1 The parties were married on 18 August 2005. The Husband is about 72 years old, while the Wife is about 46 years old. They have two children, aged 20 and 15. Interim Judgment for their divorce (“IJ”) was granted on 12 October 2023 (the “IJ Date”). The marriage lasted about 18 years. The parties resolved by consent, the issues relating to the children. ¹ I set out below my decision on the ancillary matters brought before me, which relate solely to the division of their matrimonial assets.

2 The Husband has been a businessman since the 1980s and operated multiple business in Singapore and China. ² He was in the business of developing buildings on land purchased in China. ³ The Wife was a housewife during the marriage. For the first seven years of their marriage, parties lived in China. ⁴ They moved to Singapore in 2012. ⁵ There is no dispute as to the date at which the pool is ascertained, which was on 12 October 2023, and when assets are valued, which was the date closest to the ancillary matters hearing. ⁶ Parties also did not dispute the exchange rates to be applied, which was set out in their joint summary to the court. ⁷

3 On the identification of the matrimonial assets, the Wife submits that: (a) certain assets owned pre-marriage by the Husband should be included in the pool as they were transformed by her efforts; (b) a property asset was an interspousal gift and should be excluded from the pool; and (c) assets disposed of by the Husband should be accounted for and that the proceeds of disposals should be added back to the pool. The Wife also disputes the valuation of certain assets and submits that adverse inferences should be drawn against the Husband for his less-than-forthcoming disclosures in the proceedings.

4 On the division of the matrimonial assets, the Wife submits that the framework set out in TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) should apply and that an equal division of the pool of matrimonial assets is just and equitable in this case as the marriage is a long, single income marriage. ⁸ She also urges the court to take into account her indirect contributions to the marriage as the primary caregiver to the children and her substantial efforts to fulfil her spousal duties.

5 The Husband avers that he had substantial assets prior to the marriage as a successful businessman.

6 On the identification of assets, the Husband has five main contentions. First, he submits that some assets acquired in the course of marriage should be considered pre-martial assets as they were paid for through pre-marital funds. Further, he disputes that certain pre-marital assets were transformed by the Wife and therefore submits that they should be excluded from the pool of matrimonial assets. Second, he disputes the valuations put forth by the Wife for certain companies he owns. Third, he avers that certain disputed assets were not owned by him personally but by companies that he owns, and should therefore be excluded from the pool of assets. Fourth, the Husband submits that the property held in the Wife’s name was not gifted to her. Fifth, he avers that assets the Wife claims were disposed of, were owned by his company and not him personally. Therefore, the disposal proceeds should not be added back into the pool of matrimonial assets.

7 On the division of matrimonial assets, the Husband submits that the marriage was a dual income marriage and that the framework under ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ”) should apply. ⁹ This is on account of the Wife having declared rental income. He further argues that the classification methodology should apply as some assets were paid for from pre-marital assets and urged the court to apply a 70% weightage to direct contributions and 30% to indirect contributions. ¹⁰

8 I first consider the disputes over the inclusion of assets into the pool of matrimonial assets. As the valuation of some of these assets are also disputed, I will also examine their valuation at the same time, if they are to be included in the pool.

9 Matrimonial assets are defined in s 112(10) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC”):

10 In USB v USA [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB”) at [19], the Court of Appeal set out the classes of assets that parties to a marriage may possess:

11 I will assess the pool of matrimonial assets in the sequence of the following broad categories:

(a) whether the companies owned by the Husband and the debts owing to the Husband from his companies should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets and the consequential valuations of the assets. This included the Husband’s sole proprietorship [B], China companies: [C] and [D] and Singapore companies: [E], [F] and [G];

(b) whether the property in the Wife’s name should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets;

(c) the assets where only valuation is disputed;

(d) the assets allegedly disposed of by the Husband at the time when divorce was impending.

12 The Husband is the sole proprietor of [B]. ¹¹ The Wife seeks to include [B] into the pool of matrimonial assets as it was registered in 2009 (based on ACRA records), during the course of the marriage. The Husband’s position is that [B] should be excluded as it was originally registered and became operational in 1982 and has continued to this day, and there is no evidence that the Wife has substantially improved this asset. ¹² The Wife pointed to ACRA records which show that [B]’s registration had been cancelled sometime earlier and was registered under a new UEN identity only in 2009. ¹³ In response, the Husband argued that it was mere inadvertence that [B]’s registration had lapsed. ¹⁴

13 The ACRA records show that [B]’s registration had been cancelled at the time of the marriage and that it was only registered again in 2009, and this was after the parties married in 2005. ¹⁵ The Husband has not provided any evidence to the contrary. Further, the Husband’s counsel confirmed at the hearing that [B] was not registered at the time of the marriage. ¹⁶ The Husband has also not shown any evidence that he had been operating [B] as a sole proprietorship in substance, during the intervening years when he claimed that [B]’s registration had lapsed. I will therefore include [B] in the pool.

14 [B] carried out business operations at Property 1. ¹⁷ The Wife had originally submitted that the value of Property 1 should be added to the pool of matrimonial assets as it was in the Husband’s name as at the IJ Date, ¹⁸ and a title search dated 29 April 2025 lists her Husband as the proprietor of the property. ¹⁹

15 The Husband explained that Property 1 was a leasehold property purchased by [B] from JTC prior to the marriage. Further, the lease on the property had first expired in 2011 and the subsequent extensions to the lease expired in 2024. At the final expiration of the lease, the property had been returned to JTC on 9 September 2024. ²⁰ He exhibited a title search of the property dated 20 February 2026 showing that title had reverted to JTC. ²¹ Further, any income generated from the rental of Property 1 during the marriage had been recorded as the Husband’s personal income as [B] was a sole proprietorship. ²²

16 At the hearing, counsel for the Wife stated that the Wife was no longer seeking to add the property to the pool. ²³ Nonetheless, I would have found that as Property 1 was a leasehold property that has now been returned to JTC, it is not an asset owned by the Husband. Therefore, I would not have included it in the pool of matrimonial assets.

17 The Wife seeks to include the share capital injected into the Husband’s Chinese company [C] in the pool of matrimonial assets. The Husband submits that it should be excluded from the pool, on the ground that the moneys for [C] came from [B], and that the moneys were acquired prior to the marriage. ²⁴ Further, the Husband’s position is that a notional sum should not be added as the value of the company has already been factored into the valuation of a property owned by [C] – Property 2. All the Husband relies on is the timing of [C]’s incorporation, being two months after the date of the marriage. ²⁵ The Wife submits that as the company was established post‑marriage, it is a marital asset. ²⁶

18 [C] was established during the marriage, on 28 October 2005. ²⁷ There are also ACRA search records which show that [B]’s registration had been cancelled at the time of the marriage and that it was only registered again in 2009: see [13] above. Consequently, contrary to the Husband’s contention, the moneys for C could not have come from [B]. The Husband has not provided any evidence to support his claim that the financial injection in [C]’s share capital came from his pre‑marital assets. I will therefore include this asset in the pool.

19 The Wife submits that the share capital of US$560,000 injected into [C] should notionally be included in the pool, as an imperfect proxy for its value. ²⁸ The Husband failed to provide the necessary evidence for the valuation of the company, despite being ordered to do so. Based on the limited disclosures made by the Husband, including a July 2024 statement of profit and loss, [C] had a net profit of RMB 949,283.20. ²⁹

20 The Husband disagrees, contending that [C]’s only asset is Property 2, which has been separately valued. ³⁰

21 The Husband testified that there was a break in the collection of rental proceeds for Property 2 for a period of 1.5 years and the new tenant has been paying 30% less than the agreed rent for the past six months. ³¹ There is hence evidence from the Husband himself, that there is rental income accruing to [C] as the owner of Property 2. Thus, [C] accrues value from both the value of Property 2 as an asset, and also from the stream of rental income derived from the property. In the usual course, both the value of the asset and the income stream would have been reflected in a financial statement, that allows for a holistic valuation of [C].

22 However, there is no information from the Husband that allows for such a holistic valuation of [C]. The Husband was earlier ordered by the Assistant Registrar to provide the financial statements for [C] for 2019 to 2023, but he did not provide the disclosure. Counsel for the Husband informed the Court at the hearing that he did not have anything else to say on the valuation of C. ³² In the absence of data from its financial statements, I agree with the Wife that the share capital of US$560,000 infused into [C] serves as an imperfect proxy of the company’s value. I will include the US$560,000 as part of [C]’s value, for the purposes of inclusion into the pool. The other asset, which is part of [C]’s value, is Property 2, which I turn to below.

23 The Husband submits that Property 2 should be excluded as he had acquired it prior to the marriage.

24 Further, Property 2 is not owned by the Husband, but by the company, [C]. Hence, Property 2 does not fall to be treated as part of the pool as an asset under the Husband’s name.

25 I find that given that Property 2 is owned by [C], the value of the property should be reflected in the pool, as part of the valuation of [C]. As set out above, [C] was established during the marriage. It would be a quintessential matrimonial asset (see USB at [19]) and forms part of the pool.

26 The Wife submits that Property 2 should be valued based on her valuer’s report, which estimated the value at RMB 33,951,600 (“Wife’s Valuation Report”), ³³ as opposed to the Husband’s value based on his valuation report, which estimated the value at RMB 17,360,700 (“Husband’s Valuation Report”). ³⁴ The base date for the Wife’s Valuation Report is 12 October 2023, while the on-site inspection date is 31 October 2025. ³⁵ The Husband’s Valuation Report is dated 9 April 2025.

27  The Wife’s appointed solicitors in China raised two issues with the Husband’s Valuation Report: ³⁶

(a) First, the Husband’s Valuation Report features a “70% rate”, ie, 30% of the value of Property 2 is discounted. However, no reason was proffered to explain why this discount was factored into the valuation. Based on the photographs presented in the Wife’s Valuation Report, the building’s condition is generally good and new. Property 2’s condition would likely also be good, in view of the change of tenants sometime in 2021.

(b) Second, when referenced with judicial auction of land or property in the same area of comparable size, the Husband’s Valuation Report estimates the value of Property 2 to be significantly lower than similar property. However, no reason has been given for the lower valuation. Additionally, as judicial auction prices of land or property would be lower than market rates, it is more than likely that the valuation would be higher rather than lower compared to judicial auction prices.

28 The Husband submitted that these observations should be disregarded as they did not come from the valuer but the Wife’s Chinese solicitors. The Wife informed that valuers in China are reluctant to provide opinions on each other’s reports. Hence the observations came from her Chinese solicitors who appointed her valuer. ³⁷

29 In my view, the two observations made about the Husband’s Valuation Reports should not be discounted simply because they came from the Wife’s solicitors in China. The observations are based on the materials in the Husband’s Valuation Reports and go towards the methodology and logic of that valuation.

30 Although the Wife's solicitors were not appointed as experts under the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024, I nonetheless drew guidance from case law in considering how to approach the competing valuation reports. In The “Dream Star” [2018] 4 SLR 473 (“Dream Star”), the court held at [38] that in resolving conflicting views of experts, the court would look into considerations such as the quality of the expert’s reasoning and the methodology by which an expert reached his conclusions. In Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 (“LHL”), the court held at [105] that in choosing between conflicting expert testimonies, the court will have regard to which expert testimony best accords with logic and common sense.

31 In my view, besides providing guidance on evaluating competing reports, these authorities reinforce that the observations made by the Wife’s Chinese solicitors should not be disregarded, as they would allow the court to assess the considerations, as highlighted in Dream Star and LHL, regarding the logic and reasoning of the valuation and its methodology.

32 Counsel for the Husband informed the court at the hearing that he did not have any response to these two observations specifically. He also did not have any critiques of the Wife’s valuation in terms of its reasoning and methodology. ³⁸ Instead, he submitted that the Husband’s valuation should still be preferred, as it was the latest in time. ³⁹ As this was so only because the Husband took some time to respond to the Wife’s Valuation Report which she filed with her first Affidavit of Assets and Means, I gave the Wife leave to file an updated valuation. This provided an updated valuation dated 29 May 2026, in the quantum of RMB 32,528,000. ⁴⁰ This is based on the earlier reasoning and methodology, and the new valuation was assessed to be slightly lower than the earlier valuation.

33 On the whole, the Wife’s valuation is more robust, unlike the Husband’s valuation, for which there were valid critiques which the Husband did not respond to. I accept the updated valuation from the Wife and value Property 2 at RMB 32,528,000. This will form part of the value of the company [C].

34 The Husband submits that the Husband’s Chinese company [D] should not be included in the pool of matrimonial assets as there is no evidence that it has been substantially improved during the marriage by the Wife.

35 The Wife provided an investigation report prepared by her Chinese solicitors that confirmed the Husband continued to hold 80% of the shareholdings in [D]. She submits that the Husband has produced no evidence besides his bare claim that [D] is dormant.

36 According to the Husband, [D] was registered on 9 January 2006. ⁴¹ Although the Husband recognises that the asset was acquired during the marriage, the Husband submits that the source of funds for the US$1,680,000 paid towards the 80% paid up capital of this company was earned prior to the marriage. He has, however, produced no evidence of this. At the hearing, counsel for the Husband submitted that the company is now dormant and has no assets. The units in the building owned by [D] have been sold, with two units transferred to the parties’ names. However, when queried, counsel informed that he did not have any documents to support this and only has what the Husband said to him. I would therefore include [D] in the pool of matrimonial assets.

37 The Husband did not dispute the Wife’s valuation of [D], at $2,126,582.27. This is based on his payment of 80% of the paid-up capital of US$2,100,000. ⁴² While this is again, an imperfect proxy, the Husband had not provided any documents for the Wife to carry out any valuation.

38 The Husband submits that the Husband’s Singapore company [E] should be excluded from the pool. [E] was incorporated on 16 September 2002, which is about three years before the date of the marriage. The Husband submits that the Wife did not contribute to the appreciation of [E]’s value. While [E] made CPF contributions for the Wife, she did not work for [E] or any of the Husband’s businesses in Singapore as she had to care for their children when they relocated from China to Singapore. He also submits that what the Wife did, did not substantially improve [E]. ⁴³

39 The Wife submits that she would help her Husband in [E] with the finances and accounting, preparing the relevant forms necessary for reporting purposes, and facilitating bank transfers on the Husband’s behalf. She also helped him with the making of name cards and advertisements and coordinated with suppliers, among other things. ⁴⁴

40 The Husband was not able to explain why the Wife received CPF contributions from [E] if she was not working there. On the evidence, I find that on the balance of probabilities, it is more likely that the Wife worked in [E], and that she did the activities she testified to.

41 Section 112(10)(a)(ii) of the WC provides that an asset acquired before marriage by one party to the marriage may be considered a matrimonial asset where it “has been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by both parties to the marriage”. In USB, the Court of Appeal considered the meaning of “substantial improvement” at [21]–[22]. One possible sense of this was the investment of money for the improvement of the asset. The other was improvement arising from effort having economic value (at [22]):

42 In BUX v BUY [2019] SGHCF 4 (“BUX”) at [15]–[16], Debbie Ong J (as she then was) referenced Koh Kim Lan Angela v Choong Kian Haw [1993] 3 SLR(R) 491 (“Koh Angela”). In Koh Angela, the Court of Appeal considered the former s 106(5) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1985 Rev Ed), which is the material equivalent of the current s 112(10)(a)(ii) of the WC. Section 106(5) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1985 Rev Ed) provides that “references to assets acquired during a marriage include assets owned before the marriage by one party which have been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by their joint efforts”. In considering the degree of effort from the wife necessary to satisfy the requirement of “joint efforts” in s 106(5), the Court of Appeal held that the contribution by the wife “in a small way” would be sufficient if there had been a substantial improvement by the joint efforts of both spouses: Koh Angela at [24].

43 In BUX at [16], Ong J cited Professor Leong Wai Kum in Elements of Family Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd edition, 2018) at para 16.133, where she opined that the flexible approach adopted in Koh Angela is sensible, because:

44 I agree with Ong J’s analysis as set out in BUX. Though the Wife’s stated activities in [E] could only be said to have contributed in a small way, it would nevertheless suffice, since the Husband had also exerted effort to improve [E] and this asset can be regarded as having been substantially improved by both parties to the marriage. It was not the Husband’s position that there was no improvement to [E]. The Wife also highlighted that the 2021/2022 financial statements for [E] shows an improvement from losses to profits, and that this showed that at least for this period where she received financial statements, there was improvement in the business. ⁴⁵

45 I therefore include [E] in the pool.

46 I turn next to the valuation of [B], [E] and [F] (“Singapore Companies”). The Husband agrees with the Wife’s valuation of the Husband’s interests or shareholdings in the Singapore Companies at a total of $4,157,713. ⁴⁶ This valuation was conducted by Chay Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd (“CCA”). Nevertheless, given that [E] was incorporated prior to the marriage, I was of the view that the value that should be attributed to it should only include the difference in its value now and its value prior to the marriage, in line with the approach in BUX at [24]. There, the High Court, in assessing the value of a transformed asset, took into consideration the difference in the value of shares in a company at the time of marriage and the time of the ancillary matters hearing.

47 Leave was hence given to the Husband to file the financial statements of [E] as of 2005, so that CCA can in turn assess the difference in the value now and its value prior to the marriage. However, the Husband subsequently updated the Court that the financial statements of [E] as of 2005 are no longer available, as the company’s accounting firm only keeps the accounts for five to seven years. ⁴⁷

48 In the absence of financial data from [E], and in view of the Husband’s earlier agreement to the Wife’s valuation of the Singapore Companies, I accept the Wife’s valuation of [E], as contained in CCA’s valuation of the Singapore Companies.

49 After the Husband updated that the financial statements of [E] as of 2005 are no longer available, the Wife attempted to submit a revised standalone valuation of [F], that led to a substantial increase in the valuation of the Singapore Companies, at $5,470,139. However, CCA had valued the Singapore Companies together, in its report, at $4,157,713. The Wife eventually agreed to abide by CCA’s valuation of the Singapore Companies as a whole, as set out in its report, given the Husband’s agreement to CCA’s valuation. ⁴⁸ I therefore adopt CCA’s valuation of the Singapore companies, [B], [E] and [F], at $4,157,713.

50 The Wife submits that the $5,012,512 owed by [E] to the Husband ought to be notionally returned to the matrimonial pool of assets for division. ⁴⁹ The Husband does not dispute the quantum of the debt but argues that [E] would not be able to pay this sum. They were lent as investment moneys. If the debt is paid to the Husband, then the value of [E] would be depleted. ⁵⁰

51 When queried, counsel for the Husband informed that CCA’s valuation of [E] already accounts for this liability to the Husband. ⁵¹ There is hence no reduction in the valuation of [E], even if the debt was repaid by [E]. While the Husband claims that [E] would not be able to repay this sum, he is the sole director and shareholder of [E], and he could but did not provide any documents to indicate its inability to repay.

52 I therefore include this sum in the pool of matrimonial assets as part of the Husband’s assets.

53 I next discuss the debt owed by [F] to the Husband. A significant component of [F]’s negative equity is made up of “Amounts due to directors” of $906,234. ⁵² The Husband is the sole director of [F]. ⁵³ The Wife submits that this debt ought to be notionally returned to the pool of matrimonial assets. The Husband submitted that as [F] is reflected as having current liabilities of $1.3m, it would not be able to repay this debt of $906,234 to the Husband. The Wife in turn, pointed out that the “Property, Plant and Equipment” of [F] is assessed as $203,051 and it also has current assets of $1,169,799. In addition, the financial statements were prepared on the basis of [F] continuing as a going concern, as “the director believes that there is no significant uncertainty of the Company’s liability to continue as a going concern”. ⁵⁴

54 While the Husband submitted that some of the current assets, such as trade payables, may not be received, there is no evidence to suggest that. The only one who could provide such evidence is the Husband, and he has not. On the whole, there is no evidence that [F] will be unable to pay off the debt it owes to the Husband. The debt in the amount of $906,234, should hence be included in the pool of matrimonial assets as part of the Husband’s assets.

55 There is no dispute between parties that [G] should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets, but the value of [G] is disputed. The Wife initially submitted that the share capital of [G], being $98,888, should be included in the pool, as proxy for its value. ⁵⁵

56 The Husband submitted that this value should be nil, as this is a new company and has been losing money since incorporation. The Wife responded that no documentary evidence has been produced in support of this.

57 Leave was given to the Husband to provide financial statements from [G], from which CCA can carry out a valuation. The Husband subsequently informed that the only financial statement in respect of [G] is for the year ending 2024. This showed a net loss after income tax of $265,350. ⁵⁶ The Husband testified that the company’s last business was renting a coffee shop and subletting food and drinks stalls. The lease for the coffee shop has been returned to JTC. ⁵⁷ The Wife then adduced a valuation report from CCA stating that based on the financial statement, the fair value of [G] based on the asset-based approach is approximately $1. The Wife adopted the value of [G] as stated in the CCA valuation, at $1. ⁵⁸

58 I accept CCA’s valuation of [G] at $1 and include [G] in the pool of matrimonial assets at that value.

59 CCA’s valuation of [G] was based on [G]’s financial statement for the year ending 2024, which reflected “Amounts due to director” in the amount of $352,744. ⁵⁹ The Husband is the sole director of [G]. ⁶⁰ The Wife submits that this debt is a chose in action that can be treated as a matrimonial asset under s 112(10) of the WC and should be included in the pool. ⁶¹

60 The financial statement shows that out of the total assets of $318,963, some $163,606 are in non-current assets such as air condition, kitchen equipment and renovation, which would be difficult to realise. There are however, current assets in the amount of $155,357. The Wife accepted the Husband’s argument that the other liabilities of [G] should also be considered, and was prepared to accept that as [G] is near insolvency, the other liabilities should be treated notionally as ranking pari passu with the loan to the Husband. The notional amount of the Husband’s loan to be added back, should hence be based on his share of the current liabilities, which is about 72%, or about $112,893.34. I will therefore include the debt owing from [G] to the Husband, in the amount of $112,893.34, in the pool of matrimonial assets as part of the Husband’s assets.

61 The Wife submits that Property 3 which was purchased by the Husband in 2019 and placed in her sole name, ⁶² should be excluded, as it was intended to be a gift to her. She relies on a handwritten note in Mandarin, which she claims is written by the Husband, stating that he gave Property 3 to her as he did not provide a dowry when he married her. ⁶³

62 The translation of the note does not say that the Husband intended to gift Property 3 to the Wife but only goes so far as to say that “I don’t have the money to pay the dowry (I did not give)”. ⁶⁴

63 Even if the Husband did gift Property 3 to the Wife, that does not mean that it is to be excluded from the matrimonial pool of assets. In CLT v CLS [2021] SGHCF 29 (“CLT”) at [54], Ong J held:

64 The court in CLT at [44]–[45] referred to both Tan Hwee Lee v Tan Cheng Guan [2012] 4 SLR 785 and Wan Lai Cheng v Quek Seow Kee [2012] 4 SLR 405 (“Wan Lai Cheng”). There, the courts stated that the general position is that inter-spousal gifts of assets which do not originate from third party gifts or inheritance are not gifts for the purpose of s 112(10) of the WC. The court in Wan Lai Cheng stated at [115] that unless a donor spouse clearly intends to permanently renounce his or her beneficial interest in the asset transferred, then the donor spouse “may be estopped from claiming any share in the asset when the court exercises its discretion [to] equitably [distribute] the pool of matrimonial assets”.

65 In this case, even taking the Wife’s case as its highest, the handwritten note does not evince an intention of the Husband to permanently renounce his beneficial interest in the property. It does not even say that Property 3 was intended as an inter-spousal gift. I therefore include this in the pool of matrimonial assets.

66 There are also assets that the Wife submits should notionally be returned to the matrimonial pool of assets as they had been disposed of in the period where divorce proceedings were imminent.

67 This is based on the principle set out in TNL at [24], that where a substantial sum was expended by one spouse during the period in which divorce proceedings are imminent or after interim judgment but before the ancillaries are concluded, such sum must be returned to the asset pool if the other spouse is considered to have at least a putative interest in it and has not agreed, whether expressly or impliedly, to the expenditure either before it was incurred or at any subsequent time. I refer to this principle as the “TNL dicta”.

68 The Wife submits that the proceeds from the sale of the Husband’s Chinese company [H], minus expenses, in the sum of RMB 59m, should be notionally returned to the pool of matrimonial assets. ⁶⁵

69 The Husband submits that his shares in [H] are pre-marital assets as they were acquired about nine years before the marriage and the Wife has not made substantial improvements to [H]. ⁶⁶ He does not dispute the valuation at RMB 59m. ⁶⁷

70 The Wife states that she generally assisted the Husband with the accounts of the businesses. She made various advertisements for the business to market the businesses, increase visibility and attract more customers. She also arranged to settle contractual terms to rent a building owned by [H] in 2004 before the marriage, and the lease was renewed in 2008. ⁶⁸

71 As the sale of [H] took place two weeks before the writ of divorce was filed, the TNL dicta would apply, if the shares of [H] are regarded as a matrimonial asset.

72 There is no dispute that the Husband acquired the shares of [H] nine years before marriage. The shares would nevertheless be regarded as matrimonial asset if the Wife is able to show that they have “been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by both parties to the marriage” pursuant to s 112(10)(a)(ii) of the WC. This sets out two requirements. First, the asset must have been “substantially improved”. Second, the Wife has to show that she or both parties contributed to such improvement of the asset.

73 In respect of the first requirement, it is the Husband’s evidence that he invested $3m in 1996 and sold it for far more in 2023, for RMB 64.6m (or about $12.2m). ⁶⁹ Given the sizeable quantum of appreciation, it is likely that the value of the [H] shares continued to appreciate during the long period of 18 years, from the time of the parties’ marriage in 2005, to when [H] was sold in 2023. It is not contended by the Husband that there was no substantial improvement in the asset. Rather the contention is that the Wife has not made substantial improvements to [H]. ⁷⁰

74 In respect of this, I accept that on the balance of the evidence, the Wife was involved in the business of [H]. There is evidence that the Wife received employment income from [H]. ⁷¹ The Husband was not able to explain why she received such income, if as he contended, she was not working there. In this case, she contributed more than she had for [E], as she was also involved in the renewal of a lease in 2008. Furthermore, following BUX, even if the Wife’s activities in [H] could only be said to have contributed in a small way, it would nevertheless suffice, since the Husband has also exerted effort to improve [H]. This asset can thus be regarded as having been substantially improved by both parties to the marriage. Consequently, I will include this in the pool of matrimonial assets.

75 The Wife submits that the Husband has not accounted for the proceeds from the sale of the Singapore properties in the period leading up to and during the divorce proceedings. These include:

(a) Property 4, which was sold on 14 November 2017 for $1.35m;

(b) Property 5, which was sold on 16 May 2018 for $1.398m; and

(c) Property 6, which was sold on 17 February 2023 for $960,000.

76 These three properties are no longer assets held by parties. Property 4 and Property 5 were sold in 2017 and 2018. While the Wife submitted that the sale of these properties took place in the lead up to the divorce proceedings, there is no evidence to suggest that divorce proceedings were imminent then. Counsel for the Wife informed that the breakdown took place in 2019. ⁷²

77 Property 6 was sold on 17 February 2023. The writ of divorce was filed on 13 December 2022. As the sale of Property 6 took place after the divorce proceedings had commenced, the TNL dicta would apply. While counsel for the Husband informed the court at the hearing that the sale proceeds from Property 6 had been paid into the bank account of [B], ⁷³ the Husband subsequently confirmed to the Court that the Property 6 sale proceeds were not paid into [B]’s account. ⁷⁴ The sale proceeds from Property 6, in the amount of $960,000, should hence be included in the pool of matrimonial assets.

78 Following from the above assessment, the pool of matrimonial assets is set out below.

79 The Wife submits that she has satisfied the test in UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 (“UZN”) for adverse inference, in that she has shown that there is: (a) a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case against the Husband; and (b) that the Husband must have had some particular access to the information he was said to be hiding, in respect of various properties and assets (UZN at [18]). These are set out below: ⁷⁵

(a) For the Suzhou Land: the Wife produced an agreement entitled “State Land Use Rights and Leasing Agreement”, which allows the Husband to develop the Suzhou Land for commercial purposes and profit from the same. She submits that he did not provide a reply to this.

(b) For the Amber Road Property: the Wife produced the transfer instrument for the property, which was purchased sometime in 2009 (during the marriage) and is owned by the Husband’s ex-wife. The Husband did not provide any reply on this issue.

(c) For Chinese company [J]: the Wife provided a report prepared by her Chinese solicitors, which discloses that the Husband has interests in [J]. The Husband claimed he ceased having interests in [J] ten years ago. Subsequently, he claimed that [J] “ceased business 20 years ago”. This, however, does not address whether he continues to have any interest thereto.

(d) For the Hola Centre Property. The Wife provided a handwritten document titled “Re: Purchase of Unit #XX-XX Hola Centre at XX Ubi Crescent”, which reflects a profit-sharing arrangement between the Husband and Company X for the Hola Centre Property. The Husband claimed that “this property was sold about 20 years ago” and that this property was “purchased by [his] [c]ompany”. From the face of this agreement, the Husband signed it in his sole name and not in his capacity as a representative of a company. Furthermore, no evidence has been provided to show that Hola Centre Property had been sold.

(e) China Construction Bank Accounts (“CCB Accounts”). The Wife produced statements from China Construction Bank, reflecting that the Husband has in his name various CCB Accounts. The Husband claims to not operate the other accounts, despite the documentary evidence showing otherwise.

(f) OCBC Trading Account No. XXXX. The Wife produced statements from OCBC Securities dated 17 May 2023, showing that the Husband held or holds this trading account. The Husband claimed that he “do [sic] not have such an account”, before claiming that the “SGX securities account is connected” to the trading account.

(g) Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, CIMB Bank, OCBC Bank, and POSB Bank accounts. The Wife produced a photograph of the Husband’s bank cards with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, CIMB Bank, OCBC Bank, and POSB Bank, which prima facie shows that the Husband has accounts with these banks. The Husband claims that he does not operate these accounts, despite the evidence showing otherwise. The Wife submits that it is implausible for the Husband to have such bank cards without a corresponding account.

(h) Shenyin Wangguo Securities Account No. XXXX. The Wife produced a statement of accounts from Shenyin Wanguo Securities, bearing the Husband’s name. The Husband claims that “no account exist [sic]” despite the documentary evidence produced by the Wife.

(i) Substantial withdrawals from his Maybank Account. The Wife sought interrogatories on transactions that the Husband made from his Maybank Account. Some of the transactions are over S$100,000. The Husband claims that they were “[B] Expenses or other business expenses” without more.

(j) Disposal of two units at 2 Sims Close (“Sims Close Properties”). The Wife had discovered the disposal of the Sims Close Properties, which was initially owned by [E], but was then sold to Company [Y] in August 2020, for a sum of $3.78m in total. No evidence of the whereabouts of these funds was provided. The Husband did not provide any reply to this issue.

80 The Wife submits that an uplift of 10% should be factored into the final ratio, to take into account the Husband’s failure to comply with his disclosure obligations. ⁷⁶ The Husband submits that he has declared all his assets and adverse inference should not be drawn.

81 For an adverse inference to be drawn, it must be shown, firstly, that there is a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case of concealment against the Husband.

(a) The property at [79(b)] is owned by the Husband’s ex-wife. There is no evidence that the Husband was involved in its purchase or has an interest in it. Thus, he could not be said to be hiding something in respect of this.

(b) For [79(c)], the Wife relies on a report prepared by her Chinese solicitors to submit that the Husband has interests in [J]. The report she referred to only states that the Husband has 100% shareholding of Company [K]. ⁷⁷ This is a different company from [J]. Another document relied on only contains a statement from the Wife’s lawyers in China alleging that the Husband has 100% share in the company, but the statement has not been supported by any evidence to show how the solicitors arrived at their statement. ⁷⁸ Thus, it could not be said that there is a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case of concealment from the Husband in respect of this.

82 To satisfy the test for adverse inference, the Husband must be said to be hiding information: UZN at [18]. The Wife confirmed that no further discovery was sought in respect of items (a), (d) and (j). ⁷⁹ Hence, the Husband could not be said to be hiding something for these items.

83 The Wife’s position is that further discovery was sought in respect of items (f) and (i). Counsel for the Husband sought and obtained leave to confirm that the Husband did not respond to these discovery requests. His reply did not indicate that he responded to any of them. ⁸⁰

84 For items (e) and (h), given that the Husband’s response to the statement of transactions was to deny having accounts with those banks, ⁸¹ I accept that there was no further disclosure that the Wife could seek. The transaction statements show a prima facie case that the Husband had such bank accounts.

85 For item (g), it is only certain bank cards which could indicate the existence of bank accounts. ⁸² Where the images are of credit cards, it is possible for a party to have credit cards with a bank without having a corresponding banking account. Out of the three cards exhibited, there are two which could indicate the existence of bank accounts.

86 In summary, the Wife has shown that an adverse inference ought to be drawn in respect of the items at [79] (e), (f), parts of (g), (h) and (i), but not for those at [79] items (a)–(d), parts of (g), and (j).

87 As it is not possible to quantify the value of the undisclosed accounts, I accept the Wife’s submission that the uplift approach be adopted.

88  Although the Wife had initially sought an uplift of 10%, at the hearing, in response to the court’s question about the exceptionally large asset pool size and the assumption that adverse inferences may be limited to the Husband’s bank accounts and securities, counsel for the Wife responded that an uplift of 7% should still be considered, as there are other business and rentals in China that have not been accounted for. The Husband informed that he would leave the quantum of uplift, on the basis of the more limited adverse inferences indicated, to the court.

89 In TYS v TYT [2017] 5 SLR 244, the court observed at [45] in respect of the quantum of adverse inference uplift, that much would depend on the facts, and in determining the appropriate uplift, the court will be guided by, inter alia, the evidence before it as to the extent of non-disclosure relative to the value of the disclosed assets.

90 In assessing the uplift to be ordered, I took into consideration the following. First, the Wife had sought an uplift of 10%, on the back of the full list of adverse inferences that she had submitted on. ⁸³ However, as I have found above, out of the full list, the lack of disclosures relate mainly to certain bank accounts and securities. Second, the items for which I rejected the Wife’s claims for an adverse inference, which include several properties, from which the Wife submits there were substantial sums undisclosed. Third, the uplift quantum should take into consideration: (a) the nature of the undisclosed assets (mainly bank and securities accounts) and (b) that the disclosed assets form an exceptionally large asset pool. Fourth, while the Wife submits that there were other businesses and rentals from China that have not been disclosed to the court and that these should be taken into account in assessing the uplift quantum, the Wife has not established a basis for finding an adverse inference in respect of these alleged assets. Consequently, they should not be considered. Taking into account the above, I find that it would be fair to award an uplift of 2% in favour of the Wife in the final ratio.

91 The Wife submits that the framework set out by the Court of Appeal in TNL should apply. In WXW v WXX [2025] SGHC(A) 2 (“WXW”), the Appellate Division of the High Court clarified that there were two requirements for its application. Both have been met. The first is that the marriage is long. The second is that the marriage is “along more traditional lines, ie, where one spouse is the sole income earner and the other plays the role of homemaker”: at [12].

92 In this case, the Wife is the caregiver for the children, and the Husband was primarily the breadwinner. While the Wife helped out in the Husband’s Businesses and was instrumental in the growth and development of the same, this does not displace her primary role at home. The Husband takes the view that “I was the sole breadwinner while the [Wife] was a full-time housewife”. ⁸⁴

93 The Husband’s position, as set out in the joint summary, is that the TNL framework did not apply and that the structured approach in ANJ applies instead. He submits that this is because the Wife took the position that she was also working. However, it has been held in DBA v DBB [2024] 1 SLR 459 (“DBA”) at [12]–[13] that TNL envisaged a single income marriage as one where one spouse is primarily the homemaker who might work intermittently over the course of marriage. On the evidence, the Wife could only be said to be working intermittently, and she was primarily a homemaker. When queried on his response to such authorities, counsel for the Husband informed that that it is clear in DBA and he left it to the court. ⁸⁵

94 I am satisfied that the marriage here is suitably long and that the Wife was the primary homemaker while the husband was the primary breadwinner. The Wife’s work was at the most intermittent. In light of this, TNL is the applicable framework in respect of the division of matrimonial assets.

95 The Husband submits that for the following transformed assets, namely the Matrimonial Property, China Property 1 and China Property 2, they were not substantially improved on by the Wife. Such assets should be attributed 70% weightage for direct contributions. ⁸⁶ For the undisputed assets, there should be equal weightage between direct and indirect contributions. For indirect contributions, the ratio should be 60:40 in favour of the Husband.

96 The Matrimonial Property is the parties’ matrimonial home. It falls under s 112(10)(a)(i) of the WC and would be considered a quintessential matrimonial asset based on the classes of assets set out by the Court of Appeal in USB.

97 China Property 1 and China Property 2 are assets in the parties’ joint names, acquired after their marriage. They are matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112(10)(b) of the WC, and do not require substantial improvement to acquire status as matrimonial assets.

98 There is hence no basis for the Husband’s submission to apply differentiated classification to these properties. Moreover, under the TNL approach, there is no distinction between direct and indirect contributions. While the court in TNC v TND [2016] 3 SLR 1172 (“TNC”) applied the classification methodology, this was in the context of applying the ANJ framework, where there is consideration of direct and indirect contributions: at [42]–[44]. The Husband has not surfaced any authority where the classification methodology is applied in the context of the TNL framework.

99 Even though I have found above that the TNL framework applies, I considered, for completeness, parties’ submissions under the ANJ framework.

100 If the Court were to decide that the ANJ framework applies, the Wife does not dispute that the direct contributions towards the assets are mostly made by the Husband. She testified that her husband “had solely contributed” to the assets solely owned by her and their joint assets, save for the monies in her CPF account. ⁸⁷ Under the ANJ framework it is not disputed that the Husband’s share of direct contributions is 99.9% and the Wife’s is 0.1%. ⁸⁸

101 The Wife submits that her indirect contributions to the family are substantial. but the Wife submits that should the court decide that the ANJ framework apply, she should be entitled to 80% of indirect contributions as she: (a) is the primary caregiver of the children; (b) put in substantial effort in fulfilling her spousal duties; (c) was in charge of maintaining the matrimonial home and improving the living conditions for the family; (d) put in substantial effort towards the Husband’s family members and/or children from another marriage. ⁸⁹

102 In response, the Husband’s highlighted his indirect financial contributions. He stated that his contributions to the children are mainly in terms of financial contributions to the children’s maintenance, family holidays and paying for domestic helpers to assist with the care of the children. ⁹⁰ His non‑financial contributions to the children are stated as ferrying the children around, especially before the Wife obtained her driving licence, spending time with the children whenever he was not working and caring for the children with the help of the domestic helpers when the Wife went to visit her family in China. ⁹¹ On the Husband’s own evidence, he had relatively limited involvement in the lives of the children.

103 Neither party substantially disputes the other party’s claim as to what their contributions are.

104 On the evidence, I find that the Husband was responsible for almost all the direct contributions and indirect financial contributions, while the Wife was the primary person who provided caregiving to the children and was responsible for maintaining the home.

105 In TNL, the Court of Appeal observed that in long single-income marriages, the precedent cases show that our courts tend towards an equal division of the matrimonial assets: at [48]. In BOR v BOS [2018] SGCA 78, the Court of Appeal observed at [113] that the trend in “moderately lengthy marriages” (around 15–18 years) was towards awarding the homemaker wife about 35% to 40% of the matrimonial assets.

106 In Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy [2011] 2 SLR 1157 (“Yeo Chong Lin”), the Court of Appeal upheld a 65:35 ratio in favour of the husband who was in a single income marriage of 49 years: at [83]. The asset pool was approximately $69m (at [71]) and all of it was accrued by his effort. In TNL, the Court of Appeal observed that in Yeo Chong Lin the asset pool was exceptionally large: at [52].

107 The Husband cited VIG v VIH [2021] 3 SLR 1145 (“VIG”) and CLS v CLT [2022] 2 SLR 1043 (“CLS”). VIG involved a 12-year single income marriage. The High Court awarded a ratio of 70:30 in favour of the husband where there was an exceptionally large pool of matrimonial assets (about $36.8m) and where all or most of it was earned by one party's efforts: at [71]–[76]. In CLS, which involved a 17-year single income marriage, the Appellate Division of the High Court upheld a ratio of 70:30 in favour of the husband where there was an exceptionally large pool of matrimonial assets (about $42.3m) and where all or most of it was earned by one party's efforts: at [77] and [82].

108 The Wife highlighted UYD v UYE [2019] SGHCF 20 (“UYD”) and UKA v UKB [2018] 4 SLR 779 (“UKA”). UYD involved a marriage of 26 years and had a matrimonial asset pool of around $34m. The court noted the relatively large size of the asset pool but ordered distribution in the ratio of 55:45 in favour of the husband: at [58]. UKA involved a marriage of almost 28 years and an asset pool of $34m. The court divided the assets on a 50:50 basis: at [84]. While the Wife also cited DBA, that is of limited assistance here, as it did not involve an exceptionally large asset pool, with the asset pool estimated at over $7m: at [28].

109 The marriage here is not as long as that in Yeo Chong Lin nor is the asset pool as large. In UYD, the court noted evidence of contributions from the wife to [X] Pte Ltd from her own accounts in the initial periods: at [57]. [X] Pte Ltd formed a substantial part of the asset pool. Similarly, in UKA, the court noted that while the husband’s breadwinning contributions were very substantial, both parties played a part in the company, which they jointly owned, and the wife had controlled the finances of the company as its accounts and finance manager: at [27]. The wife was assessed to have made 20% of direct contributions if the ANJ structured approach was followed.

110 In contrast, most of the assets here were earned through the Husband’s efforts. Counsel for the Wife orally submitted that the facts here are distinguished from those in cases such as UYD and UKA, because of the Wife’s tremendous assistance, especially to the businesses in China. However, this goes against the grain of what the Wife had submitted and testified to, that the Husband “had solely contributed” to the assets solely owned by her and their joint assets, save for the monies in her CPF account. ⁹² In addition, even taking the Wife’s account of her contributions to the Husband’s business in China and companies such as [E] and [H] at its highest (see above at [44] and [74]), her contributions to the acquisition of the assets are still relatively limited when compared to that of the wives in UYD and UKA.

111 Thus, VIG and CLS are more apposite points of reference for this case.

(a) The assets here (about $47m) are more than that in VIG (about $36.8m) and CLS (about $42.3m). The asset pool here would be considered exceptionally large.

(b) The bulk of the assets in all three cases, were earned by the working spouse; see above at [100]. There is however, a point of distinction. In VIG, there was no suggestion that beyond her role as homemaker, the wife contributed to the business which formed the asset pool. The husband had been the CEO of company [X] and it was recognised that this was not a family business and the wife had never worked for company [X]: at [68(e)]. In CLS, the wife had not worked during the marriage. This was observed by the High Court in CLT at [67] and undisturbed on appeal. In this case however, while the Wife did not hold any position in the Husband’s businesses, she testified that she helped the Husband, in particular with his businesses in China, drawing on her mastery of the language and her contacts. ⁹³ This ranged from reviewing documents, procuring consumers and lessees, doing market and investment research, and speaking with external parties. The Husband denied these contributions, but he did not address the detailed examples raised by the Wife ⁹⁴ . On balance, I accept the Wife’s testimony that she contributed informally to the Husband’s businesses in China. Bearing this in mind, while the Wife’s contributions to the Husband’s businesses are much less than those of the wife in UYD and UKA, the Wife made more contributions to the acquisition of the assets than the wives in VIG and CLS. This is a factor which I will take into consideration in the assessment of the ratio, and which justifies a departure from the 70:30 ratio awarded in favour of the husband in VIG and CLS.

(c) The marriage here (18 years) is longer than that in VIG (12 years) and slightly longer than that in CLS (17 years).

(d) The Husband’s contributions to the family here are comparable to those found of the husband in VIG or CLS. In VIG, the court only noted that the husband was involved in the children’s lives (at [75]). In CLT, the High Court found that “the [h]usband was not absent in the children’s lives despite his work schedule as a successful businessman” (at [77]). Similarly, it could be said that the Husband here was not absent in the children’s lives despite his work as a businessman. In oral submissions, counsel for the Wife submitted that this case should be distinguished as the Husband abused his daughter. This was not mentioned in her written submissions, and counsel acknowledged that these allegations of abuse are not set out in documentary evidence.

112 Taking into consideration the precedents and the facts of this case, in my view, a just and equitable division of the matrimonial assets is 65:35 in favour of the Husband.

113 After taking into consideration the uplift of 2% to the Wife for the adverse inferences drawn against the Husband, the Husband is awarded 63% and the Wife is awarded 37% of the matrimonial assets. If parties are unable to agree on costs, they are to file written submissions on costs, one week from this Judgment.