequent to our decision in the present application on 22 September 2026, the Judge issued his grounds of decision on the issue of liability on 14 October 2026: see NPS International School Pte Ltd v Raffles Assets (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2026] SGHC 198.
HC/SUM 1948/2026 – the summons for directions on assessment of damages
5 On 22 June 2026, Raffles filed HC/SUM 1948/2026 (“SUM 1948”) to apply for directions on the assessment of damages, which would constitute the second tranche of the trial for OC 32. Responding to SUM 1948, NPS wrote to the court to explain that the proceedings in OC 32 should be stayed pending the determination of AD 39.
6 On 21 July 2026, the Judge decided SUM 1948, directing, among other things, that the assessment of damages should not be deferred until after AD 39 had been decided.
AD/OA 32/2026 – the application for permission to appeal
7 On 3 August 2026, NPS filed a notice of appeal against the Judge’s decision in SUM 1948, without seeking permission to appeal. On 4 August 2026 at around 11pm, NPS filed OA 32 and served it on Raffles. In OA 32, NPS sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s refusal in SUM 1948 to defer the assessment of damages phase of OC 32 until after AD 39 had been determined.
The parties’ cases
Whether OA 32 was served out of time
8 Raffles submitted that OA 32 should be dismissed because it was served out of time. Under O 18 r 29(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”), a party seeking permission to appeal must file and serve the relevant application, together with the documents specified in O 18 r 29(7) of the ROC 2021, on all parties who have an interest in the appeal within 14 days after the date of the lower court’s decision. The last day of the 14-day period from the date of the Judge’s decision was 4 August 2026. NPS served OA 32 on Raffles after 5pm on that date. Under O 7 r 8(2) of the ROC 2021, a document served after 5pm is deemed to have been served the next day. Accordingly, OA 32 was deemed to have been served out of time on 5 August 2026.
9 NPS contended that it did not serve OA 32 out of time. It relied on O 28 r 12(3) of the ROC 2021, which states that a document is deemed to be served on the date and at the time that the document becomes capable of being retrieved by the electronic filing service provider in the computer system of the electronic filing service provider. NPS argued that it had served OA 32 electronically on 4 August 2026 at around 11pm, and the application was capable of being retrieved in the computer system of the electronic filing service provider by that time. Accordingly, OA 32 was served within time on 4 August 2026.
Merits of OA 32
10 NPS submitted that the Judge had made prima facie errors in failing to accord sufficient weight to the case management considerations underlying the deferment of the assessment of damages phase. Conversely, Raffles argued that there was no prima facie error in the Judge’s decision. It noted that permission to appeal is not readily granted to challenge a judge’s exercise of discretion in case management decisions, and the Judge’s exercise of discretion in SUM 1948 was in any case correct.
11 NPS also argued that there was a question of general principle to be decided for the first time or a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage. The question was:
[W]hat is the proper approach to be adopted and/or what are the appropriate considerations to be taken into account by a court, in the exercise of its case management powers, when determining whether to defer subsequent proceedings in a bifurcated trial where those subsequent proceedings are wholly dependent on findings of liability that are the subject of a pending appeal?
Raffles submitted that OA 32 did not raise a question of general principle or importance because the principles guiding the court’s case management power were well-established.
Was OA 32 served out of time?
12 The first issue to be determined was whether OA 32 and the accompanying documents were served out of time. In our view, they were indeed served out of time. Raffles rightly submitted that under O 7 r 8(2) of the ROC 2021, where a document is served after 5pm on any particular day, it is deemed to have been served on the following day. Since OA 32 was served after 5pm on 4 August 2026, it was deemed to have been served on 5 August 2026, which was after the deadline to serve any application for permission to appeal against SUM 1948.
13 We disagreed with NPS’s argument that it had served OA 32 within time under O 28 r 12(3) of the ROC 2021. The rule in O 28 r 12(3) is subject to the rule in O 7 r 8(2) because O 28 r 12(11) provides that “Order 7, Rule 8 applies to service effected under this Rule”.
14 NPS also submitted that the deeming effect of O 7 r 8(2) only applied when computing periods of time which ran after service of a document, and not the period of time within which to serve the document. We disagreed with this argument. In the Rules of Court 2014, for the purposes of computing any period of time after service of a document, the document was deemed to have been served on a particular working day only if it was served on that day before 4pm, but for all other purposes, the document was deemed to have been served on a particular day if it was served on that day before midnight (O 62 rr 8 and 6A of the Rules of Court 2014). The ROC 2021 did not retain this distinction. Instead, O 7 r 8(2) of the ROC 2021 deems documents served after 5pm as having been served on the following day not only for computing timelines after service, but for all other purposes (see Civil Justice Commission, Civil Justice Commission Report (29 December 2017) (Chairperson: Justice Tay Yong Kwang) at chapter 5, para 3).
Should an extension of time to serve OA 32 be granted?
15 Even when an application for permission to appeal is served out of time, the court has a discretion to extend the time for serving the application (O 18 r 29(18) of the ROC 2021). In deciding whether to grant an extension to serve the document, the court considers the following factors (see Pradeepto Kumar Biswas v Sabyasachi Mukherjee [2024] 1 SLR 143 at [19] and [27]):
(a) the length of the delay;
(b) the reasons for the delay;
(c) whether the application for permission to appeal and the substantive appeal are hopeless; and
(d) the prejudice caused to the would-be respondent if an extension of time is granted.
16 NPS did not apply for an extension of time to serve OA 32, maintaining that it had served OA 32 within time. Nevertheless, we considered whether to exercise our discretion to grant an extension of time, and we declined to do so.
17 The reasons for the delay in serving OA 32 were not persuasive. NPS did not initially provide detailed reasons for the delay because it took the position that it had served OA 32 within time. However, based on the correspondence that its solicitors sent to the court, the delay appeared to be caused by the solicitors’ incorrect reading of legislation in two respects:
(a) First, they had wrongly believed that permission to appeal was not needed because the appeal they sought to bring fell under para 3(l)(x) of the Fifth Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”). This led them to file a notice of appeal without permission on 3 August 2026. However, out of “an abundance of caution”, they prepared OA 32 and the required documents, and filed and served these on 4 August 2026 at around 11:25pm.
(b) Second, NPS’s solicitors wrongly believed that they could serve OA 32 within time under the ROC 2021 by serving it after 5pm on the calendar day of 4 August 2026 (see [9] and [14] above).
18 An incorrect reading of legislation is not a sufficient reason to justify an extension of time. Instead, there must be “some extenuating circumstances or explanation offered to mitigate or excuse the oversight” (Cao Pei v McCom Holding Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 745 (“Cao Pei”) at [17]). In deciding whether to extend time, the court will consider the nature of the mistake (Cao Pei at [18]). The nature of the mistake in this case militated against an extension of time being granted.
(a) First, the delay appeared to arise solely from a “misreading of … simple legal rule[s]” (Cao Pei at [18]). NPS’s solicitors failed to consider para 3(k) of the Fifth Schedule to the SCJA, which states in no uncertain terms that permission is needed to appeal against a judge’s refusal to stay proceedings. They also failed to realise that O 28 r 12(3) of the ROC 2021 was subject to O 7 r 8(2), and that O 7 r 8(2) made no distinction between the timeline for serving documents and timelines running after service. These were not difficult or novel points of law and could be gleaned just by carefully reading the plain text of the relevant provisions. “[E]lementary” mistakes like these are generally insufficient to persuade the court to show sympathy by granting an extension of time (see Cao Pei at [27]–[28]).
(b) Second, NPS’s solicitors did not promptly seek to rectify their mistake of serving OA 32 out of time (see Cao Pei at [18]). They did not file an application for extension of time but insisted that they had not served OA 32 out of time.
(c) Third, the conduct of NPS’s solicitors was egregious. In their letter to the court dated 6 August 2026, NPS’s solicitors argued that O 7 r 8(2) of the ROC 2021 did not apply to calculating the time within which a document had to be served. To support this argument, they cited Singapore Civil Procedure 2026 vol I (Cavinder Bull SC gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2026) at para 7/8/1 and annexed the relevant excerpt from that text. However, the annexed excerpt in fact highlighted that the distinction between calculating the time to serve documents and timelines after service under the Rules of Court 2014 (see [14] above) no longer applied under the ROC 2021. By insisting on an incorrect legal position despite citing to the court material that would have disabused them of that position, NPS’s solicitors conducted themselves unreasonably.
19 Apart from an absence of persuasive reasons for the delay, OA 32 and NPS’s prospective appeal against SUM 1948 were hopeless.
20 To obtain permission to appeal, an applicant must satisfy at least one of the grounds for granting permission to appeal (see Mazzagatti, Francesco v Alliance Petrochemical Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2025] SGCA 46 at [19]):
(a) there is a prima facie case of error;
(b) there is a question of general principle to be decided for the first time; or
(c) there is a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage.
21 NPS sought permission to appeal on the ground of a prima facie error, alleging that the Judge had failed to give due weight to certain considerations, eg, the need to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and the potentially wasteful deployment of resources. But even if this was true, it would not amount to a prima facie case of error. An allegation that a judge “accorded a different weight” to a certain factor in a multifactorial test would not amount to a prima facie error (see Three Arrows Capital Ltd v Cheong Jun Yoong [2024] 1 SLR 419 (“Three Arrows”) at [48]). At most, it would amount to “an assertion that the judge reached the wrong conclusion on the evidence, or the mere erroneous application of the law to a given factual scenario”, but such an assertion “will not satisfy the threshold for granting permission to appeal” (Koh Kien Chon v Ding Asset Ltd [2023] SGCA 24 at [27]; see also Three Arrows at [48]).
22 Moreover, the Judge’s refusal to stay OC 32 was sound, and any appeal against it was unlikely to succeed. A court generally does not deprive a successful litigant of the fruits of its litigation pending an appeal (see Lee Sian Hee v Oh Kheng Soon [1991] 2 SLR(R) 869 at [5]). To order a stay of OC 32 would prevent Raffles from having the damages it was entitled to assessed and paid out, depriving it of the fruits of its successful litigation. This consideration could justifiably outweigh the considerations of potential waste and duplication of effort, especially since any such wasted resources and effort would only accrue if AD 39 was allowed while the second tranche of OC 32 had substantially progressed.
23 Apart from the ground of a prima facie error, NPS also sought permission to appeal on the ground of a question of general principle or importance for this court to answer (see [11] above). We disagreed that the question posed by NPS warranted permission to appeal because it did not have sufficient generality or normative force to be considered a question of law or principle. The question concerned the exercise of the court’s case management powers. But the question of how a court should exercise these powers is a highly fact-specific one concerning a plethora of practical and administrative considerations which cannot be distilled into generalisable principles.
24 Accordingly, OA 32 and NPS’s substantive appeal were unlikely to succeed. This, coupled with the absence of persuasive reasons for the delay, meant that an extension of time to serve OA 32 should not be granted. While the delay in serving OA 32 was short and Raffles would not suffer substantial prejudice from an extension of time being granted, we did not think that an extension of time was justified after considering all the circumstances. The present facts were somewhat analogous to Cao Pei. In that case, an extension of time was not granted despite the delay not being unduly long and the respondent suffering no prejudice, because the delay was due to elementary errors by the applicant’s solicitor and the object of the application was to pursue a hopeless appeal (Cao Pei at [15] and [37]).
25 We therefore declined to grant an extension of time to serve OA 32, and we dismissed OA 32 because it was not validly served. Even if we had granted the extension of time to serve OA 32, we would still have dismissed OA 32 for the reasons stated in [21]–[23] above. We ordered NPS to pay Raffles the costs of OA 32, fixed at $6,000 (all in), with the usual consequential orders to apply.
Should NPS’s solicitors be ordered to bear some or all of the costs of OA 32 personally?
26 When we dismissed OA 32, we also directed NPS’s solicitors to file written submissions addressing the question of whether they should be ordered to bear the costs of OA 32 personally.
27 The applicant’s solicitors submitted that they should not bear personal costs. First, they argued that the delay in serving OA 32 arose from genuine ambiguity about whether permission to appeal was needed. Second, they noted that any costs attributable to the delay were minimal because no additional costs were incurred for an application for extension of time, as no such application was taken out. Third, they pointed out that no material prejudice was caused because OA 32 would have been dismissed even if it had been served within time, and because Raffles had sufficient opportunity to consider and respond to OA 32.
28 After considering these submissions, we ordered NPS’s solicitors to personally bear $2,000 of the costs of $6,000 which we had ordered for OA 32.
29 In deciding whether to impose a personal costs order, the court considers the following questions (Dongah Geological Engineering Co Ltd v Jungwoo E&C Pte Ltd [2022] 1 SLR 1134 at [17]; Tan Hai Peng Micheal v Tan Cheong Joo [2026] SGHC 49 (“Micheal Tan”) at [39]):
(a) Has the legal representative acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently?
(b) If so, did such conduct cause the other party to incur unnecessary costs?
(c) If so, is it in all the circumstances just to order the legal representative to compensate the other party for the whole or any part of the relevant costs?
30 In our view, NPS’s solicitors had acted negligently, in that they had “fail[ed] to act with the competence reasonably to be expected of ordinary members of the profession” (Tan King Hiang v United Engineers (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR(R) 529 at [18], citing Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 232–233). The delay in serving OA 32 resulted from basic errors in statutory interpretation (see [18(a)] above) that would not be expected of an ordinary member of the profession.
31 These errors caused Raffles to incur some unnecessary costs. Preliminarily, because NPS’s solicitors did not apply for an extension of time to serve OA 32, Raffles did not incur any costs relating to such an application. Nevertheless, Raffles incurred additional costs because the parties had to address the issue of whether OA 32 was served out of time. These were additional costs that Raffles would not have incurred had the parties litigated only the merits of OA 32. However, not all the costs awarded in OA 32 were attributable to the conduct of NPS’s solicitors. Even if they had served OA 32 within time, Raffles would still have incurred costs addressing the merits of OA 32. It was therefore not appropriate to require NPS’s solicitors to personally bear all the costs awarded in OA 32.
32 Finally, we considered whether it was in all the circumstances just to order NPS’s solicitors to personally bear the costs. In making this assessment, the court may have regard to three broad considerations: (a) fairness and proportionality; (b) the need to preserve the integrity of the justice system; and (c) deterrence (Micheal Tan at [59]). Relevant considerations include the nature and impact of the solicitors’ conduct, the prejudice suffered by the opposing party, and the egregiousness of the conduct (Micheal Tan at [59]). In our view, it was just to order NPS’s solicitors to bear part of the costs of OA 32 personally. Their conduct caused some unnecessary costs to be incurred, and their errors were egregious (see [18(c)] above). We therefore ordered NPS’s solicitors to personally bear $2,000 of the costs of OA 32.
Conclusion
33 To summarise, we dismissed OA 32 and fixed the costs of the application at $6,000 (all in) with the usual consequential orders. We ordered NPS’s solicitors to personally bear $2,000 of the costs of OA 32.
Debbie Ong Siew Ling Judge of the Appellate Division | See Kee Oon Judge of the Appellate Division | | | | |
Tng Sheng Rong (Tang Shengrong) and Thawdar Soe Moe @ The Sandi Tun (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP) for the applicant;
Lin Weiqi Wendy, Jill Ann Koh Ying (Xu Ying), Ho Yi Jie, Foo Hsien Weng, Zhan Xiangyun and Phang Wei Sheng Nicholas (WongPartnership LLP) for the respondent.