1 The parties were married on 12 February 2000. ¹ The Husband is a sales manager, ² while the Wife is a healthcare professional currently employed by the public service. ³ There are two adult children to the marriage, both of whom are gainfully employed. ⁴

2 Sometime in 2008, the parties bought a Housing Development Board (“HDB”) flat in Yishun (“HDB Flat”) in their joint names. ⁵ However, it was only in or around 2012 that the parties moved into the HDB Flat. ⁶ From 2008 to 2012, the parties stayed with the Husband’s mother, Mdm [A], and rented out the HDB Flat to earn additional income. ⁷

3 On or around 28 April 2015, the parties decoupled the joint ownership of the HDB Flat, resulting in the Wife becoming the sole legal owner of the HDB Flat. ⁸ As part of the decoupling, the Wife had to refund the Husband’s Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) contributions made towards the HDB Flat, which came up to $139,189.69. ⁹ This refund was made by way of both CPF moneys ($14,191.24) and cash ($124,998.45). ¹⁰ For good order, I note that the actual amount paid appears from the records to have been $124,998.40 ¹¹ and not $124,998.45 as claimed by the Wife. Nevertheless, as the discrepancy is minute and both parties have proceeded on the basis of the Wife’s figure, I adopt that figure for the purposes of this judgment.

4 After decoupling the HDB Flat, in May 2015, the parties purchased a condominium unit at Tai Thong Crescent (“Condo Unit”) in the Husband’s sole name. ¹² The purchase price was $1,606,730, and the parties had to pay 5% of the purchase price as a booking fee, and a further 15% as downpayment. ¹³ The parties also had to pay stamp duty amounting to $42,801 and legal fees of $2,200. ¹⁴

5 The parties moved into the Condo Unit in or around August 2017, after renovation had been completed. ¹⁵ The HDB Flat was then rented out. ¹⁶

6 This arrangement continued until the Husband moved out of the Condo Unit following an argument between the couple. ¹⁷ The Husband rented a place between January 2023 and June 2023. ¹⁸ In June 2023, the parties ostensibly resolved their differences and the Husband returned to stay at the Condo Unit. ¹⁹

7 Unfortunately, things deteriorated relatively quickly after. On 29 September 2023, there was a physical altercation between the Husband and the Wife, during which the Wife sustained injuries and was admitted to Tan Tock Seng Hospital. ²⁰ Following this incident, the Wife applied for a Personal Protection Order (“PPO”) against the Husband. ²¹ The PPO was granted by consent on 15 February 2024, ²² and remains in effect. ²³

8 On 25 October 2023, the Husband commenced divorce proceedings. ²⁴ The divorce proceeded uncontested, ²⁵ and interim judgment was granted on 23 April 2024. ²⁶ The length of the marriage was therefore approximately 24 years.

9 Sometime in November 2023, the Husband left the Condo Unit and started staying with his mother. ²⁷ It is disputed whether the Husband had paid his mother rent during this period. ²⁸

10 Sometime after May 2024, the Wife applied for a domestic exclusion order (“DEO”). ²⁹ On 17 September 2024, the DEO was granted against the Husband. ³⁰

11 As the parties do not have any minor children, the ancillary matters that arise for determination are the division of matrimonial assets and the Wife’s claim for spousal maintenance. I deal with each in turn.

12 I begin with the issue of identifying and valuing the matrimonial pool. In general, the operative date for the identification of the pool of matrimonial assets is the date of the interim judgment (ARY v ARX [2016] 2 SLR 686 at [31]), while the date for the valuation of the matrimonial assets is the date of the ancillary matters hearing (BPC v BPB [2019] 1 SLR 608 at [42]–[43]), except for balances in bank and CPF accounts, which should be valued at the date of the interim judgment (CVC v CVB [2023] SGHC(A) 28 at [55]). I pause here to observe that neither party seeks to depart from either of these operative dates. ³¹

13 As a preliminary point, I note that the parties have seemingly designated the HDB Flat and the Condo Unit as joint assets. ³² In my view, this is incorrect. As explained earlier, the HDB Flat and the Condo Unit are held in the Wife’s and Husband’s sole names respectively (see above at [3]–[4]). I therefore deal with the HDB Flat and Condo Unit under the Husband’s and Wife’s assets separately. That said, I should emphasise that this erroneous designation has little impact on the eventual substantive outcome as before me, both the Husband and the Wife proceeded on the basis that each property was held in their respective sole names.

14 Turning to the Husband’s assets, while there is common ground between the Husband and Wife for several items, there are also disagreements in relation to both whether some of the assets should be included, and the valuation of other assets. I deal with the disagreements in question.

15 The largest asset in the Husband’s name is the Condo Unit. ³³ Both parties agree that the outstanding mortgage is $836,497.79, ³⁴ however they diverge on the current valuation of the property. The Husband submits that it is $2,160,000, relying on a property value update provided by the Singapore Real Estate Exchange (“SRX”) on 3 December 2025. ³⁵ The Wife submits that it is $2,480,000, relying on a property analysis report by PropNex. ³⁶ It is not clear how such a valuation was derived: the PropNex property analysis report, generated on 30 May 2025, ³⁷ estimates the market value of the Condo Unit at $2,221,000. Even assuming a 3% annual increase ³⁸ in value as estimated by the PropNex property analysis report (in light of the fact that about a year passed between the report in question and the date of the ancillary matters hearing), it is impossible to understand how the Wife arrived at the estimated value that she did. As such, I am not able to accept the Wife’s figure and taking into account the recency of the SRX report, I prefer the Husband’s figure of $2,160,000 over the $2,221,000 estimated by the PropNex report. Accordingly, deducting the outstanding mortgage, the Condo Unit has a net value of $1,323,502.21.

16 The parties also disagree on the value of the Husband’s motor vehicle. ³⁹ In his written submissions, the Husband submits a figure of $19,201, relying on a market valuation obtained from “sgcarmart”, an online car marketplace, on 5 January 2026. ⁴⁰ The Wife, on the other hand, submits a figure of $45,000, relying on the valuation of the motor vehicle as of 31 May 2024 in the Husband’s affidavit of assets and means. ⁴¹

17 All this was ultimately superseded by more recent developments. By the time the parties were before me, the Certificate of Entitlement of the motor vehicle had expired and the car was, in the interim, scrapped for about $18,739. ⁴² In the premises, I included that value in the matrimonial pool.

18 The next asset consists of 14,000 Genting SG shares in the Husband’s Central Depository (“CDP”) Account with the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”). ⁴³ The Husband submits a figure of $10,150, relying on a screenshot of his SGX CDP Investor Portal captured on 5 January 2026. ⁴⁴ The Wife submits a figure of $12,740, relying on an SGX account statement dated May 2024. ⁴⁵ The difference arose solely due to different reference dates being used. As explained above at [12], an asset should generally be valued at the date of the ancillary matters hearing. I therefore prefer the Husband’s figure.

19 The next group of assets consists of the Husband’s holdings in BGF China Bond Fund, BGF World Technology Fund and Nikko AM Singapore STI ETF. ⁴⁶ The Wife alleges that the Husband had liquidated his holdings shortly after commencing divorce proceedings, and submits that the value ascribed, calculated on the basis of the initial holdings (before any liquidation), ought to be added to the matrimonial pool. ⁴⁷ The parties’ positions are therefore as follows:

20 The Husband explains that his holdings in the Nikko AM Singapore STI ETF and BGF World Technology Fund were liquidated to supplement his income and pay for additional expenses for rental and season parking, to cover the Wife’s share of mortgage payment towards the Condo Unit and to pay for property tax and the exchange of new notes for ang pow distribution during Chinese New Year. ⁵⁰ I note that the Husband has not expressly included the ETF BGF China Bond Fund in his explanations. When queried at the hearing, the Husband’s counsel suggested that the liquidation in that fund was undertaken for the above-mentioned reasons as well as for the payment of legal fees. ⁵¹

21 In TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL v TNK”), the Court of Appeal set out the approach to be taken with respect to substantial sums expended by one spouse during the period (a) in which divorce proceedings are imminent; or (b) after interim judgment but before the ancillaries are concluded (at [24]):

22 While I note that TNL v TNK concerned the expenditure of money, in my view, a similar principle would apply here because ultimately, the ETF holdings were liquidated for money to be spent. In this regard, it has been held that the divesting of shareholding in a company when divorce proceedings were imminent fell squarely “within the situation that the Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK envisioned” (WGG v WGH [2022] SGHCF 25 at [9]). I further note that it is clear that such liquidations fell within the relevant period, given that divorce proceedings had commenced by then.

23 In assessing whether a sum is substantial, some relevant factors include (XIK v XIL [2025] SGHCF 16 (“XIK v XIL”) at [28]):

24 Bearing these factors in mind, my view is that the Husband’s liquidation of his holdings constituted expenditure of a substantial sum. Considering just the period of November 2023 to May 2024 for which documentary evidence of the Husband’s transaction history is before the court (and I note that there were clearly subsequent liquidations after this period given the further reduction in the number of units in the various ETFs beyond May 2024), the overall quantum of withdrawals was already $66,429.44 (ie, $23,970 in December 2023, $6,905.80 in January 2024, $27,357.30 in February 2024, $8,196.34 in March 2024). ⁵² This is, in my view, out of all proportion with the alleged increase in expenses. To begin with, a party who incurs legal fees on divorce and ancillary proceedings ought to use his own assets, rather than matrimonial assets, to pay for them first (see WUA v WUB [2024] SGHCF 10 (“WUA v WUB”) at [8]; AQT v AQU [2011] SGHC 138 at [37]). Given that the Husband has not disputed that these ETF holdings are matrimonial assets, the payment of legal fees cannot justify depleting the matrimonial pool. Next, from December 2023 to May 2024, based on the Husband’s own submissions (though I caveat that I take the view below at [76] that this figure is inflated), he only paid an additional $8,473.50 (ie, $1,998.50 + $1,998.50 + $2,500 + $1,000 + $976.50) to cover the Wife’s share of the mortgage payment. ⁵³ Moreover, his additional rental and parking charges amounted only to $9,600 ($1,600 x 6 months). ⁵⁴ These sums pale in comparison to the magnitude of the withdrawals. I also do not agree that paying property tax or exchanging new notes for Chinese New Year can be taken as additional expenses, given that these expenses would have been incurred yearly, and yet there were no previous patterns of the liquidating ETFs. On top of this, the Husband was still taking home around $14,000 in salary each month. ⁵⁵ While the Husband’s counsel submitted that the commission component of the Husband’s income has decreased due to his work performance being affected by the divorce and market conditions, ⁵⁶ there was no evidence supporting such an assertion. Part of the liquidation also appeared to be intended to pay off an apparent $20,000 loan, the specifics of which are unclear. ⁵⁷ In any event, it is implausible that the Wife would have consented to such a loan being repaid. Indeed, there is no evidence before me that the Husband sought the Wife’s consent before liquidating his ETF holdings, and in my view, the sheer disproportionality between the sums liquidated and the actual increase in the Husband’s expenses strongly suggests that the Wife cannot be taken to have impliedly consented to them (see XIK v XIL at [31]), and raises questions about whether the sums were being dissipated in view of the impending division of asset exercise. In the premises, the Husband’s liquidation of his holdings in these ETFs amounts to expending a substantial sum without the Wife’s consent and the sum liquidated ought to be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets.

25 This leads to the secondary question of how this sum ought to be determined, ie, what unit price should be adopted to value the Husband’s ETF holdings. In this regard, the observations in XIM v XIN [2025] SGHCF 31 are instructive. This case involved the husband dissipating shares in a company he had incorporated to his son for $150,000. The District Judge had found that the husband had wrongfully dissipated his assets when he transferred these shares at an undervalue and without compelling reasons, and decided that the operative date for determining the value of the dissipated shares was May 2015 (ie, the month these shares were transferred) because it was not the shares that were being added back into the pool of matrimonial assets, but the notional value of those shares, to account for the respondent’s dissipation. On appeal, the wife argued that this valuation punished her by depriving her of the increase in the value of the husband’s marital shareholding (ie, $251,874.70 in May 2015 compared to $1,351,000 in January 2023) and rewarded the husband for dissipating his assets. The wife therefore urged the court to adopt 31 January 2023 as the operative date for valuation, this being the date closest to the ancillary matters hearing. The court dismissed the appeal and made the following observations (at [9]):

26 A similar approach to the valuation of shares was adopted in XRM v XRN [2025] SGHCF 55. In this case, the husband and the wife owned 11,285 and 8,000 Apple shares respectively. Of the wife’s 8,000 Apple shares, 1,000 shares had been sold by the wife in May 2023 without the husband’s consent (see [15]–[16]). Significantly, although the court valued the husband’s 11,285 shares and the wife’s 7,000 shares which had not been sold in accordance with the default position that the date for the valuation of matrimonial assets should be the date of the ancillary matters (see [8] and [15]), it added the value of the wife’s 1,000 shares, which had been sold, back into the pool of matrimonial assets using the price at the time these shares had been sold in May 2023 (see [16]). If the 1,000 shares had been valued as at the date of the ancillary matters hearing, the sum added back would have been US$201,000, not US$174,658.13 (see [8], [10] at s/n 22 and [16]).

27 Guided by these precedents, my view is that the effect of TNL v TNK is to notionally add the value of the dissipated asset, and not the asset itself, to the pool of matrimonial assets. Therefore, the value of the ETF holdings should be calculated at the date these ETF holdings were liquidated, and not at the date of the ancillary matters hearing (which would factor in changes in the unit price of the holdings). Unlike the above-mentioned precedents, however, the Husband’s liquidation of his ETF holdings occurred over multiple instances and there does not appear to be any documentary evidence on the unit price of the various ETFs for the liquidations occurring after May 2024. As such, the exact sum withdrawn (and spent) by the Husband cannot be accurately determined. Nevertheless, I find that a fair estimation of this sum would be to adopt the value of the Husband’s initial ETF holdings as at 30 November 2023, which is to, in effect, treat all liquidations as having been carried out at the unit price as at this date. Accordingly, the value of the Husband’s ETF holdings for inclusion in the pool of matrimonial assets would be as follows:

28 I turn finally to the Husband’s bicycle and Rolex watch, ⁵⁹ which the Husband values at $5,000 and $15,000 respectively. The Wife submits figures of $15,000 and $20,000 respectively. In respect of the Rolex watch, the Husband has exhibited a screenshot of messages between himself and what appears to be a watch dealer, in which the watch dealer offered a “buy in price” of $15,000–$15,300. ⁶⁰ However, it is unclear when this valuation was obtained. Given that the difference in value between the parties is not large, I will adopt the average value of $17,500 (see WUA v WUB at [3]). In respect of the bicycle, the Husband has provided a screenshot of the online listings of comparable models. ⁶¹ However, two of these listings are for the bicycle’s “Frameset”, which appears to only refer to the frame (ie, without wheels, brakes, etc.). As the Husband has not asserted that he had only bought a frameset, the $9,500 listing for a “Full Bike” seems to be a more accurate valuation of the Husband’s bicycle. Applying the same approach as above, I adopt the average value of $12,250.

29 The Wife contends that a high-end car sound system and a premium home theatre sound system ought to be included in the Husband’s assets. ⁶² The Wife further alleges that the car sound system was installed for the Husband’s personal use rather than family benefit. ⁶³ The Husband disagrees, arguing that the car sound system was installed nine years ago and has significantly depreciated, ⁶⁴ and that the home theatre sound system was frequently used by the household. ⁶⁵ In my view, based on the wording of s 112(10)(b) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC”), these sound systems, being assets “acquired during the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage”, are matrimonial assets and should be included in the matrimonial pool. At this juncture, I note that at the ancillary matters hearing, the Husband’s counsel confirmed that the car sound system was scrapped with the car (see above at [17]), ⁶⁶ thereby rendering any discussion on the inclusion and valuation of the car sound system moot. Turning to the home theatre sound system, I note that while the Wife has not provided any evidence for her valuation of $10,000, the Husband does not seem to contest this valuation, instead stating that the Wife may retain it at this stated valuation and this amount should be deducted from her share of the matrimonial assets. ⁶⁷ Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the home theatre sound system would retain that value. I note that in XMU v XMV [2026] SGHCF 8 (“XMU v XMV”), the court, likewise faced with the paucity of evidence to make specific findings on the value of the wife’s luxury goods, adopted a broad-brush approach and assigned a third of the husband’s estimation as a rough and ready valuation of the wife’s luxury goods, which accounted for, amongst other things, wear and tear of the items (see XMU v XMV at [56]–[58]). In the absence of any submission on the actual depreciated value of the home theatre sound system, I take the same broad-brush approach and assign a valuation one-quarter that of the Wife’s stated valuation, ie, $2,500 to the home theatre sound system.

30 A large point of contention is whether funds amounting to $503,882 that were previously held in a Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”) Wealth Saver account in the Husband’s name ought to be included. ⁶⁸ The Husband argues that he had held this amount on trust for his mother, Mdm [A], and his friend, Mr [B], both of whom had asked the Husband to help invest their money. ⁶⁹ As such, these moneys did not belong to the Husband and should be excluded from the pool of matrimonial assets. ⁷⁰ In support of this, the Husband raises the fact that both Mdm [A] and Mr [B] had deposed affidavits attesting to this arrangement: ⁷¹

31 The Wife argues that the Husband has not discharged his burden of proof that the $503,882 did not belong to him ⁸¹ and also urges the court to draw an adverse inference against the Husband in respect of the said sum. ⁸² In my view, it is not appropriate to draw an adverse inference in this specific context. The purpose of drawing an adverse inference is to ensure that the matrimonial pool reflects the full extent of the material gains of the marital partnership such that the court may order a fair and equitable division of the matrimonial assets (XIU v XIV [2025] SGHCF 28 (“XIU v XIV”) at [19]). An adverse inference ought not to be easily drawn unless (a) there is a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case of concealment against the person against whom the inference is to be drawn; and (b) that person has some particular access to the information he is said to be hiding (see UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 (“UZN v UZM”) at [18]–[21]). In this case, the Husband has from the outset disclosed the existence of this sum of $503,882 but takes the position that this has since been transferred into a fixed deposit account in Mdm [A]’s sole name. ⁸³ On those facts, it is difficult to characterise the Husband’s conduct as concealment.

32 Instead, the analysis should focus on the Husband’s assertion that this amount was held on trust for Mdm [A] and Mr [B], ie, that the sum of $503,882 is not a matrimonial asset. In this regard, when a marriage is dissolved, in general all the parties’ assets will be treated as matrimonial assets unless a party is able to prove that the asset was either not acquired during the marriage or was acquired through gift or inheritance and is therefore not a matrimonial asset (USB v USA [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB v USA”) at [31]). As the Husband is the party asserting that the sum of $503,882 is not a matrimonial asset, the burden of proving this on a balance of probabilities falls on him (see USB v USA at [31]). In my view, the Husband has failed to discharge this burden and this conclusion is only reinforced by the answers given by Mdm [A] when she was cross-examined before me on this issue, most of which did little to advance and much to undermine the Husband’s case.

33 In view of the above, I am unable to accept that these purported investment arrangements, and therefore any trust said to arise out of these investment arrangements, existed. Accordingly, I find the sum of $503,882 that originated from the SCB Wealth Saver account a matrimonial asset. Since this sum was withdrawn and subsequently transferred to a fixed deposit account in Mdm [A]’s sole name on 28 December 2023 ¹¹⁷ (ie, after the Husband commenced divorce proceedings) without the Wife’s consent, this sum should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets under the TNL v TNK dicta (see above at [21]). I therefore include the sum of $503,882 as part of the Husband’s assets.

34 The Wife argues that the Husband had injected paid-up capital of $100,000 into a company, APAX Tech Pte Ltd. ¹¹⁸ The Wife also alleges that the Husband was involved in the company as there was a folder containing all company related documents and a cheque book in their matrimonial home. ¹¹⁹ The Husband claims that the company was incorporated under Mdm [A]’s name in 2018 and was struck off in 2022. ¹²⁰ However, based on Mdm [A]’s own account in her affidavit, it does not appear that she is a highly sophisticated and/or commercially literate individual, given that she apparently keeps her cash at home and her only form of “investment” is by way of earning interest paid on sums stored in bank accounts. ¹²¹ During cross-examination, Mdm [A] further admitted that she does not know how to carry out a bank transfer or was even aware that this even existed as an option. ¹²² In my view, it strains logic for an individual like Mdm [A] who clearly was not remotely savvy on financial or commercial matters to have incorporated a company on her own accord, to have been its sole director and to have injected $100,000 as paid-up capital. ¹²³

35 Indeed, any doubt I had entertained was put to rest by Mdm [A]’s rather incoherent account when cross-examined on the circumstances surrounding the incorporation and running of the company. Mdm [A] claimed that her younger sister asked her to start the company and that Mdm [A] was entirely uninvolved as she did not have any training in the field of information technology and data services. ¹²⁴ Despite this, her sister was neither a director nor shareholder of the company. ¹²⁵ Mdm [A] stated that this was because her sister lived in Malaysia and it would be troublesome for her to travel in and out of Singapore. ¹²⁶ However, as I noted at the hearing, this does not disqualify her sister from being a director or a shareholder of the company. ¹²⁷ In fact, one would have thought that if the company was the sister’s idea, she would have contributed to its paid-up capital. Instead, Mdm [A] stated that she alone put up the $100,000 and had done so in cash, ¹²⁸ a statement which, for similar reasons as stated above at [32(d)], I hesitate to believe. In addition, Mdm [A] subsequently stated that her sister had said that once the company was incorporated, she would come to Singapore to run the business, ¹²⁹ which entirely undermines the rationale offered by Mdm [A] as her sister would have had to, sooner or later, come to Singapore. Later, when asked why her sister ultimately did not come to Singapore despite the company having been incorporated, Mdm [A] answered that this was because the company had no business due to the COVID-19 pandemic. ¹³⁰ With respect, this is simply unbelievable. The company was registered in December 2018, ¹³¹ but, as the Wife points out, the COVID-19 pandemic only started materially impacting Singapore in 2020. ¹³² Moreover, Mdm [A] subsequently stated that she had withdrawn $70,000 of the paid-up capital to give her son to invest in March 2021, but had left $30,000 as she was “still hopeful that the business could start”. ¹³³ This made no sense given that by then, the company would have had, according to Mdm [A]’s own account, no business for more than two years and there were absolutely no signs that business was going to commence at all.

36 When inconsistencies meet contradictions at every turn, the only conclusion that avails itself is that this could not be the true state of affairs. In my view, a much simpler explanation presented itself on the facts. Without making any finding as to specifically how or why the company was incepted, I observe that the Husband has stated on his LinkedIn page that he is able to “[a]ssimilate detailed knowledge of Data Centre Solution and services” ¹³⁴ and (un)coincidentally the principal activity of APAX Tech Pte Ltd was “data centres” and “other information technology and computer service activities”. ¹³⁵ While the Husband has sought to argue that his expertise is in the “Mechanical, Electrical, and Fire services” field based on ENGIE ITS Pte Ltd’s Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”) registration, ¹³⁶ I place little weight on this as the BCA registration speaks to the various workheads the relevant company as a whole undertakes and not the particular job scope of a specific employee. Taking all the above together, this provides a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case against the Husband that there is likely to have been some concealment in relation to the source of the paid-up capital of $100,000 (see above at [31]). The Husband would also have particular access to such information. Accordingly, I draw an adverse inference against the Husband in respect of the paid-up capital of $100,000.

37 This leaves the question of how the adverse inference may be given effect to. While the question of whether to use the quantification approach (ie, attributing a value to and including the undisclosed asset based on the available evidence) or uplift method (ie, ordering a higher proportion of the known assets to be given to the other party), or both, is a matter of judgment in each case, in general, the quantification approach may be used where, as is the case here, the party has failed to disclose a particular asset and there is adequate evidence to prove its existence and valuation (UZN v UZM at [28]–[30]). At first glance, it appears that the entire paid-up capital of $100,000 should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. However, I note that $70,000 of the paid-up capital was transferred to the Husband as part of the $86,000 cheque paid to the Husband on 24 March 2021. ¹³⁷ This $70,000 would therefore have formed part of the $503,882 allegedly invested on behalf of Mdm [A] and Mr [B] (see above at [30]). As I have already added back the entirety of the sum of $503,882 to the pool of matrimonial assets (see above at [33]), in order to avoid double-counting, I adopt the quantification method and add only $30,000 to the pool of matrimonial assets. Importantly, as this sum is being added to the pool of matrimonial assets as a result of drawing an adverse inference, this sum should be added without attributing it to the Husband’s direct contributions (XIU v XIV at [57]).

38 The Wife submits that the Husband has made four large, unsubstantiated withdrawals. ¹³⁸ These include a withdrawal of $20,000 in February 2024, $40,000 in October 2023 and two withdrawals of $180,000 each in April 2021. ¹³⁹

39 In respect of the $20,000 withdrawal, this concerns the loan payment discussed above at [24]. Given that the value of the Husband’s ETF holdings (which were liquidated to pay off this loan) has been notionally added to the pool of matrimonial assets, this $20,000 withdrawal should not be factored in here, in order to avoid any double-counting.

40 In respect of the two $180,000 withdrawals, I note that in response to the Wife’s Request for Interrogatories dated 17 September 2024 concerning these two withdrawals, the Husband merely stated that these requests arose from evidence provided in Mdm [A]’s affidavit and not statements which the Wife requested and these requests therefore amounted to a fishing expedition. ¹⁴⁰ Only at the hearing before me, as adverted to above at [32(c)], did counsel for the Husband claim that the two $180,000 withdrawals related to some investments for their daughters, but that for some reason, these investments were aborted and returned to the Husband’s accounts. ¹⁴¹ In my view, once Mdm [A]’s account regarding the $503,882 is disbelieved, the sum in question can essentially be taken to have been the Husband’s cash. In this regard, when the investments were returned, these sums would have formed part of the Husband’s cash held in the DBS Multiplier Account ¹⁴² up until the $501,849 was transferred (in tranches) to the SCB Wealth Saver account, and ultimately the $503,882 placed in the fixed deposit account in Mdm [A]’s name. As such, these two $180,000 withdrawals should not be accounted for independently, but rather as a composite whole together with the $503,882. As I have already added the sum of $503,882 into the pool of matrimonial assets, I do not again consider these withdrawals separately under this head.

41 In respect of the $40,000 withdrawal, the Wife contends that the Husband claimed that these were for credit card bills and payments without providing any explanation on these payments or credit card statements supporting these payments. ¹⁴³ The Husband’s counsel states that this was spent on shopping on a family trip, ¹⁴⁴ which appears to refer to the Europe trip from 4 to 19 August 2023 that the Husband and Wife went on with their children. ¹⁴⁵ This response was provided to the Wife as early as 17 March 2025 in the Husband’s response to the Wife’s request for discovery, ¹⁴⁶ but the existence of this trip and/or the expenditure incurred do not appear to be disputed by the Wife in her affidavits or submissions. In light of this, my view is that the Wife has not established a prima facie case that there is concealment by the Husband and no adverse inference may be drawn against the Husband. Moreover, as I explain below at [54], divorce was only imminent after the incident on 29 September 2023. The expenditure on this family trip therefore falls outside the relevant period set out in TNL v TNK, and in any event, since it was a family trip and the Wife has provided no evidence that certain purchases were carried out without her knowledge, the Wife should be taken to have impliedly, if not expressly, consented to such expenditure. I therefore also decline to notionally add the sum of $40,000 into the pool of matrimonial assets.

42 Drawing the discussion above together, and adding on the agreed Husband’s assets, I summarise my decisions in respect of the Husband’s assets.

43 I turn to deal with the Wife’s assets in a similar manner.

44 As was the case with the Husband, the HDB Flat is the largest asset in the Wife’s name. ¹⁵⁷ The Husband values the HDB Flat at $692,000, relying on the same property value update provided by SRX. ¹⁵⁸ The Husband also estimates that the outstanding mortgage is $34,439.46. ¹⁵⁹ The Wife contends that the value of the HDB Flat is $648,000, relying on recently transacted prices of similar flats, ¹⁶⁰ and has provided a “Housing Loan Statement of Account” showing that the outstanding mortgage is $35,050.86. ¹⁶¹ In addition, the Wife argues that the value of the HDB Flat ought to be reduced by the sum of the resale levy which “the HDB [Flat] is subjected to … should it be sold”. ¹⁶² This amounts to a further $45,000 reduction. ¹⁶³

45 I am inclined to accept the Husband’s valuation of the HDB Flat. The SRX property value update was provided in December 2025 and appears to consider the value of the specific unit. In contrast, the most recent transaction the Wife adduces is one for a unit on the fourth to sixth floor, whereas the HDB Flat is on the ninth floor. The earlier transactions also disclose a trend that units on higher floors tend to fetch a higher price (for example, a flat on the seventh to ninth floor was sold for $660,000 in July 2023, which is higher than the Wife’s valuation even without considering any appreciation of the property in the intervening three years). As such, I consider the Husband’s valuation more accurate. In terms of the outstanding mortgage, I agree with the Wife’s figure, given that this is supported by recent objective evidence. However, I do not agree that the sum of the resale levy should be deducted from the value of the HDB Flat. The condition that triggers the resale levy is not the fact that the HDB Flat is sold, but rather the fact that a second subsidised flat is booked. ¹⁶⁴ In other words, the resale levy may not be incurred even if the Wife sells the HDB Flat, for example, if the Wife purchases a condominium unit instead. Therefore, it would not be fair to include this contingent liability in the valuation of the HDB Flat. Indeed, when I raised this concern at the hearing, the Wife’s counsel accepted that the resale levy ought not to be taken into account for the purposes of valuation. ¹⁶⁵ Accordingly, my view is that the HDB Flat should be valued at $656,949.14 (ie, $692,000 - $35,050.86).

46 The next asset is the balance of $4,247.25 in the Wife’s UOB Kris Flyer account. ¹⁶⁶ The Husband appears to argue that this balance should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets on the basis that this account, although held solely in the Wife’s name, was in fact a joint account which both parties contributed to. ¹⁶⁷ The Wife argues that this balance represented a former tenant’s rental security deposit temporarily held and this sum has since been refunded to the tenant. ¹⁶⁸ Neither party has provided any evidence one way or the other. I am inclined to accept the Wife’s account, which corresponds generally to the fact that a tenant had moved out in November 2024 (ie, after the date of the interim judgment) (see also below at [75]), ¹⁶⁹ which the Husband accepts in his submissions (as he states that no rental income was received from December 2024 to March 2025). ¹⁷⁰ Therefore, I do not include this balance in the pool of matrimonial assets. In any event, I note that this is a small sum relative to the assets that were the subject of this division process.

47 The Husband submits that the surrender value of the Wife’s Great Eastern insurance policy ought to be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. ¹⁷¹ The Wife submits that the policy should be excluded from the matrimonial pool as the policy was procured for her by her mother when she was a child (ie, pre-marriage) and the premiums were paid by her mother. ¹⁷²

48 The approach to take in this particular situation has helpfully been discussed in XHG v XHH [2025] SGHCF 2 (“XHG v XHH”) at [18] (this portion of the decision was not disturbed on appeal in XHG v XHH [2025] 2 SLR 501 (“XHG v XHH (AD)”):

49 On the present facts, I find that the insurance policy is not a transformed matrimonial asset. Counsel for the Husband conceded that it was the Wife who “started paying once she turned 21 or started working”, ¹⁷³ and there is no evidence that the Husband had contributed to the premiums for the insurance policy. Nevertheless, I am of the view that some portion of the surrender value ought to be added back to the pool of matrimonial assets as the insurance policy was at least partially paid for during the marriage by the Wife. While I accept that the Wife’s mother may have paid for the insurance premiums when the policy first commenced in December 1996 ¹⁷⁴ (when the Wife was around 14 years old), I find it difficult to believe that the Wife’s mother had continued to pay for the insurance premiums after the Wife started working and, in any event, throughout the 24 years of marriage. Significantly, the Wife provided no evidence of such continued payments on the part of her mother. I also note that the annual premium payments of $1,412 ¹⁷⁵ are not as nominal as counsel for the Wife submitted they were. ¹⁷⁶ On balance, I find it reasonable to assume that the Wife’s mother had paid for the insurance policy premiums for only six years, this being the period between the commencement of the insurance policy and when the Wife started working full time in 2002, ¹⁷⁷ and the Wife took over for the remaining 22 years until 2024 when the interim judgment was granted. As such, 22/28 of the surrender value of $48,897.30 should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets, which amounts to $38,419.31.

50 The Husband submits that the Wife has failed to disclose her luxury handbags and accessories which are of substantial value, setting out a list of these items, where they were bought and for what price, and the purported market value. ¹⁷⁸ The Husband also contends that sometime around 1 May 2025 (ie, after interim judgment was granted), the Wife had purchased a new Hermes handbag worth $40,000 to $46,900. ¹⁷⁹

51 The Wife’s position is that these luxury items should be excluded from the pool as they were not acquired as financial investments. ¹⁸⁰ The Wife further argues that these items have been used and shared between herself and her daughters, are of sentimental and functional value, and have been used heavily, diminishing their resale worth. ¹⁸¹ In respect of the purportedly new Hermes handbag, the Wife argues that it is a non-authentic product that was purchased by one of the daughters. ¹⁸²

52 To start off, I do not agree with the Wife’s arguments that these luxury items should be excluded on the basis that they were not acquired as financial investments, were used by her daughters, or are of sentimental and functional value. As discussed above at [29], these luxury items, being assets “acquired during the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage”, ought to be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. While the Wife has argued that the list provided by the Husband is fabricated, ¹⁸³ the Husband has provided receipts seemingly supporting his claim that these items were purchased. ¹⁸⁴ The difficulty here, however, is that it is impossible to ascribe an accurate valuation to these luxury items. The list provided by the Husband contains 45 items, but the Wife appears to only have expressly addressed the current value of four Hermes bags. ¹⁸⁵ While the Wife has also provided photos of two well-worn pairs of footwear, ¹⁸⁶ there is no way to tell the actual depreciated value of these goods. The Wife has also claimed that several receipts produced by the Husband were for items that were not purchased by the Wife. ¹⁸⁷ At the same time, it is also unclear whether the purported current market value of these items that the Husband puts forth, which are based on Google searches, ¹⁸⁸ accurately reflect the actual depreciated values of these items. To complicate things further, there are also disputes in relation to whether several items were bought as gifts to the parties’ daughters. ¹⁸⁹ In my view, the circumstances here are similar to those in XMU v XMV (see above at [29]), and applying the broad-brush approach, I assign one-third of the Husband’s estimation as a valuation of the Wife’s luxury goods. This amounts to $76,111.60. In my view, having regard to the Wife’s financial means, this is a reasonable sum to attribute to her luxury goods spending.

53 The Husband submits that a total sum of $308,017.26 ought to be added back into the matrimonial pool as this constituted expenditure by the Wife during the course of matrimonial proceedings or when matrimonial proceedings were imminent which the Husband did not consent to. ¹⁹⁰ The Wife instead contends that these were ordinary and legitimate expenditures. ¹⁹¹

54 I note that the Husband has set out a table of 54 payments dating as early as 29 January 2020. ¹⁹² However, for the purposes of applying TNL v TNK, the relevant time periods are (a) when divorce proceedings are imminent, and (b) after interim judgment but before the ancillaries are concluded (see above at [21]). Prior to this, parties may expend sums, even substantial sums, while managing their financial affairs in the usual ways that married couples do and the court is not concerned with the justifiability of expenses stretching indefinitely into the past (WVS v WVT [2024] SGHC(A) 35 at [16]). The preliminary question in this analysis is therefore when divorce proceedings could be said to be imminent on the present factual matrix. In my view, this was on 29 September 2023, when the Wife sustained various injuries after a physical altercation with the Husband (see above at [7]). While the Husband had previously moved out of the Condo Unit in January 2023 after an argument (during which the Wife alleges she was strangled) (see above at [6]), I note that the parties eventually reconciled, with the Husband moving back to the unit and the family going on a trip to Europe together in August 2023. ¹⁹³ During the period when the Husband had moved out, the Wife had also provided the Husband a monthly subsidy for his room rental. ¹⁹⁴ This does not appear to me to be behaviour consistent with contemplation of divorce and suggests that despite the Husband moving out, the possibility of reconciliation between the parties was not foreclosed. By contrast, shortly after the incident on 29 September 2023, the Wife filed for a PPO (which she pursued despite the Husband seemingly pressuring her not to ¹⁹⁵ ) and subsequently a DEO. Indeed, the Wife also contacted lawyers on or around 13 October 2023. ¹⁹⁶ In my view, the marked difference in response to the Husband’s physical violence evinces that the incident on 29 September 2023 was the point of no return ¹⁹⁷ and accordingly, divorce proceedings were only imminent from that date.

55 Adopting the date of 29 September 2023, the Husband’s list is pared down considerably to 31 items. ¹⁹⁸ These may be split into the following categories: (a) legal fees, ¹⁹⁹ (b) fixed deposit, ²⁰⁰ (c) cosmetic surgery, ²⁰¹ (d) personal income tax, ²⁰² (e) gifts, ²⁰³ and (f) miscellaneous expenditure. ²⁰⁴ I deal with each category in turn.

56 As an aside, I note that the court in UZN v UZM observed (at [67] and [70]) that the conduct of a spouse who uses up large sums of money before divorce is imminent may be relevant in determining the parties’ direct and indirect contributions. There is some hint of this in the Husband’s affidavits where he states “instead of saving the money for the family or spending on the family, the [Wife] started to purchase luxury goods instead … [the Husband] often advised the [Wife] to save these [sic] money for a rainy day or to invest them, instead of spending on the luxury goods but they fell on deaf ears”, ²¹⁹ and that “[the Wife] frequently insisted that [the Husband] contribute more to the family allowance so that [the Wife] could save more of her personal money and use them for her personal expenses”. ²²⁰ However, the Husband does not appear to be pursuing this point specifically and, in any case, there does not appear to be any evidence supporting such assertions. It is also equally possible that such recharacterisation of his disapproval was an afterthought once divorce proceedings were commenced. I am therefore of the view that this should not feature as a standalone factor in considering the parties’ contributions.

57 Drawing the discussion above together, and adding on the agreed Wife’s assets, I summarise my decisions in respect of the Wife’s assets.

58 The Husband’s net assets amount to $2,598,492. The Wife’s net assets amount to $1,450,438.92. The total pool of matrimonial assets is therefore $4,048,930.92.

59 I turn to the issue of just and equitable division.

60 It is not in dispute that this is a dual-income marriage, and that the structured approach set out in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ v ANK”) at [22] applies to the division of matrimonial assets in such marriages (see TNL v TNK at [42]). The structured approach involves: first, ascribing a ratio that represents each party’s direct contributions relative to that of the other party, having regard to the amount of financial contribution each party has made towards the acquisition or improvement of the matrimonial asset; next, ascribing a second ratio to represent each party’s indirect contribution to the well-being of the family relative to that of the other; and finally, using each party’s respective direct and indirect percentage contributions, deriving each party’s average percentage contribution to the family which would form the basis to divide the matrimonial assets.

61 The Husband submits that the ratio for equitable division should be 51.45:48.55 in his favour. ²²⁵ The Wife submits that the ratio for equitable division should be 74:26 in her favour. ²²⁶

62 Other than the HDB Flat and the Condo Unit, the parties agree that each party should be attributed full contribution towards the assets in their respective names. In respect of these assets, I note that the parties calculated their direct contributions based on the assets’ current value, as opposed to what each of them actually paid for the assets, which means that they have effectively deemed the capital gains (or losses) relating to each asset as part of each party’s contributions. Although this is not how direct contributions are usually assessed, I note that such an approach has been adopted in XIS v XIT [2025] SGHCF 21 at [47] and XHG v XHH at [31] (this portion of the decision was not disturbed on appeal in XHG v XHH (AD)). I also note, as I observed earlier, that this appears to represent the parties’ agreed stance on how to assess their respective contributions. I therefore adopt this approach in relation to the assets other than the HDB Flat and the Condo Unit.

63 The parties are essentially in agreement that the Wife contributed roughly $192,000 by way of direct CPF contributions towards the HDB Flat, with the Husband estimating the figure to be $192,279.45 ²²⁷ while the Wife relies on a CPF statement dated 8 January 2026 for her figure of $192,034.54. ²²⁸ As the Wife has provided documentary evidence supporting her submitted figure, I adopt that figure, though I note that in the greater scheme of things, the difference between their respective positions is negligible.

64 The next set of contributions to the HDB Flat consists of the sum of $139,189.69 ²²⁹ that the Wife had to refund to the Husband’s CPF account as part of the decoupling process. The Husband submits that he paid $25,537.10 over three transfers (ie, $10,000, $10,000, $5,537.10) to the Wife to enable her to make this payment of $139,189.69 (see above at [3]). ²³⁰ The Wife disputes this, submitting that these transfers constituted repayment of a loan the Wife had extended to the Husband to buy his first car and for some other miscellaneous purchases. ²³¹ In support of this, the Wife points out that a portion of the $25,537.10 had been transferred after the decoupling process. ²³² Instead, the Wife’s position is that the refund of $139,189.69 was made using a combination of $14,191.24 of her own CPF funds, and $124,998.45 of her own cash. ²³³ I do not agree with the Wife’s contentions. While it is true that $5,537.10 was paid only on 29 April 2015, I note that the cash portion of the refund was paid by cheque on 28 April 2015, ²³⁴ ie, it was not the case that the entire amount was liable to be deducted at that point of time such that the Husband’s version of events had to be disbelieved. Moreover, the payment reference accompanying the second of the Husband’s two transfers of $10,000 on 28 April 2015 explicitly states “HDB 20k”, ²³⁵ which puts paid to the Wife’s version of events that these transfers were repayments of a loan. Given so, my view is that the $139,189.69 refund comprised $25,537.10 of the Husband’s cash and $99,461.35 and $14,191.24 of the Wife’s cash and CPF funds respectively.

65 The Wife submits that she also paid the Cash Over Valuation sum of $35,000 by herself. ²³⁶ The Husband contends that both parties had contributed equally towards the purchase price of the HDB Flat, including the Cash Over Valuation component. ²³⁷ However, this statement is untrue as it is clear that the Wife had contributed more towards the purchase price of the HDB Flat. Indeed, the Husband appears to recognise this as he does not include any portion of the Cash Over Valuation component in his tabulation of the parties’ direct contributions to the HDB Flat in his written submissions. ²³⁸ As such, I accept that the Wife had paid the $35,000.

66 The Wife has also included in her tabulation of her direct contributions the accrued interest on the principal amount withdrawn from her CPF account, the annual property tax payable on the HDB Flat, sums incurred in the maintenance and repairs for rental of the HDB Flat, service and conservancy charges, and fire insurance. ²³⁹ In my view, none of these ought to be considered direct contributions to the HDB Flat. To begin with, the accrued interest on the principal amount withdrawn from her CPF account is the interest that would have accrued on the principal amount had it remained in the Wife’s CPF account, and which is liable to be paid into her CPF account upon selling the HDB Flat. This sum is merely a notional representation (ie, the money is not and was never owned by the Wife in the first place) and cannot be said to be a direct contribution to the HDB Flat. Indeed, it is incongruous for the Wife to seek to do so, given that she does not account for the Husband’s CPF contributions towards the Condo Unit in the same manner. ²⁴⁰ In relation to the annual property tax, service and conservancy charges and fire insurance, these payments ought not to be considered direct financial contributions as they were not expended to acquire or improve the HDB Flat (see XPG v XPH [2025] SGHCF 45 (“XPG v XPH”) at [45]). Finally, in relation to the sums incurred for maintenance and repairs, the Wife has not provided evidence of how they have increased the value of the HDB Flat (see XPG v XPH at [45]). Indeed, the categorisation of these sums as “maintenance” and “repairs” suggests that they were expended to preserve, and not improve, the value of the HDB Flat. Accordingly, none of these additional purported contributions by the Wife ought to be taken into account for the purposes of direct financial contributions, and they instead fall (with the exception of the accrued interest) to be considered as the Wife’s indirect financial contributions.

67 Summarising the discussion above, my decision on the parties’ direct financial contributions to the HDB Flat is as follows:

68 Similar to the HDB Flat, the parties agree that the Husband contributed $287,171.80 in CPF moneys towards the Condo Unit. ²⁴¹ The parties also agree that the 5% booking fee of $80,336.50 was borne by them equally (ie, $40,168.25 each). ²⁴²

69 In relation to renovation expenses, given that the renovation occurred before the parties moved in, ²⁴³ my view is that these renovations were needed to make the flat habitable and therefore the renovation costs should be included as direct contributions (see XNE v XNF [2026] SGHCF 7 at [88]). The parties agree that the renovations cost $62,198 and that this expense was shared. ²⁴⁴ Therefore, $31,099 should be considered as part of each of the Husband’s and Wife’s direct contributions towards the Condo Unit.

70 The Husband claims that he withdrew a sum of $100,000 from his OCBC account and deposited it into the Wife’s account so that she could issue cheques to make payments for stamp duty and legal fees as well as part payment of the 15% downpayment (see above at [4]). ²⁴⁵ The Wife disputes this and instead submits that this sum was paid by her. ²⁴⁶ Considering the bank statement produced by the Husband evidencing the withdrawal of $100,000, ²⁴⁷ the timing of the withdrawal (ie, within a day of the Wife issuing cheques to pay for stamp duty and legal fees) ²⁴⁸ and the similarity in arrangement with the previous payment for the HDB decoupling (see above at [64]), my view is that the Husband did provide this sum to the Wife for the payment of these expenses. Indeed, the Wife has stated that she is “unable to confirm the accuracy of [the Husband’s] claim” and her account was based on “the best of [her] recollection”. ²⁴⁹ While the Wife has also submitted that the Husband’s narrative is inconsistent in that he had previously stated that he had no cheque facility yet now claims he purchased a cheque, ²⁵⁰ I do not find this convincing as a cheque can be purchased from the bank even if one’s personal bank account has no cheque facilities. In this regard, it makes sense that the Husband opted to purchase only one cheque to pay the Wife the total sum of $100,000 (and for the Wife to issue separate cheques to the different payees), instead of three cheques splitting up each individual payment to each respective payee. Finally, the Wife has also stated that the Husband could have raised his bank transfer limit instead of purchasing a cheque for $100,000. ²⁵¹ In my view, for the reasons explained above, merely suggesting such alternatives does not impugn the credibility of the Husband’s account. As such, the $100,000 payment towards stamp duty, legal fees and part payment of the downpayment should be considered the Husband’s direct financial contribution.

71 The Wife has again included payments for annual property tax, fire insurance and Management Corporation Strata Title fees in her direct contributions. ²⁵² For the reasons discussed at [66], these payments should not count towards direct contributions, but instead fall to be considered under indirect contributions.

72 Turning finally to the mortgage payments, the Husband has calculated the total mortgage payment paid from July 2015 until December 2025 to be $660,254. ²⁵³ The Wife submitted a figure of $600,277 in her third affidavit, ²⁵⁴ but in this calculation, did not include the mortgage payments from July 2015 to June 2017 (amounting to $31,389 ²⁵⁵ ) and September 2025 to December 2025 (amounting to $28,584 ²⁵⁶ ), and also misstated (albeit in a de minimis way) the mortgage payment for January 2018 as $4,440 instead of $4,444. ²⁵⁷ Adding these omitted payments to the Wife’s figure gives the same figure of $660,254. A large point of contention is whether the rental income earned from the HDB Flat in the Wife’s sole name and paid towards the mortgage of the Condo Unit ought to be attributed solely to the Wife or split between the Husband and the Wife equally. The Husband argues that parties had agreed that each would be entitled to 50% of the rental income received even though the HDB Flat was in the Wife’s sole name. ²⁵⁸ The Wife argues she had “bought back” the Husband’s share of the HDB Flat at the point of decoupling and had since handled all rental matters alone. ²⁵⁹ As such, the rental income was derived solely from her property and efforts and its use to service the mortgage of the Condo Unit should be attributed solely to her. ²⁶⁰

73 I do not agree with the Wife. In my view, the refund to the Husband’s CPF account was an administrative requirement imposed by the CPF Board and not a “purchase” in the manner advanced by the Wife. As the Husband points out, the refund was not based on the market value of the HDB Flat at that point in time. ²⁶¹ In the circumstances, it would not have been within the parties’ contemplation that the HDB Flat and any rental earned on it would be owned entirely by the Wife. Instead, the more plausible version of events is that the decoupling was really an administrative one structured around stamp duty and/or HDB rules considerations. In this regard, I also disagree with the Wife’s counsel’s submission that if there was such an agreement between the Husband and Wife, their home financing document would have stated so, instead of stating that rental was to be paid “To DBS (By Wife)”. ²⁶² On my reading, this home financing document does not purport to set out any agreement as to entitlement to rental income, but rather organises the flows of cash between the Husband and the Wife for accounting purposes. As the rental income was paid into the bank account in the Wife’s name (although I note the Husband contends that this was a joint account in reality), it makes sense that the home financing document stipulates that the Wife transfers the entire rental income to the DBS mortgage account, instead of first transferring half to the Husband, followed by the Husband transferring that same sum to the DBS mortgage account. Indeed, the same stipulation (ie, “To DBS (By Wife)”) is set out in relation to the cash top-up portion of the mortgage, part of which the Husband transfers to the Wife monthly, and the Wife (rightly) does not claim that this entire sum should be attributed to her. Moreover, while the Wife’s position is that she was fully responsible for all aspects of the HDB Flat’s rental, I note that she has only exhibited one screenshot between herself and one “Allen Agent” discussing prospective tenants in 2017. ²⁶³ To add to this, the Wife also exhibited a screenshot between herself and the Husband where she sets out the listing information of the HDB Flat. ²⁶⁴ If the Husband was not at all involved in the rental of the HDB Flat, there would be no conversation between the Husband and the Wife presumably discussing the listing information. On balance, I am inclined to accept that the Husband had participated somewhat in the rental of the HDB Flat, including in the ways set out by the Husband, such as cleaning the HDB Flat between tenancies, reviewing and preparing tenancy agreements, etc. ²⁶⁵ Given the above, the rental income earned from the HDB Flat which went towards the payment of the mortgage of the Condo Unit ought to be split 50-50 between the Husband and the Wife.

74 This leaves the calculation of the total rental income earned. The Husband submits as follows: ²⁶⁶

75 The Wife largely agrees with these figures, save that she has excluded the rental for the months of December 2023, January 2024, March 2024, June 2024 and November 2024 (ie, $4,000 x 5) and August 2025, November 2025 and December 2025 (ie, $2,600 x 3). ²⁶⁷ While the Wife has explained that tenants had moved out in November 2023 and November 2024, ²⁶⁸ this only accounts for the exclusion of the rental for December 2023, January 2024 and November 2024. The Wife also accepts that rental of $2,600 was received in May 2025 and September 2025. ²⁶⁹ In my view, the sporadicity of the remaining non-payments in March 2024, June 2024, August 2025 is inconsistent with the usual scheme of regular payments of rental in a tenancy agreement. Moreover, the Wife has also not stated that the tenant moved out in November 2025 (such that no rental was received in November 2025 and December 2025) when she expressly did so in relation to other months where the tenant had moved out. I therefore exclude only the rental payments for the months of December 2023, January 2024 and November 2024 ($4,000 x 3), while adding the rental income of $2,600 received in May 2025 and September 2025. Overall, the total rental income earned from the HDB Flat up until December 2025 is therefore $269,700 (ie $134,400 + $27,900 + $96,000 + $18,200 - $4,000 x 3 + $2,600 x 2). Apportioning this 50-50 would mean that the Husband and the Wife each contributed $134,850 in rental income towards the Condo Unit.

76 Turning to consider the cash top-up portion of the mortgage payments, deducting the rental income and the Husband’s monthly CPF contributions (not including the $160,000 downpayment) from the total mortgage payments leaves $263,382.20 (ie, $660,254 - $269,700 - $127,171.80). This cash top-up portion ought to have been paid equally by both parties. However, between December 2023 and December 2025, the Husband claims that there were several instances where the Wife did not do so. ²⁷⁰ I set these out together with my assessment of whether there was overpayment by the Husband below:

77 Taking into account the overpayment by the Husband, $145,215.10 of the cash top-up portion ought to be attributed to the Husband’s direct contributions, while $118,167.10 ought to be attributed to the Wife’s direct contributions.

78 The above discussion on direct contributions towards the Condo Unit can be distilled in the following table:

79 In view of the above, the direct contributions of the Husband and Wife can be summarised as follows:

80 In ascribing a ratio of parties’ indirect contributions, the court does not indulge in any mathematical calculation and the values to be attributed are a matter of impression and judgment of a court (see ANJ v ANK at [24]). The broad-brush approach should be applied with particular vigour in assessing the parties’ indirect contributions and the court should not focus unduly on the minutiae of family life, but instead direct attention to broad factual indicators, including the length of the marriage, the number of children and which party was the children’s primary caregiver (see USB v USA at [43]).

81 In my view, the Wife was the children’s primary caregiver. As much is admitted by the Husband, who states that when “the [Wife] did her Master[s] in Nursing … I was the one to look after and take care of the children during her absence”. ²⁸⁸ Leaving aside the fact that the Wife disputes that the Husband did in fact do so, ²⁸⁹ on the Husband’s own account, it was the Wife who was carrying out the day-to-day care-taking of the children. I am also of the view that the Wife contributed significantly more to the maintenance and upkeep of the household. ²⁹⁰ Again, this is admitted by the Husband, who states that he “[o]ccasionally would also help the [Wife] with the other chores” beyond the few tasks he was “in charge of”. ²⁹¹ On top of this, the Wife was also working full-time and contributing to household expenses, including groceries and necessities, school fees, ²⁹² property tax and other fees (see above at [66] and [71]), and had only employed a domestic helper for four years over this 24-year marriage. ²⁹³ In light of the above, the ratio of indirect contributions should skew in favour of the Wife. Nevertheless, I recognise that the Husband also contributed to a certain extent, for example, covering family expenses for the car, helper, house furnishings and providing the children with pocket money, ²⁹⁴ ferrying the family around, ²⁹⁵ assisting in the acquiring, renovation and setting up of the HDB Flat and Condo Unit, ²⁹⁶ and taking the family out for activities or for overseas trips. ²⁹⁷ Overall, my view is that an appropriate ratio is 60:40 in the Wife’s favour.

82 I turn to one final point in this regard: the Husband’s submission that the Wife has negatively contributed to the marriage. ²⁹⁸ In principle, it is possible to ascribe a negative value to a spouse’s misconduct where such misconduct fundamentally undermines the co-operative partnership and harms the welfare of the other (Chan Tin Sun v Fong Quay Sim [2015] 2 SLR 195 (“Chan Tin Sun”) at [27]). At the same time, however, the hearing of ancillaries is not intended to be another forum for parties to dredge up accusations and allegations relating to each other’s conduct. The court is not equipped to scrutinise the conduct of the parties to assign blame, nor should it be so in light of the no-fault basis of divorce embodied in the WC (Chan Tin Sun at [25]). In particular, where parties are clearly in a highly acrimonious relationship and they have alleged various counts of misconduct against each other, the court should not too readily sift through the facts and evidence in order to assign relative blame for the purposes of dividing matrimonial assets (AQS v AQR [2012] SGCA 3 at [39]). In my view, there is no basis for a negative contribution to be ascribed to the Wife. The bulk of the Husband’s allegations relate to the Wife’s conduct after divorce proceedings had commenced, eg, reducing her mortgage contributions from December 2023, refusing to allow him to stay in the HDB Flat, inappropriately targeting Mdm [A]’s money, misrepresenting her financial contributions, making a complaint to the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority and filing a Magistrate’s Complaint against him. ²⁹⁹ For the remaining allegation that the Wife has displayed a “longstanding” pattern of downplaying his contributions, which “was one of the root causes of the breakdown in their marriage”, ³⁰⁰ this conduct is not “extreme” (nor “undisputed”, see Chan Tin Sun at [25]) and does not rise to the level of fundamentally undermining the co-operative partnership of marriage. For completeness, while the Wife has obtained a PPO against the Husband in respect of the September 2023 incident, this does not mean that the Wife did not contribute to the incident, whether through emotional attacks or otherwise. Indeed, the Husband has referred to an Institute of Mental Health report dated 2 January 2024 which states that the Husband’s “physical violence towards [the Wife was] often related [to] her intense emotional dysregulation during their conflicts”. ³⁰¹ I raise this not to question whether the PPO was properly granted – indeed I note the Husband is not denying that physical injury was caused to the Wife and that the PPO was granted by consent ³⁰² – or to take away from the Wife’s lived experience that resulted in her applying for a PPO, but instead to highlight the complexity of the parties’ relationship dynamic and to make the point that a PPO, particularly one granted by consent, does not amount to a finding on the relative blameworthiness of the parties involved, and more importantly, would be difficult to map coherently onto the questions of broader contributions to the marriage on the specific facts here without engaging in a detailed interrogation of what happened, which this Court is, from the perspective of considering the division of matrimonial assets, not especially well-equipped to do. In my view, therefore, the PPO being granted is not an independent factor which should skew the ratio further in the Wife’s favour. Accordingly, the ratio of 60:40 in the Wife’s favour stands.

83 There are no factors which warrant ascribing a greater weight to either the direct or indirect contributions (see ANJ v ANK at [26]–[27]). Therefore, in sum, I ascribe the following ratios to the parties’ contributions:

84 In arriving at this average percentage contributions, I appreciate that the Wife appears to have enjoyed a period of rent-free occupation, to the exclusion of the Husband, in the Condo Unit since November 2023 (see s 112(2)(f) of the WC). Nevertheless, I am of the view that the average percentage contributions above already achieve a just and equitable division of matrimonial assets and see no need to adjust the ratio further, not least because the Husband admits that he had occasionally moved back into the Condo Unit during this period of time, ³⁰³ and the Husband’s exclusion from the Condo Unit from June 2024 onwards ³⁰⁴ was a result of the Wife applying for a DEO that was ultimately granted against him.

85 The Wife seeks a lump-sum payment of $300,000 from the Husband for the “immense suffering” she endured during the marriage and for the “sustained physical and emotional torment inflicted by the [Husband]” which the Wife claims has negatively impacted her career progression. ³⁰⁵

86 In my view, this can be rejected quickly. In awarding maintenance, the court ought always to bear in mind the underlying rationale and purpose for the award of maintenance generally to former wives, ie, that of financial preservation, which requires the wife to be maintained at a standard that is, to a reasonable extent, commensurate with the standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage (see ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2 (“ATE v ATD”) at [31]). In addition, the power to order maintenance is supplementary to the power to order a division of matrimonial assets (ATE v ATD at [33]). In this regard, it is worth restating the following observations set out in Leong Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2013) at p 666 (endorsed by the Court of Appeal in ATE v ATD at [34]):

87 Applying the above principles, there is simply no basis for the Wife’s claim for maintenance. The Wife is presently employed and drawing a monthly salary of $12,854.64 (ie, ($143,123 + $151,995 + $167,649) / 36 months). ³⁰⁶ She has also been granted a larger proportion of the matrimonial assets, which includes the HDB Flat. In my view, this suffices to allow the Wife to reasonably maintain herself at a standard commensurate to the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and the court need not intervene to equalise the financial statuses of the former spouses by way of an order of maintenance. Considering the Wife’s submissions on this issue, it is clear to me that the Wife’s claim for maintenance is, at its core, animated by the desire to vindicate her grievances towards the Husband’s conduct while the marriage subsisted. While such an impulse is understandable between spouses whose marriage has come to a bitter end, an order of maintenance cannot be weaponised to settle the score between former spouses. As highlighted above at [86], financial preservation is the raison d'être of an order of maintenance and punitive considerations should not factor into the court’s decision on whether to award maintenance, a proposition that the Wife’s counsel accepted at the hearing when I made that observation to her. ³⁰⁷ I am therefore of the view that no spousal maintenance should be awarded.

88  In conclusion, the value of the pool of matrimonial assets is $4,048,930.92. $1,982,761.47 of the pool of matrimonial assets should be awarded to the Husband and $2,066,169.45 to the Wife. As the Husband’s assets amount to $2,598,492, I order the Husband to pay the Wife $615,730.53 within four months of this judgment. For the reasons explained earlier, no spousal maintenance should be awarded to the Wife.

89 Before turning to the costs of these proceedings, I deal with one final submission by the Husband. The Husband argues that the Wife ought to repay him the rental expenses he incurred after moving out of the Condo Unit, which could have been reduced had the Wife allowed him to reside in the HDB Flat. ³⁰⁸ I reject this argument. Rental income was earned from renting out the HDB Flat, and as explained above at [73]–[75], this rental income has been attributed equally to both parties when considering their direct contributions. If instead the Husband had stayed at the HDB Flat, no such rental income would have been earned, and the parties’ direct contributions would accordingly have been reduced. By making such a claim, the Husband is, in effect, approbating and reprobating: he relies on the fact that the HDB Flat was rented out to enjoy the fruits of rental income while simultaneously maintaining the contradictory position that the Wife ought to have allowed him to stay in the HDB Flat, a position which rests upon the impossible premise that the HDB Flat remained vacant all along. The Husband cannot have his cake and eat it too. I therefore decline to make such an order.

90 As for costs, having regard to the nature of these proceedings as well as the fact that neither party succeeded on all of the issues he or she canvassed, I order that each party bear their own costs of the proceedings.